Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
for
Banksys DEP/PCI Version 3.0
from
Banksys N.V.
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
SOGIS-MRA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
Banksys DEP/PCI Version 3.0
from
Banksys N.V.
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and
approved/licensed evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation,
Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL3 augmented by ADV_FSP.2 (Functional Specification - Fully defined
external interfaces)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 08. August 2003
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the Certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
· BSIG2
· BSI Certification Ordinance3
· BSI Schedule of Costs4
· Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
· DIN EN 45011 standard
· BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
· Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
· Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
· BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-
Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
A-2
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates based on the CC
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003 Certification Report
A-3
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Banksys DEP/PCI Version 3.0 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Banksys DEP/PCI Version 3.0 was conducted by
TNO ITSEF BV which is an evaluation facility recognised by BSI (ITSEF)6
.
The sponsor and developer is:
Banksys N.V.
Haachtsesteenweg 14
1130 Brussels
Belgium.
The certification is concluded with
· the comparability check and
· the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 8th
August 2003.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
· all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
· the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-34.
The product Banksys DEP/PCI Version 3.0 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the sponsor of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
· the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
· the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
· complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
B-2
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 12
3 Security Policy 14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 15
5 Architectural Information 18
6 Documentation 21
7 IT Product Testing 22
8 Evaluated Configuration 24
9 Results of the Evaluation 25
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations 27
11 Annexes 28
12 Security Target 29
13 Definitions 30
14 Bibliography 33
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003 Certification Report
B-3
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Banksys DEP/PCI Version 3.0 (also named
Banksys DEP/PCI in short). It is a tamper-resistant and tamper-responsive host
security module, which can be used with standard PC hardware that supports a
PCI interface.
The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are AES/DES/RSA key
generation and verification, hashing, and random number generation. This
services are meant to be used in application domains like e-commerce,
Electronic Purse, PKI, etc.
The TOE is mainly used at the host side (e.g. it is plugged into a workstation
that is connected to a mainframe or server located in a computer room, or it is
plugged into a server located in a computer room).
The TOE provides means to securely load an application and keys. Only
authorised personnel can enable the loading of applications and/or keys.
The Banksys DEP/PCI includes hardware and software components and
communicates with its environment via a PCI-bus and serial ports.
The Banksys DEP/PCI detects tamper attacks (e.g. physical intrusion,
temperature and chemical attacks) and takes appropriate measures to log the
event and to protect all sensitive data.
The following list summarises the TOE components and defines the evaluated
configuration of the TOE:
Hardware DEP/PCI, Version 3.0:
PCI Card, Version 701.2 and Alarm Card, Version 702.2
Alarm Processor Software, Version 2.0.b
Boot Software, Version 1.0.d:
Boot Command Handler, Boot Library CZAM, Boot Library STD,
Boot ToolBox
Application Software, Version 1.0.i:
Command Handler, Library CZAM, Library STD, ToolBox
Software
Application Software, Version 1.0.i:
EVAL Library
To ensure a secure usage, a set of guidance documents is provided together
with the Banksys DEP/PCI. Details can be found in chapter 6 of this report.
The TOE uses the following hardware: Standard PC hardware that supports a
PCI interface.
Note: A smart card reader/encoder called C-ZAM/DEP together with the
respective smart cards (called DCCs = DEP Control Cards) is used for
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
B-4
administrative purposes. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter
2.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Functionality
Cryptographic Services
FCS_CKM.1+17
AES Key Generation
FCS_COP.1+1 AES encryption and decryption
FCS_COP.1+2 AES CBC-MAC generation
FCS_CKM.1+2 DES/3DES Key Generation
FCS_COP.1+3 DES/3DES encryption and decryption
FCS_COP.1+4 DES/3DES CBC-MAC generation
FCS_CKM.1+3 RSA Key Generation
FCS_COP.1+5 RSA encryption and decryption
FCS_COP.1+6 RSA signature generation and verification
FCS_COP.1+7 SHA-1, SHA-256 and MD5 hash generation
FCS_RND.1 Random Number Generation
Note: This requirement is not part of the CC, Part 2.
Loading Applications
FDP_ACC.1+1 Naming the Security Policy for the loading of an application
FDP_ACF.1+1 Definition of the Security Policy Rules
FDP_ITC.2 Loading of Software
FDP_DAU.2 Only Software from a trusted developer can be loaded
Loading, back-up, and deleting Application Keys
FDP_ACC.1+2 Naming the Security Policy for the
loading/backup/restore/erasing of application keys
FDP_ACF.1+2 Definition of the Security Policy Rules
FDP_ITC.1 Loading of application keys
FTP_ITC.1 Trusted channel between TOE and environment.
7
Notation of SFR component iteration: FXX_XXX.y+n means nth iteration of the SFR
FXX_XXX.y
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003 Certification Report
B-5
Security
Functional
Requirement
Functionality
Management of the TOE
FMT_SMR.1 Definition of administrative roles
FIA_UID.2 Identification of roles
FIA_UAU.2 Authentication of roles
FMT_MSA.1 Enable/disable operations by a certain role
FMT_SAE.1 Limit operations in time by a certain role
FMT_SAE.2 Limit number of times for an operation by a certain role
Note: This requirement is not part of the CC, Part 2.
FDP_ACC.1+3 Naming the Security Policy for the access to operations
FDP_ACF.1+3 Definition of the Security Policy Rules
FMT_MSA.3 Default access to operations
FMT_SMF.1 Management operations of the TOE
FMT_MOF.1 Assignment of management operations to roles
Tampering and abnormal operating conditions
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attacks
FAU_GEN.1 Logging of tamper events
FPT_STM.1 Generation of timestamp for logging
FAU_SAA.1 Detecting when a tamper event has taken place
FAU_ARP.1 Reacting on a detected tamper event (clearing the
DEP/PCI)
FDP_RIP.1 Ensuring that when the DEP is cleared, the data cannot be
retrieved
Architectural Security
FPT_SEP.1 Resistance to logical attacks
FPT_RVM.1 Ensuring that the TSF cannot be bypassed
The TOE Banksys DEP/PCI was evaluated by:
TNO ITSEF BV
Oude Waalsdorperweg 63
PO Box 96864
2509 JG The Hague
The Netherlands.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
B-6
The evaluation was completed on 17th
June 2003. The TNO ITSEF BV is an
evaluation facility recognised by BSI (ITSEF)8
.
The sponsor and developer is:
Banksys N.V.
Haachtsesteenweg 14
1130 Brussels
Belgium
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL3+
(Evaluation Assurance Level 3 augmented). The assurance level is augmented
by: ADV_FSP.2 – Fully defined external interfaces. Additionally the assurance
component ATE_FUN.1 - Functional Testing was refined in the Security Target
of the TOE (refer to [6], chapter 5.2).
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Banksys DEP/PCI provides the following Security Functions:
Name Function
Cryptographic Security Functions
KEY_1 AES cryptographic key generation service
CRYPT_1 AES encryption/decryption service
CRYPT_2 AES CBC-MAC generation service
KEY_2 DES/3DES cryptographic key generation service
CRYPT_3 DES/3DES encryption/decryption service
CRYPT_4 DES/3DES CBC-MAC generation service
KEY_3 RSA cryptographic key generation service
CRYPT_5 RSA encryption/decryption service
CRYPT_6 RSA signature creation/verification service
CRYPT_7 SHA-1, SHA-256 and MD5 hash generation service
RND_1 Random number generation service
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003 Certification Report
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Name Function
Loading and Saving Security Functions
LOAD_1 Loading of signed applications via the PCI interface
LOAD_2 Loading of application keys via a trusted channel
BACKUP_1 Backup of application keys via the PCI interface
BACKUP_2 Restore applications keys previously backed-up
ERASE_1 Deletion of application software and all keys maintaining the
authority level of the TOE
ERASE_2 Deletion of application keys maintaining the authority level
of the TOE
Security Functions for the Management of the TOE
CZAM_1 Trusted channel between TOE and smart card reader C-
ZAM/DEP for identification and authentication of
administrative roles.
MODE_1 Deletion of all application software and keys if TOE is
brought to NONE level
MODE_2 Assignment of TOE to specific customer and setting of TOE
mode
MODE_3 Entering authority level INIT
MODE_4 Entering authority level BKS by a certain role by using the
trusted channel
MODE_5 Entering authority level CUST by a certain role by using the
trusted channel
MANAGE_1 Enable/disable/limit (time/number of execution) of individual
security functions.
MANAGE_2 Disable certain security functions by default
Tampering / Abnormal conditions Security Functions
ALARM_1 The TOE is able to detect tamper events (physical
penetration, chemical penetration, removal of the cover,
unusual temperatures, unusual voltage, removal of the TOE
from its PCI slot, unusual physical acceleration of the TOE)
LOG_1 Tamper events (refer to ALARM_1) are logged by the TOE
REACT_1 The TOE moves back to NONE state upon detection of a
tamper event
PROT_1 The TOE is enclosed in a hard casing which is hard to
penetrate (tamper resistant)
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
B-8
Name Function
Architectural Security Functions
ARCH_1 The internal code and data of the TOE cannot be modified
ARCH_2 Protection of application software and keys against
modification
ARCH_3 Protection of application keys against disclosure
ARCH_4 No ability to bypass the security functions
Note: Only the titles of the SF and a short summary are provided here because
they are very granular and almost self-explanatory. Please refer for a precise
definition of the SF to the Security Target of the TOE ([6], chapter 6.1)
1.3 Strength of Function
No strength of function was claimed for the TOE.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
A summary of the threats defined in [6], chapter 3.3 is provided here. For the
precise description of the threats and any subject, object and operation used in
that description please refer to [6]:
T.UNAUT_APPLICATION_LOAD
An attacker tries to load/replace Application Software.
T.UNAUT_KEY_LOAD
An attacker tries to load/replace Application Keys.
T.UNAUT_KEY_BACKUP
An attacker tries to backup/restore Application Keys.
T.UNAUT_BACKUP_DISCLOSURE
An attacker tries to get notice of backed-up Application Keys.
T.UNAUT_ERASE
An attacker tries to delete Application Software and/or Application Keys
without resetting the TOE
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER
An attacker tries to modify the TOE or the Application Software to read out
Application Keys by physically tampering with the TOE.
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER
An attacker tries to modify the TOE or the Application Software to read out
Application Keys by logically tampering with the TOE.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003 Certification Report
B-9
T.BAD_RANDOM
An attacker tries to predict information on random numbers and/or keys
generated by the TOE (based on a poor random number generator).
T.IMPERSONATE
An attacker tries to impersonate as a certain administrative role. A certain
administrative role tries to impersonate as another administrative role.
Note that not all threats are entirely averted by the TOE. Instead, additional
support from the TOE’s environment is needed. For information which parts are
averted by the TOE and which by the environment of the TOE, please refer to
[6], chapter 8.1 (Security Objective Rationale) and to chapter 4.3.
The TOE has to comply to the following Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs). Note that only a summary of the policies is provided in this report. For
the detailed and precise definition refer to [6], chapter 3.4:
P.SERVICES_EVAL
The subject S.HOST_APPL (Application Software residing on a host) can
obtain the following services from the TOE:
- AES key generation, encryption, decryption and CBC-MAC
generation
- DES/3DES key generation, encryption, decryption and CBC-
MAC generation
- RSA key generation, encryption, decryption, signature creation,
signature verification
- SHA-1, SHA-256 and MD5 hashing
- Random number generation
Keys can either be loaded into the TOE or generated by the TOE.
P.AUTHORITY_LEVELS
The TOE is always in exactly one of the following Authority Levels: NONE
(non authority state), INIT (initialised state), BKS (personalised state) or
CUST (operational state). For a detailed description of the Authority Levels
refer to [6] chapter 2.5.
P.AUTHORITY_LEVEL_CHANGE
The following rules shall be enforced:
- Anyone with physical access to the TOE can move the TOE to
authority level NONE (Note that the TOE is reset and sensitive
data is erased).
- Anyone with logical access to the TOE can move the TOE from
authority level NONE to INIT.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
B-10
- Only the subject S.INIT_ADM can move the TOE from INIT to
BKS authority level.
- Only the subject S.BKS_ADM can move the TOE from BKS to
CUST authority level.
P.ADMIN
Once in CUST authority level the TOE can be managed as follows:
- Application Software (D.DEP_APPL) can be loaded into the
TOE.
- Application Keys (D.APPL_KEYS) can be loaded by a certain
administrator using a C-ZAM/DEP.
- Application Keys can be backed-up.
- Backed-up Application Keys can be restored.
- Application Keys and Application Software can be deleted
without resetting the TOE.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
According to the Security Target ([6], chapter 2.5.2) the TOE supports three
different modes of operation: DEV, TST and LIV. It is claimed in the ST that the
functionality the TOE provides in each mode is exactly the same. The difference
between the modes are the initial secrets which were chosen in each mode.
The TOE that was evaluated is the DEP/PCI using the application EVAL, that
was developed as dedicated software for the evaluation. The evaluated mode is
the TST mode, the other modes were not evaluated.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The TOE uses standard PC hardware that supports a PCI interface. A smart
card reader/encoder called C-ZAM/DEP together with the respective smart
cards (called DCCs = DEP Control Cards) is needed for administrative
purposes. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 2.2.
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target.
The following constraints are based on the assumptions defined in [6], chapter
3.2. (Please refer to the Security Target for the precise definition):
A.ADMIN
Only trustworthy personnel administers the TOE. The personnel is
adequately trained and keeps their confidential information (like PINs and
passwords) secret.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003 Certification Report
B-11
A.ENABLE_PROTECT
Whenever an operation of the TOE is enabled, anyone with logical access
to the TOE may use this operation. Therefore the environment has to
ensure that only authorised use is made of that operation.
A.SIGN_SOFTWARE
The Administrator ensures that Application Software (i) is correct, (ii) has
the right capabilities and (iii) suitably protects access to all cryptographic
keys before the Application Software is signed.
A.SECURE_ROOM
The TOE is used in a “Server-Room” environment restricting physical
access only to necessary personnel.
A.KEY_GEN
Any keys generated outside the TOE are generated in a confidential way,
are unique with a high probability and cryptographically strong.
The following constraints are based on Security Objectives which have to be
met by the TOE environment. Theses objectives are defined in [6], chapter 4.2.
(Please refer to the Security Target for the precise definition):
OE.RANDOM_TEST
The quality of the random number generator of the TOE shall be tested by
means implemented in the TOE environment
OE.TRAFFIC
The IT environment shall protect sensitive data in transit between the TOE
and the Host Application using the TOE.
1.7 Disclaimers
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. The rating of the strength of functions does not include
the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section
4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by
the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product
by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation is called:
Banksys DEP/PCI Version 3.0
The following list summarises the TOE components and defines the evaluated
configuration of the TOE:
Hardware DEP/PCI, Version 3.0:
PCI Card, Version 701.2 and Alarm Card, Version 702.2
Alarm Processor Software, Version 2.0.b
Boot Software, Version 1.0.d:
Boot Command Handler, Boot Library CZAM, Boot Library STD,
Boot ToolBox
Application Software, Version 1.0.i:
Command Handler, Library CZAM, Library STD, ToolBox
Software
Application Software, Version 1.0.i:
EVAL Library
The following guidance documents are supplied together with the TOE. The
Guidance have to be followed to ensure an evaluation conformant operation of
the TOE.
Administrator
Guidance
- DEP/NT Documentation –
DEP/NT Installation Guide version 02.01
- DEP/PCI –
Customer Security Officer: Guidelines version 1.0 (10)
- DEP/PCI –
Customer Host Programmers Guidelines version 1.0 (1)
- DEP/NT Documentation –
DEP/NT C-ZAM/DEP User Manual version 02.03
- DEP/NT Documentation –
DEP/NT PC-AUX Program User Manual version 02.01
- DEP/NT Documentation –
DEP/NT Host Interface Supervision User Manual
version 02.01
- DEP/NT Documentation –
DEP/NT DEP Handler Supervision User Manual
version 02.03
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003 Certification Report
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Evaluated
version
specific user
guidance
- Common Criteria Software –
Integration Manual version 1.0 (10)
- Subset of Eval Library for DEP –
Reference DFS Manual version 2.0 (12)
- DEP/PCI –
Security Target version 1.1 (4)
- DEP/PCI –
Guidance Documentation – Erratum version 1.0 (1)
General user
guidance
- Subset STD Library for DEP –
Ref DFS Manual version 3.5 (8)
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
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3 Security Policy
The TOE is a tamper-resistant and tamper-responsive host security module. Its
main purpose is to provide cryptographic services and means to securely load
an application and keys into it. Only authorised personnel can enable the
loading of applications and/or keys.
Therefore the Security Policy of the TOE is defined by the following TOE
security functional requirements:
- FDP_ACC.1+1 and FDP_ACF.1+1 defining the DEP Application
Policy, a Security Policy for loading applications into the TOE.
- FDP_ACC.1+2 and FDP_ACF.1+2 defining the DEP Application Key
Policy, a Security Policy for loading/backup/restore/erasing
application keys into the TOE.
- FDP_ACC.1+3 and FDP_ACF.1+3 defining the DEP Executing
Policy, a Security Policy that controls access to operations of the
TOE.
A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is
given in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003 Certification Report
B-15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the Organisational Security Policies to which the TOE complies the
following usage assumptions arise (for the detailed and precise definition refer
to [6], chapter 3.4):
- The subject S.HOST_APPL (Application Software residing on a host)
can obtain the following services from the TOE:
- AES key generation, encryption, decryption and CBC-MAC
generation
- DES/3DES key generation, encryption, decryption and CBC-
MAC generation
- RSA key generation, encryption, decryption, signature creation,
signature verification
- SHA-1, SHA-256 and MD5 hashing
- Random number generation
Keys can either be loaded into the TOE or generated by the TOE.
- The TOE is always in exactly one of the following Authority Levels:
NONE (non authority state), INIT (initialised state), BKS (personalised
state) or CUST (operational state). For a detailed description of the
Authority Levels refer to [6] chapter 2.5.
- The following rules shall be enforced:
- Anyone with physical access to the TOE can move the TOE to
authority level NONE (Note that the TOE is reset and sensitive
data is erased).
- Anyone with logical access to the TOE can move the TOE from
authority level NONE to INIT.
- Only the subject S.INIT_ADM can move the TOE from INIT to
BKS authority level.
- Only the subject S.BKS_ADM can move the TOE from BKS to
CUST authority level.
- Once in CUST authority level the TOE can be managed as follows:
- Application Software (D.DEP_APPL) can be loaded into the
TOE.
- Application Keys (D.APPL_KEYS) can be loaded by a certain
administrator using a C-ZAM/DEP.
- Application Keys can be backed-up.
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- Backed-up Application Keys can be restored.
- Application Keys and Application Software can be deleted
without resetting the TOE.
Based on personnel assumptions the following usage conditions exist:
- Only trustworthy personnel administers the TOE. The personnel is
adequately trained and keeps their confidential information (like PINs
and passwords) secret.
- Whenever an operation of the TOE is enabled, anyone with logical
access to the TOE may use this operation. Therefore the environment
has to ensure that only authorised used is made of that operation.
- The Administrator ensures that Application Software (i) is correct, (ii)
has the right capabilities and (iii) suitably protects access to all
cryptographic keys before the Application Software is signed.
- Any keys generated outside the TOE are generated in a confidential
way, are unique with a high probability and cryptographically strong.
- The quality of the random number generator of the TOE shall be tested
by means implemented in the TOE environment
For a detailed description of the usage assumptions refer to the Security Target
[6], especially chapter 3.2 and 4.2
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.2 and
4.2):
- The TOE is used in a “Server-Room” environment restricting physical
access only to necessary personnel.
- The IT environment shall protect sensitive data in transit between the
TOE and the Host Application using the TOE.
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 8 of this report.
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4.3 Clarification of scope
The threats listed below are not (entirely) averted by the TOE. Additional
support from the operating environment of the TOE is necessary (for detailed
information about the threats and how the environment may cover them refer to
the Security Target [6], especially chapter 3.3 and chapter 8.1).
- T.UNAUT_APPLICATION_LOAD
- T.UNAUT_KEY_LOAD
- T.UNAUT_KEY_BACKUP
- T.UNAUT_ERASE
- T.BAD_RANDOM
- T.EAVESDROP
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5 Architectural Information
TOE definition
Physically the TOE consists of a PCI card with a main processor and an alarm
processor. Wired paper, epoxy potting and a steel enclosure shield both
processors.
TSF
C-ZAM
AUX1
AUX2
PCI BRIDGE
PWR Supply & batteries
Main processor +
cryptographic
subpart
Alarm processor
subpart + sensors
RAM
sensor
sensor
sensor
Figure 1: TOE-Hardware.
TOE functionality
The DEP/PCI delivers services to the environment depending on the software
that is loaded. The TOE is a special implementation of the DEP/PCI, which
delivers cryptographic services and protects the software and keys loaded
against tampering.
The cryptographic services delivered are AES/DES/RSA key generation and
verification, hashing, and random number generation.
The confidentiality and integrity of all data in the DEP/PCI is protected:
- Physically, by tamper resistance and tamper responsive hardware,
- Logically, by only allowing well-defined interfaces and using access
control (permissions to execute a specific task).
DCC
DCC
DEP/PCI
(TOE)
Workstation
with PCI bus
Host
C-ZAM/DEP
DCC
Figure 2: The TOE in its environment.
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Note: A smart card reader/encoder called C-ZAM/DEP together with the
respective smart cards (called DCCs = DEP Control Cards) is used for
administrative purposes. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter
2.2.
Components of the TOE
The TOE is Banksys DEP/PCI version 3.0, with:
- PCI card 701.2
- Alarm card 702.2
- Boot Software 1.0.d
- Alarm software 2.0.b
The software components are compiled in the file:
- Application Software ‘Common Criteria’ version 1.0.i
Additionally, the final documentation that was delivered as evaluation evidence
(please refer to chapter 2 of this report for more detail).
External interfaces of the TOE
The TOE has four hardware interfaces:
PCI-bridge interface
This is used for communication (through the Command Handler) with the
Boot Library STD, the Library STD and the Library EVAL.
CZAM/DEP interface
This is used for communication (through the Command Handler) with the
CZAM Boot Library and the CZAM library.
AUX 1 is not used.
The Library EVAL does not use the AUX1 interface.
AUX 2 is used for:
- Authentication of the DEP/PCI Alarm Processor Section hardware,
- Reading of alarm status and alarm logging,
- Alarm processor administration purposes.
Additionally, the TOE has a number of sensors that trigger an alarm. These
sensors are: light sensor, temperature sensor, motion sensor, voltage sensor,
and additionally copper & silver wiring against physical and chemical
penetration.
Finally, the enclosure of the logic parts in epoxy potting and a steel enclosure
are security functions of the TOE.
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Software components
The software components available are:
- (Boot) C-ZAM/DEP Library (also known as CZD or DS3)
- (Boot) STanDard Library (also known as STD)
- Application Library EVAL
- (Boot) Command Handler
- Alarm Software
Some components are available during boot of the TOE and during operation.
The application library EVAL is only available once the TOE is in operation
(Authority Level CUST, TST mode, Application loaded).
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
[8] DEP/NT Documentation – DEP/NT Installation Guide, banksys,
Version 02.01
[9] DEP/PCI – Customer Security Officer: Guidelines, banksys,
Version 1.0 (10)
[10] DEP/PCI – Customer Host Programmers Guidelines, banksys,
Version 1.0 (1)
[11] DEP/NT Documentation – DEP/NT C-ZAM/DEP User Manual, banksys,
Version 02.03
[12] DEP/NT Documentation – DEP/NT PC-AUX Program User Manual,
banksys, Version 02.01
[13] DEP/NT Documentation – DEP/NT Host Interface Supervision User
Manual, banksys, Version 02.01
[14] DEP/NT Documentation – DEP/NT DEP Handler Supervision User
Manual, banksys, Version 02.03
[15] Common Criteria Software – Integration Manual, banksys,
Version 1.0 (10)
[16] Subset of Eval Library for DEP – Reference DFS Manual, banksys,
Version 2.0 (12)
[17] DEP/PCI – Security Target, banksys, Version 1.1 (4)
[18] DEP/PCI – Guidance Documentation – Erratum, banksys, Version 1.0 (1)
[19] Subset STD Library for DEP – Ref DFS Manual, banksys, Version 3.5 (8)
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198-2003
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7 IT Product Testing
Test Schedule
Testing took place during 21 October 2002 and 28 February 2003.
Test configuration
The test configuration was a rack-mountable PC running the Windows NT 4.0
Workstation SP4 operating system. The TOE was mounted in the PCI interface
of the PC. A dedicated Test Suite was installed on the PC to enable the
automated test scripts to be run.
For the independent evaluator testing as well as for the penetration testing the
same test configuration was used by evaluation lab.
Note: The TOE was tested in TST mode, the modes DEV (developer mode)
and LIV (operational mode) were not tested. The only difference between DEV,
LIV and TST mode is the (initial) set of keys that is used. Please refer to
chapter 1.5 for more details.
Depth/Coverage of Testing
The developer has done substantial functional testing of all externally visible
interfaces, including tests that check out-of-range values. The evaluators
repeated most of the developer tests (because of the highly automated testing
approach of the developer) and conducted additional independent tests and
penetrations tests.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration:
All the tests have been performed on the configuration defined above.
Testing approach:
The developer has highly automated the software testing by using scripts which
can be run in a dedicated test suite. These automatic test were supplemented
by manual tests for the TOE hardware and the random number generator.
Testing results:
The results of the tests are that all test cases show the expected behaviour in
the evaluated configuration.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration
All the tests have been performed on the configuration defined above.
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Testing approach:
Since the developer has automated his tests to a great extent, the evaluation
lab repeated almost all tests. These developer tests have been supplemented
by test cases generated by the evaluation lab (including supplementary test for
the random number generator and the key generation).
Evaluator penetration testing:
Penetration tests have been performed by the evaluation lab to assess possible
vulnerabilities found during the evaluation of the different CC assurance
classes. Furthermore some penetration tests have been carried out to verify
some of the claims the developer made in its vulnerability assessment.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
According to the Security Target the evaluated configuration of the TOE (as
specified in chapter 2 of this report) is defined as follows (refer to Security
Target [6]):
- The TOE uses standard PC hardware that supports a PCI interface.
- A smart card reader/encoder called C-ZAM/DEP together with the
respective smart cards (called DCCs = DEP Control Cards) is needed
for administrative purposes.
According to the Security Target ([6], chapter 2.5.2) the TOE supports three
different modes of operation: DEV, TST and LIV. It is claimed in the ST that the
functionality the TOE provides in each mode is exactly the same. The difference
between the modes are the initial secrets which were chosen in each mode.
The TOE that was evaluated is the DEP/PCI using the application EVAL, that
was developed as dedicated software for the evaluation. The evaluated mode is
the TST mode, the other modes were not evaluated.
The TOE is used in a “Server-Room” environment restricting physical access
only to necessary personnel.
The IT environment shall protect sensitive data in transit between the TOE and
the Host Application using the TOE.
For setting up / configuring the TOE all guidance documents have to be
followed (refer to chapter 6 of this report).
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Common Evaluation Methodology [2],
the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the
Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL3
augmented by ADV_FSP.2, the refined ATE_FUN.1 component and the
Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table:
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Authorisation Control ACM_CAP.3 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery Procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Examination of Guidance AVA_MSU.1 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
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Note that no strength of function claim has been made in the Security Target.
Hence the requirements of AVA_SOF.1 were implicitly fulfilled.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the product Banksys
DEP/PCI Version 3.0 in the configuration as defined in the Security Target and
summarised in this report (refer to the Security Target [6] and the chapters 2, 4
and 8 of this report). The validity can be extended to new versions and releases
of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified
product, and if the evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any
security deficiencies.
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10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6) contains necessary
information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage
of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the
Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to be taken into
account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance in these
documents.
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11 Annexes
None.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
3DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BKS Banksys Authority Level of the TOE
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CBC Cyber Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CUST Customer Authority Level of the TOE
DCC DEP Control Card
DEP Data Encryption Peripheral
DES Data Encryption Standard
DEV Development mode of the DEP/PCI
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
INIT Initial Authority Level of the TOE
IT Information Technology
LIV Live mode of the DEP/PCI
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD Message Digest
NONE None Authority Level of the TOE
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SOF Strength of Function
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ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TP TSF Protection
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TST TST mode of the DEP/PCI
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
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SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE:
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] DEP/PCI Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0198, Version 1.1 (4), banksys,
2003-05-08
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0198, Version 3.0, TNO-
ITSEF BV, 2003-06-17 (confidential document)
User Guidance Documentation:
[8] DEP/NT Documentation – DEP/NT Installation Guide, banksys,
Version 02.01
[9] DEP/PCI – Customer Security Officer: Guidelines, banksys,
Version 1.0 (10)
[10] DEP/PCI – Customer Host Programmers Guidelines, banksys,
Version 1.0 (1)
[11] DEP/NT Documentation – DEP/NT C-ZAM/DEP User Manual, banksys,
Version 02.03
[12] DEP/NT Documentation – DEP/NT PC-AUX Program User Manual,
banksys, Version 02.01
[13] DEP/NT Documentation – DEP/NT Host Interface Supervision User
Manual, banksys, Version 02.01
[14] DEP/NT Documentation – DEP/NT DEP Handler Supervision User
Manual, banksys, Version 02.03
[15] Common Criteria Software – Integration Manual, banksys,
Version 1.0 (10)
[16] Subset of Eval Library for DEP – Reference DFS Manual, banksys,
Version 2.0 (12)
[17] DEP/PCI – Security Target, banksys, Version 1.1 (4)
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[18] DEP/PCI – Guidance Documentation – Erratum, banksys, Version 1.0 (1)
[19] Subset STD Library for DEP – Ref DFS Manual, banksys, Version 3.5 (8)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“