COMMON CRITERIA RECOGNITION ARRANGEMENT
FOR COMPONENTS UP TO EAL 4
Certification Report
EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5)
Evaluation of
TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE
SMART CARD OPERATING SYSTEM (AKiS) v1.2.2I
AKILLI KART İŞLETİM SİSTEMİ (AKiS) v1.2.2I
issued by
Turkish Standards Institution
Common Criteria Certification Scheme
Date : 08.08.2011
Pages : 37
Certification Report
Number : 14.10.01/11-248
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Document No: PCC-03-FR-060
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................5
2. GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................................................................6
3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..........................................................................................................................................7
4. IDENTIFICATION ....................................................................................................................................................20
5. SECURITY POLICY .................................................................................................................................................22
6. ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION ....................................................................................................................23
7. ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE .........................................................................................27
8. DOCUMENTATION .................................................................................................................................................29
9. IT PRODUCT TESTING...........................................................................................................................................30
10. EVALUATED CONFIGURATION........................................................................................................................32
11. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION ......................................................................................................................34
12. EVALUATOR COMMENTS/ RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................................................36
13. CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY COMMENTS/ RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................36
14. SECURITY TARGET..............................................................................................................................................36
15. BIBLIOGRAPHY.....................................................................................................................................................37
16. APPENDICES...........................................................................................................................................................37
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 - Glossary................................................................................................................................6
Table 2 - TOE Security Functions .....................................................................................................14
Table 3 - Threats ................................................................................................................................18
Table 4 - TOE's Scope and Boundaries .............................................................................................26
Table 5 - Assumptions .......................................................................................................................28
Table 6 - Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE..................................................................34
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 - TOE Life cycle phases ......................................................................................................15
Figure 2 - Smart Card Product Life Cycle .........................................................................................16
Figure 3 - TOE’s components and environment................................................................................21
Figure 4 - TOE's environment............................................................................................................24
Figure 5 - Smart Card Connection Pins .............................................................................................25
Figure 6 - TOE’s components and environment................................................................................25
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CERTIFICATION REPORT
The Certification Report is drawn up to submit the Certification Committee the results and
evaluation information upon the completion of a Common Criteria evaluation service performed
under the Common Criteria Certification Scheme.
Certification Report covers all non-confidential security and technical information related with a
Common Criteria evaluation which is made under the PCC Common Criteria Certification Scheme.
This report is issued publicly to and made available to all relevant parties for reference and use.
1.INTRODUCTION
The Common Criteria Certification Scheme (CCCS) provides an evaluation and certification
service to ensure the reliability of Information Security (IS) products. Evaluation and tests are
conducted by a public or commercial Common Criteria Test Laboratory (CCTL) under CCCS’
supervision.
CCTL is a facility, licensed as a result of inspections carried out by CCCS for performing tests and
evaluations which will be the basis for Common Criteria certification. As a prerequisite for such
certification, the CCTL has to fulfill the requirements of the standard ISO/IEC 17025 and should
be accredited with respect to that standard by the Turkish Accreditation Agency (TÜRKAK), the
national accreditation body in Turkey. The evaluation and tests related with the concerned product
have been performed by TÜBİTAK-BİLGEM-UEKAE-OKTEM, which is a public CCTL.
A Common Criteria Certificate given to a product means that such product meets the security
requirements defined in its security target document that has been approved by the CCCS. The
Security Target document is where requirements defining the scope of evaluation and test activities
are set forth. Along with this certification report, the user of the IT product should also review the
security target document in order to understand any assumptions made in the course of evaluations,
the environment where the IT product will run, security requirements of the IT product and the
level of assurance provided by the product.
This certification report is associated with the Common Criteria Certificate issued by the CCCS for
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AKILLI KART İŞLETİM SİSTEMİ(AKiS) v1.2.2I - SMART CARD OPERATING SYSTEM
(AKiS) v1.2.2I whose evaluation was completed on 20.05.2011 and whose evaluation technical
report was drawn up by OKTEM (as CCTL), and with the Security Target document with version
no 05 of the relevant product.
2.GLOSSARY
Table 1 - Glossary
CCCS: Common Criteria Certification Scheme
CCTL: Common Criteria Test Laboratory
CCMB: Common Criteria Management Board
CEM: Common Evaluation Methodology
AKiS: Smart Card Operating System (Akıllı Kart İşletim Sistemi)
ETR: Evaluation Technical Report
IT: Information Technology
OKTEM: Common Criteria Test Center (as CCTL)
PCC: Product Certification Center
ST: Security Target
TOE: Target of Evaluation
TSF: TOE Security Function
TSFI: TSF Interface
SFR: Security Functional Requirement
TÜBİTAK: Turkish Scientific and Technological Research Council
TÜRKAK: Turkish Accreditation Agency
BİLGEM: Center of Research For Advanced Technologies of Informatics and Information
Security
UEKAE: National Electronics and Cryptology Research Institute
EAL: Evaluation Assurance Level
PP: Protection Profile
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3.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Evaluated IT product name:
Smart Card Operating System (AKiS) v1.2.2I
Akıllı Kart İşletim Sistemi(AKiS) v1.2.2I
IT Product version:
v1.2.2I
Developer`s Name:
TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE AKIS Project Group
Name of CCTL :
TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE OKTEM Common Criteria Test Laboratory
Completion date of evaluation :
20.05.2011
Common Criteria Standard version :
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
Common Criteria Evaluation Method version :
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation v3.1 rev3, July
2009
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Short summary of the Report:
1) Assurance Package :
EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5)
2) Functionality :
AKiS v1.2.2i is a smart card operating system which can be used in personal identification,
digital sign, health care system, smart logon, secure email.
TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS
Cryptographic
Operations
1. Sign
In Sign security function, plain data sent by the user within the APDU
command is signed (decrypted) with the key that is previously referenced
with another command. Signed data is transmitted back to the user. The
point here is not the secrecy of the data; it is the integrity of the data. RSA
2048 algorithm can be used for this operation, so the referenced key must be
an RSA 2048 key and it must own all the parameters required for this
operation.
2. Verify Signature
In Verify Signature security function, signed part of the data sent by the user
within the APDU command is encrypted with the key that is previously
referenced with another command and the encrypted data is compared with
the plain part of the data sent at the end of signed data within the command.
After the comparison, a response is transmitted back to the user indicating
whether the signature is verified or not. The point here also is not the
secrecy of the data; it is the integrity of the data. RSA 2048 algorithm can be
used for this operation, so the referenced key must be an RSA 2048 key and
it must own all the parameters required for this operation.
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3. Encryption
In Encryption security function plain data sent by the user within the APDU
command is encrypted with the key that is previously referenced with
another command. Encrypted data is transmitted back to the user as a
response. Here both the secrecy and the integrity of the data is of concern.
For the encryption operation, any of the RSA 2048, 3DES (DDES) and DES
algorithms can be used, so the referenced key can be any of these
algorithms’ keys. But the key must own all the parameters required for this
operation.
4. Decryption
In Decryption security function, cipher data sent within the APDU command
is decrypted with the key that is previously referenced with another
command. The plain text is transmitted back to the user as a response. Also
here both the secrecy and the integrity of the data is of concern. For the
decryption operation, any of the RSA 2048, DES3 and DES algorithms can
be used, so the referenced key can be any of these algorithms’ keys. But the
key must own all the parameters required for this operation.
For the correct operation of the security functions described above, the user
should reference an appropriate key (application-DF key) before the
cryptographic operation takes place. Here to reference a key means moving
the key from the EEPROM memory area into the RAM memory area in
order to use it. Also before this operation, the user must load the key into
that application specific EEPROM memory area in a secure way. Loading
more than 1 key to an application (DF) is possible (maximum 20 keys). The
algorithms for these keys may be different (any of RSA, DES3 and DES).
5. Cryptographic Checksum Calculation
Cryptographic checksum is used in order to protect user data integrity.
Cryptographic checksum calculation function calculates the checksum of the
plain data and the initialization vector sent within the command according to
the reference key sent prior to the command by the user.
The first part of the plain data sent within the command is XORed with the
initialization vector and encrypted with the reference key. The data formed
after this operation serves as the new initialization vector for the second part
of the plain data. The operation is repeated until all parts of the data is
encrypted. Calculation of cryptographic checksum is performed using DES
or 3DES algorithms in the TOE. That’s why; the reference key must belong
to one of these algorithms.
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6. Cryptographic Checksum Verification
Cryptographic checksum verification is performed in two steps. Firstly, the
checksum of the plain data and the initialization vector sent within the
command is calculated according to the reference key. Secondly, the
calculated checksum is compared with the checksum within the command. If
they match, an operation successful response is returned. If they don’t
match, an error message is returned. A mismatch means that the data
integrity has been corrupted. Calculation of cryptographic checksum is
performed using DES or 3DES algorithms in the TOE. That’s why, the
reference key must belong to one of these algorithms.
Authentication
and
Authorization
Functions
1. Administrator Authentication (with System PIN)
Administration life cycle is a life cycle which allows only the administrator
to run administration commands. In order to pass to the administration life
cycle, System PIN must be verified. If a wrong System PIN is entered 3
times, the card goes to the death life cycle. Only the administrator can
change the System PIN. System PIN must be minimum 4, maximum 16
digits. System PIN initial value is given at production state during
constitution of MF.
Administration commands such as CHANGE_KEY, ERASE_FILES are to
be performed in this life cycle by the administrator (after personalization
phase). Only administrator can change the life cycle from Operation to
Administration and vice versa.
2. Authenticated User Authentication (with PIN)
On a directory (DF) created with PIN, in order to perform PIN verification
in operation life cycle, PIN must be set first. During PIN change operation,
if the operation is interrupted by taking out the card from the card reader, old
PIN is valid.
PIN must be minimum 4, maximum 16 digits. When the PIN is input
maximum PIN error value times (if it is not set at configuration, default
value is 3) incorrectly, that directory (DF) becomes INVALID and only the
administrator can make that DF reusable by resetting PIN error counter.
After the error counter is reset, authenticated user can use his DF with the
PIN the administrator gave him. During PIN change, if the old PIN is input
incorrectly, error counter is incremented by 1. After maximum PIN retry
number incorrect entries, the DF becomes INVALID.
For performing operations in operation life cycle on a DF created with PIN,
VERIFY command must be performed successfully. Access to the EFs/DFs
under that DF is dependent to their own access conditions.
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Operation life cycle is a life cycle belonging to the user and the
authenticated user usually. For this reason, in order to change the life cycle
to administration, system PIN must be entered. Furthermore, a
user/authenticated user cannot create directories (DFs).
3. Authorizing User to an Operation
Authorizing user to an operation function is used for making the decision if
the user is authorized or not to perform the operation he wants. In this
function, the user must transmit a secret data known both by the user and the
TOE within the operation’s command. The user is authorized to the
operation only if he transmits that secret data accurately and completely.
Otherwise, the user will not be allowed to perform that operation. Here, the
secret data transmitted in the command can be a key encrypted by itself or a
special data encrypted by a key depending on the involved command and the
user type.
For being authorized, the user should either know the key or both the key
and the special data according to the command and the user type. For this
operation, one of RSA2048 and DES3 algorithms can be used depending on
the command being used. So the referenced key may belong to one of these
algorithms, but the key must own all the parameters required for this
operation.
This function is concerned with the commands; Exchange Challenge,
Change Key, Erase Files and External Authenticate (activation). There is an
error counter for each of these commands separately. The secret data used
for authorization may be common for some of these commands, but the error
counter is not counted for each faulty usage of the secret data itself, it is
counted for each faulty usage of the command.
4. Authentication of User to TOE
Authentication of user to TOE function is used to determine if the user is a
secure user in order to use the active application. User is expected to
transmit a secret data known both by the user and the application within the
command. If the user transmits this secret data correctly and completely, he
is defined as a secure user for the application. Otherwise, the user will not be
allowed to perform any secure operation on that application. Here, the secret
data transmitted within the command is a random number generated by the
TOE and encrypted with a key belonging to that application. Each random
generated by the TOE can only be used once. TOE guarantees a random
number to be used for the authentication of user to TOE at most once. For
this operation, one of DES3 and DES algorithms can be used, so the
referenced key may belong to one of these algorithms, but the key must own
all the parameters required for this operation.
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5. Authentication of TOE to User
Authentication of TOE to user function is used to decide whether the TOE is
secure and correct TOE or not. TOE is expected to encrypt the data within
the incoming command with a key known both by the user and the TOE and
transmit back the encrypted data. TOE is defined as a secure TOE for the
user, only if transmits this secret data correctly and completely. Otherwise, it
is not reliable for a user to use the TOE. Here, the secret data transmitted
within the response is a random number generated by the user and encrypted
with a key belonging to that application. For this operation, one of DES3
and DES algorithms can be used, so the referenced key may belong to one of
these algorithms, but the key must own all the parameters required for this
operation.
Cryptographic
Keys
Proprietary key access function is used to write and erase application keys
from EEPROM, RAM/XRAM. Each key has unique ID number per
application. Two components of DES and 3DES keys are written with in the
same APDU command whereas each component of RSA keys is written in a
separate command with different parameters by TOE.
While the keys are written into TOE, the algorithm of the key and type of
the cryptographic operations will be used with this key are determined by
APDU command. The key is not allowed to be written if algorithm of key is
inconsistent with determined cryptographic operations for this key.
DES and 3DES keys cannot be used with sign and verify signature operations.
They can be used with Ext. Auth., Int. Auth., Encryption, Decryption, MAC and
verify MAC operations.
RSA keys cannot be used with Ext. Auth., Int. Auth., MAC, verify MAC
operations. They can be used with Encryption, Decryption, verify signature
operations.
All key lengths are checked whether the length of the key is meaningful or
not. The key is not allowed to be written with an invalid length.
Content of all system keys and DF keys are checked if they are not entirely
composed of 0xFF. All keys must include at least one byte different from
0xFF. Otherwise, the key is not allowed to be written.
When a key is erased, all components belonging to that key are also erased,
they are removed from the key table and their connections are deleted.
Proprietary key access function reads the modulus and public components of
RSA keys which are loaded to the application. Since these components are
public, they can be read without any authentication.
DES, 3DES keys and PDAT, QDAT, DPDAT, DQDAT, QINVDAT
components of RSA keys are not given outside the card. An error response is
produced if these components are tried to be read.
Proprietary key access function (Reading from EEPROM to RAM)
transports all of the parameters of the requested application key from
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EEPROM to RAM.
An initialization function completely fills the buffer on RAM containing the
application key with 0xFF.
Secure
Messaging
With a bit in APDU command’s CLA byte, it is decided whether to use
secure (encrypted) messaging or not. Secure messaging is mandotory
according MF or DF access rights. If MF is created with secure messaging
access right all commands under MF must be encrypted. If DF is created
with secure messaging access right all commands under DF must be
encrypted. EXCHANGE CHALLENGE command does not need to be
encrypted. In secure messaging all the data transmitted within a command is
encrypted with the session key according to 3DES algorithm. As both sides
(users and TOE) know the session key, they decrypt the incoming
commands with the session key to interpret them.
Integrity of the
Objects
DF, DF keys, EF, System/DF PIN, System/DF PUK and life cycle integrity
check is performed with checksum. In every write and erase operation the
checksum is being updated, checksum is controlled in every read operation.
If there is a corruption in DF, EF, System/DF PIN, and System/DF PUK, a
warning or error message is returned as a response to the user. If there is a
corruption in DF keys, System/DF PIN, System/DF PUK an error is returned
and the corrupted data is no longer allowed to use. If there is a corruption in
EF header, an error is returned and the corrupted EF is no longer allowed to
use. But if the corruption occurred in EF body a warning returned and the
corrupted EF is used. When DF, EF, DF PIN/PUK or DF keys are being
deleted, the delete operation is performed by releasing the connections on
tables. When a page is taken from the memory area, that page is being
erased before the operation.
During DF/EF creation and System/DF PIN/PUK change if the operation is
interrupted by ejecting the card from the card reader, old data becomes valid
in order to protect the data integrity, because it is not clear where the write
operation is interrupted.
When an uncontrolled access is detected to write to the special areas of
EEPROM, an error code indicating a memory error is returned and the write
operation is not permitted.
Command integrity is provided with the checksum byte which is at the end
of the command. If the checksum is wrong, the command sent from card to
the reader or command sent from the reader to the card must be repeated.
At each reset, card life cycle is tested whether it is one of the defined states
or not, checksum is also controlled. If the card life cycle data is corrupted,
TOE returns to the activation life cycle.
Code memory checksum is calculated and returned to the user within the
GET DATA command. User can check the code memory integrity by this
way.
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Access
Conditions on
the DFs and
EFs
DF/EF access conditions are controlled according to the command to be
performed. Access control is made:
 Read/Write access: If the DF has a write access, new DFs and EFs
can be created/deleted under that DF. If the EF has a write access, EF
can be written/updated. In order to read an EF, the EF must have
read access.
 Security access with System/DF PIN: User can access DF and any
EF under that DF if the DF is created without PIN. If the DF is
created with PIN, access conditions of EFs under that DF, depends
on the access conditions of EF in the operation life cycle
 Security access with key authentication: If the DF is created with key
authentication, the user uses the internal and external authenticate
commands in order to get authenticated into that directory. This
subject is explained in Authentication of User to TOE.
Function
Countering
Physical
Attacks
1. Countering System/DF PINs and System/DF PUK Attacks
In order to prevent unexpected jumps in critical code points which may be
caused by external attacks, there is a double check in code lines controlling
System/DF PIN and System/DF PUK. System/DF PIN/PUK control flag is a
byte (8 bit) instead of one bit for the unexpected multiple changes on the
flag. System/DF PIN and PUK error counters are incremented before to
check it for the attacks against to System/DF PUK/PIN error counters by
using power of the smart card. System/DF PUK/PIN is verified when all the
digits is completed against the timing attacks.
2. Physical Sensors
SLE66CX680PE chip produces an NMI when code, data and IRAM areas
are attacked. In this chip, there are different sensors for the physical attacks
such as low/high frequency, low/high voltage, temperature, glitch and light
detectors. Chip produces a HW reset signal or NMI interrupt when these
sensors sense an abnormal situation. TOE goes to a reset (soft RESET) state
if NMI is produced.
Random number generator and Sanity of the Physical sensors are checked
by calling the Infineon library functions in the main procedure of TOE.
Table 2 - TOE Security Functions
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3) AKiS v1.2.2I Operating System Phases
ADMINISTRATION
(YÖNETİM)
INITIALIZATION
(İLKLENDİRME)
PRODUCTION
(İMALAT)
OPERATION
(İŞLETİM)
DEATH
(ÖLÜM)
E
R
A
S
E
F
I
L
E
S
(
-
b
a
)
P
H
A
S
E
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
P
H
A
S
E
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
PERSONALIZATION
(KİŞİSELLEŞTİRME)
PERSONALIZE(-ka)
INITIALIZ
E
EEPROM
(-ba)
F
O
R
M
A
T
(
M
F
'
l
i
,
-
b
a
)
FORMAT
(MF'siz, -ba)
E
R
A
S
E
F
I
L
E
S
(
-
b
a
)
E
R
A
S
E
F
I
L
E
S
(
-
b
a
)
ACTIVATION
(CANLANDIRMA)
Faz 5
Faz 5
Faz 6
Faz 6
Faz 7
Faz 7
EXCHANGE CHALLENGE (-ba)
Figure 1 - TOE Life cycle phases
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Figure 2 - Smart Card Product Life Cycle
A smart card life cycle process consists of some certain phases as shown in Figure 2. TOE takes
place within Phase 6 and Phase 7 on this process. Just like the whole smart card, TOE also
consists of some phases which will be called as “Life cycle phases” (Figure 1) in order to
obstruct a confusion.
There are 7 different life cycle phases available on TOE. Relations and crossing between these life
cycle phases are shown in Figure 1. Also there are some several keys available on TOE in order to
be used within the execution of the secure commands. Command interpreter of TOE is designed
to execute some special commands for the different life cycle phases.
These phases are;
Activation:
Main purposes of the activation life cycle phase is; check if the smart card includes correct TOE
and load the initial values of the keys that will be used on the execution of the secure commands
(initialization and personalization key).
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Production:
Main purpose of the production phase is to format the EEPROM memory of the card and prepare
the card for the next step. The next step would be the Initialization phase or the Administration
phase depending on the format type. MF(Master File) is created in the Production phase.
Initialization:
Main purpose of the initialization phase is to load the initialization data into the card. Therefore
the file system will begin to construct on the EEPROM on each command.
Personalization:
Main purpose of the personalization phase is to load the personalization data into the card.
Henceforth the card will include unique data belonging to the end user.
Administration:
Administration phase is the management phase for the administrator and the authorized user.
Changes in the file system or file system errors are handled in this phase. Smart cards with TOE
have the reusability feature.
Operation:
In operation phase, TOE is also available for the end user.
Death:
When some security conditions are not satisfied or it is noticed that security is trying to be
surpassed, TOE forces the card into death phase.
4) Summary of Threats addressed by the evaluated IT product:
The TOE counter such threats presented in the table below and provide functions for
countermeasure to them.
Threats on all
smartcard
product life
cycle phases (1
to 7)
T.CLON Functional cloning of the TOE (full or partial) appears to be
relevant to any phase of the smart card product life-cycle, from phase 1 to
phase 7.
Generally, this threat is derived from specific threats combining
unauthorized disclosure, modification or theft of assets at different phases.
T.DIS Unauthorized disclosure of the smartcard embedded software, data
or any related information.
T.MOD Unauthorized modification of the smartcard embedded software
and data.
Threats on
smartcard
product life
cycle phase 1
T.T_TOOLS Theft or unauthorized use of the smartcard embedded
software development tools (such as PC, databases). TOE system design,
basic software, TOE hex code, activation key are subject to threats.
T.FLAW Introduction of flaws in the TOE due to malicious intents or
insufficient development. TOE system design, basic software, TOE hex
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code are subject to threats.
T.T_SAMPLE Theft or unauthorized use of integrated circuit samples
containing the embedded software (e. g. bound out, dil, evalOS). TOE
hexcode is subject to threat.
T.MOD_INFO Unauthorized modification of any information (technical
or detailed specifications, implementation code, design technology, tools
characteristics) used for developing software or loading data. TOE system
design, basic software, TOE hex code are subject to threats.
T.DIS_TEST Unauthorized disclosure of the smartcard embedded
software test information including interpretations. Application data and
activation key is subject to threat.
T.DIS_INFO Unauthorized disclosure of any information (technical or
detailed specifications, implementation code, design technology, tools
characteristics) used for developing software or loading data. This includes
sensitive information on IC specification, design and technology, software
and tools. TOE system design, basic software, TOE hex code are subject to
threats.
Threats on
delivery of
software and
related
information
from
smartcard
product life
cycle phases 1,
2, 3 and 6
T.T_DEL Theft or unauthorized use of the smartcard embedded software
and any additional application data delivered to the IC designer, IC
manufacturer or to the personalizer. TOE hex code and application data are
subject to threats.
T.MOD_DEL Unauthorized modification of the smartcard embedded
software and any additional application data delivered to the IC designer,
IC manufacturer or to the personalizer.
TOE hex code and application data are subject to threats.
T.DIS_DEL Unauthorized disclosure of the smartcard embedded software
and any additional application data delivered to the IC designer, IC
manufacturer or to the personalizer.
TOE hex code and application data are subject to threats.
Threats on
smartcard
product life
cycle phase 2
T.DIS_TEST Unauthorized disclosure of the smartcard embedded
software test information including interpretations. TOE hex code is subject
to threat.
T.DESIGN_IC Poor IC design leading to IC security mechanisms not
meeting state of the art level. Application data is subject to threat.
Threats on
smartcard
product life
cycle phases 3
to 6
T.T_PRODUCT Theft or unauthorized use of the smartcard product or
any related information. For example, unauthorized use of the embedded
software application functions.
TOE hex code and application data are subject to threats.
T.DIS_TEST Unauthorized disclosure of the smartcard embedded
software test information including interpretations. TOE hex code and
application data are subject to threats.
Threat on
smartcard
product life
cycle phase 7
T.T_PRODUCT Theft or unauthorized use of the smartcard product or
any related information. For example, unauthorized use of the embedded
software application functions. Application data is subject to threat.
Table 3 - Threats
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5) Disclaimers:
This certification report and the IT product defined in the associated Common Criteria
document has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility conformance to
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version3.1 revision3, using Common Methodology
for IT Products Evaluation, version3.1 revision 3. This certification report and the associated
Common Criteria document apply only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. Evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
CCCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with
the evidence adduced. This report and its associated Common Criteria document are not an
endorsement of the product by the Turkish Standardization Institution, or any other organization
that recognizes or gives effect to this report and its associated Common Criteria document, and
no warranty is given for the product by the Turkish Standardization Institution, or any other
organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report and its associated Common Criteria
document.
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4.IDENTIFICATION
AKiS v1.2.2i is a smart card operating system which can be used in personal identification,
digital sign, health care system, smart logon, secure email. TOE:
 Is loaded into ROM of the Infineon Smart Card (SLE66CX680PE/m1534a13) during the
manufacturing phase. SLE66CX680PE/m1534a13 has EAL 5+ (ALC_DVS.2, AVA.MSU.3,
AVA_VLA.4) certificate.
 Does not allow loading of executable files, communicates with the PC via card reader
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 T = 1 protocol,
 Implements user and interface authentication,
 Is capable of binary file operations (open, update, erase, read),
 Supports fixed length linear, variable length linear, fixed length cyclic file structures and file
operations (open, append record, update record, read record),
 Follows the life cycles (activation, manufacturing, initialization, personalization,
administration, operation and death) and operates functions according to the present life
cycle,
 Encrypts, decrypts, digitally signs and verifies with RSA/DES/3DES cryptographic
algorithms by using HW modules of the SLE66CX680PE,
 Calculates SHA-1 hash.
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Memory Management
File Management
Command Interpreter
Communication Handler
MMU
UART
TOE
CARD READER PC
Random Number
Generator
ROM
EEPROM
RAM
ACE
Timer
Interrupt Module
MED
Figure 3 - TOE’s components and environment
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5.SECURITY POLICY
Organizational Security Policies
- OSP.SECURE_DF Creation of DFs with the secure messaging attributes.
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6. ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION
AKiS v1.2.2i Algorithms and crypto specifications are;
Authentication;
External Authenticate: DES/DES3/RSA (1024 bit)
Internal Authenticate: DES/DES3
Encryption;
DES-ECB: Plain data can be encrypted with a DES key.
DES3-ECB: Plain data can be encrypted with a DES3 (DDES) key (A-B-A key structure).
RSA2048: Plain data can be encrypted with an RSA2048 key.
Decryption;
DES-ECB: Encrypted data can be decrypted with a DES key.
DES3-ECB: Encrypted data can be decrypted with a DES3 (DDES) key (A-B-A key structure).
RSA2048: Encrypted data can be decrypted with an RSA2048 key.
Digital Sign;
RSA2048: Plain data can be signed with an RSA2048 key.
Digital Sign Verification;
RSA2048: Signed data with the length equal to the RSA2048 key modulus length can be verified
with an RSA2048 key.
Data Integrity;
DES-MAC: Cryptographic checksum is calculated with a DES key.
Hash;
SHA-1: Data can be hashed with SHA-1 algorithm.
Smart cards are used as electronic authentication keys, digital signs, GSM cards and bank cards. Also, they
are used as electronic passports and e-government cards such as personal identification and health care cards.
Basically smart card consists of 3 main parts:
 Metallic unit on plastic material which is called plastic module (physical plastic card)
 Silicon chip located in the metallic unit on the plastic module. This chip consists of
microprocessor, ROM, RAM, EEPROM and some hardware units (decoders, advanced
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crypto engine, RNG, MED)
 Operating system (written in ROM and enables the operation of card functions using
hardware units)
From the 3 parts listed above, only the third one is developed by TÜBİTAK - BİLGEM - UEKAE.
The first part is developed by a card manufacturer company (who provides the conditions that are
presented in AKiS_TeslimveIsletim document) and the second part is developed by Infineon
Company. The second part has EAL 5+ (compatible with BSI0002) certificate. TOE operates on
Infineon’s SLE66CX680PE chip. Chip consists of; 8051 based microprocessor, ROM, EEPROM,
RAM, Advanced Crypto Engine (ACE), Random Number Generator, MMU, UART, Timers and
MED.
TOE is embedded in ROM during chip manufacturing and can’t be changed afterwards. However,
data can be written into EEPROM under operating system’s control.
TOE will be located in a smart chip planted to a plastic card. The interface of the card to the outside
world is over a smart card reader or access device such as POS (Point of Sale) machine. PC (over
the smart card reader) or access device transmits the commands to the smart card. Incoming
commands are interpreted by TOE and the response is transmitted back to the access device or to the
PC over smart card reader (Figure 4).
Figure 4 - TOE's environment
The smart card has 8 pins according to the IEC/ISO 7816-2 which is shown in Figure 5. Smart card
communicates with reader via I/O pin. 2 pins are reserved for future use. In the past, smart card’s
EEPROM was being programmed by Vpp pin which is not used anymore. VCC, GND, RST and
CLK pins are used to operate the smartcard.
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Figure 5 - Smart Card Connection Pins
TOE Components
TOE components are Figure 6;
 Memory Manager
 File Manager
 Command Interpreter
 Communication Handler
Memory Management
File Management
Command Interpreter
Communication Handler
MMU
UART
TOE
CARD READER PC
Random Number
Generator
ROM
EEPROM
RAM
ACE
Timer
Interrupt Module
MED
Figure 6 - TOE’s components and environment
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Message is received by UART which is managed by communication handler in TOE. The message
comes in TPDU format which is mentioned above. Incoming TPDU packet is analysed and block
type decision is made by the communication handler. TPDU can include 3 different types of block,
named R, S and I block. R and S blocks are used to control the protocol. I block carries the
command which is transmitted to the command interpreter and executed in TOE. When command
execution is finished, communication handler sends the answer to the reader via UART. If the
command is related with the file system, command interpreter calls the file manager. File manager is
responsible for the operations in the file field which is in the EEPROM. Memory manager is used to
open new file, close file, delete page and attach new page.
TOE Scope
TOE’s scope and boundaries are shown in Table 4. During TOE evaluation a PC/SC compatible
smart card reader is needed. Smart card reader’s driver and smart card communication software
must be installed to the computer for operation.
TOE AKiS(Akıllı Kart İşletim Sistemi) v1.2.2i
Hardware
Infineon SLE66CX680PE/m1534a13 chip
(ECO2000 CPU, 244K ROM , 68K EEPROM, 6K External RAM, MMU, UART,
Timers, MED, ACE Advanced Crypto Engine, RNG (Random Number Generator)
Table 4 - TOE's Scope and Boundaries
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7. ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
TOE consists of the components which are defined in section 6 (Architectural information).
Except these, Other components are not in the scope of Common Criteria Evaluation.
7.1 Assumptions
Assumptions on the
TOE delivery process
phase 1 to phase 7
A.DLV_CONTROL procedures must guarantee the control of the
TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives
as described in the following secure usage assumptions. Secure
storage and handling procedures are applicable for all TOE’s parts
(programs, data, documents).
A.DLV_CONF procedures must also prevent if applicable any non-
conformance to the confidentiality convention and must have a
corrective action system in case any non-conformance or
misprocessed procedures are identified.
A.DLV_PROTECT procedures shall ensure protection of
material/information under delivery including the following
objectives:
non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
identification of the elements under delivery,
meeting confidentiality rules (confidentiality level,
transmittal form, reception acknowledgment), physical
protection to prevent external damage.
A.DLV_TRANS procedures shall ensure that material/information is
delivered to the correct party.
A.DLV_TRACE procedures shall ensure traceability of delivery
including the following parameters:
origin and shipment details,
reception, reception acknowledgment,
location material/information.
A.DLV_AUDIT procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are
taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and
highlight all non-conformances to this process.
A.DLV_RESP procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the
procedures for delivery have got the required skill, training and
knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and to act to be fully
in accordance with the above expectations.
Assumptions on IC
development
(smartcard product
life cycle phase 2)
A.IC_PRODUCT the Smartcard integrated circuit is designed and
built using state of art technology with the aim of achieving security
objectives.
A.IC_ORG procedures dealing with physical, personnel,
organizational, technical measures for the confidentiality and integrity
of smartcard embedded software and data (e.g. source code and any
associated documents) shall exist and be applied in the smartcard IC
database construction.
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Assumptions on
smartcard product life
cycle phases 3 to 6
A.USE_TEST it is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of
the smartcard functions is used in phases 3 to 6.
A.USE_PROD it is assumed that security procedures are used during
all manufacturing and test operations through smartcard production
phases to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of
its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
Assumption on
smartcard product life
cycle phase 7 and on
delivery to these
phases
A.USE_SYS it is assumed that the security of sensitive data
stored/handled by the system (terminals, communications ...) is
maintained.
Assumption on the
intended usage of the
TOE, related with
TOE Life Cycle
Phases (Figure 1)
except Activation
phase
A.USE_OPR after giving a warning message from TSF for corrupted
objects (DF-EF-DF PIN-DF PUK, System PIN, System PUK), it is
assumed that the user knows which corrupted objects can be used or
not without taking any risk for security and availability of the TOE.
Table 5 - Assumptions
7.3 Clarification of Scope
Under normal conditions; there are no threats which TOE must counter but did not; however
Operational Environment and Organizational Policies have countered. Information about threats
that are countered by TOE and Operational Environmental are stated in the Security Target
document.
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8. DOCUMENTATION
AKiS v1.2.2I Security Target
Version Number and Date: 05 – 19.04.2011
AKiS v1.2.2I Administrator’s And User’s Guide
Ver. Number and Date: 01 – 30.12.2011
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9. IT PRODUCT TESTING
During the evaluation, all evaluation evidences of TOE were delivered and transferred completely
to CCTL by the developers. All the delivered evaluation evidences which include software,
documents, etc are mapped to the assurance families of Common Criteria and Common
Methodology; so the connections between the assurance families and the evaluation evidences has
been established. The evaluation results are available in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) of
AKiS v1.2.2I.
It is concluded that the TOE supports EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5). There are 24
assurance families which are all evaluated with the methods detailed in the ETR.
IT Product Testing is mainly realized in two parts:
1) Developer Testing :
 TOE Test Coverage: Developer has prepared TOE System Test Document according to
the TOE Functional Specification documentation.
 TOE Test Depth: Developer has prepared TOE System Test Document according to the
TOE Design documentation which includes TSF subsystems and its interactions.
 TOE Functional Testing: Developer has made functional tests according to the test
documentation. Test plans, test scenarios, expected test results and actual test results are in
the test documentation.
2) Evaluator Testing :
 Independent Testing: Evaluator has done a total of 33 sample independent tests. 20 of
them are selected from developer`s test plans. The other 13 tests are evaluator`s
independent tests. All of them are related to TOE security functions.
 Penetration Testing: Evaluator has done 16 penetration tests to find out if TOE`s
vulnerabilities can be used for malicious purposes. The potential vulnerabilities and the
penetration tests are in “TOE Security Functions Penetration Tests Scope” which is in
Annex-C of the ETR and the penetration tests and their results are available in detail in the
ETR document as well.
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The result of AVA_VAN.5 evaluation is given below:
 It is determined that TOE, in its operational environment, is resistant to an attacker
possessing “High” attack potential.
 For the product AKiS v1.2.2I, there are no exploitable vulnerabilities in the scope of the
assumptions in ST (Competent Administrators, Officers and Auditors will be assigned to
manage the TOE and the information it contains and authorized users will not intentionally
perform hostile actions).
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10. EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
During the evaluation; the configuration of evaluation evidences which are composed of Software
source code, Common Criteria documents, sustenance document and guides are shown below:
Evaluation Evidence: TOE – AKiS Smart Card Operating System (Akıllı kart işletim sistemi)
Version Number: 1.2.2i
Production Date : 29.03.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i Source Code (Kaynak Kodu)
Version Number and Date: 1.0 – 01.02.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i Detailed Design Document (Ayrıntılı Tasarım Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 03 – 19.04.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i Functional Specification Document (Fonksiyonel Belirtim
Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 04 – 09.06.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i Security Architecture Document (Güvenlik Mimari
Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 03 – 19.04.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i Delivery and Usage Document (Teslim ve İşletim Dokümanı
)
Version Number and Date: 06 – 09.06.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i Configuration Management Document (Konfigürasyon
Yönetim Planı)
Version Number and Date: 06 – 10.06.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i Development Environment Security and Development Tools
(Geliştirme Ortam Güvenliği ve Geliştirme Aletleri Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 03 – 19.04.2011
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Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i Life Cycle Document (Kullanım Ömrü (Yaşam Çevrimi)
Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 03 – 19.04.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i Security Target Dokümanı
Version Number and Date: 05 – 19.04.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i System and Test Document (Sistem ve Test Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 05 – 09.06.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i Administrator and User Manual Document (Yönetici ve
Kullanıcı Kılavuzu Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 07 – 09.06.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.2.2i Differences between Versions (Versiyonlar Arası Farklar
Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 06 – 09.06.2011
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11. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
Table 8 below provides a complete listing of the Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE.
These requirements consists of the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL 4) components as
specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria, augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
Component ID Component Title
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance Claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_OBJ.2 Security Objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended Components Definition
ASE_REQ.2 Security Requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture
ADV_FSP.4 Functional Specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation Representation
ADV_TDS.3 TOE Design
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
ALC_CMC.4 Configuration Management Capabilities
ALC_CMS.4 Configuration Management Scope
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery
ALC_DVS.2 Development Security
ALC_LCD.1 Life-Cycle Definition
ALC_TAT.1 Tools and Techniques
ATE_COV.2 Coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Depth
ATE_FUN.1 Functional Tests
ATE_IND.2 Independent Testing
AVA_VAN.5 Vulnerability Analysis
Table 6 - Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The Evaluation Team assigned a Pass, Fail, or Inconclusive verdict to each work unit of each EAL
4 assurance component. For Fail or Inconclusive work unit verdicts, the Evaluation Team advised
the developer about the issues requiring resolution or clarification within the evaluation evidence.
In this way, the Evaluation Team assigned an overall Pass verdict to the assurance component only
when all of the work units for that component had been assigned a Pass verdict. So for TOE AKiS
v1.2.2I the result of the assessment of all evaluation tasks are “Pass”.
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Results of the evaluation:
AKiS v1.2.2I product was found to fulfill the Common Criteria requirements for each of 24
assurance families and provide the assurance level EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5) .This
result shows that TOE is resistant against the “HIGH’’ level attack potential and it countervails the
claims of the functional and assurance requirements which are defined in ST document.
There is no residual vulnerability (vulnerabilities can be used as evil actions by the hostile
entities who have BEYOND HIGH level attack potential), that they do not affect the evaluation
result, found by CCTL(OKTEM) laboratory under the conditions defined by the evaluation
evidences and developer claims.
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12. EVALUATOR COMMENTS/ RECOMMENDATIONS
No recommendations or comments have been communicated to CCCS by the evaluators related to
the evaluation process of AKiS v1.2.2I product, result of the evaluation, or the ETR.
13. CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY COMMENTS/ RECOMMENDATIONS
The certifier has no comments or recommendations related to the evaluation process of AKiS
v1.2.2I product, result of the evaluation, or the ETR.
14. SECURITY TARGET
Information about the Security Target document associated with this certification report is as
follows:
Name of Document : AKiS V1.2.2I Security Target
Version No. : 05
Date of Document : 19.04.2011
This Security Target describes the TOE, intended IT environment, security objectives, security
requirements (for the TOE and IT environment), TOE security functions and all necessary
rationale.
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15. BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3,
July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1
Revision 3, July 2009
[3] AKIS v1.2.2I Security Target Version: 05 Date: 19.04.2011
[4] Evaluation Technical Report (Document Code: DTR 09 TR 02), June 13, 2011
[5] PCC-03-WI-04 CERTIFICATION REPORT PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS, Version 2.0
[6] CC Supporting Document Guidance, Mandatory Technical Document, Application of Attack
Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.7 Revision 1, March 2009, CCDB-2009-03-001
[7] CC Supporting Document Guidance, Mandatory Technical Document, Application of CC to
Integrated Circuits, Version 3.0 Revision 1, March 2009, CCDB-2009-03-002
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009
[9] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0026, Version 1.2, 19 November 2007, BSI
[10] Joint Interpretation Library, Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, confidential
Version 1.5, February 2009, BSI
16. APPENDICES
There is no additional information which is inappropriate for reference in other sections.