CRP-C0556-01
Certification Report
Tatsuo Tomita, Chairman
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan
Target of Evaluation (TOE)
Application Date/ID 2016-10-12 (ITC-6615)
Certification No. C0556
Sponsor Canon Inc.
TOE Name Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C35900KG/C3500
Series 2600 model
TOE Version 1.0
PP Conformance U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S.
Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices
Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2™-2009)
Assurance Package EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Developer Canon Inc.
Evaluation Facility ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE is certified as
follows.
2017-06-14
Takumi Yamasato, Technical Manager
Information Security Certification Office
IT Security Center
Technology Headquarters
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following
standards prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme Document."
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 4
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 4
Evaluation Result: Pass
"Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C35900KG/C3500 Series 2600 model" has
been evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the
provisions of the "Requirements for IT Security Certification" by
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified
assurance requirements.
CRP-C0556-01
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report
published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security
Evaluation and Certification Scheme.
CRP-C0556-01
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ............................................................................... 1
1.1 Product Overview ............................................................................ 1
1.1.1 Assurance Package ........................................................................ 1
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality ...................................................... 1
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives ................................................... 1
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions .................................................... 2
1.1.3 Disclaimers .................................................................................. 2
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation ...................................................................... 2
1.3 Certification ................................................................................... 2
2. Identification ....................................................................................... 3
3. Security Policy...................................................................................... 5
3.1 Security Function Policies ................................................................. 6
3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies ............................................ 6
3.1.1.1 Threats ..................................................................................... 6
3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats ..................................... 6
3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies .......... 7
3.1.2.1 Organisational Security Policies ................................................... 7
3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies to Organisational Security Policies .......... 8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope .................................................. 10
4.1 Usage Assumptions ........................................................................ 10
4.2 Environmental Assumptions ............................................................ 10
4.3 Clarification of Scope ..................................................................... 13
5. Architectural Information .................................................................... 14
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components ....................................................... 14
5.2 IT Environment ............................................................................. 15
6. Documentation ................................................................................... 16
7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results .......................... 17
7.1 Evaluation Facility ........................................................................ 17
7.2 Evaluation Approach ...................................................................... 17
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity ....................................................... 17
7.4 IT Product Testing ......................................................................... 17
7.4.1 Developer Testing ....................................................................... 18
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing ..................................................... 20
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing ...................................................... 24
7.5 Evaluated Configuration ................................................................. 26
7.6 Evaluation Results......................................................................... 26
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations ............................................ 27
8. Certification ....................................................................................... 28
CRP-C0556-01
8.1 Certification Result........................................................................ 28
8.2 Recommendations .......................................................................... 29
9. Annexes............................................................................................. 30
10. Security Target ................................................................................ 30
11. Glossary.......................................................................................... 31
12. Bibliography .................................................................................... 33
CRP-C0556-01
1
1. Executive Summary
This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of "Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C35900KG/C3500 Series 2600
model Version 1.0" (hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by Canon Inc., and the
evaluation of the TOE was finished on 2017-05 by ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation
Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is intended to report to the
sponsor, Canon Inc., and provide security information to procurement entities and
consumers who are interested in this TOE.
Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter
referred to as the "ST") described in Chapter 10. Especially, details of security functional
requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements
of the TOE are described in the ST.
This Certification Report assumes "procurement entities and general consumers who
purchase the TOE" to be readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the
certification result based on assurance requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does
not guarantee an individual IT product itself.
1.1 Product Overview
An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows. Refer
to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.
1.1.1 Assurance Package
Assurance Package of the TOE is EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality
The TOE is a multifunction printer (hereinafter referred to as "MFP") that offers Copy,
Print, Universal Send, Fax, Internet Fax ("I-fax"), and Mail Box capabilities.
The security functions provided by the TOE satisfy all the security functional requirements,
as required in the Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, U.S. Government Approved
Protection Profile – U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0
(IEEE Std. 2600.2TM-2009) [14] (hereinafter referred to as "the PP"), and ensure the
security policy in the organization that uses the TOE.
For these security functionalities, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the
implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance package. The TOE
assumes threats and assumptions as described in the following sections.
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives
The TOE assumes threats as described below and provides the functions to counter these
threats.
The assets of the TOE, namely user document data and the data that have an effect on
security functions, are susceptible to unauthorized disclosure or alteration through
manipulation of the TOE, or through access to the TOE’s network communications data.
CRP-C0556-01
2
To prevent such unauthorized disclosure or alteration of those assets, the TOE provides
security functions such as identification and authentication, access control, and encryption.
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions
The evaluated product is assumed to be operated under the following configuration and
assumptions.
It is assumed that the TOE will be located in an environment where physical components
of the TOE and its interfaces are protected from unauthorized access. The TOE shall be
properly configured and maintained according to the guidance documents.
1.1.3 Disclaimers
- The Identification and Authentication Function contained in the target of this evaluation
does not apply to incoming print jobs. Although the protocol used in the submission of the
print job contains an identification and authentication mechanism, that mechanism is
outside the scope of this evaluation.
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation
Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body
operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed on
2017-05, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE
according to the publicised documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme
Document"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for
Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.
1.3 Certification
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] and the Observation
Report prepared by the Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation documentation, and
confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. The certification oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns found
in the certification process. Those concerns pointed out by the Certification Body were fully
resolved, and the Certification Body confirmed that the TOE evaluation had been
appropriately conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or [7][8][9]) and the CEM
(either of [10][11]). The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the
Evaluation Technical Report submitted by the Evaluation Facility and fully concluded
certification activities.
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2. Identification
The TOE is identified as follows:
TOE Name: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C35900KG/C3500 Series
2600 model
TOE Version: 1.0
Developer: Canon Inc.
The TOE consists of the following software and hardware.
Note that the Japanese names are originally written in Japanese and translated into
English.
Table 2-1 Components of the TOE
Component Name Description
(Japanese Name)
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE
C35900KG/C3500 Series
(English Name)
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE
C35900KG/C3500 Series
Any of the following MFP:
- iR-ADV C35930KG/C35925KG/
C35920KG
- iR-ADV C3530/C3530i/C3530F
- iR-ADV C3525/C3525i
- iR-ADV C3520/C3520i/C3520F
The models with the character "i," "F," or
"KG" at the end of their names are called
"i models," "F models," or "Korean
Government models," respectively.
(Japanese Name)
iR-ADV Security Kit-T1 for IEEE
2600 Ver 1.00
(English Name)
iR-ADV Security Kit-T1 for IEEE
2600 Common Criteria Certification
Ver 1.00
It contains the control software and
guidance document (hardcopy, CD) for
"Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE
C35900KG/C3500 Series."
(Japanese Name)
Canon Security Chip V2.10
(English Name)
Canon Security Chip V2.10
A hardware to encrypt/decrypt the data to
be stored in the HDD. It is embedded in
"Canon image RUNNER ADVANCE
C35900KG/C3500 Series".
CRP-C0556-01
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Component Name Description
(Japanese Name)
Super G3 FAX Board-AU
(English Name)
Super G3 FAX Board-AU
A FAX Board that is attached to the MFP.
Standard-equipment on "F models" (the
following MFP):
- iR-ADV C3530F
- iR-ADV C3520F
Users can verify that a product is the TOE, which is evaluated and certified, by the
following means.
Using the control panel and guidance document, the user confirms the identification
information of the TOE components.
Identification information which is different from the name in Table 2-1 is displayed on the
control panel for a part of components. It is, therefore, necessary to refer to the guidance
document to find out how to confirm the identification information.
CRP-C0556-01
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3. Security Policy
This chapter describes security function policies that the TOE adopts to counter threats,
and organisational security policies.
In addition to offering MFP capabilities such as Copy, Print, and Scan, the TOE is capable
of storing user document data in its internal HDD device, and has the functionality for
interacting with user terminals and various servers over the network.
The PP, to which the TOE is conformant, assumes an environment where a relatively high
level of security is ensured and where accountability for actions is required, and specifies
the security functional requirements for such an environment. When using the MFP
functions, the TOE offers security functions that satisfy the security functional
requirements specified in the PP.
These include user identification and authentication, access control, HDD data encryption
and data erase functions by overwriting, and secure cryptographic communication
protocols, which protect user document data and configuration data that affect TOE
security functions.
In terms of the use of the TOE, the following roles are assumed.
- U.NORMAL
A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing functions of the
TOE, such as Copy, Print, and Scan.
- U.ADMINISTRATOR
The TOE user in this role has special privileges that allow configuration of security
functions.
- TOE Owner
A person or organizational entity responsible for protecting TOE assets and establishing
related security policies.
The TOE assets are defined as follows.
- User Document Data
User Document Data consist of the information contained in a user’s document.
- User Function Data
User Function Data are the information about a user’s document or job to be processed
by the TOE. This includes information such as print priority and print settings.
- TSF Confidential Data
TSF Confidential Data are data used by the security functions, and for which integrity
and confidentiality must be preserved. This includes information such as user password,
Box PIN, and audit logs. This does not, however, include cryptographic keys, since the
user has no interface available to its access.
CRP-C0556-01
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- TSF Protected Data
TSF Protected Data are data used by the security functions, and for which only integrity
must be preserved. This includes information such as user identification and access
privilege information.
3.1 Security Function Policies
The TOE possesses the security functions to counter the threats shown in Section 3.1.1 and
to satisfy the organisational security policies shown in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies
3.1.1.1 Threats
The TOE assumes the threats shown in Table 3-1 and provides the security functions to
counter them. These threats are the same as those specified in the PP.
Table 3-1 Assumed Threats
Identifier Threat
T.DOC.DIS User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
T.DOC.ALT User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats
The TOE counters the threats shown in Table 3-1 by the following security function
policies.
(1) Countermeasures against threat "T.DOC.DIS," "T.DOC.ALT," "T.FUNC.ALT"
These are threats to user data. The TOE counters the threats by the following
functions: "User Authentication," "Function Use Restriction," "Job Output Restriction,"
"HDD Data Erase," and "LAN Data Protection."
"User Authentication" and "Function Use Restriction" functions of the TOE allow only
the authorized users to use the TOE functions. For details of these functions, refer to
the description of P.USER_AUTHORIZATION in Section 3.1.2.2.
"Job Output Restriction" function of the TOE enforces access control when an identified
and authenticated user performs the operation such as Print, Preview, Send to Network,
Fax TX (send), Delete, Change Print Priority, and Change Print Settings on print jobs
and fax/I-fax jobs stored in the TOE or document data stored in a box, thereby ensuring
that only the owner of the documents or U.ADMINISTRATOR gains access to perform
these operations. The TOE determines that the identified and authenticated user is the
authorized document owner as follows:
CRP-C0556-01
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- For documents submitted as print jobs, the identified and authenticated user is
determined to be the owner of the document if his/her user name matches the user
name information of the document specified upon submission of the print job.
- In the case of the document data stored by using the scan function or received by
fax/I-fax, other than print jobs, the user is required to enter the correct box PIN
when the user operates the document data. The box where the document data are
stored is assigned per user and pre-configured with a 7-digit box PIN. If the user
enters the correct PIN, then the user is determined to be the owner of the document
data stored in the box.
"HDD Data Erase" function of the TOE permanently erases the HDD area where the
document data are stored, by overwriting with random data upon deleting the
document data, to prevent the deleted document data from being read from the HDD.
"LAN Data Protection" function of the TOE uses the cryptographic communication
protocol, IPsec, when the TOE communicates with other IT devices over the LAN, and
protects the communicated data from unauthorized disclosure and alteration.
With the above functions, the TOE prevents unauthorized use of the TOE,
unauthorized access to data stored in the HDD and communication data; thus, the TOE
protects the data to be protected from unauthorized disclosure and alteration.
(2) Countermeasures against threat "T.PROT.ALT," "T.CONF.DIS," "T.CONF.ALT"
These are threats to TSF data that affects the security functions. The TOE counters the
threats by the following functions: "User Authentication," "Management," and "LAN
Data Protection."
"Management" function of the TOE allows only the authorized U.ADMINISTRATOR to
manage user information and various configuration data. Note, however, that the
authorized U.NORMAL can change their own passwords and the PINs for the mail
boxes they use.
"User Authentication," and "LAN Data Protection" work as described in (1).
With the above functions, the TOE prevents unauthorized use of the TOE,
unauthorized access to data stored in the HDD and communication data; thus, the TOE
protects the data to be protected from unauthorized disclosure and alteration.
3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies
3.1.2.1 Organisational Security Policies
Organisational security policies required in use of the TOE are shown in Table 3-2. These
organizational security policies are the same as specified in the PP except
P.STORAGE.CRYPT.
CRP-C0556-01
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Table 3-2 Organizational Security Policies
Identifier Organizational Security Policy
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security,
Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as
permitted by the TOE Owner.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION To detect corruption of the executable code in the
TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable
code in the TSF.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security,
records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and
security-relevant events will be created,
maintained, and protected from unauthorized
disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by
authorized personnel.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To prevent unauthorized use of the external
interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces
will be controlled by the TOE and its IT
environment.
P.STORAGE.CRYPT*1 The data to be stored in the HDD of the TOE must
be encrypted.
*1: "P.STORAGE CRYPT" is set on the assumption that customers will require the function
to encrypt the data to be stored in the HDD.
3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies to Organisational Security Policies
The TOE provides the security functions to satisfy the organisational security policies
shown in Table 3-2.
(1) Means for organizational security policy "P.USER.AUTHORIZATION"
This policy is realized by "User Authentication" and "Function Use Restriction"
functions of the TOE.
"User Authentication" function of the TOE only permits the users who are successfully
identified and authenticated to use the TOE. To enhance the identification and
authentication mechanism, the TOE enforces a password policy to use passwords of a
certain minimum length containing a mixture of character types, and a lockout policy
whereby a lockout of certain duration is imposed upon a certain number of failed
authentication attempts.
Incoming print jobs or fax/I-fax jobs are accepted without requiring identification and
authentication. The resulting document data are stored within the TOE, and not
automatically printed out or transmitted. To print out or transmit document data
stored in the TOE, the users must operate the control panel of the TOE, which will
require identification and authentication.
"Function Use Restriction" function of the TOE performs access restriction on the use of
the TOE functions, so that only the identified and authorized users with appropriate
permissions are permitted to use the functions. For access restriction, users are
CRP-C0556-01
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assigned "roles" which are bound to permission information. This information is used to
determine whether the use of the function is permitted to each user or not.
With the above functions, the TOE ensures that only the authorized users are
permitted to use the TOE.
(2) Means for organizational security policy "P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION"
This policy is realized by "Self-Test" function of the TOE.
"Self-Test" function of the TOE checks the integrity of the cryptographic algorithm that
are used by LAN Data Protection function and the integrity of the audit log, after
decrypting the executable code which is encrypted and stored in the HDD, at start-up.
Thereby the integrity of the executable code of the TOE security functions is ensured.
Note that the self-test function does not check all executable codes of the TOE security
functions; however, the evaluator evaluates that if the integrity of the part of the TOE
security functions is verified, the integrity of all other executable codes decrypted by
the same mechanisms is also ensured.
(3) Means for organizational security policy "P.AUDIT.LOGGING"
This policy is realized by "Audit Log" function of the TOE.
"Audit Log" function of the TOE generates and stores audit logs in the TOE’s HDD at
the occurrence of security-relevant events when security functions are used. The stored
audit logs can be viewed by an authorized U.ADMINISTRATOR only, via a Web
browser.
(4) Means for organizational security policy "P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT"
This policy is realized by "User Authentication" and "Forward Received Jobs" functions
of the TOE.
"User Authentication" function of the TOE ensures that only identified and
authenticated users are allowed to use the TOE. Additionally, a session will be
terminated, if a user leaves the session inactive longer than the specified time.
"Forward Received Jobs" function of the TOE restricts data received from various
interfaces to be directly forwarded to the LAN without prior processing by the TOE.
These functions prevent the unauthorized use of the interfaces of the TOE.
(5) Means for organizational security policy "P.STORAGE.CRYPT"
This policy is realized by "HDD Encryption" function of the TOE.
"HDD Encryption" function of the TOE ensures the confidentiality of data by
encrypting all the data stored in the internal HDD of the TOE. 256 bit AES is used as
the cryptographic algorithm, and the cryptographic key is generated in accordance with
the deterministic random number generation mechanism of NIST SP800-90A upon
start-up and is erased when the power is turned off.
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the
TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to determine the use of the TOE.
4.1 Usage Assumptions
Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE. These assumptions are the same as
specified in the PP.
The effective performances of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these
assumptions are satisfied.
Table 4-1 Assumptions
Identifier Assumptions
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored
environment that provides protection from unmanaged
access to the physical components and data interfaces of
the TOE.
A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and
procedures of their organization, and are trained and
competent to follow those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are aware of the security policies and
procedures of their organization, are trained and
competent to follow the manufacturer’s guidance and
documentation, and correctly configure and operate the
TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures.
* The meaning of "correctly configure" includes the
description specified in (1) and (2) of Section 8.2
"Recommendations."
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights
for malicious purposes.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
The TOE is an MFP designed to operate in a typical office environment, where the MFP is
connected by an internal LAN, and the internal LAN is protected by Firewall, etc., from
threats from the external network. The assumed operational environment of the TOE is
shown in Figure 4-1.
TOE users can operate the TOE from its control panel, from a PC connected via USB, or
from a PC connected to the LAN.
CRP-C0556-01
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PC
HDD
LAN
Firewall
Mail server
P
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Send via I-Fax/E-Mail
Receive I-Fax
Hardcopy
documents
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Hardcopy
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C
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Web browser
Internet
R
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U
I
Multi-Function
Product
User authentication
server
User authentication
Authentication result
Time server
PC
Print via
USB
connection
Fax RX
Fax TX
PSTN
Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE
The operational environment of the TOE consists of the following components.
(1) Fax Board (Optional for using FAX with 2 or more lines)
As necessary, the following FAX Board can be attached to the TOE. The Fax Board is
outside the scope of the TOE.
- Super G3 2nd Line Fax Board-AU
(2)PC
It is a generic PC used by a user to connect to the TOE, via USB or internal LAN. This
evaluation was performed using the following software.
- Printer driver: This evaluation was performed using the following printer driver.
> Canon LIPSLX Printer Driver Version 21.80
> Canon PS Printer Driver Ver 21.80
> Canon Generic Plus PCL Printer Driver Version 1.00
- Web browser: Microsoft Internet Explorer 11
(3) User Authentication Server
The TOE supports two methods of "User Authentication" of the TOE explained in
Chapter 3: "Internal Authentication" where authentication takes place using user
information stored within the TOE, and "External Authentication" where
authentication takes place using user information stored in an external server.
The User Authentication Server is the server that is necessary for the TOE when using
"External Authentication," and the authentication protocol to be used is either
Kerberos or LDAP.
This evaluation was performed using eDirectory 8.8 SP8 as the authentication server
CRP-C0556-01
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software for LDAP authentication, and using Active Directory Domain Service as the
authentication server software for Kerberos authentication.
(4) Mail Server
A Server is installed as required to facilitate the I-fax capability of the MFP.
(5) Time Server
It is the NTP service commonly provided over the Internet. As long as the environment
allows, it is recommended that a time server be configured in the TOE, to synchronize
the time in the MFP that is used as the time stamp of audit logs. Otherwise, the time
that is configured and maintained by the TOE’s Management function is used instead.
Note that the reliability of software and hardware other than the TOE shown in this
configuration is outside the scope of this evaluation.
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4.3 Clarification of Scope
In this evaluation, it is considered that the security functional requirements for the
identification and authentication specified in the PP regarding the MFP’s Print function do
not apply to the operations on submitting print jobs; rather, they apply only to the
operations on document data accumulated in the MFP, created by the submitted print jobs.
As such, the following security functions are considered outside the scope of this
evaluation.
(1) The TOE supports various print protocols for the submission of print jobs. Some
protocols have their own identification and authentication mechanisms, and those
mechanisms are outside the scope of this evaluation. Examples of this include the
identification and authentication mechanism in the IPP protocol.
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5. Architectural Information
This chapter explains the scope and the main components (subsystems) of the TOE.
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components
The configuration of the MFP or TOE as well as the IT environment other than the MFP is
shown in Figure 5-1. In Figure 5-1, the TOE is shown within the bold line box marked as
the TOE. User Authentication Server, Mail Server, PC, Time Server and User are not
included in the TOE.
LAN Data Protection Function
HDD
UI Func
User
User Auth Server
LAN Data Protection
User Auth Function
Mail Server
LAN Data Protection
Email Function
PC
LAN Data Protection
Web Browser
DocData
DocData
AuthInfo
Hardcopy
document
Time Server
Time Function
TimeInfo
Output Func
Input Func
Print
Scan Send
Copy Mail box/ Inbox
Function Use Restriction
Job Output Restriction
User Authentication HDD Data Erase
HDD Data Encryption
Management Function
Self-Test Audit Log
LAN Data Protection
Flow of data
Operate/
Display
Hardcopy
document
Forward Received Jobs
Receive
TOE
PC
Document data
USB connection
FAX
Document data
Phone line
Figure 5-1 TOE Boundary
In Figure 5-1, the components shown in blue box within the TOE are the security functions
of the TOE described in Chapter 3, and the remaining components shown in white box
within the TOE are the basic functions of the MFP. For details on the basic MFP functions,
see Glossary in Chapter 11.
TOE users operate the TOE from its control panel ("UI Func" in Figure 5-1), from a PC
connected to the LAN using a Web browser ("Web Browser" contained in "PC" in Figure 5-1),
or from a PC connected via LAN or USB using a print driver (indicated only as the "PC"
and a print driver is not illustrated in Figure 5-1).
The security functions of the TOE are applied when the user uses basic MFP functions. The
following describes the relation between the security functions and the basic MFP
functions.
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(1) When a user submits a print job from a PC connected via LAN or USB, or when a fax/
I-fax job is received, the jobs are accepted without requiring identification and
authentication, and the resulting document data are stored within the TOE. The user
may perform operations on the document data in the TOE later, using the control panel
or from a Web browser.
When the user attempts to access the basic MFP functions from the control panel or
from a Web browser, "User Authentication" and "Function Use Restriction" functions
are applied, so that only authorized users are allowed to use the TOE. Subsequently,
when the user attempts to execute an operation on a document data stored in the TOE,
"Job Output Restriction" function is applied, so that only the owner of the document
data or the Administrator is allowed to operate the document data.
When the user attempts to use "Management" function or the function to browse audit
logs provided by "Audit Log" function from the control panel or a Web browser, "User
Authentication" function is applied, so that only the identified and authenticated users
with Administrator privileges can gain access to the TOE.
Note that audit logs are generated by "Audit Log" function when these security
functions are used.
(2) In the use described in (1) above, "HDD Data Encryption" function is applied to all data
stored in the internal HDD device, and "HDD Data Erase" function is applied when
document data are deleted.
(3) In the use described in (1) above, "LAN Data Protection" function is applied when the
TOE communicates with other IT devices over the LAN. In addition, "Forward Received
Jobs" function restricts data received from various interfaces to be forwarded without
any TOE security functions applied.
5.2 IT Environment
When the external authentication method is used for "User Authentication" function of the
TOE, Kerberos or LDAP protocol is used to query the information contained in the User
Authentication Server to perform user identification and authentication. User account
information is registered in the User Authentication Server through the management
function of the User Authentication Server.
The time information recorded on the TOE’s audit logs is provided by the TOE. The time
information of the TOE is set and maintained by the Management function of the TOE, or
can be synchronized with an external time server using the NTP protocol.
The TOE uses IPsec protocol to communicate with other external IT devices over the
network. As such, those external IT devices need to have IPsec protocol configured as well.
CRP-C0556-01
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6. Documentation
The identification of documents attached to the TOE is listed below. TOE users are
required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in order to satisfy
the assumptions.
(Japanese name)
- iR-ADV Security Kit-T1 for IEEE 2600 Administrator Guide [FT6-1862 (000)]
- Before Using the iR-ADV Security Kit-T1 for IEEE 2600 [FT6-1863 (000)]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3500 Series 2600 model User’s Guide CD
[FT6-1864 (000)]
(English name)
- iR-ADV Security Kit-T1 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Administrator
Guide [FT6-1865 (000)]
- Before Using the iR-ADV Security Kit-T1 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria
Certification [FT6-1866 (000)]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3500 Series 2600 model User's Guide CD (USE Version)
[FT6-1867 (000)]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3500 Series 2600 model User's Guide CD (APE Version)
[FT6-1868 (000)]
(Supplementary note)
"APE" in the above identification of documents represents a product for Asia-Pacific.
"USE," on the other hand, represents a product for United States.
CRP-C0556-01
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7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results
7.1 Evaluation Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center that conducted the evaluation as the
Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE (National Institute
of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which joins Mutual Recognition
Arrangement of ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation). It is
periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the requirements on the
appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining the quality of
evaluation.
7.2 Evaluation Approach
Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in the CEM in
accordance with the assurance components in the CC Part 3. Details for evaluation
activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. The Evaluation Technical
Report explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content of the evaluation and the
verdict of each work unit in the CEM.
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity
The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as
follows.
The evaluation has started on 2016-10 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation
Technical Report dated 2017-05. The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation
deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence
in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Additionally, the evaluators directly visited
the development and manufacturing sites on 2017-01, and examined procedural status
conducted in relation to each work unit for configuration management and delivery, by
investigating records and interviewing staff. For a part of process, site visits have been
omitted, and the Evaluation Facility determined with its responsibility that the
examination details on those of the past CC-certified products could be reused.
Furthermore, the evaluator conducted the sampling check of the developer testing and the
evaluator testing by using the developer testing environment at the developer site on
2017-02.
Concerns found in evaluation activities for each work unit were all issued as the
Observation Report, and it was reported to the developer. Those concerns were reviewed by
the developer, and all the concerns were solved eventually.
Concerns that the Certification Body found in the evaluation process were described as the
certification oversight reviews, and those were sent to the Evaluation Facility.
After the Evaluation Facility and the developer examined them, those concerns were
reflected in the Evaluation Technical Report.
7.4 IT Product Testing
The evaluator confirmed the validity of the testing that the developer had performed. As a
result of the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation and those confirmed validity,
the evaluator performed the reproducibility testing, additional testing and penetration
CRP-C0556-01
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testing based on vulnerability assessments judged to be necessary.
7.4.1 Developer Testing
The evaluator evaluated the integrity of the developer testing that the developer performed
and the documentation of actual testing results. The content of the developer testing
evaluated by the evaluator is explained as follows.
1) Developer Testing Environment
The TOE used in the developer testing is iR-ADV C3520 among the MFP models in the
TOE identification as described in Chapter 2.
Based on the following reasons, the evaluator evaluated that the testing configuration was
sufficient.
- The differences between the TOE models (see Table 2-1) are: the presence or absence of
the specific license (i model); the presence or absence of the fax function as standard
equipment (F model); the changes in model names for the specific destination (Korean
Government model); and hardware performances such as printing speeds. Since the
differences in the fax function, model names for certain destinations, and hardware
performances such as printing speeds do not affect the security functions, the evaluator
evaluated that it was sufficient to test a representative model from the model group
without license specific to "i-models" (non i-model group) and a representative model
from the model group with license specific to "i-models" (i-model group).
> As a representative model for non i-model group, iR-ADV C3520 was tested.
> As a representative model for i-model group, iR-ADV C3520 with the appropriate
license applied to make the configuration the same as iR-ADV C3520i was tested.
Details of the components of the developer testing environment are given in Table 7-1. The
configuration for this testing corresponds to the operational environment of the TOE as
described in Figure 4-1, except for the following differences. Besides these differences, this
configuration is identical to the configuration specified in the ST, and the evaluator
evaluates that these differences do not affect the purpose, which is to test the TOE’s
functions.
- Although included in the description in the ST, no firewall is used in the testing
environment since it was not connected to the Internet.
- The phone line pseudo-exchanger, which can emulate the same fax communication
protocol as a public telephone line, is used instead of the public telephone network
(PSTN).
- The optional Fax Board (for using two or more fax lines) is attached to the MFP.
CRP-C0556-01
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Table 7-1 Components of the Developer Testing
Component Description
TOE iR-ADV C3520 (MFP)
iR-ADV Security Kit-T1 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria
Certification Ver 1.00
Super G3 FAX Board-AU
Optional Fax Board Super G3 2nd Line FAX Board-AU
Mail Server Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard Edition
- Microsoft Exchange Server 2013
User Authentication
(Kerberos) Server 1 /
Time Server
Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard Edition
- Active Directory Domain Services
- Windows Time
User Authentication
(LDAP) Server 2
Windows Sever 2012 R2 Standard Edition
- eDirectory 8.8 SP8
PCs for tests Microsoft Windows 7 Professional
- Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 (Web Browser)
2) Summary of the Developer Testing
A summary of the developer testing is as follows.
a. Developer Testing Outline
An outline of the developer testing is as follows.
<Developer Testing Approach>
(1) By operating the user interfaces including the control panel, hard keys (such as power
switch), and Remote UI, the developer confirmed the result of the operation (such as
normal end, abnormal end, and error messages) and audit logs.
(2) To confirm the HDD Data Erase function, the developer used the SATA analyzer and
captured to confirm the input/output data to/from the HDD.
(3) To confirm the HDD Data Encryption function, the developer replaced the firmware of
the chip to implement the encryption function with the firmware to which commands
for testing are added, and conducted a known answer test using the added commands.
(4) To confirm the IPsec communication function, the developer captured the
communication data on the network by using packet capture software and confirmed
the behavior of the IPsec function. The developer also verified that the cryptographic
key used for IPsec communication was generated using the specified algorithm by
confirming that the assumed pseudorandom number to be output against the specified
input, using a program for testing to invoke the portion to generate the cryptographic
key.
(5) To confirm the behavior of "i-models" (See Table 2-1) among the MFP models, the
developer performed the testing with the license specific to "i-models" activated.
CRP-C0556-01
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<Developer Testing Tools>
The tools used for the developer testing are shown in Table 7-2 below.
Table 7-2 Developer Testing Tools
Tool Name Description
Wireshark
(Ver.1.2.11 Rev.34007)
A tool to monitor and analyze communication
data over LAN.
SierraM6-2
SAS-M006-802-X
(LeCroy)
A tool to connect between SATA cables and
capture SATA interface signal.
SATA Protocol Suite
(Ver.4.00)
A tool to analyze data captured from SATA
interface.
Pseudorandom number
testing tool
A tool developed by the Developer to confirm the
behavior of pseudorandom number generator for
IPsec.
Phone line
pseudo-exchanger
A unit that pseudo-exchanges the phone line.
Printer Driver Canon LIPSLX Printer Driver Version 21.80
Canon PS Printer Driver Ver 21.80
Canon Generic Plus PCL Printer Driver Version
1.00
<Content of the Performed Developer Testing>
It was confirmed that the security functions to be applied to various input parameters
operate according to the specification by operating the basic MFP functions and security
management functions from various interfaces.
b. Scope of the Performed Developer Testing
The developer testing was performed on 554 items by the developer. By the coverage
analysis, the coverage of the testing for the security functions described in the functional
specification and external interfaces was confirmed. For a part of the external interfaces,
the coverage was found insufficient and was supplemented by the evaluator independent
testing.
c. Result
The evaluator confirmed the approach of the performed developer testing and the
legitimacy of tested items, and confirmed consistencies between the testing approach
described in the testing plan and the actual testing approach. The evaluator confirmed
consistencies between the testing results expected by the developer and the actual testing
results performed by the developer.
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluator performed the sample testing to reconfirm the execution of security
functions by the test items extracted from the developer testing. In addition, the evaluator
CRP-C0556-01
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performed the evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as the "independent
testing") to gain further assurance that security functions are certainly implemented,
based on the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation. The independent testing
performed by the evaluator is explained as follows.
1) Independent Testing Environment
The testing environment for the developer testing was used as the configuration of the
independent testing performed by the evaluator. The specification confirmation, behavior
tests, and calibration for the devices and testing tools used were performed by the
evaluator.
The TOEs tested by the evaluator are iR-ADV C3520 or iR-ADV C3530 among the MFP
models in the TOE identification as described in Chapter 2.
The independent testing was performed in the same environment as TOE configuration
identified in the ST.
2) Summary of the Independent Testing
A summary of the independent testing is as follows.
a. Viewpoints of the Independent Testing
The evaluator devised the independent testing in terms of the following viewpoints, based
on the developer testing and the provided evaluation documentation, in order for the
evaluator him/herself to demonstrate that the TOE security functions work as specified.
<Independent Testing Viewpoints>
(1) The evaluator reinforces the developer testing by conducting testing with added
variations for parameters, string entry patterns, and exception and cancellation
handling of complex interfaces with many parameters.
(2) The evaluator reinforces the developer testing by conducting testing in the case where
multiple related functions are used simultaneously.
(3) The evaluator reinforces the developer testing by conducting testing with a method
different from the one used by the developer.
(4) The evaluator conducts testing for the functions that may affect the assets if the
developer testing is insufficient for such functions.
(5) The evaluator adds testing for the TOE configuration not tested in the developer
testing to confirm that the difference in the configuration does not affect the behavior of
the security functions.
(6) The evaluator independently verifies that the assumption for passwords (such as the
time for entry attempts) is correct.
CRP-C0556-01
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b. Independent Testing Outline
The evaluator performed sample testing on 61 items based on the developer testing and
evaluation documentation provided. The evaluator also designed an additional
independent testing on 9 items based on the developer testing and evaluation
documentation provided, from the following viewpoints. An outline of the independent
testing that the evaluator performed is as follows.
<Independent Testing Approach>
Results for operations of functions accessed through Web browser or control panel can be
observed from the error messages returned or state of the screen, etc. Therefore, an
approach to confirm responses for operations was used.
For external interfaces, the state and audit log of the TOE change by stimulating the TOE
via the devices connected to the TOE. Therefore, a testing approach to observe the results
of the state and audit log results was used.
For the functions related to communication functions, such as IPsec communication and
communication with SNMP, which cannot be observed from outside by people, an approach
to confirm the behavior of such functions by using packet capture software (Wireshark) and
SNMP-related tools (Net-snmp) was used as an alternative method.
For the management of session ID, a proxy type vulnerability analysis tool (Burp Suite)
was used to confirm the behaviour.
<Independent Testing Tools>
For the independent testing, testing tools shown in Table 7-3 were added to the tools used
for the developer testing.
Table 7-3 Independent Testing Tools Used
Tool Name
(Version)
Description/Purpose of Use
Net-snmp
(Ver.5.6.1.1)
Application software which implements each version of
SNMP. Only command functions, such as MIB browser
function, are used in this testing (snmpwalk, snmpset, etc.).
Burp Suite Pro
(Ver. 1.7.17)
Proxy type vulnerability analysis tool.
It is used to confirm session ID that cannot be confirmed by
browser.
AMS Printer Driver
Add-in Ver 3.10
It restricts the use of functions from printer driver.
It is used to perform testing with increased parameters for
external interfaces.
Canon Generic FAX
Driver Ver 10.20
It is used to confirm that functions which are prohibited to
use actually cannot be used.
USB Memory It is used to confirm that functions which are prohibited to
use actually cannot be used.
CRP-C0556-01
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<Content of the Performed Independent Testing>
Table 7-4 shows viewpoints of the independent testing conducted by the evaluator with the
corresponding testing contents.
Table 7-4 Independent Testing Performed
Outline of independent testing
Viewpoint of
independent
testing
Functional testing for user management function, and Function
Use Restriction access control
(e.g., to confirm that a user assigned a general user role is unable
to access the management function specified in the ST)
(1)
Functional testing for user authentication screen
(e.g., to confirm the operation for character-length check of user
name and password)
(1)
Functional test for functions related to editing of user information
(e.g., to confirm the variations of the characters to be used for a
general user's password)
(1)
Functional testing for the session management function of
Remote UI
(e.g., to confirm the authentication function by observing and/or
changing session ID)
(3)
Functional testing for Job Output Restriction access control
(e.g., to confirm that the behavior of an output job is not changed
by variations of incoming job from PC, such as protocols and
drivers, and to confirm that the functions which are prohibited to
use, such as fax transmission from PC via driver, cannot be used)
(1)
Functional testing for simultaneous use of user privilege
(e.g., to confirm that administrators cannot log in simultaneously)
(2)
Functional testing for external interfaces
(e.g., to confirm that only information specified in the functional
specification can be acquired with SNMP, and to confirm that
USB memory cannot be used)
(4)
Functional testing for the Box function
(e.g., to confirm that only Administrator can access Remote UI,
and to confirm the time required to attempt to enter box PIN)
(1), (6)
Testing to confirm that same results are obtained even if the MFP
model and/or Fax Board are different from those used in the
developer testing, by selecting test items that are likely to show
hardware dependence and conducting part of the test items of the
developer testing.
(5)
CRP-C0556-01
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c. Result
All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed, and the
evaluator confirmed the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed consistencies
between the expected behavior and all the testing results.
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator devised and performed the necessary evaluator penetration testing
(hereinafter referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable
vulnerabilities of concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from the
evidence shown in the process of the evaluation. The penetration testing performed by the
evaluator is explained as follows.
1) Summary of the Penetration Testing
A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.
a. Vulnerability of Concern
The evaluator searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available
information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following
vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.
(1) There is a concern when network services other than the functions provided by the TOE
as specified in the design document are activated, security functions may be bypassed,
resulting in the assets of the TOE being compromised.
(2) Since there are publicly-known vulnerabilities on the running network service,
unintended operation may be possible, which may, in turn, result in the assets of the
TOE being accessed by bypassing security functions of the TOE.
(3) There is a possibility that identification and authentication and/or access control
functions may be bypassed in Remote UI, since there are pages (functions) that do not
check the session information.
(4) There is a possibility that bypassing checks provided by Remote UI and specifying an
incorrect value as an input value may cause unexpected behavior of the TOE, which
may, in turn, result in affecting the secure use of the TOE by bypassing security
functions of the TOE.
b. Penetration Testing Outline
The evaluator performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially
exploitable vulnerabilities.
<Penetration Testing Environment>
The penetration testing was performed by using additional testing tools shown in Table 7-5
to the evaluator independent testing environment. The specification confirmation, behavior
tests, and calibration for these tools were performed by the evaluator.
Table 7-5 Penetration Testing Tools
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Tool Name Description
Nmap (Ver.7.40) Port Scan Tool
Nessus (Ver.6.10.1) Vulnerability Scanner
Netcat (Ver.1.11) General TCP/UDP Communication tool
<Content of the Performed Penetration Testing>
Table 7-6 shows an outline of the penetration testing for the vulnerability of concern.
Table 7-6 Outline of the Penetration Testing
Vulnerability
of Concern
Outline of the Penetration Testing
(1) The evaluator performed a port scan on the TOE using a port
scan tool (Nmap). No unexpected network service was found.
Netcat was used as needed to attempt to execute commands.
(2) The evaluator performed a scan using a vulnerability scanner
(Nessus) and confirmed that publicly-known vulnerability which
can be exploited did not exist on the network services provided by
the TOE.
For the network services provided by the TOE, it was confirmed,
for the interfaces which may have functions to disclose files or
execute commands (such as FTP), that prohibited commands (OS
or protocol) cannot be executed.
(3) The evaluator examined the URLs of screens accessible after
authentication using Burp Suite.
The evaluator tried to access such screens by specifying URLs
without authentication and confirmed that these screens could
be accessed only after authentication.
(The behavior of the check function of the session information
was confirmed.)
(4) Burp Suite (proxy type vulnerability inspection tool) was used to
confirm the following points:
> For the input items of the screens which the use the TOE is
not allowed or which can be operated by general users (login
screen, password change screen, address book, etc.), the
evaluator used the above tool to confirm that no problem
occurs when inputting characters prohibited to use or long
character strings.
> For the input items which can be operated by Administrator
(user management function and various setting functions),
the evaluator used the above tool to confirm that no problem
occurs when inputting characters prohibited to use or long
character strings.
c. Result
CRP-C0556-01
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In the penetration testing performed by the evaluator, the evaluator did not find any
exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack potential could
exploit.
7.5 Evaluated Configuration
The conditions for the evaluated configuration of the TOE in this evaluation are as
described in the guidance documents, and users must follow the guidance documents to set
up the TOE. Some of the TOE settings values include enabling/disabling of the security
functions, and there are some fixed values in this evaluation. If any setting values that
affect security are changed to the value that is advised not to set in the guidance
documents, then the MFP with those settings is no longer regarded as the evaluated
configuration.
7.6 Evaluation Results
The evaluator had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM by
submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.
In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.
- PP Conformance:
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile
for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2™-2009)
SFR packages conformance defined in the above PP:
- 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational
Environment B: Conformant
- 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational
Environment B: Conformant
- 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational
Environment B: Conformant
- 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational
Environment B: Conformant
- 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval
(DSR) Functions, Operational Environment B: Conformant
- 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface
Functions, Operational Environment B: Augmented
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance
components.
- All assurance components of EAL2 package
CRP-C0556-01
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- Additional assurance component ALC_FLR.2
The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE
corresponding to the identification described in Chapter 2.
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
No particular recommendations for users (procurement entities) are provided by the
evaluator.
CRP-C0556-01
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8. Certification
The Certification Body conducted the following certification based on the materials
submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process.
1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report have properly been solved.
3. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related
work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
4. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report
shall conform to the CEM.
Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight
reviews, and those were sent to the Evaluation Facility. The Certification Body confirmed
such concerns pointed out in the certification oversight reviews were solved in the ST and
the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this Certification Report.
8.1 Certification Result
As a result of verification of the submitted Evaluation Technical Report, Observation
Report and related evaluation documentation, the Certification Body determined that the
TOE satisfies all assurance requirements for EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 in the CC
Part 3.
CRP-C0556-01
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8.2 Recommendations
(1) This evaluation was performed with the use of Fax Inbox disabled. If the use of Fax
Inbox is enabled, then that is no longer considered as the configuration assured in this
evaluation.
(2) In terms of the security functional requirements specified in the PP, this evaluation
acknowledges that the requirements for identification and authentication do not apply
to incoming print jobs. Consumers expecting identification and authentication to be
enforced for incoming print jobs are therefore advised to take note that the TOE
specification may not be consistent with their needs.
(3) When "external authentication" is used in the TOE, Kerberos or LDAP can be used to
communicate with the user authentication server. Where this is the case, the assurance
provided by this evaluation specifically applies only when Kerberos with Active
Directory Domain Services or LDAP with eDirectory 8.8 SP8 is used as the
authentication server software.
CRP-C0556-01
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9. Annexes
There is no annex.
10. Security Target
The Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided below as a separate document from this
Certification Report.
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C35900KG/C3500 Series 2600 model Security Target,
Version 1.08 (March 21, 2017) Canon Inc.
CRP-C0556-01
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11. Glossary
The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.
MFP Multifunction Product
HCD A Hardcopy Device
The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.
Box It refers to the mail box/inbox where document data created by
scan, print, and fax jobs, are stored in the TOE.
Box function
(Mail box/inbox)
It allows scanned document data or document data specified
from a PC to be stored in a mail box, or documents received by
I-fax to be stored in an inbox. It allows for operations such as
print, send and delete of document data stored in a mail box or
inbox.
Box PIN PIN used for access to mail boxes and inboxes where document
data are stored. It is used to control access to document data.
Copy function It produces duplicates of the hardcopy documents by scanning
and printing.
External interface An interface to transmit print and fax/I-fax jobs and receive data
from time server.
Fax Inbox A box to store document data received through fax/I-fax, which
enables to print the stored document data.
Hardcopy Device
(HCD)
A system producing or utilizing a physical embodiment of an
electronic document or image. These systems include printers,
scanners, fax machines, digital copiers, MFPs (multifunction
peripherals), MFDs (multifunction devices), "all-in-ones," and
other similar products.
CRP-C0556-01
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I-fax Short for Internet Fax, which uses the Internet to receive and
send fax documents, instead of telephone line.
Print function It produces a hardcopy document from its electronic form stored
in the TOE.
Print Setting It contains various print setting options for selecting
color/monochrome, paper type, and duplex printing, etc.
Remote UI An interface to access the MFP from Web browser over LAN; it
confirms the behavior of the MFP, operates jobs, operate box
functionalities, and enables various settings.
Scan function It allows the conversion of data from its hardcopy form to its
electronic form, to create document data.
Send (Universal Send)
function
It allows scanned document data or document data stored in a
mail box/inbox to be received for transmission to an email
address, shared folder on a PC, or I-fax transmission.
TOE Owner A person or organizational entity responsible for protecting TOE
assets and establishing related security policies.
TSF Confidential Data Assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who is
not an Administrator or the owner of the data would have an
effect on the operational security of the TOE.
TSF Protected Data Assets for which alteration by a User who is not an
Administrator or the owner of the data would have an effect on
the operational security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is
acceptable.
U. ADMINISTRATOR A User who has been specifically granted the authority to
manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may
affect the TOE security policy (TSP). Administrators may
possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override
portions of the TSP.
UI function It allows users to operate the TOE from the control panel, and
the TOE to display information on the control panel.
U.NORMAL A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data
processing functions of the TOE.
User Document Data The asset that consists of the information contained in a user's
document.
User Function Data The asset that consists of the information about a user's
document or job to be processed by the TOE.
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12. Bibliography
[1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document, June 2015,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCS-01
[2] Requirements for IT Security Certification, October 2015,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-02
[3] Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility, October 2015,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-03
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-001
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-002
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-003
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-001 (Japanese Version 1.0, November 2012)
[8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-002 (Japanese Version 1.0, November 2012)
[9] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-003 (Japanese Version 1.0, November 2012)
[10] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-004
[11] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-004
(Japanese Version 1.0, November 2012)
[12] Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C35900KG/C3500 Series 2600 model
Security Target, Version 1.08 (March 21, 2017) Canon Inc.
[13] Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C35900KG/C3500 Series 2600 model Evaluation
Technical Report, Version 2.0, May 22, 2017, ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation
Center
[14] U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile
for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2™-2009)
[15] CCEVS Policy Letter #20, 15 November 2010, National Information Assurance
Partnership