TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
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NL-6827 AV Arnhem
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The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
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Version
2022-02
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Certification Report
HIDApp-eDoc suite - eIDAS eSign Application Version 3_00
Sponsor and developer: HID Global S.p.A.
Viale Remo De Feo 1
80122 Arzano (NA)
Itlay
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0490187-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0490187
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 05 September 2023
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
HIDApp-eDoc suite - eIDAS eSign Application Version 3_00. The developer of the HIDApp-eDoc suite
- eIDAS eSign Application Version 3_00 is HID Global S.p.A. located in Arzano, Italy and they also act
as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist
prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their
particular requirements.
The TOE is composite product made up of the application “HIDApp-eDoc suite - eIDAS eSign
Application” in composition with the already certified Smart Card operating system “NXP JCOP 4” and
“NXP P71” Integrated Circuit and Crypto Library.
The HIDApp-eDoc suite eIDAS eSign Applet provides qualified signature features (QSCD). The
qualified signature features are compliant with the eIDAS Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and the
according Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/650, repealing the European Parliament
Directive 1999/93/EC. The eIDAS eSign application is also compliant to the BSI TR-03110-2 and TR
Signature creation and administration for eIDAS token.
The TOE is delivered in phase 2 to the Card manufacturer as a microcontroller module which is ready
to be embedded into a Smart Card or document booklet with the antenna and substrate, which are
outside the physical boundaries of the TOE.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 05 September 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the HIDApp-eDoc suite - eIDAS eSign Application
Version 3_00, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at
which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the HIDApp-eDoc
suite - eIDAS eSign Application Version 3_00 are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5: augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of
security measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the HIDApp-eDoc suite - eIDAS eSign Application
Version 3_00 from HID Global S.p.A. located in Arzano, Italy.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC
Dedicated Software and Crypto Library
(R1/R2/R3/R4)
(Certification ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V3)
B1
Platform
NXP JCOP 4 Operating System, configuration
Banking & Secure ID
(Certification ID: NSCIB- CC-180212-5MA1)
JCOP 4 P71 v4.7
R1.01.4
Software HIDApp-eDoc suite eIDAS eSign Application 3_00
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the HIDApp-eDoc
suite - eIDAS eSign Application Version 3_00. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this
report.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a contact or contactless based integrated circuit chip comprised of all IT security
functionality necessary to ensure the secrecy of the SCD and the security of the electronic signature
and deciphered data. The TOE is delivered to the Card manufacturer in Phase 2 as a microcontroller
module which is ready to be embedded into a Smart Card or document booklet with the antenna and
substrate, which are outside the physical boundaries of the TOE.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that EN 419221-5 Protection Profile [EN419221-5] claims the environment for the TOE protects
against loss or theft of the TOE, deters and detects physical tampering, protects against attacks based
on emanations of the TOE, and protects against unauthorised software and configuration changes on
the TOE and the hardware appliance in which it is contained (“OE.Env Protected operating
environment”).
The ST follows the PP and also claims OE.Env, thus the environment in which the TOE is used must
ensure the above protection.
Any threats violating these objectives for the environment are not considered.
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2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is composed of the following elements.
• NXP P71 microcontroller including the firmware for booting and low level functionality of the
microcontroller e.g. writing to flash memory as well as software for implementing cryptographic
operations called Crypto Library.
• NXP JCOP 4 Java Card platform, which can be split into the following components:
o Software for implementing a Java Card Virtual Machine, a Java Card Runtime
Environment and a Java Card Application Programming Interface.
o Software for implementing content management according to GlobalPlatform called
GlobalPlatform Framework.
o Software for executing native libraries, called Secure Box.
• The applet, which is the eIDAS eSign application compliant with the eIDAS Regulation [EU-
REG].
• The associated guidance documentation.
The TOE architecture can be depicted as follows:
The TOE implements the following security features.
• Authentication by means of a PACE authentication; Extended Access Control version 2
authentication, composed by Terminal Authentication version 2 and Chip Authentication [EU-
REG] for this TOE, HIDApp-eDoc suite eIDAS eSign Application.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Initialization Guidance for HIDApp-eDoc suite 1.4
Personalization Guidance for HIDApp-eDoc suite – eIDAS eSign
Application
1.6
Operational User Guidance for HIDApp-eDoc suite – eIDAS eSign
Application
1.5
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
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2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification and subsystems. The
testing coverage and depth was achieved by implementing groups of tests to cover the functionalities
provided by this TOE. Each group was run by a particular set of tools to verify the relevant behaviour.
The results of tests were a pass. Where a pass result was not obtained the developer explained why
the result was produced. The evaluators analysed the results and explanations and concluded that the
results were consistent with the outcomes. The Evaluator also confirmed that all TSF subsystems and
all modules in the TOE design were tested.
The sample of tests selected for repetition by the evaluators were chosen so that various aspects of
the TOE functionality would be covered and seen.
The evaluator created additional test cases to confirm verification of the version of the TOE, and to
examine crucial functionality of the TOE.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considered
whether potential vulnerabilities could already be identified due to the TOE type and/or
specified behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE was analysed using the
knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of
(additional) potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis, this was performed according to the
attack methods in [JIL-AP]. An important source for assurance in this step was the technical
report [JCOP-ETRfC] of the underlying platform.
• All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities were not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities were
addressed by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed
appropriate.
The test effort expended by the evaluators was 5 weeks. During that test campaign, 20% of the total
time was spent on perturbation attacks and 80% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST].
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused by
composition.
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2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number HIDApp-eDoc suite - eIDAS eSign
Application Version 3_00.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and Site Technical Audit Report(s) for the site(s)
[STAR] 2.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the HIDApp-eDoc suite - eIDAS
eSign Application Version 3_00, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant and to meet the
requirements of EAL 5 This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in
Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profiles [PP2], [PP4] and [PP5]
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None
2 The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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3 Security Target
The HIDApp-eDoc suite Security Target eIDAS eSign Application,TCAE210003, Version 1.5, 29 May
2023 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AA Active Authentication
BAC Basic Access Control
EAC Extended Access Control
eIDAS electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
QSCD Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Device
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “HIDApp-eDoc suite v3_00” – EAL4+/5+, 22-RPT-
805, Version 3.0, 22 June 2023
[PF-CERT] Certification Report JCOP 4 P71, NSCIB-CC-180212-CR5, Version 1, 26
September 2022
[PF-ETRfC] SGS Brightsight B.V., 19-RPT-177 v14.0, Evaluation Technical Report for
Composition NXP “JCOP 4 P71” – EAL6+, 14 September 2022
[PF-MAINT] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report JCOP 4 P71, NSCIB-CC-180212-
5MA1, Version 1, 23 January 2023
[PF-ST] JCOP 4 P71, Security Target Lite for JCOP 4 P71 / SE050, Rev. 4.11, 2023-
01-03
[EU-REG] REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust
services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing
Directive 1999/93/EC
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November 2022
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP2] Protection profiles for secure signature creation device, Part 2: Device with Key
Generation, version 2.0.1, EN 419211-2:2013 (certificate BSI-CC-PP-0059-
2009- MA-02)
[PP4] Protection profiles for secure signature creation device, Part 4: Extension for
device with key generation and trusted communication with certificate
generation application, version 1.0.1, EN 419211-4:2013 (certificate BSI-CC-
PP-0071-2012-MA- 01)
[PP5] Protection profiles for secure signature creation device, Part 5: Extension for
device with key generation and trusted communication with signature creation
application, version 1.0.1, EN 419211-5:2013 (certificate BSI-CC-PP-0072-
2012-MA- 01)
[ST] HIDApp-eDoc suite Security Target eIDAS eSign Application,TCAE210003,
Version 1.5, 29 May 2023
[ST-lite] HIDApp-eDoc suite Security Target eIDAS eSign Application, TCLE210006,
Version 1.1, 29 May 2023
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[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
[STAR] Site Technical Audit Report - HID Global Arzano, 22-RPT-240, Version 1.0, 22
June 2023
(This is the end of this report.)