BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024
for
secunet wall, Version 6.2.0
from
secunet Security Networks AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.47
BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024 (*)
Firewall
secunet wall, Version 6.2.0
from secunet Security Networks AG
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5,
ASE_TSS.2
valid until: 21 February 2029
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and
ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 22 February 2024
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks...................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure..............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements.............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification...............................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result................................................................................8
6. Publication..................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.....................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary..................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy..........................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information...........................................................................................14
6. Documentation..........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing.....................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation..........................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE....................................................18
11. Security Target........................................................................................................19
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES).............................................................19
13. Definitions...............................................................................................................19
14. Bibliography............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria............................................................................................22
D. Annexes.......................................................................................................................23
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained some components that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product secunet wall, Version 6.2.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V2-2022-MA-01.
The evaluation of the product secunet wall, Version 6.2.0 was conducted by SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 16 February 2024. SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: secunet Security Networks
AG.
The product was developed by: secunet Security Networks AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 22 February
2024 is valid until 21 February 2029. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product secunet wall, Version 6.2.0 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
secunet Security Networks AG
Kurfürstenstraße 58
45138 Essen
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the secunet wall 6.2.0 which comprises a solution set of
Linux-based firewall components that enable the controlled transfer of data on a defined
interface between internal and external networks or between segments of an internal
network. This functionality is performed by the so-called Packet Filter, a part of the TOE.
This packet filter enforced the Packet filter rules, defined by the administrator.
The secunet wall supports IPv4 and IPv6. IPv6 is not part of the TOE. The secunet wall
also supports LDAP. LDAP is not part of the TOE.
The TOE is integrated in a Linux operating system platform, where a Packet Filtering
module is placed.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5, ASE_TSS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Details
SF1 Information Flow Protection See ST [6], Chapter 6.1.1
SF2 Management See ST [6], Chapter 6.1.2
SF3 Container Authentication See ST [6], Chapter 6.1.3
SF4 Security Audit See ST [6], Chapter 6.1.4
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
secunet wall, Version 6.2.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
Installationsmedium (USB
stick)
ISO-Hybrid-Image secunet
wall Wirksystem 6.2.0
Including public signing key
secuwall-gpg-
public_signingkey.asc
Labelling “secunet-wall
Wirksystem 6.2.0“ on
installation medium
“secunet wall 6.2.0”
displayed on login screen
Physical Delivery
2 DOC secunet wall
Administrationshandbuch
(Version 1.3)
[8]
manual.pdf
Date: 28.04.2023
SHA-512 Checksum:
2ef15ec1b19e52198c3d5f2
2e4202476eba30748bb4ed
f8f771ae2ee036d461fe354
44207db13df8e23da6e5b4
bfb1966b620962614c0f0ad
dda1785611eaa7b
Installation medium
3 DOC Release Notes secunet
wall 6.2.0 [9]
release-notes.pdf
Date: 16.01.2023
SHA-512 Checksum:
e4d204139dea06aa9635f7
2d361cd0824ca493d292a4
7fa4b3c9e58e442c50c077a
2d7feb64a4b7555cbf1889e
729bcca8fb1a9757ff5b267a
2243952386f4f1
Installation medium
4 SW Signed checksum file ISO-Hybrid-Image:
bzImage.sig
rootfs.squash.sig
VERSION.sig
all.sha512.asc
Installation medium
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered to the consumer on an installation medium (USB stick).
The items 2 to 4 in Table 2 are part of the delivery on the installation medium. They are
part of the ISO-Hybrid-Image stored on the installation medium. The secunet wall
guidance [8] is also delivered on non-writable CD ROM. This copy of the Guidance
documentation is binary identical to the original in the ISO-Hybrid-Image on the installation
medium.
Remark on item 4 of the table above:
The Signed checksum file is a text file that contains a list of the delivered file names and
binaries and their SHA-512 hash values. The whole file is enclosed in an open-PGP block
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024 Certification Report
that is signed with the secunet private key. This signature can be verified with the public
key secuwall-gpg-public_signing-key.asc.
The binaries that comprise the TOE are:
● Release Linux Kernel, Identification: bzImage, SHA-512 hash value:
73169b9d450961aef7671860194b0c83f54d77dbd025e1e9339272f11bc0dfe73d3ccda50
d48403463745be58ec83530edd16bf0485a3f7e708dfafc12810475
● Release Userspace, Identification: rootfs.squash, SHA-512 hash value:
26f689b407ef414454b9191a670a0fd0bcb9e28a5c9c79e56d225d674c39af0b2ef6edf0f6
460f09a696b8fd80fe7c40f07dce0996d954317783f116718a63d0
● Release Version, Identification: VERSION, SHA-512 hash value:
92b20499867a84faa26fc0e8bb98581c6ec6efd40d0e01bcbea9e6931ff5d21fbdd056f00d
0e1e2d3db0d502588fd488267d2ca889d64f4a00c41d40f3f376b3
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-512 checksums in the file all.sha512.asc
which also contains a signature that can be verified with the public key in the file secuwall-
gpg-public_signing-key.asc.
The TOE is delivered to the customer on an installation medium (USB stick). Chapter 5.1
of the guidance [8] provides the administrator with information how to verify the
authenticity of the TOE. The authenticity check is divided into two steps: first the
administrator has to check the authenticity of the public PGP key secuwall-auth-pub.asc
delivered via installation medium. Therefore, the administrator has to check the validity
against the checksum and has to call the support via telephone for the fingerprint of the
public signing key. To perform the PGP operations a PGP implementation, e.g. the open
source tool GnuPG, must be used. The delivered public key must be imported to calculate
the fingerprint. If the fingerprint does not match the fingerprint from the project manager,
the user must cancel the process and repeat the delivery process. Otherwise he can
proceed to the second step: verification of the digital signature of the hash sum file
all.sha512.asc. Therefore, the PGP tool must be used to verify the integrity of the hash
sum file. If the hash sum file was signed with the correct key, the SHA-512 sums of all files
need to be calculated by using any tool that calculates the SHA-512 hash sum from a
given file. Then the calculated hash sums must be compared to the ones listed in the file
all.sha512.asc. If everything is correct the user must check whether the version numbers
of secunet wall and guidance match version mentioned in the certification report. So the
user can ensure that he has received the certified TOE.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues Information Flow Protection,
Management, Container Authentication, and Security Audit.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The list of objectives
which have to be met by the environment can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter
4.2.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a firewall including packet filter functionality. The secunet wall comprises a set
of Linux-based firewall components that enable the controlled transfer of data on a defined
interface between internal and external networks or between segments of an internal
network. The secunet wall relies on information available at OSI layer 3 and layer 4 for
policy enforcement. The functionality for packet filtering is part of the Linux operating
system. The secunet wall supports IPv4 and IPv6 protocols. IPv6 is not part of the TOE.
The secunet wall also supports LDAP. LDAP is not part of the TOE. This is an overview of
the subsystems of the TOE and the corresponding TSF that were objects of the evaluation.
The security functions of the TOE are:
● SF1 Information Flow Control
● SF2 Management
● SF3 Container Authentication
● SF4 Security Audit
According to the TOE design specification these security functions are enforced by the
following subsystems:
● TCP/IP Stack (represents the TSF SF1.1, SF1.2, SF1.3)
● TCP/IP Filter (represents the TSFs SF1.1, SF2.3, SF3.2, SF4.1 and SF4.2; supports the
TSF SF2.2)
● Kernel-Log (supports the TSF SF4.1 and SF4.2)
● Kernel-Space Kommunikation (represents the TSF SF2.1; supports the TSF SF2.2)
● User-Space (represents the TSF SF2.1, SF2.2, SF3.1, SF4.1 and SF4.2)
Note: The references in brackets refer to the information given in the ST [6], chapter 6.1.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer testing
The TOE was tested on a stand-alone computer which uses three virtual workstations and
a containerized environment in which these three VMs run. The TOE was running in a
virtual machine which was configured according to chapter 1.2.2 of ST [6].
The tests of the TOE were carried out by executing the test environment. The virtual work-
stations resemble two standard workstations, one with the TOE installed.
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined subsystem. The test
cases were divided into those of the TCP/IP Stack, the TCP/IP Filter, Kernel-Log, the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024 Certification Report
Kernel-Space Kommunikation and User-Space. Thus all subsystems are covered by
several test cases and each SFR-enforcing module is covered by at least one test case.
For the tests of the TOE, the developer used the test environment with three virtual work-
stations. The test environment is supported by an executable bash script that starts up the
virtual machines and initializes the complete test network. Then each test case is located
in a separate bash script. The developer carried out interactive as well as non-interactive
tests. Altogether there were 95 test cases covered by the test specification.
The results of the TOE tests prove the correct implementation. All test cases were
executed successfully and ended up with the expected result.
Independent testing
For repeating the developer tests, the evaluators used the same configuration as used in
the developer tests. The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and
firmware is described in section 1.2.2 of the ST [6], using a stand alone PC with Intel
Xeon(R) CPU 4 x 3.0 GHz, 16 GB RAM, Ubuntu 22.04 LTS 64-bit with Docker and
installed the virtualized test setup of the developer.
For the independent tests the evaluators used a TOE installed on real Hardware that was
provided by the developer as described in the ST [6], on which the release version of the
TOE was installed:
● Fujitsu PRIMERGY RX 1330-M4 (Model: RX1330 M4),
● Syslogic COMPACT81-S (Model: SDB/OEMS81120-SBC1),
● Fujitsu PRIMERGY RX2530-M5 (Model: RX2530 M5),
● Pyramid VarioFlex 2 HE (Model: VarioFlex 2 HE v2016),
● Lenovo TS 360 Tiny OEM (Model: Thinkstation 360 Tiny OEM).
These systems fulfil the minimum system requirements. All test statements are only based
on these configurations.
The general setup is the same as the developers test setup, i.e. the TOE connects via
Ethernet a source machine (SRC) and a destination machine (DST) and is further
connected to a machine inside the management network (Management). The complete
test environment runs on a single Linux Host PC system which has several physical
network cards (network interfaces) available, i.e. it is possible to realize SRC, DST and
Management on this machine.
The evaluators performed the installation procedure of the TOE, as described by the
developer in the guidance document [8]. The evaluators repeated all developer tests.
Additionally the evaluators performed independent tests. No deviation between the actual
result and the expected result was found.
Penetration tests
Publicly known vulnerabilities have been collected. The applicability of each attack path
has been considered for the configured TOE in the intended environment.
For the penetration tests the differential firewall analysis method was used. In this method
one needs to be able to compare the traffic on the “outside” to the traffic on the “inside” in
real-time and alert when this contradicts. Therefore, two monitoring points are placed
logically in front and behind the packet filter. At the monitoring points a sniffer is placed at
which the network traffic is analysed.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024
The sensor that is placed on the “inside” alerts if traffic is detected and violating the firewall
rules. In the operational environment of the TOE it is also possible that malicious or
unintended traffic is coming from the inside of the network passing the TOE. It was tested
that the packet filter responds to both network interfaces in the same way. The tests shall
show if the TOE is resistant to attacks.
After the setup of the test environment different attack scenarios were defined. The attack
scenarios were mapped to test cases and executed in the test environment.
For the penetration tests the evaluators used a TOE installed on real Hardware as
described above. The test network was realized using virtualized source and destination
machines. The host machine also provides the management network functionality.
Linux Host System (Hosting SRC, DST and Management)
● Hardware: Intel Xeon(R) CPU 4 x 3.0 GHz, 16 GB RAM
● Software: Ubuntu 22.04 LTS 64-bit OS and additionally software packages (VirtualBox,
Wireshark, ntpd, rsyslog)
SRC (virtualized guest on the Linux Host)
● Hardware: This machine is virtualized and uses the host’s HW
● Software (OS): Debian GNU/Linux Version 11 (bullseye) 64-bit and additional pentest
tools installed
DST (virtualized guest on the Linux Host)
● Hardware: This machine is virtualized and uses the host’s HW
● Software (OS): Debian GNU/Linux Version 11 (bullseye) 64-bit and additional pentest
tools installed
The following list gives a short overview about the attack scenarios which have been
tested or examined by design and code analysis:
● Port scan with or without different source ports to detect open ports.
● Bypassing the packet filter with fuzzy generated TCP, UDP or ICMP packets or during
startup/shutdown.
● Bypassing the packet filter with a flood attack with “syn” or fragmented packets.
● Bypassing the packet filter with packets with a spoofed source address.
● Bypassing the packet filter due to IP-Range conflicts.
● Bypassing the packet filter and logging due to heavy load.
● Bypassing the access rule checks.
The TOE purposely reduces system logs in cases of heavy network load.
As a result, it can be assumed that the SFRs are implemented correctly and that they
cannot be bypassed, deactivated or manipulated. The tested SFRs are listed in the
following:
● FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
● FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
● FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
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The remaining SFRs were analysed but not tested through penetration due to non-
exploitability of the related attack scenarios in the TOE’s operational environment.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. Please note, that the TOE is able to reduce syslog messages in cases
of heavy network load and extensive set logging rules. No attack scenario with the attack
potential High was actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in
Security Target [6] assumed that all measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE is defined by the notation “secunet wall Version 6.2.0“ provided by secunet
Security Networks AG with the components and hash values for the TOE as given in
chapter 2. The TOE has to be configured following the TOE guidance [8]. There exists only
one configuration of the TOE. The TOE was tested and thus shall be operated on the
hardware as specified in the Security Target [6] in chapter 1.2.2.
The hardware is not part of the TOE but secunet offers to forward the customers hardware
purchase order to the hardware vendor.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 (and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5, ASE_TSS.2 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V2-2022-MA-01, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on product and platform
evolution.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None.
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant / extended
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2, AVA_VAN.5, ASE_TSS.2
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
1 Cryptographic
primitive
Hashing for
Password and
signature Verifi-
cation using SHA-
256, SHA-512
[FIPS_180-4] - - FCS_COP.1/SHA
SHA-256 is used for
container
authentication.
SHA-512 is used for
password hashing.
2 Authenticity RSA Signature
verification with
SHA-256 of the
container signature
[IETF RFC 8017]
[FIPS_180-4]
4096 bit Yes FCS_COP.1.1/RSA-
verify
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
References to the Table above:
● [FIPS_180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, National Institute of Standards
and Technology, 2012-03.
● [IETF RFC 8017] RFC 8017, PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The user must not load any new modules into the kernel. In case a new module is loaded
the TOE is no longer in the certified configuration.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
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techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CPU Central Processing Unit
DST Destination
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HW Hardware
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
OS Operating System
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OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SBC Session Border Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SRC Source
ST Security Target
SW Software
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UDP User Data Protocol
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
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TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3-2024, secunet wall 6.2.0, Version 1.7, Date
16.10.2023, secunet Security Networks AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) secunet wall 6.2.0, BSI-DSZ-CC-1116-V3,
Version 2.0, Date: 16.02.2024, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH
(confidential document)
[8] secunet wall 6.2.0, Administrationshandbuch, Handbuch-Version 1.3, 28.04.2023,
secunet Security Networks AG
[9] Release Notes secunet wall 6.2.0, Date: 16.01.2023, secunet Security Networks AG
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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