TrustCB B.V.
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nscib@trustcb.com
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TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
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Certification Report
SN100 Series – Secure Element with Crypto Library,
versions B2.1 C25/C48/C58
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany
Beiersdorfstraße 12
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2400058-02
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2400058-02
Author(s): Alireza Rohani, Haico Haak
Date: 10 February 2025
Number of pages: 16
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 8
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
2.3.1 Assumptions 9
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 9
2.4 Architectural Information 9
2.5 Documentation 10
2.6 IT Product Testing 12
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 12
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 12
2.6.3 Test configuration 13
2.6.4 Test results 13
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 13
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 14
2.9 Evaluation Results 14
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 14
3 Security Target 15
4 Definitions 15
5 Bibliography 16
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the SN100
Series – Secure Element with Crypto Library, versions B2.1 C25/C48/C58. The developer of the
SN100 Series – Secure Element with Crypto Library, versions B2.1 C25/C48/C58 is NXP
Semiconductors Germany located in Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the
evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when
judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The SN100x Single Chip Secure Element and NFC controller Series combines on a single die an
Embedded Secure Element, an NFC Controller, and the Power Management Unit. The three
subsystems are called “SN100_SE”, “SN100_PMU”, and “SN100_NFC”. The TOE is the SN100_SE.
The NFC Controller and the PMU are not part of the TOE
The TOE is the SN100_SE B2.1 in three configurations SN100_SE B2.1 C25, SN100_SE B2.1 C48
and SN100_SE B2.1 C58. The TOE will be provided with Crypto Library and Services Software as
part of the IC Dedicated Software
The TOE is a Security Integrated Circuit Platform for various operating systems and applications with
high security requirements
The TOE was evaluated initially by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 05 July 2024. The re-evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS Brightsight
B.V. and was completed on 10 February 2025 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
There are no changes on the TOE, its parts or its environment from this last recertification. Only the
evaluation methodology changed from CC v3.1R5 to CC:2022
The certification took into account that the security evaluation reused the evaluation results of
previously performed evaluations. A full, up-to-date vulnerability analysis has been made.
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the SN100 Series – Secure Element with Crypto
Library, versions B2.1 C25/C48/C58, the security requirements, and the level of confidence
(evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements.
Consumers of the SN100 Series – Secure Element with Crypto Library, versions B2.1 C25/C48/C58
are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the following multi assurance package:
Global conformance EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security
functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.3, ADV_TDS.5,
ALC_CMC.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.3,ALC_FLR.1, ATE_COV.3, ATE_FUN.2, AVA_VAN.5, and
ASE_TSS.2.
The MPU/MMU memory management sub-TSF meets EAL6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 and
ASE_TSS.2.
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, CEM:2022 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, CC:2022 [CC].
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the SN100 Series – Secure Element with Crypto
Library, versions B2.1 C25/C48/C58 from NXP Semiconductors Germany located in Hamburg,
Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware SN100x B2.1
Software
Factory OS 4.2.0
Boot OS 4.2.0
Flash Driver Software 4.0.8
Table 1 Components common for all SN100_SE B2.1
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Configuration
Data
Factory Page 18218
System Page Common 18468
BootOS Patch 4.2.0 PL3 v4
Security
Software
Services Software 4.13.3.0
Crypto Library 1.0.0
Table 2 Components of SN100_SE B2.1 specific for C25
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Configuration
Data
Factory Page 18652
System Page Common 18468
BootOS Patch 4.2.0 PL5 v16
Security
Software
Services Software 4.13.7.1
Crypto Library 1.0.0
Table 3 Components of SN100_SE B2.1 specific for C48
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Configuration
Data
Factory Page 18218
System Page Common 18468
BootOS Patch 4.2.0 PL5 v16
Security Services Software 4.14.0.1
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Software Crypto Library 2.0.0
Table 4 Components of SN100_SE B2.1 specific for 58
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the SN100 Series –
Secure Element with Crypto Library, versions B2.1 C25/C48/C58. For details, see section 2.5
“Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.3.3.
2.2 Security Policy
The security functionality of SN100_SE is designed to act as an integral part of a security system
composed of SN100_SE and Security IC Embedded Software to strengthen it as a whole. Several
security mechanisms of SN100_SE are completely implemented in and controlled by SN100_SE.
Other security mechanisms must be treated by Security IC Embedded Software. All security
functionality is targeted for use in a potential insecure environment, in which SN100_SE maintains:
• correct operation of the security functionality
• integrity and confidentiality of data and code stored to its memories and processed in the device
• controlled access to memories and hardware components supporting separation of different
applications
This is ensured by the construction of SN100_SE and its security functionality. SN100_SE basically
provides:
• hardware to perform computations on multiprecision integers, which are suitable for public-key
cryptography
• hardware to calculate the Data Encryption Standard with up to three keys
• hardware to calculate the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with different key lengths
• hardware to support Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback
(OFB) and Counter (CTR) modes of operation for symmetric-key cryptographic block ciphers
• hardware to support Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation and Galois Message
Authentication Code (GMAC) for symmetric-key cryptographic block ciphers
• hardware to calculate Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC)
• hardware to serve with True Random Numbers
• hardware and service software to control access to memories and hardware components
In addition, SN100_SE embeds sensors, which ensure proper operating conditions of the device.
Integrity protection of data and code involves error correction and error detection codes, light sensing
and other security functionality. Encryption and masking mechanisms are implemented to preserve
confidentiality of data and code. The IC hardware is shielded against physical attacks.
The Crypto Library consists of several binary packages that are pre-loaded to the Flash memory of the
TOE for usage by the Security IC Embedded Software. The Crypto Library provides:
• AES
• Triple-DES (3DES)
• RSA
• RSA key generation
• RSA public key computation
• ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation and verification
• ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) key generation
• ECDH (ECC Diffie-Hellmann) key exchange
• MontDH (Diffie Hellman key exchange on Montgomery Curves over GF(p)) key generation
• MontDH (Diffie Hellman key exchange on Montgomery Curves over GF(p)) key exchange
• EdDSA (Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm) signature generation and verification
• EdDSA (Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm) key generation
• ECDAA related functions
• Full point addition (ECC over GF(p))
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• Standard security level SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-3/224, SHA-3/256,
SHA-3/384, SHA-3/512 algorithms
• High security level SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-3/224, SHA-3/256,
SHA-3/384, SHA-3/512 algorithms
• HMAC algorithms
• eUICC authentication functions (MILENAGE, TUAK and CAVE)
In addition, the Crypto Library implements a software (pseudo) random number generator which is
initialized (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the TOE. The Crypto Library also
provides a secure copy routine, a secure memory compare routine, cyclic redundancy check (CRC)
routines, and includes internal security measures for residual information protection.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 and 4.3 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product
2.4 Architectural Information
The SN100x Single Chip Secure Element and NFC controller Series combines on a single die an
Embedded Secure Element, an NFC Controller, and the Power Management Unit. The three
subsystems are called “SN100_SE”, “SN100_PMU”, and “SN100_NFC”. The TOE is the SN100_SE.
The NFC Controller and the PMU are not part of the TOE.
The TOE is the SN100_SE B2.1 in three configurations SN100_SE B2.2 C25/C48/C58. The TOE will
be provided with Crypto Library and Services Software as part of the IC Dedicated Software.
A block diagram is given in Figure 1 below.
IC Hardware
The hardware part of the SN100_SE incorporates a high frequency clocked ARM SC300 processor, a
Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) coprocessor and a Direct Memory Access (DMA) controller, which are
all connected over a Memory Management Unit (MMU) to a bus system. This bus system gives
access to memories, hardware peripherals and communication interfaces.
The ARM SC300 processor is a security enhanced variant of the ARM Cortex M3. It includes the
SC300 core and the Nested Vector Interrupt Controller (NVIC). The core implements the ARMv7-M
architecture, which supports a subset of the Thumb instruction set. The PKC coprocessor provides
large integer arithmetic operations, which can be used by Security IC Embedded Software for
asymmetric-key cryptography. Hardware peripherals include coprocessors for symmetric-key
cryptography and for calculation of error-detecting codes, and also a random number generator. The
DMA controller manages data transfers over communication interfaces like ISO/IEC 7816 compliant
interface, Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI), I2C interface and the Secure Mailbox Interface. On-chip
memories are Flash memory, ROM and RAMs. The Flash memory can be used to store data and
code of Security IC Embedded Software. It is designed for reliable non-volatile storage.
SN100_SE is offered with the NXP Trust Provisioning Service, which involves secure reception,
generation, treatment and insertion of customer data and code at NXP. The documentation of
SN100_SE includes a product data sheet, several product data sheet addenda, a user guidance and
operation manual, and service documentation. This documentation describes secure configuration and
secure use of SN100_SE as well as the services provided with it.
Also, the IC Dedicated Support Software is considered part of the IC Hardware, as it is stored to the
ROM of the TOE. It consists of the Factory OS, the Boot OS and the Flash Driver Software.
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Security Software
The IC Dedicated Software provides Security Software that can be used by the Security IC Embedded
Software. The Security Software is composed of Services Software and Crypto Library.
The Services Software consists of Flash Services Software, Services Framework Software and the
part of the Services HAL (Hardware Abstraction Layer) that is not stored to ROM. The Flash Services
Software manages technical demands of the Flash memory and serves the Security IC Embedded
Software with an interface for Flash erase and/or programming. The Services Framework Software
represents a collection of different abstractions and utility functions that provide a runtime environment
to the individual Services. The Services HAL provides an interface for the Services Software to the
hardware that controls the Flash memory.
The Services Software is considered part of the Service Code and is stored in the Flash memory of
the TOE.
Figure 1 Logical architecture of the TOE
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
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Identifier Version
SN100x_SE High-performance secure element subsystem, Product data sheet 1.0
SN100x_SE - SFR Tables for Berlin core 0.5
SN100x Wafer and Delivery Specification, Product data sheet addendum 1.2
P73 family SC300 User Manual, Product Data sheet addendum 1.0
P73 family DMA Controller PL080 User manual, Product data sheet addendum 1.0
P73 Family Chip Health Mode, Application note 1.0
P73 Family Code Signature Watchdog, Application note 1.1
ARM®v7-M Architecture Reference Manual DDI 0403E.b
(ID120114)
Table 5 Manuals common for all SN100_SE B2.1
Identifier Version
SN100_SE Information on Guidance and Operation 1.4
SN100 Services User Manual – API and Operational Guidance 4.12
SN100 Services Addendum - Additional API and Operational Guidance 0.4
SN100x Crypto Library Information on Guidance and Operation 1.10
SN100x Crypto Library: Errata sheet 1.0
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – RNG Library 1.4
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – SHA Library 0.3
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – Secure SHA Library 0.4
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – SHA-3 Library 0.2
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – Secure SHA-3 Library 0.2
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – HMAC Library 0.4
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – Rsa Library (Rsa) 1.3
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – RSA Key Generation Library (RsaKg) 0.7
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – ECC over GF(p) Library 1.4
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – ECDAA 1.0
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – TwdEdMontGfp Library 1.2
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – eUICC Library 0.5
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – Symmetric Cipher Library (SymCfg) 0.5
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – Utils Library 0.4
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – HASH Library 0.3
Table 6 Manuals SN100_SE B2.1 C25 & C48
Identifier Version
SN100_SE Information on Guidance and Operation 1.4
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SN100 Services User Manual – API and Operational Guidance 4.13
SN100 Services Addendum - Additional API and Operational Guidance 0.5
SN100x Crypto Library Information on Guidance and Operation 2.4
SN100x Crypto Library: Errata sheet 1.0
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – RNG Library 1.4
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – SHA Library 0.3
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – Secure SHA Library 0.4
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – SHA-3 Library 0.2
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – Secure SHA-3 Library 0.2
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – HMAC Library 0.4
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – Rsa Library (Rsa) 2.0
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – RSA Key Generation Library (RsaKg) 0.7
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – ECC over GF(p) Library 2.0
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – ECDAA 1.0
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – TwdEdMontGfp Library 1.2
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – eUICC Library 0.5
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – Symmetric Cipher Library (SymCfg) 1.1
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – Utils Library 0.4
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – UtilsMath Library 1.0
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – KDF Library 1.0
SN100x Crypto Library: User Manual – HASH Library 0.3
Table 7 Manuals SN100_SE B2.1 C58
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts
were used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator. As no changes were made to the TOE the evaluators determined that no
additional independent functional testing was necessary
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The evaluator independent penetration tests were conducted according to the following testing
approach:
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• During evaluation of the ADV, ATE and ALC classes the evaluators hypothesized possible
vulnerabilities. This resulted in a shortlist of possible vulnerabilities to be further analysed in
AVA using the design knowledge gained in particular from the source code analysis in IMP.
This resulted in a shortlist of potential vulnerabilities to be tested.
• Next the evaluators analysed the TOE design and implementation for resistance against the
JIL attacks. This resulted in further potential vulnerabilities to be tested.
• The evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended environment to check whether the
developer vulnerability analysis in ARC has assessed all information.
• The evaluators concluded that a number of areas could be potentially vulnerable for attackers
possessing a high attack potential. Consequently, practical penetration testing was performed
for absolute assurance.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 7.5 weeks. During that test campaign, 0% of the
total time was spent on physical attacks, 0% overcoming sensors and filters, 0% perturbation attacks,
20% retrieving keys with FA, 60% side channel attacks, 0% exploitation of test features, 20% attacks
on RNG, 0% ill-formed Java Card application, 0% software attacks, and 0% application isolation
penetration tests. For this re-certification, no tests were performed.
2.6.3 Test configuration
Testing performed during this re-evaluation was executed on slightly different configurations of the
TOE SN100_SE B2.1 C25/C48/C58. The differences (i.e. no services software, no crypto lib) between
these configurations and the TOE have been analysed. They have no impact on the test results,
hence the test results apply to the TOE.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the
independent penetration tests.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 29 site certificates and Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
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2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number SN100 Series – Secure Element with
Crypto Library, versions B2.1 C25/C48/C58. The user can identify the certified configuration by
reading the TypeID bytes.
The wafer fab can be identified (i) physically by reading the laser marking (an “s” indicates sample
from GF7 Diffusion center, an “L” indicates a sample from GF1 Diffusion center, and an “SJ” indicates
a sample from SMNC Diffusion center) and/or (ii) logically by reading the ECID of the sample - by
means of the implemented Operation System or in Chip Health Mode. A 0xC2 as first byte indicates a
sample from diffusion center GF7, a 0xC0 indicates a sample from GF1, and 0x80 indicates a sample
from SMNC diffusion center. Only the certified configurations C48 and C58 can be manufactured in all
three wafer fabs, the certified configuration C25 only in GF7.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details of
the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite
evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the SN100 Series – Secure
Element with Crypto Library, versions B2.1 C25/C48/C58, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3
conformant, and to meet the requirements of:
EAL 5 augmented with ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.3, ADV_TDS.5, ALC_CMC.5, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_TAT.3, ALC_FLR.1, ATE_COV.3, ATE_FUN.2, AVA_VAN.5, and ASE_TSS.2 for Global
conformance.
The assurance conformance of MPU/MMU memory management sub-TSF is EAL6 augmented with
ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.2.
This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_0084].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The SN100 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library Security Target, Rev. 4.3 — 12 November
2024 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
MITM Man-in-the-Middle
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TDES Triple DES
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
Page: 16/16 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2400058-02, dated 10 February 2025
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TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
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requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts 1 to 5,
CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
CEM:2022 Revision 1, November 2022
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report SN100 Series - Secure Element with Crypto
Library B2.1 C25, C48, and C58, 24-RPT-1370, Version 3.0, 27 January 2025
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition SN100 Series - Secure Element
with Crypto Library B2.1 C25/C48/C58, 24-RPT-1371, Version 3.0, 27 January
2025
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November 2022
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[JIL-SPM-INT] JIL, ADV_SPM.1 interpretation for [CC:2022] transition, Version 1.0, May 2024
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP_0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014
[ST] SN100 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library Security Target, Rev. 4.3
— 12 November 2024
[ST-lite] SN100 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library, Security Target Lite, Rev.
4.3 — 12 November 2024
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)