National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11430-2025
Dated: January 02, 2025
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Lauren Brandt
Jenn Dotson
Linda Morrison
Clare Parran
Lori Sarem
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Furukh Siddique
Akshay Jain
Shaina Rae
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
3.1 Physical Boundaries .......................................................................................................................................7
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 9
4.1 Security Audit.................................................................................................................................................9
4.2 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................................9
4.3 Identification and Authentication .................................................................................................................9
4.4 Security Management ..................................................................................................................................10
4.5 Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................................................10
4.6 TOE Access ...................................................................................................................................................10
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels ................................................................................................................................10
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope............................................................................... 11
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................11
5.2 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................13
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 14
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 15
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................15
7.2 Excluded Functionality .......................................................................................................................................15
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 16
8.1 Developer Testing.........................................................................................................................................16
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 17
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................17
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................17
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................17
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................18
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................18
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................18
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................19
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 20
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 21
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 22
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 23
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 24
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents
the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is
either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in January 2025. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the
Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 [PP-ND].
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as
interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile (PP). This VR applies
only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The Validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these findings,
the Validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions
justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories
called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against
PPs containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract
with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the
evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [CPP_ND_V2.2E]
Security Target Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform Security Target v1.0
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform, v0.9.
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor & Developer Ciena Corporation
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Lauren Brandt, Jenn Dotson, Linda Morrison, Clare Parran, and Lori Sarem
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3 Architectural Information
The TOE is the Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform running software version 15.6 and is
developed by Ciena Corporation. The Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform, the Target of
Evaluation (TOE), is a family of standalone hardware devices that run VxWorks and provide
OSI Layers 1 and 2 network traffic management services. The security functions provided by the
TOE include security auditing, cryptographic support, identification and authentication, security
management, protection of TSF, TOE access controls, and trusted communications. The
appliance provides the TL1 interface to the TOE’s security management functionality. The TOE
enables users to direct traffic to designated ports, giving them control of network availability for
specific services. The system features an agnostic switch fabric that is capable of switching
SONET/SDH, OTN, and Ethernet/MPLS networks. The switching behavior is beyond the scope
of the claimed Protection Profile.
This section provides an overview of the TOE architecture, including physical boundaries,
security functions, and relevant TOE documentation and references. The Ciena 6500 has five
shelf variants which range in size from 2RU (Rack Units) to 22RU (Rack Units). Each variant
has the same software image loaded onto it and therefore each has the same security
functionality across the family.
The five variants are:
• 6500-2
• 6500-4
• 6500-7
• 6500-14
• 6500-32
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Figure 1 – Representative TOE Deployment
3.1 Physical Boundaries
The Physical boundary of the TOE is the Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform hardware appliance
and the software which runs on it. The TOE runs VxWorks 6.9 for the SP3 and SPAP3 shelf
processors. The TOE is managed using the Transaction Language 1 (TL1) interface, used for local
or remote administration.
The TOE has two physical connections for security management: a local console (RJ-45 Craft
ethernet port) for direct connections and a Central Office Local Area Network (COLAN) ethernet
port for remote connections. An administrator can access the TL1 interface using either a local
workstation connected directly to the TOE’s Craft ethernet port or a remote workstation that can
connect to the TOE over the COLAN ethernet via SSH. The TL1 interface is the command line
interface for the TOE. The audit server communicates to the TOE via TLS; the update server
communicates with the TOE using SFTP via SSH over the COLAN ethernet port. In practice, the
TOE will be deployed to perform network switching functions and will be connected to a number
of other pieces of network traffic infrastructure equipment. This has not been depicted in detail
because this capability is out of scope of the TOE from a security functional perspective.
The TOE may consist of any of the following models:
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Table 2: TOE Models
MODEL
TYPE
MODEL PART
#
SP3 Shelf Processor
Card
SPAP3 Shelf Processor
Card
2-slot Type 2 NTK503LA NO YES
4-slot Type NTK503HA YES NO
7-slot NTK503PA YES NO
7-slot type 2 NTK503KA NO YES
6500-7 NTK503RA YES NO
14-slot NTK503BA
NTK503CA
NTK503CC
NTK503GA
NTK503AD
NTK503BD
NTK503CD
NTK503SA
YES NO
32-slot NTK603AA
NTK603AB
YES NO
Models using the SP3 service card are running on QorIQ T1042 Quad Core processor, with
VxWorks 6.9; models using SPAP3 Service Cards are running on QorIQ T1022 Dual Core
processors with VxWorks 6.9. The TOE software version is 15.6.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functions required by the Collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices, hereafter referred to as NDcPP v2.2e or NDcPP.
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE creates audit records for events
related to security relevant events including authentication (success and failure, remote and
local), cryptographic key management, session establishment (success and failure) and session
termination, including for SSH communications. In addition, all actions corresponding to
management functions are audited.
The TOE records, for each audited event, the date and time of the event, the type of event, the
subject’s claimed identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of that event. Depending on the
specific type of event, additional data may be included in the audit record.
Audit data is stored locally transmitted in real-time to the remote audit server via TLS-protected
trusted channel. The local audit data keeps the most recent records by overwriting the oldest
records when the maximum size threshold of the file is met. No filesystem access is allowed to
ensure protection of local audit data from deletion or modification.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of SSH for remote administration, and secure
download of TOE updates. The TOE provides a TLS protected channel for remote storage of
audit data. The TOE uses CAVP-validated cryptographic algorithms to ensure that appropriately
strong cryptographic algorithms are used for these trusted communications. Cryptographic keys
are overwritten by zeroes by the TOE when they are no longer needed for their purpose.
The TOE collects entropy from a local hardware entropy source contained within the device to
ensure sufficient randomness for secure key generation.
The TOE utilizes a cryptographic module which can be referenced by its CAVP ID: #A5421.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
All users must be identified and authenticated by the TOE before being allowed to perform any
actions on the TOE, except viewing a banner. The TOE provides complexity rules that ensure
that user-defined passwords will meet a minimum-security strength through the set of supported
characters and configurable minimum password length. As part of connecting to the TOE
locally, using the management workstation, password data is obfuscated as it is inputted.
The TOE detects when a configurable number of failed authentication attempts are made by a
remote user. Once this configurable threshold of between 2 and 20 attempts has been met the
TSF will automatically lock a user’s account. The user’s account can be unlocked after a
configurable time-period between 0 and 300 seconds or can be unlocked by a Security
Administrator with sufficient User Privilege Code (UPC) level.
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4.4 Security Management
The TSF provides the TL1 interface for performing management functions remotely or locally.
Also, the Security Administrator can use the Site Manager to pass commands to the TL1
interface. The functions that a Security Administrator can perform on the TL1 interface are
determined by the Security Administrator’s UPC value. The Security Administrator is the only
administrative role that has the ability to manage the TSF, so it is the only role that is within the
scope of the TOE. Apart from the Security Administrator, other roles that perform network
management related functionality are not considered part of the TSF.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE is expected to ensure the security and integrity of all data that is stored locally and
accessed remotely. The TSF prevents the unauthorized disclosure of secret cryptographic data,
and administrative passwords are hashed using SHA-256. The TOE maintains system time with
its local hardware clock and can synchronize with up to 3 NTPv4 time sources. TOE software
updates are acquired using SFTP and initiated using the TL1 interface. Software updates are
digitally signed to ensure their integrity. The TSF also validates its correctness through the use of
self-tests for both cryptographic functionality and integrity of the system software.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after a Security Administrator-configurable time
period. The TOE also allows users to terminate their own interactive session. Once a session has
been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new session. The
TOE can also display a configurable banner on the TL1 interface that is displayed prior to use of
any other security-relevant functionality.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The Security Administrator establishes a trusted path to the TOE for remote administration using
SSH. The TOE initiates a TLS-protected trusted channel to the remote audit data server. The
TOE establishes a trusted channel (SSH) for downloading software updates from the update
server using SSH.
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5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 3 – Assumptions
ID Assumption
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Network Device is assumed to be
physically protected in its operational
environment and not subject to physical attacks
that compromise the security or interfere with
the device’s physical interconnections and
correct operation. This protection is assumed to
be sufficient to protect the device and the data
it contains. As a result, the cPP does not
include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations.
The cPP does not expect the product to defend
against physical access to the device that
allows unauthorized entities to extract data,
bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate
the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies
to the physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking
functionality as its core function and not
provide functionality/services that could be
deemed as general purpose computing. For
example, the device should not provide a
computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking
functionality).
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ID Assumption
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic Network Device does not
provide any assurance regarding the protection
of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the
Network Device to protect data that originates
on or is destined to the device itself, to include
administrative data and audit data. Traffic that
is traversing the Network Device, destined for
another network entity, is not covered by the
ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will
be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for
particular types of Network Devices (e.g.,
firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the Network
Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in
the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes appropriately
trained, following policy, and adhering to
guidance documentation. Administrators are
trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have
sufficient strength and entropy and to lack
malicious intent when administering the
device. The Network Device is not expected to
be capable of defending against a malicious
Administrator that actively works to bypass or
compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based
authentication, the Security Administrator(s)
are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline
verification) any CA certificate (root CA
certificate or intermediate CA certificate)
loaded into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root
store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a
trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The Network Device firmware and software is
assumed to be updated by an Administrator on
a regular basis in response to the release of
product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key)
used to access the Network Device are
protected by the platform on which they reside.
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ID Assumption
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive
residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys,
keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on
networking equipment when the equipment is
discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices,
Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 [PP-ND].
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Consistent with the expectations of the PP, this evaluation did not specifically search for,
nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities
to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one
that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform Security Target v1.0
• Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform Supplemental Administrative Guidance for Common
Criteria Version 1.8
o Externally Referenced Documents in the AGD
▪ Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform Administration and Security Release
15.6
▪ Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform TL1 Command Definition Release
15.6
▪ Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform User Interface Overview and Site
Manager Fundamentals Release 15.6
▪ Suite of Hardware Installation Manuals Release 15.6:
• General Information
• 2, 4, 7, 14, & 32 Slot Shelves (individual documents)
15
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The following environmental components are required to operate the TOE in the evaluated
configuration:
Table 4 – Required Environmental Components
Component Function
Management Workstation Any general-purpose computer that is used by an administrator to
manage the TOE. The TOE can be managed remotely, in which case the
management workstation requires an SSH client, or locally, in which
case the management workstation must be physically connected to the
TOE using the serial port and must use a terminal emulator that is
compatible with serial communications. Alternatively, the workstation
can physically be connected to the TOE using the craft port, which is an
Ethernet port through which the TOE can be managed locally using a
SSH Client
Audit Server A properly configured audit data storage server implementing the
Syslog over TLS protocol.
Update Server A server that supports SSH/SFTP and that is used as a location for
storing product updates that can be transferred to the TOE.
Site Manager Software
(Optional)
The Site Manager software provides a graphical interface to the TL1
interface for managing the TOE. The Site Manager software is installed
on the Management workstation and uses an SSH channel to connect to
the TOE.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The following product functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:
HTTP server, FTP service, Telnet and SNMP services – these must be disabled in the evaluated
configuration. The TOE also includes a number of strictly unevaluated features and functions,
which are outside the scope of the evaluation.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in ETR for Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform, which is not
publicly available. The AAR provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance
activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network
Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 [PP-ND]. The Independent Testing activity is
documented in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
17
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR.
The reader of this document can assume that all activities and work units received a passing
verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 Rev. 5 and CEM version 3.1 Rev. 5. The evaluation determined the TOE to be Part 2
extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the claimed PP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform that are
consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities
specified in the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March
2020 [PP-ND].
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the ST's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e,
23 March 2020 [PP-ND] related to the examination of the information contained in the TOE
Summary Specification.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
18
Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices,
Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 [PP-ND] related to the examination of the information contained in
the operational guidance documents.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network
Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 [PP-ND]and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the ETR and AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence was provided by the Evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed
the test activities in the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23
March 2020 [PP-ND], and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The Evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The Evaluation team performed a
public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues
with the TOE.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
addressed the vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the Collaborative Protection Profile
for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 [PP-ND], and that the conclusion reached by
the Evaluation team was justified.
19
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The Validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the Evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the Collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 [PP-ND], and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
20
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform
Supplemental Administrative Guidance for Common Criteria, Version 1.8, December 23, 2024.
As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the ST, and the only evaluated functionality was that
which was described by the SFRs claimed in the ST. All other functionality provided by the TOE
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated configuration is
established and maintained. It is important to note the excluded functionality listed in Section 7.2
and follow the configuration instructions to ensure that this functionality is disabled.
Evaluation activities are strictly bound by the assurance activities described in the NDcPP 2.2e
and accompanying Supporting Documents. Consumers and integrators of this TOE are advised to
understand the inherent limitations of these activities and take additional measures as needed to
ensure proper TOE behavior when integrated into an operational environment.
21
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
22
12 Security Target
• The security target is identified as: Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform Security Target
v1.0, January 2025.
23
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
Term Definition
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) An IT security evaluation facility accredited by
the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation
Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-
based evaluations.
Conformance The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous
way that a given implementation is correct with
respect to the formal model.
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product against the
Common Criteria using the Common Criteria
Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or
not the claims made are justified; or the
assessment of a protection profile against the
Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation
Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence
suitable for use as a statement of requirements for
one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
Evaluation Evidence Any tangible resource (information) required from
the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to
perform one or more evaluation activities.
Feature Part of a product that is either included with the
product or can be ordered separately.
Target of Evaluation (TOE) A group of IT products configured as an IT
system, or an IT product, and associated
documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
Validation The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation
Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria
certificate.
Validation Body A governmental organization responsible for
carrying out validation and for overseeing the
day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
24
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
• Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 [PP-
ND]
• Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform Security Target, v1.0, January 2025
• Assurance Activity Report for Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform Version, v0.8 January
2025 (AAR)
• Evaluation Technical Report for Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform, Version 0.9,
January 2025
• Ciena 6500 Packet Optical Platform Supplemental Administrative Guidance for Common
Criteria, Version 1.8, December 23, 2024