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Reference: 2017‐3‐INF‐2526‐v1
Target: Público
Date: 11.10.2018
Created by: CERT11
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2017‐3
TOE FusionAccess Software version V100R006C20
Applicant 440301192W ‐ HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.
References
[EXT‐3261] Certification Request
[EXT‐4304] Evaluation Technical Report
Certification report of the product FusionAccess Software version V100R006C20, as requested in
[EXT‐3261] dated 17/01/2017, and evaluated by Epoche & Espri S.L.U., as detailed in the Evaluation
Technical Report [EXT‐4304] received on 28/09/2018.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.....................................................................................5
IDENTIFICATION.............................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES.........................................................................................................................6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON‐COVERED THREATS ............................................................................6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY .........................................................................6
ARCHITECTURE...............................................................................................................................7
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE .............................................................................................................7
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE............................................................................................................8
DOCUMENTS..................................................................................................................................9
PRODUCT TESTING.........................................................................................................................9
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION......................................................................................................10
EVALUATION RESULTS..................................................................................................................11
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM ..........................................11
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................11
GLOSSARY....................................................................................................................................11
BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................................................12
SECURITY TARGET ........................................................................................................................12
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS........................................................................................................13
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS‐MRA).................................................13
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA) ...............................................................13
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product
FusionAccess Software version V100R006C20.
This is a virtualization product that centralises and delivers virtual desktops and applications to end
users. End users can access their virtual desktops and applications wherever connection is available.
The TOE provides a web portal graphical user interface (GUI) for administrators to quickly provision,
maintain, and reclaim virtual desktops and applications. This helps to elastically manage virtual
resources, improve resource utilization, and reduce operational expenditure (OPEX).
Developer/manufacturer: HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN).
ITSEF: Epoche & Espri S.L.U.
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 EAL3 + ALC_FLR.2
Evaluation end date: 28/09/2018.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL3 (augmented with ALC_FLR.2)
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Epoche & Espri S.L.U. assigns
the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL3
+ ALC_FLR.2, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1 R4.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product FusionAccess Software version V100R006C20, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The TOE provides the following key security features:
 Identification and Authentication: Only authenticated local administrators can access
management portal to provision, maintain, and reclaim virtual desktops and applications. If
authentication is failed, local administrator cannot access the TOE. Only authenticated end
users can access AccessClient application and WI web portal to gain access to virtual desktops
and published applications assigned by a local administrator. In case of multiple authentication
failure in a row the affected account is locked to avoid unauthorized access.
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 Security Audit: An operation log records the operations that a local administrator has
performed on the system and the result of the operation and is used for tracing and auditing.
Only local administrator can review and query the records. Operation logs are stored in such a
way that unauthorized modifications are prevented.
 User access policy: local administrator can assign virtual desktops and applications to end
users. End users only can access to their permitted virtual desktops and applications. Local
administrator can set end user access policy to determine whether the end users can access to
local device resources such as USB device, the clipboard or local drivers.
 Secure communications: TOE server can be accessed by TLS creating a trusted path between
the TOE and the end user.
 Security management: local administrator is able to configure the password policy, the user
attributes, set lock timeouts, lock/unlock accounts, end user access control policy, and local
resource policy. The TOE is able to manage different user roles.
 TOE Access: The TOE is able to manage the concurrent multiple sessions by limiting the number
of active sessions per user. The TOE is also able to terminate an interactive session after an
inactivity period of time.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL3 and the
evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.2, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R4.
Class Family/Component
ADV Development ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.3, ADV_TDS.2
AGD Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1
ALC Life‐Cycle Support
ALC_CMC.3, ALC_CMS.3, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1,
ALC_FLR.2
ASE Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2,
ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1
ATE Tests ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2
AVA Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.2
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SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to
Common Criteria v3.1 R4:
Class Component
FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.3
FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.3
FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_SOS.1
FIA_UID.2/end user
FIA_UID.2/local administrator
FIA_UAU.2/end user
FIA_UAU.2/local administrator
FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT: Protection of the Security Functions FTP_TRP.1
FTA: TOE Access
FTA_MCS.1
FTA_SSL.3
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IDENTIFICATION
Product: FusionAccess Software version V100R006C20
Security Target: Huawei FusionAccess V100R006C20 Security Target, Version 1.4, 2018‐09‐27 [ST].
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 EAL3 + ALC_FLR.2.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product FusionAccess Software version V100R006C20 shall implement a set of
security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the [ST], chapter 3.5 (Organizational Security Policies).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The assumptions detailed in [ST], chapter 3.4 (Assumptions) are constraints to the conditions used
to assure the security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the identified
vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON‐COVERED THREATS
The threats detailed in [ST], chapter 3.3 (Threats) do not suppose a risk for the product
FusionAccess Software version V100R006C20, although the agents implementing attacks have the
attack potential according to the Basic attack potential of EAL3 and always fulfilling the usage
assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
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The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are detailed in [ST], chapter
4.2 (Security Objectives for the Operational Environment).
The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and organisational
security policies) and the TOE security requirements are included in the associated security target
[ST].
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The following figure provides an architectural overview of the product FusionAccess Software
version V100R006C20, the elements displayed with a blue background are components of the TOE.
The TOE is composed by following components:
Component Function Description
ITA The ITA provides interfaces for administrator to manage
desktops and application. It interacts with the HDC
and FusionSphere to create and assign VMs, manage VM status
and images, and operate and maintain VMs.
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HDC As the core of the virtual desktop management software, the
HDC manages desktop groups, assigns VMs to users, un‐assign
VMs from users, and enables users to log in to VMs after
receiving requests from the ITA.
License The license component manages and distributes licenses for
the HDC and restricts the amount of users who login virtual
desktop.
WI The WI provides a web login page for end users. After an end
user initiates a login request, the WI forwards the user login
information (the encrypted username and password) to the AD
for authentication. If the authentication succeeds, the WI
displays a desktop and application list provided by the HDC to
the user. The user can choose a desktop or application from
the list to log in.
vLB/vAG The vLB implements load balancing of WIs to prevent a large
number of users from accessing the same WI (in case of there
are more than one instance for each TOE component). The vAG
serves as the access gateway to connect to the elements
located at the internal network.
AccessClient AccessClient installed on user devices and enabled HDP
connections from user devices to virtual desktops and
published applications.
AccessAgent AccessAgent software installed on VMs and enables VMs to
interact with desktop management components
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The physical boundary of the TOE is integrated by the TOE Server and TOE Client components.
The TOE Server components consist of ITA, WI, HDC, License, vLB/vAG and AccessAgent (which is
installed in the managed VMs). The TOE Client component is the AccessClient running on a user
device.
The TOE software packages are binary compressed files. The following software packages and
documents are required:
Type Name Version Delivery Format
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Software FusionAccess V100R006C20 .iso file
Software FusionAccess Client V100R006C20 .msi file
Software FusionAccess Tools V100R006C20 .iso file
Document [AGD_PRE] CC Huawei FusionAccess
V100R006C20 Preparative
procedures
0.7 .docx format
Document [AGD_OPE] CC Huawei FusionAccess
V100R006C20 Operational user
guidance
0.8 .docx format
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
Type Name Version Delivery Format
Document
[AGD_PRE] CC Huawei FusionAccess V100R006C20
Preparative procedures
0.7 .docx format
Document
[AGD_OPE] CC Huawei FusionAccess V100R006C20
Operational user guidance
0.8 .docx format
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been performed by
the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security
functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate to the
function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established
architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the
tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has repeated all the developer functional
tests in the evaluator premises.
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In addition, the laboratory has devised a test for each of the security function of the product
verifying that the obtained results are consistent with the results obtained by the developer.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results and, in the cases
where a deviation in respect to the expected results was present, the evaluator has confirmed that
this variation neither represents any security problem nor a decrease in the functional capacity of
the product.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are indicated below.
Therefore, for the operation of the product FusionAccess Software version V100R006C20 it is
necessary the disposition of the following components:
 Hardware platform1
in which the virtual servers can be installed.
 Huawei FusionSphere that virtualizes hardware resources so that one physical server can
function as multiple virtual machine:
 Item: v100R006C00U1_FusionSphereInstaller.zip
 Item: FusionCompute V100R006C00U1_VRM.zip
 Item: FusionCompute V100R006C00U1_CNA.iso
 The TOE components and non‐TOE components which are virtualized inside the cloud
platform, which are:
 WI/ITA/HDC/License server and vLB/vAG server with SUSE Linux Enterprise Server11
SP3
 The WI/ITA/HDC/License server has a Database with Huawei GaussDBV100R003C10
 AccessAgent for virtual desktop with Microsoft Windows Windows Server 2012 R2
Standard and Microsoft .NET framework with version 1.6.20005.10694
(V100R006C20).
 A Domain controller with a Microsoft Active Directory Domain Service of Windows
Server 2012 R2 Standard.
 A PC with Windows 7 32‐bits operating system where CloudClient application is installed:
 CloudClient application with version 1.6.20005.0 (V100R006C20).
 A PC with Debian 9 placed between external network and internal network acting as a firewall,
with the configuration specified in the document [AGD_PRE].
1
The evaluated platform has been FusionServer H22H‐03 (RH2288H V3).
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EVALUATION RESULTS
The product FusionAccess Software version V100R006C20 has been evaluated against the Security
Target [ST].
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL3 + ALC_FLR.2 have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Epoche & Espri S.L.U. assigns the “PASS”
VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level
EAL3 + ALC_FLR.2, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1 R4.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
The TOE usage is recommended as there are not exploitable vulnerabilities for the TOE under its
operational environment.
The following usage recommendations are given:
 The fulfilment of the assumptions indicated in the security target is a key point as it implies
TOE environment configurations that leave some potential vulnerabilities out of the scope.
 The user guidance must be read and understood in order to operate the TOE in and
adequate manner according to the security target.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Epoche & Espri S.L.U., a positive resolution is proposed.
The certifier strongly recommends potential consumers to follow specific security instructions
provided in preparative [AGD_PRE] and operational guidance [AGD_OPE] as well as to observe the
assumptions provided in the Security Target [ST].
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
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EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target of Evaluation
VM Virtual Machine
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[AGD_OPE] FusionAccess V100R006C20. Operational User Guidance. Version 0.8, 2018‐08‐28
[AGD_PRE] FusionAccess V100R006C20. Preparative Procedures. Version 0.7, 2018‐08‐27
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1, R4 Final, September 2012.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, R4 Final, September 2012.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1, R4 Final, September 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1,
R4 Final, September 2012.
[ST] Huawei FusionAccess V100R006C20 Security Target, Version 1.4, 2018‐09‐27
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body:
 Huawei FusionAccess V100R006C20 Security Target, Version 1.4, 2018‐09‐27.
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates ‐ as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC ‐ under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS‐MRA)
The SOGIS‐Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS‐MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT‐Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT‐Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.org.
The SOGIS‐MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS‐MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA‐2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA‐2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA‐2000). Certificates based on CCRA‐
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA‐
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re‐certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA‐2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
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As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA‐2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR.