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COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
Oracle Access Management 12c
20 September 2023
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE).
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common
Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or
any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT
product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report,
and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your organization has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Contact Centre and Information Services
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security.
A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the
official website of the International Common Criteria Program).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Description................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................................... 7
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 9
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................................................................... 9
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ......................................................................................................10
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................................................10
3.2 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................................................10
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................11
4.1 Documentation.................................................................................................................................................11
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................12
5.1 Development....................................................................................................................................................12
5.2 Guidance Documents........................................................................................................................................12
5.3 Life-Cycle Support ............................................................................................................................................12
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................13
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests.........................................................................................................................13
6.2 Conduct of Testing...........................................................................................................................................13
6.3 Independent Testing.........................................................................................................................................13
6.3.1 Independent Testing Results .........................................................................................................................13
6.4 Vulnerability Analysis .......................................................................................................................................14
6.4.1 Vulnerability Analysis Results........................................................................................................................15
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................16
7.1 Recommendations/Comments..........................................................................................................................16
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................17
8.1 List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................17
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8.2 References.......................................................................................................................................................17
LIST OF FIGURES
TOE Architecture..................................................................................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification ................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s).........................................................................................................................9
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Oracle Access Management 12c (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Oracle Corporation , was
the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this
evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Section 1.1 for the
evaluated security functionality.
Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 20 September 2023 and
was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify
that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Program).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Oracle Access Management 12c
Developer Oracle Corporation
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance:
Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Policy Management Version 2.1, October 24, 2013
Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Access Control Version 2.1, October 24, 2013
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE, Oracle Access Management (OAM), is an enterprise web access control and policy management solution. The TOE
enforces administrator-configurable rules ensuring that organization’s users given appropriate and consistent access to
managed resource based on organizationally defined policy.
1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
The TOE, Oracle Access Management (OAM), is a distributed application software that consists of the following
components:
 OAM Server. The Policy Decision Point. The OAM Server is deployed on an instance of Oracle WebLogic Server. The
OAM Server retrieves policy data from the Policy Store, evaluates access requests from WebGates and responds
with policy decisions for enforcement.
 OAM Console. The Policy Administration Point - a management Web GUI for configuration and policy definition.
Deployed on a WebLogic Administration Server. The OAM Console is itself protected by a dedicated OAM WebGate.
The OAM Console transmits policy data to the Policy Store.
 OAM WebGate. The Policy Enforcement Point(s) that intercept HTTP requests to enforce access decisions. OAM
WebGate(s) are deployed on Oracle HTTP Servers (web server).
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
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TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:
 Access Control Policy Definition
 Access Control Policy Enforcement
 Policy Security
 Security Audit
 Secure Administration
 Continuity of Enforcement
 Cryptographic Support
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic implementations are used by the TOE and have been evaluated by the CAVP:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)
Cryptographic Module/Algorithm Certificate Number
RSA BSAFE Crypto-C Micro Edition v4.1.2.2 C810
RSA BSAFE Crypto-J JSAFE and JCE Software Module v6.2.5 C652
Note: These CIs are provided by the operational environment (OE).
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
Enterprise Security Management Policy Management (PM)
 The TOE will use cryptographic primitives provided by the Operational Environment to perform cryptographic
services.
 The TOE will be able to establish connectivity to other ESM products in order to share security data.
 There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to install, configure, and operate the TOE.
 The TOE will receive policy data from the Operational Environment.
 The Operational Environment will provide mechanisms to the TOE that reduce the ability for an attacker to
impersonate a legitimate user during authentication.
 The TOE will receive reliable time data from the Operational Environment.
 The TOE will receive identity data from the Operational Environment.
Enterprise Security Management Access Control (AC)
 The TOE will use cryptographic primitives provided by the Operational Environment to perform cryptographic
services.
 The TOE will be able to establish connectivity to other ESM products in order to share security data.
 The TOE will receive policy data from the Operational Environment.
 The Operational Environment will provide mechanisms to the TOE that reduce the ability for an attacker to
impersonate a legitimate user during authentication.
 The TOE will receive reliable time data from the Operational Environment.
 The TOE will receive identity data from the Operational Environment.
 There will be a competent and trusted administrator who will follow the guidance provided in order to install the
TOE.
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The following functions are outside of the logical TOE scope and have not been evaluated:
 Deploying Oracle Access Management (OAM) on Cloud Infrastructure environment
 Oracle Access Management (OAM) domain deployment on Kubernetes or Docker environment
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
TOE Software Oracle Access Management 12.2.1.4 with patch 35371374
TOE Platform Requirements OAM Server & Console
 Oracle WebLogic Server 12c
 Oracle Linux 7.6 UEK 5
 Oracle JRE 8
OAM WebGate 12.2.1.4.0 with patch 33974688
 Oracle HTTP Server 12c
 Oracle Linux 7.6 UEK 5
Environmental Support Audit Store – Oracle Database 19c
Policy Store – Oracle Database 19c
Identity Store – Oracle Unified Directory / Oracle Internet Directory 12c
OAM Console Identity Store - LDAPv3 directory server
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided (and also available for download) to assist the consumer in the configuration and
installation of the TOE:
a) Oracle Access Management 12c Common Criteria Guide, v1.6 (PDF) - https://www.oracle.com/corporate/security-
practices/assurance/development/external-security-evaluations/common-criteria/certifications.html
b) Oracle Access Management 12c Information Library -
https://docs.oracle.com/en/middleware/idm/access-manager/12.2.1.4/aiaag/introducing-oracle-access-
management.html
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a
vulnerability analysis.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and
guidance documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP
b. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluator verified that the claimed cryptographic implementations
were present in the OE.
6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as
specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.
 Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
 Technical community sources (Type 2)
 Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
 Tool Generated (Type 4)
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and
technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to
discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators
formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.
Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on 31 May 2023 and included the following search terms:
Oracle OAM version 12c ASM 6.0 Mina 2.0.19
Oracle WebGate 12c Commons Codec 1.13 Jettison 1.4.0
Oracle Weblogic 12c Commons Validator 1.6 Jython 2.7.1
Geronimo-stax-api 1.0.1 Jackson-Core-ASL 1.9.13 Commons FileUpload 1.4
Felix 4.4.0 jackson-jaxrs 1.9.13 Commons Beanutils 1.9.4
Commons Logging 2.17.1 jackson-mapper-asl 2.10.2 jackson-core 2.9.9
Bean Validation API 1.1.0.Final jackson-xc 1.9.13 jackson-databind 2.10.2
ini4j 0.5.5 Higgins Framework T1-0-1 HttpComponents HttpClient 4.5.10
Zip4j 1.3.2 ZXing 3.3.0 HttpCore 4.4.10
Jose4j 0.5.5 Simple Logging Façade for Java
(SLF4J) 1.7.28
jackson-annotations 2.9.9
Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:
Oracle Critical Patch Updates, Security Alerts and Bulletins
https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/
Open Source Vulnerability Database
https://security.snyk.io/
Apache bug reporting sites
a) https://logging.apache.org/
b) https://issues.apache.org/jira/issues/
c) https://hc.apache.org/httpcomponents-core-4.4.x
Offensive Security Exploit Database
https://www.exploit-db.com/
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NIST National Vulnerabilities Database
https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS
The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification
report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration.
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
The CCTL also recommends:
The TOE is a complicated piece of software with many dependent pieces of software. The online guidance for the TOE is
extensive and allows for a clear understanding of the TOE and how it interacts with the operational environment. The
evaluator recommends that administrators review the online guide in depth prior to deploying the TOE, and make use of the
developer provided support extensively. This includes the Oracle Online Guidance “Administering Oracle Access
Management” Appendix B which includes the steps to generate certificates, enable FIPS mode and configure the TLS
channels.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Security
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Oracle Access Management 12c Security Target, Version 2.0, 19 September 2023
Oracle Access Management 12c Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1 , 20 September 2023
Oracle Access Management 12c Assurance Activity Report, Version 1.0, 20 September 2023