National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility
Controllers with ArubaOS 8.10
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11403-2023
Dated: November 20, 2023
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jenn Dotson
Randy Heimann
Lisa Mitchell
Clare Parran
Lori Sarem
Chris Thorpe
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Sean Bennett
Greg McLearn
Kevin Steiner
Wasif Sikder
Lightship Security USA, Inc.
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2. Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3. Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 4
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration.......................................................................... 4
3.2. Physical Boundary............................................................................................ 4
3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware................................. 5
4. Security Policy............................................................................................................ 6
4.1. Security Audit................................................................................................... 6
4.2. Cryptographic Support ..................................................................................... 6
4.3. Communication ................................................................................................ 6
4.4. Identification and Authentication..................................................................... 6
4.5. Security Management....................................................................................... 6
4.6. Packet Filtering................................................................................................. 6
4.7. Protection of the TSF........................................................................................ 7
4.8. TOE Access ...................................................................................................... 7
4.9. Trusted Path/Channels...................................................................................... 7
5. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................... 8
5.1. Assumptions ..................................................................................................... 8
5.2. Clarification of Scope....................................................................................... 8
6. Documentation.......................................................................................................... 10
7. IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 11
7.1. Developer Testing........................................................................................... 11
7.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing........................................................... 11
7.3. Evaluated Configuration................................................................................. 11
8. Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 13
8.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE).............................................................. 13
8.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)...................................... 13
8.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)................................................... 13
8.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)....................................... 14
8.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)................... 14
8.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)..................................................... 14
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8.7. Summary of Evaluation Results ..................................................................... 15
9. Validator Comments................................................................................................. 16
10. Annexes..................................................................................................................... 17
11. Security Target.......................................................................................................... 18
12. Glossary .................................................................................................................... 19
13. Acronym List ............................................................................................................ 20
14. Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 21
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers............................................................................................ 2
Table 2: TOE models.......................................................................................................... 5
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1. Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba
Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS 8.10 provided by Aruba, A Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Company. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or
implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Lightship Security USA Common Criteria
Laboratory (CCTL) in Baltimore, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
November 2023. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Lightship Security (LS).
The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and
Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-Configuration for
Network Device and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.2, 31 March
2022 (CFG_NDcPP-VPNGW_V1.2). This PP-Configuration includes the following
components:
Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e
(CPP_ND_V2.2E)
PP-Module: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.2
(MOD_VPNGW_V1.2)
The TOE is Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS
8.10. The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This
VR applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated
in the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Aruba Remote
Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS 8.10 Security Target, v1.6,
November 2023, and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
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2. Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme
TOE
Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers
with ArubaOS 8.10
Sponsor and Developer
Aruba, A Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
6280 America Center Dr.
San Jose, CA 95002
CCTL
Lightship Security USA, Inc.
3600 O’Donnell St., Suite 2
Baltimore, MD 21224
CC Version
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
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Item Identifier
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017.
Protection Profile
PP-Configuration for Network Device and Virtual Private
Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.2, 31 March 2022
(CFG_NDcPP-VPNGW_V1.2). This PP-Configuration includes
the following components:
Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices,
Version 2.2e (CPP_ND_V2.2E)
PP-Module: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Gateways, Version 1.2 (MOD_VPNGW_V1.2)
ST
Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers
with ArubaOS 8.10 Security Target, v1.6, November 2023
Evaluation Technical
Report
Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers
with ArubaOS 8.10 Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3,
November 14, 2023
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Evaluation Personnel Sean Bennett, Greg McLearn, Kevin Steiner, Wasif Sikder
CCEVS Validators
Jenn Dotson, Randy Heimann, Lisa Mitchell, Clare Parran, Lori
Sarem, Chris Thorpe
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3. Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a distributed network security solution offered by Aruba, a Hewlett Packard
Enterprise company and is comprised of Aruba Remote Access Points (RAP) and an Aruba
Mobility Controller (each with an embedded ArubaOS). The TOE devices are running
ArubaOS 8.10. The Mobility Controller provides VPN gateway functionality for gateway-
to-gateway VPN connections. The RAP and Mobility Controller communicate via IPsec.
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is deployed in a distributed configuration with the Aruba Remote Access Points
providing connectivity for wireless clients in a branch deployment, and the Aruba Mobility
Controller serving as a gateway between wired and wireless networks as well as command
and control functionality over Aruba RAPs.
The TOE interfaces are as follows:
a) CLI. Local serial and remote SSH command line interface.
Note: The SSH channel can be tunneled over IPsec.
b) GUI. Web-based management UI via HTTPS/TLS.
Note: This channel can be optionally tunneled over IPsec and was tested in this
evaluation.
c) RAP IPsec. Secure tunnel between RAP and Mobility Controller via IPsec (TOE
acts as peer).
d) RADIUS/TACACS+. Authentication servers for user authentication via IPsec
(TOE is VPN gateway).
e) NTP. The TOE synchronizes time with an NTP server via IPsec (TOE is VPN
gateway).
f) Syslog. Interface for sending audit logs to remote audit server via IPsec (TOE is
VPN gateway).
g) OCSP. The TOE receives certificate revocation status information from an
external OCSP responder.
3.2. Physical Boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE includes the appliance models shown in Table 2
executing ArubaOS 8.10 software. The ArubaOS consists of a base software package with
add-on software modules that can be activated by installing the appropriate licenses. The
following modules are required to be licensed and activated in the CC evaluated
configuration:
• Policy Enforcement Firewall Next Generation. Provides identity-based security
for wired and wireless clients.
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• Advanced Cryptography. Required for Commercial National Security
Algorithms Suite, AES-GCM, and ECDSA functionality.
Table 2: TOE models
Type Model CPU Software
Mobility Controller 7210 Broadcom XLP416
(MIPS64)
ArubaOS 8.10
Mobility Controller 7220 Broadcom XLP432
(MIPS64)
Mobility Controller 9004 Intel Atom C3508
(Denverton)
Remote Access Point 303H Qualcomm IPQ4019
(ARM Cortex-A7)
Remote Access Point 503H Broadcom
BCM47622L
(ARM-A7)
Remote Access Point 505H Broadcom
BCM47622L
(ARM-A7)
3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware
The TOE operates with the following components in the environment:
a) Audit Server. The TOE sends audit events to a remote syslog server.
b) NTP Server. The TOE synchronizes time via NTP.
c) Authentication Server. The TOE leverages a RADIUS or TACACS+ server for
handling user authentication.
d) OCSP Responder. The TOE receives certificate revocation status information
from an external OCSP responder.
e) Administrator Workstation. The device(s) used by administrators to facilitate
access to the TOE CLI and GUI interfaces.
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4. Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
4.1. Security Audit
The TOE generates logs for security relevant events including startup and shutdown of the
TOE and all administrative actions. Logs are stored locally on the Mobility Controller to
be accessed by an administrator or can be configured to be sent via syslog to a remote
server in the operational environment.
4.2. Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements key generation, establishment, and other cryptographic services to
protect data in transit and at rest within the TOE. In support of cryptographic functions, the
TOE implements two cryptographic modules that perform all IPsec/IKE session
operations, and functions that support all SSH, HTTPS, and TLS operations. The relevant
Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates have been obtained for
the necessary components.
4.3. Communication
The TOE is a distributed configuration consisting of an Aruba Mobility Controller and
Aruba RAPs. The Security Administrator must enable communications between the RAPs
and Controller TOE components before any communication can take place. The RAPs
must be configured with an appropriate RSA or ECDSA certificate and the IP address of
the Aruba Mobility Controller.
4.4. Identification and Authentication
The TOE implements mechanisms to identify and authenticate administrators to ensure
only authorized access to TOE functionality or TSF data is granted. These mechanisms can
also be implemented using RADIUS or TACACS+ servers within the operational
environment.
4.5. Security Management
The TOE provides the administrator role with the capability to configure and manage all
TOE security functions including cryptographic operations, user accounts, passwords,
advisory banner, session inactivity, and TOE updates. The management functions are
restricted to the administrator role which must be assigned to an administrative user or
access to these functions will be denied.
4.6. Packet Filtering
The TOE acts as a VPN gateway – a device at the edge of a private network that terminates
an IPsec tunnel, which provides device authentication, confidentiality, and integrity of
information traversing a public or untrusted network. The TOE provides packet filtering
for gateway-to-gateway VPN connections. Administrators can configure security policies
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that determine whether to block, allow, or log a session based on traffic attributes such as
source and destination port, IP address or service.
4.7. Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a variety of protection mechanisms including authentication, self-
tests, and reliable timestamping that leverages an internal hardware clock, or
synchronization with an NTP server. Passwords are stored on flash using SHA1 hashes and
the TOE does not provide an interface that allows for passwords or keys to be read.
Confidentiality and integrity are provided for all communications between TOE
components via IPsec.
4.8. TOE Access
The TOE provides session monitoring and management functions for local and remote
administrative sessions. A warning banner is displayed at the management interfaces (Web
GUI and CLI) to advise users on appropriate use and penalties for misuse of the system.
4.9. Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE provides secure channels between itself and local/remote administrators,
including logging channels to ensure data in transit is protected. IPsec is implemented to
provide encrypted channels between Mobility Controllers and third-party trusted IT entities
in the operating environment. The TOE also uses IPsec to encrypt communications
between TOE components and for all VPN connections. Remote Web UI access is
protected with TLS/HTTPS, and CLI access is protected via SSHv2.
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5. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
5.1. Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v2.2e, 23 March 2020
(CPP_ND_V2.2E)
• PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.2, 31 March
2022 (MOD_VPNGW_V1.2)
That information has not been reproduced here and the CPP_ND_V2.2E and
MOD_VPNGW_V1.2 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2. Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in
CPP_ND_V2.2E and MOD_VPNGW_V1.2 as described for this TOE in the ST. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made in accordance with the evaluation activities
specified in CPP_ND_V2.2-SD and MOD_VPNGW_V1.2-SD and performed by
the Evaluation team
• This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this
document and referenced in the Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility
Controllers with ArubaOS 8.10 Security Target, Version 1.6, November 2023, and
not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guides identified in Section 6, additional customer
documentation for the specific software version and platform versions was not
included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the CPP_ND_V2.2E, MOD_VPNGW_V1.2 and
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applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional
capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
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6. Documentation
The following guidance documents are provided with the TOE upon delivery in accordance
with the PP:
• Common Criteria Configuration Guidance ArubaOS 8.10 Supplemental Guidance
(Target of Evaluation: Aruba Remote Access Points with Mobility Controllers
running ArubaOS 8.10-FIPS), Version 2.3, November 2023
• ArubaOS 8.10.0.0 User Guide, Revision 14, 2023
• ArubaOS 8.x Command-Line Interface Reference Guide, 2023
• ArubaOS 8.10.0.0 Syslog Reference Guide
• Aruba 303H Series Hospitality Access Points Installation Guide, March 2017
• Aruba 503H Series Hospitality Access Points Installation Guide, July 2020
• Aruba AP-505H Access Points Installation Guide, May 2023
• Aruba 7200 Series Controller Installation Guide 0511169-06, July 2015
• Aruba 9004 Gateway Installation Guide, Revision 03, June 2021
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be installed and
configured as specified in Common Criteria Configuration Guidance ArubaOS 8.10
Supplemental Guidance (Target of Evaluation: Aruba Remote Access Points with Mobility
Controllers running ArubaOS 8.10-FIPS). This document provides references to other
documentation for specific steps to place the TOE into its the evaluated configuration and
these documents are provided on the NIAP website.
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7. IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the Evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with
ArubaOS 8.10 Assurance Activity Report (AAR), Version 1.3, November 14, 2023, and the
proprietary Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS
8.10 Detailed Test Report (DTR), Version 1.4, November 14, 2023, and Aruba Remote
Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS 8.10 Detailed Test Report
Evidence, Version 1.4, November 14, 2023.
7.1. Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the SARs or Evaluation Activities for this
product.
7.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team conducted independent testing at Lightship Security USA in
Baltimore, MD from December 2022 until November 2023. The Evaluation team
configured the TOE according to vendor installation instructions and as identified in the
Security Target.
The Evaluation team confirmed the technical accuracy of the setup and installation guide
during installation of the TOE. The Evaluation team confirmed that the TOE version
delivered for testing was identical to the version identified in the ST.
The Evaluation team used the Protection Profile test procedures as a basis for creating each
of the independent tests as required by the Evaluation Activities.
Each Evaluation Activity was tested as required by the conformant Protection Profile and
the evaluation team verified that each test passed.
7.3. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE testing environment components are identified in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1: Testing Environment Overview
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8. Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary DTR & ETR. The reader of this document can assume
that all activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC Version 3.1 Revision 5 and CEM Version 3.1 Revision 5 and the specific evaluation
activities specified in CPP_ND_V2.2-SD and MOD_VPNGW_V1.2-SD.
The Evaluation determined the TOE satisfies the conformance claims made in the Aruba
Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS 8.10 Security Target,
v1.6, November 2023 of Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant. The Validation Team
reviewed all the work of the Evaluation team and agreed with their practices and findings.
8.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a ST introduction, TOE overview, TOE description, description of the
environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements
claimed to be met by the Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers
with ArubaOS 8.10 that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the
evaluation evidence and found it adequate to meet the requirements specified in the claimed
Protection Profile for design evidence. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the ST and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the Evaluation Activities related to the examination of the information contained
in the TSS.
The Validation reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
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to securely administer the TOE. All the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that
the TOE was appropriately labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE
identification in the evaluation evidence and that the TOE references used are consistent.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Test Evaluation Activities and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in
the Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS 8.10
Vulnerability Assessment, Version 0.2, November 2023, report prepared by the Evaluation
team. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The public
search for vulnerabilities conducted on October 31, 2023, did not uncover any residual
vulnerability.
The Evaluation team searched:
• NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (can be used to access CVE and US-CERT
databases identified below): https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures:
o http://cve.mitre.org/cve/
o https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-search.php
• US-CERT: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/html/search
• Tenable Network Security: https://www.tenable.com/cve
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories
• Offensive Security Exploit Database: https://www.exploit-db.com/
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• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database: https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities
The Evaluation team performed a search using the following keywords:
• Aruba Mobility Controller
• Aruba Remote Access Point
• ArubaOS 8.10
• Aruba Crypto Module
• Aruba OpenSSL Module
• Aruba Bootloader Module
• Aruba 303H
• Aruba 503H
• Aruba 505H
• Aruba 7210
• Aruba 7220
• Aruba 9004
• Broadcom XLP416
• Broadcom XLP432
• Intel Atom C3508
• Qualcomm IPQ4019
• Broadcom BCM47622L
• FreeRADIUS
• Ntp.org
• Mocana
• OpenSSH
• OpenSSL
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.7. Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The Validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that
it demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM and
performed the Evaluation Activities in CPP_ND_V2.2-SD and MOD_VPNGW_V1.2-SD,
and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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9. Validator Comments
The Validation team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the TOE. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated
functionality is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the
ST, and the only evaluated functionality was that which was described by the SFRs claimed
in the ST. All other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed separately and
no further conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
Customers should be aware that the TOE requires the purchase of two additional license-
restricted modules, which must be activated in the evaluated configuration as described in
the ST. They are the Policy Enforcement Firewall Next Generation and the Advanced
Cryptography modules.
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in Common Criteria
Configuration Guidance ArubaOS 8.10 Supplemental Guidance (Target of Evaluation:
Aruba Remote Access Points with Mobility Controllers running ArubaOS 8.10-FIPS). As
noted in Section 6, consumers are encouraged to download the configuration guides from
the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated. No versions of the TOE
and software, either earlier or later were evaluated.
Any additional customer documentation, not listed in Section 6, provided with the product,
or that which may be available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore, should not be relied upon to configure or operate the TOE as evaluated.
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10. Annexes
Not applicable.
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11. Security Target
Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS 8.10 Security
Target, v1.6, November 2023
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12. GLOSSARY
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL): An IT security evaluation
facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
(NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common
Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance: The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation: The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using
the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the
claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the
Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the
Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a
statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence: Any tangible resource (information) required from the
sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature: Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE): A group of IT products configured as an IT system,
or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
• Threat: Means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely
affect the primary functionality of the TOE, facility that contains the TOE, or
malicious operation directed towards the TOE. A potential violation of security.
• Validation: The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body: A governmental organization responsible for carrying out
validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
• Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a hardware, firmware, or software flaw that
leaves an Automated Information System (AIS) open for potential exploitation. A
weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls,
physical layout, internal controls, and so forth, which could be exploited by a threat
to gain unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing.
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13. Acronym List
AAR Assurance Activity Report
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratories
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
DTR Detailed Test Report
LS Lightship Security USA CCTL
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
OSP Organizational Security Policies
PCL Products Compliant List
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
VR Validation Report
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14. Bibliography
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security functional requirements, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security assurance requirements, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v2.2E, 23-March-2020
6. PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version: 1.2, 2022-03-31
7. Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS
8.10 Security Target, Version 1.6, November 2023
8. Common Criteria Configuration Guidance ArubaOS 8.10 Supplemental
Guidance (Target of Evaluation: Aruba Remote Access Points with Mobility
Controllers running ArubaOS 8.10-FIPS), Version 2.3, November 2023
9. ArubaOS 8.10.0.0 User Guide, Revision 14, 2023
10. ArubaOS 8.x Command-Line Interface Reference Guide, 2023
11. ArubaOS 8.10.0.0 Syslog Reference Guide
12. Aruba 303H Series Hospitality Access Points Installation Guide, March 2017
13. Aruba 503H Series Hospitality Access Points Installation Guide, July 2020
14. Aruba AP-505H Access Points Installation Guide, May 2023
15. Aruba 7200 Series Controller Installation Guide 0511169-06, July 2015
16. Aruba 9004 Gateway Installation Guide, Revision 03, June 2021
17. Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS
8.10 Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, November 14, 2023
18. Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS
8.10 Assurance Activity Report, Version 1.3, November 14, 2023, and the
proprietary Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with
ArubaOS 8.10 Detailed Test Report , Version 1.4, November 14, 2023 and
Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS
8.10 Detailed Test Report Evidence, Version 1.4, November 14, 2023
19. Aruba Remote Access Points and Aruba Mobility Controllers with ArubaOS
8.10 Vulnerability Assessment, Version 0.2, November 2023