Australasian Information
Security Evaluation Program
Certification Report
Certificate Number: 2008/45
10 March 2008
Version 1.0
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page i
Commonwealth of Australia 2008.
Reproduction is authorised provided
that the report is copied in its entirety.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page ii
Amendment Record
Version Date Description
1.0 10/03/2008 Public release.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page iii
Executive Summary
1 Windows Mobile 5.0 with Messaging and Security Feature Pack (MSFP)
is a compact operating system for use on Pocket PCs and Smartphones
enabling users to extend their corporate Windows desktop to mobile
devices in a secure manner. Windows Mobile 5.0 with MSFP is the Target
of Evaluation (TOE).
2 This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of
Microsoft Corporation’s Windows Mobile 5.0 with MSFP, to the Common
Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level 2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1. The
report concludes that the product has met the target assurance level of
EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 and that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the relevant criteria and the requirements of the
Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program. The evaluation
was performed by stratsec and was completed on 10 March 2008.
3 With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australasian
Certification Authority recommends that users:
a) are aware that information stored on external storage cards is not
protected;
b) review the security of default applications;
c) consider the necessity of pre-installed certificates contained within the
certificate stores;
d) maintain awareness of the evaluated configuration;
e) not accept Service Indicator or Service Loader provisioning messages
they are not expecting; and
f) not install applications with identified security vulnerabilities.
4 This report includes information about the underlying security policies and
architecture of the TOE, and information regarding the conduct of the
evaluation.
5 It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their
requirements. For this reason, it is recommended that a prospective user of
the TOE refer to the Security Target [1], and read this Certification Report
prior to deciding whether to purchase the product.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page iv
Table of Contents
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................1
1.1 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................1
1.2 PURPOSE....................................................................................................................................1
1.3 IDENTIFICATION ........................................................................................................................1
CHAPTER 2 - TARGET OF EVALUATION.....................................................................................3
2.1 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................3
2.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE TOE ........................................................................................................3
2.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE.................................................................................................................4
2.4 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE .........................................................................................................5
2.4.1 Evaluated Functionality....................................................................................................5
2.4.2 Non-evaluated Functionality ............................................................................................6
2.5 USAGE.......................................................................................................................................7
2.5.1 Evaluated Configuration ..................................................................................................7
2.5.2 Delivery procedures .........................................................................................................7
2.5.3 Verifying the Evaluated Product.......................................................................................9
2.5.4 Documentation..................................................................................................................9
2.5.5 Secure Usage..................................................................................................................10
CHAPTER 3 - EVALUATION ...........................................................................................................11
3.1 OVERVIEW ..............................................................................................................................11
3.2 EVALUATION PROCEDURES.....................................................................................................11
3.3 FUNCTIONAL TESTING.............................................................................................................12
3.4 PENETRATION TESTING ...........................................................................................................12
CHAPTER 4 - CERTIFICATION......................................................................................................12
4.1 OVERVIEW ..............................................................................................................................12
4.2 CERTIFICATION RESULT ..........................................................................................................12
4.3 ASSURANCE LEVEL INFORMATION..........................................................................................13
4.4 RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................................................13
ANNEX A - REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS....................................................................15
A.1 REFERENCES ...........................................................................................................................15
A.2 ABBREVIATIONS......................................................................................................................17
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 1
Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 Overview
6 This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and
how to identify the Target of Evaluation (TOE).
1.2 Purpose
7 The purpose of this Certification Report is to:
a) report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the
TOE, Windows Mobile 5.0 with Messaging and Security Feature
Pack (MSFP), against the requirements of the Common Criteria
(CC) Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented with basic
flaw remediation (ALC_FLR.1); and
b) provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for
any interested parties.
8 This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target
[1], which provides a full description of the security requirements, and
specifications that were used as the basis of the evaluation.
1.3 Identification
9 Table 1 provides identification details for the evaluation. For details of all
components included in the evaluated configuration refer to section 2.5.1
Evaluated Configuration.
Table 1: Identification Information
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP)
TOE Windows Mobile Version 5.0 with MSFP (derived from
Windows CE 5.1) which includes the following editions:
• Windows Mobile 5.0 MSFP for Smartphones; and
• Windows Mobile 5.0 MSFP for Pocket PC Phones
Software Version This evaluation includes the following Adaptation Kit Updates
(AKUs):
• Build 14847 AKU 2.0
• Build 14914 AKU 2.1
• Build 14928 AKU 2.2
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 2
• Build 14929 AKU 2.2.1
• Build 14932 AKU 2.2.2
• Build 14955 AKU 2.3
• Build 14957 AKU 2.3.1
• Build 14959 AKU 2.3.2
• Build 14960 AKU 2.4
• Build 14967 AKU 2.5
• Build 14989 AKU 2.6
• Build 14992 AKU 2.6.1
• Build 14994 AKU 2.6.2
• Build 14995 AKU 2.6.3
• Build 15096 AKU 3.0
• Build 15097 AKU 3.0.1
• Build 15314 AKU 3.1
• Build 15633 AKU 3.2
• Build 15671 AKU 3.3
• Build 15673 AKU 3.3.1
• Build 15359 AKU 3.4
• Build 15361 AKU 3.4.1
• Build 15362 AKU 3.4.2
• Build 15363 AKU 3.43
• Build 15704 AKU 3.5
• Build 15705 AKU 3.5.1
• Build 15706 AKU 3.5.2
Security Target Windows Mobile 5.0 MSFP Security Target 1.0, 25 February
2008
Evaluation Level EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1
Evaluation
Technical Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Windows Mobile 5.0 MSFP,
1.0, 03 March 2008
Criteria CC Version 2.3, August 2005, with interpretations as of
18 July 2005
Methodology CEM-99/045 Version 2.3, August 2005 with interpretations as
of 18 July 2005
Conformance Part 2 extended
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 3
Part 3 conformant, augmented with basic flaw remediation
(ALC_FLR.1)
Developer Microsoft Corporation
1 Microsoft Way, Redmond WA 98052-8300 USA
Evaluation Facility stratsec
Suit 1/50 Geils Court, Deakin, ACT 2600
Chapter 2 - Target of Evaluation
2.1 Overview
10 This chapter contains information about the TOE, including: a description
of functionality provided, its architecture components, the scope of
evaluation, security policies, and its secure usage.
2.2 Description of the TOE
11 The TOE is Windows Mobile 5.0 with MSFP developed by Microsoft
Corporation.
12 The TOE is a single user operating system designed for use with
Smartphones and Pocket PC devices. The intended method of use of the
TOE is as a mobile messaging solution that allows users to stay connected
to their email, contacts and calendar whilst away from their enterprise
workstation.
13 The TOE operates in a specific operational environment, the user
environment, and is supported by capabilities that exist within the
operator and enterprise environments. This configuration is depicted in
Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: The TOE operating environment
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 4
14 Further details on the TOE and its operating environment are provided in
the Security Target [1].
2.3 TOE Architecture
15 Windows Mobile 5.0 with MSFP is made up of three layers namely the
Application layer, Operating System layer, and Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) layer. Figure 2 provides a diagrammatic
representation of the Windows Mobile architecture. The TOE is defined as
the Operating Systems Layer and consists of the following major
architectural components:
a) Shell services subsystem
b) Remote connectivity subsystem
c) Core subsystem
d) Kernel subsystem
e) Security policy engine subsystem
f) Authentication services subsystem
g) Cryptographic services subsystem
h) Graphics, Windowing and Events Subsystem
i) Device manager subsystem
j) Storage manager subsystem
k) Communications and networking subsystem
Figure 2: TOE Architecture
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 5
2.4 Clarification of Scope
16 The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the
Security Target [1].
2.4.1 Evaluated Functionality
17 The TOE provides the following evaluated security functionality:
Table 2: Evaluated Security Functionality
Security function TOE security feature
SSL/TLS channel encryption. Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS) encrypts data
transmitted between the device and server, over-the-air or
through a wired connection.
Device data protection.
The TOE provides the
capability to protect data in
transit.
Certified cryptographic module. The TOE includes a
certified FIPS validated cryptographic module.
Applications can make use of cryptographic modules to
perform cryptographic operations.
Controlled application installation. The TOE can be
configured to only permit applications signed with a
trusted certificate to be installed on the operating system.
Device application control.
The TOE provides the
capability to only permit
trusted applications to be
installed and executed on
the mobile device.
Controlled application execution. Code execution control
allows the device to be locked so that only applications
signed with a trusted certificate can run.
Secure channel. Windows Mobile establishes a secure
channel for communicating with another trusted IT
product.
Secure enterprise access.
The TOE provides the
capability to securely
synchronise data items with
the Mobile User’s Exchange
Mailbox.
Synchronization of Mailbox Items. Mobile users can
apply the secure channel to synchronise their emails, tasks,
calendar and contacts with their enterprise mailbox.
Exchange ActiveSync Mailbox Policy. The Enterprise
Administrator can use the secure channel to push down an
enterprise policy for the Mobile Device.
Trusted provisioning. Windows Mobile can implement
secure communications with a trusted source that has the
ability to provide provisioning and configuration data.
Device configuration
control. The TOE provides
the capability to protect
against modification by un-
trusted systems.
Local configuration control. The authenticated user has
the ability to locally manage specific configurations and
settings.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 6
Security function TOE security feature
Device authentication and lock. Windows Mobile can be
configured to require a password to gain access to the
Mobile Device, however, it is possible to receive incoming
calls and to make emergency calls without authenticating.
Device access control. The
TOE has inbuilt security
mechanisms that can be
enabled to provide
controlled access to the
Mobile Device.
Local device wipe. Windows Mobile can be configured to
perform a local device wipe after a specified number of
incorrect login attempts.
Note: This feature only wipes TOE Security Functions
(TSF) and user data on the Mobile Device. Data is not
wiped from installed removable storage cards.
Security roles. Windows Mobile maintains multiple
management roles which determine access to device
resources.
Security policies. Security policies establish the
foundation configuration for the Mobile Device. They can
be set to configure low-level device configuration policies
and also implement enterprise password policy.
Device security
management. The TOE
has configurable security
policies that establish which
actions a user or application
may take.
Remote wipe. The Enterprise Administrator can issue a
command to wipe a managed device if it has been lost or
stolen.
Note: This feature only wipes TSF and user data on the
Mobile Device. Data is not wiped from installed removable
storage cards.
2.4.2 Non-evaluated Functionality
18 Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services
have not been evaluated as part of the evaluation. Potential users of the
TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and
services outside of the evaluated configuration; Australian Government
users should refer to Australian Government Information and Technology
Security Manual (ACSI 33) [2] for policy relating to using an evaluated
product in an unevaluated configuration. New Zealand Government users
should consult the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).
19 The functions and services that have not been included as part of the
evaluation are provided below:
a) Application Layer which includes:
i) Microsoft Windows Mobile applications,
ii) OEM applications, and
iii) applications provided by independent software vendors.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 7
b) OEM Layer which includes:
i) drivers,
ii) boot loader,
iii) OEM configuration files, and
iv) hardware.
20 While the actual mobile device does not form part of the TOE, potential
users should note that the security functionality provided by the TOE is
independent of the device that the operating system is installed upon.
2.5 Usage
2.5.1 Evaluated Configuration
21 This section describes the configurations of the TOE that were included
within scope of the evaluation. The assurance gained via evaluation
applies specifically to the TOE in these defined evaluated configuration(s).
Australian Government users should refer to ACSI 33 [2] to ensure that
configuration meets the minimum Australian Government policy
requirements. New Zealand Government users should consult the GCSB.
22 The evaluated configuration is provided in the Installation and
Administrator Guide [3]. The key policies that are applied to the TOE in
the evaluated configuration are:
a) minimum password length and complexity requirements;
b) local device wipe after maximum unsuccessful authentication
attempts;
c) encryption and signing settings;
d) applications must be signed to be installed or to run;
e) client provisioning settings; and
f) device password required for Desktop ActiveSync.
2.5.2 Delivery procedures
23 The end customer does not purchase the TOE directly from the developer.
Windows Mobile 5.0 with MSFP is sold pre-installed on the device. A
customer can purchase a device that contains the TOE in two ways: from
the OEM or from a network provider.
24 The TOE has either two or three delivery stages depending on where the
customer purchases the device.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 8
2.5.2.1 OEM
25 An OEM obtains the TOE directly from the developer and can develop
images for deployment onto their mobile devices. The OEM development
activities add functionality to the handset including:
a) drivers to support the specific hardware components of the mobile
device;
b) device specific applications that may use Windows Mobile
operating system resources; and/or
c) device configuration settings as requested by Mobile Operators, or
by enterprise customers.
26 Once the OEMs have completed development and integration with a
specific AKU, OEMs are required to either:
a) submit their developed OEM image to a National Standards Testing
Lab for independent verification and validation; or
b) self certify that the developed OEM image satisfies the Logo Test
Kit (LTK).
27 The LTK includes a test case that performs a Cyclic Redundancy Check
(CRC) of all Microsoft developed components that can be used to verify
the integrity of the Windows Mobile operating system.
28 Note: The OEMs are trusted not to deliberately make changes to the TOE.
(See A.DELIVERY in the Security Target [1]).
2.5.2.2 Network provider
29 In the mobile operator customisation phase, Mobile Operators perform
final customisation of the mobile device.
30 This customisation of the mobile device may include:
a) installation of mobile operator specific applications;
b) setting of mobile device themes;
c) configuration of functionality to allow device management within
the mobile operator network; and/or
d) device configuration (within the limitation of the mobile operator(s)
security role) on behalf of customers.
31 Mobile Operators can make use of the CRC verification tool to determine
whether the Windows Mobile operating system image provided by an
OEM is the same as that released by Microsoft in the release to
manufacturer Phase.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 9
32 Note: The network operators are trusted not to deliberately make changes
to the TOE. (See A.DELIVERY in the Security Target [1]).
2.5.2.3 End user
33 It is possible for an enterprise customer to bypass the Mobile Operator and
negotiate provisioning of mobile devices directly from an OEM. In either
case, the following procedures must be followed.
34 The Enterprise Administrator or Mobile User can have assurance that the
mobile device and operating system have not been altered if the
manufacturer’s shrink-wrapped packaging is intact.
35 The Enterprise Administrator or Mobile User must check the shrink-
wrapping of the delivered Mobile Device. If there are signs of tampering
or damage then the manufacturer should be contacted.
2.5.3 Verifying the Evaluated Product
36 The Enterprise Administrator or Mobile User must check that the AKU of
the received product matches one of the versions contained in the
introduction of this report. This can be done by selecting “Settings ->
About” from the main Windows Menu.
2.5.4 Documentation
37 It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance
documentation in order to ensure secure usage. The following
documentation is available:
a) Windows Mobile 5.0 MSFP Installation and Administrator Guide,
version 1.0 [3]; and
b) Windows Mobile 5.0 MSFP & 6 User Guide Supplement, version
1.1 [4].
38 Other guidance is referenced from these documents and should be
followed where there is no contradiction. In the case of a contradiction, the
above references are considered to be authoritative.
39 To gain access to the relevant evaluation guidance the Enterprise
Administrator can request access to the Windows Mobile 6 LTK Beta
program, which provides controlled and secure access to the Microsoft
Connect website where evaluation documentation and information is
posted. The site provides both identification and authentication for
controlling access and encryption using SSL for all access to Microsoft
Connect.
40 Additionally, access to the Windows Mobile 6 LTK Beta program is only
provided on a case-by-case basis. Enterprise Administrators must contact
their local Microsoft office to request access to this program.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 10
41 Once the Enterprise Administrator has been provided with access to the
program, the Enterprise Administrator will need to go to the Microsoft
Connect site and register. Once a Connect profile is established, the
Windows Mobile team will be able to activate individuals in the Windows
LTK Preview program.
42 To register on Connect, the following steps must be used.
a) Go to http://connect.microsoft.com.
b) Click “Sign In” and log in with your Windows Live ID Passport
account.
c) Select “Manage Your Connect Profile”.
d) Accept the “Terms and Conditions”.
e) Fill out the Registration screen. Note: You MUST select YES to the
question “I would like to be contacted about participating in other
MS Beta programs”.
f) Click Submit.
43 Once this is completed a member of the Windows Mobile team will
contact the individual to determine that they have a valid external record
and need to access the evaluation guidance documentation.
2.5.5 Secure Usage
44 The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its
operational environment. These assumptions must hold in order to ensure
the security objectives of the TOE are met.
Table 3: Secure Usage Assumptions
Assumption Identifier Assumption Description
A.USAGE Mobile Users are trusted to:
• follow user guidance,
• ensure that the TOE continues to operate in the
evaluated configuration,
• only permit ActiveSync connections between the
Mobile Device and trusted computing devices, and
• store the Mobile Device when not in use in a physically
protected area that is appropriate for the information
processed by the TOE.
A.DELIVERY The security enforcing components of the TOE will not be
modified by either the Mobile Operator or the manufacturer
of the Mobile Device during the delivery process.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 11
Assumption Identifier Assumption Description
A.IT_ENTERPRISE The Enterprise Exchange Server and Active Directory
Server are located within the enterprise boundary and are
protected from unauthorised logical/physical access.
A.IT_MOBILE The Trusted Provisioning Server is located within the
Mobile Operators network boundary and is protected from
unauthorised logical and physical access.
A.ADMIN The Enterprise Administrator is not careless, wilfully
negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the
instructions provided by administrator documentation.
A.OPERATOR The Mobile Operator will not transmit configuration
messages that undermine the security objectives of the
TOE.
A.I&A_ENTERPRISE The IT environment will provide mechanisms for
authenticating Mobile Users when accessing their mailbox
and other resources within the corporate network.
A.COMMS_ENT The IT environment will provide the server-side of a secure
channel between the Enterprise Exchange Server and the
Mobile Device.
A.COMMS_NET The IT environment will provide the server-side of a secure
channel between the Trusted Provisioning Server and the
Mobile Device.
A.SEC_POLICY The IT environment will provide a mechanism for setting
enterprise policy and pushing it to the Mobile Device.
Chapter 3 - Evaluation
3.1 Overview
45 This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting
the evaluation and the testing conducted as part of the evaluation.
3.2 Evaluation Procedures
46 The criteria against which the TOE has been evaluated are contained in the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
[5][6][7]. The methodology used is described in the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM) [8].
The evaluation was also carried out in accordance with the operational
procedures of the AISEP [9][10][11][12]. In addition, the conditions
outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria
Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security [13] were also
upheld.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 12
3.3 Functional Testing
47 To gain confidence that the developer’s testing was sufficient to ensure the
correct operation of the TOE, the evaluators analysed the evidence of the
developer’s testing effort. This analysis included examining: test coverage;
test plans and procedures; and expected and actual results. The evaluators
drew upon this evidence to perform a sample of the developer tests in
order to verify that the test results were consistent with those recorded by
the developers.
3.4 Penetration Testing
48 The developer performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE in order to
identify any obvious vulnerability in the product and to show that the
vulnerabilities were not exploitable in the intended environment of the
TOE. This analysis included a search for possible vulnerability sources in
publicly available information.
49 Of the vulnerabilities examined, the evaluators deemed that two
vulnerabilities exist but are not exploitable in the intended environment.
These residual vulnerabilities are:
a) An attacker could attempt to read the contents of the internal
memory of a TOE device in order to compromise user or TOE
Security Function data. In this scenario, an attacker would be
required to locate and remove the internal memory chip(s) from the
TOE device and utilise specialised equipment in order to inspect the
contents of the memory.
b) The TOE operates on portable devices that are intended to allow
users to access office automation tools whilst away from their
enterprise workstation. By their nature, such devices are subject to
being lost, or physically stolen. It is possible that an attacker may
access User data of a lost or stolen device by interacting with the
user interface. While the device has a lockout, the device could be
stolen/found within the timeout period.
Chapter 4 - Certification
4.1 Overview
50 This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an
overview of the assurance provided by the level chosen, and
recommendations made by the certifiers.
4.2 Certification Result
51 After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as witnessed by
the certifiers, and of the Evaluation Technical Report [14], the
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 13
Australasian Certification Authority (ACA) certifies the evaluation of
Windows Mobile 5.0 with MSFP performed by the Australasian
Information Security Evaluation Facility (AISEF), stratsec.
52 The stratsec AISEF has found that Windows Mobile 5.0 with MSFP
upholds the claims made in the Security Target [1] and has met the
requirements of the CC EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1.
53 Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities.
4.3 Assurance Level Information
54 EAL2 provides assurance by an analysis of the security functions, using a
functional and interface specification, guidance documentation and the
high-level design of the TOE, to understand the security behaviour.
55 The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TOE security
functions, evidence of developer testing based on the functional
specification, selective independent confirmation of the developer test
results, strength of function analysis, and evidence of a developer search
for obvious vulnerabilities (e.g. those in the public domain).
56 EAL2 also provides assurance through a configuration list for the TOE,
and evidence of secure delivery procedures.
4.4 Recommendations
57 Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable
for Australian and New Zealand Government users. For further guidance,
Australian Government users should refer to ACSI 33 [2] and New
Zealand Government users should consult the GCSB.
58 In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational
environment are fulfilled and the guidance document is followed [3][4],
the ACA also recommends the following for users and administrators.
a) The administrator must ensure that users are aware that data stored
on external storage cards is not protected and should advise users
against storing sensitive data on external media.
b) The administrator should review the applications included in the
default image and determine whether they allow the user to change
the security areas of the registry.
c) The administrator should consider the necessity of all pre-installed
certificates contained within the certificate stores. While specific
OEM and Mobile Operator certificates may be required to ensure
that the TOE boots and operates correctly, there may be no
requirements to have other pre-installed certificates on the TOE.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 14
d) The administrator should ensure that users are aware of the
importance of running the TOE in the evaluated configuration, and
ensure that they return for reconfiguration following a device wipe.
e) The administrator should advise users not to accept Service
Indicator or Service Loader messages that they are not expecting.
f) The administrator should advise users against installing Resco Photo
Viewer versions 4.11 and 6.01.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 15
Annex A - References and Abbreviations
A.1 References
[1] Windows Mobile 5.0 MSFP Security Target 1.0, 25 February 2008,
Microsoft Corporation.
[2] Australian Government Information and Communications Technology
Security Manual (ACSI 33), September 2007, Defence Signals
Directorate, (available at www.dsd.gov.au).
[3] Windows Mobile 5.0 MSFP Installation and Administrator Guide, version
1.1, 25 February 2008, Microsoft Corporation
[4] Windows Mobile 5.0 MSFP & 6 User Guide Supplement, version 1.0, 07
February 2008, Microsoft Corporation
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model (CC), Version 2.1, August 1999, CCIMB-
99-031, Incorporated with interpretations as of 2003-12-31
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Requirements (CC), Version 2.1, August 1999,
CCIMB-99-032, Incorporate with interpretations as of 2003-12-31
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Requirements (CC), Version 2.1, August 1999,
CCIMB-99-033, Incorporate with interpretations as of 2003-12-31
[8] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 1.0, August 1999, CEM-99/045, Incorporated with
interpretations as of 2003-12-31
[9] AISEP Publication No. 1 – Program Policy, AP 1, Version 3.1, 29
December 2006, Australian Certification Authority, Defence Signals
Directorate.
[10] AISEP Publication No. 2 – Certifier Guidance, AP 2. Version 3.0,
21 February 2006, Australian Certification Authority, Defence Signals
Directorate.
[11] AISEP Publication No. 3 – Evaluator Guidance, AP 3. Version 3.1, 29
September, Australian Certification Authority, Defence Signals
Directorate
[12] AISEP Publication No. 4 – Sponsor and Consumer Guidance, AP 4.
Version 3.1, 29 September, Australian Certification Authority, Defence
Signals Directorate
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 16
[13] Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the
field of Information Technology Security, May 2000
[14] Evaluation Technical Report for Windows Mobile 5.0 MSFP 1.0,
03 March 2008, stratsec.
10 March 2008 Version 1.0 Page 17
A.2 Abbreviations
ACA Australasian Certification Authority
AISEP Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
AKU Adaptation Kit Update
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCSB Government Communications Security Bureau
LTK Logo Test Kit
IT Information Technology
MMS Multimedia Messaging Service
MSFP Messaging and Security Feature Pack
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
S/MIME Secure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
SMS Short Messaging Service
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
USB Universal Serial Bus