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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE).
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common
Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or
any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT
product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report,
and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your organization has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Contact Centre and Information Services
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security.
A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the
official website of the International Common Criteria Program).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance............................................................................................................................. 7
1.2 TOE Description ................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.3 TOE Architecture.................................................................................................................................................. 8
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 9
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality .................................................................................................................................. 9
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ......................................................................................................10
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions................................................................................................................10
3.2 Clarification of Scope..........................................................................................................................................11
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................12
4.1 Documentation....................................................................................................................................................12
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................14
5.1 Development.......................................................................................................................................................14
5.2 Guidance Documents ..........................................................................................................................................14
5.3 Life-Cycle Support...............................................................................................................................................14
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................15
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests............................................................................................................................15
6.2 Conduct of Testing..............................................................................................................................................15
6.3 Independent Testing............................................................................................................................................15
6.3.1 Independent Testing Results .......................................................................................................................15
6.4 Vulnerability Analysis ..........................................................................................................................................16
6.4.1 Vulnerability Analysis Results......................................................................................................................16
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................17
7.1 Recommendations/Comments.............................................................................................................................17
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................18
8.1 List of Abbreviations ...........................................................................................................................................18
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8.2 References..........................................................................................................................................................18
LIST OF FIGURES
TOE Architecture................................................................................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification...................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation................................................................................................................................9
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Nokia IXR Service Router Linux (SR Linux) Family v24.10.4 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from
Nokia Corporation , was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section
1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in
Section 1.1 for the evaluated security functionality.
EWA-Canada is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 15 December 2025 and was
carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify
that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Program).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Nokia IXR Service Router Linux (SR Linux) Family v24.10.4
Developer Nokia Corporation
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance:
EAL 3+ (ALC_FLR.1)
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is a network operating system (NOS) router/switch providing network operating system functionality.
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1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic implementation are used by the TOE and have been evaluated by the CAVP:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation
Cryptographic Implementation Certificate Number
Nokia SR Linux Cryptographic module (SRLCM) v24.10.4 A7218
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 Authorized administrators are not careless, wilfully negligent, or hostile and will follow and abide by the instructions
provided by the TOE documentation, including the administrator guidance, and will periodically check the audit record;
however, they are capable of error. It is further assumed that personnel will be trained in the appropriate use of the TOE
to ensure security.
 External authentication services will be available to the TOE via either RADIUS, TACACS+, or both, based on defined
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards.
 TOE functions with the external IT entities shown in Figure 1 and with other vendors’ routers on the network and meets
Request for Comments (RFC) requirements for implemented protocols.
 There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the ability to execute arbitrary code or applications) and
storage repository capabilities on the TOE.
 The operational environment provides the TOE with appropriate physical security, commensurate with the value of the IT
assets protected by the TOE. It is further assumed that the processing resources of the TOE will be located within
controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
 The operational environment provides the TOE with the necessary reliable time stamp. External Network Time Protocol
(NTP) services will also be available to provide external time synchronization.
 Trusted remote systems that communicate with the TOE, except for the network traffic/data interface, are attached to
an internal trusted protected network that is only accessible by infrastructure devices and trusted administrators. This
includes: (1) the RADIUS, TACACS+ server; (2) the Syslog servers; and (3) the NTP server.
 The Network traffic/data interface is attached to internal and external networks. Console Access is via RS-232, a direct
local connection in the same physical location as the TOE.
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3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The following features of the TOE are outside the evaluated configuration.
 The high availability (HA) feature is not in the scope of the evaluated configuration.
 The following protocols and technologies are not in the scope of the evaluated configuration.
o Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
o MAC-VRF
o Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS)
o Label Distribution Protocol (LDP)
 Third-party developed applications that plug into the SR Linux framework.
o CLI Plug-Ins
 gRPC Routing Information Base Interface (gRIBI) – a gRPC-based protocol that allows external applications to change
routes in a device’s routing information base (RIB).
 Packet capture filters that copy and extract packets for inspection by tools outside the TOE to protect against
Distributed and other DoS (D/DoS) attacks.
 Filtering based on IP Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP).
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
TOE Software/Firmware V24.10.4
TOE Hardware  7220 IXR-D1
 7220 IXR-D2
 7220 IXR-D2L
 7220 IXR-D3
 7220 IXR-D3L
 7220 IXR-D4
 7220 IXR-D5
 7220 IXR-H2
 7220 IXR-H3
 7220 IXR-H4
 7250 IXR-6e
 7250 IXR-10e
 7250 IXR-X1b
 7250 IXR-X3b
Environmental Support  RADIUS/TACACS+ Server
 Syslog Server
 NTP Server
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a) Nokia Service Router Linux, 7215 Interconnect System, 7220 Interconnect Router, 7250 Interconnect Router, 7730
Service Interconnect Router, Release 24.10 ACL and Policy-based Routing Guide, 3HE 20968 AAAA TQZZA,01,
November 2024
b) Nokia Service Router Linux, 7220 Interconnect Router, 7250 Interconnect Router, Release 24.10 Advanced Solutions
Guide, 3HE 20952 AAAA TQZZA, 01, November 2024
c) Nokia Service Router Linux, 7215 Interconnect System, 7220 Interconnect Router, 7250 Interconnect Router, 7730
Service Interconnect Router, Release 24.10 Configuration Basics Guide, 3HE 20951 AAAA TQZZA, 01, November
2024
d) Nokia Service Router Linux, 7215 Interconnect System, 7220 Interconnect Router, 7250 Interconnect Router, 7730
Service Interconnect Router, Release 24.10 Data Model Reference, 3HE 20958 AAAA TQZZA, 01, November 2024
e) Nokia Service Router Linux, 7215 Interconnect System, 7220 Interconnect Router, 7250 Interconnect Router, 7730
Service Interconnect Router, Release 24.10 Log Events Guide, 3HE 20957 AAAA TQZZA, 01, November 2024
f) Nokia Service Router Linux, 7215 Interconnect System, 7220 Interconnect Router, 7250 Interconnect Router, 7730
Service Interconnect Router, Release 24.10 Product Overview, 3HE 20948 AAAA TQZZA, 01, November 2024
g) Nokia Service Router Linux, 7215 Interconnect System, 7220 Interconnect Router, 7250 Interconnect Router, 7730
Service Interconnect Router, Release 24.10 Routing Protocol Guide, 3HE 20966 AAAA TQZZA, 01, November 2024
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h) Nokia Service Router Linux, 7215 Interconnect System, 7220 Interconnect Router, 7250 Interconnect Router, 7730
Service Interconnect Router, Release 24.10 Software Installation Guide, 3HE 20953 AAAA TQZZA, 01, November
2024
i) Nokia Service Router Linux, 7215 Interconnect System, 7220 Interconnect Router, 7250 Interconnect Router, 7730
Service Interconnect Router, Release 24.10 System Management Guide, 3HE 20949 AAAA TQZZA, 01, November
2024
j) Nokia IXR Service Router Linux (SR Linux) Family v24.10.4 Supplemental Common Criteria Guidance, 2233-002-
D105, 1.0, 25 November 2025
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a
vulnerability analysis.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and
guidance documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developer's tests.
b. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluator verified that the claimed cryptographic implementation
was present in the TOE.
c. Cipher Suite Verification: The evaluator verified that the TOE supports the claimed cipher suites.
d. Authentication Method Verification: The evaluator verified that the TOE supports the claimed authentication
methods.
e. Trusted Path Verification: The evaluator verified that the TOE provides a trusted path between itself and remote
entities.
f. Network Traffic Filtering: The evaluator verified that the TOE could filter traffic.
6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as
specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.
 Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
 Technical community sources (Type 2)
 Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
 Tool Generated (Type 4)
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and
technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to
discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators
formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.
Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on 5 November 2025 and included the following search terms:
TOE Name/Version (Section 4) OpenSSL 3.0.15 OpenSSH 9.2p1
gNMI Free Radius 3.0.19
Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:
NOKIA PSIRT
https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-
privacy/product-security-advisory/
National Vulnerability Database
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS
The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification
report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration.
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Section 1.1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Evaluation Technical Report Nokia IXR Service Router Linux (SR Linux) Family v24.10.4, 2025-12-15, v1.3.
Security Target Nokia IXR Service Router Linux (SR Linux) Family v24.10.4, 2025-11-25, v1.0.