TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-06
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Certification Report
NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 - cryptovision ePasslet
Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-
Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for
Official Use with BAC option
Sponsor: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Beiersdorfstrasse 12
D-22529 Hamburg
Germany
Developer: cv cryptovision GmbH
Munscheidstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
Germany
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300154-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300154-01
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 28 June 2024
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NXP
eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC
option. The developer of the NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java
Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110
for Official Use with BAC option is cv cryptovision GmbH located in Gelsenkirchen, Germany and NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH was the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification
Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security
properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a Java Card (NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite)
configured to provide a contactless integrated circuit chip containing components for a machine
readable travel document (MRTD chip). After instantiation and configuration of the according
configuration it can be programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and provides the
Basic Access Control.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 28 June 2024 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 -
cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic
Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option, the security requirements, and
the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the
security requirements. Consumers of the NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 - cryptovision ePasslet
Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on
BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 -
cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic
Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option from cv cryptovision GmbH
located in Gelsenkirchen, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
NXP secure Smart Card controller N7121 with IC Dedicated
Software and Crypto Library (as part of [CR-N7121] certificate)
B1
Platform
JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4
JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4
Software NXP eDoc Suite on JCOP4 –cryptovision ePasslet Suite V3.5
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the NXP eDoc Suite
v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-
Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option. For details,
see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.4.6.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a Java Card configured to provide a contact and contactless integrated circuit chip
containing components for a machine readable travel document (MRTD chip). After instantiation and
configuration of the according configuration it can be programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure (LDS) and provides the Basic Access Control according to the ICAO documents referenced
in the [ST] and the set of Security Functional Requirements defined in the [ST] and implemented by
the TOE.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
The TOE can be ordered in two configurations:
• configuration without Biometry
• configurations with Biometry library
It is noted that the Biometry is not claimed in anyway nor specified in the Security Target and
considered SFR-Non-interfering.
Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
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The environment in which the TOE is personalised must perform proper and safe personalisation
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE logical architecture can be depicted as follows:
Multiple configurations (and hence support for different applications) can be present at the same time
by instantiating multiple applets with their distinct configurations. Such additional functionality is
independent of the functionality of the TOE as described in the [ST] and the guidance manuals. This is
ensured by the isolation properties of the Java Card platform.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
JCOP 4 P71, User Manual for JCOP 4P71, dated 03 April 2023 rev 4.4
NXP Secure Smart Card controller N7121, Preliminary data sheet, dated
15 April 2020
rev 3.3
NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing an ICAO MRTD application with Extended Access
Control (EACv1) or with Basic Access Control (BAC) and Supplemental
Access Control (SAC), Preparation Guidance (AGD_PRE), dated 12 April
2024
version 1.12.0
NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing an ICAO MRTD application with Extended Access
Control (EACv1) or with Basic Access Control (BAC) and Supplemental
version 1.10.0
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Access Control (SAC), Operational Guidance (AGD_OPE), dated 12 April
2024
NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – version 1.6.0 2024-
04-18 Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID
Documents applications Guidance Manual, dated 18 April 2024
version 1.6.0
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge
gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in
[JIL-AP]. An important source for assurance in this step is the technical report of the
underlying platform.
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 2 weeks. During that test campaign, 100% of the
total time was spent on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE has been tested in pre-personalisation, personalisation and operational life-cycle states with
applet instance configurations specified in the Security Target [ST].
Functional testing was carried out by witnessing of the developer testing and by repeating some tests
by the Laboratory. A combination of standard commercial tools and proprietary developer tools were
used. Penetration testing was performed by using the Lab’s equipment.
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2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused
by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 -
cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic
Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option. The guidance documents
describe how to verify the TOE and perform correct configuration.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on
JCOP4 P71 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Machine-
Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option, to be CC
Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with
ALC_DVS.2. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security
Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
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The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
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3 Security Target
The NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official
Use with BAC option Security Target, Version 3.5, Dated 12 April 2024 [ST] is included here by
reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
BAC Basic Access Control
EAC Extended Access Control
eMRTD electronic MRTD
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 –
cryptovision ePasslet Suite” – EAL4+/EAL5+, 23-RPT-1392, Version 3.0,
Dated 22 April 2024
[HW-CERT] Certification report for NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated
Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/4) from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH, dated 05 March 2024, registered under the reference
BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V4-2024
[HW-ST] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and
Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4), Security Target, v2.9, 2024-01-17, BSI-DSZ-
CC-1136
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November
2022
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January
2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version
2.6, 02 August 2022
[PLAT-CERT] Certification Report for JCOP 4 P71, registered under the reference
NSCIB-CC- 2300172-01-CR, dated 04 April 2024
[PLAT-ST] JCOP 4 P71, Security Target Lite for JCOP 4 P71 / SE050, NXP
Semiconductors, Rev. 4.14, dated 17 January 2024
[PP] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control, version 1.10, 25th March
2009, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
[ST-lite] NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java
Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic
Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option –
Security Target Lite, v3.5, Dated 18 April 2024
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-
004, April 2006
[ST] NXP eDoc Suite v3.5 on JCOP4 P71 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java
Card applet configuration providing Machine-Readable Electronic
Documents based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use with BAC option
Security Target, Version 3.5, Dated 12 April 2024
(This is the end of this report.)