Certification Report Page 1
KECS-CR-23-62
HDS V1.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1268-2023
2023. 10. 16.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2023.10.16. -
Certification report for HDS V1.0
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for HDS V1.0 of HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore
Engineering Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KoSyAs)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ................................................................................................... 5
2. Identification............................................................................................................... 9
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................ 9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ................................................................ 10
5. Architectural Information......................................................................................... 10
1. Physical Scope of TOE ................................................................................. 10
6. Documentation ......................................................................................................... 14
7. TOE Testing............................................................................................................... 14
8. Evaluated Configuration .......................................................................................... 15
9. Results of the Evaluation......................................................................................... 15
1. Security Target Evaluation (ASE) .................................................................. 15
2. Development Evaluation (ADV)..................................................................... 16
3. Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD) ....................................................... 16
4. Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)............................................................. 17
5. Test Evaluation (ATE).................................................................................... 17
6. Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) .................................................................... 17
7. Evaluation Result Summary.......................................................................... 18
10. Recommendations ................................................................................................... 19
11. Security Target.......................................................................................................... 19
12. Acronyms and Glossary .......................................................................................... 20
13. Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 21
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the evaluation facility on the
results of the HDS V1.0 developed by HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering
Co., Ltd. with reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter)[1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness
and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (hereinafter referred to as “TOE”) is used to protect important
documents managed by the organization. The TOE can encrypt/decrypt a document to
be protected by specifying document type. The entire content of the protected
document, however, must be encrypted. Also, the TOE shall provide a variety of
security features: security audit, the user identification and authentication including
mutual authentication between TOE components, security management, the TOE
access session management, and the TSF protection function, etc.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance
(KOSYAS) and completed on October 04, 2023.
The ST claims conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Electronic
Document Encryption V1.1[3]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST
are based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the
SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1+. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE
is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based
upon both functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the
Extended Component Definition chapter of the PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE
satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2
extended.
‘HDS v1.0’(hereinafter referred to as “TOE”) is used to protect important documents
managed by the organization. The TOE encrypts electronic documents to protect the
important documents managed by the organization according to the policy set by the
administrator, and a document is decrypted according to the document user’s request
and right.
The TOE can encrypt/decrypt documents to be protected by document types and the
TOE encrypts the entire contents of the documents.
The TOE is “Electronic Document Encryption” that prevents information leakage by
encrypting/decrypting important documents within the organization and is provided as
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software. The TOE supports “user device encryption” type.
[Figure 1] Operational Environment of the TOE
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the “user device encryption” type. In
the “user device encryption” type, the TOE can be composed of HDS SERVER which
manages the security policy and cryptographic key, and the HDS AGENT that performs
Electronic Document encryption/decryption installed in the user device.
The validated cryptographic module, ‘MagicCrypto V2.2.0’, is used for the
cryptographic operation of the major security features of the TOE. For the
communication between the TOE component and the administrator (e.g., when the
administrator accesses the HDS SERVER using the web browser and web server to
configure policies), TLS 1.2 is used. As other external entities necessary for the
operation of the TOE, there is the Mail server to send alerts by email to the authorized
administrator.
The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the TOE are
shown in [Table 1].
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Component Requirement
HDS
SERVER
HW
CPU: Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2.6 GHz or higher
Memory: 16 GB or higher
HDD: 300 GB or higher for the installation of TOE
NIC: 100/1000 Mbps 1Port or higher
SW
IIS 10
MS-SQL 2019-15.0
OS Windows Server 2019 Standard (64 bit)
HDS
AGENT
HW
CPU: Intel Core 3.30 GHz or higher
Memory: 4 GB or higher
HDD: 1 GB or higher for the installation of TOE
NIC: 100/1000 Mbps 1Port or higher
OS
Windows 10 Pro (32, 64 bit)
Windows 10 Enterprise (32, 64 bit)
[Table 1] TOE Hardware and Software specifications
Administrator uses the pc that can operate web browser to use the security
management. Administrator pc minimum requirements are shown in [Table 2]
Component Requirement
S/W
Web
Browser
Chrome 114
[Table 2] Administrator PC Requrements
The S/W required for TOE operation is as follows.
Classfication Description
Encryption Target
Document Program
Microsoft Office 2016, 2019, 2021
Hancom Office 2022
Adobe Acrobat Pro X
Adobe Acrobat Reader DC
[Table 3] Encryption Target Document Program
The 3rd party S/W included in the TOE is as follows.
Classfication Description
S/W Microsoft Visual C++ 2010 Redistributable -10.0
[Table 4] 3rd party S/W included in the TOE
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Validated cryptographic modules included the TOE are as follows.
Classfication Description
Cryptographic Module MagicCrypto V2.2.0
Validation No. CM-162-2025.3
Developer Dream Security Co., Ltd.
Validation Date 2025.03.03
[Table 5] Validated Cryptographic Module
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by
the government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or
gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives
effect to the certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2. Identification
The TOE reference is identified as follows.
TOE HDS v1.0
Version V1.0.0.2
TOE
Components
HDS SERVER v1.0.0.2
HDS AGENT v1.0.0.2
Manuals
HDS v1.0 Operation Guide_admin v1.2
HDS v1.0 Operation Guide_user v1.2
HDS v1.0 Preparative Procedure v1.1
[Table 6] TOE identification
[Table 7] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation, facility,
certification body, etc.
Scheme
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (October
31, 2022)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security (May 17,
2021)
TOE HDS v1.0
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April
2017
EAL EAL1+ (ATE_FUN.1)
Protection Profile
Korean National Protection Profile for Electronic Document Encryption
V1.1
Developer HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering Co., Ltd.
Sponsor HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
October 04, 2023
[Table 7] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- User Data Protection
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- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Prtoection of the TSF
- TOE Access
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the
Security Target (ST) [4]
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the ST. The scope of
this evaluation is limited to the functionality and assurance covered in the Security
Target. This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. (for the detailed
information of TOE version and TOE Components version refer to the [Table 6])
5. Architectural Information
1. Physical Scope of TOE
The physical scope of the TOE consists of the HDS SERVER, HDS AGENT, and
guidance documents. Verified Cryptographic Module (MagicCrypto V2.2.0) is embedded
in the TOE components. Hardware, operating system, DBMS, WAS which are operating
environments of the TOE are excluded from the physical scope of the TOE.
Category Identification Type
TOE
component
HDS SERVER v1.0.0.2
(HDS SERVER v1.0.0.2.exe) Software
(Distributed as
a CD)
HDS AGENT v1.0.0.2
(HDS AGENT v1.0.0.2.exe,
HDS AGENT v.1.0.0.2_x64.exe)
guidance
documents
HDS v1.0 Operation Guide_admin v1.2
(HDS v1.0 Operation Guide_admin v1.2.pdf)
PDF
(Distributed as
a CD)
HDS v1.0 Operation Guide_user v1.2
(HDS v1.0 Operation Guide_user v1.2.pdf)
HDS v1.0 Preparative Procedure v1.1
(HDS v1.0 Preparative Procedure v1.1.pdf)
[Table 1] Physical scope of TOE
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2. Logical Scope of TOE
The logical scope of the TOE is as in [Figure 2] below.
[Figure 2] TOE Logical Scope
▣ Security Audit
The TOE creates and records audit data of the events relating to the start/end of the
audit functions and security functions in the DBMS.
The authorized administrator can search through the management screen for the stored
audit data. Audit can be retrieved in the descending order based on the selectable AND
condition and the server time.
If any potential security violation such as integrity violation, TSF self-tests failure, and
Mutual authentication failuer, Login failure 5 times, Unauthorized shutdown/deletion of
TOE executables and proccess, Document user failure to encrypt/decrypt documents,
Audit trail amount exceed is detected, the TOE sends an email to the administrator to
inform the administrator of the potential violation.
In case of a situation when the audit data storage limit exceeds, the TOE sends an alert
by email to the administrator and overwrites the old data.
▣ Cryptographic support
The TOE performs cryptographic operation and cryptographic key management such as
generation, distribution and destruction through MagicCrypto V2.2.0.
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HASH_DRBG is used to generate all DEKs, and the key encryption key (KEK) is
generated according to PBKDF2. Key distribution between components is safely
distributed using ECDH.
Document encryption/decryption is performed in ARIA-CTR mode, and TSF data
encryption/decryption is performed in ARIA-CBC mode. The authentication data of the
administrator and document user is stored in one-way encryption with SHA-256. For
destruction of the encryption key after use, it is overwritten with ‘0’ three times in
memory.
▣ User data protection
The HDS AGENT encrypts the document stored on the user PC to generate secure
documents and the authorized document user access them.
The authorized administrator controls the decryption of secure documents according to
the policy set by the HDS SERVER of the TOE through the management screen of the
web browser.
The file formats that the HDS AGENT of the TOE supports encryption are as follows.
Application File format (extension)
Hancom Office 2022 HWP, HWT
Adobe Acrobat Pro X PDF
Acrobat Reader DC PDF
Microsoft Office 2016,
2019, 2021
(Word, Powerpoint,
Excel)
DOC, DOCX, DOTM, DOTX,
PPT, PPTX, PPTM, PPS, PPSM, PPSX, POT, POTX,
POTM,
XLS, XLSX, XLSM, XLSB, XLTX, XLTM
▣ Identification and authentication
The TOE provides identification and authentication process based on ID/PW for the
administrators and document users. Only the authorized administrator can manage the
security functions through the web browser. The identification and authentication
process of a user are performed through the HDS AGEMT. The identification and
authentication process of the document user are performed through the HDS AGENT.
When the administrator or user enters password to log in, it is masked to prevent
disclosure and in case of authentication failure, the reason is not provided.
The password must be at least 9 characters (max 20) in length, with at least one
alphabetic character, numeric character, and special character. If the authentication
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failure exceeds 5 times, the login function is disabled for 10 minutes.
In order to prevent the reuse of administrator and document user authentication
information, the timestamp of the packet is added, and mutual authentication is
performed using Internally Implemented Authentication Protocol when communicating
between HDS SERVER and HDS AGENT.
▣ Security Management
The administrators and the document users must change their passwords during the
initial access. The authorized administrator performs security management through the
management screen on the web browser. The authorized administrator performs
security function management, security properties management, and TSF data
management and provides the functions through following the menu below.
Change the administrator password of TOE’s management web browser
Register administrator IP
Mail setting
Add and delete document user ID
Document decryption rights
Agent deletion rights
▣ Protection of the TSF
The TOE communicates securely to protect transmission data between components and
secures confidentiality and integrity. The TOE also protects TSF data against
unauthorized exposure and modification through encryption, digital signature and
internally implemented encoding.
The TOE performs TSF self-tests and integrity checks periodically and when operating,
and prevents process termination and file deletion to prevent the running HDS AGENT
from terminating.
▣ TOE access
The TOE terminates the login session after a time interval of inactivity from logging in for
secure session management of the authorized administrator. If logging in with an
account, after logging in with the same account from one device, from another device is
tried, the previous connection is blocked, and administrators can access only from the
devices whose IP is designated as accessible.
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6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identification Date
HDS v1.0 Operation Guide_admin v1.2
(HDS v1.0 Operation Guide_admin v1.2.pdf)
September 04, 2023
HDS v1.0 Operation Guide_user v1.2
(HDS v1.0 Operation Guide_user v1.2.pdf)
September 04, 2023
HDS v1.0 Preparative Procedure v1.1
(HDS v1.0 Preparative Procedure v1.1.pdf)
September 04, 2023
[Table 8] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The evaluator conducted independent testing listed in Independent Testing Report [5],
based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The evaluator took a testing approach
based on the security services provided by each TOE components based on the
operational environment of the TOE. Each test case includes the following information:
- Test no.: Identifier of each test case
- Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
- Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
- Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
- Expected result: Result expected from testing
- Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
- Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected and
actual result
The evaluator set up the test configuration and testing environment consistent with the
ST [4]. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases
devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities. These tests cover weakness analysis of privilege check of executable
code, bypassing security functionality, invalid inputs for interfaces, vulnerability scanning
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using commercial tools, disclosure of secrets, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities by
attackers possessing basic attack potential were found from penetration testing. The
evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected testing
results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and
results are summarized in the Penetration Testing Report [6].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: HDS v1.0 (v1.0.0.2)
- HDS SERVER v1.0.0.2
- HDS AGENT v1.0.0.2
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6
were evaluated with the TOE
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility wrote the evaluation result in the ETR which references Single Evaluation
Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports. The evaluation result was based
on the CC [1] and CEM [2]. The TOE was evaluated based on Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation. (EAL1+).
1. Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC
and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and it
is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
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The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for the
TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
2. Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specify a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and SFR-
supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
3. Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented
and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and
interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use of
the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates prevention
and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE in a
secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of users (e.g.
those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect actions could
adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
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4. Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes the
TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
5. Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1. Thus, the TOE behaves as
described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation evidence (described in the ADV
class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
6. Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable vulnerabilities
by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational environment of the TOE.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t allow
attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
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7. Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_INT.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1
ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
AGD
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1
ATE_IND.1.1E PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1
AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 9] Evaluation Result Summary
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10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE
operational environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be
operated by complying with the followings:
⚫ The administrator should periodically check the free space of the audit data storage in
preparation for the loss of the audit records, and perform backups of the audit records
so that the audit records are not exhausted.
⚫ HDS SERVER must be installed and operated in a physically secure environment that
is accessible only to authorized administrators and should not allow remote
administration from outside.
⚫ If a cryptographic key is lost due to administrator's wrong cryptographic key
management, document users may not be able to decrypt the encrypted file stored on
the user's PC, so administrator has to be careful with cryptographic key management
11. Security Target
HDS v1.0 Security Target v1.2 [4] is included in this report for reference.
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12. Acronyms and Glossary
(1) Acronyms
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
(2) Glossary
Authorized Document User
The TOE user who may, in accordance with the SFRs, perform an operation
Authorized Administrator
Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE
Data Encryption Key (DEK)
Key that encrypts the data
Decryption
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The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key
Encryption
The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext using the cryptographic key
External Entity
An entity (person or IT object) that interact (or can interact) with the TOE from outside
the TOE.
Key Encryption Key (KEK)
Key that encrypts another cryptographic key.
Validated Cryptographic Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a validation number by validation
authority
Wrapper
Interface to connect the TOE with various types of information system
13. Bibliography
The evaluation facility has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision
5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017
[3] Korean National Protection Profile for Electronic Document Encryption V1.1, December
11, 2019
[4] HDS v1.0 Security Target v1.2, Septemeber 04, 2023
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[5] HDS v1.0 Independent Testing Report(ATE_IND.1) V2.00, October 11, 2023
[6] HDS v1.0 Penetration Testing Report (AVA_VAN.1) V1.00, September 27, 2023