ForeScout CounterACT
Security Target
ST Version: 1.0
February 14, 2018
ForeScout Technologies, Inc.
190 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA, USA 95134
Prepared By:
Cyber Assurance Testing Laboratory
1100 West St
Laurel MD 20707
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Table of Contents
1 Security Target Introduction .................................................................................................................6
1.1 ST Reference.................................................................................................................................6
ST Identification ...................................................................................................................6
Document Organization........................................................................................................6
Terminology..........................................................................................................................7
Acronyms..............................................................................................................................7
Reference ..............................................................................................................................8
1.2 TOE Reference..............................................................................................................................9
1.3 TOE Overview..............................................................................................................................9
1.4 TOE Type....................................................................................................................................11
1.5 Evaluated Components of the TOE ............................................................................................11
1.6 Components and Applications in the Operational Environment.................................................11
1.7 Excluded from the TOE..............................................................................................................12
Not Installed........................................................................................................................12
Installed but Requires a Separate License...........................................................................12
Installed But Not Part of the TSF........................................................................................13
1.8 Physical Boundary ......................................................................................................................13
1.9 Logical Boundary........................................................................................................................14
Security Audit .....................................................................................................................14
Cryptographic Support........................................................................................................15
Identification and Authentication........................................................................................15
Security Management .........................................................................................................15
Protection of the TSF..........................................................................................................15
TOE Access ........................................................................................................................16
Trusted Path/Channels ........................................................................................................16
2 Conformance Claims ..........................................................................................................................17
2.1 CC Version..................................................................................................................................17
2.2 CC Part 2 Conformance Claims..................................................................................................17
2.3 CC Part 3 Conformance Claims..................................................................................................17
2.4 PP Claims....................................................................................................................................17
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2.5 Package Claims...........................................................................................................................17
2.6 Package Name Conformant or Package Name Augmented........................................................17
2.7 Technical Decisions....................................................................................................................17
2.8 Conformance Claim Rationale....................................................................................................19
3 Security Problem Definition ...............................................................................................................21
3.1 Threats.........................................................................................................................................21
3.2 Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................22
3.3 Assumptions................................................................................................................................22
3.4 Security Objectives .....................................................................................................................23
TOE Security Objectives ....................................................................................................23
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ........................................................23
3.5 Security Problem Definition Rationale.......................................................................................24
4 Extended Components Definition.......................................................................................................24
4.1 Extended Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................24
4.2 Extended Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................24
5 Security Functional Requirements......................................................................................................25
5.1 Conventions ................................................................................................................................25
5.2 Security Functional Requirements Summary..............................................................................25
5.3 Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................26
Class FAU: Security Audit .................................................................................................26
Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.....................................................................................28
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication .....................................................................32
Class FMT: Security Management .....................................................................................34
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF .......................................................................................35
Class FTA: TOE Access .....................................................................................................37
Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels......................................................................................37
5.4 Statement of Security Functional Requirements Consistency ....................................................38
6 Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................................................39
6.1 Class ADV: Development...........................................................................................................39
Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)....................................................................39
6.2 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation .......................................................................................40
Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1) ........................................................................40
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Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1) ...............................................................................41
6.3 Class ALC: Life Cycle Support ..................................................................................................41
Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)..................................................................................41
TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1) ....................................................................................42
6.4 Class ATE: Tests.........................................................................................................................42
Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1) ...........................................................42
6.5 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment.......................................................................................43
Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1).................................................................................43
7 TOE Summary Specification ..............................................................................................................44
7.1 Security Audit.............................................................................................................................44
FAU_GEN.1 and FAU GEN.2: ..........................................................................................44
FAU_STG_EXT.1: .............................................................................................................44
7.2 Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................45
FCS_CKM.1: ......................................................................................................................46
FCS_CKM.2: ......................................................................................................................47
FCS_CKM.4: ......................................................................................................................47
FCS_COP.1(1):...................................................................................................................48
FCS_COP.1(2):...................................................................................................................48
FCS_COP.1(3):...................................................................................................................48
FCS_COP.1(4):...................................................................................................................49
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: .............................................................................................................49
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 .............................................................................................................49
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.............................................................................................................50
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 .............................................................................................................50
7.3 Identification and Authentication................................................................................................51
FIA_PMG_EXT.1:..............................................................................................................51
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 and FIA_UIA_EXT.1:..........................................................................51
FIA_UAU.7: .......................................................................................................................51
FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, and FIA_X509_EXT.3:.......................................51
7.4 Security Management .................................................................................................................52
FMT_MOF.1(1)/AdminAct, FMT_MOF.1(1)/TrustedUpdate, FMT_MTD.1, and
FMT_SMF.1 .......................................................................................................................................52
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FMT_SMR.2:......................................................................................................................53
7.5 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................................53
FPT_APW_EXT.1:.............................................................................................................53
FPT_SKP_EXT.1:...............................................................................................................54
FPT_STM.1: .......................................................................................................................54
FPT_TST_EXT.1:...............................................................................................................54
FPT_TUD_EXT.1:..............................................................................................................55
7.6 TOE Access ................................................................................................................................55
FTA_SSL_EXT.1: ..............................................................................................................55
FTA_SSL.3:........................................................................................................................55
FTA_SSL.4:........................................................................................................................56
FTA_TAB.1:.......................................................................................................................56
7.7 Trusted Path/Channels ................................................................................................................56
FTP_ITC.1:.........................................................................................................................56
FTP_TRP.1: ........................................................................................................................56
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Table of Tables
Table 1: Customer Specific Terminology.....................................................................................................7
Table 2: CC Specific Terminology...............................................................................................................7
Table 3: Acronym Definition........................................................................................................................8
Table 4: TOE Models..................................................................................................................................11
Table 5: Supporting Components in the Operational Environment............................................................12
Table 6: Evaluated Models .........................................................................................................................14
Table 7: TOE Threats..................................................................................................................................22
Table 8: TOE Organization Security Policies.............................................................................................22
Table 9: TOE Assumptions.........................................................................................................................23
Table 10: TOE Operational Environment Objectives.................................................................................24
Table 11: Security Functional Requirements for the TOE..........................................................................26
Table 12: Auditable Events.........................................................................................................................28
Table 13: Self-Test List ..............................................................................................................................36
Table 14: Cryptographic Algorithm Table for OpenSSL ...........................................................................46
Table 15: Cryptographic Algorithm Table for Bouncy Castle....................................................................46
Table 16: Identification of Crypto Module Supporting Secured Communication Channel........................46
Table 17: Crypto key destruction table.......................................................................................................48
Table 18: Self-Test List with Failure Results .............................................................................................54
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1 Security Target Introduction
This chapter presents the Security Target (ST) identification information and an overview. An ST
contains the Information Technology (IT) security requirements of an identified Target of Evaluation
(TOE) and specifies the functional and assurance security measures offered by the TOE.
1.1 ST Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its Target of Evaluation.
ST Identification
ST Title: ForeScout CounterACT Security Target
ST Version: 1.0
ST Publication Date: February 14, 2018
ST Author: Booz Allen Hamilton
Document Organization
Chapter 1 of this document provides identifying information for the ST and TOE as well as a brief
description of the TOE and its associated TOE type.
Chapter 2 describes the TOE in terms of its physical boundary, logical boundary, exclusions, and
dependent Operational Environment components.
Chapter 3 describes the conformance claims made by this ST.
Chapter 4 describes the threats, assumptions, objectives, and organizational security policies that apply to
the TOE.
Chapter 5 defines extended Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs).
Chapter 6 describes the SFRs that are to be implemented by the TSF.
Chapter 7 describes the SARs that will be used to evaluate the TOE.
Chapter 8 provides the TOE Summary Specification, which describes how the SFRs that are defined for
the TOE are implemented by the TSF.
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Terminology
This section defines the terminology used throughout this ST. The terminology used throughout this ST is
defined in Table 1 & 2. These tables are to be used by the reader as a quick reference guide for
terminology definitions.
Term Definition
Administrator, System
Administrator,
Security Administrator
The class of TOE administrators that are tasked with managing the TOE’s functional
and security configuration. Embodies those administrators that have access to the CLI
and Console.
Connection One to One simple flows between a network port and a tool port.
Console or Console
application
The CounterACT Console is a GUI application used for creating NAC, firewall and IPS
policies, generating reports, viewing and managing detection information, and
managing CounterACT Appliances.
Endpoint A Network Host discovered by CounterACT, for example desktop, laptop, server, etc.
Enterprise Manager A CounterACT Appliance configured to manage multiple Appliances distributed across
the network.
Local console When the TOE’s command line interface (CLI) is accessed locally with a physical
connection to the TOE using the serial port and a terminal emulator that is compatible
with serial communications is referred to as the local console.
Plugins Functionality enhancement modules that can be incorporated into CounterACT. Plugins
enable deeper inspection as well as broader control over network endpoints. Bundled
plugins are pre-packaged with CounterACT. Other plugins may be available from
ForeScout or from a third party.
Network Port Where data arrives into the TOE. The ports which receive copied network data for the
TOE.
Remote console When the TOE’s CLI is accessed remotely using SSH is referred to as the remote
console
Table 1: Customer Specific Terminology
Term Definition
Authorized
Administrator
The claimed Protection Profile defines an Authorized Administrator role that is
authorized to manage the TOE and its data. For the TOE, this is considered to be any
user with the ‘admin’ role.
Security Administrator Synonymous with Authorized Administrator and System Administrator.
Trusted Channel An encrypted connection between the TOE and a system in the Operational
Environment.
Trusted Path An encrypted connection between the TOE and the application an Authorized
Administrator uses to manage it (web browser, terminal client, etc.).
Table 2: CC Specific Terminology
Acronyms
The acronyms used throughout this ST are defined in Table 3. This table is to be used by the reader as a
quick reference guide for acronym definitions.
Acronym Definition
CC Common Criteria
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CLI Command-line Interface
CPU Central Processing Unit
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NTP Network Time Protocol
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
RU Rack Unit
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Secure Copy Protocol
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TAP Test Access Point
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TP Tool Port
TSF TOE Security Function
UI User Interface
Table 3: Acronym Definition
Reference
[1] Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 1.0 (NDcPP)
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and
general model, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-009-001
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-009-
002
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-009-003
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[5] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation
Methodology, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-009-004
[6] NIST Special Publication 800-56B Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, August 2009
[7] NIST Special Publication 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,
December 2001
[8] FIPS PUB 140-2 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules May 25, 2001
[9] FIPS PUB 180-3 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Secure Hash
Standard (SHS) October 2008
[10] FIPS PUB 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Secure Hash
Standard (SHS) March 2012
[11] FIPS PUB 186-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Digital Signature
Standard July 2013
[12] FIPS PUB 197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 26 2001
[13] FIPS PUB 198-1 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication The Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008
1.2 TOE Reference
The TOE is ForeScout CounterACT that runs the CounterACT software version 7.0.
1.3 TOE Overview
The TOE is the ForeScout CounterACT product referred to as just CounterACT or TOE from this point
forward. CounterACT is an appliance device that can be used singularly or in a hierarchical manner to
dynamically identify and evaluate network infrastructure, devices and applications connected to the
network, and provide enforcement of Network Access Policy (NAC) and Enterprise Conformance
Policies. CounterACT’s agentless technology discovers, classifies and assesses devices. The CounterACT
Appliance interrogates the network infrastructure to discover devices as they connect to the network.
After discovering a device, CounterACT uses a combination of passive and active methods to classify the
device according to its type and ownership. Based on its classification, CounterACT then assesses the
device security posture and allows organizations to set policies that establish the specific behavior the
device is allowed to have while connected to a network.
When CounterACT is used for hierarchical network control, an appliance must be configured as a
CounterACT Enterprise Manager (EM) appliance. The EM provides all the same functionality as the
CounterACT Appliance and additionally becomes the aggregation device that communicates with
multiple CounterACT Appliances distributed across an organization via secure TLS communications. The
EM distributes the compliance and network policies to all CounterACT Appliances for enforcement
throughout the enterprise network. The EM collects security event data for reporting and shares relevant
security information, gathered from assigned monitored endpoints and individual CounterACT
Appliances, with the rest of the CounterACT Appliances on the network. The hierarchical functionality
and data flow between the two CounterACT devices does not map to any NDcPP SFRs and is considered
beyond the scope of the claimed Protection Profile. Therefore, the TOE’s hierarchical functionality and
the CEM to Appliance interface is not being tested.
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The CounterACT Console application (aka Console) is a separately installed Windows executable which
provides an administrator with a graphical user interface to manage the EM and Appliances. The Console
is used to centrally manage CounterACT Appliances, define and distribute compliance and network
policies, view the audit trail, monitor network endpoints and appliances, and securely update the TOE.
The Console must be installed on a separate Windows OS host platform. The Console communicates with
the TOE via a secure TLS channel.
CounterACT also provides a Command Line Interface (CLI) for remote management of the device. To
access the CLI an administrator must either be locally connected, via the keyboard/video or the serial port
connections, or use SSHv2 to establish a secure connection.
The CLI provides lower level configuration of the device such as initial IP address configuration which
cannot be done via the Console, and some diagnostic capabilities. The CLI does not provide any OS-level
or shell type access to the embedded OS on the TOE.
The following figure depicts the TOE boundary and operational environment:
Figure 1: TOE Boundary
As illustrated in Figure 1, the CounterACT device and the CounterACT Console are responsible for all
the security functions of the TOE, as scoped by the Protection Profile.
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The CounterACT Appliance will be evaluated in both configurations (CEM and Appliance) as standalone
entities to ensure that the PP specified functionality is the same.
1.4 TOE Type
The TOE type for this product is Network Device. The product is a hardware appliance whose primary
functionality is related to the handling of network traffic. The NDcPP defines a network device as “a
device composed of hardware and software that is connected to the network and has an infrastructure role
within the network.” Additionally, the NDcPP says that example devices that fit this definition include
routers, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, audit servers, and switches.
The TOE is a network device that enables network access control, threat protection, and compliance of
the entire enterprise based on network security policies. The TOE type is justified because the TOE
provides an infrastructure role in internetworking of different network environments across an enterprise.
1.5 Evaluated Components of the TOE
The following table describes the TOE components in the evaluated configuration:
Table 4: TOE Models
1.6 Components and Applications in the Operational Environment
These components and the functionality they provide are outside the scope of evaluation testing but are
needed to support the tested functionality of the TOE. The following table lists components and
applications are used in the operational environment for the TOE’s evaluated configuration.
Component Definition
Management Workstation Any general-purpose computer that is used by an administrator to manage the TOE. For the
TOE to be managed remotely the management workstation is required to have:
 Non-dedicated machine:
o Pentium 3, 1GHz
o 2GB memory
o 1GB disk space
 OS running:
o Windows 7/8/8.1/10
o Windows Server 2008
o Linux
 SSHv2 client installed to access the TOE’s CLI
 ForeScout CounterACT Console application (Console) installed
TCP communications from the Management Workstation to the TOE is secured using:
 SSH for remote access to the CLI (remote console)
 TLS for remote access from the Console
The TOE acts as a server for both protocols. Required to support interfaces 1, 2, 3, & 8 as
defined in Figure 1 above.
TOE Components Hardware Components Software
Version
CounterACT Appliances CT-R, CT-100, CT-1000, CT-2000, CT-4000, CT-10000, CEM-
5, CEM-10, CEM-25, CEM-50, CEM-100, CEM-150, and
CEM-200
ForeScout
CounterACT
v7.0
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The TOE’s CLI can also be accessed locally with a physical connection to the TOE using the
keyboard/video or the serial port and must use a terminal emulator that is compatible with
serial communications (local console).
Update Server A general-purpose computer controlled by the vendor that includes a web server and is used to
store software update packages that can be retrieved by product customers using HTTPS/TLS
enabled browser or Console. The host of the CounterACT Console provides the secure channel
and not the TOE. Therefore, HTTPS is not declared in this ST. The CounterACT device does
not automatically download or update itself nor does it connect to the update server directly.
The TOE receives the update from the CounterACT Console. Required to support interface 8
as defined in Figure 1 above and testing for trusted updates.
Certificate Authority (CA)
Server/Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP)
Responder
Certificate authority servers can manage certificate enrollment requests from customers, and
are able to issue and revoke digital certificates. CA Servers are built to address the identity
management requirements. Sending a request to a CA server is usually performed using Simple
Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) over HTTP or Enrollment over Secure Transport
(EST) RFC7030 using TLS.
An OCSP responder (a server typically run by the certificate issuer) may return a signed
response signifying that the certificate specified in the request is 'good', 'revoked', or 'unknown'.
If the OCSP responder cannot process the request, it may return an error code.
Communications are based on HTTP protocol where the TOE is the client.
Required to support interface 5 as defined in Figure 1 above.
Active Directory Server A system that is capable of receiving authentication requests using LDAP over TLS and
validating these requests against identity and credential data that is defined in an LDAP
directory. The TOE is the TLS client for this communication. Required to support interface 6
as defined in Figure 1 above.
Syslog Server The TOE connects to a Syslog Server to send Syslog messages for remote storage via TLS
connection where the TOE is the TLS client. This is used to send copies of audit data to be
stored in a remote location for data redundancy purposes. Required to support interface 7 as
defined in Figure 1 above.
Network Infrastructure The network infrastructure contains components such as routers, switches, DNS server, etc.
Figure 1 identifies these interfaces as a single interface. Interface 4 represents the additional
operational network infrastructure required for support. These components are out of scope of
the evaluation.
Table 5: Supporting Components in the Operational Environment
1.7 Excluded from the TOE
The following TOE functionality, components, and/or applications are not included in the evaluated
configuration. They provide no added security related functionality for the evaluated product. They are
separated into three categories: not installed, installed but requires a separate license, and installed but not
part of the TSF.
Not Installed
There are no components, applications, and/or functionality that are not installed.
Installed but Requires a Separate License
There are no excluded components, applications, and or functionality that are installed and require a
separate license for activation.
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Installed But Not Part of the TSF
This section contains functionality that is part of the purchased product but is not part of the TSF relevant
functionality that is being evaluated as the TOE based on the Protection Profile.
 Web Portals – The different Web Portals provide functionality that allows TOE users, through a
local browser or the Console, to view descriptive information such as trend information,
vulnerabilities, and network inventory. The Web Portals contain no remote or local security
management functionality. They can only provide read-only descriptive information in a
dashboard display or that can be incorporated into customized report using the Console. Since the
Web Portal interfaces do not have any administrative functionality or any functionality that can be
mapped to the NDcPP, they are considered beyond the scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
 Trusted Appliance Interface – This interface is for another instantiation of the TOE configured
as a CounterACT Appliance (not an Enterprise Manager) for creating a hierarchical monitoring of
a distributed Enterprise network. TLS communications for this interface uses a preconfigured
vendor certificate. This interface is not used for remote or local administration. Functionality and
Data flow between the two devices does not map to any NDcPP SFRs and is considered beyond
the scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
 Host Scanning – This functionality allows the TOE to collect vulnerability data and the data used
to enforce network access control policies from the network. This functionality is beyond the scope
of the claimed Protection Profile.
 Network Monitor – This functionality allows the TOE to monitor and track network traffic. This
functionality is beyond the scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
 Network Response – This functionality allows the TOE to send responses back into the protected
network. This functionality is beyond the scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
 HTTP Redirection – This functionality allows the TOE to send HTTP (or HTTPS) formatted
communications (Web or Intranet) to users on network endpoints. This functionality is beyond the
scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
 SNMP – The TOE can be configured to use SNMP to communicate with network switches and
routers and to receive SNMP traps from network switches and routers. This functionality is
beyond the scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
 SMTP – The TOE can be configured to use SNMP to send e-mail messages to the administrators
or other personnel regarding information of interest. This functionality is beyond the scope of the
claimed Protection Profile.
 NTP – The TOE can be configured to use an NTP server as a third-party source of time. This
functionality is not tested as the TOE does not support the ability to use the NTP protocol over a
secure channel. Therefore, this functionality is beyond the scope of the claimed Protection
Profile.
1.8 Physical Boundary
The following table outlines the models and their key differentiators that are part of the evaluation.
System Name Equipment
ForeScout CounterACT:
Appliance (CT-)
&
Enterprise Manager (CEM-)
Software/Firmware Hardware Model Component/Configuration
ForeScout CounterACT v7.0
operating on CentOS 6.6
CT-Remote
1U Desktop
2 USB 2.0
1 CPU Intel Celeron
4x Intel-based 10/100/1000 NIC
Ports
CT-100
1U Rack-mount
3x RAID1 with hot spare
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System Name Equipment
2x USB 2.0 (back), 2x USB 1.0
(front)
1 CPU Intel Xeon E5
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC
Ethernet Ports
CT-1000; CEM-05,
and CEM-10
1U Rack-mount
3x RAID1 with hot spare
2x USB 2.0 (back), 2x USB 1.0
(front)
1 CPU Intel Xeon E5
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC
Ethernet Ports
CT-2000; CEM-25,
and CEM-50
2U Rack-mount
3x RAID1 with hot spare
2x USB 2.0 (back), 2x USB 1.0
(front)
1 CPU Intel Xeon E5
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC
Ethernet
Ports
CT-4000; and
CEM-100
2U Rack-mount
3x RAID1 with hot spare
2x USB 2.0 (back), 2x USB 1.0
(front)
2 CPU Intel Xeon E5
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC
Ethernet Ports
CT-10000; and
CEM-150, CEM-
200
2U Rack-mount
3x RAID1 with hot spare
2x USB 2.0 (back), 2x USB 1.0
(front)
2 CPU Intel Xeon E5
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC
Ethernet Ports
Table 6: Evaluated Models
1.9 Logical Boundary
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists
of several security functionalities, as identified below.
1. Security Audit
2. Cryptographic Support
3. Identification and Authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE Access
7. Trusted Path/Channels
Security Audit
The TOE contains mechanisms to generate audit data to record predefined events on the TOE. The audit
logs are stored in an internal database on the TOE’s local hard drive. An authorized administrator has the
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ability to enable/disable the forwarding of events to a syslog server. When enabled, the audit data is also
securely transmitted to the syslog server using a TLS v1.1 or 1.2 communication channel.
Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of SSH, and TLS (v1.1 and 1.2) trusted communications.
RSA key generation is implemented in accordance with FIPS 186-4 and RSA key establishment is
implemented in accordance with NIST SP 800-56B. Diffie-Hellman group 14 (FFC) key generation is
implemented in accordance with RFC 3526, Section 3 and Diffie-Hellman group 14 key establishment is
implemented in accordance with RFC 3526, Section 3. Keys are destroyed when no longer used. AES,
SHA, HMAC, RSA are all used by the TOE for encryption, hashing, message authentication and digital
signatures, respectively. The TOE uses a hash DRBG to provide the random bit generation services with
256 bits of entropy. The cryptographic implementation has been validated to ensure that the algorithms
are appropriately strong for use in trusted communications.
Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides local password authentication as well as providing the ability to securely connect to an
Active Directory server for the authentication of users. Communications over this interface is secured
using TLS in which the TOE is acting as a client. The TOE enforces X.509 certificates to support
authentication for TLS connections. The only available function available to an unauthenticated user is
the ability to acknowledge a warning banner.
Security Management
The TOE can be administered locally and remotely and uses role based access control to prevent
unauthorized management. The TOE enforces role based access control (RBAC) to prevent/allow access
to TSF data and functionality. The NDcPP scopes the management capabilities to: manually download an
update, manually initiate an update which verifies the digital signature before installation, configure
inactivity time, and configuring the access banner.
A pre-defined set of permissions is called a role. The TOE has one pre-defined role: “Admin”. The user
permissions for the “Admin” role cannot be modified or customized. A user assigned the “Admin” role is
the TOE administrator (Security Administrator) and has access to all Console tools and features. All
other users that do not have the full set of administrative permissions are categorized as a “Console User”.
A Console User’s set of permissions are set during creation and can be customized by adding and
subtracting specific permissions to allow/disallow the user TOE functionality.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE is expected to ensure the security and integrity of all data that is stored locally and accessed
remotely. Passwords are not stored in plaintext. The cryptographic module prevents the unauthorized
disclosure of secret cryptographic data. The TOE does not support automatic updates. An administrator
has the ability to query the TOE for the currently executing version the TOE software and is required to
manually initiate the update process from the Console. The TOE automatically verifies the digital
signature of the software update prior to installation. If the digital signature is found to be invalid for any
reason the update is not installed. If the signature is deemed invalid, the administrator will be provided a
warning banner and allow an administrator to continue with the installation or abort. There is no means
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for an administrative override to continue the installation if the signature is completely missing. The TOE
implements a self-testing mechanism that is automatically executed during the initial start-up and can be
manually initiated by an administrator after authentication, to verify the correct operation of product and
cryptographic modules. The TOE provides its own time via its internal clock.
TOE Access
The TOE displays a configurable warning banner prior to its use. Inactive sessions will be terminated
after an administrator-configurable time period. Users are allowed to terminate their own interactive
session. Once a remote session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to
establish a new session. Local and remote sessions are terminated after the administrator configured
inactivity time limit is reached.
Trusted Path/Channels
Users can access a CLI for administration functions remotely via SSH (remote console) or a local
physical connection (local console) to the TOE. The TOE provides the SSH server functionality. The
main administrator interface is the Console which is running on a separate Windows PC. The Console
initiates a TLS connection to the TOE appliance, which is acting as a TLS server, for this connection.
The TOE acts as a TLS client to initiate the following secure paths to:
 User Authentication (Active Directory)
 Auditing (Syslog)
The TOE acts as a TLS server and receives requests to establish the following secure paths from:
 CounterACT Console
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Version
This ST is compliant with Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4 September 2012.
2.2 CC Part 2 Conformance Claims
This ST and Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Part 2 extended to include all applicable NIAP and
International interpretations through May 6, 2017.
2.3 CC Part 3 Conformance Claims
This ST and Target of Evaluation (TOE) are conformant to Part 3 to include all applicable NIAP and
International interpretations through May 6, 2017.
2.4 PP Claims
This ST claims exact conformance to the following Protection Profiles:
 collaboration Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 1.0 [NDcPP]
2.5 Package Claims
The TOE claims exact compliance to the collaboration Protection Profile for Network Devices, which is
conformant with CC Part 3.
The TOE claims following Selection-Based SFRs that are defined in the appendices of the claimed PP:
 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
The TOE claims following Optional SFRs that are defined in the appendices of the claimed PP:
 FMT_MOF.1(1)/AdminAct
This does not violate the notion of exact conformance because the PP specifically indicates these as
allowable options and provides both the ST author and evaluation laboratory with instructions on how
these claims are to be documented and evaluated.
2.6 Package Name Conformant or Package Name Augmented
This ST and TOE are in exact conformance with the NDcPP.
2.7 Technical Decisions
Technical Decisions that effected the SFR wording have been annotated with a Footnote.
The following list of the NDcPP v1.0 Technical Decisions apply to the TOE because SFR wording,
application notes, or assurance activities were modified for SFRs claimed by the TOE:
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 TD0291 – NIT technical decision for DH14 and FCS_CKM.1
 TD0290 – NIT technical decision for physical interruption of trusted path/channel.
 TD0289 – NIT technical decision for FCS_TLSC_EXT.x.1 Test 5e
 TD0281 – NIT Technical Decision for Testing both thresholds for SSH rekey
 TD0257 – NIT Technical Decision for Updating FCS_DTLSC_EXT.x.2/FCS_TLSC_EXT.x.2
Tests 1-4
 TD0256 – NIT Technical Decision for Handling of TLS connections with and without mutual
authentication
 TD0255 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server Tests - Issue 3: Verification of application of
encryption
 TD0235 – NIT Technical Decision adding DH group 14 to the selection in FCS_CKM.2
 TD0228 – NIT Technical Decision for CA certificates - basicConstraints validation
 TD0227 – NIT Technical Decision for TOE acting as a TLS Client and RSA key generation
 TD0226 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS Encryption Algorithms
 TD0201 – NIT Technical Decision for Use of intermediate CA certificates and certificate
hierarchy depth
 TD0189 – NIT Technical Decision for SSH Server Encryption Algorithms
 TD0188 – NIT Technical Decision for Optional use of X.509 certificates for digital signatures
 TD0187 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarifying FIA_X509_EXT.1 test 1
 TD0185 – NIT Technical Decision for Channel for Secure Update.
 TD0184 – NIT Technical Decision for Mandatory use of X.509 certificates
 TD0183 – NIT Technical Decision for Use of the Supporting Document
 TD0181 – NIT Technical Decision for Self-testing of integrity of firmware and software
 TD0168 – NIT Technical Decision for Mandatory requirement for CSR generation
 TD0167 – NIT Technical Decision for Testing SSH 2^28 packets
 TD0165 – NIT Technical Decision for Sending the ServerKeyExchange message when using
RSA
 TD0164 – NIT Technical Decision for Negative testing for additional ciphers for SSH
 TD0156 – NIT Technical Decision for SSL/TLS Version Testing in the NDcPP v1.0 and FW cPP
v1.0
 TD0154 – NIT Technical Decision for Versions of TOE Software in the NDcPP v1.0 and FW
cPP v1.0
 TD0153 – NIT Technical Decision for Auditing of NTP Time Changes in the NDcPP v1.0 and
FW cPP v1.0
 TD0152 – NIT Technical Decision for Reference identifiers for TLS in the NDcPP v1.0 and FW
cPP v1.0
 TD0151 – NIT Technical Decision for FCS_TLSS_EXT Testing - Issue 1 in NDcPP v1.0.
 TD0150 – NIT Technical Decision for Removal of SSH re-key audit events in the NDcPP v1.0
and FW cPP v1.0
 TD0143 – NIT Technical Decision for Failure testing for TLS session establishment in NDcPP
and FWcPP
 TD0130 – NIT Technical Decision for Requirements for Destruction of Cryptographic Keys
 TD0126 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS Mutual Authentication
 TD0117 – NIT Technical Decision for FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 Requirement in NDcPP
 TD0116 – NIT Technical Decision for a Typo in reference to RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5 in NDcPP
and FWcPP
 TD0114 – NIT Technical Decision for Re-Use of FIPS test results in NDcPP and FWcPP
 TD0113 – NIT Technical Decision for testing and trusted updates in the NDcPP v1.0 and FW
cPP v1.0
 TD0112 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS testing in the NDcPP v1.0 and FW cPP v1.0.
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 TD0111 – NIT Technical Decision for third party libraries and FCS_CKM.1 in NDcPP and
FWcPP
 TD0095 – NIT Technical Interpretations regarding audit, random bit generation, and entropy in
NDcPP
 TD0094 – NIT Technical Decision for validating a published hash in NDcPP
 TD0090 – NIT Technical Decision for FMT_SMF.1.1 Requirement in NDcPP
The following list of the NDcPP v1.0 Technical Decisions do not apply to the TOE for the reasons
defined next to the Technical Decision:
 TD0262 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS server testing - Empty Certificate Authorities list –
This applies to TLSS server with mutual authentication. TOE does not claim mutual
authentication.
 TD0225 – NIT Technical Decision for Make CBC cipher suites optional in IPsec – The TOE does
not claim IPsec SFRs
 TD0224 – NIT Technical Decision Making DH group 14 optional in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 –
The TOE does not claim IPsec SFRs
 TD0223 – NIT Technical Decision for "Expected" vs "unexpected" DNs for IPsec
Communications – The TOE does not claim IPsec SFRs
 TD0200 – NIT Technical Decision for Password authentication for SSH clients – TOE is not a
SSH Client
 TD0199 – NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic Curves for Signatures – Elliptic curves for
signature generation is not claimed by the TOE
 TD0186 – NIT Technical Decision for Applicability of X.509 certificate testing to IPsec – The
TOE does not claim IPsec SFRs
 TD0182 – NIT Technical Decision for Handling of X.509 certificates related to ssh-rsa and
remote comms – The TOE does not use ssh-rsa for all remote communications
 TD0170 – NIT Technical Decision for SNMPv3 Support – The TOE does not claim SNMP for
administration
 TD0169 – NIT Technical Decision for Compliance to RFC5759 and RFC5280 for using CRLs –
The TOE does not claim CRLs
 TD0160 – NIT Technical Decision for Transport mode and tunnel mode in IPSEC
communications – The TOE does not claim IPsec SFRs
 TD0155 – NIT Technical Decision for TLSS tests using ECDHE in the NDcPP v1.0 – The TOE
does not claim ECDHE support
 TD0125 – NIT Technical Decision for Checking validity of peer certificates for HTTPS servers –
The TOE does not claim HTTPS SFRs
 TD0115 – NIT Technical Decision for Transport mode and tunnel mode in IPsec communication
in NDcPP and FWcPP – The TOE does not claim IPsec SFRs
 TD0096 – NIT Technical Interpretation regarding Virtualization – The TOE does not include any
virtualization layer
2.8 Conformance Claim Rationale
The NDcPP states the following: “This is a Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) whose Target of
Evaluation (TOE) is a network device. It provides a minimal set of security requirements expected by all
network devices that target the mitigation of a set of defined threats. This baseline set of requirements will
be built upon by future cPPs to provide an overall set of security solutions for networks up to carrier and
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enterprise scale. A network device in the context of this cPP is a device composed of both hardware and
software that is connected to the network and has an infrastructure role within the network”.
The TOE is a network device composed of hardware and software that is connected to the network.
CounterACT is an appliance device that can be used singularly or in a hierarchical manner in order to
dynamically identify and evaluate network infrastructure, devices and applications connected to the
network, and to provide enforcement of Network Access Policy (NAC) and Enterprise Conformance
Policies. Therefore, this conformance claim is appropriate.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Threats
This section identifies the threats against the TOE. These threats have been taken from the NDcPP.
Threat Threat Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain administrator
access to the network device by nefarious means such
as masquerading as an administrator to the device,
masquerading as the device to an administrator,
replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or
selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle
attacks, which would provide access to the
administrative session, or sessions between network
devices. Successfully gaining administrator access
allows malicious actions that compromise the security
functionality of the device and the network on which
it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic
algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against
the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms,
modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to
compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the
key space and give them unauthorized access
allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the
traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target network devices
that do not use standardized secure tunneling
protocols to protect the critical network traffic.
Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed
protocols or poor key management to successfully
perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks,
etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of
confidentiality and integrity of the critical network
traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of
the network device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols
that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints –
e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported
as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a
poorly designed protocol, the attacker could
masquerade as the administrator or another device,
and the attacker could insert themselves into the
network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle
attack. The result is the critical network traffic is
exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality
and integrity, and potentially the network device itself
could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised
update of the software or firmware which undermines
the security functionality of the device. Non-validated
updates or updates validated using non-secure or
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weak cryptography leave the update firmware
vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or
modify the security functionality of the network
device without administrator awareness. This could
result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g.,
misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise
the device and the administrator would have no
knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and device
data enabling continued access to the network device
and its critical data. The compromise of credentials
include replacing existing credentials with an
attacker’s credentials, modifying existing credentials,
or obtaining the administrator or device credentials
for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to
the device. Having privileged access to the device
provides the attacker unfettered access to the network
traffic, and may allow them to take advantage of any
trust relationships with other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE A component of the network device may fail during
start-up or during operations causing a compromise or
failure in the security functionality of the network
device, leaving the device susceptible to attackers.
Table 7: TOE Threats
3.2 Organizational Security Policies
This section identifies the organizational security policies which are expected to be implemented by an
organization that deploys the TOE. These policies have been taken from the NDcPP.
Policy Policy Definition
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal
agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by
accessing the TOE.
Table 8: TOE Organization Security Policies
3.3 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in this section are assumed to exist in the TOE’s Operational Environment.
These assumptions have been taken from the NDcPP.
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that
compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s
physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is
assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it
contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any requirements
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on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations.
The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical
access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract
data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its
core function and not provide functionality/services that could be
deemed as general purpose computing. For example the device
should not provide computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide any
assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The
intent is for the network device to protect data that originates on
or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data
and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the network device,
destined for another network entity, is not covered by the NDcPP.
It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs for
particular types of network devices (e.g, firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed
to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following
policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators
are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient
strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when
administering the device. The network device is not expected to
be capable of defending against a malicious administrator that
actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the
device.
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The network device firmware and software is assumed to be
updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the
release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
network device are protected by the platform on which they
reside.
Table 9: TOE Assumptions
3.4 Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment. The security
objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and its environment in meeting the security needs.
TOE Security Objectives
The NDcPP does not define any security objectives for the TOE.
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The TOE’s operational environment must satisfy the following objectives:
Objective Objective Definition
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than
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those services necessary for the operation, administration and
support of the TOE.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses
it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by
other security and assurance measures in the operational
environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance
documentation in a trusted manner.
OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an administrator on
a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to
known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they
reside.
Table 10: TOE Operational Environment Objectives
3.5 Security Problem Definition Rationale
The assumptions, threats, OSPs, and objectives that are defined in this ST represent the assumptions,
threats, OSPs, and objectives that are specified in the Protection Profile to which the TOE claims
conformance. The associated mappings of assumptions to environmental objectives, SFRs to TOE
objectives, and OSPs and objectives to threats are therefore identical to the mappings that are specified in
the claimed Protection Profile.
4 Extended Components Definition
4.1 Extended Security Functional Requirements
The extended Security Functional Requirements that are claimed in this ST are taken directly from the PP
to which the ST and TOE claim conformance. These extended components are formally defined in the PP
in which their usage is required.
4.2 Extended Security Assurance Requirements
There are no extended Security Assurance Requirements in this ST.
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5 Security Functional Requirements
5.1 Conventions
The CC permits four functional component operations—assignment, refinement, selection, and
iteration—to be performed on functional requirements. This ST will highlight the operations in the
following manner:
 Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Indicated with italicized text.
 Refinement: allows the addition of details. Indicated with bold text.
 Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Indicated with underlined
text.
 Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. Indicated with
a sequential number in parentheses following the element number of the iterated SFR and/or
separated by a “/” with a notation that references the function for which the iteration is used, e.g.
“/LocSpace” for an SFR that relates to local storage space
When multiple operations are combined, such as an assignment that is provided as an option within a
selection or refinement, a combination of the text formatting is used.
If SFR text is reproduced verbatim from text that was formatted in a claimed PP (such as if the PP’s
instantiation of the SFR has a refinement or a completed assignment), the formatting is not preserved.
This is so that the reader can identify the operations that are performed by the ST author as opposed to the
PP author.
5.2 Security Functional Requirements Summary
The following table lists the SFRs claimed by the TOE:
Class Name Component Identification Component Name
Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol
Identification and
Authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Authentication using Certificates
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Class Name Component Identification Component Name
FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Generation
Security
Management
FMT_MOF.1(1)/AdminAct Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1(1)/TrustedUp
date
Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
Protection of the
TSF
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
TOE Access FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banner
Trusted Path
/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
Table 11: Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
5.3 Security Functional Requirements
Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 Refinement
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrative actions comprising:
 Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user
accounts are required for administrators).
 Security related configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change
occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
 Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the
action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
 Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
 Starting and stopping services (if applicable)
 [no other actions];
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 12.
FAU_GEN.1.2 Refinement
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
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a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure)
of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 12.
Requirement Auditable Event(s) Additional Audit Record
Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None. None.
FAU_GEN.2 None. None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.2 None. None.
FCS_CKM.4 None. None.
FCS_COP.1(1) None. None.
FCS_COP.1(2) None. None.
FCS_COP.1(3) None. None.
FCS_COP.1(4) None. None.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.11 Failure to establish an SSH session. Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS session Reason for failure
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS session Reason for failure
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_UAU.7 None. None.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism.
Provided user identity, origin of
the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_X509_EXT.1 Unsuccessful attempt to validate a
certificate
Reason for failure
FIA_X509_EXT.2 None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 None. None.
FMT_MOF.1(1)/AdminAct Modification of the behaviour of the TSF. None.
FMT_MOF.1(1)/TrustedUpdate Any attempt to initiate a manual update None.
FMT_MTD.1 All management activities of TSF data. None.
FMT_SMF.1 None. None.
FMT_SMR.2 None. None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_STM.1 Changes to time. The old and new values for
the time. Origin of the
attempt to change time for
success and failure (e.g.,
IP address).
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of the update
attempt (success or failure)
No additional information.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 Any attempts at unlocking of an interactive
session.
None.
1
TD0150
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Requirement Auditable Event(s) Additional Audit Record
Contents
FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote session by the
session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive session. None.
FTA_TAB.1 None. None.
FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted channel.
Termination of the trusted channel.
Failure of the trusted channel functions.
Identification of the initiator
and target of failed trusted
channels establishment attempt.
FTP_TRP.1 Initiation of the trusted path.
Termination of the trusted path.
Failures of the trusted path functions.
Identification of the claimed
user identity.
Table 12: Auditable Events
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each
auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted
channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall [[invoke a DB purge that will delete oldest entries based on first-in-first-out (FIFO)
rules and generate a syslog record for the purge event]] when the local storage space for audit data is
full.
Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm:
[
 RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
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 FFC schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC 3526, Section
3]2
.
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key establishment method:
[
 RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication
800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes
Using Integer Factorization Cryptography”;
 Key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC
3526, Section 3]3
.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.14
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method
 For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite
consisting of [zeroes]],
 For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation
of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [instructs a part of the TSF to destroy the
abstraction that represents the key];
that meets the following: No Standard.
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1(1)
The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
AES used in [CBC] mode and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] that meet the
following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116].
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1(2)5
2
TD0291
3
TD0235
4
TD0130
5
TD0116
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The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[
 RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048 bits or
greater]]
that meet the following:
[
 For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using
PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC
9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3]
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1(3)
The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1(4)
The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic
key sizes [112 bits] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC
9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC
18031:2011 using [Hash_DRBG (any)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from
[[3] software-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the
greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for
Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, and [no
other RFCs].
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FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication
methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, password-based.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [32768] bytes in an SSH
transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.46
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms
and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [ssh-rsa] and [no other public key
algorithms] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-
sha2-512] and [no other MAC algorithms] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC
algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7
The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1] and [no other methods] are the only allowed
key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.87
The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections the same session keys are used for a threshold of
no longer than one hour, and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data. After either of the
thresholds are reached a rekey needs to be performed.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] supporting the following
ciphersuites8
:
 [
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
6
TD0189
7
TD0167
8
TD0226
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○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC
6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall only establish a trusted channel if the peer certificate is valid.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the following
NIST curves: [none] and no other curves.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] supporting the following
ciphersuites9
:
 [
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.210
The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and [none].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall generate key establishment parameters using RSA with key size 2048 bits and [no
other size] and [no other].
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:
a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters,
numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”];
9
TD0226
10
TD0156
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b) Minimum password length shall be settable by the Security Administrator, and shall support
passwords of 15 characters or greater.
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication is in
progress at the local console.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism, [[Active Directory]] to
perform administrative user authentication.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the
identification and authentication process:
 Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
 [no other actions]
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
 RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
 The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
 The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints
extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.
 The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [the Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 2560].
 The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have
the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp
1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
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o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp
2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose
(id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present
and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS],
and [code signing for system software updates].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall
[allow the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases].
FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests
FIA_X509_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request Message as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to
provide the following information in the request: public key and [Common Name].
FIA_X509_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate
Response.
Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1(1)/AdminAct Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1(1)/AdminAct
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the behaviour of the functions TOE Security Functions to
Security Administrators.
FMT_MOF.1(1)/TrustedUpdate Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1(1)/TrustedUpdate
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual update to Security
Administrators.
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FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.111
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
● Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
● Ability to configure the access banner;
● Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
● Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital signature] capability prior to
installing those updates;
● [No other capabilities].
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
FMT_SMR.2.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles:
 Security Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3
The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
 The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
 The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely
are satisfied.
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.
11
TD0090
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FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power on), at the
request of the authorised user] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [Specifically defined
in Table 13].
# Validation Component
1. HMAC + Built-in Crypto Self-test Kernel
2. Built-in RPM Verification Core OS and packages (including OpenSSH)
3. HMAC verified against fipshmac Fipscheck utility
4. Fipscheck (including OpenSSL self-check) Crypto: OpenSSL
5. Built-in RPM Verification OpenSSL rpm package
6. Built-in crypto package self-test (KAT) Crypto: Bouncy Castle
7. SHA-256 verified against last known or
stored hash.
Core CounterACT and plugin installation packages and
extracted files.
8. Running kernel version compared to version
defined in grub;
System current state vs system configuration
Table 13: Self-Test List
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.112
The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version of
the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE firmware/software version].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
12
TD0154
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The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [digital
signature mechanism] prior to installing those updates.
Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [
 terminate the session]
after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-configurable time
interval of session inactivity.
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1
The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own interactive
session.
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banner
FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-
specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.
Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of using [TLS] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself
and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [authentication server]
that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the
channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
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FTP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [export audit, authentication
decision].
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH, TLS] to provide a communication path between itself and
authorized remote administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from
disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_TRP.1.2
The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial administrator authentication and all remote
administration actions.
5.4 Statement of Security Functional Requirements Consistency
The Security Functional Requirements included in the ST represent all required SFRs specified in the PPs
against which exact conformance is claimed and a subset of the optional SFRs. All hierarchical
relationships, dependencies, and unfulfilled dependency rationales in the ST are considered to be identical
to those that are defined in the claimed PP.
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6 Security Assurance Requirements
This section identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that are claimed for the TOE. The
SARs which are claimed are in exact conformance with the NDcPP.
6.1 Class ADV: Development
Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Developer action elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1D
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2D
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
Content and presentation elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1C
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as
SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_ FSP.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_ FSP.1.2E
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete
instantiation of the SFRs.
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6.2 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation
Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Developer action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1D
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1C
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate
warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces
provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces,
in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as
appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant
event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the
security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including
operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for maintaining
secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed
in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1E
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The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Developer action elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_ PRE.1.1C
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the
delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_ PRE.1.2C
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE
and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_ PRE.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AGD_ PRE.1.2E
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared
securely for operation.
6.3 Class ALC: Life Cycle Support
Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
Developer action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1C
The TOE shall be labeled with its unique reference.
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Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Developer action elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1D
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1C
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence
required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C
The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
6.4 Class ATE: Tests
Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Developer action elements:
ATE_IND.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
ATE_IND.1.1C
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements:
ATE_IND.1.1E
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The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
6.5 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
Developer action elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1C
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in
the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3E
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
The following sections identify the security functions of the TOE and describe how the TSF meets each
claimed SFR. They include Security Audit, Cryptographic Support, Identification and Authentication,
Security Management, Protection of the TSF, TOE Access and Trusted Path / Channels.
7.1 Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 and FAU GEN.2:
The TOE has the mechanisms to automatically generate audit records based on the behavior that occurs
within the TSF. The TOE generates audit records for all administrative functions including Login/Logout,
security related changes, resetting of passwords, starting and stopping the TOE (equivalent to starting and
stopping audit), and certificate management. Additionally, Table 12 identifies the audit records that are
inclusive to the PP evaluation scoping. The TOE records the date and time, type of event, subject identity
(identity of the user associated with each audited event that occurred due to a user action), and the
outcome in the audit record.
The TOE application layer maintains two separate log files in an internal database to record all the
records needed to satisfy this requirement as scoped by the PP. The host OS also maintains an audit log
(OS log) that is stored locally on the hard drive. All OS log records are incorporated into the appropriate
application layer logs based on the type of event. The two application layer logs are as follows:
 User Audit Trail
The User Audit Trail records information concerning TOE user activity for both CLI (OS log)
and Console interface, for example: administrative changes to the security configuration of the
TOE, or updated/resetting of user passwords. The logs give additional information about the
activity, such as the date of the activity and the IP address from which it was carried out.
 System Event Log
The System Event Log records information about system activity, for example: successful and
failed administrator authentication attempts, startup and shutdown of TOE or services,
cryptographic key generation and destruction, and OS events. The startup and shutdown of the
TOE’s audit functionality is synonymous with the startup and shutdown of the TOE.
FAU_STG_EXT.1:
The TSF provides the ability for an administrator to enable/disable the near real-time forwarding of the
audit trail to an external syslog server in the operational environment. The forwarding of the audit trail to
a syslog server is mandated for compliance to the NDcPP. Once enabled, the generated audit is first saved
locally in the internal database and then the TOE will securely transmit audit data to the Operational
Environment syslog server without administrator intervention via a TLS channel.
Application layer audit events are stored in the TOE database (DB). The TOE runs an automatic DB
purge function to prevent audit logs from filling up the internal database and hard drive to capacity. The
DB, as part of the installation, determines a maximum size based on hard drive availability. This
predefined and non-configurable threshold is used to trigger the DB purge function. The DB purge
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function is initiated when 80% of this predefined and non-configurable threshold is exceeded. When the
DB threshold is exceeded, the DB purge function deletes entries in a FIFO (oldest events deleted first)
fashion. The DB purge function causes a syslog event to be sent by the TOE.
The TOE also takes into consideration the storage needed for the OS log files when preventing the hard
drive being filled to capacity. The TOE provides an administrator with the ability to define a maximum
size for the OS log file and the number of OS log files (current plus historical) saved at the OS level.
When the OS log file reaches the administratively defined maximum size, the log file is closed and
renamed sequentially (i.e. OSlog.1, OSlog.2). This means that if an administrator configures the TOE to
keep the maximum setting of 5 log files then there will be 5 OS logs maintained on the system (the
currently opened and 4 historical).
The administrator can configure the maximum size of OS log files to 50 MB. This configuration setting
applies to all OS log files (current and historical). Therefore, with a maximum setting of 5 audit logs and
a maximum setting file size of 50MB each would result in 5*50MB= 250MB of total audit space required
for the OS logs. Once the number of log files reaches its configured maximum amount, the oldest log file
is automatically deleted and the remaining log files roll over in order to allow the new file to be created
for the new audit records.
The TOE provides a means to review all of the audit records via the Console interface. The TOE does not
provide a means for any user to manually delete or manipulate the audit logs stored at the OS level or
those in the internal DB. The management interfaces (Console or CLI) do not allow the audit records to
be modified or deleted. The audit functionality starts automatically with the TOE and cannot be disabled
by any means.
7.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements two different cryptographic modules: OpenSSL and Bouncy Castle. Both modules
are FIPS certified:
a) OpenSSL RPM version 1.0.1e-30.el6.11.i686 which contains the OpenSSL module 3.0 certified
under CMVP Cert. #2441
b) BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Software Version 1.0.0 w/ Java SE Runtime Env 8
certified under CMVP Cert. #2768
The following tables contain the CAVP algorithm certificates for the two cryptographic modules
implemented in the TOE:
SFR Algorithm/Protocol OpenSSL
CAVP Cert #
FCS_CKM.1 RSA FIPS 186-4 Key Generation #1584
FCS_CKM.2 RSA Key Establishment SP 800-56B Vendor Affirmed
FCS_COP.1(1) AES, CBC Mode, 128, 192, and 256 bits #3113
FCS_COP.1(2) RSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation and Signature
Verification
#1584
FCS_COP.1(3) SHS: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 #2569
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FCS_COP.1(4) HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512 #1950
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 DRBG #625
Table 14: Cryptographic Algorithm Table for OpenSSL
SFR Algorithm/Protocol Bouncy Castle
CAVP Cert #
ForeScout
CAVP Cert #
FCS_CKM.1 RSA FIPS 186-4 Key Generation #1932 #2551
FCS_CKM.2 RSA Key Establishment SP 800-56B Vendor Affirmed Vendor Affirmed
FCS_COP.1(1) AES, CBC Mode, 128, 192, and 256 bits #3756 #4671
FCS_COP.1(2) RSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation and
Signature Verification
#1932 #2551
FCS_COP.1(3) SHS: SHA-1, SHA-256 #3126 #3827
FCS_COP.1(4) HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 #2458 #3094
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 DRBG #1031 #1580
Table 15: Cryptographic Algorithm Table for Bouncy Castle
OE Component Definition of Communication (protocol, client/server, crypto module)
Management
Workstation
Communications are secured using TLS where the TOE is the Server.
TOE crypto required to support interfaces 3 as defined in Figure 1 above.
Crypto Module: Bouncy Castle
Communications are secured using SSH where the TOE is the Server
TOE crypto required to support interfaces 2 as defined in Figure 1 above.
Crypto Module: OpenSSL
Active Directory
Server
Communications are secured using TLS where the TOE is the client.
TOE crypto required to support interface 6 as defined in Figure 1 above.
Crypto Module: OpenSSL
Syslog Server Communications are secured using TLS where the TOE is the client.
TOE crypto required to support interface 7 as defined in Figure 1 above.
Crypto Module: OpenSSL
Table 16: Identification of Crypto Module Supporting Secured Communication Channel
FCS_CKM.1:
The TOE implements a FIPS PUB 186-4 conformant key generation mechanism for RSA key generation
schemes for establishing TLS connections. Specifically, the TOE complies with the FIPS 186-4 (Digital
Signature Standard (DSS) Appendix B.3). This is used to generate the RSA key pairs with a modulus of
at least 2048 bits which has an equivalent key strength of 112 bits. See Tables 14 & 15 Cryptographic
Algorithm Table for certification numbers. This is applicable to both cryptographic modules being
implemented.
In addition, the TOE implements FFC schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets RFC 3526,
Section 3. This is used to generate the keys of size 2048 bits for diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. DH group
14 support is provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic module.
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FCS_CKM.2:
The TOE implements RSA key establishment, conformant to NIST SP 800-56B. The TOE complies with
section 6 and all subsections regarding RSA key pair generation and key establishment in NIST SP 800-
56B. This requirement is met by the vendor affirmation. The TOE is able to generate RSA key pairs with
a modulus of at least 2048 bits which has an equivalent key strength of 112 bits. The RSA key
establishment is used for TLS communications.
In addition, the TOE implements a key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets
RFC 3526, Section 3. DH group 14 support is provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic module. The TSF
uses Diffie-Hellman-group14-SHA1 and is used for SSH communication establishment. The Diffie-
Hellman group 14 is implemented by using the KexAlgorithms parameter as specified in RFC 3526
Section 3. SSH is also forced to only work with DH group 14. This is hardcoded with no ability for an
administrator to modify the settings.
FCS_CKM.4:
The table below breaks out the keys/secrets and how and when they are zeroized or destroyed.
Name Origin Store Zeroization / Destruction
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret
SSH Server /
client
applications
RAM Destroyed by a single direct overwrite
consisting of zeroes (0x00). After
overwriting, the TSF reads the memory to
verify the key has been destroyed. If the
read-verify fails, the process is repeated.
The key is zeroized immediately after it is
no longer needed and when the TOE is
shutdown or reinitialized. Automatically
zeroized after DH exchange.
Diffie-Hellman private
exponent
SSH Server /
client
applications
RAM Destroyed by a single direct overwrite
consisting of zeroes (0x00). After
overwriting, the TSF reads the memory to
verify the key has been destroyed. If the
read-verify fails, the process is repeated.
The key is zeroized immediately after it is
no longer needed and when the TOE is
shutdown or reinitialized. Automatically
zeroized after DH exchange
SSH session key SSH Server /
client
applications
RAM Destroyed by a single direct overwrite
consisting of zeroes (0x00). After
overwriting, the TSF reads the memory to
verify the key has been destroyed. If the
read-verify fails, the process is repeated.
The key is zeroized immediately after it is
no longer needed and when the TOE is
shutdown or reinitialized. Automatic
zeroized after SSH session is terminated.
SSH Server Host Private
Key
Generated on
platform during
Filesystem Filesystem: Generation of a new certificate
will only be accomplished during a
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initial setup of
device.
reinstallation of the product where all files
would be overwritten which would in
effect also destroy the abstraction that
represented the key.
TLS Server Host Certificate
Private Key
Generated on
platform during
initial setup or
imported after
installation.
TLS
Communications
for syslog, AD
RAM and
Filesystem
RAM: The Server Certificate’s private key
is destroyed by a single direct overwrite
consisting of zeroes (0x00). After
overwriting, the TSF reads the memory to
verify the key has been destroyed. If the
read-verify fails, the process is repeated.
The key is zeroized immediately after it is
no longer needed and when the TOE is
shutdown or reinitialized.
Filesystem: Private key is deleted when
generation of a new certificate are
imported or when certificates are removed.
The TOE will invoke an interface provided
by a part of the TSF that instructs a part of
the TSF to destroy the abstraction that
represents the key (i.e. delete the resource).
Table 17: Crypto key destruction table
FCS_COP.1(1):
The TOE performs encryption and decryption using the AES algorithm in CBC mode with key sizes of
128, 192, and 256 bits. The AES algorithm meets ISO 18033-3 and CBC meets ISO 10116. The TOE’s
AES implementation is validated under CAVP. See Tables 14 & 15 Cryptographic Algorithm Table for
certification numbers. This is applicable to both cryptographic modules being implemented.
FCS_COP.1(2):
The TOE performs digital signature services generation and verification in accordance with RSA Digital
Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) 2048 bits or greater. The RSA schemes are in
accordance with FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1
Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature
scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3. The TOE’s RSA implementation is validated under CAVP. See
Tables 14 & 15 Cryptographic Algorithm Table for certification numbers. This is applicable to both
cryptographic modules being implemented.
FCS_COP.1(3):
The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512* as specified in
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 (FIPS PUB 180-4). The TOE’s SHS implementation is validated under CAVP.
See Tables 14 & 15 Cryptographic Algorithm Table for certification numbers. This is applicable to both
cryptographic modules being implemented. The hashing function is used to support password hashing of
all passwords stored on the TOE (FPT_APW_EXT.1), Trusted updates digital signature verification
(FPT_TUD_EXT.1), and TSF self-testing hash value check verification (FPT_TST_EXT.1). *Only the
OpenSSL cryptographic module provides the SHA-512 hashing support.
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FCS_COP.1(4):
The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services that meet ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 (FIPS
PUB 198-1, and FIPS PUB 180-4), Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”. The TOE supports the following:
 HMAC-SHA-1 [key-size: 160 bits, digest size: 160 bits, block size: 512 bits, MAC lengths:
160 bits]
 HMAC-SHA-256 [key-size: 256 bits, digest size: 256 bits, block size: 512 bits, MAC
lengths: 256 bits]
 HMAC-SHA-512 [key-size: 512 bits, digest size: 512 bits, block size: 1024 bits, MAC
lengths: 512 bits]
The TOE’s HMAC implementation is validated under CAVP. See Tables 14 & 15 Cryptographic
Algorithm Table for certification numbers. This is applicable to both cryptographic modules being
implemented but only the OpenSSL cryptographic module provides HMAC-SHA-512 keyed-hashing
message authentication.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1:
The TOE implements a hash deterministic random bit generator (Hash_DRBG). The DRBG used by the
TOE is in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011. There is no ability to specify the use of an alternative
DRBG. The different TOE models uniformly provide three software-based noise-based entropy sources
as described in the proprietary entropy specification. The amount of entropy that is collected is based on
the function that the DRBG is being used for. In all cases, this amount is greater than or equal to the
security strength of the data that is being output. For example, a 256-bit AES key generation operation
will collect at least 256 bits of entropy before the DRBG is invoked. The largest AES key generation
operation supported is 2048-bit.
The Bouncy Castle and OpenSSL module collect entropy from /dev/random, which is a blocking entropy
source. The /dev/random entropy pools are protected by being in kernel memory and are not accessible
from user space. The entropy source is described in greater detail in the proprietary Entropy Assessment
Report.
CounterACT currently relies on kernel modules to gather and output entropy for our random uses:
 Interrupt events - the timestamp of the event, the IRQ number and interrupt flags are used
 Disk events - the timestamp of a disk operation completion event is used
 Keyboard event - the timestamp of a keyboard press/release event and the key code are used
 CPU cycles event – the output of the 32 bit counter that measures CPU cycles
The TOE’s DRBG implementation is validated under CAVP. See Tables 14 & 15 Cryptographic
Algorithm Table for certification numbers.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
The TOE acts as an SSHv2 server for remote CLI sessions that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253,
and 4254. The TOE implementation of SSH supports public key-based and password-based
authentication. SSH is used for remote administrators to connect securely to the TOE for CLI
connections. The SSH implementation will detect all large packets greater than 32,768 bytes and drop
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accordingly as well as enforcing the connection to be rekeyed after no longer than one hour, and no more
than one gigabyte of transmitted data. These parameters are not configurable.
The TOE’s implementation of SSHv2 only supports:
 aes128-cbc and aes256-cbc for its encryption algorithms
 ssh-rsa as its public key algorithms.
 hmac-sha-1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512 for data integrity
 diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 for key exchange method.
OpenSSL cryptographic module provides all cryptographic support required for SSH communication.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
The TOE when acting as a TLS client will only support TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols to connect and
secure the following trusted channels:
 checking the validity of certificates,
 performing authentication requests with the AD Server,
 audit data transfer, and
Mutual authentication is not being claimed.
The following ciphersuites are used for the evaluated configuration:
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246.
Elliptic Curves are not supported.
The TOE will only establish a trusted channel if the peer certificate is valid. The TSF shall verify the
presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125. The Common Name and
Subject Alternative Name (DNS Name only) are the only reference identifiers in the certificate that is part
of that validation. The TOE will only support a wildcard in the left-most label (e.g. *.example.com). All
other usages of a wildcard will cause a failure in the connection. The TOE does not support URI reference
identifier or pinned certificates.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
The TOE, when acting as a TLS server, will only support TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols to connect and
secure the following trusted channels:
 Console remotely connecting to the TOE for remote management
The TOE will deny connections from a client requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 protocol
versions.
The following ciphersuites are used for the evaluated configuration:
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○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246.
The TSF generates key establishment parameters using RSA with key size of 2048 bits.
Elliptic Curves are not supported. Mutual authentication is not being claimed.
7.3 Identification and Authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1:
The TOE supports the ability for an administrator to set the minimum password length to 15 characters or
greater. Passwords can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers and
special characters. The accepted special characters include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“,
and “)”.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 and FIA_UIA_EXT.1:
The warning banner text can be configured by the administrator. The display and acknowledgement of
this banner is the only TOE functionality that is available to an unauthenticated user.
When connecting to the TOE remotely using an SSH client (remote console) or using a local physical
connection (local console) to gain access to the CLI, the TOE displays the pre-authentication warning
banner. Users are authenticated using a native username/password credential authentication mechanism
for local physical connections and SSH connections. SSH connections also support public key based
authentication.
When connecting to the TOE remotely using the Console application, which establishes a TLS
connection, the TOE displays the pre-authentication warning banner is displayed. The TOE can be
configured to request an authentication decision from an Active Directory server or use the native
username/password credential authentication mechanism for users connecting to the TOE using the
Console.
Access is only granted once the user provides a valid username/password that is verified using Active
Directory or native username/password credential authentication mechanism.
FIA_UAU.7:
When authenticating to the TOE with a local physical connection (local console) to access the CLI, the
password is obscured by suppressing the echo of keystrokes to the screen. No indication of progress is
provided while typing in a password.
FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, and FIA_X509_EXT.3:
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates to support authentication for TLS and code signing for system
software updates in accordance with RFC 5280. When the TSF cannot determine the validity of a
certificate, the TSF can be administratively configured to not accept the certificate and not establish a
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connection or accept the certificate and establish the connection. The TSF does not provide a mechanism
to override the validation decision.
The TSF determines the validity of certificates by ensuring that the certificate and the certificate path is
valid in accordance with RFC 5280. In addition:
 The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension
is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE
 The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
 The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints
extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.
 The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using the Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 2560.
 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate the
TSF shall not accept the certificate and deny the connection.
 The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification
shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose
(id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing
purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
A Certificate Request Message is generated as specified in RFC 2986 containing the public key and
“Common Name”. The chain of certificates is validated from the root CA when the CA Certificate
Response is received.
7.4 Security Management
FMT_MOF.1(1)/AdminAct, FMT_MOF.1(1)/TrustedUpdate, FMT_MTD.1, and
FMT_SMF.1
The SFRs listed above have been combined to clarify the Security Management functions of the TOE
including how the TOE implements authentication, identification, and also RBAC. The following
description will also include restrictions for these roles and functions.
The TOE uses role based access control (RBAC), as described in FMT_SMR.2, to restrict access to the
functions that manage the TSF data. The available functionality that is presented to an authenticated user
is based on the group of permissions and the privileges associated with the permissions. These
permissions/privileges are bound to the user only after the user has successfully authenticated. Until then
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the only ability for a user is to see the Warning Banner and present credentials. The Console then limits
the presented functionality based on the privileges bound to that user.
The TSF management functions that are restricted to the Security Administrator and scoped by this
evaluation are:
● Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely (FMT_MOF.1(1)/AdminAct,
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FTP_TRP.1)
● Ability to configure the access banner (FTA_TAB.1)
● Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking
(FTA_SSL.3 and FTA_SSL.4);
● Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to
installing those updates (FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FMT_MOF.1(1)/TrustedUpdate)
FMT_SMR.2:
The TOE is designed to use permissions which allow, limit or prevent user access to specific Console
tools (access to the management functions available through the Console). Upon successful
authentication, the TSF associates the administratively defined set of permissions for that user to the
subject acting on behalf of that user. The TSF then enforces role based access control (RBAC) to limit
access to TSF functions and data based on the set of permissions bound to the subject.
A set of permissions is called a role. The TOE has one pre-defined role: “Admin”. The user permissions
for the “Admin” role cannot be modified or customized. A user assigned the “Admin” role is the TOE
administrator (Security Administrator) and has access to all Console tools and features. All other users
that do not have the full set of administrative permissions are categorized as a “Console User”.
CounterACT is installed with a user with the “Admin” role with a customized password created during
installation by the customer. This means that other users (Console Users) do not need to be created in
order to operate the system. However, if other users are desired then this administrative user may create
Console Users or additional TOE administrators.
Console Users can be created, deleted or modified by an administrator (or a Console User with the
necessary permission). Each Console User must be assigned one or more permissions when created
(equivalent of a customizing a role without being able to assign a specialized moniker to the set of
permissions selected). A Console User’s set of permissions can be customized by adding and subtracting
specific permissions to allow/disallow the user TOE functionality or by selecting the “Admin” role to
establish another full TOE administrator after creation.
7.5 Protection of the TSF
FPT_APW_EXT.1:
No passwords are stored by the TOE in plaintext. All Console user passwords are hashed using SHA-256
and then encrypted using AES256. CLI user password is hashed using SHA512. There is no function
provided by the TOE to display a password value in plaintext nor is the password data recoverable.
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FPT_SKP_EXT.1:
The TOE does not provide a mechanism to view pre-shared keys, symmetric keys and private keys.
Volatile memory used to store secret keys, private keys, and secret key data is not accessible by
administrators and neither is the file system of the OS. Data keys stored on the TOE are encrypted using
AES-256. There are no keys stored in plaintext.
FPT_STM.1:
The TOE provides its own time via its internal clock that is set manually. An administrator can set the
time using the CLI interface.
The TOE uses the clock for several security-relevant purposes, including:
 Audit records timestamps (seconds, milliseconds, microseconds, or nanoseconds).
 X.509 certificate validation
 Inactivity of remote sessions
 Inactivity of local session
FPT_TST_EXT.1:
Upon the startup of the TOE, multiple Power-On Self Tests (POSTs) are run. The POSTs provide
environmental monitoring of the TOE’s components (hardware and software), in which early warnings
can prevent whole component failure.
The following self-tests are performed to verify the integrity of the software and cryptographic modules.
The self-tests will also be run on service restarts and will be available for manual execution. The
following tests are part of the self-test suite:
# Component Validation Fail
Result
1. Kernel HMAC + Built-in Crypto Self-test Hard-fail
2. Core OS and packages (including OpenSSH) Built-in RPM Verification Hard-fail
3. fipscheck utility HMAC verified against fipshmac Hard-fail
4. Crypto: OpenSSL fipscheck (including OpenSSL self-
check)
Hard-fail
5. OpenSSL rpm package Built-in RPM Verification Hard-fail
6. Crypto: Bouncy Castle Built-in crypto package self-test (KAT) Hard-fail
7. Core CounterACT and plugin installation
packages and extracted files.
SHA-256 verified against last known or
stored hash.
Soft-fail
8. System current state vs system configuration Running kernel version compared to
version defined in grub;
FIPS mode running status compared to
configuration in grub.
Soft-fail
Table 18: Self-Test List with Failure Results
Hard-fail: Kernel test failure will result in panic the OS. Machine will not start.
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Soft-fail: Upon test failure, the function would alert the Admin on the terminal (upon logon to CLI), write
an audit event and send syslog event (if configured). The main CounterACT service will not start (i.e. not
available for operational use), alert will be displayed on the terminal (upon logon to CLI),
These tests are sufficient to validate the correct operation of the TSF because they verify that the software
has not been tampered with and that the underlying hardware does not have any anomalies that would
cause the software to be executed in an unpredictable or inconsistent manner.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1:
The Console provides the administrator a means to query the TOE for the currently executing version of
the TOE software.
When an update is available, an administrator may download the update package in the following ways:
 directly to the Console’s host platform using the host platform’s web browser,
 download to another device and then upload the package to Console’s host platform*, or
 by directly using the Console to download the update package
*NOTE: Method used for evaluated configuration testing.
Once the update is on the Console’s host platform, an administrator must manually initiate the installation
via the Console. There is no automatic update function provided. The Console will upload the update
package over the existing TLS path that is already established between the Console and the TOE
appliance. The CounterACT device does not automatically download or update itself nor does it connect
to the update server directly.
Once the upload is complete, the Console will stimulate the TSF to verify the update’s digital signature.
The TSF uses a locally stored public key (on the appliance) to verify update package authenticity. The
TSF will not continue with the update if the digital signature is determined to be invalid for any other
reason. If the signature is deemed invalid, the administrator will be provided a warning banner and allow
an administrator to continue with the installation or abort. There is no means for an administrative
override to continue the installation if the signature is completely missing. The TOE will reboot upon
completion.
7.6 TOE Access
FTA_SSL_EXT.1:
When a local session is inactive for the configured period of time the TOE will terminate the session. The
inactivity timer can be configured by an administrator using the Console, which is set in minutes.
FTA_SSL.3:
The TOE will terminate a remote session due to inactivity according to the configuration threshold set by
the administrator. The inactivity timer can be configured by an administrator using the Console to be
enabled/disabled and it is set in minutes or hours.
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FTA_SSL.4:
Any user accessing the TOE is capable of terminating their own Console session by clicking the “Exit”
command from the File menu. A user authenticated to the CLI can terminate the current session by typing
"quit" at the command line.
FTA_TAB.1:
There are three possible administrative ways to log into the TOE: locally via physical connection to
access the CLI, remotely via SSH connection to access the CLI, and remotely using the Console which
establishes a TLS connection. When logging in locally or remotely, the pre-authentication banner is
displayed and is viewed prior to authentication. The authentication banner is administratively
customizable.
7.7 Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1:
The TOE provides the ability to secure sensitive data in transit to and from the Operational Environment.
The TOE, acting as the TLS client, uses the TLS protocol to initiate and establish the trusted channel to
support the following capabilities:
 to export audit data to a syslog server
 authenticate users via an Active Directory server
The TOE appliance’s TLS client implementation is conformant to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1. TLS
communications use X5.09v3 certificates to support authentication.
FTP_TRP.1:
Remote administration is secured by using SSH and TLS protocols.
The Console establishes the TLS connection to the TOE appliance on behalf of the user for remote
administration. The TOE appliance is acting as a TLS Server and is conformant to FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.
The Console is using the host platforms TLS client capabilities.
A user can connect to the TOE appliance using SSH to remotely manage the TOE appliance via the CLI
(remote console). The TOE appliance’s SSH server implementation is conformant to FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.