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Reference: 2021-41-INF-4381- v1
Target: Limitada al expediente
Date: 29.08.2024
Created by: CERT10
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2021-41
TOE DefensePro and APSolute Vision Attack Mitigation System (APSolute Vision
4.85.00, DefensePro 8.26.1.0)
Applicant 520044371 - Radware, LTD.
References
[EXT-7297] Certification request
[EXT-9066] Evaluation technical report
Certification report of the product DefensePro and APSolute Vision Attack Mitigation System
(APSolute Vision 4.85.00, DefensePro 8.26.1.0), as requested in [EXT-7297] dated 06/08/2024, and
evaluated by Applus Laboratories, as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-7297]
received on 03/05/2024.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................5
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................5
IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................................................................7
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................7
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS..................................................................................7
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ...............................................................................7
ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................................8
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ....................................................................................................................8
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE...................................................................................................................8
DOCUMENTS........................................................................................................................................10
PRODUCT TESTING...............................................................................................................................11
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .............................................................................................................12
EVALUATION RESULTS .........................................................................................................................14
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM...............................................14
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................................14
GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................................15
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................15
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)..............................................................15
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS...............................................................................................................16
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)......................................................16
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).....................................................................16
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product
DefensePro and APSolute Vision Attack Mitigation System (APSolute Vision 4.85.00, DefensePro
8.26.1.0).
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product
DefensePro and APSolute Vision Attack Mitigation System (APSolute Vision 4.85.00, DefensePro
8.26.1.0).
The TOE is a series of products which themselves are composed of two independent components:
the DefensePro 8.26.1.0 and the APSolute Vision 4.85.00. Either of them can be running directly on
a hardware appliance, or on a virtualized environment (Virtual Appliance).
The TOE is designed to act as a real-time perimeter attack mitigation system, securing organizations
against emerging network attacks, Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed-DoS (DDoS).
Developer/manufacturer: Radware, LTD.
Sponsor: Radware, LTD..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Applus Laboratories.
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL2.
Evaluation end date: 18/07/2024
Expiration Date1: 13/08/2029
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 have been assigned a “PASS”
verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole
evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL2, as defined by the Common
Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1 R5.
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product DefensePro and APSolute Vision Attack Mitigation System (APSolute Vision 4.85.00,
DefensePro 8.26.1.0), a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The TOE is composed of the DefensePro 8.26.1.0 (running on DefensePro appliances or in a Virtual
Appliance) and APSolute Vision 4.85.00 (running on APSolute Vision appliances or in a Virtual
Appliance). If the TOE is configured on bare-metal hardware, using the appliances defined in [ST]
section 2.2.3, the following diagram relates the evaluated elements.
FIGURE 1 - PHYSICAL SCOPE ON APPLIANCES
In case the TOE is running on a Virtual Appliance (VA), the TOE evaluated elements behave under a
logically equivalent diagram:
FIGURE 2 - PHYSICAL SCOPE ON VA
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The differences between the bare-metal and the Virtual Appliance configurations of the TOE are
only related to the throughput capacity, as the bare-metal system has specifically-selected
hardware that executes the filtering at a Layer 2/3 level, whereas the Virtual Appliances perform
the full filtering on the virtual NICs. In both cases the filtering results and the algorithms, which
determine whether the traffic is benign or not, are functionally equivalent. The hardware
acceleration is just performed on a specialized ASIC instead of the CPU to ensure a high-
performance throughput can be achieved, for carrier grade solutions. Therefore, even mixed
deployments, hardware AP and virtual DP, or vice versa, are equivalent and can be considered
another instance of the series of products.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL2,
according to Common Criteria v3.1 R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_TSS.1
ADV ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.2
ADV_TDS.1
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.2
ALC_CMS.2
ALC_DEL.1
ATE ATE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_VAN.2
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SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.4
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UID.2
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2
FTA_SSL.4
IDENTIFICATION
Product: DefensePro and APSolute Vision Attack Mitigation System (APSolute Vision 4.85.00,
DefensePro 8.26.1.0)
Security Target: DefensePro and APSolute Vision Security Target (v2.0, 16/04/2024)
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL2.
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SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product DefensePro and APSolute Vision Attack Mitigation System (APSolute Vision
4.85.00, DefensePro 8.26.1.0) shall implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of
different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 4.3 (“Organizational
Policies”).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 4.4 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product DefensePro and APSolute Vision Attack
Mitigation System (APSolute Vision 4.85.00, DefensePro 8.26.1.0), although the agents
implementing attacks have the attack potential according to the Basic attack potential of EAL2 and
always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Security Target,
section 4.2 (“Threats”).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 5.2 (“Security Objectives
for the operational Environment”).
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ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
This section summarizes the logical scope of the TOE.
SECURITY AUDIT
The TOE generates audit records for security-related events which are stored in the APSolute Vision
4.85.00 and DefensePro 8.26.1.0. In addition, the security-related logs generated in the DefensePro
8.26.1.0 are sent to the APSolute Vision 4.85.00.
The audit logs are protected from unauthorized modification and deletion.
USER DATA PROTECTION
The TOE achieves information flow control applying different policies and rules to the traffic that
passes through its interfaces. Information flow control is used by the TOE to mitigate denial of
service attacks.
IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
The different parts of the TOE present a different set of roles. The TOE requires that the users
associated with those roles must be identified and authenticated before granting them access to
the TOE and its security functions. Users can authenticate through the different management
interfaces using their username and password, but in the evaluated configuration all access and
management will be done through the AP.
SECURITY MANAGEMENT
The APSolute Vision 4.85.00 provides remote management capabilities of the TOE via the
management interfaces (HTTPS-AP). The security management functionality allows to configure
users, roles and all of the other configuration objects (policies and profiles) needed to manage the
data flow control.
TOE ACCESS
The TOE allows user-initiated session termination for its management interfaces (HTTPS-AP).
PHYSICAL SCOPE
This section outlines the physical scope of the TOE and all of the complementary parts needed for
the proper usage of the TOE.
Radware maintains a single code base where all of the product features (TSF included) are
implemented. The code base is then compiled and packaged specifically for each of the supported
underlying platforms, resulting in multiple images. Thus, any change to the code base is observable
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and applicable to all platforms, guaranteeing the complete equivalency at the functional and
security level.
DEFENSEPRO 8.26.1.0 PHYSICAL APPLIANCES
The physical appliances may not include the correct version of the TOE, hence when the appliance
is received the end user must perform an upgrade process in order to upgrade the TOE to its
correct version.
File Name Hardware Platform SHA-256
DefensePro_6-20-60-110-220-
200-400_v8-26-1-0-b93.tgz
DefensePro 6
DefensePro 20
DefensePro 60
DefensePro 110
DefensePro 200
DefensePro 220
DefensePro 400
47F14F430F662E7416AC999CF
B1AB9E4B61B01146B11105F1
D0690BE19800BD2
APSOLUTE VISION 4.85.00 PHYSICAL APPLIANCES
The physical appliances may not include the correct version of the TOE hence when the appliance is
received, the end user must perform a re-installation process in order to setup the TOE to its
correct version.
File Name Hardware Platform SHA-256
APSoluteVision-USB-4-85-00-
40-x86_64.iso
APSolute Vision Server ODS-
VL2
ECBA902692528E3995693B385
C5BC8649021BC09FEAE1EBFA4
5E760835EB3922
DEFENSEPRO 8.26.1.0 VIRTUAL APPLIANCES
The virtual appliances (VA) correspond to images used to deploy virtual machines containing the
DefensePro 8.26.1.0. The VAs always come as a complete DefensePro 8.26.1.0 instance for each
supported platform and/or format:
File Name Virtualization Platform SHA-256
DefensePro_VA_v8-26-1-0-
b93_ISO_KVM.iso
KVM (ISO Format)
193F3E67CC56F7A6A2A880F74
E2F452395A3308271C8B70349
1EF0F84FD26A24
DefensePro_VA_v8-26-1-0-
b93_Full_Install_KVM.tgz
KVM (tgz Format) B8D0D68695159AF3AFCE3042
95C78D9D6223E9C0C6E8767A
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81AB7E3B8498CA33
DefensePro_VA_v8-26-1-0-
b93_Full_Install_VMware.ova
VMWare
E1546ED74372058425AFC8D67
4AA741CF3D77E93E071BB938
6742CA7E6458034
APSOLUTE VISION 4.85.00 VIRTUAL APPLIANCES
The virtual appliances (VA) correspond to images used to deploy virtual machines containing the
APSolute Vision 4.85.00. The VAs always come as a complete APSolute Vision 4.85.00 instance for
each supported platform and/or format:
File Name Virtualization Platform SHA-256
APSoluteVision-4-85-00-43-
x86_64.iso
Generic
AB37D4EC44A998BB3976851A
E543FE9933A303EC2CDE97591
158CE0E65412256
Vision-4-85-00-
KVM_43_prod.qcow2
KVM (OpenStack)
4AB4579C0BA21C8AF7E0D6F9
D54CADB96841FAFB1846E404
FB403F03D58F9005
Vision-4-85-00-
VMware_43_Basic.ova
VMWare (OVA Format)
2C251F27F8E5CBF0A12B0CAC0
43604FAD8A41268C776FA4541
BC38BB974F0A44
SUPPORTING SOFTWARE FOR APSOLUTE VISION 4.85.00
The APSolute Vision 4.85.00 physical appliances need some software scripts to allow it to create a
bootable USB.
File Name Hardware Platform SHA-256
Vision-4-85-00-usb-boot-
ODSVL2-43.tar.gz
APSolute Vision Server ODS-
VL2
CC929F1285C967BA9665FE27B
F1E009C50DF02E95AF81E8061
2F47FF7FAF3403
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
The main CC documentation that is provided as part of the TOE delivery is:
Document Name Version SHA-256
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DefensePro and APSolute
Vision Common Criteria Guide
1.8
393cad5378801691a3ec871d8
80792dc3b601dd960dadebd70
41481adb10fdc1
Additionally, the following complementary documentation is also provided as part of the TOE
delivery:
Document Name Document ID SHA-256
APSolute Vision Installation and
Maintenance Guide
RDWR_APSV_V485_IG2203
FDCC14CEC98F7D073F0B57CF8
D88099F4707F0D918FA583D4
CC65B073DC0D597
APSolute Vision User Guide RDWR-APSV-V048500_UG2203
C71F598A108EDAE18293288B0
267FD39CFB28C38083EB09258
E06AC2DCB67DEA
DefensePro Installation and
Maintenance Guide
RDWR_DP_IG_2309
F3C37B7486942BF93B9BAFB7C
B9E9681FC83A1CCF26237F890
8B7D3356E17930
DefensePro User Guide RDWR-DP-V082610_UG2112
53B45E7C5444589494CC87F26
0780276365B93253579016939
0D3CCE14EF6B1A
DefensePro VA Installation and
Maintenance Guide
RDWR-DPVA_IG2112
A6EE6AFFD7CF0CCDCA03A700
8E32774C8B9E53445A006858F
839044272EAC419
Furthermore, the TOE includes via its Web Management Interface complementary information
describing each parameter. This Online Help is delivered as part of the APSolute Vision 4.85.00 and
can be accessed through its Web Management Interface by clicking on the “?” button.
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed tests for all the TOE TSFIs and a subset of the TOE SFRs. All the tests
have been performed by the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result. During the
evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security functionality that
covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate to the function that is intended
to test. All the tests have been executed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established
architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the
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tests match the expected results. To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has
repeated all the developer functional tests.
In addition, the lab has devised independent test cases to complement the testing performed by
the developer. The devised independent test cases aimed to test the SFRs that were not covered by
the developer testing effort. The evaluators verified that the obtained results conform to the
expected results. Through the tests performed by the Laboratory it is concluded that 92.85% of the
SFRs and all the TSFIs defined in the Functional Specification has been tested.
Based on the vulnerability analysis activities performed as part of the AVA class activities, the
evaluation team defined a list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment, and subsequently devised attack scenarios for penetration tests according to the
potential vulnerabilities detected. The overall test result is that no deviations were found between
the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with attack potential Basic has been
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target, when all security
measures required by the developer security guidance documentation [AGD] are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
For the operation of the DefensePro 8.26.1.0 the disposition of the following software and
hardware components is required:
• For bare-metal installations, at least one of the following appliances is required:
o DefensePro 6
o DefensePro 20
o DefensePro 60
o DefensePro 110
o DefensePro 200
o DefensePro 220
o DefensePro 400
• For Virtual Appliance (VA) installations, the following minimum specs apply:
o Supported Virtualization Platforms:
▪ KVM
▪ VMWare
o System Requirements:
▪ vCPU: 2
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• Recommended Intel server-grade processors: Westmere, Sandy-
bridge, Ivy-bridge, Haswell, Broadwell, Skylake
▪ RAM: 4 GB per vCPU + 5 GB (16 GB minimum recommended)
▪ Disk space: 10 GB
▪ Network Interfaces: 3
For the operation of the APSolute Vision 4.85.00 the disposition of the following software and
hardware components is required:
• For bare-metal installations, the following appliance is required:
o APSolute Vision Server ODS-VL2
• For Virtual Appliance (VA) installations, the following minimum specs apply:
o Virtualization platform:
▪ VMWare
▪ KVM
▪ KVM (OpenStack)
▪ Hyper-V
o System Requirements:
▪ vCPU: 8
▪ RAM: 32 GB
▪ Disk space: 500 GB
▪ NICs: 3
The TOE configuration used for the testing is the same configuration obtained after performing the
TOE installation steps according to the guidance documentation [AGD]. The TOE was installed both
in a virtualized environment and in a physical platform environment, both of which have been used
during the testing.
The TOE version and specific platform used for testing are the following:
Virtual platform installation:
• APSolute Vision 4.85.00, virtualized in Proxmox platform
• DefensePro 8.26.1.0, virtualized in eSXi platform
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Physical platform installation:
• APSolute Vision 4.85.00, running in appliance APSolute Vision Server ODS-VL2
• DefensePro 8.26.1.0, running in appliance DefensePro 6
The evaluators used the TOE installed in a virtual environment as the base TOE for testing, and also
repeated all the tests using the TOE installed in a physical platform environment to verify the
consistency of the test results for both the virtual and physical installations.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product DefensePro and APSolute Vision Attack Mitigation System (APSolute Vision 4.85.00,
DefensePro 8.26.1.0) has been evaluated against the Security Target DefensePro and APSolute
Vision Security Target (v2.0, 16/04/2024).
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 have been assigned a “PASS”
verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole
evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL2, as defined by the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1 R5.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
• To follow the security guidance’s of the TOE strictly
• To keep the TOE under personal control and set all other security measures available from
the environment.
To keep the administrators properly trained.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product DefensePro and APSolute Vision Attack Mitigation System (APSolute Vision 4.85.00,
DefensePro 8.26.1.0), a positive resolution is proposed.
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GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[JIL-PROD-SERIE] Joint Interpretation Library, Evaluation methodology for product series, V.1.0,
April 2017.
[ST] DefensePro and APSolute Vision Security Target, v2.0, 16/04/2024.
[AGD] DefensePro & APSolute Vision Common Criteria Guide, v1.8, 16/04/2024.
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body:
• DefensePro and APSolute Vision Security Target (v2.0, 16/04/2024).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
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2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components selected.