KECS-CR-24-20
FilingBox MEGA2 v2
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1298-2024
2024. 3. 28.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2024.03.28. -
Certification report for FilingBox MEGA2 v2
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for FilingBox MEGA2 v2 of
Namusoft Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary...............................................................................................5
2. Identification ..........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy.......................................................................................................8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.............................................................9
5. Architectural Information......................................................................................9
6. Documentation.....................................................................................................10
7. TOE Testing..........................................................................................................10
8. Evaluated Configuration ..................................................................................... 11
9. Results of the Evaluation.................................................................................... 11
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................. 11
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) .......................................................12
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD) .................................................12
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ...............................................................12
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE) ..............................................................................13
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)...............................................................13
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary.....................................................................13
10. Recommendations...............................................................................................14
11. Security Target.....................................................................................................15
12. Acronyms and Glossary .....................................................................................15
13. Bibliography.........................................................................................................15
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the evaluation of FilingBox MEGA2 v2 of Namusoft Co., Ltd. with reference to
the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter)
[1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is an information security software that allows only
authorized applications to access files within the storage protected by the TOE. The
TOE is provided as software and provides the following security features: security audit,
cryptographic operations using OpenSSL, user data protection, identification and
authentication, security management, TSF protection function, and TOE access.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
and completed on 26 March 2024. This report grounds on the evaluation technical
report (ETR) KOSYAS had submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST) [6].
The ST has no conformance claim to the protection profile (PP). All Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part
3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of evaluation assurance level (EAL) 1. Therefore,
the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional components in CC Part 2 and
newly defined components in the Extended Component Definition chapter of the ST,
and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is
CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE. The TOE consists of the
following software components: FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Server, FilingBox MEGA2 v2
Windows Client, and FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Linux Client. The component FilingBox
MEGA2 v2 Server provides security management features for administrators (the super
and general administrators) through web UI. The components FilingBox MEGA2 v2
Windows Client and FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Linux Client provide device administrators to
configure the security attributes of the objects (application softwares) to access to the
files in the storage protected by the TOE.
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[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE
[Table 1] shows hardware and software requirements necessary for installation and
operation of the TOE.
Category Contents
FilingBox
MEGA2 v2
Server
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-13400 CPU @ 2.50 GHz or above
RAM 16 GB or higher
SSD At least 10 GB of space required for the TOE installation
NIC 100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or more
OS Rocky Linux 8.8 64-bit (Kernel 4.18.0-477.10.1)
S/W MariaDB 10.11.5
Tomcat 9.0.85
OpenJDK 1.8.0_382
NGINX 1.24.0
FilingBox
MEGA2 v2
Windows
Client
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7600 CPU @ 3.5 GHz or above
RAM 8 GB or higher
SSD At least 10 GB of space required for the TOE installation
NIC 100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or more
OS Windows Server 2016 64-bit Version 1607, OS Build
14393.693
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FilingBox
MEGA2 v2
Linux Client
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-13400 CPU @ 2.50 GHz or above
RAM 16 GB or higher
SSD At least 10 GB of space required for the TOE installation
NIC 100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or more
OS Rocky Linux 8.8 64-bit (Kernel 4.18.0-477.10.1)
[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
A PC with the following requirement is needed for authorized administrators
(super/general administrators) to access the component FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Server
for security management.
Category Contents
SW (Web Browser) Chrome V 120.0 (64 bit)
[Table 2] The minimum requirements for the administrator’s PC
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is software consisting of the following software components and related
guidance documents.
TOE FilingBox MEGA2 v2
Version v2.6.0
TOE
Components
FilingBox MEGA2 v2
Server
FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Server v2.2.0
(FilingBox MEGA2_v2_Server_v2.2.0.tgz)
FilingBox MEGA2 v2
Windows Client
FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Windows Client v2.2.0
(FilingBox MEGA2_v2_Windows_Client_v2.2.0.exe)
FilingBox MEGA2 v2
Linux Client
FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Linux Client v2.2.0
(FilingBox MEGA2_v2_Linux_Client_v2.2.0.tgz )
Guidance FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Server User Manual v1.3
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Document FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Client User Manual v1.3
FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Server Installation Manual v1.4
FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Client Installation Manual v1.4
[Table 3] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.
[Table 4] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(October 31, 2022)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (May
17, 2021)
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-
003, April 2017
EAL EAL1
Protection Profile ST does not claim conformance to PP
Developer Namusoft Co., Ltd.
Sponsor Namusoft Co., Ltd.
Evaluation
Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
March 26, 2024
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 4] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies defined in the ST [6] by security requirements.
Thus, the TOE provides the following security features: security audit, cryptographic
operations using OpenSSL, user data protection, identification and authentication,
security management, TSF protection function, and TOE access. The details of SFRs
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can be found in the ST [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There is no explicit Security Problem Definition chapter, therefore no Assumptions
section in the low assurance ST. The scope of this evaluation is limited to the
functionality and assurance covered in the Security Target.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
 FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Server
 FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Windows Client
 FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Linux Client
[Figure 2] Architectural Information of the TOE
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6. Documentation
The following documentations are evaluated and provided with the TOE by the
developer to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Server User Manual v1.3 v1.3 February 26, 2024
FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Client User Manual v1.3 v1.3 February 26, 2024
FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Server Installation Manual v1.4 v1.4 February 26, 2024
FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Client Installation Manual v1.4 v1.4 February 26, 2024
[Table 5] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The evaluator installed and prepared the TOE in accordance to the preparative
procedures, then conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the
evaluator. The evaluator took a testing approach based on the security services
provided by each TOE components based on the operational environment of the TOE.
Each test case includes the following information:
 Test no.: Identifier of each test case
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon
test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities. No exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack
potential were found from penetration testing. The evaluator confirmed that all the
actual testing results correspond to the expected testing results.
The evaluator’s testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results
are summarized in the ETR [5].
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8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is FilingBox MEGA2 v2 (version number v2.6.0). See table 3 for detailed
information on the TOE components.
The TOE is installed from the CD-ROM distributed by Namusoft Co., Ltd. After installing
the TOE, the administrator can check the TOE version from the product. And the
guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 5] were evaluated with the
TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL1.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
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ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has uniquely identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration list includes the TOE and the evaluation evidence required by the
SARs in the ST. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users whose incorrect actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their
own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The developer has provided a high-level description of at least the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
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9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE, don’t allow attackers possessing basic attack
potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
ATE ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE shall be located in a physically secure environment to which only the
authorized administrator is allowed to access. The TOE shall not allow remote
management.
 The authorized administrator of the TOE shall preserve a secure state of the
TOE by various methods such as keeping the OS and the DBMS up to date
with the latest patch, eliminating unnecessary services, and changing the
default ID and password.
 The authorized administrator shall periodically checks a spare space of audit
data storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data
backup (external log server or separate storage device, etc.) to prevent audit
data loss.
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11. Security Target
FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Security Target v1.5 [6] is included in this report for reference.
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Authorized Administrator Authorized user to securely operate and manage the
TOE
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (31 October 2022)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (17 May 2021)
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[5] FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Evaluation Technical Report V3.00, 26 March 2024
[6] FilingBox MEGA2 v2 Security Target v1.5, 21 March 2024