Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
for
Hitachi AE45C (HD65145C)
Smartcard Integrated Circuit
Version 01
from
Hitachi Ltd.
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
Hitachi AE45C (HD65145C)
Smartcard Integrated Circuit
Version 01
from
Hitachi Ltd. SOGIS-MRA
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by:
ADV_IMP.2 (Development – Implementation of the TSF)
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 7 May 2002
The President of the Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Dr. Henze L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and
no warranty of the IT product by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4
2
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
A-2
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates based on the CC
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000,.Sweden in February 2002.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002 Certification Report
A-3
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Hitachi AE45C (HD65145C) Smartcard Integrated Circuit Version
01 with production line indicator “2” or “4” (Kofu) has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Hitachi AE45C (HD65145C) Smartcard Integrated
Circuit Version 01 was conducted by T-Systems ISS GmbH. The evaluation
facility of T-Systems ISS GmbH is an evaluation facility recognised by BSI
(ITSEF)6
.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Hitachi Ltd.. Point of contact for this
certification procedure was Hitachi Europe Ltd., Whitebrook Park, Lower
Cookham Road, Maidenhead, Berkshire SL6 8YA, U.K.
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 7 May 2002.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-20.
The product Hitachi AE45C (HD65145C) Smartcard Integrated Circuit Version
01 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline 0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Hitachi Limited, Semiconductor and Integrated Circuits, 20-1 Jousuihon-cho 5-chome,
Kodaira-shi, Tokyo 187-8588, Japan
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
B-2
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 9
3 Security Policy 10
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 11
6 Documentation 12
7 IT Product Testing 12
8 Evaluated Configuration 13
9 Results of the Evaluation 13
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations 15
11 Annexes 16
12 Security Target 16
13 Definitions 16
14 Bibliography 18
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002 Certification Report
B-3
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the "Hitachi AE45C (HD65145C) Smartcard
Integrated Circuit Version 01 with production line indicator “2” or “4” (Kofu)". It
provides a hardware platform for a smart card to run smart card applications
executed by a smart card operating system.
The TOE is composed of a processing unit, system control logic, security logic,
watchdog timer, firewall management unit, I/O ports, volatile or non-volatile
memories (4 KBytes RAM, 96 KBytes User ROM, 32 KByte + 512 Bytes
EEPROM), a DES co-processor, a random number generator, an interval timer
and a modular multiplication coprocessor (512 Byte Copro RAM). The TOE also
includes Hitachi proprietary IC Dedicated Software stored on the chip and used
for testing purposes during production only. It does not provide additional
services in the operational phase of the TOE. Additionally, the listing of a
software for random number postprocessing is delivered as part of the TOE and
can be included in the users embedded software as outlined in the guidance
[11]. The smart card operating system and the application stored in the User
ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE.
The TOE is embedded in a micro-module or another sealed package. The
micro-modules are embedded into a credit card sized plastic card.
The EEPROM part of the TOE provides an ideal platform for applications
requiring non-volatile data storage. The TOE is intended for use in a range of
high security applications, including high speed security authentication, data
encryption or electronic signature. Several security features independently
implemented in hardware or controlled by software will be provided to ensure
proper operations and integrity and confidentiality of stored data. This includes
for example measures for memory protection, leakage protection and sensors
to allow operations only under specified conditions.
The Security Target is written using the Smartcard IC Platform Protection
Profile, Version 1.0 (BSI-PP-0002-2001) [9]. With reference to this Protection
Profile, the smart card product life cycle is described in 7 phases. The
development, production and operational user environment are described and
referenced to these phases. TOE delivery is defined at the end of phase 3 or
phase 4.
The assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile [9] are
used. To address additional security features of the TOE (e.g cryptographic
services), the security environment as outlined in the PP [9] is augmented by an
additional policy, threats, assumptions and security objectives accordingly.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
B-4
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation ST
FDP User data protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information overflow control PP
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection PP
FDP_ACC.1
[CRP]
Subset access control [Controlled-Register
Policy]
ST
FDP_ACC.1
[WPP]
Subset access control [Write-Protect Policy] ST
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state PP
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection PP
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack PP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation PP
FRU Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance PP
Table 1: SFRs taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage PP
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers PP
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities PP
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability PP
Table 2: SFRs CC part 2 extended
As the final transition from test mode to user mode is performed before TOE
delivery, all security functions (SF) of the TOE are applicable from TOE delivery
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002 Certification Report
B-5
at the end of phase 3 or 4 (depending on when TOE delivery takes place in a
specific case) to phase 7.
SF.HWProtect: HW protection
The TSF provides out-of-range detection for supply voltage and
frequency and illegal address and instruction detection. The
confidentiality and integrity of information is supported by providing
physical shielding of the die and scrambling of memory arrays.
SF.LeakProtect: Leakage protection
The TSF protects against leakage of information from the IC. The
protection features include functions designed to alter the power
consumption, and DES protection including additional measures to alter
the power consumption of the device.
SF.RNG: Random Number Generator
The random number generator is designed to produce random numbers
of 16 bit for the generation of cryptographic keys and for other critical
uses. The random number generator meets the requirements of
application class P2 as specified in [4, AIS 31] and the test requirements
in [14]. Additionally, the TOE software for random number
postprocessing can be included in the users embedded software.
SF.DES:
The TOE provides a DES coprocessor that carries out DES encryption
and decryption in ECB mode, according to the FIBS PUB 46-3 standard
[15].
SF.FMU: Firewall management unit (FMU)
The FMU enables software to control addresses that can be accessed to
check that a target address used in any instruction is within specified
limits and, if not, to enter the reset state. In addition, the FMU may
enforce a policy controlled only by software executing in ROM, that the
TOE may not execute code in either EEPROM or RAM, or both.
SF.ESFunction:
The Smartcard Embedded Software developer can rely on the following
TOE functionality that has been specifically evaluated as part of the TOE:
- Generation of a non-maskable interrupt (the EWE interrupt) when
writing to EEPROM.
- Generation of a non-maskable interrupt at software-defined
intervals (watchdog timer)
- CPU Halt initiated by user software to stop execution until an
external reset is received.
SF.TestModeControl: Test mode control
If the TOE has been set to user mode, test mode functions are no longer
accessible.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
B-6
SF.EEPAccess: EEPROM access
The TOE allows any page of EEPROM to have writes (or erase)
disallowed by setting the page to have a protected state. If a write is
attempted to a protected page then it will leave the page content
unaltered. This protection is permanent once set.
SF.Inject: Injection
Each TOE is injected with data that uniquely identifies the individual IC
during manufacture. If specified for the Smartcard Embedded Software
included, then additional data may also be injected during manufacture.
The TOE was evaluated against the claims of the Security Target [6] by
T-Systems ISS GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 3 May 2002. The
evaluation facility of T-Systems ISS GmbH is an evaluation facility recognised
by BSI (ITSEF)8
.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Hitachi Ltd..
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see AnnexC or [1],
part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance
level EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table
shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: Methodically designed, tested and
reviewed
+: ADV_IMP.2 Development – Implementation of the TSF
+: ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for
insecure states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant
Table 3: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Strength of Function
The TOE‘s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for those functions,
identified in the Security Target, chapter 5.1.4. The rating of the strength of
functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002 Certification Report
B-7
1.3 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the organisational security policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target [7] and can be summarized as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or a process acting on behalf
of him.
With reference to the Protection Profile [9], the Security Target [7] defines so
called standard high-level security concerns derived from considering the end-
usage phase (Phase 7 of the life cycle as described in the Security Target) as
follows:
- manipulation of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software
(while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s
memories),
- disclosure of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
- deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined by defining threats on a more
technical level for
- Inherent Information Leakage,
- Physical Probing,
- Physical Manipulation,
- Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
- Forced Information Leakage,
- Abuse of Functionality and
- Deficiency of Random Numbers.
Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
Additionally, the Security Target defines a security concern about specific
attacks on the Smartcard Embedded Software not being able to be detected by
the TOE or to respond to. This concern is detailled in terms of the threats
- Inability of the TOE to detect an attack
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
B-8
- Inability of the Smartcard Embedded Software to respond to an attack
A specific additional security functionality for DES encryption and decryption
must be provided by the TOE according to an additional security policy defined
in the Security Target.
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional threats and policy.
1.4 Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode. The
TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC manufacturing process
(Phase 3) or at the end of IC Packaging (Phase 4). At this point in time the
operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is disabled. Thus, there are no special procedures for
generation or installation that are important for a secure use of the TOE. The
further production and delivery processes, like the Smart Card Finishing
Process, Personalisation and the delivery of the smart card to an end user,
have to be organized in a way that excludes all possibilities of physical
manipulation of the TOE. There are no special security measures for the startup
of the TOE besides the requirement that the controller has to be used under the
well-defined operating conditions and that the requirements on the software
have to be applied as described in the user documentation.
1.5 Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile [9], the
assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are valid for the
Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security
Target, Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6
are covered by these assumptions from the PP:
The developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software (Phase 1) must ensure:
- the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while
developing this software in Phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that
the software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In
particular the assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop
software that fulfils the assumptions.
- the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the
TOE (especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed
that the Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of
the environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE.
Only appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the
TOE have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002 Certification Report
B-9
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to Phase 7.
Following additional assumptions are assumed in the Security Target:
- Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Smartcard
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function).
- Data for injection/pre-personalisation will be supplied from the various
bodies controlling the operations of the system in which the TOE is
functioning. It is assumed that the generation, distribution, maintenance,
and destruction of this data is adequately secure (A.InjDatSupp).
1.6 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of
the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to
this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The following TOE deliverables are provided for a customer who purchases the
TOE:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
1 HW AE45C (HD65145C)
single-chip
microcomputer
01 with
production
line indicator:
“2” or “4”
(Kofu)
Wafer or packaged
module
2 SW Self-Test ROM
Software (the IC
dedicated software)
AE45C_A01_
rev0.95.as83
Rev0.95
27 August
2001
Stored in AE45C
Test ROM on the
chip
3 DOC Hardware Manual Rev. 1.2 20 Sept.
2001
Hardcopy
4 DOC Current Control
Functions
Rev. 1.2 24 January
2002
Hardcopy
5 DOC Guidelines for using the
AE45C including SW-
Listings for RNG
postprocessing
Rev. 1.11 30 April
2002
Hardcopy
6 DOC Option List for Smart
Card Microcomputer
(for HD65145C
[AE45C])
V. 1.42 29 March
2002
Hardcopy
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
B-10
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
7 DOC Notes on usage for
AE-4 series interval
timer (TMR1/TMR2)
with interrupt enabled
22 Feb.
2002
Hardcopy
Table 4: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is identified by HD65145C (short form AE45C), Version 01 (stored as
version number in the EEPROM), produced in Kofu (indicated by the character
Production Line „2“ or „4“ as a second character of the lot number indicator).
The pre-personalisation data are injected into the EEPROM as specified by the
customer using the option list [13].
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery pro-
cedures described in [11] have to be followed.
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus provi-
ding an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and
it will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory
of the TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of
security functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC dedicated software) is used by the TOE manufacturer to
check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was considered as part of the
evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for relevant procedures and
under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002 Certification Report
B-11
modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the security functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system, and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
security functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environ-
mental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Hitachi Ltd. is the TOE developer and manufacturer and
responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded smart card
application software in its development and production environment. For those
aspects refer to chapter 9 of this report.
5 Architectural Information
The Hitachi AE45C (HD65145C), Version 01 smart card controller is an
integrated circuit (IC) providing a hardware platform to a smart card operating
system and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list
of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target.
The complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of the
Hitachi AE45C (HD65145C), Version 01 smart card controller is to be found in
the Hardware Manual [10] and in the document Current Control Functions [12].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
32-bit AE-4 CPU, EEPROM, Watchdog Timer, System Control Registers, DES
coprocessor, Firewall Management Unit, a Random Number Generator, the
analog block with security sensors and the random logic module for security
logic are used. Security measures for physical protection are realized within the
layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers provide the interface to the software using the
security functions of the TOE. The TOE software for random number
postprocessing uses the defined TOE interfaces and can be implemented by
the embedded software developer as outlined in the guidance [11].
The TOE IC Dedicated Software, stored on the chip, is used for testing
purposes during production only and is completely separated from the use of
the embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target:
• The Hardware Manual [10],
• Guidelines for using the TOE [11],
• Guidance on Current Control Functions [12],
• The Option List [13],
• Guidance for using the interval timer [16].
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hard-
ware computing platform. The documents [10] - [13] and [16] will be used by the
customer to implement the software (operating system / application software)
which will use the TOE.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into four categories:
- (i) tests which are performed in a simulation environment;
- (ii) functional production tests, which are done as a last step of the
production process (phase 3) and, in case TOE delivery is at the end of
phase 4, additionally done as a last step of IC Packaging. These tests
are done for every chip to check its correct functionality;
- (iii) characterization tests, which were used to determine the behaviour of
the chip with respect to different operating conditions and
- (iv) special verification tests for security functions which were done with
samples of the TOE.
The developer tests cover all security functions and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification and the high level design. Chips from
the production site in Kofu (see annex A of this report) were used for tests.
The evaluators could repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs and tools delivered to the evaluator or at the developers site. They
performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer by sampling. Besides repeating exactly the
developers tests, test parameters were varied and additional analysis was
done. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections.
The evaluators gave evidence that the actual version of the TOE (Version 01
with production line indicator “2” or “4” (Kofu)) provides the security functions as
BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002 Certification Report
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specified. The test results confirm the correct implementation of the TOE
security functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functions into considera-
tion. Intensive penetration testing was performed to consider the physical
tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated equipment and expert know
how.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by AE45C (HD65145C) Version 01 with production line
indicator “2” or “4” (Kofu). There is only one evaluated configuration of the TOE.
This configuration (all TSF are active and usable) has to be selected by the
customer in the option list at order. All information of how to use the TOE and its
security functions by the software is provided within the user documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode.
Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user mode. For all evaluation
activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid
for the user mode, too.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 Evaluation of the TOE
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in
coordination with the Certification Body. For smart card IC specific methodology
the guidance documents (i) Joint Interpretation Library - The application of CC
to Integrated Circuits, (ii) Joint Interpretation Library - Integrated Circuit
Hardware Evaluation Methodology and (iii) Functionality classes and evaluation
methodology for physical random number generators (see [4]: AIS 25, AIS 26
and AIS 31) were used. The assurance refinements outlined in the Security
Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 5: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that the TOE fulfills the claimed strength of function
for the (i) Random Number Generation (SF.RNG) and (ii) resistance of the DES
co-processor against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) (SF.LeakProtect).
For the TOE security function SF.DES, which is DES encryption and decryption
by the hardware co-processor, and for other usage of encryption and decryption
within the TOE, the strength was not evaluated as these are cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
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The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC dedicated software) is used by the
TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Hitachi AE45C
(HD65145C) Version 01 Smartcard Integrated Circuit produced in Kofu
(indicated by the character Production Line „2“ or „4“ as a second character of
the lot number indicator).
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product or to
chips from other production and manufacturing sites, provided the sponsor
applies for re-certification of the modified product, in accordance with the
procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the modified product does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2 Additional Evaluation Results
• The AE45C provides a coprocessor that carries out modular
multiplication according to the specification in the Hardware Manual [10].
This forms a basis for software implementation of algorithms such as
RSA. This functionality was additionally stated in the TOE Summary
Specification of the Security Target (chapter 6.1), but not specifically
evaluated as a security function of the TOE. Thus, the evidence for the
assurance aspects of EAL4 augmented was not completely provided.
Nevertheless, the developer performed functional tests and analysis of
depth and coverage on this functionality.
• To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific
smart card embedded software, additional evaluator actions were
performed during the TOE evaluation. Therefore, refering to the life-cycle
model for the TOE the interaction between phase 1 and phase 2 is of
importance and the interface between a smart card embedded software
developer and the developer of the TOE was examined.
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
1. The operational documentation [10] - [13] and [16] contains necessary
information about the usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage of
the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the
Security Target has to be taken into account. Therefore, the
requirements stated in the guidance document [11] have to be taken into
account.
2. For evaluations of products or systems including the TOE as a part or
using the TOE as a platform (for example smart card operating systems
or complete smart cards), specific information resulting from this
evaluation is of importance and shall be given to the succeeding
evaluation.
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11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (see [1])
COT Chip-on-Tape
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electrical Code Block
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Repor
EWE An Interrupt generated by the AE45C whenever an attempt is
made to write to EEPROM
FMU Firewall Management Unit
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
OTP One Time Programmable (a certain part of the EEPROM)
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adelmann – a public key encryption algorithm
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SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
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SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125, Version 5.1, January
1998)
[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS), Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Bonn, as relevant for the TOE,
specifically
AIS 25, Version 1, 29.02.2000 for Joint Interpretation Library – The
application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.0, January 2000;
AIS 26, Version 1, 26.06.2000 for: Joint Interpretation Library - Integrated
Circuit Hardware Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.3, April 2000;
AIS 31, Version 1, 25.09.2001 for: Functionality classes and evaluation
methodology of physical random number generators;
AIS 32, Version 1, 02.07.2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter
CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
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[6] AE45C (HD65145C) Version 01, Smartcard Security Target,
Semiconductor & Integrated Circuits Hitachi, Ltd., Version 1-3, 29 March
2002, (confidential document)
[7] AE45C (HD65145C) Version 01, Smartcard Security Target, (Public
version), Semiconductor & Integrated Circuits Hitachi, Ltd., Version 1.0,
30 April 2002
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0168, Version 1.0, 03 May
2002, for the Product Hitachi Single-Chip Microcontroller AE45C
(HD65145C) Version 01, (confidential document)
[9] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Europe Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[10] Hitachi Single-Chip Microcomputer, AE-4 Series, AE45C (HD65145C)
Hardware Manual, Rev. 1.2, 20 September 2001, Hitachi, Ltd., (confi
dential document)
[11] Hitachi Single-Chip Microcomputer, AE-4 Series, Guidelines for using the
AE45C Rev. 1.11, 30 April 2002, Hitachi, Ltd., (confidential document)
[12] Hitachi Single-Chip Microcomputer, AE-4 Series, AE-4 Series AE45C
(HD65145C), Current Control Functions, Rev. 1.2, 24 January 2002,
Hitachi, Ltd., (confidential document)
[13] Hitachi, Semiconductor Technical Report, Option List for Smart Card
Microcomputer (for HD65145C[AE45C]), V1.42, 29 March 2002,
(confidential document)
[14] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-1, 11 th
January
1994
[15] U.S. Departement of Commerce/ National Bureau of Standards Data
Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 46-3, 25 th
October 1999
[16] Hitachi, Semiconductor Technical Report, Notes on usage for AE-4
series interval timer (TMR1/TMR2) with interrupt enabled, 22 February
2002
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4)
The pass result of evaluation shall be a statement that describes the extent to which
the PP or TOE can be trusted to conform to the requirements. The results shall be
caveated with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) or directly to a PP, as listed below.
a) Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are only based upon functional components in Part 2.
b) Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2.
c) Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are in the form of an EAL or assurance package that is
based only upon assurance components in Part 3.
d) Part 3 augmented - A PP or TOE is Part 3 augmented if the assurance
requirements are in the form of an EAL or assurance package, plus other
assurance components in Part 3.
e) Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements are in the form of an EAL associated with additional
assurance requirements not in Part 3 or an assurance package that
includes (or is entirely made up from) assurance requirements not in Part 3.
f) Conformant to PP - A TOE is conformant to a PP only if it is compliant
with all parts of the PP.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 - Assurance family breakdown and mapping
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered in as much as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
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highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.
Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.
Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002 Certification Report
Annex A D-3
Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product, Hitachi AE45C (HD65145C) Smartcard Integrated Circuit, Version 01
(Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 7 May 2002, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below ((a) – (d)):
(a) Hitachi, Ltd., 5-22-1, Jousuihon-cho, Kodaira-shi, Tokyo 187-8522, Japan
(b) Hitachi Hokkai Semiconductor Ltd., Chitose Works, 1007-39 Izumisawa, Chitose-shi,
Hokkaido 066-8511, Japan
(c) Hitachi, Ltd., Semiconductor & Integrated Circuits, Kofu Manufacturing Works,
Nishiyahata, Ryuoh-cho, Nakakoma-gun, Yamanashi-ken 400-0117, Japan
(d) Several subcontractors supporting the production with i.e. photomask fabrication
and IC packaging into modules
The hardware part of the TOE produced at these sites is indicated by the production line
indicator: “2” or “4” for Kofu.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats and the security
objective for the life cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phases 3 or 4 as
stated in the TOE Security Target (AE45C (HD65145C) Version 01, Smartcard Security
Target, Semiconductor & Integrated Circuits Hitachi, Ltd., Version 1-3, 29 March 2002, [6])
are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0168-2002
D-4 Annex A
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