JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
Certification Report
TOMITA Tatsuo, Chairman
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan
2-28-8 Honkomagome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
IT Product (TOE)
Reception Date of Application
(Reception Number)
2020-10-19 (ITC-0770)
Certification Identification JISEC-C0715
Product Name
KONICA MINOLTA AccurioPress C14000/C12000 with
UK-112/PF-713
Version and Release Numbers GM0-20
Product Manufacturer KONICA MINOLTA, INC.
Conformance of Functionality PP conformant functionality, CC Part 2 Extended
Protection Profile Conformance
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0
dated September 10, 2015
(Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
Name of IT Security
Evaluation Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE has been certified as follows.
2021-03-24
YANO Tatsuro, Technical Manager
IT Security Technology Evaluation Department
IT Security Center
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following
standards prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme Document."
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 5
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 5
Evaluation Result: Pass
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
"KONICA MINOLTA AccurioPress C14000/C12000 with UK-112/PF-713, Version
GM0-20" has been evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the
provisions of the "Requirements for IT Security Certification" by Information-technology
Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by
the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary............................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Product Overview............................................................................................................. 1
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package...................................................................... 1
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality ................................................................................... 1
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives ................................................................................ 2
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions................................................................................. 2
1.1.3 Disclaimers ..................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation...................................................................................................... 3
1.3 Certification...................................................................................................................... 3
2. Identification ........................................................................................................................ 4
3. Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 5
3.1 Users.................................................................................................................................. 5
3.2 Assets ................................................................................................................................ 5
3.3 Threats.............................................................................................................................. 6
3.4 Organizational Security Policies..................................................................................... 6
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................................. 8
4.1 Usage Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 8
4.2 Environmental Assumptions ........................................................................................... 8
4.3 Clarification of Scope ..................................................................................................... 10
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................................11
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components ...................................................................................11
5.2 IT Environment.............................................................................................................. 13
6. Documentation................................................................................................................... 14
7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results............................................. 15
7.1 Evaluation Facility......................................................................................................... 15
7.2 Evaluation Approach...................................................................................................... 15
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity.................................................................................... 15
7.4 IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................... 16
7.4.1 Developer Testing ......................................................................................................... 16
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing................................................................................... 16
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing .................................................................................... 18
7.5 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................... 20
7.6 Evaluation Results......................................................................................................... 21
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations ..................................................................... 21
8. Certification........................................................................................................................ 22
8.1 Certification Result ........................................................................................................ 22
8.2 Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 22
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
9. Annexes............................................................................................................................... 23
10. Security Target................................................................................................................... 23
11. Glossary .............................................................................................................................. 24
12. Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 26
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
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1. Executive Summary
This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of "KONICA MINOLTA AccurioPress C14000/C12000 with
UK-112/PF-713, Version GM0-20" (hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by
KONICA MINOLTA, INC., and the evaluation of the TOE was completed on 2021-03-12 by
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation
Facility"). It is intended to report to the sponsor, KONICA MINOLTA, INC., and provide
security information to procurement entities and consumers who are interested in the
TOE.
Readers of this Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter
referred to as the "ST") described in Chapter 10. Especially, details of security functional
requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements
of the TOE are described in the ST.
This Certification Report assumes procurement entities who purchase the TOE to be
readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on
assurance requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an individual
IT product itself.
1.1 Product Overview
An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described below. Refer to
Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package
The TOE conforms to the following Protection Profile [14][15] (hereinafter referred to as
the "Conformance PP").
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
(Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality
The TOE is a Multi-Function Printer (hereinafter referred to as "MFP"), which has
functions such as copy, scan, and document storage and retrieval.
The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP to prevent the
document data processed by the MFP and the setting data etc. affecting security from
unauthorized disclosure and alteration.
For these security functions, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the
implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance requirements of the
Conformance PP.
Threats and assumptions assumed for the TOE are described in the following sections.
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1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives
The following threats are assumed for the TOE.
There are threats that user document data and data affecting security functions, which are
assets to be protected by the TOE, may be disclosed or altered by unauthorized operation of
the TOE or unauthorized access to the network to which the TOE is connected.
There are also threats that security functions of the TOE may be compromised by the
failure of the TOE itself or installation of unauthorized software.
The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP such as
identification and authentication, access control, encryption, and digital signature to
counter these threats.
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions
The TOE is assumed to be operated under the following configuration and assumptions.
The TOE is assumed to be operated in an environment where unauthorized physical access
to the TOE is restricted and connected to a LAN separated from the Internet.
The setting, administration and maintenance of the TOE must be performed in accordance
with the guidance documents by a trusted administrator. Users of the TOE must have been
trained in order to use the TOE securely.
1.1.3 Disclaimers
The following operation is not ensured by this evaluation:
- An environment different from that described in "4.2 Environmental Assumptions"
- TOE with settings different from those described in "7.5 Evaluated Configuration"
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
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1.2 Conduct of Evaluation
Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body
operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed in
2021-03, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE
according to the publicized documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme
Document"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for
Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.
1.3 Certification
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] prepared by the
Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation documentation, and confirmed that the TOE
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The certification
oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns found in the certification process.
The Certification Body confirmed that those concerns pointed out by the Certification Body
were fully resolved, and that the TOE evaluation had been appropriately conducted in
accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or [7][8][9]) and the CEM (either of [10][11]). The
Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical
Report and fully concluded certification activities.
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2. Identification
The TOE is identified as follows:
TOE Name: KONICA MINOLTA AccurioPress C14000/C12000 with
UK-112/PF-713
TOE Version: GM0-20
Users can verify that a product is the TOE, which is evaluated and certified, by the
following means.
Users confirm the following information on the MFP body, operation panel display and the
package of HDD unit as described in the guidance document.
- Model name: One of the following:
KONICA MINOLTA AccurioPress C14000
KONICA MINOLTA AccurioPress C12000
- HDD unit: "UK-112"
- Paper feeder unit: "PF-713"
- Version: All firmware versions listed in Table 2-1
Table 2-1 Firmware Versions of the TOE
Firmware components Version
Image control system I1 AC0C0Y0-00I1-GM0-20
Image control system I2 AC0C0Y0-00I2-G00-20
Image control system I3 AC0C0Y0-00I3-G00-20
Image control system I4 AC0C0Y0-00I4-GM0-20
Image control system I5 AC0C0Y0-00I5-GM0-20
ADF system F AAMP0Y0-00F1-G00-03
Sound source system T AC0C0Y0-00T1-G00-10
Browser feature W AC0C0Y0-00W1-G00-20
Scanner L AC570Y0-00L1-G00-10
Printer system C AC0C0Y0-00C1-G00-20
Network control P9 AC0C0Y0-00P9-GM0-20
Printer Sub CPU D1 AC0C0Y0-00D1-G00-03
Printer Sub CPU D2 AC0C0Y0-00D2-GC1-0402
Printer sub CPU D4 AC0C0Y0-00D4-G00-01
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
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3. Security Policy
The TOE provides the basic functions of the MFP such as copy, scan, and document storage
and retrieval. The TOE also has the functionality to store the user document data in the
TOE, and to communicate with user terminals and various servers via a network.
The TOE provides security functions that satisfy the requirements of the Conformance PP,
to protect the document data processed by the MFP and setting data etc. affecting security.
As the background of the security functions provided by the TOE, user roles, assets, threats,
and organizational security policies assumed for the TOE are described in following Section
3.1 to 3.4. Details of the security functions of the TOE are described in Chapter 5.
3.1 Users
The user roles assumed for the TOE are shown in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1 User Roles
Designation Definition
Normal User A User who has been identified and authenticated
and does not have an administrative role
Administrator A User who has been identified and authenticated
and has an administrative role
3.2 Assets
The assets assumed to be protected by the TOE are shown in Table 3-2, Table 3-3 and Table
3-4. There are two categories of the assets, User Data and TSF Data, as shown in Table 3-2.
Furthermore, User Data is classified as shown in Table 3-3 and TSF Data is as shown in
Table 3-4.
Table 3-2 Assets
Designation Category Definition
D.USER User Data Data created by and for Users that do not affect
the operation of the TSF
D.TSF TSF Data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect
the operation of the TSF
Table 3-3 Assets (User Data)
Designation Type Definition
D.USER.DOC User Document
Data
Information contained in a User's Document, in
electronic or hardcopy form
D.USER.JOB User Job Data Information related to a User's Document or
Document Processing Job
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Table 3-4 Assets (TSF Data)
Designation Type Definition
D.TSF.PROT Protected TSF
Data
TSF Data for which alteration by a User who is
neither the data owner nor in an Administrator
role might affect the security of the TOE, but for
which disclosure is acceptable
D.TSF.CONF Confidential
TSF Data
TSF Data for which either disclosure or alteration
by a User who is neither the data owner nor in an
Administrator role might affect the security of the
TOE
3.3 Threats
The threats assumed for the TOE are shown in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5 Threats
Designation Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete)
User Document Data or change (modify or delete)
User Job Data in the TOE through one of the
TOE's interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF
Data in the TOE through one of the TOE's
interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of
security if the TOE is permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE An attacker may cause the installation of
unauthorized software on the TOE.
T.NET_COMPROMISE An attacker may access data in transit or
otherwise compromise the security of the TOE by
monitoring or manipulating network
communication.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The organizational security policies required for the TOE are shown in Table 3-6.
Table 3-6 Organizational Security Policies
Designation Definition
P.AUTHORIZATION Users must be authorized before performing
Document Processing and administrative
functions.
P.AUDIT Security-relevant activities must be audited and
the log of such actions must be protected and
transmitted to an External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE must be able to identify itself to other
devices on the LAN.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
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P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION If the TOE stores User Document Data or
Confidential TSF Data on Field-Replaceable
Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such
data on those devices.
P.KEY_MATERIAL Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or
any other values that contribute to the creation of
encryption keys for Field- Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage of User Document Data or Confidential
TSF Data must be protected from unauthorized
access and must not be stored on that storage
device.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the
TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to determine whether to use the TOE.
4.1 Usage Assumptions
Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE. The effective performances of the TOE
security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.
Table 4-1 Assumptions
Designation Definition
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of
the TOE and the data it stores or processes, is
assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.NETWORK The Operational Environment is assumed to
protect the TOE from direct, public access to its
LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the
TOE according to site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE
according to site security policies.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
Figure 4-1 shows the assumed operating environment of the TOE. The TOE is installed in a
typical office and is connected to a LAN, which is the internal network of the organization.
Users mainly operate the operation panel of the TOE to use the TOE. Users can also
operate a client PC connected to the LAN to use some of the management functions of the
TOE.
Internet
Audit log server
External IT device
Client PC
Firewall
TOE
Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE
The operational environment of the TOE consists of the following components.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
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1) Client PC
A client PC is a general-purpose PC for administrators. The following software is
required:
- OS: Windows 10 Pro
- Software for IPsec: included in OS
- Web browser: Microsoft Internet Explorer 11
2) Audit log Server
An audit log server is a server to store the audit log generated by the TOE. Software that
supports the syslog is required. In this evaluation, the following software was used.
- Software for IPsec: strongswan 5.8.0
- Software for syslog: rsyslog 8.1901.0
3) External IT device
An external IT device is a server used to send user document data scanned by TOE.
Software that supports WebDAV, SMB, or FTP protocols is required. In this evaluation,
the following software was used.
- Software for IPsec: strongswan 5.8.0
- Software for WebDAV: apache2 2.4.38
- Software for SMB: samba 4.9.5
- Software for FTP: vsftpd 3.0.3
It should be noted that the reliability of the hardware and the software other than the TOE
shown in this configuration is outside the scope of this evaluation. Those are assumed to be
trustworthy.
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4.3 Clarification of Scope
There are the following restrictions on the functions provided by the TOE or ensured by
this evaluation.
1) Servers and client PCs
Administrators are responsible for operating servers and client PCs cooperating with the
TOE securely.
The only operation that can be done from the client PC is to check the version of the TOE
firmware by the administrator. Other functions of the TOE cannot be used from the
client PC.
2) Encryption key for encrypting stored data
In this TOE, the encryption key to encrypt the stored data is generated at the time of
manufacture, and no means is provided for the purchaser of the TOE to re-generate the
key. Therefore, if the administrator performs an operation to delete the encryption key,
the TOE shall become unusable.
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5. Architectural Information
This chapter explains the scope and the main components of the TOE.
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components
Figure 5-1 shows the composition of the TOE. The TOE is the entire MFP with the
necessary option.
TOE
External IT device
(to which electronic documents are sent)
Client PC
Audit log server
Audit function
Trusted communications function
Scan function
Copy function
Storage encryption function
User restriction control function
Document storage and
retrieval function
Software update verification
function
HDD SSD
Self-testing function
Security management function
Identification and authentication
function
Access control function
Operation panel
User
Figure 5-1 Composition of the TOE
The functions provided by the TOE consist of basic functions and security functions. The
security functions of the TOE are described below. Refer to Chapter 11 for the basic
functions.
1) Identification and authentication function
This function is a function to identify and authenticate users with their IDs and
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
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passwords, when users use the TOE from the operation panel of the MFP, or the Web
browser of the client PC.
This function has the following functionality to reinforce the identification and
authentication.
- Restrict the minimum password length.
- Suspend the identification and authentication on continuous unsuccessful
authentication attempts.
- Terminate the session if there is no operation for a certain time after the successful
authentication.
2) Access control function
This function is a function to control the access to the user data when users operate the
basic functions of the MFP on them. The access control is performed based on the owner
information of the user data and on the user's identification information and role.
3) Storage encryption function
This function is a function to encrypt the data stored in the TOE. AES CBC mode with a
key length of 256 bits is used to encrypt the stored data.
Encryption keys are generated using a random bit generator with enough entropy that is
difficult to guess.
4) Trusted communication function
This function is a function to protect communication data between the TOE and IT
devices using encryption communication protocol (IPsec).
Encryption keys are generated using a random bit generator with enough entropy that is
difficult to guess.
5) Security management function
This function is a function to restrict the setting, etc. of the security functions to
administrators. However, normal users can change their passwords.
6) Audit function
This function is a function to generate audit logs on audit events relevant to the security
functions and send them to the log server.
7) Software update verification function
This function is a function to verify the digital signature of new firmware when the
firmware is updated.
8) Self-testing function
This function is a function to verify the hash value of the firmware at the start-up of the
TOE.
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5.2 IT Environment
The TOE communicates with servers and client PCs via LAN. The function of the TOE
described in "4) Trusted communication function" realizes IPsec communication in
cooperation with those IT devices.
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6. Documentation
The identification of the guidance documents of the TOE is listed in Table 6-1. TOE users
are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in order to
satisfy the assumptions.
Table 6-1 Guidance (Japanese)
Name1 Version
KONICA MINOLTA Accurio Press C14000/C12000 User's Guide 01.00.00
KONICA MINOLTA Accurio Press C14000/C12000 User's Guide
Security Functions (Administrator)
1.0
(Publication 2021/03/08)
KONICA MINOLTA Accurio Press C14000/C12000 User's Guide
Security Functions (Users)
1.0
(Publication 2021/03/08)
1 The guidance name listed in Table 6-1 is the translation of Japanese name.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
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7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results
7.1 Evaluation Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center that conducted the evaluation as the
Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE (National
Institute of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which joins Mutual
Recognition Arrangement of ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation). It
is periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the requirements on the
appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining the quality of
evaluation.
7.2 Evaluation Approach
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the assurance requirements in the CC
Part 3 required by the Conformance PP using the evaluation methods prescribed in the
CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.
Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. The
Evaluation Technical Report explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content of the
evaluation and the verdict for each work unit in the CEM and assurance activity of the
Conformance PP.
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity
The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as
follows.
The evaluation started in 2020-10 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation
Technical Report dated 2021-03. The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation
deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence
in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Furthermore, the evaluator conducted the
evaluator testing at the developer site in 2020-11.
Concerns in the evaluation process that the Certification Body found were described as the
certification oversight reviews and sent to the Evaluation Facility. After the Evaluation
Facility and the developer examined the concerns, those were reflected in the Evaluation
Technical Report.
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7.4 IT Product Testing
As the verification results of the evidence shown in the evaluation process, the evaluator
performed the evaluator independent testing to ensure that the security functions of the
product are accurately implemented, and the evaluator penetration testing based on
vulnerability assessments.
7.4.1 Developer Testing
The developer testing is not included in the assurance requirements for this evaluation.
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluator performed the evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as the
"independent testing") based on the evidence shown in the evaluation process to ensure
that the security functions of the product are accurately implemented. The independent
testing performed by the evaluator is described below.
1) Independent Testing Environment
The environment for the independent testing is based on the operational environment of
the TOE shown in Figure 4-1. The components used in the independent testing
environment are listed in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1 Components for the Independent Testing Environment
Components Description
TOE KONICA MINOLTA AccurioPress C14000 with UK-112/PF-713
Version GM0-20
KONICA MINOLTA AccurioPress C12000 with UK-112/PF-713
Version GM0-20
Client PC - OS: Windows 10 Pro
- Web browser: Internet Explorer 11
Servers - OS: Kali Linux 2019.1
- IPsec: strongswan 5.8.0
- Audit log server: rsyslog 8.1901.0
- WebDAV server: apache2 2.4.38
- SMB server: samba 4.9.5
- FTP server: vsftpd 3.0.3
The TOEs tested by the evaluator were all the models described in Chapter 2, TOE
Identification.
There are following differences between the configuration of the independent testing and
the TOE configuration identified in the ST. The evaluator determined that there are no
problems with those differences and that the security functions of the TOE configuration
identified in the ST can be considered properly tested.
(1) Using additional testing tools
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In the independent testing, some testing tools were used to confirm and alter the
communication data and to confirm the encryption function. The validity of those testing
tools was confirmed by the evaluator.
2) Summary of the Independent Testing
A summary of the independent testing performed by the evaluator is described below.
a. Viewpoints of the Independent Testing
Viewpoints of the independent testing devised by the evaluator based on the
requirements of the Conformance PP and on the provided evaluation documentation are
as follows.
<Viewpoints of the Independent Testing>
(1) Confirm security functions for each Security Functional Requirement (SFR).
(2) Confirm that the implementation of the cryptographic algorithms is correct.
b. Independent Testing Outline
An outline of the independent testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.
<Independent Testing Approach>
The behavior of the TOE for inputs using the operation panel of the TOE, the client PC
and the testing tools was confirmed by following means:
- If the behavior can be confirmed from the external interfaces of the TOE, the external
interfaces of the TOE are used (including audit logs).
- If the behavior cannot be confirmed from the external interfaces of the TOE, the
developer interface of the TOE is used.
<Content of the Performed Independent Testing>
The evaluator performed the independent testing of 16 items.
Table 7-2 shows contents of the independent testing corresponding to the viewpoints.
Table 7-2 Performed Independent Testing
Viewpoint Outline of the Independent Testing
(1) <Confirmation of security functions>
Confirm that all security functions work as the specification with the test
items created based on the assurance activities of the Conformance PP for
each SFR or the requirements of the SFR.
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(2) <Confirmation of implementation of cryptographic algorithms>
Confirm the following cryptographic algorithms are implemented as the
specification using the test program installed in the TOE.
- RSA (key generation, signature verification)
- AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256
- SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
- HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512
- CTR_DRBG (AES)
c. Result
All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed, and the
evaluator confirmed the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed consistencies
between the expected behavior and all the test results.
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator devised and performed the evaluator penetration testing (hereinafter
referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable vulnerabilities of
concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from the evidence shown
in the process of the evaluation. The penetration testing performed by the evaluator is
described below.
1) Summary of the Penetration Testing
A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.
a. Vulnerability of Concern
The evaluator searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available
information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following
vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.
(1) There is a concern that unintended network ports of the TOE may be open, and
known vulnerabilities may exist in the network services running on the TOE.
(2)There is a concern that known vulnerabilities may exist in the Web interface of the
TOE.
b. Penetration Testing Outline
The evaluator performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially
exploitable vulnerabilities.
<Penetration Testing Environment>
The penetration testing was performed in the environment where tools for penetration
testing are added to the independent testing environment. The tools used in the
penetration testing are listed in Table 7-3.
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Table 7-3 Penetration Testing Tools
Name Outline and Purpose of Use
Nmap
7.80
A tool to detect available network service ports.
<Content of the Performed Penetration Testing>
Table 7-4 shows contents of the penetration testing corresponding to the vulnerabilities
of concern.
Table 7-4 Outline of the Penetration Testing
Vulnerability Penetration Testing Outline
(1) - Confirm that unexpected network ports of the TOE are not open using
Nmap.
- Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities by retrieving the
name and version of software etc. used by the TOE using the developer
interface.
(2) - Confirm that unintended behaviour is not observed even if character
strings that may cause unauthorized processing are entered into the
web interface of the TOE.
c. Result
In the penetration testing performed by the evaluator, the evaluator did not find any
exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack potential could
exploit.
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7.5 Evaluated Configuration
The conditions of the TOE configuration, that are prerequisites for this evaluation, are as
described in the guidance documents listed in Chapter 6. In order to use the TOE securely
as ensured by the evaluation, the TOE must be set as described in the guidance documents.
Different settings are not subject to assurance by this evaluation.
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7.6 Evaluation Results
The evaluator had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM
and all assurance activities in the Conformance PP as per the Evaluation Technical Report.
In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.
- PP Conformance:
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance [16]
- Treatment regarding FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Test
- Treatment regarding FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1
- Treatment regarding FTP_TRP.1(b)
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance
components required by the Conformance PP.
ASE_INT.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_OBJ.1, ASE_ECD.1,
ASE_REQ.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE
corresponding to the identification described in the Chapter 2.
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to procurement entities.
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8. Certification
The Certification Body performed the certification from the following viewpoints based on
the materials submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process.
1. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related
work units in the CEM and assurance activities of the Conformance PP shall be
evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
2. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
3. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report
shall conform to the CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.
Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight
reviews, and those were sent to the Evaluation Facility. The Certification Body confirmed
such concerns pointed out in the certification oversight reviews were solved in the ST and
the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this Certification Report.
8.1 Certification Result
As a result of verification of the Evaluation Technical Report and related evaluation
documentation submitted by the Evaluation Facility, the Certification Body determined
that the TOE evaluation satisfies the assurance requirements required by the
Conformance PP.
8.2 Recommendations
Procurement entities who are interested in the TOE are advised to refer "4.3 Clarification
of Scope" and "7.5 Evaluated Configuration" to make sure the scope of the evaluation and
the operational requirements of the TOE meet the operational conditions assumed by each
user.
As described in Chapter 2, to confirm the TOE identification, it is necessary to check the
information printed on the package of HDD unit in addition to the TOE display, etc. Note
that it is necessary to keep the information of HDD unit package even after the start of the
operation in order to confirm the TOE identification.
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9. Annexes
There is no annex.
10. Security Target
Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided as a separate document from this Certification
Report.
Title: KONICA MINOLTA AccurioPress C14000/C12000 with
UK-112/PF-713 Security Target
Version: 1.17
Publication Date: March 8, 2021
Author: KONICA MINOLTA, INC.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
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11. Glossary
The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.
MFP Multi-Function Product
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
The abbreviations relating to IT technology used in this report are listed below.
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CTR_DRBG Counter (CTR) mode block cipher algorithm DRBG
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
FTP File Transfer Protocol
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMB Server Message Block
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
WebDAV Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0715-01-2021
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The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.
Copy function A function to scan paper documents by the operation of
the MFP operation panel and duplicate them. The
scanned user document data can also be stored in the
MFP.
Scan function A function to scan paper documents by the operation of
the MFP operation panel and send the scanned user
document data to an external IT device (WebDAV server,
SMB server, FTP server).
Document storage and
retrieval function
A function to scan paper documents and store the
scanned user document data into the MFP or retrieve and
print the stored user document data by operating the
operation panel of the MFP.
Assurance Activity Evaluation work to be performed by an evaluator in order
to conform to a PP. It is a supplement of the CEM. In the
case of the Conformance PP [14], it is described in the
Conformance PP.
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12. Bibliography
[1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document, October 2020,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCS-01
[2] Requirements for IT Security Certification, October 2020,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-02
[3] Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility, October 2020,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-03
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-001
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-001, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002,
(Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[9] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003,
(Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[10] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation
methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
[11] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation
methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004,
(Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[12] KONICA MINOLTA AccurioPress C14000/C12000 with UK-112/PF-713 Security
Target, Version 1.17, March 8, 2021, KONICA MINOLTA, INC.
[13] KONICA MINOLTA AccurioPress C14000/C12000 with UK-112/PF-713 Evaluation
Technical Report, Version 2.0, March 12, 2021, ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation
Center
[14] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015 (Certification
Identification: JISEC-C0553)
[15] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
[16] Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance, Version 1.8,
November 11, 2020, Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan,
JISEC-CERT-2020-A18