KECS-CR-22-40
Spiceware DBE v2.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1182-2022
2022. 9. 2.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2022.09.02. -
Certification report for Spiceware DBE v2.0
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for Spiceware DBE v2.0 of
Spiceware Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea Testing Certification (KTC)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................9
5. Architectural Information ....................................................................................9
6. Documentation...................................................................................................10
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................10
8. Evaluated Configuration.................................................................................... 11
9. Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................. 11
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................ 11
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................12
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................12
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)..............................................................13
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................13
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................13
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................13
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................14
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................15
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................15
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................16
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the evaluation of Spiceware DBE v2.0 of Spiceware Co., Ltd. with reference
to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC”
hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is database encryption software to prevent the
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information by encrypting the database. The
TOE consists of spice.ssm, spice.cc, and spice.mgs. The component spice.cc allows
an authorized administrator (‘Master’) to manage security functions and TSF data such
as cryptographic operation policies and keys. The component spice.ssm is an agent
that encrypts and decrypts the user data based on the policies. The TOE includes
cryptographic modules (AhnLab Cryptographic Module V1.0) validated under the Korea
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP). The operational environment of
the TOE is API type, where the agent spice.ssm is installed on an application server,
and the components spice.cc and spice.mgs are installed on a management server.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea Testing Certification (KTC)
and completed on 26 August 2022. This report grounds on the evaluation technical
report (ETR) KTC had submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST) [6].
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for
Database Encryption V1.1 [7]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST
are based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the
SARs of the PP [7]. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional
components in CC Part 2 and newly defined components in the Extended Component
Definition chapter of the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the
ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE.
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[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE
[Table 1] shows minimum hardware and software requirements necessary for
installation and operation of the TOE.
Category Contents
spice.ssm CPU Intel Core i5 CPU @2.7 GHz or higher
RAM 16GB or higher
HDD 30GB or higher space for installation of spice.ssm
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or more
OS Ubuntu 16.04 (64bit, Kernel 4.17)
Required S/W Amazon corretto 8.342.07.3
spice.cc,
spice.mgs
CPU Intel Core i5 CPU @2.7 GHz or higher
RAM 32GB or higher
HDD 30GB or higher space for installation of spice.cc and
spice.mgs
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or more
OS Ubuntu 16.04 (64bit, Kernel 4.17)
Required S/W Tomcat 9.0.65
Amazon corretto 8.342.07.3
MySQL 5.7.38
Elasticsearch 7.13.4
[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
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[Table 2] shows minimum requirements necessary for the administrator’s PC to access
spice.cc.
Category Contents
Web Browser Chrome 97.0 (64bit)
OTP Generator Authenticator 6.3.3 (by authenticator.cc)
[Table 2] The minimum requirements for the administrator’s PC
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is software consisting of the following software components and related
guidance documents.
TOE Spiceware DBE v2.0
Version v2.0.5
TOE
Components
spice.ssm spice.ssm-2.0.1
(spice.ssm-2.0.1.tar.gz)
spice.cc spice.cc-2.0.3
(spice.cc-2.0.3.tar.gz)
spice.mgs spice.mgs-2.0.1
(spice.mgs-2.0.1.tar.gz)
Guidance
Document
Spiceware DBE v2.0 Operational User Guidance v1.4
(Spiceware DBE v2.0-Operational User Guidance_v1.4.pdf)
Spiceware DBE v2.0 API Guide v1.0
(Spiceware DBE v2.0-API Guide_v1.0.pdf)
[Table 3] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.
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[Table 4] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 24, 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (May
17, 2021)
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-
003, April 2017
Protection Profile Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1,
KECS-PP-0820a-2017, 11 December 2019
Developer Spiceware Co., Ltd.
Sponsor Spiceware Co., Ltd.
Evaluation
Facility
Korea Testing Certification (KTC)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
26 August 2022
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 4] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE provides security features defined in the PP [7] as follows:
 Security audit: The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events
including the start-up and shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation
and self-test failures, and stores them in the DBMS.
 Cryptographic support: The TOE performs cryptographic operation such as
encryption/decryption and hash, cryptographic key management such as key
generation/distribution/destruction, and random bit generation using
cryptographic modules (AhnLab Cryptographic Module V1.0) validated under
the KCMVP.
 User data protection: The TOE provides encryption and decryption for the user
data in a column of a database.
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 Identification and authentication: The TOE identifies and authenticates the
administrators using ID/password, and mutually authenticate TOE components
when they communicate each other.
 Security management: Security management of the TOE is restricted to only
the authorized administrator who can access the management interface
provided by TOE.
 Protection of the TSF: The TOE provides secure communications amongst
TOE components to protect confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data
between them. The TOE encrypts the stored TSF data to protect them from
unauthorized exposure and modification. The TOE performs self-tests on the
TOE components, which includes the self-test on the validated cryptographic
module.
 TOE access: The TOE manages authorized administrators’ sessions based on
access IP addresses. The TOE terminates the sessions after predefined time
interval of inactivity.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There is no explicit Security Problem Definition chapter, therefore no Assumptions
section in the low assurance ST. Some security aspects of the operational environment
are added to those of the PP [7] in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be
used (For the detailed and precise definition of the security objectives of the
operational environment, refer to the ST [6], Chapter 3.).
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
 spice.cc allows authorized administrators to manage security functions and
TSF data such as cryptographic operation policies and keys
 spice.mgs transmits the policies to the agent spice.ssm.
 spice.ssm encrypts and decrypts the user data based on the policies.
Note that all the three components perform the functionalities of audit data generation,
cryptographic key management, cryptographic operations, protection of TSF data, and
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mutual authentication between the components. For the detailed description on the
architectural information, refer to the ST [6], Chapter 1.4.2.
6. Documentation
The following documentations are evaluated and provided with the TOE by the
developer to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
Spiceware DBE v2.0 Operational User Guidance v1.4 v1.4 August 24, 2022
Spiceware DBE v2.0 API Guide v1.0 v1.0 January 21, 2022
[Table 5] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE components based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test
case includes the following information:
 Test no.: Identifier of each test case
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator installed and prepared the TOE in accordance to the preparative
procedures, performed all tests provided by developer, and conducted independent
testing based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The TOE and test
configuration are identical to the developer’s tests.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon
test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
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vulnerabilities.
The evaluator’s testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results
are summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is Spiceware DBE v2.0 (version number v2.0.5). See table 3 for detailed
information on the TOE components.
The TOE is installed from the CD-ROM distributed by Spiceware Co., Ltd. After
installing the TOE, an administrator can identify the complete TOE reference using the
product version menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report Chapter 6,
[Table 5] were evaluated with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview, and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to the PP and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
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and it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has uniquely identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration list includes the TOE and the evaluation evidence required by the
SARs in the ST. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users whose incorrect actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their
own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
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9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications provided by the developer specify a high-level description
of at least the SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of
their parameters. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, the identified potential vulnerabilities, during the evaluation of the development
and anticipated operation of the TOE, don’t allow attackers possessing basic attack
potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 Developers who make the encryption/decryption functions of the TOE interact
with other applications or DBMSs should ensure that the functions are securely
applied according to the guidance document provided with the TOE.
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 When operating the product, the administrator's password should be changed
periodically to keep its security.
 The TOE shall be located in a physically secure environment to which only the
authorized administrator is allowed to access and the protective facilities are
provided.
 When the audit storage space is fulled, audit data may be lost, so periodic
monitoring and periodic backup are required.
 The administrator shall maintain a safe state by applying, for example, the
latest security patches, eliminating unnecessary service, and changing of the
default ID/password of the operating system and DBMS in the operational
environment of the TOE.
11. Security Target
Spiceware DBE v2.0 Security Target v1.4 [6] is included in this report for reference.
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Encryption The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext
using the cryptographic key
Decryption The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext
using the decryption key
Application Server A server in which applications developed to provide
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specific application services in the organization
operating the TOE are installed and operated
Validated Cryptographic
Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a
validation number by validation authority
Column A set of data values of a particular simple type, one for
each row of the table in a relational database
DBMS A software system composed to configure and apply the
database.
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (24 August 2017)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (17 May 2021)
[5] CC2021-00011 Evaluation Technical Report V2.0, 26 August 2022
[6] Spiceware DBE v2.0 Security Target v1.4, 24 August 2022
[7] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1 (KECS-PP-
0820a-2017, December 11, 2019)