BSI-DSZ-CC-0755-2012
For
Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V,
Release 6.1.7600
from
Microsoft Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0755-2012
Server Applications: Virtualization
Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release 6.1.7600
from Microsoft Corporation
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 6 February 2012
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0755-2012
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0755-2012 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................9
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................9
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................9
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................9
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).........................................10
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................10
4 Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................10
5 Publication....................................................................................................................11
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................12
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................13
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
7.1 Developer Testing..................................................................................................17
7.1.1 Test configuration............................................................................................17
7.1.2 Testing approach.............................................................................................18
7.1.3 Test results......................................................................................................18
7.1.4 Test coverage..................................................................................................19
7.1.5 Test depth........................................................................................................19
7.1.6 Conclusion......................................................................................................19
7.2 Evaluator Testing Effort..........................................................................................19
7.2.1 TOE Test Configuration...................................................................................19
7.2.2 Evaluator Tests................................................................................................20
7.2.3 Summary of Evaluator Test Results................................................................20
7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing................................................................................20
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................21
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................21
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................21
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................22
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
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12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................22
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................23
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................26
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................36
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0755-2012 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0755-2012
the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release 6.1.7600 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-
CC-0570-2009. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0570-2009 were
re-used.
The evaluation of the product Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release
6.1.7600 was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 16 January 2012. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Microsoft Corporation.
The product was developed by: Microsoft Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5 Publication
The product Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release 6.1.7600 has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052-6399
USA
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B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Microsoft Hyper-V R2 virtualization part of the
Windows Server 2008 R2 product. Hyper-V R2 allows the definition of partitions that have
separate address spaces where they can load an operating system and applications
operating on top of this operating system. The TOE consists of the Microsoft Server 2008
R2 with Hyper-V R2 and the hypervisor being enabled.
An operating system within such a partition has access to virtualized peripheral devices
where access to those devices is controlled by Hyper-V R2. An operating system may
either access devices using the same I/O related instructions as on a real system or it may
use a specific interface offered by Hyper-V R2 (called the VMBus) to communicate with
Hyper-V R2 for access to peripheral devices. In the first case the operating system can
only access the devices virtualized by Hyper-V R2. When using the VMBus defined
interface, an operating system in a guest partition needs to install “enlightenments” that set
up the VMBus communication and use the “synthetic”devices accessible via VMBus. Note
that the “enlightenments” within a guest operating system is part of the TOE, but not part of
the TSF.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] chapter 6.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
Hyper-V provides the following primary security functionality:
• Access control between partitions and virtualized resources
• Auditing of security critical events detected by Hyper-V
• Object reuse for all resources managed by Hyper-V
• Management of the Hyper-V configuration including the configuration of the
partitions
• Maximum quota for defined resources assigned to partitions (CPU time, memory,
disk storage)
In addition the root partition provides the following security functionality within the Server
2008 parts:
• Identification and authentication of administrative users
• Management and protection of the audit trail
• Access control of administrative users to management objects
• Access control to files and devices used
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• Management of users and access control
In addition Hyper-V provides the following architectural properties:
• TSF protection against tampering from guest partitions and network devices
• Separation between the guest partitions
• Reference mediation for access of guest partitions to protected resources (including
virtualized devices)
• Non-bypassability of the reference mediation
• Maintaining the separation mechanism provided by the underlying hardware when
virtualizing resources and devices or responding to hypervisor calls for a guest
partition.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] chapter 7.2.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The evaluated
configuration is based on Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard and Hyper-V
Server 2008 R2 with Hotfixes KB977894, KB2345316 and KB2525835 installed.
For details refer to chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release 6.1.7600
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The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1.a SW Microsoft Hyper-V Server 2008 R2 6.1.7600 Download
OR
1.b SW Windows Server 2008 R2 (with the Hyper-V Role installed) 6.1.7600 DVD
2 SW All patches specifically identified in [10]. (See next entry.) Not applicable Download
3 DOC Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V Evaluated
Configuration Guide [10]
2.11 Download
4 DOC Hyper-V Security Guide [11] 1.0 Download
Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE comes as part of Windows Server 2008 R2 as well as of Hyper-V Server 2008
R2. The latter is a specifically labelled as a functional subset of Windows Server 2008 R2
called a "ServerCore" installation, which also provides the TOE.
The TOE is delivered via downloads from the Microsoft web server and via physical
delivery. It consists of the ISO image for Hyper-V Server 2008 R2 and a DVD providing
Windows Server 2008R2. To ensure the integrity of the evaluation specific guidance, which
also contains the checksums for the installation media, the user must send an e-mail to
wincc@microsoft.com and request the Evaluated Configuration Guide for Hyper-V. The
user will then receive an S/MIME signed e-mail with the requested information so that the
integrity of the TOE can be verified.
The operational TOE, when installed following the instructions in [10], provides the
following version information when the command systeminfo is executed:
Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2, Version 6.1.7600 (DVD-Version)
OR
Microsoft Hyper-V Server, Version 6.1.7600 (Download-Version)
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
• The TOE will ensure that subjects within a partition gain only authorized access to
exported resources assigned to the partition.
• The TOE will provide the capability to generate audit records for security relevant
auditable events.
• The TOE will ensure that only authorized subjects are allowed to access TSF data.
• The TOE will provide functions that allow administrators to setup and configure the
TOE such that it is started in a secure state where all the other security objectives
are enforced.
• The TOE will provide all the functions necessary to support the administrative users
and authorized subjects in their management of the TOE security functions and
configuration data, and restrict these functions from use by unauthorized subjects.
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• The TOE will ensure that any information contained in a protected resource is not
released to subjects when the resource is reallocated.
• The TOE will provide mechanisms that enforce constraints on the allocation of TOE
resources.
• The TOE will provide mechanisms to protect each guest partition from unauthorized
interference by other guest partitions.
• The TOE will preserve the hardware separation functions within a partition such that
software within the partition is able to implement its own policy for separation in the
same way as it would be when executing directly on the underlying hardware.
• The TOE will preserve the integrity of a partitions data, the integrity of a partitions
privileges and security attributes, and the overall context the partition is operated in
when the running partition is migrated from one instance of the TOE to another one.
The TOE will prohibit live migration if the source and destination instance of the
TOE are not sufficiently compatible to provide the identical operational environment
to the partition on both the source and the destination instance of the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Physical security, underlying hardware mechanisms for separation and
virtualization without side-effects, trained administrators, trusted users directly using the
TOE, protected remote administration, trusted remote administration IT products,
protection of physical network against attacks, trusted root partition, partition users are
equipped with rights corresponding to partition data and confidentiality and integrity of data
during live migration.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Microsoft Hyper-V R2 virtualization part of the Server
2008R2 product. Hyper-V R2 allows the definition of partitions that have separate address
spaces where they can load an operating system and applications operating on top of this
operating system. The TOE consists of the Microsoft Server 2008 R2 Server Core with
Hyper-V R2 and the hypervisor being enabled.
An operating system within such a partition has access to virtualized peripheral devices
where access to those devices is controlled by Hyper-V R2. An operating system may
either access devices using the same I/O related instructions as on a real system or it may
use a specific interface offered by Hyper-V R2 (called the VMBus) to communicate with
Hyper-V R2 for access to peripheral devices. In the first case the operating system can
only access the devices virtualized by Hyper-V R2. When using the VMBus defined
interface, an operating system in a guest partition needs to install “enlightenments” that set
up the VMBus communication and use the “synthetic”devices accessible via VMBus. Note
that the “enlightenments” within a guest operating system is part of the TOE, but not part of
the TSF.
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The TOE offers separation of partitions, controls access of partitions to resources like
virtual hard disks or virtual network adapter, allows the definition of roles for the
management of the TOE and enforces a role-based management policy, allows auditing of
security critical events,authenticates administrative users in the root partition, and enforces
quota for CPU time for partitions. The TOE also offers live migration of partitions from one
instance of the TOE to another instance, provided the underlying platforms of both
instances of the TOE satisfy the compatibility criteria required for live migration. Live
migration will neither allow a partition to increase its privileges nor undermine the security
of any of the two instances of the TOE involved in the migration.
The TOE can be used to consolidate several physical servers based on Intel’s x86
architecture onto one machine. The TOE allows the definition of so called partitions. Each
instantiation of the TOE has one dedicated partition, called the root partition, and a
variable number of so called “guest partitions”. Resources accessed by guest partitions
are virtualized by the TOE, i.e. the TOE performs a “translation” of the virtual resource
accesses by a guest partition onto the real resources available to the TOE. Such
resources include virtual CPUs, main memory, virtual hard disks, virtual network adapters,
virtual CD/DVD drives or floppy disk drives as well as virtual video adapter and virtual
mouse and keyboard. The root partition is used for support of the resource virtualization
and for TOE management activities.
Each guest partition can take over the tasks of one physical server. Each guest will have
its own operating system installed and is restricted by the TOE to the use of the resources
that are assigned to the partition. The assignment of resources to partitions is performed
by administrative roles defined in the root partition. The TOE allows separating each guest
partition from others with a comparable degree as if they were executing on separate
physical servers.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 1 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The evaluator examined the information provided by the sponsor and determined the
following:
7.1.1 Test configuration
The test results provided by the developer were obtained from the following test
environments.
• Manual test cases:
 Hardware: HP DL365 G5 (AMD, x64), Dell 2950 III (INTEL, x64)
 Software base setup: as outlined in the evaluated configuration guide
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 VM setup: specification of the initial virtual machines that are set up to perform
the testing, including a reference to the operating systems and their functionality
hosted by these virtual machines.
• WTT test cases:
 Hardware: Intel x64 / AMD x64
 Software: "7600.16385.amd64fre.win7_rtm.090713-1255 (for Intel 64bit and
AMD64bit machines)"
7.1.2 Testing approach
The testing is based on the use of several different test suites covering different aspects of
the TOE functionality.
Several test cases are manual test cases. The instructions provided with these test cases
outline the step-by-step actions to be performed by the tester. Each step explains how an
interface is to be invoked to initialize the system, how to stimulate the functionality to be
tested, and how to observe and interpret, if necessary, the result.
Automated test cases are provided with instructions on how to set up the initial test
conditions to bring the test system into a state that fulfills all assumptions of the test cases.
In addition,the test plan documentation provides instructions on how to start the automated
test cases. The automated test cases check the obtained result with the expected result
and return the status information whether the test failed or passed to the calling
framework. This framework records the individual results for the tester to review.
During the assessment of the TOE design, the evaluator identified that the TOE
functionality is provided through a comparatively small number of external interfaces.
Specifically, the security functions of access control implemented with the virtualization
stack and the Hypervisor could potentially be tested with one test case by simply defining
and successfully starting a virtual machine hosting an operating system. However, the
access control functionality of the TOE is about granting a virtual machine access to its
assigned resources and about prohibiting any other access to other resources. However,
testing the latter functionality about denying access is a difficult task because in theory, all
potential allowed input variables to interfaces and all potential system states would need to
be tested to validate that access denial is enforced. As such testing is not feasible due to
the number of such states and input values (and also considering the fact that some states
may not be defined and therefore the behavior is unknown), the developer performed fuzz
testing which tries to cover as many states and input variables as possible. These fuzz
tests use random input variables to invoke TOE interfaces. They validate that they cannot
smash the Hypervisor or parts of the virtualization stack. Therefore, these fuzz tests are
considered part of the functional verification testing of the TOE.
In addition to the fuzz based test approach, the developer employs "classic" tests that
cover the whole software stack by means of integration tests as well as unit based tests for
the hypervisor. Finally the management interfaces (WMI) are tested functionally.
7.1.3 Test results
The test results provided by the developer were obtained on the hardware platforms listed
above.
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As described in the testing approach, the test results of all the automated tests are
collected for review by the tester. These test logs indicate whether the test passed or
failed.
The test results of the manual tests have been recorded by the developer and those
results have been presented separately.
All test results from all tested platforms show that the expected test results are identical to
the actual test results. Failure were examined by the evaluator, who determines that the
failure did not happen in the execution of the test case but in the cleanup phase of the test.
7.1.4 Test coverage
A mapping provided by the developer shows that the tests cover all individual TSFI
identified for the TOE. The evaluator analyzed the mapping and identified that significant
details of the TSFI have been tested with the developer's test suites.
7.1.5 Test depth
The evaluator's analysis of the test suites shows that all TSF subsystems and all SFR-
enforcing modules are covered with tests. In addition, the analysis also verified that the
different security-relevant functions provided by a subsystem or module are covered with
tests.
Not all of the internal interfaces mentioned in the TOE design could be covered by direct
test cases. The evaluator assessment shows that those interfaces are covered with
indirect tests. The evaluator was able to trace the testing of those internal interfaces to test
cases based on the test description.
7.1.6 Conclusion
The evaluator has verified that developer testing was performed on hardware conformant
to the ST.
The evaluator was able to follow and fully understand the developer testing approach by
using the information provided by the developer. The evaluator analyzed the developer
testing coverage and the depth of the testing by reviewing all test cases. The evaluator
found the testing of the TSF to be extensive and covering the TSFI as identified in the
functional specification.
The evaluator reviewed the test results provided by the developer and found them to be
consistent with the test plan.
7.2 Evaluator Testing Effort
While performing independent evaluator tests, the evaluator determined the following:
7.2.1 TOE Test Configuration
The evaluator independently installed the test systems according to the documentation in
the CC guidance and the test plan. As assessed in the evaluation report on the
administrator guidance,the CC guidance is consistent with the ST. Hence, the evaluator
concludes that the evaluator’s configuration is consistent with the ST.
Testing was executed on the following test systems:
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• HP DL365 G5 (with AMD x64 processor)
• Dell 2950 III (with Intel x64 processor).
• Software setup: as outlined in the evaluated configuration guide
7.2.2 Evaluator Tests
The developer devised additional test cases based on the following reasons identified
during the evaluation of the TOE design and the developer testing:
• The evaluator devised new tests.
• Considering the test approach and the number of tests the developer used to
validate the Hypervisor and the virtualization functionality provided by the
virtualization stack,the evaluator concentrated more on the administrative interfaces
where the coverage by developer tests is not as large as for the virtualization
functionality.
• As already identified in other work units, the evaluator considers the fact that much
of the TOE functionality is visible only through a limited set of externally visible
interfaces. Thus, many of the virtualization functions can already be triggered by a
limited number of tests executed from the root partition. This means, that the
evaluator focuses his testing activities on the root partition.
The evaluator created several test cases for testing a limited number of functional aspects
where the developer test cases were not considered to be broad enough by the evaluator.
During the evaluator's review of the test cases provided by the developer, the evaluator
gained confidence in the developer testing effort and the depth of test coverage in the
developer supplied test cases. The analysis has shown a very wide coverage of the TSF,
therefore the evaluator devised only a small number of test cases.
7.2.3 Summary of Evaluator Test Results
The evaluator testing effort consists of three parts. The first one is the observation of the
developer test execution, and the second is the execution of the tests created by the
evaluator,this includes, three, the re-run of automated developer tests with variations
chosen by the evaluator.
The developer test results matched the expected results of those test cases.
In addition to running the tests that were provided by the developer, the evaluator decided
to run the following additional test cases on the provided test systems as defined:
• Remote Management Authentication for Hyper-V Management
• Partition Ids
• AzMan based Authorization
• Integration Testing
All tests passed successfully.
7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator took the following approach to derive penetration tests for the TOE: First the
evaluator checked common sources for vulnerabilities of the Windows Server 2008 R2
operating system in general and the Hypervisor:
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• If a reported vulnerability could affect the evaluated configuration of the TOE in its
intended environment, the evaluator performed a vulnerability analysis.
• If the reported vulnerability has already been fixed in the evaluated configuration of
the TOE, the evaluator did not consider the vulnerability.
Beside those vulnerabilities reported in common sources the evaluator checked the other
evaluation reports for potential vulnerabilities mentioned there. For those vulnerabilities the
evaluator devised the way to check for the existence or absence of such a hypothetical
vulnerability. To achieve this, the evaluator decided to focus on the complexity of the
software stack presented to guest partitions. This software stack is accessible through the
VMBUS protocol and the higher level protocols that run over VMBUS such as networking
or storage.
The evaluator has performed his penetration tests on a TOE that was installed as
described in the Security Target [ST] following the description given in the Common
Criteria Configuration Guide [10]. The exact hardware configuration of the systems used
for penetration testing can be found in the single evaluation report for testing.
The penetration testing addressed the following security flaw hypothesis:
• Break (somewhere in) the VMBus protocol stack
• Memory pages zeroization
Each of the security functions withstood the penetration testing efforts either by being
resistant against an explicit, tool based penetration test or against an analysis of the
source code.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated configuration is based on Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard and
Hyper-V Server 2008 R2 with Hotfixes KB977894, KB2345316 and KB2525835 installed.
The system is installed according to the [10] as the Hyper-V Server 2008 R2 role or as
Windows Server 2008 R2 on a system that has the necessary hardware virtualization
support (Intel VT-x or AMD VT).
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
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The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptoalgorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 1 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
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SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0755-2012, Version 2.6, 2012-01-12, Microsoft
Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V Security Target
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2012-01-13, Final Evaluation Technical
Report Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, atsec information security
GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Configuration lists for the TOE (confidential document):
- CL-HYPERV, Configuration list - IMP, 2012-01-12
- CL-MSDN, Configuration list - MSDN, 2011-03-08
- CL-PS, Configuration list - Product Studio, 2011-03-07
- CL-SP, Configuration list - SharePoint, 2011-04-12
- CL-TECHNET, Technet Configuration List, 2011-04-11
- CL-WTT, Test result config list, 2011-04-11
[9] Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V Evaluated Configuration Guide,
Version 2.12, 2011.12.12
[10] Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V Security Guide, Version 1.0, March
2009
8
specifically
• AIS 01: Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, version
13 as of 2008-08-14.
• AIS 14: Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für Evaluationen nach CC,
version 7 as of 2010-08-03.
• AIS 19: Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical
Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC, version 8 as of 2010-10-19.
• AIS 23: Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, version 2 as of 2009-03-11.
• AIS 32: CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, version 6 as of 2010-08-03.
• AIS 38: Reuse of evaluation results, version 2.9 as of 2011-06-08.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0755-2012
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
CC Part 3:
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Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0755-2012
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release 6.1.7600 (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 6 February 2012, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_FLR.3, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Site Name:
Redmond, WA/US
Address:
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052-7329
USA
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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