BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018
for
Infineon smart card IC (Security Controller)
IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h,
IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh,
IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h,
IFX_CCI_000018h, IFX_CCI_000023h,
IFX_CCI_000024h design step G13 with optional
libraries CIPURSE™ CL, RSA2048/4096, EC,
Toolbox, HSL, SCL and with specific IC dedicated
software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018 (*)
Infineon smart card IC (Security Controller) IFX_CCI_000007h,
IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h,
IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, IFX_CCI_000023h, IFX_CCI_000024h
design step G13 with optional libraries CIPURSE™ CL, RSA2048/4096, EC,
Toolbox, HSL, SCL and with specific IC dedicated software
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 26 September 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................7
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................8
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................9
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
6. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................17
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................17
6. Documentation............................................................................................................18
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................27
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................27
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................28
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................29
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................32
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................33
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on
08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles
(cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including
EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for
Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018 Certification Report
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon smart card IC (Security Controller) IFX_CCI_000007h,
IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h,
IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, IFX_CCI_000023h, IFX_CCI_000024h design
step G13 with optional libraries CIPURSE™ CL, RSA2048/4096, EC, Toolbox, HSL, SCL
and with specific IC dedicated software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V2-2018. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V2-2018 were re-used. Also, specific ALC related
parts were re-used in the sense of AIS38 from BSI-DSZ-CC-1079.
The evaluation of the product Infineon smart card IC (Security Controller)
IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh,
IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, IFX_CCI_000023h,
IFX_CCI_000024h design step G13 with optional libraries CIPURSE™ CL,
RSA2048/4096, EC, Toolbox, HSL, SCL and with specific IC dedicated software was
conducted by T-Systems International GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 20
September 2018. T-Systems International GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 26
September 2018 is valid until 25 September 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Infineon smart card IC (Security Controller) IFX_CCI_000007h,
IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h,
IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, IFX_CCI_000023h, IFX_CCI_000024h design
step G13 with optional libraries CIPURSE™ CL, RSA2048/4096, EC, Toolbox, HSL, SCL
and with specific IC dedicated software has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018
1. Executive Summary
The TOE is named Infineon smart card IC (Security Controller) IFX_CCI_000007h,
IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h,
IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, IFX_CCI_000023h, IFX_CCI_000024h design
step G13 with optional libraries CIPURSE™ CL, RSA2048/4096, EC, Toolbox, HSL, SCL
and with specific IC dedicated software and is an integrated circuit (IC) in 65nm
technology, providing a platform for an operating system and application software used in
smartcards but also in any other device or form factor requiring a high level of resistance
against attackers.
The Security Target [6] and [9] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.4 (Security
Requirements Rationale).
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.2. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapters 4.3, 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
Within the Security Target [6] and [9], references to, and aspects of, GBIC (German
Banking Industry Committee) are given. Unless Common Criteria relevant refinements are
made to CC contents, these GBIC topics are to be regarded as parallel and independent
of the CC certification.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018 Certification Report
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon smart card IC (Security Controller) IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h,
IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h,
IFX_CCI_000018h, IFX_CCI_000023h, IFX_CCI_000024h design step G13 with
optional libraries CIPURSE™ CL, RSA2048/4096, EC, Toolbox, HSL, SCL and with
specific IC dedicated software.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW IFX_CCI_000007h,
IFX_CCI_000009h,
IFX_CCI_00000Ah,
IFX_CCI_00000Bh,
IFX_CCI_000016h,
IFX_CCI_000017h,
IFX_CCI_000018h,
IFX_CCI_000023h and
IFX_CCI_000024h
designstep G13.
with dedicated firmware as
given in the ST [6] and [9]
(note: Firmware includes
BOS, Flash Loader (with
SCL) and RMS.)
HW-Version:
G13
FW-Version
80.101.07.0 or
80.101.07.1
Complete modules, with or
without inlay mounting, with or
without inlay antenna mounting,
plain wafers, in any IC case (e.g.
TSSOP28, VQFN32, VQFN40,
CCS-modules, etc.), in no IC
case or package, simply as bare
dies or arbitrary type of package.
The firmware is stored in
reserved areas of ROM and
NVM memories.
2 SW Libraries (to be chosen optionally and
individually):
Object code (electronic data in
lib format)
RSA2048, V2.06.003 or
V2.07.003,
RSA4096, V2.06.003 or
V2.07.003,
EC, V2.06.003 or
V2.07.003,
Toolbox (not in scope of
evaluation),
V2.06.003 or
V2.07.003,
HSL, V01.22.4346 or
V02.01.6634 or
V03.11.8339
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
SCL, V2.02.010 or
V2.04.002
CIPURSETM
CL V2.0.0002 or
V2.0.0004.
3 Doc 16-bit Security Controller –
V02 Errata sheet
[13]
Rev. 4.0,
Infineon, 2017-
08-17
Document in electronic form
4 Doc 16-bit Security Controller –
V02 Hardware Reference
Manual
[12]
Rev. 4.2,
Infineon, 2016-
11-15
Document in electronic form
5 Doc 16-Bit Security Controller -
V02, Security Guidelines
[11]
Rev. 1.00-1856,
Infineon, 2018-
06-15
Document in electronic form
6 Doc CIPURSE™ Crypto Library,
CCL52_SCP_v4 v2.0.0002,
CIPURSE™ V2, Compliant
to OSPT™ Alliance
CIPURSE™ V2
Cryptographic Protocol,
User Interface
[19]
Rev. 1.4, 2017-
06-16
Document in electronic form
CIPURSE™ Crypto Library,
CCL52_SCP_v4 v2.0.0004,
CIPURSE™ V2, Compliant
to OSPT™ Alliance
CIPURSE™ V2
Cryptographic Protocol,
User Interface
[19]
Rev. 1.6, 2018-
02-02
7 Doc CL52 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T,
RSA/ECC/Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User
Interface
[14]
Rev. 2.07.003,
Infineon, 2018-
05-24
Document in electronic form
8 Doc CL52 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T,
RSA/ECC/Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User
Interface (with included
Errata Sheet of 10th
May
2017)
see also [14]
Rev. 2.06.003,
Infineon, 2016-
12-12
Document in electronic form
9 Doc Crypto@2304T V3 User
manual
[15]
Rev. 1.4.1,
Infineon, 2014-
11-10
Document in electronic form
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
10 Doc Hardware Support Library
for SLCx2 (HSL) as active
document
[18]
1st
version:
Rev. 01.22.4346,
2016, Infineon
and
2nd
version:
Rev. 02.01.6634,
2017, Infineon
and
3rd
version:
Rev. 03.11.8339,
2018-07-12
Document in electronic form
11 Doc Production and
Personalization, 16-bit
Security Controller in 65 nm
[17]
Rev. 3.3,
Infineon, 2018-
03-23
Document in electronic form
12 Doc 16-bit Security Controller 65-
nm Technology,
Programmer's Reference
Manual
[16]
Rev. 9.7,
Infineon, 2017-
09-14
Document in electronic form
14 Doc SCL52 Symmetric
Cryptogaphic Library for
DES / AES, 16-bit Security
Controller, User Interface
(2.02.010)
[20]
Version 2.02.010,
Infineon, 2016-
12-09
Document in electronic form
SCL52 Symmetric
Cryptogaphic Library for
DES / AES, 16-bit Security
Controller, User Interface
(2.04.002)
[20]
Version 2.04.002,
Infineon, 2018-
01-15
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery documentation describes all procedures that are necessary to maintain
security when distributing versions of the TOE or parts of it to the user’s site including the
necessary intermediate delivery procedures.
Furthermore, the delivery documentation describes in a sufficient manner how the various
procedures and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications and any
discrepancies between the TOE respective parts of it send by the TOE Manufacturer and
the version received by the Composite Product Manufacturer.
Three different delivery procedures have to be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
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● Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalisation data) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE
Manufacturer.
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product
Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after
phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
Respective distribution centers are listed in Appendix B (see below).
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. The
identification data contains the CCI (Common Criteria identifier), lot number, the wafer
number and the coordinates of the chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore
be traced unambiguously and thus assigned to the entire development and production
process.
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h,
IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h,
IFX_CCI_000018h, IFX_CCI_000023h and IFX_CCI_000024h design step G13.
Another characteristic of the TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification
data is accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM).
At TOE start-up the so called GCIM can be chosen by applying special signalling in
contactless or contact based communication and the TOE outputs then the generic chip
identification data. This data contain the firmware identifier accompanied with the
certification identifier, the design step and even more tracking information. In combination
with [12] (section 6.5) the user can identify the data, interpret it and retrieve the TOE
versioning information. This information includes also the required mapping of firmware
identifier and certification identifier.
The optional software libraries can be identified by calculating a hash value (e.g. SHA-256)
over the delivered lib-files (.lib) and comparing the calculated vales to the values stated in
Security Target [6] and [9], section 11.
Please also note, that as the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE
Manufacturer can only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the
responsibility of the Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the
implemented software (developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows
detection of modifications after the delivery.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE.
It provides basic security functionalities to be used by a smart card operating system and a
smart card application, thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the
TOE implements a symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES)
to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support
implementations of secure authentication protocols.
It furthermore provides a True Random Number Generator (TRNG), Hybrid Random
Generator (HRNG), and Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018 Certification Report
The RSA Library is used to provide a high level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the core and on the hardware asymmetric coprocessor and
includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The EC Library is used to
provide a high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the core and
on hardware asymmetric coprocessor and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA
and DFA attacks.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
The TOE as well implements user manageable memory access control policy. The security
policy of memory access control policy has been formally modelled. The formal model
covers further security policies.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment.
Regarding the operational environment of the TOE the security objectives OE.Resp-Appl
(Treatment of User Data of the Composite TOE), and OE.Process-Sec-IC (Protection
during composite product manufacturing), OE.Lim_Block_Loader (Limitation of capability
and blocking the Loader), OE.TOE_Auth (External entities authenticating of the TOE) and
OE.Loader_Usage (Secure communication and usage of the Loader) are relevant for the
user in context of secure installation of the TOE and the secure preparation of the
operational environment. All objectives are properly covered by user guidance.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a platform for an operating system and
application software used in smartcards but also in any other device or form factor
requiring a high level of resistance against attackers. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 2.1.
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251
architecture.
The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units),
the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit).
The two CPUs control each other in order to detect faults and serve by this for data
integrity. The TOE implements a linear addressable memory space for each privilege level
and a simple scalable Memory Management concept. The flexible memory concept
consists of ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non volatile memory (NVM). There is
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no user available on-chip ROM module. The user software and data are now located in a
dedicated and protected part of the NVM.
The two cryptographic co-processors serve the need of modern cryptography: The
symmetric co-processor (SCP) combines both AES and Triple-DES with dual-key or triple-
key hardware acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto Co-processor is used for RSA and
Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography.
The software part of the TOE consists of the cryptographic CIPURSETM
, EC-, RSA- and
symmetric cryptography libraries and the supporting Toolbox libraries.
The Flash Loader is a firmware located in the ROM and enables the download of the user
software or parts of it to the NVM. After completion of the download and before delivery the
final user the Flash Loader shall be locked by the user.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into following categories:
● technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against the
specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the circuitry
(this testing is not strictly related to Security Functions),
● tests which are performed in a simulation environment for analogue and for digital
simulations,
● regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software (optional
software libraries) and for the IC Dedicated Support Software (BOS) on emulator
versions of the TOE or within the simulation of chip in special hardware, or on final
hardware and firmware,
● qualification tests to release the TOE to production:
• used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation
tests)
• special verification tests for Security Functions which were done with samples of the
TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which include also layout
tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify statements concerning
the layout;
● functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3 or phase 4 depending on
the TOE delivery form).
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms as identified
in the functional specification, and in the high and low level designs.
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The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
sites. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer by sampling or by complete repetition of regression tests
especially for the software. Besides repeating exactly the developer’s tests, test
parameters and test equipment are varied and additional analysis was done. Security
features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the
evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The developer has tested the TOE. In cases that different configurations were tested, the
evaluators assessed the validity of test results for the TOE.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides the Security
Functions as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE Security Functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functions into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planed based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of Security Functions using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically (i.e. DPA/SPA testing).
The evaluators have tested the TOE. In cases that different configurations were tested, the
evaluators assessed the validity of test results for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated derivate of the TOE is IFX_CCI_000007h (with options/other identifiers, see
below), G13 with firmware and optional software libraries (CCL, RSA2048 2k and 4k, EC,
Toolbox, HSL, SCL) with revisions stated in section 2. The flash loader (part of FW) was
enabled on evaluated derivative.
The BPU feature was not used. All hardware modules and all interfaces incl. options were
activated and the ranges of available memories was not limited (i.e. maximum size was
available). The system frequency was set at its maximum value. The derivative was
manufactured in wafer fab Tainan, Taiwan.
An extensive overview over all possible configuration options is given in the Security
Target [6] and [9] in table 4.
The evaluation results, also including results of tests performed by the developer, are valid
for all hardware derivates of the configuration IFX_CCI_000007h, G13 (including all further
identifiers 000009h, 00000Ah, 00000Bh, 000016h, 000017h, 000018h, 000023h, 000024h
in design step G13). All identifiers represent the equal hardware platform but name
differences in configurations or market segments. Configuration differences are achieved
by blocking only. The firmware and optional software libraries (RSA2048 2k and 4k, EC,
Toolbox, HSL, SCL were examined in those revisions, which are stated in table 2 (above).
The evaluation results are valid for all configurations and blocking options of the hardware
stated in table 4 of the Security Target [6] and [9]. Depending on configuration, blocking
option and on selection of optional software libraries, some of the services might be
unavailable to the user. The unavailable services have no security impact on the TOE. The
user must ensure a working configuration, e.g. the RAM size shall be selected to fulfill the
minimum requirement of RSA library, if it was also selected as an option. The evaluation
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results apply to all configurations of Flash Loader, BPU and PIN-Letter as stated in table 3
of the Security Target [6] and [9].
The evaluation results cannot be extended to further versions/derivates of the TOE and/or
other production sites without any extra investigations.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● AIS1, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers,
Version 13, BSI, 2008-08-14,
● AIS14, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, BSI, 2010-08-03,
● AIS19, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR
(Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC,
Version 9, BSI, 2014-11-03,
● AIS20, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3.0, BSI, 2013-05-15,
● AIS20-Part Functionality Classes and Evaluation Methodology for Deterministic Random
Number Generators, Part of AIS20, Version 2.0, BSI, 1999-11-02,
● AIS20-Part Deterministic Random Number Generator, Part of AIS20, Version 0.10, BSI,
2013-02-28,
● AIS25, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen, Version 8, BSI, 2013-02-13,
● AIS25-Part The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Part of AIS25, JIL, version 3.0,
02-2009,
● AIS25-JIL JIL-HW-ADV_ARCSecurity Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart
cards and similar devices, Version 2.0, JIL, 01-2012,
● AIS26, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9,
BSI, 2013-03-21,
● AIS26-Part Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.9, JIL, 01-2013,
● AIS26-Part Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.2, JIL, 01-
2013,
● AIS31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3.0, BSI, 2013-05-15,
● AIS31-Part A proposal for: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for true
(physical) random number generators, Part of AIS31, Version 3.1, BSI, 2001-09-25,
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● AIS31-Part A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Part of
AIS31, Version 2.00, BSI, 2011-09-18,
● AIS31-Part True Physical and Hybrid Random Number Generator, Part of AIS31,
Version 0.7, BSI, 2013-02-28,
● AIS39 Guideline for the Development and Evaluation of formal security policy models in
the scope of ITSEC and Common Criteria, Part of AIS39, Version 2.0, BSI, 2007-12-04,
● AIS46, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, BSI,
2013-12-04,
● AIS46-Part Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of
Elliptic Curve Implementations, Part of AIS46, Version 1.0.4, BSI, 2011-07-01,
● AIS46-Part Methodology for cryptographic rating of memory encryption schemes used in
smartcards and similar devices, Part of AIS46, Version 1.0, BSI, 2013-10-31,
● AIS46-Part Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of
RSA, DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations, Part of AIS46, Version
1.0, BSI, 2013-01-14.
For the non-technology specific aspects, the following guidances apply:
● AIS32, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 6, BSI, 2011-
06-08,
● AIS34, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+, Version 3, BSI,
2009-09-06,
● AIS35, Öffentliche Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, BSI, 2007-11-12,
● AIS35-Part ST sanitising for publication, Part of AIS35, CCDB-2006-04-004, Version 1.0,
2006-04,
● AIS36, Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 4, BSI, 2013-05-15,
● AIS36-Part Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Part of
AIS36, Version 1.2, JIL, 01-2012,
● AIS36-Part template for composite evaluation of Smart Cards and similar devices, Part
of AIS36, Version 1.0, Revision 1, CCDB-2007-09-002, 09-2007,
● AIS38, Wiederverwendung von Evaluationsergebnissen, Version 2, BSI, 2007-09-28,
● AIS39, Formal Method, Version 3.0, BSI, 2008-10-24,
(see [4] for respective AIS references).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE. Please note that those parts, which are to be read in the GBIC
context, are solely relevant in the GBIC context and not in the CC context (hence for CC
these are out of scope).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report),
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● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V2-2018.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table (which originates from the ITSEF-evaluated table in [21] and in this
certification report is enhanced by the 100 bit column) provides an overview of the
cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its
rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in
column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security
level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
Purpose /
Service
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above 100
Bits
Symmetric Cryptographic Co Processor
TDES in modes
ECB [S21], [S30] |k| = 168 No
CBC [S20], [S21], [S30] |k| = 168 168: Yes,
112: No
CBC-MAC [S20], [S21], [S30],
[S32]
|k| = 168 No
CBC-MAC-ELB [S20], [S21], [S30],
[S32]
|k| = 168 + key length for ELB No
AES in modes
ECB [S21], [S30], [S31] |k| = 128, 192, 256 No
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Purpose /
Service
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above 100
Bits
CBC [S21], [S30], [S31] |k| = 128, 192, 256 Yes
CBC-MAC [S20], [S21], [S30],
[S32]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 No
CBC-MAC-ELB [S20], [S21], [S30],
[S32]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 + key length
for ELB
No
Symmetric Cryptographic Libraries (both)
AES in modes
ECB [S20], modes in
[S21],[S31]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 No
CBC, CTR, CFB [S31], modes in
[S21]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 Yes
PCBC (encryption) [S31], [S36] |k| = 128, 192, 256 Yes
PCBC
(authenticated enc)
[S31], [S36] |k| = 128, 192, 256 No
TDES / TDEA in modes
ECB [S20], modes in
[S21]
|k| = 112 and 168 bits No
CBC, CTR and
CFB
[S20], modes in
[S21]
|k| = 112 and 168 bits 168: Yes,
112: No
PCBC (encryption) [S20], [S36] |k| = 128, 192, 256 168: Yes,
112: No
PCBC
(authenticated enc)
[S20], [S36] |k| = 128, 192, 256 No
CMAC
AES-CMAC [S21], [S30], [S31],
[S37]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 No
TDES-CMAC [S20], [S21], [S30],
[S37]
|k| = 168 No
Random Number Generation
Hybrid Physical
True Random
Number
Generation
[S13] N/A N/A
RSA library v2.06.003
RSA encryption [S29], [S37] Modulus length 1976 – 4096
(please note specifics for the
RSA2k and RSA4k libraries)
Yes
RSA decryption
with and without
CRT
[S29], [S37] Modulus length 1976 – 4096
(please note specifics for the
RSA2k and RSA4k libraries)
Yes
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Purpose /
Service
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above 100
Bits
RSA signature
generation with
and without CRT
[S29], [S37] Modulus length 1976 – 4096
(please note specifics for the
RSA2k and RSA4k libraries)
Yes
RSA signature
verification (only
modular
exponentiation
part)
[S29], [S37] Modulus length 1976 – 4096
(please note specifics for the
RSA2k and RSA4k libraries)
Yes
RSA library v2.07.003
RSA encryption [S22], [S29] Modulus length 1976 – 4096
(please note specifics for the
RSA2k and RSA4k libraries)
Yes
RSA decryption
with and without
CRT
[S22], [S29] Modulus length 1976 – 4096
(please note specifics for the
RSA2k and RSA4k libraries)
Yes
RSA signature
generation with
and without CRT
[S22], [S29] Modulus length 1976 – 4096
(please note specifics for the
RSA2k and RSA4k libraries)
Yes
RSA signature
verification (only
modular
exponentiation
part)
[S22], [S29] Modulus length 1976 – 4096
(please note specifics for the
RSA2k and RSA4k libraries)
Yes
EC libraries v2.06.003 + v2.07.003
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
[S19], [S23], [S26],
[S27], [S29]
Key sizes corresponding to the
used elliptic curves
[S26]: P-{192, 224, 256, 384,
521}, K-{163, 233, 283, 409}, B-
{163, 233, 283, 409};
[S19]: P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320,
384, 512}t1, P{160, 192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512}r1
Generation:
No
Verification:
Yes
ECDH key
agreement
[S19], [S24], [S26],
[S28], [S29]
Key sizes corresponding to the
used elliptic curves
[S26]: P-{192, 224, 256, 384,
521}, K-{163, 233, 283, 409}, B-
{163, 233, 283, 409};
[S19]: P{160, 192, 224, 256, 320,
384, 512}t1, P{160, 192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512}r1
Yes
CIPURSETM
CIPURSE™ Key
Generation AES
[S35-1]
Sections 5.2 and
6.2
|k| = 128 bits Yes
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Purpose /
Service
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above 100
Bits
CIPURSE™
Session Key
Agreement AES
[S35-1], [S35-2]
Sections 5.2 and
6.2
AES |K0| = 128 bits Yes
CIPURSE™
Authentication AES
[S21], [S31], [S35-
1], [S35-2]
Section 5.3
AES |K0| = 128 bits Yes
CIPURSE™
Secure Messaging
for Integrity
[S21], [S31], [S35-
1], [S35-2]
Sections 5.3 and
6.3
MAC based on AES |K0| = 128 bits No
CIPURSE™
Secure Messaging
for Confidentiality
[S21], [S31], [S35-
1], [S35-2]
Section 6.3
AES |K0| = 128 bits Yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
In addition to, the following rating applies regarding RSA key generation:
Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementati
on
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Key
Generation
(ACL
v2.07.003)
RSA Key Generation in ACL
v2.07.003, utilizing the
preparative function
“CryptoGeneratePrime()” or the
function “CryptoRSAKeyGen()”
n/a 1976 - 4096 Yes
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
For the Cryptographic Functionalities
● CryptoGeneratePrimeMask() which might be used in conjunction with RSA Key
Generation in ACL v2.07.003,
● CryptoRSAKeyGen(), CryptoGeneratePrime() or CryptoGeneratePrimeMask() of ACL
v2.06.003
no statement on the respective cryptographic strength can be given.
The Flash Loader's cryptographic strength was also not assessed by BSI. However, the
evaluation according to the TOE's Evaluation Assurance Level did not reveal any
implementation weaknesses.
Please note, that this holds true also for those algorithms, where no cryptographic 100-Bit-
Level assessment was given. Consequently, the targeted Evaluation Assurance Level has
been achieved for those functionalities as well.
Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:
[S19] RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and
Curve Generation, IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document
authors, March 2010
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[S20] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Special Publication 800-
67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block
Cipher, Revised January 2012, Technology Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 2012-01, 800-67 Rev. 1
[S21] National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST), Technology
Administration, US Department of Commerce, NIST Special Publication SP
800-38A (for AES and DES), SP800-38A, 2001-12
[S22] PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, PKCS #1 v2.2,
2012-10-27
[S23] American National Standard for Financial Services ANSI X9.62-2005, Public
Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), American National Standards Institute, ANSI
X.9.62, 2005-11-16
[S24] ANSI X.9.63, 2011-12-21, American National Standard for Financial Services
X9.63-2011, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key
Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, American
National Standards Institute
[S26] FIPS Pub 186-4, 2013-07, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication, FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST)
[S27] ISO/IEC 14888-3 2006, published 2009-02-15, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006, TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 2, Published 2009-02-
15, Information technology — Security techniques — Digital signatures with
appendix — Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms
[S28] ISO/IEC 11770-3 2008, published 2009-09-15, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
ISO/IEC 11770-3:2008, TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 1, Published 2009-09-
15, Information technology — Security techniques —Key management — Part
3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques
[S29] IEEE 1363 2000-01-30 (approved), IEEE Standard Specification for Public key
Crytography, IEEE Standards Board. The standard covers specification for
public key cryptography including mathematical primitives for secret value
deviation, public key encryption and digital signatures and cryptographic
schemes based on those primitives.
[S30] ISO/IEC 18033 2005, ISO/IEC 18033-3: 2005, Information technology –
Security techniques - Encryption algorithms - Part 3: Block ciphers [18033]
[S31] FIPS 197 2001-11-26, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
197, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE / National Institute of Standards and Technology, November 26,
2001
[S32] ISO/IEC 9797-1 2011-03-01, ISO/IEC 9797-1: 2011, Information technology –
Security techniques - Message Authentication Codes (MACs) Part 1
Mechanisms using a block cipher
[S36] PCBC mode, 1996, Bruce SCHNEIER, Applied Cryptography, Second Edition,
John Wiley & Sons,1996
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[S37] SP800-38B 2005 with update 2016-10-03, National Institute of Standards and
Technology(NIST), Technology Administration, US Department of Commerce,
NIST Special Publication SP 800-38B (for CMAC Mode for Authentication)
[S35-1] CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol issued by the OSPT™ Alliance, v1.0,
2012-09-28
[S35-2] CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol issued by the OSPT™ Alliance with
Errata and Precision List, v1.1, 2014-09-19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation
(see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product
layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be
implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product
layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also
consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation"
[10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
In addition, all the instructions in the following user guidance documents shall be
considered when using the TOE (see also section 13 below, bibliography):
● see documents [11] – [20].
The fulfilment of security objectives for the environment from the Security Target, [6] and
[9] shall be ensured as well.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
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12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BOS Boot Operating System
BPU Bill per use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DRNG Deterministic random number generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FW Firmware
GBIC German Banking Industry Committee
HRNG Hybrid random number generator
HSL Hardware Support Library
HW Hardware
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NVM Non volatile memory
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
SCL Symmetric cryptographic library
SCP Symmetric cryptographic processor
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True random number generator
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
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Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Confidential Security Target for BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018, Version 1.5, 2018-07-
20, “Confidential Security Target IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h,
IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h,
7
See section 9.1 for details on used AIS
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IFX_CCI_000018h, IFX_CCI_000023h, IFX_CCI_000024h, design step G13”,
Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018, 3.03,
2018-09-27, “Evaluation Technical Report - Summary”, T-Systems International
GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Public Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018, Version 1.0, 2018-07-20, “Public
Security Target IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah,
IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h,
IFX_CCI_000023h, IFX_CCI_000024h, design step G13”, Infineon Technologies AG
(sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018,
Version 3.02, 2018-09-24, ETR for composite evaluation (EFC), T-Systems
International GmbH (confidential document)
[11] 16-Bit Security Controller - V02, Security Guidelines, Rev. 1.00-1856, Infineon
Technologies AG, 2018-06-15
[12] 16-bit Security Controller – V02 Hardware Reference Manual, Rev. 4.2, Infineon
Technologies AG, 2016-11-15
[13] 16-bit Security Controller – V02 Errata sheet, Rev. 4.0, Infineon Technologies AG,
2017-08-17
[14] “CL52 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox” with
included Errata Sheet of 10th
May 2017, Rev. 2.06.003, Infineon Technologies AG,
2016-12-12
and
“CL52 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox”, Rev.
2.07.003, Infineon Technologies AG, 2018-05-24
[15] Crypto@2304T V3 User manual, Rev. 1.4.1, Infineon Technologies AG, 2014-11-10
[16] 16-bit Security Controller 65-nm Technology, Programmer's Reference Manual, Rev.
9.7, Infineon Technologies AG, 2017-09-14
[17] Production and Personalization, 16-bit Security Controller in 65 nm, Rev. 3.3,
Infineon Technologies AG, 2018-03-23
[18] Hardware Support Library (HSL), chm-file, Rev. 01.22.4346 (as of 2016), Infineon
Technologies AG
and
Hardware Support Library (HSL), chm-file, Rev. 02.01.6634 (as of 2017), Infineon
Technologies AG
and
Hardware Support Library (HSL), chm-file, Rev. 03.11.8339 (as of 2018-07-12),
Infineon Technologies AG
[19] “CIPURSE™ Crypto Library, CCL52_SCP_v4 v2.0.0002, CIPURSE™ V2,
Compliant to OSPT™ Alliance CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol, User
Interface”, Version 1.4, Infineon Technologies AG, 2017-06-16
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and
“CIPURSE™ Crypto Library, CCL52_SCP_v4 v2.0.0004, CIPURSE™ V2,
Compliant to OSPT™ Alliance CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol, User
Interface”, Version 1.6, Infineon Technologies AG, 2018-02-02
[20] “SCL52 Symmetric Cryptogaphic Library for DES / AES, 16-bit Security Controller,
User Interface”, Version 2.02.010, 2016-12-09, Infineon Technologies AG
and
“SCL52 Symmetric Cryptogaphic Library for DES / AES, 16-bit Security Controller,
User Interface”, Version 2.04.002, 2018-01-15, Infineon Technologies AG
[21] “Crypto-Table_IFX_CCI_7h_Step2.5-1”, Version 0.4, Infineon Technologies AG
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-V3-2018
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon smart card IC (Security Controller) IFX_CCI_000007h,
IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h,
IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, IFX_CCI_000023h, IFX_CCI_000024h design
step G13 with optional libraries CIPURSE™ CL, RSA2048/4096, EC, Toolbox, HSL, SCL
and with specific IC dedicated software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at
an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 26 September 2018, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3) are fulfilled for the
development and production sites of the TOE.
Besides the production and development sites, the relevant TOE distribution centers are
as follows:
Distribution Center name Address
DHL Singapore Excel Singapore PTE Ltd.
DHL Exel Supply Chain
Greenwich Drive 1, Singapore
489949, Singapore
G&D Neustadt Giesecke & Devrient Secure Data management
GmbH
Austraße 101b
96465 Neustadt b. Coburg
K&N Großostheim Infineon Technology AG
Distribution Center Europe (DCE)
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Table 5: TOE Distribution Centers
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
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and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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