BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 (*)
Netzwerk- und Kommunikationsprodukte
secunet SBC Container
Version 4.2.10-16
from secunet
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and
AVA_VAN.5.
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 19 May 2022
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product secunet SBC Container, Version 4.2.10-16 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-2020.
The evaluation of the product secunet SBC Container, Version 4.2.10-16 was conducted
by SRC. The evaluation was completed on 6 May 2022. SRC is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: secunet.
The product was developed by: Frafos GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 19 May 2022
is valid until 18 May 2027. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product secunet SBC Container, Version 4.2.10-16 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
secunet Security Networks AG
Kurfürstenstraße 58
45138 Essen
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
Target of evaluation (TOE) is the product secunet SBC Container, Version 4.2.10-16
provided by Frafos GmbH.
TOE Type: Session Border Controller
The secunet SBC Container is a Session Border Controller Container, a Linux systemd-
nspawn container which can be deployed on a Linux operating system. The main purpose
of the secunet SBC Container is a secure bridging between an SIP caller and the SIP
callee. Concretely, the SBC supports a safeguarded initiation of SIP sessions (also called
signalling) and bridging of media communication streams such as RTP or SRTP. A Session
Border Controller (SBC) is a device which is deployed in Voice-over-IP (VoIP) networks to
manage the signalling and media streams of audio and video communication. The used
hardware is under full control of the operating system. However, the connected networks
have to be separated physically, especially the management network, to allow the secunet
SBC container to perform the intended operation in a secure manner.
The TOE is integrated in a Linux operating system platform, where the Back-to-Back User
Agent module (abbreviated B2BUA with the functionality being referred to as Packet
Filtering) is placed.
The secunet SBC Container is a software TOE which must be deployed on a hardened
Linux operating system platform, i.e. the secunet Wall of at least version 6.1.0 or a
hardened centOS of at least version 7.9. These operating system platforms protect the
integrity of the TOE.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5. .
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.PacketFiltering, Packet Filtering The TOE performs an inspection and filtering on several levels:
SIP method filtering: the TOE performs filtering based on the
SIP method, e.g.: “INVITE”, “SUBSCRIBE”, “REGISTER”, to
allow e.g. only to register devices from the inside network. The
TOE can also set a limit of invite messages per time interval
from outside to protect the components in the inner network
from Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Another filtering method
is the manipulation of the SIP header field. This serves two
purposes: The packet headers from the inside network to the
outside network is stripped from information which potentially
could allow the attacker to determine the components used in
the inside network, e.g. the user-agent field. Also, the header
fields of packets from the external network to the internal
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
network are stripped in order to prevent exploitation of the
internal components with e.g. malformed SIP or media packets.
At the body of the message the content type is filtered to e.g.
“application-sdp”, to allow only the correct content. Also, the
media type can be set to e.g. audio, video or ap-plication.
Finally, the codec can be filtered to allow only specific codecs,
e.g. G.711 or Opus.
To hide the topology of the internal network the TOE
implements a strict Back-to-Back user agent to establish two
completely separated calls originating from the SBC. Thus, at
the external network no internal dialogue IDs (Call-ID header
field, ’tag’ attribute in From and To header fields) and IP
addresses are visible. The filtering of dialogue IDs is always
active “by design”, the filtering is always active. The filtering of
internal IP addresses can be configured by the TOE
administrator.
Media streams such as (S)RTP shall only be allowed if a
session was initiated before using SIP. Malformed SIP and
media stream packets shall always be refused or dropped.
SF.Management, Management of
Security Functions
The initial deployment as well as updates of the TOE are
performed by changing the whole container using appropriate
tools. This is out of the TOE scope and part of the TOE
environment.
The TOE can be configured by using the JSON configuration
files which is deployed directly on the SBC by using the SSH
interface.
The TOE only maintains the role TOE Administrator. This role
however is assigned to every user who is in the Linux group
“sudoers” which allows the user to update TOE configuration.
The TOE allows the user with the role TOE Administrator to
define complex filtering and protocol management rules. This
includes:
● create, modify, and delete the signalling (SIP) and media
stream endpoints on the SBC,
● create, modify, and delete the routing of SIP calls, SIP
registrations and other SIP messages between the realms
and elements in the network,
● create, modify, and delete the rules for filtering and
manipulation options of SIP calls, SIP registrations and other
SIP messages,
● create, modify, and delete the rules for filtering and
manipulation options of media stream packets and
● manage all SIP Information Flow SFP security attributes.
SF.Authentication, Authentication of
Administrators
Users can log in at the management interface with username
and password. The Authentication is performed either locally or
by using an external LDAP server, depending on the TOE
configuration. If Authentication is performed locally the
password needs a minimum size of 8 characters. After three
wrong authentication attempts the user account is disabled for
a configurable time period to prevent brute force attacks
against the management interface.
When external authentication is used the authentication of the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
user is performed by the LDAP server. Then after a successful
authentication at the LDAP server the TOE as-signs the access
conditions of this user based on the roles assigned to the user
in on the LDAP server.
SF.Logging, Security Logging The TOE provides several interfaces for logging and analyzing
of the VoIP network.
A syslog daemon is running on the TOE which writes log files to
a configured remote syslog server located in the management
network. Additionally, the TOE sends event messages to a
database in the management network, which can then be
reviewed by the ABC Monitor.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
secunet SBC Container, Version 4.2.10-16
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release SHA-256 hash sum
1 SW secunet SBC
container
version 4.2.10-16
Labeling “secunet-sbc-
container-4-2-10-16.tgz“
430b3772ab272eab40dbdee530
b51e6271aa1db1b1e01a7b38a8
fba688e977d8
detached
signature
file
secunet SBC
container signature
Labeling “secunet-sbc-
container-4-2-10-16.tgz.sig”
-
2 DOC Secunet SBC
Container Handbook
4.2 documentation
SBC – AGD v2.2.pdf
Version 2.2
63f013ad5a7d043b135c6e70bff
6d4af25b52d8ed5cc9ee056b0e
e137c75dd22
detached
signature
file
secunet SBC
container signature
Labeling “SBC – AGD
v2.2.pdf.sig”
-
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Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered via secure communication channel (SFTP server) as described in
[7], section 2.
The files for secunet SBC Container and Handbook are enclosed in an openPGP block
that is signed with the Frafos private release key. This signature can be verified with the
public key that is exchanged via a secure communication channel.
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-256 checksums listed above.
The TOE consists of the secunet SBC Container, the detached signature file and the
guidance document as well as the guidance detached signature file. The secunet SBC is
delivered as a digitally signed container to assure the integrity and authenticity of its
components. It is not required to ensure the confidentiality of the secunet SBC Container,
therefore a digital signature complies with the requirements and no further mechanisms is
in place.
Delivery Preconditions:
● Before the delivery itself is performed, the customer and Frafos need to establish a
secure connection channel. For this task, the Frafos project manager and the customer
exchange their PGP keys and verify the fingerprint in person or by phone. The keys are
stored securely.
● After this the customer creates an account on the Frafos “NextCloud” server and sends
his account name to the Frafos project manager. The account is then assigned
permission to access a specific shared directory, which will contain the released files.
● The public Frafos Release Key (pgp-key) is sent to the customer via a PGP-encrypted
email.
The Container build process is controlled by a SINA workstation connected via the build
network to the build server. After a container is built by the developer, it is signed by the
project manager on the build server. Afterwards it is stored on a USB stick connected to
the SINA workstation together with the digital signature. Both, container and signature then
are transferred from the USB stick to a regular workstation and uploaded to the
“NextCloud” delivery server. The customer is informed about the upload via the secure
PGP-channel, so that the released files can be downloaded by the customer. These steps
are executed by the project manager.
The integrity can be checked by a checksum of the delivered item. The authenticity is
ensured by the signed hash values and the public verification key in the above mentioned
files. Therefore, after delivery, the detached digital signature of the container has to be
verified. The person responsible for verifying the delivery shall test the signature with the
help of the trusted public verification key and a reliable tool. If the verification fails, the
container must not be used at all and a new delivery process has to be triggered.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced by the TOE is defined by the selected set of Security
Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE functionality. The TOE implements
logical security functionality in order to perform data inspection and protect user data by
filtering SIP headers and media stream containers. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and
confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories by the correct operation of the
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Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered via secure communication channel (SFTP server) as described in
[7], section 2.
The files for secunet SBC Container and Handbook are enclosed in an openPGP block
that is signed with the Frafos private release key. This signature can be verified with the
public key that is exchanged via a secure communication channel.
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-256 checksums listed above.
The TOE consists of the secunet SBC Container, the detached signature file and the
guidance document as well as the guidance detached signature file. The secunet SBC is
delivered as a digitally signed container to assure the integrity and authenticity of its
components. It is not required to ensure the confidentiality of the secunet SBC Container,
therefore a digital signature complies with the requirements and no further mechanisms is
in place.
Delivery Preconditions:
● Before the delivery itself is performed, the customer and Frafos need to establish a
secure connection channel. For this task, the Frafos project manager and the customer
exchange their PGP keys and verify the fingerprint in person or by phone. The keys are
stored securely.
● After this the customer creates an account on the Frafos “NextCloud” server and sends
his account name to the Frafos project manager. The account is then assigned
permission to access a specific shared directory, which will contain the released files.
● The public Frafos Release Key (pgp-key) is sent to the customer via a PGP-encrypted
email.
The Container build process is controlled by a SINA workstation connected via the build
network to the build server. After a container is built by the developer, it is signed by the
project manager on the build server. Afterwards it is stored on a USB stick connected to
the SINA workstation together with the digital signature. Both, container and signature then
are transferred from the USB stick to a regular workstation and uploaded to the
“NextCloud” delivery server. The customer is informed about the upload via the secure
PGP-channel, so that the released files can be downloaded by the customer. These steps
are executed by the project manager.
The integrity can be checked by a checksum of the delivered item. The authenticity is
ensured by the signed hash values and the public verification key in the above mentioned
files. Therefore, after delivery, the detached digital signature of the container has to be
verified. The person responsible for verifying the delivery shall test the signature with the
help of the trusted public verification key and a reliable tool. If the verification fails, the
container must not be used at all and a new delivery process has to be triggered.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced by the TOE is defined by the selected set of Security
Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE functionality. The TOE implements
logical security functionality in order to perform data inspection and protect user data by
filtering SIP headers and media stream containers. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and
confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories by the correct operation of the
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Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered via secure communication channel (SFTP server) as described in
[7], section 2.
The files for secunet SBC Container and Handbook are enclosed in an openPGP block
that is signed with the Frafos private release key. This signature can be verified with the
public key that is exchanged via a secure communication channel.
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-256 checksums listed above.
The TOE consists of the secunet SBC Container, the detached signature file and the
guidance document as well as the guidance detached signature file. The secunet SBC is
delivered as a digitally signed container to assure the integrity and authenticity of its
components. It is not required to ensure the confidentiality of the secunet SBC Container,
therefore a digital signature complies with the requirements and no further mechanisms is
in place.
Delivery Preconditions:
● Before the delivery itself is performed, the customer and Frafos need to establish a
secure connection channel. For this task, the Frafos project manager and the customer
exchange their PGP keys and verify the fingerprint in person or by phone. The keys are
stored securely.
● After this the customer creates an account on the Frafos “NextCloud” server and sends
his account name to the Frafos project manager. The account is then assigned
permission to access a specific shared directory, which will contain the released files.
● The public Frafos Release Key (pgp-key) is sent to the customer via a PGP-encrypted
email.
The Container build process is controlled by a SINA workstation connected via the build
network to the build server. After a container is built by the developer, it is signed by the
project manager on the build server. Afterwards it is stored on a USB stick connected to
the SINA workstation together with the digital signature. Both, container and signature then
are transferred from the USB stick to a regular workstation and uploaded to the
“NextCloud” delivery server. The customer is informed about the upload via the secure
PGP-channel, so that the released files can be downloaded by the customer. These steps
are executed by the project manager.
The integrity can be checked by a checksum of the delivered item. The authenticity is
ensured by the signed hash values and the public verification key in the above mentioned
files. Therefore, after delivery, the detached digital signature of the container has to be
verified. The person responsible for verifying the delivery shall test the signature with the
help of the trusted public verification key and a reliable tool. If the verification fails, the
container must not be used at all and a new delivery process has to be triggered.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced by the TOE is defined by the selected set of Security
Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE functionality. The TOE implements
logical security functionality in order to perform data inspection and protect user data by
filtering SIP headers and media stream containers. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and
confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories by the correct operation of the
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security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOE’ s policy is to protect against
malfunction, leakage and manipulation. Besides, the TOE' s life cycle is supported as well
as the user Identification whereas the abuse of functionality is prevented. Specific details
concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in [6], chapter 3.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The topics in the
Security Target [6], chapter 4.2. are of relevance.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is executed as a systemd-spawn container on a hardened centOS operating
system platform, such as a secunet wall. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE. The integrity check of container is the first step of initialization. The
main purpose of the secunet SBC Container is the initiation of a secure SIP session (also
called signaling) and media communication streams such as RTP or SRTP. To protect the
internal network the TOE perform data inspection and filtering on several protocol levels.
The security functions of the TOE are:
• SF.PacketFiltering
• SF.Management
• SF.Authentication
• SF.Logging
According to the TOE design specification these security functions are enforced by the
following subsystems:
• Signaling and processing (SF.PacketFiltering)
• Configuration (SF.Management)
• User management and authentication (SF.Management, SF.Authentication)
• Logging (SF.Logging)
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined subsystem,
modules and interface. Thus all subsystems are covered by several test cases and each
SFR-enforcing module is covered by at least one test case.
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For the tests of the TOE the developer used the test environment with two virtual
machines. This test environment consists of an executable shell script that starts up the
virtual machines and initializes the complete test setup. The automated test cases are
developed in C++. The test configuration takes place using file “config.txt” and includes the
topology and IP addresses to be applied for the test scenario. A description of the test
cases and the single steps which are done in the test execution is given in “index.html”
and supplementary data in the “result tarball” as test reports.
Testing Results
The results of the developer tests are documented and prove the correct implementation.
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected test results.
7.1. Independent Testing
The independent testing approach contains repetition of the developer test. Additionally
the evaluators considered results from the RFC analysis. The TOE has five TSFI from
which three TSFI are thoroughly tested. The other, interface 2 (configuration interface) is
only accessible (OE.ManagementNetwork) from trusted personal (OE.Administrators) and
well covered by vendor tests. The SNMP interface is covered by two manual developer
tests, which are also repeated by the evaluators.
The TOE configuration is identical for operations on the centOS and on the secunet wall.
Only one configuration exists for the TOE, which was subject to the independent testing.
The interfaces have been selected by their exposition to third parties. The evaluators also
included interfaces where the interface could be offended by misconfiguration in the TOE
environment. The tests cover the TSFI. The other SBC interfaces have been implicitly
tested by administrating the TOE. Also these are only accessible to trusted personnel.
The evaluators decided to repeat all tests cases provided by the developer.
Testing Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.2. Vulnerability Analysis
For the penetration tests assessment of ‘Common Vulnerability Entries’, code review,
fuzzing and load tests were used. The evaluators retrieved the applied versions of reused
libraries and retrieved known vulnerabilities. During code review and fuzzing the
penetration testers identified interfaces at the attack surface and send patterns that could
trigger implementation flaws. During overload scenario applicability of TOE
reconfigurations and SFP enforcement have been checked. No vulnerabilities have been
identified during these activities.
The test environment for penetration tests consist of the TOE, two linux machines and an
asterisk private branch exchange. For the load tests a total of four linux machines (three
sources and one target) have been set up. For the independent tests at the evaluator’s
site one laptop running VMware and two virtual machines have been set up.
For penetration tests such as fuzzing relevant parts of the TOE have been compiled into
the fuzzer framework of llvm and gasoline. For other tests the SBC container that contains
the TOE has been used.
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Penetration Test Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’ s operational environment as defined in [6]. This shows that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
Testing and vulnerability assessment considered both the secunet wall and the centOS
platforms. Other configurations have not been defined by the vendor und thus were not
assessed. The results of the evaluation can only be applied on secunet SBC Container
Version 4.2.10-16. Without a preceding evaluation, the extension of the results to other
versions of the TOE is not possible.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE evaluated configuration is defined by the notation:
• secunet SBC Container
• The documents:
◦ Secunet SBC Container Handbook
◦ Security Target
To identify the TOE, the guidance document [9] is providing sufficient information about
identification mechanisms in chapters 7.4.1 and 7.4.7. Additionally, see also chapter 2 of
this report. The TOE is composed of the elements listed in the configuration list for the
TOE [8].
The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in
chapter 1.3.4 of the Security Target [6] and repeated in chapter 4 of the guidance [9]. The
secunet SBC Container as a software-only TOE needs a Linux operating system with the
systemd-nspawn container management technology installed. The hardware remains fully
controlled by the operating system. The connected networks have to be separated
physically. This requirement is especially valid for a management network that is
necessary needed for the management and the configuration of the TOE.
The secunet SBC Container is a software TOE which must be deployed on a hardened
Linux operating system platform, i.e. the secunet Wall of at least version 6.1.0 or a
hardened centOS of at least version 7.9. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
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As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5. augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-2020. The focus of this re-
evaluation was on general product improvements, an added SNMP interface, and updated
documentation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The assessment has a very strict configuration mandated by the security guidance.
Violation of guidance instructions to the administrators is prohibited. It enforces especially:
● deactivation of cluster config;
● no modification of daemon and service configurations;
● activation of topology hiding (for the inner SIP clients) by JSON configuration;
● no use of backreferences in regular expressions;
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● adequate configuration of an external firewall with respect to SNMP, DNS, redis;
● careful configuration of rate limiting via CAPS.
The TOE is (principally) unable to protect clients from SIP digest authentication relay
attacks. The TOE provides capabilities to limit call rates using CAPS, but finally this does
not protect SIP clients against DoS attacks.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAPS Call Attempts Per Second
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DNS Domain Name System
DOS Denial of Service
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
openPGP open Pretty Good Privacy
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PP Protection Profile
RTCP RealTime Control Protocol
RTP Real-Time Transport Protocol
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
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SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
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Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022, Version 1.1, 26.04.2022, Security
Target for secunet SBC Container, secunet AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) – Summary for BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022,
secunet SBC Container, Version 1.8, Date 25.04.2022, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, “Reference List”, Version 2.03, 26.04.2022, file name:
SBC_Ref-List-v2.03, Frafos GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Secunet SBC Container Handbook 4.2, Version 2.2, 26.04.2022
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
network are stripped in order to prevent exploitation of the
internal components with e.g. malformed SIP or media packets.
At the body of the message the content type is filtered to e.g.
“application-sdp”, to allow only the correct content. Also, the
media type can be set to e.g. audio, video or ap-plication.
Finally, the codec can be filtered to allow only specific codecs,
e.g. G.711 or Opus.
To hide the topology of the internal network the TOE
implements a strict Back-to-Back user agent to establish two
completely separated calls originating from the SBC. Thus, at
the external network no internal dialogue IDs (Call-ID header
field, ’tag’ attribute in From and To header fields) and IP
addresses are visible. The filtering of dialogue IDs is always
active “by design”, the filtering is always active. The filtering of
internal IP addresses can be configured by the TOE
administrator.
Media streams such as (S)RTP shall only be allowed if a
session was initiated before using SIP. Malformed SIP and
media stream packets shall always be refused or dropped.
SF.Management, Management of
Security Functions
The initial deployment as well as updates of the TOE are
performed by changing the whole container using appropriate
tools. This is out of the TOE scope and part of the TOE
environment.
The TOE can be configured by using the JSON configuration
files which is deployed directly on the SBC by using the SSH
interface.
The TOE only maintains the role TOE Administrator. This role
however is assigned to every user who is in the Linux group
“sudoers” which allows the user to update TOE configuration.
The TOE allows the user with the role TOE Administrator to
define complex filtering and protocol management rules. This
includes:
● create, modify, and delete the signalling (SIP) and media
stream endpoints on the SBC,
● create, modify, and delete the routing of SIP calls, SIP
registrations and other SIP messages between the realms
and elements in the network,
● create, modify, and delete the rules for filtering and
manipulation options of SIP calls, SIP registrations and other
SIP messages,
● create, modify, and delete the rules for filtering and
manipulation options of media stream packets and
● manage all SIP Information Flow SFP security attributes.
SF.Authentication, Authentication of
Administrators
Users can log in at the management interface with username
and password. The Authentication is performed either locally or
by using an external LDAP server, depending on the TOE
configuration. If Authentication is performed locally the
password needs a minimum size of 8 characters. After three
wrong authentication attempts the user account is disabled for
a configurable time period to prevent brute force attacks
against the management interface.
When external authentication is used the authentication of the
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
user is performed by the LDAP server. Then after a successful
authentication at the LDAP server the TOE as-signs the access
conditions of this user based on the roles assigned to the user
in on the LDAP server.
SF.Logging, Security Logging The TOE provides several interfaces for logging and analyzing
of the VoIP network.
A syslog daemon is running on the TOE which writes log files to
a configured remote syslog server located in the management
network. Additionally, the TOE sends event messages to a
database in the management network, which can then be
reviewed by the ABC Monitor.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
secunet SBC Container, Version 4.2.10-16
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release SHA-256 hash sum
1 SW secunet SBC
container
version 4.2.10-16
Labeling “secunet-sbc-
container-4-2-10-16.tgz“
430b3772ab272eab40dbdee530
b51e6271aa1db1b1e01a7b38a8
fba688e977d8
detached
signature
file
secunet SBC
container signature
Labeling “secunet-sbc-
container-4-2-10-16.tgz.sig”
-
2 DOC Secunet SBC
Container Handbook
4.2 documentation
SBC – AGD v2.2.pdf
Version 2.2
63f013ad5a7d043b135c6e70bff
6d4af25b52d8ed5cc9ee056b0e
e137c75dd22
detached
signature
file
secunet SBC
container signature
Labeling “SBC – AGD
v2.2.pdf.sig”
-
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Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered via secure communication channel (SFTP server) as described in
[7], section 2.
The files for secunet SBC Container and Handbook are enclosed in an openPGP block
that is signed with the Frafos private release key. This signature can be verified with the
public key that is exchanged via a secure communication channel.
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-256 checksums listed above.
The TOE consists of the secunet SBC Container, the detached signature file and the
guidance document as well as the guidance detached signature file. The secunet SBC is
delivered as a digitally signed container to assure the integrity and authenticity of its
components. It is not required to ensure the confidentiality of the secunet SBC Container,
therefore a digital signature complies with the requirements and no further mechanisms is
in place.
Delivery Preconditions:
● Before the delivery itself is performed, the customer and Frafos need to establish a
secure connection channel. For this task, the Frafos project manager and the customer
exchange their PGP keys and verify the fingerprint in person or by phone. The keys are
stored securely.
● After this the customer creates an account on the Frafos “NextCloud” server and sends
his account name to the Frafos project manager. The account is then assigned
permission to access a specific shared directory, which will contain the released files.
● The public Frafos Release Key (pgp-key) is sent to the customer via a PGP-encrypted
email.
The Container build process is controlled by a SINA workstation connected via the build
network to the build server. After a container is built by the developer, it is signed by the
project manager on the build server. Afterwards it is stored on a USB stick connected to
the SINA workstation together with the digital signature. Both, container and signature then
are transferred from the USB stick to a regular workstation and uploaded to the
“NextCloud” delivery server. The customer is informed about the upload via the secure
PGP-channel, so that the released files can be downloaded by the customer. These steps
are executed by the project manager.
The integrity can be checked by a checksum of the delivered item. The authenticity is
ensured by the signed hash values and the public verification key in the above mentioned
files. Therefore, after delivery, the detached digital signature of the container has to be
verified. The person responsible for verifying the delivery shall test the signature with the
help of the trusted public verification key and a reliable tool. If the verification fails, the
container must not be used at all and a new delivery process has to be triggered.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced by the TOE is defined by the selected set of Security
Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE functionality. The TOE implements
logical security functionality in order to perform data inspection and protect user data by
filtering SIP headers and media stream containers. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and
confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories by the correct operation of the
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Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered via secure communication channel (SFTP server) as described in
[7], section 2.
The files for secunet SBC Container and Handbook are enclosed in an openPGP block
that is signed with the Frafos private release key. This signature can be verified with the
public key that is exchanged via a secure communication channel.
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-256 checksums listed above.
The TOE consists of the secunet SBC Container, the detached signature file and the
guidance document as well as the guidance detached signature file. The secunet SBC is
delivered as a digitally signed container to assure the integrity and authenticity of its
components. It is not required to ensure the confidentiality of the secunet SBC Container,
therefore a digital signature complies with the requirements and no further mechanisms is
in place.
Delivery Preconditions:
● Before the delivery itself is performed, the customer and Frafos need to establish a
secure connection channel. For this task, the Frafos project manager and the customer
exchange their PGP keys and verify the fingerprint in person or by phone. The keys are
stored securely.
● After this the customer creates an account on the Frafos “NextCloud” server and sends
his account name to the Frafos project manager. The account is then assigned
permission to access a specific shared directory, which will contain the released files.
● The public Frafos Release Key (pgp-key) is sent to the customer via a PGP-encrypted
email.
The Container build process is controlled by a SINA workstation connected via the build
network to the build server. After a container is built by the developer, it is signed by the
project manager on the build server. Afterwards it is stored on a USB stick connected to
the SINA workstation together with the digital signature. Both, container and signature then
are transferred from the USB stick to a regular workstation and uploaded to the
“NextCloud” delivery server. The customer is informed about the upload via the secure
PGP-channel, so that the released files can be downloaded by the customer. These steps
are executed by the project manager.
The integrity can be checked by a checksum of the delivered item. The authenticity is
ensured by the signed hash values and the public verification key in the above mentioned
files. Therefore, after delivery, the detached digital signature of the container has to be
verified. The person responsible for verifying the delivery shall test the signature with the
help of the trusted public verification key and a reliable tool. If the verification fails, the
container must not be used at all and a new delivery process has to be triggered.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced by the TOE is defined by the selected set of Security
Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE functionality. The TOE implements
logical security functionality in order to perform data inspection and protect user data by
filtering SIP headers and media stream containers. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and
confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories by the correct operation of the
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Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered via secure communication channel (SFTP server) as described in
[7], section 2.
The files for secunet SBC Container and Handbook are enclosed in an openPGP block
that is signed with the Frafos private release key. This signature can be verified with the
public key that is exchanged via a secure communication channel.
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-256 checksums listed above.
The TOE consists of the secunet SBC Container, the detached signature file and the
guidance document as well as the guidance detached signature file. The secunet SBC is
delivered as a digitally signed container to assure the integrity and authenticity of its
components. It is not required to ensure the confidentiality of the secunet SBC Container,
therefore a digital signature complies with the requirements and no further mechanisms is
in place.
Delivery Preconditions:
● Before the delivery itself is performed, the customer and Frafos need to establish a
secure connection channel. For this task, the Frafos project manager and the customer
exchange their PGP keys and verify the fingerprint in person or by phone. The keys are
stored securely.
● After this the customer creates an account on the Frafos “NextCloud” server and sends
his account name to the Frafos project manager. The account is then assigned
permission to access a specific shared directory, which will contain the released files.
● The public Frafos Release Key (pgp-key) is sent to the customer via a PGP-encrypted
email.
The Container build process is controlled by a SINA workstation connected via the build
network to the build server. After a container is built by the developer, it is signed by the
project manager on the build server. Afterwards it is stored on a USB stick connected to
the SINA workstation together with the digital signature. Both, container and signature then
are transferred from the USB stick to a regular workstation and uploaded to the
“NextCloud” delivery server. The customer is informed about the upload via the secure
PGP-channel, so that the released files can be downloaded by the customer. These steps
are executed by the project manager.
The integrity can be checked by a checksum of the delivered item. The authenticity is
ensured by the signed hash values and the public verification key in the above mentioned
files. Therefore, after delivery, the detached digital signature of the container has to be
verified. The person responsible for verifying the delivery shall test the signature with the
help of the trusted public verification key and a reliable tool. If the verification fails, the
container must not be used at all and a new delivery process has to be triggered.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced by the TOE is defined by the selected set of Security
Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE functionality. The TOE implements
logical security functionality in order to perform data inspection and protect user data by
filtering SIP headers and media stream containers. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and
confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories by the correct operation of the
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security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOE’ s policy is to protect against
malfunction, leakage and manipulation. Besides, the TOE' s life cycle is supported as well
as the user Identification whereas the abuse of functionality is prevented. Specific details
concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in [6], chapter 3.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The topics in the
Security Target [6], chapter 4.2. are of relevance.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is executed as a systemd-spawn container on a hardened centOS operating
system platform, such as a secunet wall. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE. The integrity check of container is the first step of initialization. The
main purpose of the secunet SBC Container is the initiation of a secure SIP session (also
called signaling) and media communication streams such as RTP or SRTP. To protect the
internal network the TOE perform data inspection and filtering on several protocol levels.
The security functions of the TOE are:
• SF.PacketFiltering
• SF.Management
• SF.Authentication
• SF.Logging
According to the TOE design specification these security functions are enforced by the
following subsystems:
• Signaling and processing (SF.PacketFiltering)
• Configuration (SF.Management)
• User management and authentication (SF.Management, SF.Authentication)
• Logging (SF.Logging)
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined subsystem,
modules and interface. Thus all subsystems are covered by several test cases and each
SFR-enforcing module is covered by at least one test case.
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For the tests of the TOE the developer used the test environment with two virtual
machines. This test environment consists of an executable shell script that starts up the
virtual machines and initializes the complete test setup. The automated test cases are
developed in C++. The test configuration takes place using file “config.txt” and includes the
topology and IP addresses to be applied for the test scenario. A description of the test
cases and the single steps which are done in the test execution is given in “index.html”
and supplementary data in the “result tarball” as test reports.
Testing Results
The results of the developer tests are documented and prove the correct implementation.
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected test results.
7.1. Independent Testing
The independent testing approach contains repetition of the developer test. Additionally
the evaluators considered results from the RFC analysis. The TOE has five TSFI from
which three TSFI are thoroughly tested. The other, interface 2 (configuration interface) is
only accessible (OE.ManagementNetwork) from trusted personal (OE.Administrators) and
well covered by vendor tests. The SNMP interface is covered by two manual developer
tests, which are also repeated by the evaluators.
The TOE configuration is identical for operations on the centOS and on the secunet wall.
Only one configuration exists for the TOE, which was subject to the independent testing.
The interfaces have been selected by their exposition to third parties. The evaluators also
included interfaces where the interface could be offended by misconfiguration in the TOE
environment. The tests cover the TSFI. The other SBC interfaces have been implicitly
tested by administrating the TOE. Also these are only accessible to trusted personnel.
The evaluators decided to repeat all tests cases provided by the developer.
Testing Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.2. Vulnerability Analysis
For the penetration tests assessment of ‘Common Vulnerability Entries’, code review,
fuzzing and load tests were used. The evaluators retrieved the applied versions of reused
libraries and retrieved known vulnerabilities. During code review and fuzzing the
penetration testers identified interfaces at the attack surface and send patterns that could
trigger implementation flaws. During overload scenario applicability of TOE
reconfigurations and SFP enforcement have been checked. No vulnerabilities have been
identified during these activities.
The test environment for penetration tests consist of the TOE, two linux machines and an
asterisk private branch exchange. For the load tests a total of four linux machines (three
sources and one target) have been set up. For the independent tests at the evaluator’s
site one laptop running VMware and two virtual machines have been set up.
For penetration tests such as fuzzing relevant parts of the TOE have been compiled into
the fuzzer framework of llvm and gasoline. For other tests the SBC container that contains
the TOE has been used.
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Penetration Test Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’ s operational environment as defined in [6]. This shows that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
Testing and vulnerability assessment considered both the secunet wall and the centOS
platforms. Other configurations have not been defined by the vendor und thus were not
assessed. The results of the evaluation can only be applied on secunet SBC Container
Version 4.2.10-16. Without a preceding evaluation, the extension of the results to other
versions of the TOE is not possible.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE evaluated configuration is defined by the notation:
• secunet SBC Container
• The documents:
◦ Secunet SBC Container Handbook
◦ Security Target
To identify the TOE, the guidance document [9] is providing sufficient information about
identification mechanisms in chapters 7.4.1 and 7.4.7. Additionally, see also chapter 2 of
this report. The TOE is composed of the elements listed in the configuration list for the
TOE [8].
The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in
chapter 1.3.4 of the Security Target [6] and repeated in chapter 4 of the guidance [9]. The
secunet SBC Container as a software-only TOE needs a Linux operating system with the
systemd-nspawn container management technology installed. The hardware remains fully
controlled by the operating system. The connected networks have to be separated
physically. This requirement is especially valid for a management network that is
necessary needed for the management and the configuration of the TOE.
The secunet SBC Container is a software TOE which must be deployed on a hardened
Linux operating system platform, i.e. the secunet Wall of at least version 6.1.0 or a
hardened centOS of at least version 7.9. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
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As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5. augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-2020. The focus of this re-
evaluation was on general product improvements, an added SNMP interface, and updated
documentation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The assessment has a very strict configuration mandated by the security guidance.
Violation of guidance instructions to the administrators is prohibited. It enforces especially:
● deactivation of cluster config;
● no modification of daemon and service configurations;
● activation of topology hiding (for the inner SIP clients) by JSON configuration;
● no use of backreferences in regular expressions;
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● adequate configuration of an external firewall with respect to SNMP, DNS, redis;
● careful configuration of rate limiting via CAPS.
The TOE is (principally) unable to protect clients from SIP digest authentication relay
attacks. The TOE provides capabilities to limit call rates using CAPS, but finally this does
not protect SIP clients against DoS attacks.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAPS Call Attempts Per Second
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DNS Domain Name System
DOS Denial of Service
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
openPGP open Pretty Good Privacy
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PP Protection Profile
RTCP RealTime Control Protocol
RTP Real-Time Transport Protocol
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
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SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
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SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
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Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022, Version 1.1, 26.04.2022, Security
Target for secunet SBC Container, secunet AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) – Summary for BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022,
secunet SBC Container, Version 1.8, Date 25.04.2022, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, “Reference List”, Version 2.03, 26.04.2022, file name:
SBC_Ref-List-v2.03, Frafos GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Secunet SBC Container Handbook 4.2, Version 2.2, 26.04.2022
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered via secure communication channel (SFTP server) as described in
[7], section 2.
The files for secunet SBC Container and Handbook are enclosed in an openPGP block
that is signed with the Frafos private release key. This signature can be verified with the
public key that is exchanged via a secure communication channel.
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-256 checksums listed above.
The TOE consists of the secunet SBC Container, the detached signature file and the
guidance document as well as the guidance detached signature file. The secunet SBC is
delivered as a digitally signed container to assure the integrity and authenticity of its
components. It is not required to ensure the confidentiality of the secunet SBC Container,
therefore a digital signature complies with the requirements and no further mechanisms is
in place.
Delivery Preconditions:
● Before the delivery itself is performed, the customer and Frafos need to establish a
secure connection channel. For this task, the Frafos project manager and the customer
exchange their PGP keys and verify the fingerprint in person or by phone. The keys are
stored securely.
● After this the customer creates an account on the Frafos “NextCloud” server and sends
his account name to the Frafos project manager. The account is then assigned
permission to access a specific shared directory, which will contain the released files.
● The public Frafos Release Key (pgp-key) is sent to the customer via a PGP-encrypted
email.
The Container build process is controlled by a SINA workstation connected via the build
network to the build server. After a container is built by the developer, it is signed by the
project manager on the build server. Afterwards it is stored on a USB stick connected to
the SINA workstation together with the digital signature. Both, container and signature then
are transferred from the USB stick to a regular workstation and uploaded to the
“NextCloud” delivery server. The customer is informed about the upload via the secure
PGP-channel, so that the released files can be downloaded by the customer. These steps
are executed by the project manager.
The integrity can be checked by a checksum of the delivered item. The authenticity is
ensured by the signed hash values and the public verification key in the above mentioned
files. Therefore, after delivery, the detached digital signature of the container has to be
verified. The person responsible for verifying the delivery shall test the signature with the
help of the trusted public verification key and a reliable tool. If the verification fails, the
container must not be used at all and a new delivery process has to be triggered.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced by the TOE is defined by the selected set of Security
Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE functionality. The TOE implements
logical security functionality in order to perform data inspection and protect user data by
filtering SIP headers and media stream containers. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and
confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories by the correct operation of the
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Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered via secure communication channel (SFTP server) as described in
[7], section 2.
The files for secunet SBC Container and Handbook are enclosed in an openPGP block
that is signed with the Frafos private release key. This signature can be verified with the
public key that is exchanged via a secure communication channel.
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-256 checksums listed above.
The TOE consists of the secunet SBC Container, the detached signature file and the
guidance document as well as the guidance detached signature file. The secunet SBC is
delivered as a digitally signed container to assure the integrity and authenticity of its
components. It is not required to ensure the confidentiality of the secunet SBC Container,
therefore a digital signature complies with the requirements and no further mechanisms is
in place.
Delivery Preconditions:
● Before the delivery itself is performed, the customer and Frafos need to establish a
secure connection channel. For this task, the Frafos project manager and the customer
exchange their PGP keys and verify the fingerprint in person or by phone. The keys are
stored securely.
● After this the customer creates an account on the Frafos “NextCloud” server and sends
his account name to the Frafos project manager. The account is then assigned
permission to access a specific shared directory, which will contain the released files.
● The public Frafos Release Key (pgp-key) is sent to the customer via a PGP-encrypted
email.
The Container build process is controlled by a SINA workstation connected via the build
network to the build server. After a container is built by the developer, it is signed by the
project manager on the build server. Afterwards it is stored on a USB stick connected to
the SINA workstation together with the digital signature. Both, container and signature then
are transferred from the USB stick to a regular workstation and uploaded to the
“NextCloud” delivery server. The customer is informed about the upload via the secure
PGP-channel, so that the released files can be downloaded by the customer. These steps
are executed by the project manager.
The integrity can be checked by a checksum of the delivered item. The authenticity is
ensured by the signed hash values and the public verification key in the above mentioned
files. Therefore, after delivery, the detached digital signature of the container has to be
verified. The person responsible for verifying the delivery shall test the signature with the
help of the trusted public verification key and a reliable tool. If the verification fails, the
container must not be used at all and a new delivery process has to be triggered.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced by the TOE is defined by the selected set of Security
Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE functionality. The TOE implements
logical security functionality in order to perform data inspection and protect user data by
filtering SIP headers and media stream containers. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and
confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories by the correct operation of the
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Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered via secure communication channel (SFTP server) as described in
[7], section 2.
The files for secunet SBC Container and Handbook are enclosed in an openPGP block
that is signed with the Frafos private release key. This signature can be verified with the
public key that is exchanged via a secure communication channel.
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-256 checksums listed above.
The TOE consists of the secunet SBC Container, the detached signature file and the
guidance document as well as the guidance detached signature file. The secunet SBC is
delivered as a digitally signed container to assure the integrity and authenticity of its
components. It is not required to ensure the confidentiality of the secunet SBC Container,
therefore a digital signature complies with the requirements and no further mechanisms is
in place.
Delivery Preconditions:
● Before the delivery itself is performed, the customer and Frafos need to establish a
secure connection channel. For this task, the Frafos project manager and the customer
exchange their PGP keys and verify the fingerprint in person or by phone. The keys are
stored securely.
● After this the customer creates an account on the Frafos “NextCloud” server and sends
his account name to the Frafos project manager. The account is then assigned
permission to access a specific shared directory, which will contain the released files.
● The public Frafos Release Key (pgp-key) is sent to the customer via a PGP-encrypted
email.
The Container build process is controlled by a SINA workstation connected via the build
network to the build server. After a container is built by the developer, it is signed by the
project manager on the build server. Afterwards it is stored on a USB stick connected to
the SINA workstation together with the digital signature. Both, container and signature then
are transferred from the USB stick to a regular workstation and uploaded to the
“NextCloud” delivery server. The customer is informed about the upload via the secure
PGP-channel, so that the released files can be downloaded by the customer. These steps
are executed by the project manager.
The integrity can be checked by a checksum of the delivered item. The authenticity is
ensured by the signed hash values and the public verification key in the above mentioned
files. Therefore, after delivery, the detached digital signature of the container has to be
verified. The person responsible for verifying the delivery shall test the signature with the
help of the trusted public verification key and a reliable tool. If the verification fails, the
container must not be used at all and a new delivery process has to be triggered.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced by the TOE is defined by the selected set of Security
Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE functionality. The TOE implements
logical security functionality in order to perform data inspection and protect user data by
filtering SIP headers and media stream containers. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and
confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories by the correct operation of the
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security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOE’ s policy is to protect against
malfunction, leakage and manipulation. Besides, the TOE' s life cycle is supported as well
as the user Identification whereas the abuse of functionality is prevented. Specific details
concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in [6], chapter 3.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The topics in the
Security Target [6], chapter 4.2. are of relevance.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is executed as a systemd-spawn container on a hardened centOS operating
system platform, such as a secunet wall. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE. The integrity check of container is the first step of initialization. The
main purpose of the secunet SBC Container is the initiation of a secure SIP session (also
called signaling) and media communication streams such as RTP or SRTP. To protect the
internal network the TOE perform data inspection and filtering on several protocol levels.
The security functions of the TOE are:
• SF.PacketFiltering
• SF.Management
• SF.Authentication
• SF.Logging
According to the TOE design specification these security functions are enforced by the
following subsystems:
• Signaling and processing (SF.PacketFiltering)
• Configuration (SF.Management)
• User management and authentication (SF.Management, SF.Authentication)
• Logging (SF.Logging)
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined subsystem,
modules and interface. Thus all subsystems are covered by several test cases and each
SFR-enforcing module is covered by at least one test case.
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For the tests of the TOE the developer used the test environment with two virtual
machines. This test environment consists of an executable shell script that starts up the
virtual machines and initializes the complete test setup. The automated test cases are
developed in C++. The test configuration takes place using file “config.txt” and includes the
topology and IP addresses to be applied for the test scenario. A description of the test
cases and the single steps which are done in the test execution is given in “index.html”
and supplementary data in the “result tarball” as test reports.
Testing Results
The results of the developer tests are documented and prove the correct implementation.
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected test results.
7.1. Independent Testing
The independent testing approach contains repetition of the developer test. Additionally
the evaluators considered results from the RFC analysis. The TOE has five TSFI from
which three TSFI are thoroughly tested. The other, interface 2 (configuration interface) is
only accessible (OE.ManagementNetwork) from trusted personal (OE.Administrators) and
well covered by vendor tests. The SNMP interface is covered by two manual developer
tests, which are also repeated by the evaluators.
The TOE configuration is identical for operations on the centOS and on the secunet wall.
Only one configuration exists for the TOE, which was subject to the independent testing.
The interfaces have been selected by their exposition to third parties. The evaluators also
included interfaces where the interface could be offended by misconfiguration in the TOE
environment. The tests cover the TSFI. The other SBC interfaces have been implicitly
tested by administrating the TOE. Also these are only accessible to trusted personnel.
The evaluators decided to repeat all tests cases provided by the developer.
Testing Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.2. Vulnerability Analysis
For the penetration tests assessment of ‘Common Vulnerability Entries’, code review,
fuzzing and load tests were used. The evaluators retrieved the applied versions of reused
libraries and retrieved known vulnerabilities. During code review and fuzzing the
penetration testers identified interfaces at the attack surface and send patterns that could
trigger implementation flaws. During overload scenario applicability of TOE
reconfigurations and SFP enforcement have been checked. No vulnerabilities have been
identified during these activities.
The test environment for penetration tests consist of the TOE, two linux machines and an
asterisk private branch exchange. For the load tests a total of four linux machines (three
sources and one target) have been set up. For the independent tests at the evaluator’s
site one laptop running VMware and two virtual machines have been set up.
For penetration tests such as fuzzing relevant parts of the TOE have been compiled into
the fuzzer framework of llvm and gasoline. For other tests the SBC container that contains
the TOE has been used.
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Penetration Test Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’ s operational environment as defined in [6]. This shows that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
Testing and vulnerability assessment considered both the secunet wall and the centOS
platforms. Other configurations have not been defined by the vendor und thus were not
assessed. The results of the evaluation can only be applied on secunet SBC Container
Version 4.2.10-16. Without a preceding evaluation, the extension of the results to other
versions of the TOE is not possible.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE evaluated configuration is defined by the notation:
• secunet SBC Container
• The documents:
◦ Secunet SBC Container Handbook
◦ Security Target
To identify the TOE, the guidance document [9] is providing sufficient information about
identification mechanisms in chapters 7.4.1 and 7.4.7. Additionally, see also chapter 2 of
this report. The TOE is composed of the elements listed in the configuration list for the
TOE [8].
The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in
chapter 1.3.4 of the Security Target [6] and repeated in chapter 4 of the guidance [9]. The
secunet SBC Container as a software-only TOE needs a Linux operating system with the
systemd-nspawn container management technology installed. The hardware remains fully
controlled by the operating system. The connected networks have to be separated
physically. This requirement is especially valid for a management network that is
necessary needed for the management and the configuration of the TOE.
The secunet SBC Container is a software TOE which must be deployed on a hardened
Linux operating system platform, i.e. the secunet Wall of at least version 6.1.0 or a
hardened centOS of at least version 7.9. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
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As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5. augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-2020. The focus of this re-
evaluation was on general product improvements, an added SNMP interface, and updated
documentation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The assessment has a very strict configuration mandated by the security guidance.
Violation of guidance instructions to the administrators is prohibited. It enforces especially:
● deactivation of cluster config;
● no modification of daemon and service configurations;
● activation of topology hiding (for the inner SIP clients) by JSON configuration;
● no use of backreferences in regular expressions;
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
● adequate configuration of an external firewall with respect to SNMP, DNS, redis;
● careful configuration of rate limiting via CAPS.
The TOE is (principally) unable to protect clients from SIP digest authentication relay
attacks. The TOE provides capabilities to limit call rates using CAPS, but finally this does
not protect SIP clients against DoS attacks.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAPS Call Attempts Per Second
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DNS Domain Name System
DOS Denial of Service
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
openPGP open Pretty Good Privacy
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PP Protection Profile
RTCP RealTime Control Protocol
RTP Real-Time Transport Protocol
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
20 / 23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022, Version 1.1, 26.04.2022, Security
Target for secunet SBC Container, secunet AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) – Summary for BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022,
secunet SBC Container, Version 1.8, Date 25.04.2022, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, “Reference List”, Version 2.03, 26.04.2022, file name:
SBC_Ref-List-v2.03, Frafos GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Secunet SBC Container Handbook 4.2, Version 2.2, 26.04.2022
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered via secure communication channel (SFTP server) as described in
[7], section 2.
The files for secunet SBC Container and Handbook are enclosed in an openPGP block
that is signed with the Frafos private release key. This signature can be verified with the
public key that is exchanged via a secure communication channel.
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-256 checksums listed above.
The TOE consists of the secunet SBC Container, the detached signature file and the
guidance document as well as the guidance detached signature file. The secunet SBC is
delivered as a digitally signed container to assure the integrity and authenticity of its
components. It is not required to ensure the confidentiality of the secunet SBC Container,
therefore a digital signature complies with the requirements and no further mechanisms is
in place.
Delivery Preconditions:
● Before the delivery itself is performed, the customer and Frafos need to establish a
secure connection channel. For this task, the Frafos project manager and the customer
exchange their PGP keys and verify the fingerprint in person or by phone. The keys are
stored securely.
● After this the customer creates an account on the Frafos “NextCloud” server and sends
his account name to the Frafos project manager. The account is then assigned
permission to access a specific shared directory, which will contain the released files.
● The public Frafos Release Key (pgp-key) is sent to the customer via a PGP-encrypted
email.
The Container build process is controlled by a SINA workstation connected via the build
network to the build server. After a container is built by the developer, it is signed by the
project manager on the build server. Afterwards it is stored on a USB stick connected to
the SINA workstation together with the digital signature. Both, container and signature then
are transferred from the USB stick to a regular workstation and uploaded to the
“NextCloud” delivery server. The customer is informed about the upload via the secure
PGP-channel, so that the released files can be downloaded by the customer. These steps
are executed by the project manager.
The integrity can be checked by a checksum of the delivered item. The authenticity is
ensured by the signed hash values and the public verification key in the above mentioned
files. Therefore, after delivery, the detached digital signature of the container has to be
verified. The person responsible for verifying the delivery shall test the signature with the
help of the trusted public verification key and a reliable tool. If the verification fails, the
container must not be used at all and a new delivery process has to be triggered.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced by the TOE is defined by the selected set of Security
Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE functionality. The TOE implements
logical security functionality in order to perform data inspection and protect user data by
filtering SIP headers and media stream containers. Hence the TOE maintains integrity and
confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories by the correct operation of the
14 / 23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOE’ s policy is to protect against
malfunction, leakage and manipulation. Besides, the TOE' s life cycle is supported as well
as the user Identification whereas the abuse of functionality is prevented. Specific details
concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in [6], chapter 3.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The topics in the
Security Target [6], chapter 4.2. are of relevance.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is executed as a systemd-spawn container on a hardened centOS operating
system platform, such as a secunet wall. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE. The integrity check of container is the first step of initialization. The
main purpose of the secunet SBC Container is the initiation of a secure SIP session (also
called signaling) and media communication streams such as RTP or SRTP. To protect the
internal network the TOE perform data inspection and filtering on several protocol levels.
The security functions of the TOE are:
• SF.PacketFiltering
• SF.Management
• SF.Authentication
• SF.Logging
According to the TOE design specification these security functions are enforced by the
following subsystems:
• Signaling and processing (SF.PacketFiltering)
• Configuration (SF.Management)
• User management and authentication (SF.Management, SF.Authentication)
• Logging (SF.Logging)
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined subsystem,
modules and interface. Thus all subsystems are covered by several test cases and each
SFR-enforcing module is covered by at least one test case.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
For the tests of the TOE the developer used the test environment with two virtual
machines. This test environment consists of an executable shell script that starts up the
virtual machines and initializes the complete test setup. The automated test cases are
developed in C++. The test configuration takes place using file “config.txt” and includes the
topology and IP addresses to be applied for the test scenario. A description of the test
cases and the single steps which are done in the test execution is given in “index.html”
and supplementary data in the “result tarball” as test reports.
Testing Results
The results of the developer tests are documented and prove the correct implementation.
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected test results.
7.1. Independent Testing
The independent testing approach contains repetition of the developer test. Additionally
the evaluators considered results from the RFC analysis. The TOE has five TSFI from
which three TSFI are thoroughly tested. The other, interface 2 (configuration interface) is
only accessible (OE.ManagementNetwork) from trusted personal (OE.Administrators) and
well covered by vendor tests. The SNMP interface is covered by two manual developer
tests, which are also repeated by the evaluators.
The TOE configuration is identical for operations on the centOS and on the secunet wall.
Only one configuration exists for the TOE, which was subject to the independent testing.
The interfaces have been selected by their exposition to third parties. The evaluators also
included interfaces where the interface could be offended by misconfiguration in the TOE
environment. The tests cover the TSFI. The other SBC interfaces have been implicitly
tested by administrating the TOE. Also these are only accessible to trusted personnel.
The evaluators decided to repeat all tests cases provided by the developer.
Testing Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.2. Vulnerability Analysis
For the penetration tests assessment of ‘Common Vulnerability Entries’, code review,
fuzzing and load tests were used. The evaluators retrieved the applied versions of reused
libraries and retrieved known vulnerabilities. During code review and fuzzing the
penetration testers identified interfaces at the attack surface and send patterns that could
trigger implementation flaws. During overload scenario applicability of TOE
reconfigurations and SFP enforcement have been checked. No vulnerabilities have been
identified during these activities.
The test environment for penetration tests consist of the TOE, two linux machines and an
asterisk private branch exchange. For the load tests a total of four linux machines (three
sources and one target) have been set up. For the independent tests at the evaluator’s
site one laptop running VMware and two virtual machines have been set up.
For penetration tests such as fuzzing relevant parts of the TOE have been compiled into
the fuzzer framework of llvm and gasoline. For other tests the SBC container that contains
the TOE has been used.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
Penetration Test Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’ s operational environment as defined in [6]. This shows that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
Testing and vulnerability assessment considered both the secunet wall and the centOS
platforms. Other configurations have not been defined by the vendor und thus were not
assessed. The results of the evaluation can only be applied on secunet SBC Container
Version 4.2.10-16. Without a preceding evaluation, the extension of the results to other
versions of the TOE is not possible.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE evaluated configuration is defined by the notation:
• secunet SBC Container
• The documents:
◦ Secunet SBC Container Handbook
◦ Security Target
To identify the TOE, the guidance document [9] is providing sufficient information about
identification mechanisms in chapters 7.4.1 and 7.4.7. Additionally, see also chapter 2 of
this report. The TOE is composed of the elements listed in the configuration list for the
TOE [8].
The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in
chapter 1.3.4 of the Security Target [6] and repeated in chapter 4 of the guidance [9]. The
secunet SBC Container as a software-only TOE needs a Linux operating system with the
systemd-nspawn container management technology installed. The hardware remains fully
controlled by the operating system. The connected networks have to be separated
physically. This requirement is especially valid for a management network that is
necessary needed for the management and the configuration of the TOE.
The secunet SBC Container is a software TOE which must be deployed on a hardened
Linux operating system platform, i.e. the secunet Wall of at least version 6.1.0 or a
hardened centOS of at least version 7.9. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5. augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-2020. The focus of this re-
evaluation was on general product improvements, an added SNMP interface, and updated
documentation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The assessment has a very strict configuration mandated by the security guidance.
Violation of guidance instructions to the administrators is prohibited. It enforces especially:
● deactivation of cluster config;
● no modification of daemon and service configurations;
● activation of topology hiding (for the inner SIP clients) by JSON configuration;
● no use of backreferences in regular expressions;
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
● adequate configuration of an external firewall with respect to SNMP, DNS, redis;
● careful configuration of rate limiting via CAPS.
The TOE is (principally) unable to protect clients from SIP digest authentication relay
attacks. The TOE provides capabilities to limit call rates using CAPS, but finally this does
not protect SIP clients against DoS attacks.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAPS Call Attempts Per Second
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DNS Domain Name System
DOS Denial of Service
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
openPGP open Pretty Good Privacy
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PP Protection Profile
RTCP RealTime Control Protocol
RTP Real-Time Transport Protocol
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
20 / 23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
20 / 23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022, Version 1.1, 26.04.2022, Security
Target for secunet SBC Container, secunet AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) – Summary for BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022,
secunet SBC Container, Version 1.8, Date 25.04.2022, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, “Reference List”, Version 2.03, 26.04.2022, file name:
SBC_Ref-List-v2.03, Frafos GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Secunet SBC Container Handbook 4.2, Version 2.2, 26.04.2022
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
21 / 23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
security functionality provided by the TOE. Therefore the TOE’ s policy is to protect against
malfunction, leakage and manipulation. Besides, the TOE' s life cycle is supported as well
as the user Identification whereas the abuse of functionality is prevented. Specific details
concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in [6], chapter 3.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The topics in the
Security Target [6], chapter 4.2. are of relevance.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is executed as a systemd-spawn container on a hardened centOS operating
system platform, such as a secunet wall. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE. The integrity check of container is the first step of initialization. The
main purpose of the secunet SBC Container is the initiation of a secure SIP session (also
called signaling) and media communication streams such as RTP or SRTP. To protect the
internal network the TOE perform data inspection and filtering on several protocol levels.
The security functions of the TOE are:
• SF.PacketFiltering
• SF.Management
• SF.Authentication
• SF.Logging
According to the TOE design specification these security functions are enforced by the
following subsystems:
• Signaling and processing (SF.PacketFiltering)
• Configuration (SF.Management)
• User management and authentication (SF.Management, SF.Authentication)
• Logging (SF.Logging)
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined subsystem,
modules and interface. Thus all subsystems are covered by several test cases and each
SFR-enforcing module is covered by at least one test case.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
For the tests of the TOE the developer used the test environment with two virtual
machines. This test environment consists of an executable shell script that starts up the
virtual machines and initializes the complete test setup. The automated test cases are
developed in C++. The test configuration takes place using file “config.txt” and includes the
topology and IP addresses to be applied for the test scenario. A description of the test
cases and the single steps which are done in the test execution is given in “index.html”
and supplementary data in the “result tarball” as test reports.
Testing Results
The results of the developer tests are documented and prove the correct implementation.
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected test results.
7.1. Independent Testing
The independent testing approach contains repetition of the developer test. Additionally
the evaluators considered results from the RFC analysis. The TOE has five TSFI from
which three TSFI are thoroughly tested. The other, interface 2 (configuration interface) is
only accessible (OE.ManagementNetwork) from trusted personal (OE.Administrators) and
well covered by vendor tests. The SNMP interface is covered by two manual developer
tests, which are also repeated by the evaluators.
The TOE configuration is identical for operations on the centOS and on the secunet wall.
Only one configuration exists for the TOE, which was subject to the independent testing.
The interfaces have been selected by their exposition to third parties. The evaluators also
included interfaces where the interface could be offended by misconfiguration in the TOE
environment. The tests cover the TSFI. The other SBC interfaces have been implicitly
tested by administrating the TOE. Also these are only accessible to trusted personnel.
The evaluators decided to repeat all tests cases provided by the developer.
Testing Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.2. Vulnerability Analysis
For the penetration tests assessment of ‘Common Vulnerability Entries’, code review,
fuzzing and load tests were used. The evaluators retrieved the applied versions of reused
libraries and retrieved known vulnerabilities. During code review and fuzzing the
penetration testers identified interfaces at the attack surface and send patterns that could
trigger implementation flaws. During overload scenario applicability of TOE
reconfigurations and SFP enforcement have been checked. No vulnerabilities have been
identified during these activities.
The test environment for penetration tests consist of the TOE, two linux machines and an
asterisk private branch exchange. For the load tests a total of four linux machines (three
sources and one target) have been set up. For the independent tests at the evaluator’s
site one laptop running VMware and two virtual machines have been set up.
For penetration tests such as fuzzing relevant parts of the TOE have been compiled into
the fuzzer framework of llvm and gasoline. For other tests the SBC container that contains
the TOE has been used.
16 / 23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
Penetration Test Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’ s operational environment as defined in [6]. This shows that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
Testing and vulnerability assessment considered both the secunet wall and the centOS
platforms. Other configurations have not been defined by the vendor und thus were not
assessed. The results of the evaluation can only be applied on secunet SBC Container
Version 4.2.10-16. Without a preceding evaluation, the extension of the results to other
versions of the TOE is not possible.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE evaluated configuration is defined by the notation:
• secunet SBC Container
• The documents:
◦ Secunet SBC Container Handbook
◦ Security Target
To identify the TOE, the guidance document [9] is providing sufficient information about
identification mechanisms in chapters 7.4.1 and 7.4.7. Additionally, see also chapter 2 of
this report. The TOE is composed of the elements listed in the configuration list for the
TOE [8].
The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in
chapter 1.3.4 of the Security Target [6] and repeated in chapter 4 of the guidance [9]. The
secunet SBC Container as a software-only TOE needs a Linux operating system with the
systemd-nspawn container management technology installed. The hardware remains fully
controlled by the operating system. The connected networks have to be separated
physically. This requirement is especially valid for a management network that is
necessary needed for the management and the configuration of the TOE.
The secunet SBC Container is a software TOE which must be deployed on a hardened
Linux operating system platform, i.e. the secunet Wall of at least version 6.1.0 or a
hardened centOS of at least version 7.9. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
17 / 23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5. augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-2020. The focus of this re-
evaluation was on general product improvements, an added SNMP interface, and updated
documentation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The assessment has a very strict configuration mandated by the security guidance.
Violation of guidance instructions to the administrators is prohibited. It enforces especially:
● deactivation of cluster config;
● no modification of daemon and service configurations;
● activation of topology hiding (for the inner SIP clients) by JSON configuration;
● no use of backreferences in regular expressions;
18 / 23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
● adequate configuration of an external firewall with respect to SNMP, DNS, redis;
● careful configuration of rate limiting via CAPS.
The TOE is (principally) unable to protect clients from SIP digest authentication relay
attacks. The TOE provides capabilities to limit call rates using CAPS, but finally this does
not protect SIP clients against DoS attacks.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAPS Call Attempts Per Second
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DNS Domain Name System
DOS Denial of Service
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
openPGP open Pretty Good Privacy
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PP Protection Profile
RTCP RealTime Control Protocol
RTP Real-Time Transport Protocol
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
19 / 23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
20 / 23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
20 / 23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022, Version 1.1, 26.04.2022, Security
Target for secunet SBC Container, secunet AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) – Summary for BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022,
secunet SBC Container, Version 1.8, Date 25.04.2022, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, “Reference List”, Version 2.03, 26.04.2022, file name:
SBC_Ref-List-v2.03, Frafos GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Secunet SBC Container Handbook 4.2, Version 2.2, 26.04.2022
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
21 / 23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
For the tests of the TOE the developer used the test environment with two virtual
machines. This test environment consists of an executable shell script that starts up the
virtual machines and initializes the complete test setup. The automated test cases are
developed in C++. The test configuration takes place using file “config.txt” and includes the
topology and IP addresses to be applied for the test scenario. A description of the test
cases and the single steps which are done in the test execution is given in “index.html”
and supplementary data in the “result tarball” as test reports.
Testing Results
The results of the developer tests are documented and prove the correct implementation.
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected test results.
7.1. Independent Testing
The independent testing approach contains repetition of the developer test. Additionally
the evaluators considered results from the RFC analysis. The TOE has five TSFI from
which three TSFI are thoroughly tested. The other, interface 2 (configuration interface) is
only accessible (OE.ManagementNetwork) from trusted personal (OE.Administrators) and
well covered by vendor tests. The SNMP interface is covered by two manual developer
tests, which are also repeated by the evaluators.
The TOE configuration is identical for operations on the centOS and on the secunet wall.
Only one configuration exists for the TOE, which was subject to the independent testing.
The interfaces have been selected by their exposition to third parties. The evaluators also
included interfaces where the interface could be offended by misconfiguration in the TOE
environment. The tests cover the TSFI. The other SBC interfaces have been implicitly
tested by administrating the TOE. Also these are only accessible to trusted personnel.
The evaluators decided to repeat all tests cases provided by the developer.
Testing Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.2. Vulnerability Analysis
For the penetration tests assessment of ‘Common Vulnerability Entries’, code review,
fuzzing and load tests were used. The evaluators retrieved the applied versions of reused
libraries and retrieved known vulnerabilities. During code review and fuzzing the
penetration testers identified interfaces at the attack surface and send patterns that could
trigger implementation flaws. During overload scenario applicability of TOE
reconfigurations and SFP enforcement have been checked. No vulnerabilities have been
identified during these activities.
The test environment for penetration tests consist of the TOE, two linux machines and an
asterisk private branch exchange. For the load tests a total of four linux machines (three
sources and one target) have been set up. For the independent tests at the evaluator’s
site one laptop running VMware and two virtual machines have been set up.
For penetration tests such as fuzzing relevant parts of the TOE have been compiled into
the fuzzer framework of llvm and gasoline. For other tests the SBC container that contains
the TOE has been used.
16 / 23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
Penetration Test Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’ s operational environment as defined in [6]. This shows that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
Testing and vulnerability assessment considered both the secunet wall and the centOS
platforms. Other configurations have not been defined by the vendor und thus were not
assessed. The results of the evaluation can only be applied on secunet SBC Container
Version 4.2.10-16. Without a preceding evaluation, the extension of the results to other
versions of the TOE is not possible.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE evaluated configuration is defined by the notation:
• secunet SBC Container
• The documents:
◦ Secunet SBC Container Handbook
◦ Security Target
To identify the TOE, the guidance document [9] is providing sufficient information about
identification mechanisms in chapters 7.4.1 and 7.4.7. Additionally, see also chapter 2 of
this report. The TOE is composed of the elements listed in the configuration list for the
TOE [8].
The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in
chapter 1.3.4 of the Security Target [6] and repeated in chapter 4 of the guidance [9]. The
secunet SBC Container as a software-only TOE needs a Linux operating system with the
systemd-nspawn container management technology installed. The hardware remains fully
controlled by the operating system. The connected networks have to be separated
physically. This requirement is especially valid for a management network that is
necessary needed for the management and the configuration of the TOE.
The secunet SBC Container is a software TOE which must be deployed on a hardened
Linux operating system platform, i.e. the secunet Wall of at least version 6.1.0 or a
hardened centOS of at least version 7.9. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
17 / 23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5. augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-2020. The focus of this re-
evaluation was on general product improvements, an added SNMP interface, and updated
documentation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The assessment has a very strict configuration mandated by the security guidance.
Violation of guidance instructions to the administrators is prohibited. It enforces especially:
● deactivation of cluster config;
● no modification of daemon and service configurations;
● activation of topology hiding (for the inner SIP clients) by JSON configuration;
● no use of backreferences in regular expressions;
18 / 23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
● adequate configuration of an external firewall with respect to SNMP, DNS, redis;
● careful configuration of rate limiting via CAPS.
The TOE is (principally) unable to protect clients from SIP digest authentication relay
attacks. The TOE provides capabilities to limit call rates using CAPS, but finally this does
not protect SIP clients against DoS attacks.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAPS Call Attempts Per Second
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DNS Domain Name System
DOS Denial of Service
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
openPGP open Pretty Good Privacy
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PP Protection Profile
RTCP RealTime Control Protocol
RTP Real-Time Transport Protocol
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
19 / 23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
20 / 23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
20 / 23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022, Version 1.1, 26.04.2022, Security
Target for secunet SBC Container, secunet AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) – Summary for BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022,
secunet SBC Container, Version 1.8, Date 25.04.2022, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, “Reference List”, Version 2.03, 26.04.2022, file name:
SBC_Ref-List-v2.03, Frafos GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Secunet SBC Container Handbook 4.2, Version 2.2, 26.04.2022
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
21 / 23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
Penetration Test Result
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’ s operational environment as defined in [6]. This shows that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
Testing and vulnerability assessment considered both the secunet wall and the centOS
platforms. Other configurations have not been defined by the vendor und thus were not
assessed. The results of the evaluation can only be applied on secunet SBC Container
Version 4.2.10-16. Without a preceding evaluation, the extension of the results to other
versions of the TOE is not possible.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE evaluated configuration is defined by the notation:
• secunet SBC Container
• The documents:
◦ Secunet SBC Container Handbook
◦ Security Target
To identify the TOE, the guidance document [9] is providing sufficient information about
identification mechanisms in chapters 7.4.1 and 7.4.7. Additionally, see also chapter 2 of
this report. The TOE is composed of the elements listed in the configuration list for the
TOE [8].
The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in
chapter 1.3.4 of the Security Target [6] and repeated in chapter 4 of the guidance [9]. The
secunet SBC Container as a software-only TOE needs a Linux operating system with the
systemd-nspawn container management technology installed. The hardware remains fully
controlled by the operating system. The connected networks have to be separated
physically. This requirement is especially valid for a management network that is
necessary needed for the management and the configuration of the TOE.
The secunet SBC Container is a software TOE which must be deployed on a hardened
Linux operating system platform, i.e. the secunet Wall of at least version 6.1.0 or a
hardened centOS of at least version 7.9. This operating system platform protects the
integrity of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
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As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5. augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-2020. The focus of this re-
evaluation was on general product improvements, an added SNMP interface, and updated
documentation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The assessment has a very strict configuration mandated by the security guidance.
Violation of guidance instructions to the administrators is prohibited. It enforces especially:
● deactivation of cluster config;
● no modification of daemon and service configurations;
● activation of topology hiding (for the inner SIP clients) by JSON configuration;
● no use of backreferences in regular expressions;
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● adequate configuration of an external firewall with respect to SNMP, DNS, redis;
● careful configuration of rate limiting via CAPS.
The TOE is (principally) unable to protect clients from SIP digest authentication relay
attacks. The TOE provides capabilities to limit call rates using CAPS, but finally this does
not protect SIP clients against DoS attacks.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAPS Call Attempts Per Second
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DNS Domain Name System
DOS Denial of Service
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
openPGP open Pretty Good Privacy
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PP Protection Profile
RTCP RealTime Control Protocol
RTP Real-Time Transport Protocol
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
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SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
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This page is intentionally left blank.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Message Protocol
SRTCP Secure RealTime Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VoIP Voice over IP
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022, Version 1.1, 26.04.2022, Security
Target for secunet SBC Container, secunet AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) – Summary for BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022,
secunet SBC Container, Version 1.8, Date 25.04.2022, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, “Reference List”, Version 2.03, 26.04.2022, file name:
SBC_Ref-List-v2.03, Frafos GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Secunet SBC Container Handbook 4.2, Version 2.2, 26.04.2022
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022, Version 1.1, 26.04.2022, Security
Target for secunet SBC Container, secunet AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) – Summary for BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022,
secunet SBC Container, Version 1.8, Date 25.04.2022, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, “Reference List”, Version 2.03, 26.04.2022, file name:
SBC_Ref-List-v2.03, Frafos GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Secunet SBC Container Handbook 4.2, Version 2.2, 26.04.2022
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1089-V2-2022 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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