Security Target for IBM RACF for z/OS V2R3
Version 5.5
June 26, 2019
➢ TABLE OF CONTENTS
➢ 1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................8
1.1 Security Target (ST) Identification...........................................................................................................8
1.2 TOE Identification...................................................................................................................................8
1.3 TOE Overview........................................................................................................................................8
1.4 TOE Description.....................................................................................................................................9
1.4.1 Intended method of use...................................................................................................................9
1.4.2 Summary of security features..........................................................................................................9
1.4.3 Configurations...............................................................................................................................13
1.5 Structure...............................................................................................................................................14
1.6 Terminology.......................................................................................................................................... 14
1.7 Abbreviations........................................................................................................................................16
1.8 References...........................................................................................................................................17
1.9 Trademarks...........................................................................................................................................17
➢ 2. CC CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..............................................................................................................19
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance............................................................................................................19
➢ 3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION.....................................................................................................20
3.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................................................20
3.2 Threat Environment..............................................................................................................................20
3.2.1 Assets............................................................................................................................................20
3.2.2 Threat Agents................................................................................................................................20
3.2.3 Threats countered by the TOE.......................................................................................................21
3.3 Assumptions.........................................................................................................................................21
3.3.1 Environment of use of the TOE......................................................................................................22
3.4 Organizational Security Policies...........................................................................................................23
➢ 4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES......................................................................................................................24
4.1 Security Objectives For The TOE.........................................................................................................24
4.2 Security Objectives For The Operational Environment.........................................................................25
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale...............................................................................................................26
4.3.1 Security Objectives Coverage........................................................................................................26
4.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency......................................................................................................28
➢ 5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION............................................................................................34
5.1 FIA_USB.2............................................................................................................................................ 34
5.2 FAU_GEN_SUB.1................................................................................................................................35
➢ 6. SUPPORTING FUNCTIONALITY PROVIDED BY THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT..................36
➢ 7. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................37
7.1 Security Audit (FAU).............................................................................................................................37
Subset audit data generation (FAU_GEN_SUB.1)..................................................................................37
User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)..................................................................................................41
Audit review (FAU_SAR.1)......................................................................................................................42
Selective audit (FAU_SEL.1)..................................................................................................................42
7.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)...............................................................................................................42
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)...................................................................................................42
7.3 User Data Protection (FDP)..................................................................................................................42
7.3.1 General resource class and data set access control policy...........................................................42
Subset access control: (FDP_ACC.1(GRD))..........................................................................................42
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1(GRD))..................................................................49
7.3.2 UNIX file system object access control policy................................................................................51
Subset access control: (FDP_ACC.1(UFS))...........................................................................................51
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Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1(UFS))...................................................................51
7.3.3 UNIX IPC access control policy.....................................................................................................53
Subset access control: (FDP_ACC.1(IPC))............................................................................................53
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1(IPC))....................................................................53
7.3.4 RACF Field-level access control policy..........................................................................................54
Subset access control: (FDP_ACC.1(FLA))............................................................................................54
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1(FLA))...................................................................54
7.3.5 Mandatory access control policy....................................................................................................55
Complete information flow control: labeled security (FDP_IFC.2) (Labeled Security Mode only)...........55
Hierarchical security attributes (FDP_IFF.2) (Labeled Security Mode only)............................................55
7.4 Identification And Authentication (FIA)..................................................................................................57
Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)...........................................................................................57
User attribute definition: human users (FIA_ATD.1(HU))........................................................................57
User attribute definition: labeled security (FIA_ATD.1(LS)) (Labeled Security Mode only).....................58
Verification of secrets (FIA_SOS.1)........................................................................................................58
Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)....................................................................................................58
Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)..................................................................................58
Protected authentication feedback (FIA_UAU.7)....................................................................................59
Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)........................................................................................................59
User-subject binding (FIA_USB.1) (Labeled Security Mode only)).........................................................59
Enhanced user-subject binding (FIA_USB.2).........................................................................................59
7.5 Security Management (FMT)................................................................................................................61
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1(GRD))........................................................................61
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1(UFS)).........................................................................61
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1(IPC))..........................................................................62
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1(FLA))..........................................................................62
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1(LS)) (Labeled Security Mode only)............................62
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3(LS)) (Labeled Security Mode only)........................................62
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3(GRD))....................................................................................63
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3(UFS))....................................................................................63
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3(IPC))......................................................................................63
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3(FLA)).....................................................................................63
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(SO))........................................................................................63
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(AE)).........................................................................................63
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(UA))........................................................................................63
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(RA))........................................................................................64
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(TH)).........................................................................................64
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(AD))........................................................................................64
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(RC))........................................................................................64
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(DC))........................................................................................65
Revocation: object security attributes (FMT_REV.1(OSA)).....................................................................65
Revocation: user security attributes (FMT_REV.1(USR)).......................................................................65
Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)..........................................................................65
Security Roles (FMT_SMR.1).................................................................................................................66
7.6 Protection Of The TSF (FPT)................................................................................................................67
Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency (FPT_TDC.1(RA))......................................................................67
Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency (FPT_TDC.1(LS)) (Labeled Security Mode only).......................67
7.7 Security Functional Requirements Rationale........................................................................................67
7.7.1 Security Requirements Coverage..................................................................................................67
7.7.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency................................................................................................70
7.7.3 Security Requirements Dependency Analysis...............................................................................72
7.7.4 Discussion of dependencies not satisfied......................................................................................76
7.7.5 TSF Rationale................................................................................................................................77
7.7.6 Mutual support of the security functions.........................................................................................81
7.7.7 Security assurance requirements rationale....................................................................................82
➢ 8. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION........................................................................................................83
8.1 Overview Of The RACF Architecture....................................................................................................83
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 3 of 179
8.1.1 RACF TSF Protection....................................................................................................................83
8.1.2 Initial RACF Setup.........................................................................................................................84
8.2 Identification And Authentication Support By RACF (IA).......................................................................84
8.2.1 Authentication function...................................................................................................................84
8.2.2 RACF Passwords and Password Phrases.....................................................................................86
8.2.3 RACF PassTickets.........................................................................................................................89
8.2.4 Authentication via Client Digital Certificates...................................................................................90
8.2.5 Authentication via Kerberos...........................................................................................................91
8.2.6 Started procedures........................................................................................................................91
8.2.7 Handling of Groups During Authentication.....................................................................................92
8.2.8 Assertion of User Identity...............................................................................................................92
8.3 Access Control (AC).............................................................................................................................93
8.3.1 Access control principles...............................................................................................................93
8.3.2 Protected resources.......................................................................................................................94
8.3.3 Mandatory access control (Labeled Security Mode only).............................................................107
8.3.4 Discretionary Access Control.......................................................................................................108
8.3.5 Digital Certificates, Key Rings, and Certificate Mappings in RACF and PKCS#11 Cryptographic
Tokens..................................................................................................................................................... 114
8.4 Security Management (SM)................................................................................................................137
8.4.1 User and group management......................................................................................................137
8.4.2 Resource management................................................................................................................144
8.4.3 RACF configuration and management.........................................................................................148
8.5 Auditing (AU)......................................................................................................................................173
8.5.1 Generation of audit records.........................................................................................................173
8.5.2 Event Notifications generated by RACF.......................................................................................174
8.5.3 Audit configuration and management..........................................................................................174
8.6 RACF Support For Program Signing And Verification (SP).................................................................175
➢ 9. TOE ASSURANCE MEASURES.........................................................................................................178
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List of Tables
Table 1: Mapping of security objectives to threats and policies........................................................................27
Table 2: Mapping of security objectives for the Operational Environment to assumptions, threats and policies
......................................................................................................................................................................... 28
Table 3: Sufficiency of objectives countering threats........................................................................................30
Table 4: Sufficiency of objectives holding assumptions....................................................................................32
Table 5: Sufficiency of objectives enforcing Organizational Security Policies...................................................33
Table 6: Auditable Events.................................................................................................................................41
Table 7: General Resource Classes.................................................................................................................46
Table 8: General Resource Classes for DB2....................................................................................................47
Table 9: General Resource Classes for EIM....................................................................................................47
Table 10: General Resource Classes for ICSF.................................................................................................47
Table 11: General Resource Classes for Infoprint............................................................................................48
Table 12: General Resource Classes for Kerberos..........................................................................................48
Table 13: General Resource Classes for DFSMS............................................................................................48
Table 14: General Resource Classes for TSO..................................................................................................48
Table 15: General Resource Classes for z/OS UNIX.......................................................................................49
Table 16: Mapping of security functional requirements to security objectives..................................................70
Table 17: Security objectives for the TOE rationale..........................................................................................72
Table 18: TOE SFR dependency analysis........................................................................................................76
Table 19: TOE SFR dependency analysis........................................................................................................81
Table 20: General Resource Classes...............................................................................................................97
Table 21: General Resource Classes for DB2..................................................................................................99
Table 22: General Resource Classes for EIM..................................................................................................99
Table 23: General Resource Classes for ICSF.................................................................................................99
Table 24: General Resource Classes for PSF..................................................................................................99
Table 25: General Resource Classes for Kerberos..........................................................................................99
Table 26: General Resource Classes for DFSMS............................................................................................99
Table 27: General Resource Classes for TSO................................................................................................100
Table 28: General Resource Classes for z/OS Unix.......................................................................................100
Table 29: User Profile Authorizations required for RACDCERT functions.......................................................118
Table 30: Authorizations required for RACDCERT BIND................................................................................119
Table 31: Authorizations required for RACDCERT CONNECT (own key ring)................................................119
Table 32: Authorizations required for RACDCERT CONNECT (not own key ring)..........................................119
Table 33: Authorizations required for RACDCERT EXPORT..........................................................................120
Table 34: Authorizations required for RACDCERT GENCERT.......................................................................120
Table 35: Authority required for the RACDCERT ADD function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................121
Table 36: Authority required for the RACDCERT ADDRING function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................121
Table 37: Authority required for the RACDCERT ALTER function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................121
Table 38: Authority required for the RACDCERT CONNECT function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................122
Table 39: Authority required for the RACDCERT DELETE function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................122
Table 40: Authority required for the RACDCERT DELRING function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................122
Table 41: Authority required for the RACDCERT EXPORT function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................123
Table 42: Authority required for the RACDCERT GENCERT function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................123
Table 43: Authority required for the RACDCERT GENREQ function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................123
Table 44: Authority required for the RACDCERT GENREQ function under the RDATALIB class when
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 5 of 179
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................124
Table 45: Authority required for the RACDCERT REKEY function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................124
Table 46: Authority required for the RACDCERT REMOVE function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................124
Table 47: Authority required for the RACDCERT ROLLOVER function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined.......................................................................................................125
Table 48: Ring-specific profile checking for the DataGetFirst, DataGetNext, and GetUpdateCode functions
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-22}........................................................................................................................126
Table 49: Global profile checking for the DataGetFirst, DataGetNext, and GetUpdateCode functions
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-23}........................................................................................................................126
Table 50: Profile checking for the CheckStatus function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-24}.................................127
Table 51:Profile checking for the IncSerialNum function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-26}.................................127
Table 52:Ring-specific profile checking for the NewRing function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-27}..................127
Table 53:Global profile checking for the NewRing function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-28}.............................128
Table 54:Ring-specific profile checking for the DelRing function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-30}....................128
Table 55:Global profile checking for the DelRing function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-31}..............................128
Table 56:Ring-specific profile checking for the DataRemove function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-33}............128
Table 57:Global profile checking for the DataRemove function if the removed certificate is not to be deleted
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-34}........................................................................................................................129
Table 58:Additional profile checking for the DataRemove function if the removed certificate is to be deleted
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-36}........................................................................................................................129
Table 59:Certificate-specific profile checking for the DataRemove function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-37}...130
Table 60:Ring-specific profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required to connect with the
Personal usage {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-40}..............................................................................................130
Table 61:Ring-specific profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required to connect with the SITE
or CERTAUTH usage {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-41}.....................................................................................130
Table 62:Global profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required to connect with the Personal
usage {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-42}..............................................................................................................131
Table 63:profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required to connect with the SITE or CERTAUTH
usage {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-43}..............................................................................................................131
Table 64:Global profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required under the FACILITY class to add
or re-add a certificate {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-44}......................................................................................132
Table 65:Certificate-specific profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required under the RDATALIB
class to add or re-add a certificate {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-46}..................................................................133
Table 66:Certificate-specific profile checking for the DataAlter function - Authority required under the
RDATALIB class to alter a certificate {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-48}..............................................................133
Table 67:Global profile checking for the DataAlter function - - Authority required under the FACILITY class to
alter a certificate {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-49}.............................................................................................134
Table 68:Ring-specific profile checking for the GetRingInfo function - Authority required under the RDATALIB
class to list information for one or more key ring's {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-53}..........................................134
Table 69:Global profile checking for the GetRingInfo function - Authority required under the FACILITY class to
list information for one or more key ring's {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-54}.......................................................135
Table 70: User Profile.....................................................................................................................................140
Table 71: Group profiles.................................................................................................................................141
Table 72: Data Set profile...............................................................................................................................146
Table 73: General Resource profile................................................................................................................147
Table 74: RACF Commands and related OPERCMDS resource names – TSO commands..........................151
Table 75: RACF Commands and related OPERCMDS resource names – Console only commands.............152
Table 76: RACF command authorizations......................................................................................................172
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Change History:
5.0 2018-10-15 Initial version, based on the RACF for z/OS V2R2 version
5.1 2019-03-25 Update list of APARs
5.2 2019-03-26 Address evaluator comments
5.3 2019-05-15 Address CB comments
5.4 2019-06-13 Include APAR OA57638
5.5 2019-06-26 Corrections due to evaluator comments
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 7 of 179
1. Introduction
This is version 5.5 of the Security Target for IBM® RACF for z/OS V2R3.
1.1 Security Target (ST) identification
Title: Security Target for IBM RACF for z/OS V2R3
Version: 5.5
Status: Release
Date: 2019-06-26
Sponsor: IBM Corporation
Developer: IBM Corporation
Keywords: access control, discretionary access control, security labels, mandatory access
control, security
This document is the Security Target for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation of the IBM RACF for z/
OS V2R3 access control component. It is conformant to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5 [CC].
1.2 TOE Identification
The TOE is RACF for z/OS Version 2 Release 3.
Provided as part of the Common Criteria Evaluated Base Package for z/OS V2R3, program number
5650-ZOS with the following APARs:
• OA53946/UA94612
• OA52110/UA93049
• OA52834/UA94035
• OA53930/UA95160
• OA57638/UA99513, UA99514
1.3 TOE overview
This Security Target (ST) documents the security characteristics of the IBM RACF for z/OS V2R3
access control component of z/OS V2R3, which is the flagship operating system for IBM z SystemTM
mainframe computers, empowering the use of their most advanced features, such as the 64-bit
z/ArchitectureTM
.
RACF is the central component within z/OS responsible for user authentication, access control,
management of user security attributes, and management of access rights.
RACF provides the interfaces for identification and authentication of users using different
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authentication mechanisms, interfaces that resource managers can use for both discretionary and
mandatory access control to objects they define, interfaces for sophisticated security management
functions, and the ability to generate audit records for security critical events.
1.4 TOE description
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the RACF component of the z/OS operating system. RACF is the
component that is called within z/OS from any component that wants to perform user authentication,
access control to protected resources and the management of user security attributes and access
rights.
RACF is designed as an authentication and access manager component that manages both user
security attributes and access management attributes in its own database. Users are represented
within RACF by user profiles and protected resources are represented by resource profiles. Users
can be members of groups where each group is represented by a group profile.
Resource profiles are structured into classes, which represent the different types of resources. Within
such a class an individual profile is represented by the name of the resource, which is unique within
its class. Resource manager will then query RACF whenever they need to check a user's access
rights to a resource. In this query they will specify the resource class, the name of the resource within
the class, the type of access requested and the internal representation of the user that requests
access.
RACF is also called when a component within z/OS needs to authenticate a user. In this case the
z/OS component will call RACF and will pass the identity of the user, the authentication credentials
presented, the name of the component requesting user authentication and several other parameters
to RACF. Based on this information RACF will authenticate the user and, if successful, create a
control block representing the user with the security attributes assigned. This control block is later
used when a component of z/OS calls RACF for checking access rights.
RACF also provides interfaces that allow the management of user profiles, digital certificates
assigned to users, group profiles, resource profiles, access rights, security labels and general RACF
attributes. RACF also provides an interface that z/OS components can call to generate a security
related audit record.
Note: The RACF Remote Sharing Facility (RRSF) is not considered as a part of this evaluation and
therefore must not be used in an evaluated system configuration.
1.4.1 Intended method of use
RACF is designed to be used by z/OS components to perform user authentication, validate a user's
access to a resource, audit security critical events, and manage RACF profiles, access rights to
resources and RACF security parameter. It also provides interfaces to extract RACF status
information. This interface is a programming interface implemented by the RACROUTE macro. RACF
will check if the calling application has the right to use the function called.
In addition RACF exports a command interface that can be used by appropriately authorized users
directly to perform management operations.
This Security Target specifies two modes of operation: a "normal" mode where labeled security
features are not configured as required in this Security Target and a "Labeled Security Mode" where
labeled security is configured as described in this Security Target. In "Labeled Security Mode"
additional security functionality is active, which is marked with "Labeled Security Mode" in this
document. Note that when functions of labeled security are configured differently than specified in this
Security Target, the security functionality defined for the "normal" mode still works but additional
restrictions may be imposed due to the way the functions for labeled security are configured.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 9 of 179
1.4.2 Summary of security features
The primary security features of RACF are:
· identification and authentication of users
· discretionary access control
· mandatory access control and support for security labels (Labeled Security Mode)
· auditing
· security management
· TSF protection
· program signing and verification
These primary security features are supported by the domain separation and reference mediation
properties of the other parts of the z/OS operating system, which ensure that the RACF functions are
invoked when required and cannot be bypassed. RACF itself is protected by the architecture of the z/
OS operating system from unauthorized tampering with the RACF functions and the RACF database.
1.4.2.1 Identification and authentication (IA)
RACF provides support for the identification and authentication of users by the means of
 an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a system-encrypted password or password phrase.
 an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a PassTicket, which is a cryptographically-generated
password substitute encompassing the user ID, the requested application name, and the
current date/time.
 an x.509v3 digital certificate presented to a server application in the TOE environment that
uses System SSL or TCP/IP Application Transparent TLS (AT-TLS) to provide TLS-based
client authentication, and then “mapped” (using TOE functions) by that server application or
by AT-TLS to a RACF user ID.
 a KerberosTM
v5 ticket presented to a server application in the TOE environment that supports
the Kerberos mechanism, and then mapped by that application through the GSS-API
programming services. The TOE also provides functions (specifically the R_ticketServ, and
R_GenSec services) that enable the application server to validate the Kerberos ticket, and
thus the authentication of the principal. The application server then translates (or maps) the
Kerberos principal (using the TOE provided function of R_userMap) to a RACF user ID.
The TOE security functions authenticate the claimed identity of the user by verifying the
password/phrase (or other mechanism, as listed above) and returning the result to the trusted
program that used the RACF functions for user identification and authentication. It is up to the trusted
program to determine what to do when the user identification and authentication process fails. When
a user is successfully identified and authenticated RACF creates control blocks containing the user's
security attributes as managed by RACF. Those control blocks are used later when a resource
manager calls RACF to determine the user's right to access resources or when the user calls RACF
functions that require the user to hold specific RACF managed privileges.
The required password quality can be tailored to the installation’s policies using various parameters.
When creating users, administrators are required to choose an initial password and optionally a
password phrase, that must usually be changed by the user during the initial logon that uses the
password/phrase.
1.4.2.2 Discretionary access control (AC)
RACF implements the functions allowing resource managers within z/OS to control access to the
resources they want to protect. Resources protected by RACF fall into two categories, based on the
mechanisms used within RACF to describe them: Standard (e.g., MVS data sets, or general
resources in classes defined by RACF or the system administrator), and UNIX (e.g., UNIX files,
Page 10 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
directories, and IPC objects instantiated by a UNIX file system). Discretionary access control (DAC)
rules allow resource managers to differentiate access of users to resources based on different
access types.
RACF standard DAC mechanism
Access types implemented in RACF for standard resources are hierarchical (i. e. a higher level of
access implies all lower levels of access). The access types are in hierarchical order:
• ALTER
• CONTROL
• UPDATE
• READ
• EXECUTE
• NONE
RACF makes access control decisions based on the user’s identity, security attributes, group
authorities, and the access authority specified with respect to the resource profile. RACF leaves the
interpretation of the semantics of the different access types to the resource manager. This allows for
example a resource manager to manage privileges for users with RACF by defining a resource class
for the privileges it wants to manage and individual resources within the class to represent individual
privileges. A resource manager can then interpret a specific access type to such a resource as a
specific privilege and allow a user to use functions it has bound to that privilege based on the access
type the user has to the resource representing the privilege.
Access authorities to resources are stored in profiles. Discrete profiles are valid for a single, named
resource and generic profiles are applicable to a group of resources, typically with similar names. For
access permission checks, RACF always chooses the most specific profile for a resource. Profiles
can have an access control list associated with them that contains a potentially large number of
entries for different groups and users, thus allowing the modeling of complex, fine-grained access
controls.
Access rights of users to resources can be set by the profile owner and by a user with the appropriate
administrative privileges.
The TOE supports access decisions local applications want to enforce for the resources they control.
Local applications can use the RACROUTE programming interface or the related programming
interfaces from the RACF callable services to perform the access check. The request specifies the
resource to be checked and the RACF user ID or group name whose access should be checked.
Most RACF interfaces require either the calling program to execute with privileges (e. g. supervisor
state or APF authorized) or require the user that started the program to have specific RACF managed
privileges. The system or RACF privileges required are documented with each RACF interface.
RACF UNIX DAC mechanism
RACF implements POSIX-conformant access control that can be used for such named objects in the
UNIX realm as UNIX file system objects and UNIX inter-process communication (IPC) objects.
Access types for UNIX file system objects are read, write, and execute/search, and read and write for
UNIX IPC objects. z/OS UNIX uses a dedicated interface to RACF to perform access control to file
system objects which is based on the permission bits associated with a file, or based on access
control lists, which are upward-compatible with the permission bits algorithm and implement the
recommendations from Portable Operating System Interface for UNIX (POSIX) 1003.1e draft 17.
Unlike the access rights to resources protected by RACF resource profiles, the permission bits and
access control lists for those objects are not stored in the RACF database but are stored outside of
RACF with the objects they protect and passed to RACF together with the request to check for
access permissions. The RACF callable services contain the interfaces to perform those access
checks and manage the related access permissions. The use of many of those interfaces is restricted
to programs executing with system privileges and some of those interfaces are explicitly reserved for
IBM's implementation of the UNIX System Services component or other z/OS components.
RACF supports resource managers in the decision when to prepare a resource for re-use.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 11 of 179
1.4.2.3 Mandatory access control and support for security labels (AC)
In addition to DAC, RACF provides mandatory access control (MAC) functions that are required for
Labeled Security Mode, which impose additional access restrictions on information flow on security
classification. Users and resources can have a security label specified in their profile. Security labels
contain a hierarchical classification (security level), which specify the sensitivity (for example: public,
internal use, or secret), and zero or more non-hierarchical security categories (for example:
PROJECTA or PROJECTB).
The access control enforced by the TOE ensures that users can only read labeled information if their
security labels dominate the information’s label, and that they can only write to labeled information
containers if the container’s label dominates the subject’s, thus implementing the Bell-LaPadula
model of information flow control. The system can also be configured to allow write-down for certain
authorized users.
1.4.2.4 Auditing (AU)
RACF provides an auditing capability that allows generating audit records for security-critical events.
RACF provides a number of logging and reporting functions that allow resource owners and auditors
to identify users who attempt to access resources. Audit records are generated by RACF and
submitted to another component of z/OS (System Management Facilities (SMF)), which collects them
into an audit trail.
RACF always generates audit records for such events as unauthorized attempts to access the
system or changes to the status of the RACF database. The security administrator, auditors, and
other users with appropriate authorization can configure which additional optional security events are
to be logged. In addition to writing records to the audit trail, messages can be sent to the security
console to immediately alert operators of detected policy violations. RACF provides SMF records for
all RACF-protected resources (either “traditional” or z/OS UNIX-based).
For reporting, auditors can unload all or selected parts of the SMF data for further analysis in a
human-readable formats and can then upload the data to a query or reporting package, such as
DFSORT™ if desired.
1.4.2.5 Security management (SM)
RACF provides a set of commands and options to adequately manage the TOE’s security functions.
Additionally, RACF provides the capability of managing users, groups of users, general resource
profiles, and RACF SETROPTS options.
RACF recognizes several authorities that are able to perform the different management tasks related
to the TOE’s security:
· General security options are managed by security administrators.
· In Labeled Security Mode: management of MAC attributes is performed by security
administrators.
· Management of users and their security attributes is performed by security administrators.
Management of groups (and to some extent users) can be delegated to group security
administrators.
· Users can change their own passwords or password phrases, their default groups, and their
user names (but not their user IDs).
· In Labeled Security Mode: users can choose their security labels at login, for some login
methods. (Note: this also applies in normal mode if the administrator chooses to activate
security label processing.)
· Auditors manage the parameters of the audit system (a list of audited events, for example)
and can analyze the audit trail.
· Security administrators can define what audit records are captured by the system.
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· Discretionary access rights to protected resources are managed by the owners of the
applicable profiles (or UNIX objects) or by security administrators.
1.4.2.6 Program Signing and Verification (SP)
RACF provides the services to support the signing and signature verification of z/OS program objects.
The function can be used for both signing a program object and verifying the signature of a program
object. The function is intended to be used by the z/OS program binder (for signing program objects)
and the z/OS loader (to verify the signature of a program object). The signature will be generated
using SHA256 as the hash function and RSA as the public key encryption algorithm. The maximum
RSA key size is 4096 bit.
1.4.2.7 TSF protection
TSF protection is based on several protection mechanisms that are provided by the underlying
abstract machine and z/OS operating system:
· Privileged processor instructions are only available to programs running in the processor’s
supervisor state
· Semi-privileged instructions are only available to programs running in an execution
environment that is established and authorized by the TSF
· While in operation, all address spaces, as well as the data and tasks contained therein, are
protected by the memory protection mechanisms of the underlying abstract machine
· z/OS protects the RACF address space and RACF functions from unauthorized access and
either z/OS or RACF itself ensures that a caller of RACF services has the hardware or z/OS
privileges (e. g. supervisor state, PSW key, APF authorization) required to invoke the service
z/OS address space management ensures that programs running in problem state cannot access
protected memory or resources that belong to other address spaces.
Access to system services – through supervisor call (SVC) or program call (PC) instructions, for
example – is controlled by z/OS, which requires that subjects who want to perform security-relevant
tasks be authorized appropriately.
The hardware and firmware components that provide the abstract machine for the TOE are required
to be physically protected from unauthorized access.
Tools are provided in the TOE environment to allow authorized administrators to check the correct
operation of the underlying abstract machine.
In addition to the protection mechanism of the underlying abstract machine, z/OS also uses software
mechanisms like the authorized program facility (APF) or specific privileges for programs in the UNIX
system services environment to protect the TSF.
Please refer to section 8.1.1 for a description of how RACF makes use of the TSF protection
infrastructure provided by z/OS.
1.4.3 Configurations
1.4.3.1 Software configuration
The Target of Evaluation, RACF for z/OS V2R3, consists of:
• RACF for z/OS V2R3 (RACF) provided as part of the Common Criteria Evaluated Base
Package for z/OS V2R3, program number 5650-ZOS with the following APARs:
◦ OA53946/UA94612
◦ OA52110/UA93049
◦ OA52834/UA94035
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 13 of 179
◦ OA53930/UA95160
◦ OA57638/UA99513, UA99514
The z/OS Common Criteria Evaluated Base package must be installed on appropriate IBM z System
mainframe hardware according to the directions delivered with the media and configured according to
the instructions in Chapter 7, “The evaluated configuration for the Common Criteria” in z/OS Planning
for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria ([PMLS]).
Although RACF allows the installation of system exits to tailor RACF processing, no such exits are
allowed in the evaluated configuration with the exception of the sample ICHPWX11 exit and its
associated IRRPHREX routine (which may be modified to suit the security administrator's needs).
Additionally, the RACF Authorized Caller Table (ICHAUTAB) is not allowed in the evaluated
configuration.
1.5 Structure
The structure of this document is as follows :
· Section 1 is the ST Introduction.
· Section 2 is the CC Conformance Claims
· Section 3 provides the Security Problem Definition
· Section 4 provides the Security Objectives
· Section 5 provides the Extended Components Definition
· Section 6 provides a statement on supporting functionality implemented by the operational
environment of RACF
· Section 7 provides the statement of Security requirements
· Section 8 provides the TOE summary specification, which includes the detailed specification of
the IT security functions
1.6 Terminology
This section contains a glossary of technical terms with definitions that are specific to this document.
Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise. Some of these terms are
used differently in other z/OS publications. This glossary includes the differences in usage where
appropriate.
abstract machine
A processor design that is not intended to be implemented as hardware, but which is the notional
executor of a particular intermediate language (abstract machine language) used in a compiler or
interpreter. An abstract machine has an instruction set, a register set, and a model of memory. It
may provide instructions that are closer to the language being compiled than any physical
computer or it may be used to make the language implementation easier to port to other platforms.
access
If an authorized user is granted a request to operate on an object, the user is said to have access
to that object. There are numerous types of access. Examples include read access, which allows
the reading of objects, and write access, which allows the writing of objects.
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access control policy
A set of rules used to mediate user access to TOE-protected objects. Access control policies
consist of two types of rules: access rules, which apply to the behavior of authorized users, and
authorization rules, which apply to the behavior of authorized administrators.
Accessor Environment Element
A RACF control block that describes the current user’s security environment.
authorization
If an authorized user is granted a requested service, the user is said to have authorization to the
requested service or object. There are numerous possible authorizations. Typical authorizations
include auditor authorization, which allows an administrator to view audit records and execute
audit tools, and DAC override authorization, which allows an administrator to override object
access controls to administer the system.
authorized administrator
An authorized user who has been granted the authority to manage all or a defined subset of the
functions of the TOE. Authorized administrators are expected to use this authority only in the
manner prescribed by the guidance that is given to them.
authorized user
A user who has been properly identified and authenticated. Authorized users are considered to be
legitimate users of the TOE. (Note: this is different from the z/OS concept of an “authorized
program” which is a program running in supervisor state, or system key, or with APF authority.)
category
See security category.
classification (MLS)
A hierarchical designation for data that represents the sensitivity of the information. The equivalent
IBM term is security level.
discretionary access control (DAC)
An access control policy that allows authorized users and authorized administrators to control
access to objects based on individual user identity or membership in a group (PROJECTA, for
example).
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
A client/server protocol for accessing a directory service.
mandatory access control (MAC)
An access control policy that determines access based on the sensitivity (SECRET, for example)
and category (PERSONNEL or MEDICAL, for example) of the information that is being accessed
and the clearance of the user who is trying to gain access to that information.
mediation
When DAC and MAC policy rules are invoked, the TOE is said to be mediating access to TOE-
protected objects.
password
For the purposes of this evaluation, a 6 to 8 character secret value used during some forms of
user authentication, and allowing upper- and lower-case alphabetic, numeric, or national ($, #, @)
characters. Passwords are initially assigned by administrators, but may be changed by the user to
whom they are assigned.
password phrase
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 15 of 179
A 14 to 100 character secret value used in a manner similar to a password, except for its length
and an expanded set of valid characters (upper- and lower-case alphabetic, special (including
blanks), or numeric). In addition to assigning a password, administrators may assign a password
phrase to a user.
Note: Phrase may be shorter (down to 9 characters) if enabled by an administrator-installed exit
(ICHPWX11) that RACF supplies.
password/phrase
A shorthand term for “password or password phrase” sometimes used in this security target when
statements apply equally to passwords or to password phrases.
SECLABEL
Synonym for security label.
SECLEVEL
Synonym for security level (IBM).
security category
A special designation for data at a certain level, which indicates that only people who have been
properly briefed and cleared for access to data with this category can receive permission for
access to the information.
security label
A name that represents the combination of a hierarchical level of classification (IBM security level)
and a set of non-hierarchical categories (security category). Security labels are used as the base
for mandatory access control decisions. Security labels are sometimes referred to as
SECLABELs.
security level (IBM)
A hierarchical designation for data that represents the sensitivity of the information. Security levels
are sometimes referred to as SECLEVELs. The equivalent MLS term is classification.
security level (MLS policy in the Bell-LaPadula model)
The combination of a hierarchical classification (called security level in z/OS) and a set of non-
hierarchical categories that represents the sensitivity of information is known as the security level.
sensitivity label
A specific marking attached to subjects or objects that indicates the security level. The equivalent
to this MLS term in other IBM documentation is security label.
user
A person who is trying to invoke a service that is offered by the TOE.
user ID
In z/OS, a string of up to eight characters defined as a RACF USER profile that uniquely identifies
a user. Users who may use UNIX services will additionally have a numerical user identifier (UID)
that is used by the UNIX subsystem for access decisions. The user name is an additional attribute
that usually holds the user’s full name. While users can modify their user names, only
administrators can change user IDs.
1.7 Abbreviations
ACEE Accessor Environment Element
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APAR Authorized Program Analysis Report (IBM)
CC Common Criteria
DAC discretionary access control
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MAC mandatory access control
PADS program access to data sets
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RACF Resource Access Control Facility
SDSF System Display and Search Facility
SFR security functional requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functions
TSP TOE security policy
1.8 References
[ABC-V6] ABCs of z/OS System Programming Volume 6, IBM Redbook SG246986, First Edition, August
2008
[ADP] DoD Manual 5200.28-M: Techniques and procedures for Implementing, Deactivating and
Evaluating Resource Sharing ADP Systems
[OSPP] Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, BSI-CC-PP-0067, June 2010
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts 1 to 3: [CCMB-2017-04-
001, April 2017, Version 3.1R5], [CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017, Version 3.1R5], and [CCMB-
2017-04-003, April 2017, Version 3.1R5]
[CCINT] CCIMB Interpretations (as of October 1, 2012)
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology,
[CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017, Version 3.1R5]
[GUIDE] ISO/IEC TR 15446 Title: Information technology – Security techniques – Guide for the production
of protection profiles and security targets, 2009
[PMLS] z/OS Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria
[ZARCH] IBM: z/Architecture: Principles of Operation, SA22-7832-10
[z/OS Concepts] Introduction to the New Mainframe: z/OS Basics, IBM Redbook SG246366, March 29, 2011
1.9 Trademarks
The following terms are trademarks or registered trademarks of International Business Machines
Corporation in the United States, other countries, or both:
DFSORT
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 17 of 179
IBM
MVS
PR/SM
Print Services Facility
Processor Resource/Systems Manager
RACF
System z
VTAM
z/Architecture
z/OS
z/VM
zSeries
z9
z10
Java and all Java-based trademarks and logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sun Microsys-
tems, Inc. in the United States, other countries, or both.
UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group in the United States, other countries, or both.
Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks or service marks of others.
Page 18 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
2. CC Conformance Claims
2.1 Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target is conformant to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation Version 3.1 R5 [CC]. It is CC Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant, with a claimed
Evaluation Assurance Level of EAL5, augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 19 of 179
3. Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
The statement of the TOE security problem definition describes the security aspects of the
environment in which the TOE is intended to be used and the manner in which it is expected to be
deployed.
To this end, the statement of the TOE security environment identifies the list of assumptions made on
the operational environment (including physical and procedural measures) and the intended method
of use of the product, defines the threats that the product is designed to counter, and the
organizational security policies with which the product is designed to comply.
3.2 Threat Environment
Threats to be countered by the TOE are characterized by the combination of an asset being subject
to a threat, a threat agent and an adverse action.
3.2.1 Assets
Assets to be protected are:
1. RACF internal data used to control the operation of RACF (TSF data), including user and
group profiles and profiles in other classes that RACF uses for its internal operations
2. RACF profiles managed by RACF on behalf of resource managers (user data)
3. RACF functions
4. The resources managed by the TSF that are used to store the above-mentioned objects,
including the metadata needed to manage these objects.
3.2.2 Threat Agents
Threat agents are external entities that potentially may attack the TOE. They satisfy one or more of
the following criteria:
• External entities not authorized to access assets may attempt to access them either by
masquerading as an authorized entity or by attempting to use TSF services without proper
authorization.
• External entities authorized to access certain assets may attempt to access other assets they
are not authorized to either by misusing services they are allowed to use or by masquerading
as a different external entity.
• Untrusted subjects may attempt to access assets they are not authorized to either by
misusing services they are allowed to use or by masquerading as a different subject.
Threat agents are typically characterized by a number of factors, such as expertise, available
resources, and motivation, with motivation being linked directly to the value of the assets at stake.
The TOE protects against intentional and unintentional breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a moderate attack potential.
The threat agents can be categorized as one of the following:
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· unauthorized users of the TOE (that is, individuals who have not been granted the right to
access the system)
· authorized users of the TOE (that is, individuals who have been granted the right to access
the system) but not given administrative authority. Those users may have programming
capabilities and/or are allowed to install programs on the underlying z/OS operating system.
Note: Security breaches in the operational environment that are not caused by security
problems within the TOE itself are not subject of this evaluation.
The threat agents are assumed to originate from a well-managed user community in a moderately
hostile working environment, and hence the product protects against threats of attempts to breach the
system security by users with a moderate attack potential. The TOE is not intended to be applicable
to circumstances in which protection is required against determined attempts by hostile and well-
funded attackers with a high level of expertise to breach system security. The TOE relies on the z/OS
operating system within its operational environment to ensure that users can not bypass the z/OS
separation mechanisms and get operating system privileges (getting one of their programs to operate
in supervisor state, with a storage key of 0 to 7, or as an APF authorized program). The TOE also
relies on z/OS to enforce the decisions made by RACF for access to the data sets used by RACF.
The TOE also relies on z/OS to enforce the protection of system memory and prohibit any untrusted
program from modifying system memory used by RACF or accessing such memory other than the
allowed access modes. The TOE also uses services from some z/OS components and relies upon
those services to be implemented correctly.
3.2.3 Threats countered by the TOE
T.ACCESS.TSFDATA
A threat agent may read or modify TSF data using functions of the TOE without the necessary
authorization
T.ACCESS.USERDATA
A threat agent may gain access to user data stored, processed or transmitted by the TOE without
being appropriately authorized according to the TOE security policy by using functions provided by
the TOE.
T.ACCESS.TSFFUNC
A threat agent may use or manage functionality of the TSF bypassing protection mechanisms of the
TSF.
T.IA.MASQUERADE
A threat agent might masquerade as an authorized entity including the TOE itself or a part of the TOE
in order to gain unauthorized access to user data, TSF data, or TOE resources.
T.IA.USER
A threat agent might gain access to user data, TSF data or TOE resources with the exception of
public objects without being identified and authenticated by the TSF.
T.SENSITIVITY (Labeled Security Mode only)
The TOE may not adequately separate data on the basis of its sensitivity label, thereby allowing
access to RACF internal data, RACF user data or resources protected by external resource
managers in violation of the label-based access control policy.
3.3 Assumptions
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to be
used. It includes information about the physical, personnel, procedural, and connectivity aspects of
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 21 of 179
the environment.
The TOE is assured to provide effective security measures in its intended environment only if it is
installed, managed, and used correctly. The operational environment must be managed in
accordance with user/administrator guidance documentation. The following specific conditions are
assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed.
3.3.1 Environment of use of the TOE
Physical
The TOE is intended for application in user areas that have physical control and monitoring. It is
assumed that the following physical conditions will exist:
A.PHYSICAL
It is assumed that the IT environment provides the TOE with appropriate physical security,
commensurate with the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE.
Personnel
A.MANAGE
The TOE security functionality is managed by one or more competent individuals. The system
administrative personnel are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by
the instructions provided by the guidance documentation.
A.AUTHUSER
Authorized users possess the necessary authorization to access at least some of the information
managed by the TOE and are expected to act in a cooperating manner in a benign environment.
A.TRAINEDUSER
Users are sufficiently trained and trusted to accomplish some task or group of tasks within a secure IT
environment by exercising complete control over their user data.
Procedural
A.DETECT
Any modification or corruption of security-enforcing or security-relevant files of the TOE, user or the
underlying platform caused either intentionally or accidentally will be detected by an administrative
user.
Operating system
A.OPERATING_SYSTEM
The z/OS operating system the TOE is integrated in protects the TOE from modification and access of
the TOE's TSF data and user data other than through the interfaces provided by the TOE. The
operating system also ensures that no unauthorized user program can escalate its privileges such
that it can bypass the separation and memory protection functions of the operating system. RACF
also relies on the functional support of the following components of z/OS:
• SMF for the collection, protection and analysis of the audit records.
• DFSMS for access to data sets RACF uses for its TSF data and user data.
• UNIX System Services for storage of and access to TSF data RACF stores with UNIX file
system and IPC objects.
• PKI for the provision of PKI services backing the RACF services provided by the R_pkiserv
function.
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• IBM Tivoli directory server for the provision of LDAP services used by the R_proxyserv
callable service
• ICSF to manage PKCS#11 key tokens used by RACF and provide cryptographic services
used by RACDCERT
• SystemSSL for certificate validation
• BCP for address space separation, assignment of hardware privileges to address spaces and
programs, management of APF authorizations, and general protection of data in address
spaces that need to be protected from read and/or write access by untrusted subjects
Note: the RACF callable services R_dceinfo and R_dceruid have no use in the evaluated
configuration of RACF as z/OS (the environment for this evaluation) no longer provides DCE
functionality, and always return with an error, since the administrators will have no reason to
activate the DCEUUIDS class of RACF nor to define DCE segments in USER profiles.
A.TRUSTED_PROGRAMS
The operational environment prohibits the installation of untrusted programs that execute with
hardware or operating system privileges which would allow this program to use RACF interfaces
reserved for trusted programs. Trusted Programs use the RACF interfaces in accordance with their
specification.
3.4 Organizational security policies
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
The users of the TOE shall be held accountable for their security-relevant actions within the TOE.
P.USER
Authority shall only be given to users who are trusted to perform the actions correctly.
P.RESOURCE_LABELS (Labeled Security Mode only)
All resources accessible by subjects and all subjects must have associated labels identifying their
sensitivity levels.
P.USER_CLEARANCE (Labeled Security Mode only)
All users must have a clearance level identifying the maximum sensitivity levels of data they may
access.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 23 of 179
4. Security objectives
This section defines the security objectives of the TSF and its supporting environment. Security
objectives for the TOE, reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats, comply with any
organizational security policies identified, or both. In addition, assumptions related to the operational
environment of the TOE are upheld by respective objectives for the TOE environment. All of the
identified threats, organizational policies, and assumptions are addressed under one of the following
categories.
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE
O.AUDITING
The TSF must be able to generate audit records for defined security-relevant events ( including
security-critical actions of users of the TOE). The TSF must submit those records to the operating
system auditing function, which adds the time and date and stores the audit records in a protected
area.
O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS
The TSF must control access of subjects and/or users to named resources based on identity of the
object. The TSF must allow authorized users to specify for each access mode which users/subjects
are allowed to access a specific named object in that access mode.
O.I&A
The TOE must ensure that users have been successfully authenticated before allowing any action the
TOE has defined to provide to authenticated users only.
O.MANAGE
The TSF must provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support the authorized users that
are responsible for the management of TOE security mechanisms and must ensure that only
authorized users are able to access such functionality.
O.I&A.MULTIPLE
The TOE shall allow the concurrent use of multiple identification and authentication mechanisms
implementing the identification and authentication policy.
O.PROGRAM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORT
The TOE shall provide a functionality that allows its operational environment the implementation of a
function that verifies the integrity and authenticity of programs before they are loaded and executed.
O.LS.CONFIDENTIALITY (Labeled Security Mode only)
The TOE shall support resource managers to control information flow between entities and resources
Page 24 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
based upon the sensitivity labels of users and resources.
O.LS.LABEL (Labeled Security Mode only)
The TOE shall provide the capability to label all users, and all resources, to allow resource managers
to restrict information flow based on the sensitivity labels.
4.2 Security objectives for the operational environment
OE.ADMIN
Those responsible for the TOE are competent and trustworthy individuals, capable of managing the
TOE and the security of the information it contains.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE must establish and implement procedures to ensure that information is
protected in an appropriate manner. In particular:
1) All applications trusted by the operating system must be approved for the handling of the
most sensitive data held by the system. Such applications as well as the operating system
itself are assumed to be adequately protected against threats to the confidentiality and
integrity of the data handled.
2) DAC protections on security-relevant resources shall always be set up correctly.
3) Users are authorized to access parts of the data managed by the TOE and are trained to
exercise control over their own data.
4) Resource managers that use the TOE to protect their resources invoke the TOE on all
attempts to access resources they manage, provide correct information about the subject that
attempts to access the resource, the resource itself and the attempted type of access.
Resource managers will honor the access decision made by the TOE.
OE.INSTALL
Those responsible for the TOE must establish and implement procedures to ensure that the
components that comprise the TOE are distributed, installed and configured in a secure manner
supporting the security mechanisms provided by the TOE.
OE.MAINTENANCE
Authorized users of the TOE must ensure that the comprehensive diagnostics facilities provided by
the product are invoked at every scheduled preventative maintenance period.
OE.PHYSICAL
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to enforcement of the
security policy are protected from physical attack that might compromise IT security objectives. The
protection must be commensurate with the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE.
OE.RECOVER
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that procedures and/or mechanisms are provided to
assure that after system failure or other discontinuity, recovery without a protection (security)
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 25 of 179
compromise is achieved.
OE.OS_SEP
The z/OS operating system provides the mechanisms to separate the address spaces of RACF from
any untrusted address spaces and provides the mechanisms to protect RACF programs and data
within an address space from any uncontrolled access by untrusted entities. The operating system
assigns hardware and software privileges only to programs that are defined as trusted and prohibits
any untrusted subject to escalate its privileges to supervisor state, a privileged storage key or to APF
authorization. Such privilege escalation will only happen when the defined z/OS interfaces that imply
such privilege escalations are used and the program that is executed after this privilege escalation
has been defined as a trusted program.
OE.TRUSTED_PROGRAMS
Those responsible for the operating system the TOE is integrated in must ensure that only programs
that are fully trusted are installed such that they execute with hardware privileges (system storage key
or supervisor state) or with operating system privileges (APF authorization).
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Security Objectives Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of TOE objectives to threats and policies, showing that each
objective counters or enforces at least one threat or policy, respectively.
Objective Threats / OSPs
O.AUDITING P.ACCOUNTABILITY
O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS T.ACCESS.TSFDATA
T.ACCESS.USERDATA
O.I&A T.IA.MASQUERADE
T.IA.USER
O.MANAGE T.ACCESS.TSFFUNC
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
P.USER
O.I&A.MULTIPLE T.IA.MASQUERADE
T.IA.USER
O.PROGRAM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORT T.ACCESS.TSFDATA
T.ACCESS.TSFFUNC
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Objective Threats / OSPs
O.LS.CONFIDENTIALITY T.SENSITIVITY
P.USER_CLEARANCE
O.LS.LABEL P.RESOURCE_LABELS
P.USER_CLEARANCE
T.SENSITIVITY
Table 1: Mapping of security objectives to threats and policies
The following table provides a mapping of the objectives for the Operational Environment to
assumptions, threats and policies, showing that each objective holds, counters or enforces at least
one assumption, threat or policy, respectively.
Objective Assumptions / Threats / OSPs
OE.ADMIN A.MANAGE
A.AUTHUSER
A.TRAINEDUSER
OE.INFO_PROTECT A.MANAGE
A.AUTHUSER
A.TRAINEDUSER
P.USER
OE.INSTALL A.MANAGE
A.DETECT
OE.MAINTENANCE A.DETECT
OE.PHYSICAL A.PHYSICAL
OE.RECOVER A.MANAGE
OE.OS_SEP A.OPERATING_SYSTEM
T.ACCESS.USERDATA
T.ACCESS.TSFDATA
T.ACCESS.TSFFUNC
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 27 of 179
Objective Assumptions / Threats / OSPs
OE.TRUSTED_PROGRAMS A.TRUSTED_PROGRAMS
T.ACCESS.USERDATA
T.ACCESS.TSFDATA
T.ACCESS.TSFFUNC
Table 2: Mapping of security objectives for the Operational Environment to
assumptions, threats and policies
4.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives are suitable to counter each
individual threat and that each security objective tracing back to a threat, when achieved, actually
contributes to the removal, diminishing or mitigation of that threat:
Threat Rationale for security objectives
T.ACCESS.TSFDATA The threat of accessing TSF data without proper authorization is re-
moved by:
· O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS requiring that data, in-
cluding TSF data stored with the TOE, have discre-
tionary access control protection (Note: some TSF
data is not intended to be directly accessible by ex-
ternal entities and therefore no discretionary access
can be assigned to such TSF data),
· O.PROGRAM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORT requiring the
TOE to implement a supporting function for program
integrity verification
· OE.OS_SEP requiring that the operating system protects
RACF from access to its TSF data and user data
other than through the RACF provided interfaces and
also prohibits that untrusted user programs escalate
their privileges such that it can bypass the hardware
and OS provided protection mechanisms,
· OE.TRUSTED_PROGRAMS requiring that those re-
sponsible for the operating system don't install un-
trusted programs with privileges that would allow
those programs to bypass operating system protec-
tion
T.ACCESS.USERDATA The threat of accessing user data without proper authorization is re-
moved by:
· O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS requiring that data includ-
ing user data stored with the TOE, have discre-
tionary access control protection,
· OE.OS_SEP requiring that the operating system protects
Page 28 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
Threat Rationale for security objectives
RACF from access to its TSF data and user data
other than through the RACF provided interfaces and
also prohibits that untrusted user programs escalate
their privileges such that it can bypass the hardware
and OS provided protection mechanisms,
· OE.TRUSTED_PROGRAMS requiring that those re-
sponsible for the operating system don't install un-
trusted programs with privileges that would allow
those programs to bypass operating system protec-
tion
T.ACCESS.TSFFUNC The threat of accessing TSF functions without proper authorization
is removed by:
· O.MANAGE requiring that only authorized users utilize
management TSF functions,
· O.PROGRAM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORT requiring the
TOE to implement a supporting function for program
integrity verification
· OE.OS_SEP requiring that the operating system protects
RACF from access to its TSF data and user data
other than through the RACF provided interfaces and
also prohibits that untrusted user programs escalate
their privileges such that it can bypass the hardware
and OS provided protection mechanisms,
· OE.TRUSTED_PROGRAMS requiring that those re-
sponsible for the operating system don't install un-
trusted programs with privileges that would allow
those programs to bypass operating system protec-
tion
T.IA.MASQUERADE The threat of masquerading as an authorized entity in order to gain
unauthorized access to user data, TSF data or TOE resources is
removed by:
· O.I&A requiring that each entity interacting with the TOE
is properly identified and authenticated before allow-
ing any action the TOE is defined to provide to au-
thenticated users only.
· O.I&A.MULTIPLE requiring that the TOE supports multi-
ple identification and authentication mechanisms, al-
lowing to use the most appropriate one.
T.IA.USER The threat of accessing user data, TSF data or TOE resources
without being identified and authenticated is removed by:
· O.I&A requiring that each entity interacting with the TOE
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 29 of 179
Threat Rationale for security objectives
is properly identified and authenticated before allow-
ing any action the TOE has defined to provide to au-
thenticated users only.
· O.I&A.MULTIPLE requiring that the TOE supports multi-
ple identification and authentication mechanisms, al-
lowing to use the most appropriate one.
T.SENSITIVITY The threat of not adequately separating data on the basis of its sen-
sitivity label, thereby allowing information to flow illicitly from or to
users is removed by:
· O.LS.CONFIDENTIALITY requiring the TOE to provide
assistance to resource managers allowing them to
control information flow between entities and re-
sources based upon the sensitivity labels of users
and resources. RACF uses its own functionality to
protect its resources,
· O.LS.LABEL requiring the TOE to provide labels used to
enforce a label-based mandatory access control pol-
icy. Note: while RACF mainly provides this function-
ality to support external resource managers, it also
uses this functionality for its own resources.
Table 3: Sufficiency of objectives countering threats
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives for the environment are
suitable to cover each individual assumption, that each security objective for the environment that
traces back to an assumption about the environment of use of the TOE, when achieved, actually
contributes to the environment achieving consistency with the assumption, and that if all security
objectives for the environment that trace back to an assumption are achieved, the intended usage is
supported:
Assumption Rationale for security objectives
A.PHYSICAL The assumption on the IT environment to provide the TOE with appropriate
physical security, commensurate with the value of the IT assets protected by
the TOE is covered by:
· OE.PHYSICAL requiring physical protection.
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Assumption Rationale for security objectives
A.MANAGE The assumptions on the TOE security functionality being managed by one or
more competent trustworthy individuals is covered by:
· OE.ADMIN requiring trustworthy personnel managing the TOE,
· OE.INFO_PROTECT requiring personnel to ensure that informa-
tion is protected in an appropriate manner,
· OE.INSTALL requiring personnel to ensure that components that
comprise the system are distributed, installed and configured
in a secure manner supporting the security mechanisms pro-
vided by the TOE,
· OE.RECOVER requiring personnel to assure that after system fail-
ure or other discontinuity, recovery without a protection (secu-
rity) compromise is achieved.
A.AUTHUSER The assumption on authorized users to possess the necessary authorization
to access at least some of the information managed by the TOE and to act in
a cooperating manner in a benign environment is covered by:
· OE.ADMIN ensuring that those responsible for the TOE are com-
petent and trustworthy individuals, capable of managing the
TOE and the security of the information it contains,
· OE.INFO_PROTECT requiring that DAC protections on security-
relevant files (such as audit trails and authentication data-
bases) shall always be set up correctly and that users are au-
thorized to access parts of the data maintained by the TOE.
A.TRAINEDUSER The assumptions on users to be sufficiently trained and trusted to accomplish
some task or group of tasks within a secure IT environment by exercising
complete control over their user data is covered by:
· OE.ADMIN requiring competent personnel managing the TOE,
· OE.INFO_PROTECT requiring that those responsible for the TOE
must establish and implement procedures to ensure that infor-
mation is protected in an appropriate manner and that users
are trained to exercise control over their own data.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 31 of 179
Assumption Rationale for security objectives
A.DETECT The assumption that modification or corruption of security-enforcing or secu-
rity-relevant files will be detected by an administrative user is covered by:
· OE.INSTALL requiring an administrative user to ensure that the
TOE is distributed, installed and configured in a secure man-
ner supporting the security mechanisms provided by the TOE,
· OE.MAINTENANCE requiring an administrative user to ensure
that the diagnostics facilities are invoked at every scheduled
preventative maintenance period, verifying the correct opera-
tion of the TOE,
A.OPERATING_SY
STEM
The assumptions on the separation functions provided by the z/OS operating
system is covered by:
· OE.OS_SEP requiring the z/OS operating system to protect the
address spaces of RACF and the RACF programs and data
within an address space from uncontrolled access by subject
not executing with hardware privileges or APF authorization.
A.TRUSTED_PRO-
GRAMS
The assumptions on the trusted programs installed on the z/OS operating
system is covered by:
· OE.TRUSTED_PROGRAMS requiring the persons responsible for
installing trusted programs on z/OS to not install any program
executing with critical privileges unless they trust the program
to not misuse those privileges and not use the RACF inter-
faces for privileged programs in a way not allowed by the
specification of the interface.
Table 4: Sufficiency of objectives holding assumptions
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives are suitable to cover each
individual organizational security policy, that each security objective that traces back to an OSP, when
achieved, actually contributes to the implementation of the OSP, and that if all security objectives that
trace back to an OSP are achieved, the OSP is implemented:
OSP Rationale for security objectives
P.ACCOUNTABILITY The policy to hold users accountable for their security-relevant actions
within the TOE is implemented by:
· O.AUDITING providing the TOE with audit functionality,
· O.MANAGE allowing the management of this function.
P.USER The policy to match the trust given to a user and the actions the user is
given authority to perform is implemented by:
· O.MANAGE allowing appropriately-authorized users to
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OSP Rationale for security objectives
manage the TSF,
· OE.INFO_PROTECT, which requires that users are trusted
to use the protection mechanisms of the TOE to protect
their data.
P.RESOURCE_LABELS The policy that resources accessible by subjects and all subjects must
have associated labels identifying their sensitivity levels is imple-
mented by:
· O.LS.LABEL providing the capability to label all subjects
and all objects accessible by subjects to restrict the in-
formation flow based on the sensitivity labels.
P.USER_CLEARANCE The policy that all users must have a clearance level identifying the
maximum sensitivity levels of data they may access is implemented
by:
· O.LS.CONFIDENTIALITY requiring the TOE to control infor-
mation flow between entities and resources based upon
the sensitivity labels of users and resources.
· O.LS.LABEL ensures that objects and subjects are accu-
rately labeled for the TOE to enforce the label policy.
Table 5: Sufficiency of objectives enforcing Organizational Security Policies
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 33 of 179
5. Extended Components Definition
This Security Target uses security functional requirements taken from part 2 of the Common Criteria
plus two extended security functional requirements (FIA_USB.2 and FAU_GEN_SUB.1).
5.1 FIA_USB.2
FIA_USB.2 has been taken from the "Operating System Protection Profile" [OSPP]. This extended
SFR is defined there as:
FIA_USB.2 Enhanced user-subject binding
FIA_USB.2 is analog to FIA_USB.1 except that it adds the possibility to specify rules whereby subject
security attributes are also derived from TSF data other than user security attributes.
Component leveling
FIA_USB.2 is hierarchical to FIA_USB.1.
Management
See management description specified for FIA_USB.1 in [CC].
Audit
See audit requirement specified for FIA_USB.1 in [CC].
FIA_USB.2 Enhanced user-subject binding
Hierarchical to: FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.2.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects
acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes].
FIA_USB.2.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user se-
curity attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules
for the initial association of attributes].
FIA_USB.2.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user se-
curity attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [as-
signment: rules for the changing of attributes].
FIA_USB.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for the assignment of subject secu-
rity attributes not derived from user security attributes when a subject is cre-
ated: [assignment: rules for the initial association of the subject security at-
tributes not derived from user security attributes].
Rationale
An operating system may derive subject security attributes from other TSF data that are not directly
user security attributes. An example is the point-of-entry the user has used to establish the
connection. An access control policy may also use this subject security attribute within its access
control policy, allowing access to critical objects only when the user has connected through specific
ports-of-entry.
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5.2 FAU_GEN_SUB.1
This Security Target includes an extended component for audit data generation. This extended
component defines a subset of the component FAU_GEN.1 as defined in part 2 of the CC.
This extended component needed to be defined since RACF uses the audit trail interfaces provided
by the SMF component of z/OS for trusted components that want to store their audit records in the
common audit trail provided by z/OS. While RACF collects all the information for its own audit records
and formats the audit records, it does not generate an audit record for the start and the stop of the
audit system (this is done by SMF, which controls the audit trail). RACF also does not store the time
and date into the audit record. This is also a function that is performed by SMF when a trusted
component submits an audit record for inclusion into the SMF audit trail.
This way of handling audit records is common for a large number of products that on the one hand
want to produce audit records and on the other hand do not want to implement the functions to
manage the audit trail, protect the audit trail, or process audit records for evaluation. Many
applications use audit trails provided either by the underlying operating system or by a dedicated
audit component in the IT environment (e. g. a log host). In order to have a single time source most of
those dedicated audit systems that provide an interface to other product to submit audit records for
storing them in the audit trail will put the time stamp with the time and date into the audit records
themselves rather than relying on the other systems to synchronize their time sources.
The extended component FAU_GEN_SUB.1 has been derived as a subset from the component
FAU_GEN.1 as listed in part 2 of the CC. The requirement for auditing the start and stop of the audit
system has been dropped compared to FAU_GEN.1.1 and in FAU_GEN.1.2 the requirement to
include the time and date has been dropped. As a consequence of dropping the inclusion of the time
and date, the extended component no longer has a dependency on FPT_STM.1
Component leveling
FAU_GEN_SUB.1 is not hierarchical to any other component.
Management
There are no management activities foreseen..
Audit
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_GEN_SUB.1 Subset audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: none
FAU_GEN_SUB.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not
specified] level of audit; and
b) [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].
FAU_GEN_SUB.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of
the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the ST, [assignment: other audit relevant information].
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 35 of 179
6. Supporting Functionality provided by the Operational Environment
In the case of RACF the security functionality defined in chapter 8 of this Security Target depends on
the supporting functionality of the z/OS operating system defined in this section. Note that also z/OS
itself relies on security functional requirements provided by its operational environment to support the
provision of its security functionality. Since RACF relies on the general protection mechanisms
provided by z/OS, this implies by transitivity that RACF also relies on the security functional
requirements provided by the operational environment of z/OS. To avoid duplication, the security
functional requirements for the z/OS operational environment are not listed here.
There are several components of z/OS that are used by the TOE to implement its security functional
requirements. Those are:
• SMF to record and store audit records generated by RACF, prevent records from getting lost
and other z/OS components to provide utilities for reading and searching audit records.
• PKI Services to provide the PKI related services used by the R_PKIServ RACF callable
service. This includes the generation of key pairs, the generation of digital certificates.
• DFSMS which provides the functions for managing and accessing data sets. RACF uses
z/OS data sets for persistent storage of its TSF data.
• UNIX System Services for storage and access to TSF data RACF stores with UNIX file
system and IPC objects.
• IBM Tivoli directory server for the provision of directory services used by the R_proxyserv
callable service.
• ICSF which is used to manage PKCS#11 tokens used by RACF and provide cryptographic
services used by RACDCERT.
• SystemSSL for certificate validation.
• BCP for address space and memory management, assignment of hardware privileges to
address spaces and programs, management of system calls, interrupts and exceptions,
management of APF authorizations, general protection of data in address spaces that need to
be protected from read and/or write access by untrusted subjects, scheduling of processes,
provision of serialization services, and provision of notification services.
Page 36 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
7. Security Functional Requirements
In this section assignment or selection operations on SFRs are marked bold while refinements are
marked bold and italic.
Iteration operations are identified by a suffix in parentheses added to the SFR identifier.
7.1 Security audit (FAU)
Subset audit data generation (FAU_GEN_SUB.1)
FAU_GEN_SUB.1.1The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
b) all modifications to the set of events being audited;
c) all user authentication attempts;
d) all denied accesses to resources;
e) explicit modifications of access rights to resources; and
f) the events listed in table 6, "Auditable Events".
Component Event Details
FAU_GEN_SUB.1 Startup of RACF . SMF type 81 record (RACF
initialization).
FAU_GEN.2 None.
FAU_SAR.1 Reading of information
from the audit records.
SMF type 80 record for the
raw and saved SMF data
sets.
FAU_SEL.1 All modifications to the
audit configuration that
occur while the audit
collection functions are
operating.
SMF records generated by
the RACF commands that
modify the audit configura-
tion (SMF type 90 record,
subtypes 5 and 9.
IFASMFDP and IDCAMS
(which are part of the TOE
environment) can be used
to report on these events).
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 37 of 179
Component Event Details
FCS_COP.1 Success or failure of
signature verification
for program signing.
Failure to validate the
certificate chain.
SMF type 80 record event
code 86 (56 hex)
FDP_ACF.1(GRD) All requests to perform
an operation on an ob-
ject covered by the Se-
curity Function Policy
(SFP).
SMF type 80 record, event
code 2 for access to MVS
resources.
FDP_ACF.1(UFS)
FDP_ACF.1(IPC)
All requests to perform
an operation on an ob-
ject covered by the Se-
curity Function Policy
(SFP).
SMF type 80 record, event
codes 28-30 for access to
UNIX resources.
FDP_IFC.2 None.
FDP_IFF.2 All decisions on re-
quests for information
flow.
SMF type 80 record, event
code 2, with reason indicat-
ing SECLABEL AUDIT.
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure
notification and account
locking.
SMF type 80 record, event
code 1, all qualifiers except
0, 12 and 13. Qualifier 7 es-
pecially reports account
locking.
FIA_ATD.1(HU)
FIA_ATD.1(LS)
None.
FIA_SOS.1 Rejection or accep-
tance by the TSF of any
tested secret.
SMF type 80 record, event
code 1, qualifier 1 (pass-
word/phrase not valid).
Also SMF type 80, event
code 68, qualifier 0 (suc-
cess) or 1 (failure) to gener-
ate a Kerberos TGT (gener-
ated by Network authenti-
cation service, not the TOE)
Also SMF type 80, event
code 70, qualifier 2 for
R_PKIServ Export function
with incorrect passphrase.
FIA_UAU.1 All use of the authenti-
cation mechanism.
SMF type 80 record, event
code 1, various qualifiers
and SMF record type 30
Page 38 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
Component Event Details
subtypes 1 and 5).
Also SMF type 80, event
code 68, qualifier 0 (suc-
cess) or 1 (failure) to gener-
ate a Kerberos TGT (gener-
ated by Network authenti-
cation service, not the TOE)
Also SMF type 83, subtype
3, event codes 2,4,6,11 for
LDAP bind operations.
FIA_UAU.5 None specific. All au-
thentication functions
produce the audit
records mentioned for
FIA_UAU.1 and
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.7 None.
FIA_UID.1 All use of the user iden-
tification mechanism,
including the identity
provided during suc-
cessful attempts.
SMF type 80 record, event
code 1, various qualifiers.
(Note: the authorized caller
of the RACF authentication
function can control
whether RACF audits the
result or not, and in cases
where the caller instructs
RACF not to audit the result
the caller is responsible for
providing appropriate alter-
native auditing.)
FIA_USB.1
FIA_USB.2
Success and failure of
binding user security
attributes to a subject
(e.g. success and fail-
ure to create a subject).
SMF type 80 record, event
code 1, various qualifiers.
(Note: the authorized caller
of the RACF authentication
function can control
whether RACF audits the
result or not, and in cases
where the caller instructs
RACF not to audit the result
the caller is responsible for
providing appropriate alter-
native auditing.)
FMT_MSA.1(GRD)
FMT_MSA.1(UFS)
FMT_MSA.1(IPC)
FMT_MSA.1(FLA)
FMT_MSA.1(LS)
All modifications of the
values of security at-
tributes.
SMF type 80 record (gener-
ated by the RACF com-
mands).
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 39 of 179
Component Event Details
FMT_MSA.3(LS)
FMT_MSA.3(GRD)
FMT_MSA.3(UFS)
FMT_MSA.3(FLA)
Modifications of the de-
fault setting of permis-
sive or restrictive rules.
All modifications of the
initial value of security
attributes.
SMF type 80 record (gener-
ated by the RACF com-
mands).
FMT_MSA.3(IPC) none
FMT_MTD.1(SO)
FMT_MTD.1(AE)
FMT_MTD.1(UA)
FMT_MTD.1(RA)
FMT_MTD.1(TH)
FMT_MTD.1(AD)
FMT_MTD.1(RC)
FMT_MTD.1(DC)
All modifications to the
values of TSF data.
SMF type 80 record (gener-
ated by the RACF com-
mands).
FMT_REV.1(USR) All attempts to revoke
security attributes.
SMF type 80 record (gener-
ated by the RACF com-
mands).
FMT_REV.1(OSA) All attempts to revoke
security attributes.
SMF type 80 record (gener-
ated by the RACF com-
mands).
FMT_SMF.1 None specifically asso-
ciated with this SFR,
but auditing is covered
under the FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_MSA.3,
FMT_MTD.1,
FMT_REV.1,
FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SEL.1, and
FMT_SMR.1 require-
ments which are im-
plied by FMT_SMF.1 as
discussed in chapter 7.
FMT_SMR.1 Modifications to the
group of users that are
part of a role.
SMF type 80 record (gener-
ated by the RACF com-
mands). See the event
codes related to the individ-
ual commands
FMT_SMR.1 Every use of the rights
of a role. (Additional /
Detailed)
SMF type 80 record.
Page 40 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
Component Event Details
FPT_TDC.1(RA)
FPT_TDC.1(LS)
None
Table 6: Auditable Events
FAU_GEN_SUB.1.2The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and outcome (success or failure) of the
event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the ST,
a) Date and time of the event (obtained from the underlying operating system)
b) User identity (if applicable); and
c) (in Labeled Security Mode) The sensitivity labels of subjects, objects, or in-
formation involved; and
d) The additional information specified in the “Details” column of table 6 Au-
ditable Events.
Application note: Each SMF record has a standard header that includes the ID of the job that caused the
event. The ID of the job is related to the user ID under which the job has been started by
SMF. Also, in cases of a client authenticating using a digital certificate, RACF certificate
mapping rules are used to assign an administrator-specified ID rather than a unique ID.
The audit records will contain the administrator-specified ID and the X500-based distin-
guished name from the client’s digital certificate for accountability purposes. In the case
where a user has been authenticated by a remote trusted system and the ID of the user
on the remote system has been mapped to a RACF userID using the identity mapping
function, audit records generated for that user will contain both the RACF userID and the
remote identity that mapped to the RACF userID.
Application note: RACF requires SMF to be active and configured to be able to record the RACF related
audit records. In this case the RACF initialization marks the audit record for the start of
the (RACF-related) audit system and the record for stopping RACF marks the shutdown
of the audit system
User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to asso-
ciate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
Application Note: As mentioned above audit records generated for users that have been authenticated by a
remote trusted IT system and where the remote userID has been mapped to a RACF
userID will contain both the RACF userID as well as the remote userID, allowing to trace
the real user even in cases where different remote userIDs have been mapped to the
same RACF userID.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 41 of 179
Audit review (FAU_SAR.1)
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide users with access rights to the data set containing the audit
records with the capability to read all audit information from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
Selective audit (FAU_SEL.1)
FAU_SEL.1.1 The TSF shall be able to select the set of events to be audited from the set of all au-
ditable events based on the following attributes:
a) Type of audit event;
b) user identity;
c) Outcome (success or failure) of the audit event;
d) Named object identity;
e) subject sensitivity label; (Labeled Security Mode only)
f) object sensitivity label; (Labeled Security Mode only)
7.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform digital signature generation and digital signature verification
in accordance with the following cryptographic algorithm SHA256withRSAEncryption
and cryptographic key sizes 1024, 2048, and 4096 bit that meet the following: X.509 v3
certificates and signatures according to PKCS#1 V2.1 (June 14, 2002)..
Application Note: RACF can digitally sign a program and verify the digital signature of a signed program. To
do this RACF uses an implementation of the RSA algorithm that is identical to the one
used by the software cryptographic service provider in ICSF. Since ICSF itself is a signed
program, RACF requires to have the implementation of RSA as part of RACF in order to
verify the signature of ICSF when this component is loaded.
7.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
7.3.1 General resource class and data set access control policy
Subset access control: (FDP_ACC.1(GRD))
FDP_ACC.1.1(GRD) The TSF shall enforce the RACF general resource class and data set access control
policy on subjects represented by an ACEE, the defined resources in the classes
listed in tables 7 to 15 below as objects and the RACF-defined access modes of
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ALTER, CONTROL, UPDATE, READ, EXECUTE, and NONE as operations among
subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
Application Note: RACF uses profiles in the resource classes to identify a profile that matches a resource
name specified.
Application Note: Except where noted in the table, RACF does not imply any semantics to the classes and
the profiles in the classes. The semantics of the profiles (i. e., what resource they protect
and what the semantics of the different access modes is) is completely left to the re-
source managers that use those classes to protect access to their resources. Profile
classes that are used by RACF itself are marked in red. Profile classes listed in black are
those defined by IBM and used outside of RACF. Since an installation may define its own
profile classes and use them in their applications, the set of profile classes is an open set
and profiles not used by RACF itself are user data (as far as RACF is concerned).
Application Note: RACF uses RACF profiles to control access to its own resources or control the use of
RACF privileges. Classes listed in red contain profiles used by RACF, but in some
classes not all profiles in the class may be used by RACF. For example RACF uses only
some profiles in the FACILITY class, while other profiles in this class are used by other
parts of z/OS.
Application Note: The following table only defines the general resource classes. There are also profiles in
the USER, GROUP, and DATASET classes, which have their own profile format. The ac-
cess control policy covers the general resource classes listed here and resources in the
DATASET class.
Class Name Purpose
ALCSAUTH Supports the Airline Control System/MVS (ALCS/MVS) product.
APPCLU Verifying the identity of partner logical units during VTAM session establish-
ment.
APPCPORT Controlling which user IDs can access the system from a given LU (APPC
port of entry). Also, conditional access to resources for users entering the
system from a given LU.
APPCSERV Controlling whether a program being run by a user can act as a server for a
specific APPC transaction program (TP).
APPCSI Controlling access to APPC side information files.
APPCTP Controlling the use of APPC transaction programs.
APPL Controlling access to applications.
CACHECLS Contains profiles used for saving and restoring cache contents from the
RACF database.
CBIND Controlling the client’s ability to bind to the server.
CDT Contains profiles for installation-defined classes for the dynamic CDT.
CFIELD Contains profiles that define the installation's custom fields.
CONSOLE Controlling access to MCS consoles. Also, conditional access to other re-
sources for commands originating from an MCS console.
DASDVOL DASD volumes.
DBNFORM Reserved for future IBM use.
DEVICES Used by MVS allocation to control who can allocate devices such as:
 Unit record devices (printers and punches) (allocated only by PSF, JES2,
or JES3)
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 43 of 179
Class Name Purpose
 Graphics devices (allocated only by VTAM)
Teleprocessing (TP) or communications devices (allocated only by VTAM)
DIGTCERT Contains digital certificates and information related to them. See chapter 19
of [RACF.SAG] and the description of the RACDCERT command.
DIGTCRIT Specifies additional criteria for certificate name filters. See chapter 19 of
[RACF.SAG] and the description of the RACDCERT command.
DIGTNMAP Mapping class for certificate name filters. See chapter 19 of [RACF.SAG] and
the description of the RACDCERT command.
DIGTRING Contains a profile for each key ring and provides information about the digital
certificates that are part of each key ring. See chapter 19 of [RACF.SAG] and
the description of the RACDCERT command.
DIRAUTH Setting logging options for RACROUTE REQUEST=DIRAUTH requests.
Also, if the DIRAUTH class is active, security label authorization checking is
done when a user receives a message sent through the TPUT macro or the
TSO SEND, or LISTBC commands.
DLFCLASS The data lookaside facility.
FACILITY Miscellaneous uses. Profiles are defined in this class so resource managers
(typically elements of z/OS or z/VM) can check a user’s access to the profiles
when the user takes some action. Examples are the profiles used to control
execution of RACDCERT command functions and the profiles used to control
privileges in the z/OS UNIX environment. RACF does not document all of the
resources used in the FACILITY class by other products. For information on
the FACILITY class resources used by a specific product (other than RACF
itself), see that product’s documentation.
FIELD Fields in RACF profiles (field-level access checking).
FSACCESS Allows control of access to the root of a zFS file system through RACF re-
source profiles rather than UNIX permission bits or ACLs.
FSEXEC Allows to prevent users from executing any file in a zFS file system or Tem-
porary File System.
GDASDVOL Resource group class for DASDVOL class.
GLOBAL Global access checking table entry.
GMBR Member class for the GLOBAL class.
GSDSF Resource group class for SDSF class.
GTERMINL Resource group class for TERMINAL class.
GXFACILI Grouping class for XFACILIT resources.
IBMOPC Controlling access to OPC/ESA subsystems.
IDIDMAP Contains distributed identity filters created with the RACMAP command. See
chapter 25 of [RACF.SAG] and the description of the RACMAP command.
JESINPUT Conditional access support for commands or jobs entered into the system
through a JES input device.
JESJOBS Controlling the submission and cancellation of jobs by job name.
JESSPOOL Controlling access to job data sets on the JES spool (that is, SYSIN and
SYSOUT data sets).
KEYSMSTR Contains profiles that hold keys to encrypt data stored in the RACF data-
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Class Name Purpose
base, such as LDAP BIND passwords and DCE passwords.
LDAPBIND Contains the LDAP server URL, bind distinguished name, and bind pass-
word.
LOGSTRM Controls system logger resources, such as log streams and the coupling fa-
cility structures associated with log streams.
NODES Controlling the following on MVS systems:
 Whether jobs are allowed to enter the system from other nodes
 Whether jobs that enter the system from other nodes have to pass user
identification and password verification checks
NODMBR Member class for the NODES class.
OPERCMDS Controlling who can issue operator commands (for example, JES and MVS,
and operator commands).
PMBR Member class for the PROGRAM class.
PROGRAM Protects executable programs.
PROPCNTL Controlling if user ID propagation can occur, and if so, for which user IDs
(such as the CICS or IMS main task user ID), user ID propagation is not to
occur.
PSFMPL Used by PSF to perform security functions for printing, such as separator
page labeling, data page labeling, and enforcement of the user printable
area.
PTKTDATA PassTicket key class enables the security administrator to associate a RACF
secured sign-on secret key with a particular mainframe application that uses
RACF for user authentication. Examples of such applications are IMS, CICS,
TSO, z/VM, APPC, and MVS batch.
RACFEVNT Contains profiles that control the following events:
 LDAP change log notification for changes to certain RACF profiles
New password and password phrase enveloping for a given user.
RACFHC Used by IBM Health Checker for z/OS. Contains profiles that list the re-
sources to check for each installation-defined health check.
RACFVARS RACF variables. In this class, profile names, which start with & (ampersand),
act as RACF variables that can be specified in profile names in other RACF
general resource classes. See [RACF.SAG], chapter 7.
RACGLIST Class of profiles that hold the results of RACROUTE
REQUEST=LIST,GLOBAL=YES or a SETROPTS RACLIST operation.
RACHCMBR Used by IBM Health Checker for z/OS. Member class for the RACHCMBR
class.
RDATALIB Used to control use of the R_datalib callable service (IRRSDL00 or IR-
RSDL64).
RRSFDATA Used to control RACF remote sharing facility (RRSF) functions.
RVARSMBR Member class for the RACFVARS class.
SCDMBR Member class for the SECDATA class.
SDSF Controls the use of authorized commands in the System Display and Search
Facility (SDSF). See also GSDSF class.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 45 of 179
Class Name Purpose
SECDATA Security classification of users and data (security levels and security cate-
gories).
SECLABEL If security labels are used, and, if so, their definitions.
SECLMBR Member class for the SECLABEL class.
SERVAUTH Contains profiles used by servers to check a client’s authorization to use the
server or to use resources managed by the server. Also, can be used to pro-
vide conditional access to resources for users entering the system from a
given server.
SERVER Controlling the server’s ability to register with the daemon.
SMESSAGE Controlling to which users a user can send messages (TSO only).
SOMDOBJS Controlling the client’s ability to invoke the method in the class.
STARTED Used in preference to the started procedures table to assign an identity dur-
ing the processing of an MVS START command.
SURROGAT If surrogate submission is allowed, and if allowed, which user IDs can act as
surrogates.
SYSMVIEW Controlling access by the SystemView for MVS Launch Window to Sys-
temView for MVS applications.
TAPEVOL Tape volumes.
TEMPDSN Controlling who can access residual temporary data sets.
TERMINAL Terminals (TSO or z/VM). See also GTERMINL class.
VTAMAPPL Controlling who can open ACBs from non-APF authorized programs.
WRITER Controlling the use of JES writers.
XFACILIT Miscellaneous uses. Profile names in this class can be longer than 39 char-
acters in length. Profiles are defined in this class so that resource managers
(typically elements of z/OS) can check a user’s access to the resources
when the users take some action.
Table 7: General Resource Classes
DB2 Classes
DSNADM DB2 administrative authority class.
DSNR Controls access to DB2 subsystems.
GDSNBP Grouping class for DB2 buffer pool privileges.
GDSNCL Grouping class for DB2 collection privileges.
GDSNDB Grouping class for DB2 database privileges.
GDSNGV Grouping class for global variables
GDSNJR Grouping class for Java archive files (JARs).
GDSNPK Grouping class for DB2 package privileges.
GDSNPN Grouping class for DB2 plan privileges.
GDSNSC Grouping class for DB2 schemas privileges.
GDSNSG Grouping class for DB2 storage group privileges.
GDSNSM Grouping class for DB2 system privileges.
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GDSNSP Grouping class for DB2 stored procedure privileges.
GDSNSQ Grouping class for DB2 sequences.
GDSNTB Grouping class for DB2 table, index, or view privileges.
GDSNTS Grouping class for DB2 tablespace privileges.
GDSNUF Grouping class for DB2 user-defined function privileges.
GDSNUT Grouping class for DB2 user-defined distinct type privileges.
MDSNBP Member class for DB2 buffer pool privileges.
MDSNCL Member class for DB2 collection privileges.
MDSNDB Member class for DB2 database privileges.
MDSNGV Grouping class for global variables
MDSNJR Member class for Java archive files (JARs).
MDSNPK Member class for DB2 package privileges.
MDSNPN Member class for DB2 plan privileges.
MDSNSC Member class for DB2 schema privileges.
MDSNSG Member class for DB2 storage group privileges.
MDSNSM Member class for DB2 system privileges.
MDSNSP Member class for DB2 stored procedure privileges.
MDSNSQ Member class for DB2 sequences.
MDSNTB Member class for DB2 table, index, or view privileges.
MDSNTS Member class for DB2 tablespace privileges.
MDSNUF Member class for DB2 user-defined function privileges.
MDSNUT Member class for DB2 user-defined distinct type privileges.
Table 8: General Resource Classes for DB2
Enterprise Identity Mapping (EIM) Classes
RAUDITX Controls auditing for Enterprise Identity Mapping (EIM).
Table 9: General Resource Classes for EIM
ICSF Classes
CRYPTOZ Controls access to PKCS #11 tokens.
CSFKEYS Controls access to ICSF cryptographic keys.
CSFSERV Controls access to ICSF cryptographic services.
GCSFKEYS Resource group class for the CSFKEYS class.
GXCSFKEY Resource group class for the XCSFKEY class.
XCSFKEY Controls the exportation of ICSF cryptographic keys.
Table 10: General Resource Classes for ICSF
Infoprint Classes
PRINTSRV Controls access to printer definitions for Infoprint Server.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 47 of 179
Table 11: General Resource Classes for Infoprint
Network authentication (Kerberos) Classes
KERBLINK Mapping class for user identities of local and foreign principals.
REALM Used to define the local and foreign realms.
Table 12: General Resource Classes for Kerberos
DFSMS Classes
MGMTCLAS SMS management classes.
STORCLAS SMS storage classes.
SUBSYSNM Authorizes a subsystem (such as a particular instance of CICS) to open a
VSAM ACB and use VSAM record level sharing (RLS) functions.
Table 13: General Resource Classes for DFSMS
TSO Classes
ACCTNUM TSO account numbers.
PERFGRP TSO performance groups.
TSOAUTH TSO user authorities such as OPER and MOUNT.
TSOPROC TSO logon procedures.
Table 14: General Resource Classes for TSO
z/OS UNIX Classes
DIRACC Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) for access checks for
read/write access to z/OS UNIX directories. This class need not be active to
control auditing.
DIRSRCH Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) of z/OS UNIX directory
searches. This class need not be active to control auditing.
FSOBJ Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) for all access checks
for z/OS UNIX file system objects except directory searches. Controls audit-
ing (using SETROPTS AUDIT) of creation and deletion of z/OS UNIX file
system objects. This class need not be active to control auditing.
FSSEC Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) for changes to the se-
curity data (FSP) for z/OS UNIX file system objects. This class need not be
active to control auditing. When this class is active, it also controls whether
ACLs are used during authorization checks to z/OS UNIX files and directo-
ries.
IPCOBJ Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) of access checks for
inter-process communication (IPC) objects and changes to security informa-
tion of IPC objects. Controls auditing (using SETROPTS AUDIT) of the cre-
ation and deletion of IPC objects. This class need not be active to control au-
diting.
PROCACT Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) of functions that look at
data from, or affect the processing of, z/OS UNIX processes. This class need
not be active to control auditing.
PROCESS Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) of changes to UIDs
and GIDs of z/OS UNIX processes. Controls auditing (using SETROPTS AU-
DIT) of dubbing and undubbing of z/OS UNIX processes. This class need not
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be active to control auditing.
UNIXMAP Contains profiles that are used to map z/OS UNIX UIDs to RACF user IDs
and z/OS UNIX GIDs to RACF group names.
UNIXPRIV Contains profiles that are used to grant z/OS UNIX privileges.
Table 15: General Resource Classes for z/OS UNIX
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1(GRD))
FDP_ACF.1.1(GRD) The TSF shall enforce the RACF general resource class and data set access
control policy to objects based on the following: users represented by an ACEE as
subjects, profiles in one of the resource classes as representatives of objects, us-
ing the user’s name, the RACF attributes stored in the ACEE, the user’s group
memberships, the ACL associated with the resource profile, the value of UACC
stored in the resource profile, and the entry for the resource containing the object
in the global access checking table as security attributes.
FDP_ACF.1.2(GRD) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
a subject's requested type of access to a protected resource is granted or denied
by the following algorithm, if the resource class is known and active, and if a
matching resource profile in the class was found,
a) if access is allowed by global access checking (Note: does not apply for user
with the RESTRICTED attribute; does not apply to checks performed by
RACROUTE REQUEST=FASTAUTH)
or, if a) is not true,
b) (in Labeled Security Mode) if the access is not denied by the mandatory access
control
if a) did not grant access, and b) did not deny access,
c) if the resource is a tape or DASD data set and the high-level qualifier of the
data set name is identical to the user ID
if c) did not grant access,
d) if the requested type of access is allowed by an access control list (ACL) entry-
for this particular user (Note: does not apply to checks performed by
RACROUTE REQUEST=FASTAUTH with the AUTHCHKS=CRITONLY option)
if d) neither granted nor denied access then continue with e) Otherwise, if d) de-
nied access, continue with h),
e) if the requested type of access is allowed by an ACL entry for the group the
user belongs to. If list-of-groups processing is not in effect, this rule is evalu-
ated only for the current connect group. Otherwise, this rule is evaluated for all
groups to which the user is connected. (Note: does not apply to checks per-
formed by RACROUTE REQUEST=FASTAUTH with the AUTHCHKS=CRITONLY
option)
if no entries in e) granted access, and no entries in e) denied access, then continue
with f). Otherwise, if at least one entry in e) denied access, then continue with h),
f) if the user does not have the RESTRICTED attribute and the requested type of
access is granted by the universal access authority (UACC) in the profile pro-
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 49 of 179
tecting the resource or granted by an ACL with ID(*)(Note: does not apply to
checks performed by RACROUTE REQUEST=FASTAUTH with the
AUTHCHKS=CRITONLY option)
if f) did not grant access,
g) if the user has the OPERATIONS role or the group-OPERATIONS role (for a
group to which the user is connected and the resource is within the group’s
scope) and OPERATIONS access is allowed for the class
if g) did not grant access,
h) if the user has an entry in the conditional access list for the profile that allows
the requested type of access and the user meets the condition defined in this
conditional access list entry (Note: for checks performed by RACROUTE RE-
QUEST=FASTAUTH with the AUTHCHKS=CRITONLY option, only conditional
access list entries specifying WHEN(CRITERIA(SQLROLE...)) will apply)
or, if h) did not grant access,
i) if the user is a member of a group that has an entry in the conditional access
list for the profile that allows the requested type of access and the user meets
the condition defined in this conditional access list entry. If list-of-groups pro-
cessing is not in effect, this rule is evaluated only for the current connect
group. Otherwise, this rule is evaluated for all groups to which the user is con-
nected. (Note: for checks performed by RACROUTE REQUEST=FASTAUTH with
the AUTHCHKS=CRITONLY option, only conditional access list entries specify-
ing WHEN(CRITERIA(SQLROLE...)) will apply)
or, if i) did not grant access,
j) if a conditional access list entry for ID(*) exists with requested type of access,
the user does not have the RESTRICTED attribute set and the user satisfies the
condition of the conditional access list entry. (Note: for checks performed by
RACROUTE REQUEST=FASTAUTH with the AUTHCHKS=CRITONLY option,
only conditional access list entries specifying WHEN(CRITERIA(SQLROLE...))
will apply).
FDP_ACF.1.3(GRD) The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the fol-
lowing additional rules:
a) the subject is a trusted subject and has specified a nested ACEE in its call to
RACF with a second user ID. In this case access is allowed if either the primary
user ID specified in the first ACEE or the secondary user ID specified in the
nested ACEE has the requested access right to the object and the object has
been designated as eligible for nested ACEE processing and the authorization
check is made using RACROUTE REQUEST=FASTAUTH.
b) when "program control" is activated (using the WHEN(PROGRAM) option in the
SETROPTS command) and the program is protected by a profile in the PRO-
GRAM class and the user has at least EXECUTE access to this profile, the user
can execute the program in a clean z/OS environment not "contaminated" by
any untrusted program. If the user has at least READ access then untrusted
programs may also be used by the user.
c) when "program control" is activated and "PADCHK" has been defined in the
profile for a program, a user may access a data set via PADS if the program
that attempts the access or a higher program in the execution hierarchy is al-
lowed to access the file in the intended mode by the conditional access list for
the data set and all other active programs not from the link pack area that have
Page 50 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
been defined using the WHEN PROGRAM operand with “PADCHK” are in-
cluded in the conditional access list of the data set. While a data set is open
using PADS, for any new program defined with PADCHK and started in this sit-
uation in the same environment, the TOE checks that the new program is also
in the conditional access list of that data set.
Application note: “trusted” in this sense means “defined to RACF via profiles in the PROGRAM class, or
resident in the system link pack area.
FDP_ACF.1.4(GRD) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: data sets that are not protected by a discrete or generic profile can
not be accessed except by users with the SPECIAL role.
7.3.2 UNIX file system object access control policy
Subset access control: (FDP_ACC.1(UFS))
FDP_ACC.1.1(UFS) The TSF shall enforce the RACF UNIX file system access control policy on
subjects represented by a UNIX System Services Credentials Structure (CRED), the
UNIX file system resources represented by a File Security Packet (FSP) as objects
and the UNIX access modes of read, write, execute (for ordinary files), and search
(for directories) as operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
Application Note: The File Security Packet needs to be created by the caller. It contains the UID and GID of
the owner of the file system object, the permission bits, and other file system object secu-
rity attributes associated with the file system object. RACF provides the makeFSP
callable service to create a FSP.
Application Note: The UNIX System Services Credentials Structure (CRED) needs to be created by the
caller. It contains information about the user that initiated the request but also information
about the object being accessed (including the ACL for the object)
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1(UFS))
FDP_ACF.1.1(UFS) The TSF shall enforce the RACF UNIX file system access control policy to UNIX file
system objects based on the following: users represented by a UNIX System Services
Credentials Structure (CRED) as subjects, UNIX file system objects represented by
a File Security Packet (FSP) as objects and the security attributes used in the algo-
rithm defined in FDP_ACF.1.2(UFS).
FDP_ACF.1.2(UFS) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
The mandatory access control (Labeled Security Mode only) must allow access
and the following algorithm for the discretionary access control must also result in
granting access.
If the FSACCESS class is active and SETROPTS RACLISTed, and if the subject is
accessing the root directory in a mounted zFS file system (but not the system root
directory), then if the MVS data set name of the file system container is protected
by a profile in the FSACCESS class the subject must have UPDATE access to that
FSACCESS profile or the request will fail.
A subject must have search permission for every element of the path name and the
requested access for the object. A subject has a specific type of access to an ob-
ject if:
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 51 of 179
a) the user has the AUDITOR or ROAUDIT attribute or the UNIXPRIV class is ac-
tive and RACLISTed and the user has at least READ access to he SUPERUS-
ER.FILESYS.DIRSRCH profile in the UNIXPRIV class, the requested type of ac-
cess is READ or SEARCH, and the object is a directory.
b) the effective user ID is 0 and the requested type of access is not EXECUTE. If
this is the case, access is granted. If the effective user ID is 0, and the re-
quested type of access is EXECUTE access is granted only if there is either a
permission bit, or an ACL that provides EXECUTE access to any user.
c) the effective user ID is the one of the file owner and has been granted access
according to the owner permission bits, access is granted.
d) the FSSEC class is active in RACF and an ACL exists within the set of ACLs for
the file that grants the required type of access to the requesting user, access is
granted.
e) the effective user ID is the one of the owner of the file, the algorithm continues
with step j.
f) the effective group ID (GID) or any of the user’s supplemental GIDs matches
the group of the file and has the requested type of access defined in the group
permission bits, access is granted.
g) the effective GID or any of the user’s supplemental GIDs has an ACL defined
for the file that allows the requested type of access, access is granted.
h) the requested type of access is defined in the “other” permission bits and the
user does not have the RESTRICTED attribute defined in his profile, access is
granted.
i) the user has the RESTRICTED attribute defined and has the requested type of
access defined in the RESTRICTED.FILESYS.ACCESS resource profile and the
ACLs associated with this profile, access is granted.
j) the user has the RESTRICTED attribute defined, the RESTRICTED.FILESYS.AC-
CESS profile is not defined in RACF, and the requested type of access is al-
lowed according to the “other” permission bits, access is granted.
k) the UNIXPRIV class is active and RACLISTed, and if the SUPERUSER.-
FILESYS.ACLOVERRIDE resource is protected by a profile in the UNIXPRIV
class, then the user must have the correct access level as documented for the
ck_access (IRRSKA00) callable service in z/OS Security Server: RACF Callable
Services. If the profile exists, it determines whether file access is granted or
denied.
l) If this step of the algorithm is reached and no decision for granting or denying
access has been made, access is denied.
FDP_ACF.1.3(UFS) The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
a) the object is a z/OS UNIX file system object, the UNIXPRIV class is active in
RACF, the access was denied by an ACL entry and the user has the requested
type of access to the file defined as access to the SUPERUSER.FILESYS.A-
CLOVERRIDE profile
or
b) the object is a z/OS UNIX file system object, the UNIXPRIV class is active in
RACF, the access was denied by the permission bits, the SUPERUSER.-
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FILESYS.ACLOVERRIDE profile is not defined in the UNIXPRIV class and the
user has the requested type of access to the SUPERUSER.FILESYS profile, that
is, if the user wants to read the file, the user must have read access to the pro-
file, if the user wants to read and write the file, the user must have write access
to the profile, if the user wants to update any directory, the user must have
control access.
FDP_ACF.1.4(UFS) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following addi-
tional rules: none.
7.3.3 UNIX IPC access control policy
Subset access control: (FDP_ACC.1(IPC))
FDP_ACC.1.1(IPC) The TSF shall enforce the RACF UNIX IPC access control policy on subjects repre-
sented by a UNIX System Services Credentials Structure for IPC (CREI), the UNIX
IPC resources represented by an IPC Security Packet (ISP) as objects and the UNIX
access modes of read and write as operations among subjects and objects cov-
ered by the SFP.
Application Note: The ISP needs to be created by the caller. It contains the UID and GID of the owner and
creator of the IPC object, the permission bits, and the security label associated with the
IPC object. RACF provides the makeISP callable service that creates an ISP.
Application Note: The UNIX System Services Credentials Structure for IPC (CREI) needs to be created by
the caller. It contains information about the user that initiated the request but also infor-
mation about the object being accessed (including the ACL for the object).
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1(IPC))
FDP_ACF.1.1(IPC) The TSF shall enforce the RACF UNIX IPC access control policy to UNIX IPC objects
based on the following:
a) The z/OS UNIX user identity and group membership(s) associated with a sub-
ject; and
b) The following access control attributes associated with an object: permission
bits.
Access rights for z/OS UNIX IPC objects are:
a) read
b) write
Access is defined by permission bits only.
FDP_ACF.1.2(IPC) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
The mandatory access control (Labeled Security Mode) must allow access and the
following algorithm for the discretionary access control must also result in grant-
ing access.
Access permissions are defined by permission bits of the IPC object only. IPC ob-
jects don’t have ACLs associated with them. The process creating the object de-
fines the creator, owner, and group based on the user ID of the current process.
Access of a process to an IPC object is allowed if:
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 53 of 179
a) access is allowed by the mandatory access control (Labeled Security Mode)
and the following algorithm:
a. the effective UID of the current process is equal to zero or the UID
of the IPC object creator or owner and the “owner” permission bit
for the requested type of access is set or,
b. the effective UID of the current process is not equal to the UID of
the IPC object creator or owner and the effective GID of the current
process or any supplementary z/OS UNIX GIDs the user is a mem-
ber of is equal to the GID of the IPC object and the “group” permis-
sion bit for the requested type of access is set or,
c. the “other” permission bit for the requested type of access is set
for users who do not satisfy one of the first two conditions.
FDP_ACF.1.3(IPC) The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4(IPC) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following addi-
tional rules: none.
7.3.4 RACF Field-level access control policy
Subset access control: (FDP_ACC.1(FLA))
FDP_ACC.1.1(FLA) The TSF shall enforce the RACF Profile Field-Level Access Control Policy on
a) Subjects: RACF commands executed on behalf of a user
b) Objects: fields in segments other than the base segment in RACF profiles
c) Operations: reading or modifying dedicated fields in segments other than the
base segment in RACF profiles using RACF commands or the R_admin
callable service.
Application Note: Field-level access control allows an installation to define access to fields within segments
other than the base segment of RACF profiles. Access to those fields is via the RACF
commands used to manage/list RACF profiles or via the R_admin callable service.
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1(FLA))
FDP_ACF.1.1(FLA) The TSF shall enforce the RACF Profile Field-Level Access Control Policy to objects
based on the following:
a) The RACF user identity and group membership(s) associated with the user ex-
ecuting the RACF command; and
b) The access rights defined in a RACF profile in the FIELD class of the type pro-
file-type.segment-name.field-name where profile-type is either the class name
for a general resource profile, DATASET, GROUP, or USER; segment-name is
the name of a valid segment for the profile type; and field-name is the name of
a defined segment field in the segment type that corresponds to the command
operand controlling that field.
Application Note: The complete list of field names for the segments of the individual profile types is pro-
vided in Table 18 of [RACF.SAG]. Access to specific fields in segments within RACF pro-
files requires of course that the related segment is defined for the profile type. Table 18 of
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[RACF.SAG] also identifies which segments exist for which profile type and maps the field
names of those segments to the RACF command parameter used to update those fields.
FDP_ACF.1.2(FLA) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
a subject has the requested type of access to a field in a segment of a RACF pro-
file, if access is allowed by RACF based on the information in the related profile in
the FIELD class using the RACF algorithm for determining access to general re-
sources (see FDP_ACF.1(GRD)) using the access control information from the pro-
file.
FDP_ACF.1.3(FLA) The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
a) users with the SPECIAL attribute always have READ and UPDATE access to all
fields in all non-base segments that are defined for the different RACF profile
types.
b) users with the AUDITOR or ROAUDIT attribute always have READ access to all
fields in all non-base segments that are defined for the different profile types.
c) when the FIELDS class is active and SETROPTS RACLIST processing is active
for the FIELDS class, users are allowed to read or modify fields in their own
user profile when ID(&RACUID) is specified in the PERMIT command defining
access.
FDP_ACF.1.4(FLA) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following addi-
tional rules: users without the SPECIAL attribute, AUDITOR attribute, or ROAUDIT
attribute have no access to fields in RACF segments until the FIELDS class is ac-
tive and SETROPTS RACLIST processing is activated for the FIELDS class.
7.3.5 Mandatory access control policy
Complete information flow control: labeled security (FDP_IFC.2) (Labeled Se-
curity Mode only)
FDP_IFC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the mandatory access control policy on
a) Subjects represented by an ACEE, CRED or CREI;
b) Objects represented by a RACF profile, a File Security Packet (FSP), or an IPC
Security Packet (ISP)
and all operations that cause that information to flow from subjects covered by the SFP.
FDP_IFC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow
among untrusted subjects and named objects in the TOE are covered by the manda-
tory access control policy.
Hierarchical security attributes (FDP_IFF.2) (Labeled Security Mode only)
FDP_IFF.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the mandatory access control policy based on the following
types of subject and object security attributes:
a) Subject security attributes:
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 55 of 179
Sensitivity label of the subject consisting of at least 8 site definable hi-
erarchical levels and a set of 60 site definable non-hierarchical cate-
gories;
b) Object security attributes:
the sensitivity label of the object consisting of at least 8 site definable
hierarchical levels and a set of 60 site definable non-hierarchical cate-
gories;
FDP_IFF.2.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and a controlled
object via a controlled operation if the following rules, based on the ordering relation-
ships between security attributes hold:
a) If the sensitivity label of the subject is greater than or equal to the sensitivity
label of the object, then the flow of information from the object to the subject is
permitted (a read operation);
b) If the sensitivity label of the object is greater than or equal to the sensitivity la-
bel of the subject; then the flow of information from the subject to the object is
permitted (a write operation);
c) If the information flow is between objects, the sensitivity label of the destina-
tion object must be greater than or equal to the sensitivity label of the source
object.
FDP_IFF.2.3 The TSF shall enforce no additional information flow rules.
FDP_IFF.2.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: a user
is permitted to bypass the information flow policy, if the profile IRR.WRITE-
DOWN.BYUSER in the FACILITY class exists and is active and the user has at least
read access to it.
FDP_IFF.2.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: objects
that are supposed to have a security label but do not have a security label can not
be accessed.
FDP_IFF.2.6 The TSF shall enforce the following relationships for any two valid information flow control
security attributes:
a) There exists an ordering function that, given two valid security attributes, determines
if the security attributes are equal, if one security attribute is greater than the other, or
if the security attributes are incomparable with the following properties:
a. Sensitivity labels are equal if the hierarchical level of both labels
are equal and the non-hierarchical category sets are identical;
b. Sensitivity label A is greater than sensitivity label B if the hierarchi-
cal level of A is greater than or equal to the hierarchical level of B,
and the non- hierarchical category set of A is equal to or a superset
of the non- hierarchical category set of B;
c. Sensitivity labels are incomparable if they are not equal and neither
label is greater than the other as defined in 1 and 2 above;
b) There exists a “least upper bound” in the set of security attributes, such that, given
any two valid security attributes, there is a valid security attribute that is greater than
or equal to the two valid security attributes; and
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c) There exists a “greatest lower bound” in the set of security attributes, such that, given
any two valid security attributes, there is a valid security attribute that is not greater
than the two valid security attributes.
7.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)
Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within the
range 1 to 255 number of consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts for the
authentication methods passwords, password phrases and RACF PassTickets oc-
cur related to all authentication events using these authentication methods.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been surpassed,
the TSF shall set the user status to REVOKE.
User attribute definition: human users (FIA_ATD.1(HU))
FIA_ATD.1.1(HU) The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual hu-
man users:
a) User identifier;
b) Group memberships;
c) User password and optionally a password phrase;
d) Security roles;
e) default access rights for objects created by the user (UACC);
f) classes in which the user can define profiles (CLAUTH);
g) indicator that global access checking, the ID(*) entry on the access list, and the
UACC will not be used to allow this user access to a protected resource (RE-
STRICTED);
h) z/OS UNIX UID (for users also defined to UNIX System Services);
i) Kerberos principal name (for users defined to the z/OS Network Authentication
Service and for foreign Kerberos principals that are defined to a Kerberos
realm that has a cross realm trust relationship with the z/OS Network Authenti-
cation Service);
j) Kerberos ticket maximum lifespan for users defined to the z/OS Network Au-
thentication Service;
k) indicator of the encryption algorithm used by the z/OS Network Authentication
Service;
l) X.509v3 certificate(s).
Application note: Attributes such as SPECIAL, group-SPECIAL, AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, group-AUDITOR,
OPERATIONS and group-OPERATIONS designate roles in the model of this Security
Target and are therefore further explained in the role model in FMT_SMR.1
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 57 of 179
User attribute definition: labeled security (FIA_ATD.1(LS)) (Labeled Security
Mode only)
FIA_ATD.1.1(LS) The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
users:
a) Sensitivity label,
b) user clearances.
Verification of secrets (FIA_SOS.1)
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet the following quality
metric:
a) the probability that a secret can be obtained by an attacker during the lifetime
of the secret is less than 2-20
Application note: Some authentication functions depend on cryptographic functions, such as certificate-
based client authentication. No strength of function analysis is provided in this ST for
these, nor for any cryptographic key generation functions that may be a part of the identi-
fication and authentication mechanisms.
Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow all functions allowed to be performed by the individual pseudo-
user assigned by the authorized administrator for started procedures (started
tasks) on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
Application Note: Trusted applications can request the creation of an ACEE. It is up to the trusted applica-
tion to ensure that the user has been successfully authenticated via RACF.
In z/OS, predefined jobs known as started procedures (or started tasks) may be started
automatically, or by an operator who has the required privileges. Those started tasks op-
erate under a pseudo-user-ID assigned to them by the system administrator when the
started task job was created and stored in a protected data set. RACF allows the defini-
tion of protected user IDs for this purpose. Protected user IDs don’t have a password or
password phrase associated with them and cannot be authenticated using RACF. They
need to be defined in RACF and they are bound by the same RACF access control rules
as a normal user. Activities performed by such a started task are accounted to the
pseudo-user-ID assigned to them and not with the ID of the operator that started those
tasks (because, in most cases, the operator would not know what those started tasks are
doing and the operator would not be allowed to access the resources that the started
tasks needs access to). No “user authentication” is performed for started tasks. Instead,
they can only be started from predefined libraries.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide the following authentication mechanisms to support user au-
thentication:
a) Authentication based on username and password and password phrases;
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b) Authentication based on software token verification data (digital certificates);
c) RACF PassTickets
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following rules:
a) Authentication based on username and password, password phrase or RACF
PassTicket is performed for authentication requests using the RACROUTE RE-
QUEST=VERIFY, RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFYX and initACEE functions;
b) Authentication based on software token verification data is performed for au-
thentication requests using the initACEE function;
Protected authentication feedback (FIA_UAU.7)
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide no feedback to the user while the authentication is in progress.
Application Note: The “user” in this case is the application that calls RACF to perform user authentication.
RACF does not provide any feedback to a caller until the authentication process has fin-
ished.
Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow all functions allowed to be performed by the individual pseudo-
user assigned by the authorized administrator for started procedures (started
tasks) on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
User-subject binding (FIA_USB.1) (Labeled Security Mode only))
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the
behalf of that user:
a) User sensitivity level that is used to enforce the mandatory access control pol-
icy which consists of the following:
a. A hierarchical level; and
b. A set of non-hierarchical categories
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security at-
tributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
a) The sensitivity label associated with a subject shall be within the clearance
range of the user;
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security at-
tributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: none
Enhanced user-subject binding (FIA_USB.2)
FIA_USB.2.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the
behalf of that user:
a) The RACF user identity that is associated with auditable events;
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 59 of 179
b) The RACF user security attributes that are used to enforce the RACF general
resource class and data set access control policy, the UNIX file system object
security policy and the UNIX IPC object security policy;
c) The software token that can be used for subsequent identification and authen-
tication with the TSF or other remote IT systems;
d) Active roles;
e) Active groups;
f) The RACF attributes/roles SPECIAL, group-SPECIAL, AUDITOR, ROAUDIT,
group-AUDITOR, CLAUTH, OPERATIONS, and group-OPERATIONS;
g) The port of entry (POE)
FIA_USB.2.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security at-
tributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
a) A started task executes with the user ID defined in the started class or started
procedures table defining the started task.
b) in the case the user was authenticated by a remote trusted IT system and then
mapped to a RACF userID using a profile in the IDIDMAP class: the identity of
the user on the remote trusted IT system is also assigned as a security at-
tribute to that user (and later used in audit records generated for that user).
FIA_USB.2.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security at-
tributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
a) An administrator may define specific z/OS Applications to execute with an ad-
ministrator defined user ID.
b) An administrator may use the SURROGAT authority mechanism to allow a user
to switch his identity to another defined user without specifying the password/
phrase for this user.
c) An application executing in supervisor state may change the group IDs of a
subject representing a user with the R_setegid, R_setgid, or R_exec callable
services according to the following rules:
a. R_setegid: If the high-order bit of the input GID is on, the real, effec-
tive, and saved GIDs are changed for the current process.
b. R_setegid: If the high-order bit of the input GID is off and if the user
is the superuser or if the input GID is equal to the real or saved GID
of the calling process, the effective GID of the process is changed
to the input GID. The real and saved GIDs are not changed.
c. R_setgid: If the calling process is a superuser, the real, saved, and
effective GIDs are changed. If the calling process is not a superuser
but the input GID is equal to the real or saved GID, the effective GID
of the process is changed. If neither condition is met, the GIDs of
the process are not changed.
d. R_exec: sets the effective and saved UNIX group identifier to the
specified values (if the call requested a change of the GID)
e. The new GID must be known to RACF.
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d) An application executing in supervisor state may change the user IDs of a sub-
ject representing a user with the R_seteuid, R_setuid, or R_exec callable ser-
vices according to the following rules.
a. R_seteuid: If the high-order bit of the input UID is on, the real, effec-
tive, and saved UIDs are changed for the current process.
b. R_seteuid: If the high-order bit of the input z/OS UNIX user identifier
(UID) is off and if the user is the superuser or if the input UID is
equal to the real or saved UID of the calling process, the effective
UID of the process is changed to the input UID. The real and saved
UIDs are not changed.
c. R_setuid: If the calling process is a superuser, the real, saved, and
effective z/OS UNIX user identifiers (UIDs) are changed. If the call-
ing process is not a superuser, but the input UID is equal to the real
or saved UID, the effective UID of the process is changed. If neither
condition is met, the UIDs of the process are not changed.
d. R_exec: sets the effective and saved UNIX user identifier to the
specified values (if the call requested a change of the UID).
e. The new UID must be known to RACF.
FIA_USB.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for the assignment of subject security attributes
not derived from user security attributes when a subject is created:
a) The Port of Entry (POE) is set to the value specified by the caller of initACEE in
the SERVAUTH_name parameter or to the value of the POE or POENET parame-
ter for callers of RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY or RACROUTE
REQUEST=VERIFYX
7.5 Security management (FMT)
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1(GRD))
FMT_MSA.1.1(GRD) The TSF shall enforce the RACF general resource class and data set access
control policy to restrict the ability to modify the security attributes (ACLs using the
PERMIT command and security attributes that can be modified using the ALTDSD
or RALTER commands) of the objects covered by the SFP to users that are allowed
to use those commands according to the conditions defined in table 38 in the TOE
Summary Specification.
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1(UFS))
FMT_MSA.1.1(UFS) The TSF shall enforce the UNIX file system object access control policy to re-
strict the ability to modify the security attributes (ACLs) of the objects covered by the
SFP to users that satisfy one of the following conditions:
a) The user is a superuser (has an UID of 0 or has at least READ access to the re-
source named SUPERUSER.FILESYS.CHANGEPERMS in the UNIXPRIV class)
b) The user is the owner of the file system object
(Labeled Security Mode only): In addition to one of the conditions above, the cur-
rent security label of the subject must be greater than or equal to the security label
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 61 of 179
of the file system object or the security label of the file system object must be
greater than or equal to the current security label of the process (the labels are not
disjoint). Security label checking is bypassed if the ACEE indicates trusted or privi-
leged authority or if the service has passed a system CRED.
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1(IPC))
FMT_MSA.1.1(IPC) The TSF shall enforce the UNIX IPC object access control policy to restrict the ability
to modify the security attributes (permission bits) of the objects covered by the SFP
to users that satisfy one of the following conditions:
a) The user is a superuser (has an UID of 0)
b) The user is the owner or the creator of the IPC object
(Labeled Security Mode only): In addition to one of the conditions above, the cur-
rent security label of the subject must be greater than or equal to the security label
of the IPC object or the security label of the IPC object must be greater than or
equal to the current security label of the process (the labels are not disjoint). Secu-
rity label checking is bypassed if the ACEE indicates trusted or privileged author-
ity.
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1(FLA))
FMT_MSA.1.1(FLA) The TSF shall enforce the RACF profile field-level access control policy to re-
strict the ability to modify the security attributes defined by profiles in the FIELD class
to users that are allowed manage profiles in this class and define ACLs to such
profiles using the PERMIT command.
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1(LS)) (Labeled Security Mode
only)
FMT_MSA.1.1(LS) The TSF shall enforce the mandatory access control policy to restrict the ability to
modify the security attributes (security labels) of the objects covered by the SFP to
users that satisfy one of the following conditions:
a) For UNIX file system objects: the caller of the R_setfsecl callable service must
be in supervisor state and pass a system CRED, or the caller must have the
SPECIAL attribute and no security label is currently assigned to the file system
object.
b) For UNIX IPC objects: security labels can not be modified.
c) For general resource and data set profiles: the user must have the SPECIAL at-
tribute or at least READ access to the security label profile.
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3(LS)) (Labeled Security Mode only)
FMT_MSA.3.1(LS) The TSF shall enforce the mandatory access control policy to provide restrictive de-
fault values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2(LS) The TSF shall allow the users with the SPECIAL attribute and the owner of the pro-
file protecting the object to specify alternative initial values to override the default val-
ues when an object or information is created.
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Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3(GRD))
FMT_MSA.3.1(GRD) The TSF shall enforce the RACF general resource class and data set access
control policy to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2(GRD) The TSF shall allow the users with the SPECIAL attribute and the owner of
the profile protecting the object to specify alternative initial values to override the de-
fault values when an object or information is created.
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3(UFS))
FMT_MSA.3.1(UFS) The TSF shall enforce the UNIX file system object access control policy to
provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2(UFS) The TSF shall allow the z/OS components allowed to use the R_umask
callable service to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when
an object or information is created.
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3(IPC))
FMT_MSA.3.1(IPC) The TSF shall enforce the RACF UNIX IPC object access control policy to provide re-
strictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2(IPC) The TSF shall allow the no user to specify alternative initial values to override the default
values when an object or information is created.
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3(FLA))
FMT_MSA.3.1(FLA)The TSF shall enforce the RACF profile field-level access control policy to provide re-
strictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2(FLA)The TSF shall allow the users that can manage access control lists for the related
profiles in the FIELD class (and therefore set the value for UACC for those profiles)
to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or infor-
mation is created.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(SO))
FMT_MTD.1.1(SO) The TSF shall restrict the ability to initialize or change the additional TOE configura-
tion parameters (as set by the SETROPTS command) to authorized administrators
that satisfy the criteria for using the SETROPTS RACF command as defined in ta-
ble 38 in the TOE Summary Specification.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(AE))
FMT_MTD.1.1(AE) The TSF shall restrict the ability to query or modify the set of audited events to
a) users in the AUDITOR role
b) for events related to a profile: the profile owner
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(UA))
FMT_MTD.1.1(UA) The TSF shall restrict the ability to initialize, modify, delete the user security attributes
used for the identification and authentication policy to the authorized administra-
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 63 of 179
tors that satisfy the rules defined for the ADDUSER, ALTUSER, and DELUSER
RACF commands as defined in table 38 in the TOE Summary Specification.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(RA))
FMT_MTD.1.1(RA) The TSF shall restrict the ability to re-enable the authentication to the account subject
to authentication failure to users that satisfy the rules defined for the use of the
RESUME operand in the ALTUSER RACF command in table 38 in the TOE Sum-
mary Specification.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(TH))
FMT_MTD.1.1(TH) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the threshold for unsuccessful authentica-
tion attempts to users that satisfy one of the following rules:
a) user has SPECIAL
b) user has group-SPECIAL in the group that owns the user, or group-SPECIAL in
a higher group in the group tree if group ownership is setup appropriately.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(AD))
FMT_MTD.1.1(AD) The TSF shall restrict the ability to initialize, modify, delete the user security attributes
authentication data to users that satisfy the following rules:
a) users authorized to modify their own authentication data
b) Users with the SPECIAL or appropriate group-SPECIAL attribute can modify a
user’s password/phrase;
c) Users with access to FACILITY resource IRR.PASSWORD.RESET are allowed to
reset passwords/phrases for any user that does not have the PROTECTED,
SPECIAL, AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, or OPERATIONS attributes;
d) Users with access to FACILITY resource IRR.PWRESET.OWNER.owner-value
are allowed to reset passwords/phrases for users owned by “owner-value” if
those users do not have the PROTECTED SPECIAL, AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, or
OPERATIONS attributes and are not exempted from reset by the IRR.PWRE-
SET.EXCLUDE.userID resource in the FACILITY class;
e) Users with access to FACILITY resource IRR.PWRESET.TREE.owner-value are
allowed to reset passwords/phrases for users in the scope of the group speci-
fied by “owner-value” if those users do not have the PROTECTED, SPECIAL,
AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, or OPERATIONS attributes and are not exempted from re-
set by the IRR.PWRESET.EXCLUDE.userID resource in the FACILITY class.
(Note: this “tree” function applies to the same target users that group-SPECIAL
would affect.);
f) Users may be allowed to renew or revoke their own digital certificates via the z/
OS PKI Services component.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(RC))
FMT_MTD.1.1(RC) The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data operated upon by other
RACF commands to users with the authority to those commands as defined in the
table 38 in the section on using RACF management commands in the TOE sum-
mary specification.
Page 64 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1(DC))
FMT_MTD.1.1(DC) The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform management functions for the digital cer-
tificates to users with the SPECIAL attribute and users assigned the authority to
specific management functions as defined in the tables in the section on managing
digital certificates in the TOE summary specification.
Application note: To perform a specific management function for digital certificates, a user that does not
have the SPECIAL attribute must have RACF authority to a profile of the type
IRR.DIGTCERT.function in the FACILITY class where function is the name of the man-
agement function. The list of management functions and the semantics of READ, UP-
DATE and CONTROL authority for each function is defined in the tables in Authority
checking for RACDCERT Processing, Authority Checking for R_datalib Processing and
the section "Authority Checking for PKCS#11 Cryptographic Tokens in the ICSF TKDS" in
the z/OS Security Target. That chapter in the z/OS Security Target also discusses use of
resources in the CRYPTOZ resource class to control access to PKCS#11 tokens. To de-
termine the authority a user has to those profiles, RACF uses the algorithm defined in
FDP_ACF.1(GRD).
Revocation: object security attributes (FMT_REV.1(OSA))
FMT_REV.1.1(OSA) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke object security attributes defined by
SFPs associated with the corresponding object under the control of the TSF to users
that satisfy the following rules: users authorized to modify the security attributes
by the RACF general profile access control policy, the UNIX file system object ac-
cess control policy, the UNIX IPC objects access control policy or (in Labeled Se-
curity Mode) the mandatory access control policy.
FMT_REV.1.2(OSA) The TSF shall enforce the following rules:
a) The access rights associated with an object shall be enforced when an access
check is made;
b) Labeled Security Mode only: the rules of the mandatory access control policy
are enforced on all future operations.
Revocation: user security attributes (FMT_REV.1(USR))
FMT_REV.1.1(USR) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke user security attributes defined by
the SFP associated with the corresponding user under the control of the TSF to the au-
thorized identified roles allowed to modify user security attributes.
FMT_REV.1.2(USR) The TSF shall enforce the following rules:
a) The enforcement of the revocation of user security attributes stored in the user
profile with the next user-subject binding process during the next authentica-
tion of the user;
b) the immediate revocation of security-relevant access authorization (active with
the next access check being made).
Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
a) Management of auditing parameters and configuration;
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 65 of 179
b) Management of RACF General Resource and Data set Profile Access Control
Policy;
c) Management of UNIX File System Object Access Control Policy;
d) Management of UNIX IPC Object Access Control policy;
e) Management of Field Level Access Control;
f) Management of identification and authentication policy;
g) Management of user security attributes;
h) Management of RACF profiles
i) Management of UNIX file system object security attributes
j) Management of UNIX IPC objects security attributes
k) Management of RACF configuration data
Security Roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
a) User role with the following rights:
o Users are authorized to modify their own user password;
o Users are authorized to modify the access control permissions for
the named objects they own;
b) users authorized by the RACF general resource class and data set access con-
trol policy to modify object security attributes;
c) in Labeled Security Mode: users authorized by the mandatory access control
policy to modify the object label as an object security attribute;
d) users authorized to perform administrative actions within a defined group
(group-SPECIAL attribute)
e) users authorized to perform administrative actions for user or group security
attributes via ownership
f) RACF auditors (users who have the RACF AUDITOR attribute in their profiles)
g) RACF read-only auditors (users who have the RACF ROAUDIT attribute in their
profile)
h) RACF group auditors (users who have the RACF group-AUDITOR attribute in
their profiles)
i) Operations roles (users with the OPERATIONS attribute)
j) group-Operations roles (users with the RACF OPERATIONS attribute within a
group or set of groups)
k) z/OS pseudo-user (protected user IDs)
l) z/OS UNIX superusers
Page 66 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
m) Users authorized to perform management operations for digital certificates
based on access rights to RACF profiles protecting the individual management
operations
n) Users authorized to perform other management functions based on access
rights to RACF profiles protecting the individual management operations
o) authorized administrator (user with the SPECIAL attribute).
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
7.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency (FPT_TDC.1(RA))
FPT_TDC.1.1(RA) The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret information in the RACF
database and security attributes of UNIX file system objects when shared between
the TSF and another trusted IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2(RA) The TSF shall use the rules to interpret RACF profiles and authorizations and the
rules to interpret extended attributes of UNIX file system objects when interpreting
the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
Application note: Inter-TSF data consistency shall ensure that access control information is consistently in-
terpreted when this information is shared between different instantiations of the TOE or
when UNIX file system objects with their extended attributes are exported from one sys-
tem and imported into another system. The discretionary access control information ei-
ther has to be identical (which requires that the same users, groups and user member-
ship of groups are defined in the involved systems) or this information has to be updated
accordingly by a system administrator before the UNIX file system object is made avail-
able to other user on the system importing the object.
Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency (FPT_TDC.1(LS)) (Labeled Security
Mode only)
FPT_TDC.1.1(LS) The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret label-related security at-
tributes when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2(LS) The TSF shall use the list of security labels to be applied by the TSF when interpret-
ing the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
Application note: Inter-TSF data consistency shall ensure that access control information including security
labels are consistently interpreted when this information is shared between different in-
stantiations of the TOE. In order to do this, at least the definition of the security labels be-
tween the systems involved have to be identical.
7.7 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
7.7.1 Security Requirements Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of SFR to the security objectives, showing that each security
functional requirement addresses at least one security objective.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 67 of 179
Security Functional Requirements Objectives
FAU_GEN_SUB.1 O.AUDITING
FAU_GEN.2 O.AUDITING
FAU_SAR.1 O.AUDITING
FAU_SEL.1 O.AUDITING
FCS_COP.1 O.PROGRAM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORT
FDP_ACC.1(GRD) O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS
FDP_ACC.1(UFS) O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS
FDP_ACC.1(IPC) O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS
FDP_ACC.1(FLA) O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS
FDP_ACF.1(GRD) O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS
FDP_ACF.1(UFS) O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS
FDP_ACF.1 (IPC) O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS
FDP_ACF.1 (FLA) O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS
FDP_IFC.2 (Labeled Security Mode only) O.LS.CONFIDENTIALITY
FDP_IFF.2 (Labeled Security Mode only) O.LS.CONFIDENTIALITY
FIA_AFL.1 O.I&A
FIA_ATD.1(HU) O.I&A
FIA_ATD.1(LS) (Labeled Security Mode
only)
O.LS.LABEL
FIA_SOS.1 O.I&A
FIA_UAU.1 O.I&A
FIA_UAU.5 O.I&A,
O.I&A.MULTIPLE
FIA_UAU.7 O.I&A
FIA_UID.1 O.I&A
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Security Functional Requirements Objectives
FIA_USB.1 (Labeled Security Mode only) O.LS.LABEL
FIA_USB.2 O.I&A
FMT_MSA.1(GRD) O.MANAGE
FMT_MSA.1(UFS) O.MANAGE
FMT_MSA.1(IPC) O.MANAGE
FMT_MSA.1(FLA) O.MANAGE
FMT_MSA.1(LS) (Labeled Security Mode
only)
O.MANAGE
FMT_MSA.3(GRD) O.MANAGE
FMT_MSA.3(UFS) O.MANAGE
FMT_MSA.3(IPC) O.MANAGE
FMT_MSA.3(FLA) O.MANAGE
FMT_MSA.3(LS) (Labeled Security Mode
only)
O.MANAGE
FMT_MTD.1(AE) O.MANAGE
FMT_MTD.1(SO) O.MANAGE
FMT_MTD.1(UA) O.MANAGE
FMT_MTD.1(RA) O.MANAGE
FMT_MTD.1(TH) O.MANAGE
FMT_MTD.1(AD) O.MANAGE
FMT_MTD.1(RC) O.MANAGE
FMT_MTD.1(DC) O.MANAGE
FMT_REV.1(OSA) O.MANAGE
FMT_REV.1(USR) O.MANAGE
FMT_SMF.1 O.MANAGE
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 69 of 179
Security Functional Requirements Objectives
FMT_SMR.1 O.MANAGE
FPT_TDC.1(RA) O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS
FPT_TDC.1(LS) (Labeled Security Mode
only)
O.LS.CONFIDENTIALITY,
O.LS.LABEL
Table 16: Mapping of security functional requirements to security objectives
7.7.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the
security functional requirements are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:
Security objectives Rationale
O.AUDITING The events to be audited are defined in FAU_GEN_SUB.1 and
are associated with the identity of the user that caused the
event (FAU_GEN.2). Authorized users are provided the capa-
bility to read the audit records (FAU_SAR.1). The authorized
user must have the capability to specify which audit records are
generated (FAU_SEL.1).
The audit trail is stored and managed by the SMF component
of the z/OS operating system, which ensures the protection of
the audit trail and protects audit data from being lost.
O.DISCRETIONARY.ACCESS The TSF must control access to resources based on the iden-
tity of users that are allowed to specify which resources they
want to access for storing their data.
There are 4 different discretionary access control policies sup-
ported by the TOE:
1. The "general resource access control policy" (GRD),
which the TOE enforces for "general resource profiles.
Some of those profiles are used by RACF itself to con-
trol access to its own resources. External resource
managers that use general resource profiles may call
RACF to decide if a user is allowed to access a re-
source. This policy is defined by the SFRs
FDP_ACC.1(GRD) and FDP_ACF.1(GRD).
2. The "UNIX file system access control policy" (UFS)
used by RACF to control access to UNIX file system
objects. For this policy RACF uses information it stores
with z/OS UNIX file system objects. This policy is de-
fined by the SFRs FDP_ACC.1(UFS) and
FDP_ACF.1(UFS).
3. The "inter-process communication access control pol-
icy" used by RACF to control access to UNIX IPC ob-
jects. For this policy RACF uses information it stores
with z/OS UNIX IPC objects. This policy is defined by
Page 70 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
Security objectives Rationale
the SFRs FDP_ACC.1(IPC) and FDP_ACF.1(IPC).
4. The "field level access control policy" (FLA) used by
RACF to control access to fields in RACF profiles via
RACF commands. This policy is defined by the SFRs
FDP_ACC.1(FLA) and FDP_ACF.1(FLA).
In addition the objective is also supported by FPT_TDC.1(RA)
which ensures the consistent interpretation of the TSF data
used for controlling access.
O.I&A The TSF must ensure that only authorized users gain access to
the TOE functions and resources. Users authorized to access
the TOE must use an identification and authentication process
(FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1). This process is initiated by a trusted
function within the TOE environment, which calls the TOE to
perform the actual user authentication. Multiple I&A mecha-
nisms are allowed as specified in FIA_UAU.5. To ensure autho-
rized access to the TOE, authentication data is protected
(FIA_ATD.1(HU), FIA_UAU.7). Proper authorization for sub-
jects acting on behalf of users is also ensured (FIA_USB.2).
The appropriate strength of the authentication mechanism is
ensured (FIA_SOS.1). To support the strength of authentication
methods, the TOE is capable of identifying and reacting to un-
successful authentication attempts (FIA_AFL.1).
O.I&A.MULTIPLE The TOE supports multiple I&A mechanisms, which is specified
with FIA_UAU.5.
O.MANAGE The TOE provides management interfaces globally defined in
FMT_SMF.1 for:
· the access control policies (FMT_MSA.1(GRD),
FMT_MSA.1(UFS), FMT_MSA.1(IPC),
FMT_MSA.1(FLA), FMT_MSA.3(GRD),
FMT_MSA.3(UFS)), FMT_MSA.3(IPC),
FMT_MSA.3(FLA);
· Note: since the default values for FMT_MSA.3(IPC)
can not be changed, there is of course no manage-
ment interface for this SFR.
· the information flow control policy (FMT_MSA.1(LS)
and FMT_MSA.3(LS));
· the user security attributes (other than authentication
data) (FMT_MTD.1(UA));
· the auditing aspects (FMT_MTD.1(AE));
· the identification and authentication aspects
(FMT_MTD.1(RA), FMT_MTD.1(AD),
FMT_MTD.1(TH));
· the use of RACF commands (FMT_MTD.1(RC));
· the general management of RACF (FMT_MTD.1(SO));
· the management of digital certificates (used for user au-
thentication and for program signing and verifica-
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 71 of 179
Security objectives Rationale
tion) (FMT_MTD.1(DC));
The rights management for the different management aspects
is defined with FMT_SMR.1.
The management interfaces for the revocation of user and ob-
ject attributes is provided with (FMT_REV.1(OSA),
FMT_REV.1(USR)).
O.PROGRAM_INTEGRITY_S
UPPORT
The support for program integrity verification is defined by
FCS_COP.1, which describes the functional requirement for
program signature generation and verification support.
O.LS.CONFIDENTIALITY The information flow control policy is defined by specifying the
subjects, objects, security attributes and rules in FDP_IFC.2
and FDP_IFF.2. This objective is also supported by
FPT_TDC.1(LS), which ensures the consistent interpretation of
the TSF data used for the label based access control policy.
O.LS.LABEL The assignment of labels to users is performed during user-
subject binding (FIA_USB.1(LS)) with security attributes main-
tained by the TOE (FIA_ATD.1(LS)). FPT_TDC.1(LS) ensures
the consistent interpretation of the labels.
Table 17: Security objectives for the TOE rationale
7.7.3 Security Requirements Dependency Analysis
The following table demonstrates the dependencies of SFRs modeled in CC Part 2 and how the
SFRs for the TOE resolve those dependencies:
Security Functional Re-
quirement
Dependencies Resolution
FAU_GEN_SUB.1 no dependencies
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN_SUB.1
FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN_SUB.1
FAU_SEL.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN_SUB.1
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1(AE)
FCS_COP.1 [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FMT_MTD.1(DC) (see discussion below)
FCS_CKM.4 no (see discussion below)
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Security Functional Re-
quirement
Dependencies Resolution
FDP_ACC.1(GRD) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(GRD)
FDP_ACC.1(UFS) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(UFS)
FDP_ACC.1(IPC) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(IPC)
FDP_ACC.1(FLA) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(FLA)
FDP_ACF.1(GRD) FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(GRD)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3(GRD)
FDP_ACF.1(UFS) FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(UFS)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3(UFS)
FDP_ACF.1(IPC) FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(IPC)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3(IPC)
FDP_ACF.1(FLA) FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(FLA)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3(FLA)
FDP_IFC.2 (Labeled Se-
curity Mode only)
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.2(LS) (Labeled Security Mode only)
FDP_IFF.2 (Labeled Se-
curity Mode only)
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.2(LS) (Labeled Security Mode only)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3(LS) (Labeled Security Mode only)
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1(HU) No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1(LS) (Labeled
Security Mode only)
No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 73 of 179
Security Functional Re-
quirement
Dependencies Resolution
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies.
FIA_USB.1(LS) (Labeled
Security Mode only)
FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1(LS) (Labeled Security Mode only)
FIA_USB.2 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1(HU)
FMT_MSA.1(GRD) [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_ACC.1(GRD)
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1(UFS) [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_ACC.1(UFS)
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1(IPC) [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_ACC.1(IPC)
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1(FLA) [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_ACC.1(FLA)
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1(LS) [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_IFC.2
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3(GRD) FDP_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1(GRD)
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
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Security Functional Re-
quirement
Dependencies Resolution
FMT_MSA.3(UFS) FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1(UFS)
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3(IPC) FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1(IPC)
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3(FLA) FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1(FLA)
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3(LS) FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1(LS)
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1(SO) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1(AE) FMT_SMR.1 • FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1(UA) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1(RA) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1(TH) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 75 of 179
Security Functional Re-
quirement
Dependencies Resolution
FMT_MTD.1(AD) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1(RC) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1(DC) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_REV.1(OSA) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_REV.1(USR) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies.
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FPT_TDC.1(RA) No dependencies.
FPT_TDC.1(LS) (Labeled
Security Mode only)
No dependencies.
Table 18: TOE SFR dependency analysis
7.7.4 Discussion of dependencies not satisfied
The dependencies mentioned in CC part 2 for FCS_COP.1 are not satisfied. CC part 2 lists as
dependencies either the import of user data or key generation. In addition in either case a
dependency to key destruction is listed.
The RACF security target does not satisfy those dependencies for the following reason:
• RACF does not generate cryptographic keys, but imports them. For this import FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP.ITC.2 are not suitable requirements, since they relate to "user data" while the certificates
imported are actually TSF data. Still their import is protected, since importing certificates to be
used for program signing and verification requires the user to have the right to use the
RACDCERT command with the required parameter and also have the appropriate access to
the RACF key ring used to store the imported certificate. This is reflected in the SFR
FMT_MTD.1(DC), which requires appropriate administrative privileges to manage the digital
certificates. Therefore FMT_MTD.1(DC) resolves the dependency to control the rights to
import digital certificates.
• RACF does not destruct cryptographic keys but leaves this to the environment (ICSF), which
RACF uses to store the RACF key rings. Therefore the dependency to FCS_CKM.4 is
addressed in the TOE environment.
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7.7.5 TSF Rationale
The following table maps the SFRs to the TOE summary description and provides pointers into the
TSS where the implementation of the SFR is described.
Security Functional Re-
quirements
Security Functions
FAU_GEN_SUB.1 Section 8.5.1 explains how audit records are generated. This section
also explains the structure of the audit records.
FAU_GEN.2 Section 8.5.1 explains the information contained in the audit records.
Tools to export audit records in human-readable format are men-
tioned in this section, too.
FAU_SAR.1 Section 8.4.1.2.1, subsection "AUDITOR and group-AUDITOR" ex-
plains the auditor role. Section 8.4.3.1 explains the options of the
SETROPT command a user in the AUDITOR role may use. Section
8.5.4 describes the purpose of the audit dump programs that read
audit records from the audit trail and store them in a data set where
they can be assessed.
FAU_SEL.1 Sections 8.4.3.2 table 76 explain how the auditor role can configure
the events that are audited using the RACF commands and the oper-
ands reserved for users in the AUDITOR role. This section also ex-
plain that the owner of a profile can define which events related to the
profile are audited.
FCS_COP.1 Support for program signing and signature verification is explained in
section 8.6
FDP_ACC.1(GRD) The general resource access control policy is described in sections
8.3.4.1 and 8.3.4.2.
FDP_ACC.1(UFS) The UNIX file system access control policy is explained in section
8.3.4.4.
FDP_ACC.1(IPC) The IPC object access control policy is described in section 8.3.4.5.
FDP_ACC.1(FLA) The RACF field level access control policy is explained in sections
8.4.2 and 8.4.3.2 in table 76.
FDP_ACF.1(GRD) The general resource access control policy is described in sections
8.3.4.1 and 8.3.4.2.
FDP_ACF.1(UFS) The UNIX file system access control policy is explained in section
8.3.4.4.
FDP_ACF.1 (IPC) The IPC object access control policy is described in section 8.3.4.5.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 77 of 179
Security Functional Re-
quirements
Security Functions
FDP_ACF.1 (FLA) The RACF field level access control policy is explained in sections
8.4.2 and 8.4.3.2 in table 76.
FDP_IFC.2 (Labeled Se-
curity Mode only)
The labeled security access control policy is explained in section
8.3.3.
FDP_IFF.2 (Labeled Se-
curity Mode only)
The labeled security access control policy is explained in section
8.3.3.
FIA_AFL.1 The system-wide attribute REVOKE for the number of failed consec-
utive authentication attempts is explained in sections 8.4.1.2, table
70, and the section titled "User Revocation" and the section titled
"User profiles" where the REVOKE attribute in a user profile is ex-
plained. The effect of a user ID being revoked is described in section
8.2.1.
FIA_ATD.1(HU) User attributes for human users are defined in the user profile, which
is described in section 8.4.1.2 in the subsection titled "User profiles".
FIA_ATD.1(LS) (Labeled
Security Mode only)
Labels as users attributes are also described in section 8.4.1.2 in the
subsection titled "User profiles".
FIA_SOS.1 The password and password phrase specifics are defined in section
8.2.2 where the options for the password and passphrase policy are
defined in the subsections titled "Password Quality" (8.2.2.1) and
"Password Phrase Quality" (8.2.2.2).
FIA_UAU.1 User authentication is explained in section 8.2.1.
FIA_UAU.5 Authentication using passwords and password phrases is explained
in section 8.2.2.
Authentication using RACF Pass Tickets is explained in section 8.2.3.
Authentication using digital certificates is explained in section 8.2.4.
Authentication using Kerberos tickets is explained in section 8.2.5.
FIA_UAU.7 Section 8.2.1 describes the RACF interfaces that can be invoked for
user authentication. The functions do not provide any feedback to the
caller while they are in progress.
FIA_UID.1 User identification is explained in 8.2.1.
FIA_USB.1 (Labeled Se-
curity Mode only)
The user sensitivity level bound to subjects while the TOE operates in
Labeled Security Mode is explained in 8.2.1 (under "some additional
considerations").
FIA_USB.2 User subject binding using in z/OS, the TOE’s environment, is ex-
plained in section 8.2.7 with respect to group processing and 8.2.8,
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Security Functional Re-
quirements
Security Functions
which describes how RACF creates an ACEE using the information
from the user's profile.
FMT_MSA.1(GRD) Management of access control for the general resource access con-
trol policy is explained in table 76 section 8.4.3.2, where the RACF
commands and the restrictions on their usage is described. Access
control to general resource profiles is managed by the PERMIT com-
mand.
FMT_MSA.1(UFS) Management of access control for the UNIX file system access con-
trol policy is described in section 8.4.3.3 in the section titled "Man-
agement of z/OS UNIX file system objects and IPC objects" where
the RACF interfaces for the management of the UNIX file system ac-
cess policy and IPC access policy are described.
FMT_MSA.1(IPC) Management of access control for the IPC access control policy is
described in section 8.4.3.3 in the section titled "Management of z/
OS UNIX file system objects and IPC objects" where the RACF inter-
faces for the management of the UNIX file system access policy and
IPC access policy are described.
FMT_MSA.1(FLA) Management of the RACF profile field level access control policy is
performed via the management of profiles in the FIELD class and
defining access to those profiles using the PERMIT command. The
management of access control lists for general resource class pro-
files therefore applies here. See section 8.4.2.1 for more details.
FMT_MSA.1(LS) (La-
beled Security Mode
only)
Management of security labels being restricted to users with the
SPECIAL attribute is described in section 8.3.3 as well as in table 70
which states that for the various commands that may set or alter a
security label the user has to have the SPECIAL attribute to use this
functionality.
FMT_MSA.3(GRD) Default values for the general resource access control policy are de-
scribed in section 8.3.4.1. Default access of a user is defined by the
UACC value in the profile protecting the resource.
FMT_MSA.3(UFS) Default values for the UNIX file system access control policy are de-
scribed in section 8.3.4.4 which explains that access is denied unless
it is given either by the ACLs or the permission bits.
FMT_MSA.3(IPC) The default values for this access control policy can not be managed.
See section 8.4.3.3.
FMT_MSA.3(FLA) The default values for this access control policy are defined by the
UACC value for the profiles in the FIELD class which are managed
by the functions of the RACF general resource class access control
policy. See section 8.4.2.1 for more details.
FMT_MSA.3(LS) (La- Default values for the security label are defined in the SECLABEL at-
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 79 of 179
Security Functional Re-
quirements
Security Functions
beled Security Mode
only)
tribute in the resource profiles as explained in section 8.3.3 (and sub-
sections) in the description of the resource profiles and in sections
8.3.4.4 and 8.3.4.5 for z/OS UNIX objects
FMT_MTD.1(AE) Audit trail management is performed using the command options re-
served for users in the AUDITOR or group-AUDITOR role as defined
in table 76 section 8.4.3.2. Those are:
• SETROPTS options reserved for users with the AUDITOR
privilege
• GLOBALAUDIT keyword for ALTDSD and RALTER com-
mands
• UAUDIT/NOUAUDIT keyword for the ALTUSER command
FMT_MTD.1(SO) The SETROPTS command related management is described in sec-
tion 8.4.3.1 and in table 76 in section 8.4.3.2.
FMT_MTD.1(UA) User security attribute management is explained in section 8.4.1.
FMT_MTD.1(RA) Management for re-enabling authentication is described in section
8.4.1 where the authority to reset a user's password is described in
detail.
FMT_MTD.1(TH) Management of the threshold for unsuccessful authentication events
is described in section 8.4.3.1 it is explained that this threshold can
be set using the SETROPTS command.
FMT_MTD.1(AD) Management of authentication data is explained in sections 8.2.1 and
8.4.1.
FMT_MTD.1(RC) Management of RACF commands is explained in table 76 in section
8.4.3.2.
FMT_MTD.1(DC) Management of digital certificates is explained in sections 8.2.4 and
8.3.5 where the RACDCERT command and the authorities required
for the use of its parameter are described in detail.
FMT_REV.1(OSA) Revocation of object security attributes is explained in section 8.4.2
for the management of general resource profiles (and data set pro-
files) as well as for the field-level access control are defined. Section
8.4.3.3, subsection titled "Management of z/OS UNIX file system ob-
jects and IPC objects" describes the interfaces used for the revoca-
tion of object security attributes for z/OS UNIX file system objects
and IPC objects.
FMT_REV.1(USR) Revocation of user security attributes is explained in section 8.4.1.
Page 80 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
Security Functional Re-
quirements
Security Functions
FMT_SMF.1 See SFRs FMT_MTD.1(x) and sections 8.2.1, 8.2.4, 8.3.5, 8.4.1,
8.4.3.1, 8.4.3.2 as well as Table 76.
FMT_SMR.1 The roles are explained in section 8.4.1 in the subsection titled
"RACF Roles".
FPT_TDC.1(RA) The inter-TSF data consistency is given by the general structure of
the profiles in the RACF database, which ensures that a RACF data-
base is consistently interpreted when used by a remote system. See
also section 8.1.
FPT_TDC.1(LS) (La-
beled Security Mode
only)
See above. This applies also for security labels, which are part of the
RACF profiles or part of the file security attributes of z/OS UNIX file
system objects. See also section 8.1.
Table 19: TOE SFR dependency analysis
7.7.6 Mutual support of the security functions
This section demonstrates that the TOE security functions are mutually supportive by showing how
the individual functions are interrelated.
Identification and authentication is a prerequisite for discretionary and (in Labeled Security Mode)
mandatory access control as well as the security management functions that require the user to have
the required privileges to perform the management activities. It also is a prerequisite to auditing by
provision of a unique and reliable reference to a user causing an audit event. Identification and
authentication is supported by access control that protects the user and group profiles (including the
authentication information) against unauthorized access and modification. In addition identification
and authentication is supported by security management that defines user with their credentials and
assigns initial authentication information to them.
Discretionary access control supports audit by protecting the audit data sets against unauthorized
access, supports security management by protecting security management information stored in data
sets or files and by ensuring that the user performing management functions have the required
privileges.
Labeled Security Mode: Mandatory access control is implemented in the TOE in addition to
discretionary access control. Mandatory access control is supported by identification and
authentication as well as security management with respect to the definition of security labels, the
assignment of labels to objects and the assignment of security classification to users. The TOE
implements a label-based mandatory access control mainly for use by external resource managers,
but also applies for profiles it uses to protect its own resources
Security management is required to manage the users, groups, access rights, authentication data,
digital certificates, the privileges of users, and other TSF data. This is supporting identification and
authentication, audit, as well as the different access control policies. Different aspects of security
management support each other. For example user and group management supports the
management of access control, because the definition of access rights can be simplified by defining
access on a group level and assign users that require access to the appropriate groups. Security
management also supports auditing because it allows to define the events to be audited based on
individual users, individual protected objects, privileges of the users, type of event, and (in Labeled
Security Mode) security label.
Security management also includes the management of access rights including (in Labeled Security
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 81 of 179
Mode) the definition of the security labels. Management of discretionary access rights can be
performed by users with the required privileges and the management of those privileges is part of the
user and group management. This structure allows delegation of some management functions to
users with privileges limited to the scope of a group.
Auditing is a secondary security function that does not provide direct support for other security
functions. Auditing provides indirect support to other security functions, because it allows identification
of security problems and allows definition of appropriate measures (in the TOE configuration or the
TOE environment) to prevent those events in the future.
TOE self-protection supports all other security functions to ensure that they can not be tampered with
or bypassed.
7.7.7 Security assurance requirements rationale
The evaluation assurance level has been chosen commensurate with the threat environment that is
experienced by typical consumers of the TOE. In addition, the evaluation assurance level has been
augmented with ALC_FLR.3 commensurate with the augmented flaw remediation capabilities offered
by the developer beyond those required by the evaluation assurance level.
The assurance measures and how they are satisfied are explained in the table in section "TOE
Assurance Measures". The authors of this Security Target view this table as sufficient justification for
the individual assurance measures.
Page 82 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
8. TOE summary specification
This chapter provides a summary of the security functions of RACF that are subject to the evaluation.
The chapter also provides some overview material required for a basic understanding how the
security functions work. Those details of the security functions that are the focus of the evaluation are
marked in brackets using an identifier such as “IA” or “AC” for the security function and a unique,
opaque identifier to denominate the claim as it is laid down in this document.
8.1 Overview of the RACF architecture
RACF is implemented as a dedicated component that can be used by operating system components
and trusted applications to
• authenticate users
• control access to resources
• manage access rights
• manage users and groups with their security attributes
• log and report attempts to authenticate or access protected resources
RACF manages the information it relies on in its own database. This database includes, in a well
defined structure and format, user and group profiles, which store information about individual users
and groups with the security attributes assigned to the users and groups. It also includes resource
profiles, where those profiles represent the resources for which a resource manager can call RACF in
order to check for a user's authority to access a specific resource. The RACF database contains
information on the protection of z/OS UNIX filesystem and IPC objects. In addition RACF manages
access rights associated with resource profiles, which define the type of access users or groups have
to the resource.
RACF has the capability to generate audit records for specific events. RACF also provides an
interface to resource managers that they can use to cause RACF to generate a specific audit record.
Audit records generated by RACF are not stored in the RACF database, but passed to the
components of z/OS, which are centrally used to store and manage all types of audit records.
RACF has three main sets of interfaces:
· The RACROUTE macro interface, which sufficiently authorized programs executing within
z/OS can use to request services from RACF
· The RACF callable services, which also sufficiently authorized programs executing within z/OS
can use to request services from RACF. Those services include specific services related UNIX
file systems and UNIX IPC objects.
· The RACF command interface which sufficiently authorized users can use to perform RACF
management functions.
The authorizations required are defined with the individual functions and may even be dependent on
the parameters used.
8.1.1 RACF TSF Protection
RACF uses the protection mechanisms provided by z/OS as described in section 1.4.2.7 in the
following way:
• the main functions of RACF are implemented as separate address spaces, which protects
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 83 of 179
their code and data from direct interference by unprivileged programs executing in other
address spaces
• RACF defines a limited set of SVCs and PCs that programs in all address spaces can invoke.
Some PCs are defined such that the hardware prohibits their use unless the caller has
appropriate hardware privileges. For other PCs as well as for SVCs, callable services and
commands RACF performs its own check if the caller has the appropriate authorization to
invoke the interface with the parameter specified. The specification of the individual interfaces
also define the authorizations required to use the interface and specific parameter of the
interface.
• many interfaces to RACF require the calling program to execute with system privileges like
supervisor state, key 0, or APF authorization. When called without proper authorizations,
those programs will fail to perform the requested action and either return with an appropriate
return code, cause an exception, or cause an "abnormal end" (ABEND) with an ABEND code
indicating the cause of the problem.
RACF uses the z/OS mechanisms for establishing error recovery routines which allows RACF to
handle errors or exceptions detected by z/OS or the hardware and either recover from the error,
perform any necessary clean-up operation and signal the error to the calling program, or (in the
extreme case when RACF is not able to maintain its integrity e. g. when the RACF database is full or
compromised) terminate RACF itself.
8.1.2 Initial RACF Setup
Upon installation RACF is configured using
· the RACF data set name table (ICHRDSNT load module), which provides the data set names
for the RACF database and for each of them the backup data set.
· the RACF range table (load module ICHRRNG), which determines in which data set of the
RACF database RACF places each profile.
· the class descriptor table (CDT), which describes the RACF general resource classes known
to RACF. This table has two parts: the static class descriptor table and the dynamic class
descriptor table. The static class descriptor table consists of a load module describing the
classes supplied by IBM (load module ICHRRCDX) and an optional load module
(ICHRRCDE) that contains installation defined classes.
8.2 Identification and authentication support by RACF (IA)
8.2.1 Authentication function
An application can use RACF to support the identification and authentication of users. RACF provides
the following interfaces to perform user authentication:
· the RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY macro
· the RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFYX macro
· the initACEE RACF callable service
When authenticating a user the TOE allows applications to accept and provide to RACF:
· A user ID defined to RACF {IA1::IA.1.4-R8-RACF-1} and the RACF password {IA.1::IA.1.4-R8-
RACF-2} or password phrase {IA.1::IA.1.4-R10-RACF-4} or a PassTicket {IA.1::IA.1.4-R8-
RACF-3}.
· A valid x.509v3 digital certificate that the application has validated using TLSv1.1- or TLS V1.2-
Page 84 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
based client authentication and presented to RACF via initACEE (or indirectly via
__certificate()) or mapped to a RACF user ID via R_usermap(), for applications supporting
TLSv1.1- and , TLSv1.2-based client authentication (see Authentication via Client Digital
Certificates) . {IA.1::IA.1.4-R21-RACFEAL5-1} (Note: the mapping of a certificate to an ID is the
responsibility of the application, and as it is not directly a function of RACF will not be tested
during this evaluation.)
· A valid Kerberos service ticket for the client Kerberos principal, which the R_usermap() service
will convert to a RACF user ID, for applications supporting Kerberos (see Authentication via
Kerberos) {IA.1::IA.1.4-R13-RACFEAL5-2}.
Some additional considerations:
· If security label (SECLABEL) processing is active, the user may also specify the security label
he wants to have for the session or job unless the security label is already restricted by the port
of entry. This user-supplied label must be within the set of labels the user is allowed to use.
With this processing active, if the user does not supply a security label, a defined default
security label is chosen depending on the user’s label and the label of the port of entry
{IA.1::IA.1.5}
· For access to UNIX functions, the user must have a valid UID and his default group must have
a valid GID {IA.1::IA.1.6}.
If the user is in additional groups they may have GIDs, too, and if so UNIX access checking will
make use of those additional GIDs {IA.1::IA.1.6-R8-USS-3}.
· If the user ID is in REVOKE status, RACF prevents user from entering the system at all or
entering the system with certain groups {IA.1::IA.1.7}.
· For a user defined as a system administrator (that is, one who has the system SPECIAL
attribute) a message is displayed on the console asking the operator if the user shall be
revoked if he exceeds the number of failed login attempts due to incorrect passwords
{IA.1::IA.1.7-R8-RACF-1} or if he exceeds the system inactivity interval {IA.1::IA.1.7.R8-RACF-
2}.
· For users in the TSO environment the administrator can impose restrictions on whether the
user can use the system on this day and at this time of the day. This is checked only when
using a terminal from a defined set. {IA.1::IA.1.8}.
· RACF also checks if the user is authorized to access the terminal (which can also include day
and time restrictions for accessing that terminal) or other port of entry {IA.1::IA.1.9}.
· RACF also checks if the user is authorized to use the application (if specified) {IA.1::IA.1.10}.
· A user may have SURROGAT authority for another user. This allows him to submit a job under
the user ID of this other user without specifying the password or to use the z/OS UNIX su
command to switch to this user’s ID without specifying the password {IA.1::IA.1.11}. It also
allows appropriately-authorized servers to switch a session to run under a pre-specified ID
{IA.1::IA.1.11-R8-MULTI-1}. In Labeled Security Mode, the surrogate user who submits the job
must have read access to the security label under which the job runs {IA.1::IA.1.12}. The audit
record for surrogate job submission identifies both the surrogate user and the jobcard user ID
{IA.1::IA.1.13}.
The application requesting RACF to authenticate a user will usually also request RACF to create a
specific control block, named Accessor Control Environment Element (ACEE). The content of the
ACEE is built from information taken from the user's profile in the RACF database and from
information provided by the application requesting authentication. Examples of information supplied
by the requesting application are the "Port of entry" or the name of the application. The ACEE is later
used in access checks performed by RACF when the user related information like the user's RACF
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 85 of 179
attributes, group memberships, port of entry, etc. are evaluated as part of the access control
algorithm.
8.2.2 RACF Passwords and Password Phrases
In RACF, the user selects his own password/phrase and only the user knows the value chosen. If the
user has forgotten his password/phrase and it needs to be reset, the security administrator will reset
the password/phrase {IA.2::IA.2.1-R10}. When the system administrator follows the rules for the
evaluated configuration, this new password/phrase should be in an expired state, thus forcing the
user to enter a new password/phrase on the next logon {IA.2::IA.2.2-R10}. When creating a new user
ID for a pseudo-user that is not a protected user ID, the initial password/phrase may be marked as
nonexpired, allowing it to be used without being changed first. {IA.2::IA.2.3-R10}.
8.2.2.1 Password Quality
A system administrator can set a variety of system-global rules for forming valid passwords using the
SETROPTS command (for system-wide settings) or (to a lesser extent) using the password
command to affect only one user. He can change such parameters as the number of days a password
is valid for, how long to maintain password history to prevent the user from reusing the same
password again, the minimum number of days between password changes, and syntax rules for
password content.
When a user changes a password, RACF treats the new, user-supplied password as an encryption
key to transform the RACF user ID into an encoded form using the DES algorithm that it stores on the
database. The password is not stored in clear text {IA.2::IA.2.4}.
The following system-wide options can be set to enforce a minimum strength of passwords using the
PASSWORD option in the SETROPTS command:
• Minimum and maximum length of passwords (LENGTH(m1:m2) as part of a RULE suboption)
{IA.2::IA.2.5}
• Maximum password lifetime (INTERVAL suboption) {IA.2::IA.2.6} and minimum password-
change time (MINCHANGE option) {IA.2::IA.2.V1R7-1}
• Number of passwords from the user’s password history that are not allowed for a new pass-
word (HISTORY suboption) {IA.2::IA.2.7}
• Maximum number of consecutive failed authentication attempts until the REVOKE attribute is
set in the user’s profile (REVOKE suboption) {IA.2::IA.2.8}
• Differentiate between upper- and lowercase characters with the PASSWORD(MIXEDCASE)
option {IA.2::IA.2.V1R7-2}
• allowance for the use of the following special characters in passwords: .<+|&!*-%_>?:=
• Type of character for each character position of a password. Possible types are {IA.2::IA.2.9}:
• ALPHA
• NOVOWEL
• CONSONANT
• NUMERIC
• MIXEDCONSONANT
• MIXEDVOWEL
• MIXEDNUM
• NATIONAL
If the value ALPHANUM is defined for more than one position in the password, at least one
alphabetical value and one numeric value are required by RACF.
Page 86 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
The SETROPTS command with the SPECIALCHARS option can be used to increase the possible
password space by an additional 14 characters (! % & * _ + | : ? > < . - =) {IA.2::IA.2-V2R2.1}.
A new MIXEDALL content-keyword is used to force a mixture of the four categories of characters
within a password. Note: MIXEDALL considers the existing national characters (@, #, $) as special
characters, and not as upper case letters {IA.2::IA.2-V2R2.2}.
SMF Type 80 record for the SETROPTS event code is being augmented with new indicators for:
• the NO/SPECIALCHARS keyword specified
• the NO/SPECIALCHARS keyword failed
• the SPECIALCHARS setting in effect after completion of the SETROPTS command
{IA.2::IA.2-V2R2.3}.
When the commands are called in a way that allows the TOE to suppress printing, passwords are not
displayed:
• when entered at a TSO terminal as part of the login process {IA.2::IA.2.10}, or
• when entered at a TSO terminal as part of the ADDUSER, ALTUSER, or PASSWORD com-
mands when the command contains the PASSWORD keyword but no value {IA.2::IA.2-R10-
RACF-21}, or
• when entered into one of the RACF-supplied ISPF panels that allows specification of a pass-
word {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-22}, or
• when entered at a system operator console as part of the operator logon {IA.2::IA.2-R8-BCP-
1}, or
• when the content of a jobcard is displayed as part of a job’s output {IA.2::IA.2.13}.
Note that the TSF can not ensure that passwords entered into programs executing with the user's
privilege are fully protected from being spoofed. The user has to take care about his password in
those cases as explained in the guidance.
Note that supressing printing of passwords in TSO, JES2, or BCP is subject to those z/OS
components. RACF is not involved in this. The claims are listed here just for completeness. They are
verified as part of the z/OS evaluation and not as part of the RACF evaluation.
Note that, as previously mentioned, for a local Kerberos user, when using RACF as the KDC’s
registry, the user’s RACF password/phrase and Kerberos password are the same.
Note that [PMLS] describes in section 7, chapter “Passwords and password phrases” an actual
password policy describing the requirements for password quality in the evaluated configuration.
8.2.2.2 Password Phrase Quality
Many of the system rules for passwords set by SETROPTS apply to password phrases, too.
However, RACF does not provide support for content syntax rules when using password phrases.
When a password phrase is established for a user, RACF treats the new phrase as a sequence of
encryption keys to transform the RACF user ID into an encoded form using the DES algorithm with
chaining, that it then stores on the database. The password phrase is not stored in clear text
{IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-1}.
The following system-wide options that can be set to enforce a minimum strength of passwords using
the PASSWORD option in the SETROPTS command also apply to password phrases:
· Maximum password phrase lifetime (INTERVAL suboption) {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-2} and
minimum password phrase change time (MINCHANGE option) {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-3}
· Number of password phrases from the user’s password phrase history that are not allowed for
a new password phrase (HISTORY suboption) {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-4}
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 87 of 179
· Maximum number of consecutive failed authentication attempts using a password or password
phrase until the REVOKE attribute is set in the user’s profile (REVOKE suboption) {IA.2::IA.2-
R10-RACF-5}
Rather than having an administrator specify syntax rules to specify valid password phrase content,
RACF enforces the following set of predefined rules:
• maximum length: 100 characters in the absence of exit ICHPWX11 {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-6}
Note: The evaluated configuration of the TOE generally does not allow customers to
implement exits to change the system processing. However, RACF supplies a sample
ICHPWX11 exit and a sample REXX exec IRRPHREX that the sample ICHPWX11 will
invoke. The administrator may install the sample ICHPWX11 unmodified, and may specify
tailoring options in IRRPHREX to apply some additional syntax/content rules.
• minimum length:
○ 14 characters in the absence of exit ICHPWX11 and when KDFAES is not the
passphrase encryption algorithm {IA.2::IA.2-V2R2-4}
○ 9 characters when KDFAES is the passphrase encryption algorithm {IA.2::IA.2-V2R2-5}
○ 9 characters if exit ICHPWX11 is present and allows the phrase {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-8}
• The phrase may not contain the user ID, in either sequential uppercase or sequential
lowercase characters {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-9}
• The phrase must contain at least two alphabetic characters (A-Z, a-z) {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-
10}
• The phrase must contain at least two non-alphabetic characters (numeric, punctuation,
special (including blanks)) {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-11}
• The phrase may not contain more than two consecutive identical characters {IA.2::IA.2-R10-
RACF-12}
If the administrator chooses to install the supplied sample exit ICHPWX11, the sample REXX exec
IRRPHREX may then apply the following additional checks, if selected by the administrator, and may
then accept a shorter phrase or reject a phrase that RACF would have accepted:
• The administrator can set the minimum allowable phrase length to a value between 9 and
100 inclusive by setting variable Phr_minlen {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-26}
• The administrator can set the maximum allowable phrase length to a value between 9 and
100 inclusive by setting variable Phr_maxlen {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-13}
• The administrator can set a more restrictive set of characters for password phrases by setting
the variables numbers, letters, special, and Phr_allowed_chars {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-14}
• The administrator can prevent leading or trailing blanks in password phrases by setting the
variables Phr_leading_blanks or Phr_trailing_blanks to “no” IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-15}
• The administrator can prevent use of password phrases that contain a case-insensitive
character string from the user's name by setting the variable Phr_name_allowed to “no” and
setting the variable Phr_name_minlen to the longest substring allowed {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-
16}
Example: if the user's name is John Smith the administrator could prevent the user from
specifying a phrase containing John or john or jOhn or Smit by appropriate settings of the
variables.
• The administrator can enable a triviality check by setting the variable Phr_triviality to “yes”.
This will prevent use of a new password phrase that differs from the old one only
insertion/deletion of spaces or changing character case. It also will reject a new phrase when
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the shorter of the old and new phrases is simply a substring of the other. {IA.2::IA.2-R10-
RACF-17}
• The administrator can prevent use of new phrases that do not differ in a significant number of
characters from the old phrase by setting the variable Phr_min_unique to the number of
positions that must differ. In addition, if the variable Phr_min_unique_norm has the value
“yes” the exec will first normalize the old and new phrases to be checked by converting them
to uppercase and removing spaces. {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-18}
• The administrator can prevent the user of a new phrase which simply reorders the words of
the old phrase by setting the variables Phr_unique_words (number of words that must be
unique), Phr_word_minlen (minimum length of the unique words), and
Phr_word_unique_upper (if “yes” then the exec will convert the old and new phrases to
uppercase for this check {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-19}
• The administrator can provide a list of disallowed words by setting the variables Phr_dict.0 to
the number of words in a supplied list, and supplying the list in variables Phr_dict.1,
Phr_dict.2, etc. {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-20}
When the commands are called in a way that allows the TOE to suppress printing, the phrase is not
displayed:
• when entered at a TSO terminal as part of the login process {IA.2::IA.2-R10-TSO-23}, or
• when entered into one of the RACF-supplied ISPF panels that allows specification of a
password phrase {IA.2::IA.2-R10-RACF-25}.
Note that the TSF can not ensure that password phrases entered into programs executing with the
user's privilege are fully protected from being spoofed. The user has to take care about his password
phrase in those cases as explained in the guidance.
8.2.3 RACF PassTickets
PassTickets provide a one-time {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-RACF-1} (by default, though administrators can
change that for selected applications {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-RACF-2}), cryptographically-computed,
password substitute that may be used to authenticate a user {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-RACF-3}. The
computed value comprises information about the user ID, the application to which the user is
authenticating, and the date and time-of-day {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-RACF-4}. A given PassTicket is usable
only within a time interval of plus-or-minus 10 minutes from the time of generation {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-
RACF-5}.
The cryptographic computation of a PassTicket requires usage of a secret key assigned by the
administrator, and (for computations on z/OS) maintained within a profile in the PTKTDATA class.
PassTicket evaluation also uses PTKTDATA profiles to determine the appropriate secret key to use.
For PassTicket generation, RACF locates a PTKTDATA profile whose name matches the application
name, and extracts the secret key from it. The generation of the PassTicket then proceeds, using the
user ID, application name, time/date, and selected key as inputs to the generation algorithm.
For PassTicket evaluation, RACF receives a user ID, application name, and optionally a group name,
and locates a PTKTDATA profile to determine the secret key using a series of profile lookups, until a
matching profile is found:
1. application-name.group-name.user-ID {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-RACF-6}
2. application-name.user-ID {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-RACF-7}
3. application-name.group-name {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-RACF-8}
4. application-name {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-RACF-9}
RACF provides two services for generation of PassTickets:
1. An internal service usable only by key 0 callers and located via the RCVT (RCVTPTGN);
{IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-RACF-10}
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 89 of 179
2. An external service usable by appropriately authorized users or servers, and invoked by
R_ticketserv() or R_gensec() {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-RACF-11}. To use one of these services for
PassTicket generation the caller needs UPDATE authority to resource
IRRPTAUTH.application-name.target-user-ID in the PTKTDATA class. {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-
RACF-12}
RACF also allows applications to evaluate PassTickets by using the R_ticketserv() or R_gensec()
services {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-RACF-13}. Use of these services for PassTicket evaluation requires READ
authority to IRRPTAUTH.application-name.target-user-id in the PTKTDATA class {IA.2::IA.2.14-R8-
RACF-13a}.
8.2.4 Authentication via Client Digital Certificates
z/OS applications can accept client certificates and map them to RACF user IDs as part of the client
authentication process. Such applications must be configured to use RACF to store the keyrings that
contain the application private key and the allowed Certificate Authority (CA) certificates that may be
used to provide the client certificates that the application will support. The security administrator will
use RACDCERT to establish those keyrings, which may reside in RACF profiles in the DIGTRING
class or in PKCS#11 tokens maintained in ICSF, and thus to approve of any CAs that will be used.
Any CA used in the evaluated configuration must support Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
maintained in an LDAP registry, and the security administrator must configure the application to use
the CRLs. This configuration may be application-specific, or may be done by establishing LE
environment variables that System SSL will use in the absence of specific application-provided CRL
configuration information.
The first step in the client authentication process is for the application to acquire the client certificate,
usually via the standard TLS data flows. As part of that processing, another z/OS component,
System SSL will validate the client certificate using the gsk_validate_certificate_mode() function,
passing the validation mode to be applied to the validation processing. This validation is outside the
scope of RACF.
After System SSL has validated the client certificate, the application (or AT-TLS) can map it to a
RACF user ID via the R_usermap() callable service {IA.2::IA.2.16-R8-RACF-1}. Or the application
can directly create a security environment for the user by using the InitACEE() service {IA.2::IA.2.16-
R8-RACF-3}. In this case, RACF will:
1. Examine the RACF database and determine whether the certificate is installed and registered
to a specific user. If so, return that user ID {IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-1}
2. Otherwise, RACF will try to find the best-matching mapping profile (DIGTNMAP class), and
return the user ID specified in the profile’s APPLDATA field:
a. Check for a filter of subject’s-full-name.issuer’s-full-name {IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-2}
b. Iteratively remove nodes from the subject’s name and check for a filter of the form:
subject’s-partial-name.issuer’s-full-name {IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-3}
c. Check for a filter of the form:
subject’s-full-name {IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-4}
d. Iteratively remove nodes from the subject’s name and check for a filter of the form:
subject’s-partial-name {IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-5}
e. Check for a filter of the form:
issuer’s-full-name {IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-6}
f. Iteratively remove nodes from the issuer’s name and check for a filter of the form:
issuer’s-partial-name {IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-7}
3. Otherwise, RACF will try to find the best-matching mapping profile (DIGTNMAP, DIGTCRIT
Page 90 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
class) that matches the mapping criteria specified by the application that presented the
certificate to RACF, and if found return the user ID specified in the DIGTNMAP profile’s
APPLDATA field {IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-8}.
4. Otherwise, if the certificate contains at least one hostIDMappings extension with a host-name
and user ID {IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-9} and the certificate was issued by a CA defined to
RACF as having the HIGHTRUST status {IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-10}, then RACF will
examine each of the hostIDMappings extensions, in order {IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-11}.
RACF will determine whether the application has READ access to IRR.HOST.host-name in
the SERVAUTH class, and if so RACF will return the user ID associated with that host-name
{IA.2::IA.2.17-R8-RACF-12}.
8.2.5 Authentication via Kerberos
In the evaluated configuration Kerberos-aware applications can accept Kerberos service tickets from
Kerberos clients (principals), map them to RACF user IDs, and allow them to access the system
using their RACF identities. In addition, users running on z/OS may have Kerberos identities, and act
as clients (Kerberos principals) to Kerberos-aware servers. For more information on authentication
using the z/OS Network Authentication Service and how it uses RACF see the z/OS Security Target.
The main support RACF provides for this function is the provision and management of the KERB
segment of a user profile, How the z/OS Network Authentication Services use RACF is beyond the
scope of this Security Target.
8.2.6 Started procedures
With the concept of a started procedure, z/OS provides a mechanism where a defined task can be
started by an operator, but then operates under a defined user ID that is specifically assigned to the
started procedure itself.
A started procedure consists of a set of job control language statements that are frequently used
together to achieve a certain result. Started procedures usually reside in the system procedure library,
SYS1.PROCLIB, which is a partitioned data set. A started procedure is usually started by an operator,
but can be associated with a functional subsystem. For example, SMS is treated as a started
procedure even though it does not need to be specifically started with a START command.
Only RACF-defined users and groups can be specifically authorized to access RACF-protected
resources {IA.3::IA.3.2}. Other users can access those resources with the authority allowed in the
UACC entry of the RACF profile controlling access to the resource. However, started procedures
have system-generated JOB statements that do not contain the USER, GROUP, or PASSWORD
parameter.
To enable started procedures to access RACF-protected resources with other authorities than those
defined in the UACC entry of the profile protecting the resource, started procedures must have RACF
user IDs and group names. By assigning them RACF identities, an installation can give started
procedures specific authorization to access RACF-protected resources. For example, one can allow
JES to access spool data sets.
To associate the names of started procedures with specific RACF group names and user IDs, an
administrator can do one of the following:
o Set up the STARTED class (the recommended method)
o Create a started procedures table (ICHRIN03)
8.2.6.1 Assigning RACF user IDs to started procedures
As with any other user ID and group name, the user ID and group name that is assigned to a started
procedure must be defined to RACF using the ADDUSER and ADDGROUP commands, and the user
must be connected to the group. The administrator also needs to use the PERMIT command to
authorize the users or groups to get access to the required resources.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 91 of 179
8.2.6.2 Protected user IDs
The user IDs that an administrator assigns to started procedures should have the PROTECTED
attribute unless the started procedure is required to have a user ID with a password defined.
Protected user IDs are user IDs that have both the NOPASSWORD and NOOIDCARD attributes
{IA.3::IA.3.5}. They are defined or modified using the ADDUSER and ALTUSER commands.
Protected user IDs can not be authenticated via a password, password phrase, or RACF PassTicket,
and are protected from being revoked through incorrect password attempts {IA.3::IA.3.6-R12-
RACFEAL5}.
8.2.7 Handling of Groups During Authentication
During authentication, RACF constructs security information that represents the user (subject) for
subsequent use during access checking.
• During RACF authentication, RACF determines whether list-of-groups processing is in effect
or not. If list-of-groups is not in effect, RACF puts the user's default group into the subject's
ACEE, or the group specified by the caller of the RACF interfaces for user authentication. If
list-of-groups is in effect, RACF gathers a list of all the groups to which the user is
connected, and makes a copy of that list in the subject's ACEE. During access checking
(DAC) for MVS resources, RACF can then base its decisions on both the user ID and on the
group membership of the user {IA.3::IA.1.14-R12-RACFEAL5-1}.
• When an application attempts to use the RACF interfaces for UNIX functions, RACF selects
from the group(s) in the subject's ACEE up to the first 300 (alphabetically) which have OMVS
segments with GIDs defined. During access checking (DAC) for UNIX resources, RACF can
then base its decisions on the user's UID and the selected groups' GIDs {IA.3::IA.1.14-R10-
RACF-2}.
8.2.8 Assertion of User Identity
{IA.5::IA.5-R12-IDPROP-RACF-1} RACF supports specification on initACEE and RACROUTE
REQUEST=VERIFY of a distributed identity via a structure called an IDID (containing a user's
distinguished name (DN) and a domain/realm name (DC)):
• If an IDID is specified on initACEE but a RACF user ID is not specified, then initACEE will
perform a mapping operation using the IDIDMAP class to determine the associated RACF
user ID to use during RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY processing and will also include the
IDID information.
• If both an IDID and a RACF user ID are specified on initACEE, then initACEE will create an
ACEE for that user ID as it usually would and not perform mapping. Again, it will include the
IDID information on the RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY call.
• When an IDID is specified on RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY, RACF uses the other
parameters to create the ACEE as it normally does, but will anchor the IDID information in the
ACEE for later use during auditing.
{IA.5::IA.5-R12-IDPROP-RACF-2} RACF provides a ‘RACMAP’ command to allow the security
administrator to define ‘mapping filter rules’ to RACF that will support the mapping of distributed user
identities, as specified within the IDID data area, into RACF userIDs as required by the customer. This
new RACF command is similar to the existing RACDCERT command, which allows the specification
of mapping filter rules that RACF uses to map distributed user identities based on the ‘subject’ and
‘issuer’ information within Digital Certificates. But instead of being limited to only user identities within
Digital Certificates, the command supports the definition of mapping filter rules within the IDIDMAP
class based on an x.500 representation of the user identity and the ‘Name-Space’ that the user is
defined within.
{IA.5::IA.5-R12-IDPROP-RACF-3} The RACF R_cacheserv callable service provides a function
(function code 7) that will extract a copy of the ACEE for the currently active user in the form of a
RACF environment object (aka RACO), save that RACO in a data space, and return a context
Page 92 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
reference (ICRX) that will uniquely identify that saved RACO. Subsequently an invoker of
RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY can provide that ICRX and RACF will recreate the security
environment (ACEE) of the original user from the RACO or from the IDID information in the ICRX if
necessary. R_cacheserv will also allow deletion of a cached security environment.
{IA.5::IA.5-R12-IDPROP-RACF-5} The RACF R_cacheserv service can also return a pseudo-userID
and pseudo-password that RACF authentication functions (initACEE, RACROUTE
REQUEST=VERIFY) will subsequently accept and use to create an ACEE for the previously specified
RACF user ID with an ICTX data area cached on the earlier R_cacheserv invocation. The pseudo-
userID and pseudo-password may be used at most once on a subsequent authentication request.
{IA.5::IA.5-R12-IDPROP-RACF-4} RACF will provide an ENF 71 signal when an administrator has
issued an ALTUSER REVOKE or a CONNECT or REMOVE command that changes a user's group
connections, allowing applications that have cached ACEEs locally or via R_cacheserv to remove
their cache entries and recreate the ACEEs if needed.
{IA.5::IA.5-R21-IDPROP-RACF-6} RACF will provide an ENF 71 signal when an administrator has
issued a DELUSER or DELGRP command allowing applications that have cached ACEEs local or via
R_cacheserv to remove cache entries.
{IA.5::IA.5-R12-IDPROP-USS-1} The UNIX System Services __passwd (BPX1PWD) and
pthread_security_np() (BPX1TLS) function allows appropriately authorized servers to assert a user
identity and create a security environment by specification of the pseudo-userID and pseudo-
password obtained via a prior authentication and use of R_cacheserv.
{IA.5::IA.5-V2R1-IDPROP-RACF-7} RACF will provide an ENF 79 signal when an administrator has
issued a PERMIT command that changes a user's or group's authorization to resources in a resource
class that has been defined in the RACF Class Descriptor Table with the SIGNAL=YES option.
8.3 Access control (AC)
8.3.1 Access control principles
The Resource Access Control Facility (RACF) is the component that performs access control
between subjects acting on behalf of a user and resources protected by the discretionary and (if
active) mandatory access control policies. RACF uses user and resource profiles it stores in the
RACF database to decide if a subject has access to a non-UNIX resource. For UNIX resources, the
access permissions are carried with the resource itself (permission bits).
While external resource manager can use RACF to manage and control access of users to the
resources they control, RACF acts also as a resource manager to some of its own resources. For
external resource manager RACF neither knows what the actual resource protected by a specific
RACF profile is nor knows the semantics the resource manager places on the individual access
modes. Therefore this summary specification only describes the purpose of profiles and the
semantics of access modes that protect resources owned by RACF itself.
All z/OS components that have to make access decisions will call RACF through a z/OS interface.
The following figure shows the flow of requests and replies within z/OS when a request to access a
protected resource is made.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 93 of 179
Figure 1: RACF and its relationship to the operating system
A program that wants to access a resource uses a function that is part of the external interface
provided by the z/OS operating system to one of the z/OS components (1). An example is a program
that wants to open a data set.
The z/OS component responsible for managing the resource calls the RACF component using the
internal interface to RACF (mainly the RACROUTE interface) to check the access rights of the user
that initiated the user request and passes the name and type of the resource and the requested type
of access to RACF {AC.1::AC.1.1}. The caller may also pass the ID of the user or an explicit user
security context (ACEE), or RACF obtains those values from the security context of the user that has
been established during user authentication (2) {AC.1::AC.1.2}.
RACF extracts the user information from the security context of the user or (in a few cases) from the
user profile, extracts the resource profile from its external database or the internal cache (3), and
checks to see if the user with his current security attributes is allowed to access the resource in the
requested access mode (4 and 5).
If the resource is known to RACF, RACF returns either a “yes” or a “no” decision for the access
request {AC.1::AC.1.3}. If the resource is not known to RACF, RACF may return a “don’t know” return
code unless there are specific options set that allow RACF to take a yes or no decision (6)
{AC.1::AC.1.4}. In the case of a “don’t know” result, the resource manager needs to make its own
decision whether to allow access or not. Depending on the decision, the resource manager will either
perform or reject the access request of the user program (7) {AC.1::AC.1.5}.
The protection philosophy of RACF is based on “profiles” that represent protected resources but also
users and groups. Profiles are organized in profile classes, where each class represents a type of
resource (such as data sets or terminals) or other entity (such as users or groups). A profile stores
attributes of the subject or object it represents.
For profiles that represent a protected resource, an access list can be assigned {AC.1::AC.1.6}. This
access list specifies the type of access subjects may have to the resource represented by the profile.
Access control to UNIX file system objects and IPC objects are also handled by RACF, but in the
case of these objects, the access rights are stored with the object itself. RACF still performs the
access check. For details, see the description of access control for UNIX objects.
8.3.2 Protected resources
Resource profiles of RACF are structured into an open set of “resource classes”. IBM provides a set
of resources classes used by z/OS (stored in the “static class descriptor table”), but RACF also allows
for the definition and activation of additional resource classes using the RDEFINE or RALTER
commands addressing the CDT general resource class (those are stored in the “dynamic class
descriptor table”). The dynamically defined classes need to be “activated” using the command
SETROPTS RACLIST(CDT) REFRESH. Resource classes represent “types” of objects that are
access protected by RACF. IBM supplies a default static class descriptor table, which is structured
into resources used by different components of z/OS as well as resources used by specific other IBM
Page 94 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
products like DB2 or CICS.
8.3.2.1 General z/OS Resource Classes
IBM supplies a class descriptor table that defines classes used by z/OS or other IBM products that
use the services of RACF for controlling access to the resources they manage. The following tables
list the classes of general resources used by z/OS and DB2. Resource classes marked in red include
resources that are used by RACF internally for managing access to RACF resources or use of RACF
controlled privileges.
Class Name Purpose
ALCSAUTH Supports the Airline Control System/MVS (ALCS/MVS) product.
APPCLU Verifying the identity of partner logical units during VTAM session establish-
ment.
APPCPORT Controlling which user IDs can access the system from a given LU (APPC
port of entry). Also, conditional access to resources for users entering the
system from a given LU.
APPCSERV Controlling whether a program being run by a user can act as a server for a
specific APPC transaction program (TP).
APPCSI Controlling access to APPC side information files.
APPCTP Controlling the use of APPC transaction programs.
APPL Controlling access to applications.
CACHECLS Contains profiles used for saving and restoring cache contents from the
RACF database. See the description of the R_cacheserv RACF callable ser-
vice.
CBIND Controlling the client’s ability to bind to the server.
CDT Contains profiles for installation-defined classes for the dynamic CDT.
CFIELD Contains profiles that define the installation's custom fields.
CONSOLE Controlling access to MCS consoles. Also, conditional access to other re-
sources for commands originating from an MCS console.
DASDVOL DASD volumes.
DBNFORM Reserved for future IBM use.
DEVICES Used by MVS allocation to control who can allocate devices such as:
 Unit record devices (printers and punches) (allocated only by PSF, JES2,
or JES3)
 Graphics devices (allocated only by VTAM)
Teleprocessing (TP) or communications devices (allocated only by VTAM)
DIGTCERT Contains digital certificates and information related to them. See chapter 20
of [RACF.SAG] and the description of the RACDCERT command.
DIGTCRIT Specifies additional criteria for certificate name filters. See chapter 20 of
[RACF.SAG] and the description of the RACDCERT command.
DIGTNMAP Mapping class for certificate name filters. See chapter 20 of [RACF.SAG] and
the description of the RACDCERT command.
DIGTRING Contains a profile for each key ring and provides information about the digital
certificates that are part of each key ring. See chapter 20 of [RACF.SAG] and
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 95 of 179
Class Name Purpose
the description of the RACDCERT command.
DIRAUTH Setting logging options for RACROUTE REQUEST=DIRAUTH requests.
Also, if the DIRAUTH class is active, security label authorization checking is
done when a user receives a message sent through the TPUT macro or the
TSO SEND, or LISTBC commands.
DLFCLASS The data lookaside facility.
FACILITY Miscellaneous uses. Profiles are defined in this class so resource managers
(typically elements of z/OS or z/VM) can check a user’s access to the profiles
when the user takes some action. Examples are the profiles used to control
execution of RACDCERT command functions and the profiles used to control
privileges in the z/OS UNIX environment. RACF does not document all of the
resources used in the FACILITY class by other products. For information on
the FACILITY class resources used by a specific product (other than RACF
itself), see that product’s documentation.
FIELD Fields in RACF profiles (field-level access checking).
FSEXEC Allows to prevent users from executing any file in a zFS file system or Tem-
porary File System.
GDASDVOL Resource group class for DASDVOL class.
GLOBAL Global access checking table entry.
GMBR Member class for the GLOBAL class.
GSDSF Resource group class for SDSF class.
GTERMINL Resource group class for TERMINAL class.
GXFACILI Grouping class for XFACILIT resources.
IBMOPC Controlling access to OPC/ESA subsystems.
IDIDMAP Contains distributed identity filters created with the RACMAP command.
JESINPUT Conditional access support for commands or jobs entered into the system
through a JES input device.
JESJOBS Controlling the submission and cancellation of jobs by job name.
JESSPOOL Controlling access to job data sets on the JES spool (that is, SYSIN and
SYSOUT data sets).
KEYSMSTR Contains profiles that hold keys to encrypt data stored in the RACF data-
base, such as LDAP BIND passwords and DCE passwords.
LDAPBIND Contains the LDAP server URL, bind distinguished name, and bind pass-
word.
LOGSTRM Controls system logger resources, such as log streams and the coupling fa-
cility structures associated with log streams.
NODES Controlling the following on MVS systems:
 Whether jobs are allowed to enter the system from other nodes
 Whether jobs that enter the system from other nodes have to pass user
identification and password verification checks
NODMBR Member class for the NODES class.
OPERCMDS Controlling who can issue operator commands (for example, JES and MVS,
and operator commands).
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Class Name Purpose
PMBR Member class for the PROGRAM class.
PROGRAM Protects executable programs.
PROPCNTL Controlling if user ID propagation can occur, and if so, for which user IDs
(such as the CICS or IMS main task user ID), user ID propagation is not to
occur.
PSFMPL Used by PSF to perform security functions for printing, such as separator
page labeling, data page labeling, and enforcement of the user printable
area.
PTKTDATA PassTicket key class enables the security administrator to associate a RACF
secured sign-on secret key with a particular mainframe application that uses
RACF for user authentication. Examples of such applications are IMS, CICS,
TSO, z/VM, APPC, and MVS batch.
RACFEVNT Contains profiles that control the following events:
 LDAP change log notification for changes to certain RACF profiles
New password and password phrase enveloping for a given user.
RACFHC Used by IBM Health Checker for z/OS. Contains profiles that list the re-
sources to check for each installation-defined health check.
RACFVARS RACF variables. In this class, profile names, which start with & (ampersand),
act as RACF variables that can be specified in profile names in other RACF
general resource classes. See [RACF.SAG], chapter 7.
RACGLIST Class of profiles that hold the results of RACROUTE
REQUEST=LIST,GLOBAL=YES or a SETROPTS RACLIST operation.
RACHCMBR Used by IBM Health Checker for z/OS. Member class for the RACHCMBR
class.
RDATALIB Used to control use of the R_datalib callable service (IRRSDL00 or IR-
RSDL64).
RRSFDATA Used to control RACF remote sharing facility (RRSF) functions.
RVARSMBR Member class for the RACFVARS class.
SCDMBR Member class for the SECDATA class.
SDSF Controls the use of authorized commands in the System Display and Search
Facility (SDSF). See also GSDSF class.
SECDATA Security classification of users and data (security levels and security cate-
gories).
SECLABEL If security labels are used, and, if so, their definitions.
SECLMBR Member class for the SECLABEL class.
SERVAUTH Contains profiles used by servers to check a client’s authorization to use the
server or to use resources managed by the server. Also, can be used to pro-
vide conditional access to resources for users entering the system from a
given server.
SERVER Controlling the server’s ability to register with the daemon.
SMESSAGE Controlling to which users a user can send messages (TSO only).
SOMDOBJS Controlling the client’s ability to invoke the method in the class.
STARTED Used in preference to the started procedures table to assign an identity dur-
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 97 of 179
Class Name Purpose
ing the processing of an MVS START command.
SURROGAT If surrogate submission is allowed, and if allowed, which user IDs can act as
surrogates.
SYSMVIEW Controlling access by the SystemView for MVS Launch Window to Sys-
temView for MVS applications.
TAPEVOL Tape volumes.
TEMPDSN Controlling who can access residual temporary data sets.
TERMINAL Terminals (TSO or z/VM). See also GTERMINL class.
VTAMAPPL Controlling who can open ACBs from non-APF authorized programs.
WRITER Controlling the use of JES writers.
XFACILIT Miscellaneous uses. Profile names in this class can be longer than 39 char-
acters in length. Profiles are defined in this class so that resource managers
(typically elements of z/OS) can check a user’s access to the resources
when the users take some action.
Table 20: General Resource Classes
DB2 Resource Classes
DB2 Resource classes are mentioned here to support the evaluation of DB2. Within this Security
Target they are not used for any security function. The IBM supplied class descriptor table just
contains those classes (as well as other classes related to applications like CICS, IMS, or
Websphere), which are not used unless those applications are installed and configured to use RACF.
DSNADM DB2 administrative authority class.
DSNR Controls access to DB2 subsystems.
GDSNBP Grouping class for DB2 buffer pool privileges.
GDSNCL Grouping class for DB2 collection privileges.
GDSNDB Grouping class for DB2 database privileges.
GDSNGV Grouping class for global variables
GDSNJR Grouping class for Java archive files (JARs).
GDSNPK Grouping class for DB2 package privileges.
GDSNPN Grouping class for DB2 plan privileges.
GDSNSC Grouping class for DB2 schemas privileges.
GDSNSG Grouping class for DB2 storage group privileges.
GDSNSM Grouping class for DB2 system privileges.
GDSNSP Grouping class for DB2 stored procedure privileges.
GDSNSQ Grouping class for DB2 sequences.
GDSNTB Grouping class for DB2 table, index, or view privileges.
GDSNTS Grouping class for DB2 tablespace privileges.
GDSNUF Grouping class for DB2 user-defined function privileges.
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GDSNUT Grouping class for DB2 user-defined distinct type privileges.
MDSNBP Member class for DB2 buffer pool privileges.
MDSNCL Member class for DB2 collection privileges.
MDSNDB Member class for DB2 database privileges.
MDSNGV Member class for global variables
MDSNJR Member class for Java archive files (JARs).
MDSNPK Member class for DB2 package privileges.
MDSNPN Member class for DB2 plan privileges.
MDSNSC Member class for DB2 schema privileges.
MDSNSG Member class for DB2 storage group privileges.
MDSNSM Member class for DB2 system privileges.
MDSNSP Member class for DB2 stored procedure privileges.
MDSNSQ Member class for DB2 sequences.
MDSNTB Member class for DB2 table, index, or view privileges.
MDSNTS Member class for DB2 tablespace privileges.
MDSNUF Member class for DB2 user-defined function privileges.
MDSNUT Member class for DB2 user-defined distinct type privileges.
Table 21: General Resource Classes for DB2
Enterprise Identity Mapping (EIM) Classes
RAUDITX Controls auditing for Enterprise Identity Mapping (EIM).
Table 22: General Resource Classes for EIM
ICSF Resource Classes
CRYPTOZ Controls access to PKCS #11 tokens.
CSFKEYS Controls access to ICSF cryptographic keys.
CSFSERV Controls access to ICSF cryptographic services.
GCSFKEYS Resource group class for the CSFKEYS class.
GXCSFKEY Resource group class for the XCSFKEY class.
XCSFKEY Controls the exportation of ICSF cryptographic keys.
Table 23: General Resource Classes for ICSF
PSF Resource Classes
PRINTSRV Controls access to printer definitions for Infoprint Server.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 99 of 179
Table 24: General Resource Classes for PSF
Kerberos Resource Classes
KERBLINK Mapping class for user identities of local and foreign principals.
REALM Used to define the local and foreign realms.
Table 25: General Resource Classes for Kerberos
DFSMS Resource Classes
MGMTCLAS SMS management classes.
STORCLAS SMS storage classes.
SUBSYSNM Authorizes a subsystem (such as a particular instance of CICS) to open a
VSAM ACB and use VSAM record level sharing (RLS) functions.
Table 26: General Resource Classes for DFSMS
TSO Resource Classes
ACCTNUM TSO account numbers.
PERFGRP TSO performance groups.
TSOAUTH TSO user authorities such as OPER and MOUNT.
TSOPROC TSO logon procedures.
Table 27: General Resource Classes for TSO
UNIX System Services Resource Classes
DIRACC Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) for access checks for
read/write access to z/OS UNIX directories. This class need not be active to
control auditing.
DIRSRCH Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) of z/OS UNIX directory
searches. This class need not be active to control auditing.
FSACCESS Allows control of access to the root of a zFS file system through RACF re-
source profiles rather than UNIX permission bits or ACLs.
FSEXEC Allows to prevent users from executing any file in a zFS file system or Tem-
porary File System.
FSOBJ Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) for all access checks
for z/OS UNIX file system objects except directory searches. Controls audit-
ing (using SETROPTS AUDIT) of creation and deletion of z/OS UNIX file
system objects. This class need not be active to control auditing.
FSSEC Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) for changes to the se-
curity data (FSP) for z/OS UNIX file system objects. This class need not be
active to control auditing. When this class is active, it also controls whether
ACLs are used during authorization checks to z/OS UNIX files and directo-
ries.
IPCOBJ Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) of access checks for
inter-process communication (IPC) objects and changes to security informa-
tion of IPC objects. Controls auditing (using SETROPTS AUDIT) of the cre-
ation and deletion of IPC objects. This class need not be active to control au-
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diting.
PROCACT Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) of functions that look at
data from, or affect the processing of, z/OS UNIX processes. This class need
not be active to control auditing.
PROCESS Controls auditing (using SETROPTS LOGOPTIONS) of changes to UIDs
and GIDs of z/OS UNIX processes. Controls auditing (using SETROPTS AU-
DIT) of dubbing and undubbing of z/OS UNIX processes. This class need not
be active to control auditing.
UNIXMAP Contains profiles that are used to map z/OS UNIX UIDs to RACF user IDs
and z/OS UNIX GIDs to RACF group names.
UNIXPRIV Contains profiles that are used to grant z/OS UNIX privileges.
Table 28: General Resource Classes for z/OS Unix
8.3.2.2 Installation Defined Resource Classes
As a general-access control system, RACF is capable of protecting a number of other resources
including installation defined resource classes, but those are not included in this evaluation. The
reader should note that some RACF classes are included in this evaluation that the resource
managers do not use to represent “resources” but represent privileges or restrictions, where
assigning “access” to a resource in such a class to a user or a group just determines that the user or
group has the privilege or restriction associated with the profile. As stated before it is up to the
resource manager to make the association between the real "resource" and the profiles within RACF
that represent the resource. It is also up to the resource manager to determine the semantics of
specific access types to the resources it manages. Classes with resources that are used by RACF
are marked in red.
8.3.2.3 Data sets
8.3.2.3.1 Standard data set naming conventions
By default, RACF expects a data set name (and the data set profile name) to consist of at least two
qualifiers. RACF also expects the high-level qualifier of the data set profile name to be either a RACF-
defined user ID or a RACF-defined group name.
If an installation has chosen to define data set profiles under the standard RACF naming conventions,
they can create a group for each high-level qualifier that is not a user ID, and permit users to protect
any data set that has that high-level qualifier by giving them CREATE authority in that group
{AC.2::AC.2.1}.
8.3.2.3.2 Table-driven data set naming conventions
An installation can use the naming convention table to set up and enforce a data set naming
convention other than that used by RACF (AC.2.2). The table can:
· Supply a qualifier to be used as the high-level qualifier for authorization checking
{AC.2::AC.2.3}
· Convert data set names to RACF naming convention form for RACF use {AC.2::AC.2.4}
· Convert names in RACF form to the installation’s format for external display {AC.2::AC.2.5}
· Enforce a naming convention by not allowing the definition of data sets that do not conform to
an installation’s rules {AC.2::AC.2.6}
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 101 of 179
· Reduce RACF overhead by determining whether a data set is a user or group data set
An installation can create a naming convention table (module ICHNCV00), which RACF uses
to check and modify (internally to RACF) the data set name in all commands and macros that
process data set names {AC.2::AC.2.7}. An installation can use the table to selectively
rearrange data set names to “fit” the RACF convention without actually changing those
names.
8.3.2.3.3 Protecting data sets that have single-qualifier data set names
If some of the data sets in an installation have names that consist of a single qualifier, one can still
RACF-protect those data sets {AC.2::AC.2.8}. To get RACF protection for single-qualifier names, the
SETROPTS command with the PREFIX operand must be issued.
This command defines a high-level qualifier to be used as a prefix for single-qualifier names and
activates the facility {AC.2::AC.2.9}. Then, when RACF processes requests for the data set, RACF
internally modifies single-qualifier names by adding the prefix, making the data set names acceptable
to RACF routines {AC.2::AC.2.10}. All SMF log records and all messages from RACF contain the
RACF-modified version of the data set name {AC.2::AC.2.11} unless the SETROPTS REALDSN
option is in effect {AC.2::AC.2-R10-RACF-1}.
8.3.2.3.4 Protecting user data sets
A user data set is a data set whose high-level qualifier is a RACF user ID. The following rules apply to
user data sets:
· In general, all RACF-defined users can protect their own data sets {AC.2::AC.2.12}
· A user can RACF-protect a data set for another user under any of the following conditions:
– The user who is protecting the data set has the SPECIAL attribute. A discrete or generic profile
can be created {AC.2::AC.2.13}.
– The user who is protecting the data set has the group-SPECIAL attribute, and the high-level-
qualifier of the data set name is a user within the group-SPECIAL user’s scope of authority. A
discrete or generic profile can be created {AC.2::AC.2.14}.
– The user who is protecting a data set has the OPERATIONS attribute (or the group-
OPERATIONS attribute if the data set is within his scope of authority) and is simultaneously
creating the data set {AC.2::AC.2.15}.
In this case, the user can create a discrete profile:
§ Through ADSP {AC.2::AC.2.16}
§ By specifying the PROTECT operand on the TSO ALLOCATE command that creates the data set
{AC.2::AC.2.17}
§ By specifying the PROTECT=YES OR SECMODEL= profile-name operands on the JCL DD
statement that creates the data set {AC.2::AC.2.18}
8.3.2.3.5 Protecting group data sets
A group data set is a data set whose high-level qualifier is a RACF group name. A RACF-defined user
can RACF-protect a group data set under any of the following conditions:
· The user has JOIN, CONNECT, or CREATE authority in the group {AC.2::AC.2.19};
· The user has the SPECIAL attribute (or the group-SPECIAL attribute for that group) and the
request is made using the ADDSD command {AC.2::AC.2.20};
· The user has the OPERATIONS attribute and is not connected to the group {AC.2::AC.2.21}.
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8.3.2.3.6 Controlling the creation of new data sets
Using data set profiles, an administrator can control whether users can create (allocate) new data
sets.
For cataloged data sets, creating, deleting, or renaming the data set involves access not only to the
data set profile protecting the data set, but also to the catalog in which the data set is cataloged
{AC.2::AC.2.22}. In general, users need the following:
· To add entries to the catalog, users need authority to create the data set as specified below
and (except for SMS-managed data sets) UPDATE authority to the catalog {AC.2::AC.2.23}.
· To delete entries from the catalog, users need ALTER authority to the protecting profile or to
the catalog {AC.2::AC.2.24}.
The following cases describe how RACF can be used to control the creation of new user and group
data sets.
A user can create a new user data set in the following situations:
· The data set is covered by an existing generic profile and the user does not have ADSP
{AC.2::AC.2.25}. The creation is allowed if (1) the user has ALTER authority to the data set
through a generic profile or global access checking, or (2) the data set is the user’s own data
set {AC.2::AC.2.26}.
· The data set name is not covered by an existing generic profile and the user does not have
ADSP and the data set is covered by the Global Access check table granting ALTER.
{AC.2::AC.2.27}
· The user has ADSP and the data set is the user’s own data set. The creation is allowed and
RACF creates a discrete profile for the data set {AC.2::AC.2.28}.
· The user has the OPERATIONS attribute. If the user has the group-OPERATIONS attribute
(that is, the user is connected to a group with the OPERATIONS attribute), the high-level
qualifier of the new data set must be the ID of a user who is within the scope of that group
{AC.2::AC.2.29}.
A user can create a new group data set in the following situations:
· The data set name is protected by an existing generic profile and the user does not have
ADSP.
The creation is allowed if at least one of the following is true:
o The user has ALTER authority to the data set through the generic profile or global access
checking {AC.2::AC.2.30}
o The user has CREATE authority in the group {AC.2::AC.2.31}
· The data set name is not covered by an existing generic profile and the user does not have
ADSP {AC.2::AC.2.32}
· The user has ADSP and the data set belongs to a group of which the user is a member. The
creation is allowed only if the user has CREATE authority in the group. If the creation is
allowed, RACF creates a discrete profile for the data set {AC.2::AC.2.33}
· {AC.2::AC.2.36-R12-RACF}The user has the OPERATIONS attribute , or the group-OPERA-
TIONS attribute for the group in question (directly or via a superior group), except when both
of the following are true: The user is connected to the group with less than CREATE authority
{AC.2::AC.2.34-R12-RACF}, and the user has less than ALTER access to the data set if it pro-
tected by a generic profile {AC.2::AC.2.35-R12-RACF}
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 103 of 179
8.3.2.3.7 Data set profile ownership
Each data set profile defined to RACF requires a RACF-defined user or group as the owner of the
profile. The owner (if a user) has full control over the profile, including the access list {AC.2::AC.2.37}.
If the owner of the data set profile is a group, users with group-SPECIAL in that group have full
control over the profile {AC.2::AC.2.38}.
Ownership of data set profiles is assigned when the profiles are defined to RACF but may be
changed later. Note that ownership of a data set profile does not mean that the owner can
automatically access that data set. To access a data set, the owner must still be authorized by the
DAC and (in Labeled Security Mode) MAC policy rules {AC.2::AC.2.39}.
8.3.2.4 Programs
The ability of users to execute programs can be restricted by the RACF program control function. This
feature is useful for programs operating with privileges like authorized programs. Program control can
for example be used to restrict the ability of a user to start an authorized program from an authorized
library in a way such that it executes with APF authorization {AC.2::AC.2-V1R7-1}. Users may still
have read access to the library and may therefore copy the program into another library and execute
it from this library. Although this is possible, the program will then not execute with the privileges it has
when executed from the original library {AC.2::AC.2-V1R7.2}.
Program control (as described in this section) applies to programs residing in z/OS partitioned data
sets or libraries, not to programs stored as part of z/OS UNIX file system. Mechanisms for program
control for the z/OS UNIX subsystem are explained in another section of this Security Target.
z/OS allows for three modes for program control: BASIC, ENHANCED and ENHANCED-WARNING.
The mode is defined by the strings 'BASIC', 'ENHANCED' or 'ENHANCED-WARNING' in the
APPLDATA field of the IRR.PGMSECURITY profile in the FACILITY class {AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.3}. An
empty value or any other value than 'BASIC' or 'ENHANCED' will result in the ENHANCED-
WARNING mode {AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.4}. If the IRR.PGMSECURITY profile is not defined, BASIC
mode is used {AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.5}. In ENHANCED-WARNING mode the access decisions made by
the TOE are the same as in BASIC mode but a warning message is issued whenever the access
would have been denied in ENHANCED mode {AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.6}.
The checks that RACF makes when a user makes a request to load (execute) a program are:
1. If program control has been activated with SETROPTS WHEN(PROGRAM) {AC.2::AC.2-V1R7.7}
2. If program control is active, RACF checks to see whether the program is protected by a profile in
the PROGRAM class {AC.2::AC.2-V1R7.8}
3. If the program is not protected, RACF determines whether there are any data sets currently open
using PADS or whether there are any execute-controlled programs in storage in the address
space:
 If there are no such data sets or programs, RACF marks the environment dirty (uncontrolled)
and allows the user to execute the program {AC.2::AC.2-V1R7.9}.
 If there are data sets currently opened using PADS, or programs to which the user has only
EXECUTE authority, RACF fails the request and the system abends the task. RACF issues
message ICH423I to document the execute-controlled programs, or message ICH424I to
document the PADS data sets that caused the operation to fail. In this way, RACF prevents
uncontrolled programs from gaining access to protected data or programs inappropriately
{AC.2::AC.2-V1R7.10}.
4. If the program is protected by a profile but the user does not have at least EXECUTE authority to
the program, RACF causes the system to abend the task because the user is not authorized to
execute the program {AC.2::AC.2-V1R7.11}.
5. If the program is protected by a profile and the user has only EXECUTE authority to the
PROGRAM profile or to the library that contains the program (when the program is loaded from a
JOBLIB, STEPLIB, or tasklib), and if the job step or TSO session is running in ENHANCED
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program security mode, RACF checks whether an appropriate program established the program
environment. RACF determines if the first program executed in the job step had the ’MAIN’
attribute, or (if necessary) if the program invoked by TSOEXEC or IKJEFTSR had the ’MAIN’
attribute. If the program does not have MAIN, RACF next determines if the first program run in the
current task (TCB) or the first program executed in some parent task had the ’BASIC’ attribute. If
so, RACF allows the Program control request. Otherwise, RACF fails the request and issues
message ICH429I to describe the problem and tell you what program established the environment
{AC.2::AC.2-V1R7.12}.
6. If the user is still authorized to execute the program and the program was defined with the
PADCHK attribute, RACF checks whether any program-accessed data sets are open.
 If no program-accessed data sets are open, RACF allows the user to execute the program
{AC.2::AC.2-V1R7.13}.
 If program-accessed data sets are open, RACF checks the user or program combination to
verify that the combination has at least the same authority to each data set in the list that was
required when each data set was opened.
 If the user or program combination has sufficient authority to all of the opened data sets,
RACF allows the user to execute the program {AC.2::AC.2-V1R7.14}
 If the user or program combination does not have sufficient authority to all of the opened data
sets, RACF causes the system to end the task (with abend code 306 or 806) {AC.2::AC.2-
V1R7.15}.
With program control enabled, z/OS provides the ability to allow users to access data sets which they
are not allowed to access directly by using program controlled programs {AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.16}.
The following algorithm is used to determine if a user has access to a data set via a controlled
program:
Whenever the user has the requested access to the data set as determined by normal RACF access
checking, access is granted {AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.17}.
If the user is not granted access to the data set with normal authorization checking, RACF checks the
data set’s conditional access list if program control is active and the program currently executing is
executing as a RACF-controlled program in a clean environment. RACF authorizes the user to open
the program-accessed data set with the currently executing program if all of the following conditions
are met:
1. The conditional access list contains the name of the currently running program, the name of the
first program currently running in the current task (TCB), or the name of the first program currently
running in a parent task, with the requested level of access or higher {AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.18}.
2. The user’s group or user ID is associated with the program name in the conditional access list
{AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.19}.
3. The current program environment (job step, or task established under TSO/E using TSOEXEC or
IKJEFTSR) is controlled. In other words, it has not loaded an uncontrolled program. If either of
these conditions are not met, the environment is considered uncontrolled. The user’s attempt to
open the program-accessed data set fails and the task ends with abend code 913. RACF issues
message ICH417I, specifying what caused the environment to become uncontrolled
{AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.20}.
4. If the job step or TSO session is running in ENHANCED program security mode, one of the
following is true:
 The current environment (job step or task created by TSOEXEC or IKJEFTSR) first ran a
program defined with the ’MAIN’ attribute.
 The current program running in the current task, or the first program run in the current task or
a parent task, has the BASIC attribute. If neither of these conditions is met, the user’s attempt
to open the program-accessed data set fails and the task ends with abend code 913. RACF
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 105 of 179
issues message ICH426I, specifying the non-MAIN program that established the current
environment {AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.21}.
5. If there is more than one controlled program running in the current environment (job step or task
created by TSOEXEC or IKJEFTSR), all of those programs defined with the PADCHK attribute
have conditional access list entries allowing them to access the data set. If one or more programs
in the environment are not authorized, the attempt fails and the task terminates with abend code
913. RACF issues message ICH418I specifying one or more programs that were missing from the
conditional access list {AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.22}.
6. If all the conditions for program access to data set are met and the requested type of access is
granted to the program by the profile protecting the data set, access is granted
{AC.2::AC.2.V1R7.23}.
8.3.2.5 RACF protection of UNIX file system objects
UNIX file system objects in the HFS or zFS file system have their access control defined by:
· UNIX permission bits
· Access control list entries
· In Labeled Security Mode: security labels (zFS file system)
All of those access-control-related attributes of file system objects are stored with the object. Access
control lists and (in Labeled Security Mode) security labels are stored and managed as extended
attributes of the file system object and are not stored in the RACF database {AC.2::AC.2.65}. RACF is
still involved when an access decision is made to a UNIX file system object {AC.2::AC.2.66}. The
UNIX System Services subsystem of the TOE extracts the permission bits, access control list entries
and (in Labeled Security Mode) the security label from the file system object as well as the effective
user ID and (in Labeled Security Mode) the security label of the user that performed the request and
passes this information to RACF. RACF then evaluates this information, extracts other information
relevant for the access decision from the RACF database, performs the auditing in accordance with
the audit policy defined by the system administrator and returns the access decision to the calling
UNIX System Services subsystem {AC.2::AC.2.67}.
Besides the access control lists and (in Labeled Security Mode) the security label, additional
privileges and restrictions may be defined to allow a finer granularity. Those privileges and restrictions
are defined as profiles in the UNIXPRIV class and users can be granted those privileges or
restrictions by giving them authority to those profiles. The ones that are considered in this Security
Target are:
· SUPERUSER.FILESYS.ACL.ACLOVERRIDE
When this profile is defined and active in RACF, a user who has been given authority to this profile is
able to override the access control defined by the access control lists for z/OS UNIX file system
objects.
In z/OS, a UNIX superuser can access all z/OS UNIX files, but is still bound by his rights defined in
RACF with respect to z/OS data sets and other resources {AC.2::AC.2.68}. In Labeled Security Mode,
a z/OS UNIX superuser is also bound by the mandatory access control rules when accessing z/OS
UNIX files {AC.2::AC.2.69}.
· SUPERUSER.FILESYS.DIRSRCH
Users with at least READ access to this profile are allowed to search directories regardless of the
general access control settings {AC.2::AC.2-V2R2-6}.
8.3.2.6 z/OS UNIX IPC objects
z/OS UNIX IPC objects are subject to discretionary access control. The permission bits associated
with the IPC object define the discretionary access to those objects. The permission bits are
determined by the creator of the IPC object and are saved in-memory by the UNIX Kernel. For
security claims see DAC for UNIX objects.
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8.3.3 Mandatory access control (Labeled Security Mode only)
Label based mandatory access control is supported by z/OS. User profiles may contain one or two
SECLABEL names, representing defaults for that user (one for TSO/E, and one for other applications)
which are the name of profiles in the SECLABEL class. Each profile in the SECLABEL class contains
a security classification consisting of a hierarchical security level and a set of non-hierarchical
categories. The values for the levels and the categories are defined by the system administrator
{AC.3::AC.3.1}. z/OS supports more than 8 levels and more than 60 categories {AC.3::AC.3-R12-
RACF-1}. The system administrator can then also define resources in the SECLABEL resource class
as a combination of one security level and zero or more categories. Such a resource is called a
“security label”.
The system defines a set of predefined security labels:
· SYSHIGH
This label consists of the highest security level and all categories defined for the system
· SYSLOW
This label consists of the lowest security level defined for the system and no categories
· SYSNONE
This is used for resources that need to be read and written by users with different security labels. It
needs to be reserved for resources that can only be accessed in a controlled way using trusted
programs to avoid a breach of the information flow policy
· SYSMULTI
This is used for resources that support a range of security labels. It needs to be reserved for
resources controlled by trusted programs. Administrators can also be allowed to operate as
SYSMULTI. An organization should apply great care when assigning and using this option
z/OS enforces the rules of the Bell-LaPadula model for mandatory access control:
· a subject has read access to an object when:
o the security level of the subject is higher or equal to the security level of the object
o the set of categories of the subject includes the set of the categories of the object
o read access is allowed by the discretionary access control rules {AC.3::AC.3.2}
· a subject has write (update or control) access to an object when
o the security level of the subject is lower or equal to the security level of the object
o the set of categories of the object includes the set of categories of the subject
o write (update or control) access is allowed by the discretionary access control rules
{AC.3::AC.3.3}
· a subject has alter access to an object when:
o the security label of the subject and the security label of the object are identical
o the user has ALTER access according the discretionary access control rules
{AC.3::AC.3.4}
z/OS prohibits the modification of a security label of a resource unless the system is in a state that
allows to the activity to be performed in a secure way. This prohibits unauthorized flow of information
due to users operating on a resource while the security label of the resource is changed. A change of
security labels is restricted to users with the SPECIAL attribute {AC.3::AC.3.V1R7.3}.
The following types of resources are subject to mandatory access control:
· Data sets {AC.3::AC.3.5}
· Volumes (DASD and tape) {AC.3::AC.3.6}
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 107 of 179
· Devices {AC.3::AC.3.7}
· Terminals {AC.3::AC.3.8}
· TCP/IP connections {AC.3::AC.3.9}
· UNIX file system objects (for zFS file systems and read-only HFS file systems) {AC.3::AC.3.11}
· UNIX IPC objects {AC.3::AC.3.12}
A system administrator can allow a user to bypass the mandatory access control rules. To do this, the
administrator needs to define the profile IRR.WRITEDOWN.BYUSER in the FACILITY class and give
the user at least READ authority to this profile. A user with this privilege can then activate the ability to
downgrade using the RACPRIV command {AC.3::AC.3.23}.
8.3.4 Discretionary Access Control
Discretionary access control (DAC) applies to all system resources, but the implementation differs
depending on the type of resource. This evaluation considers MVS (non-UNIX) resources (RACF
general resource classes and data sets), and UNIX resources. RACF provides the discretionary
access controls for MVS and UNIX resources. See the sections above on the different profiles for
details on what is stored in those profiles.
8.3.4.1 DAC for RACF general resources and data sets
RACF controls the types of access to all MVS (non-UNIX) resources. The access types are ordered
hierarchically, an access type listed higher in the list implies all the access types lower in this list
(except for NONE access). The full semantics of each access type are defined by the resource
manager. This Security Target therefore only defines semantics that RACF generally associates with
the access types. The access types are:
· ALTER
When specified in a discrete profile, ALTER allows users to read, alter, and delete the profile itself
including the access list {AC.4::AC.4.1}.
ALTER does not allow users to change the owner of the profile using the ALTDSD command
{AC.4::AC.4.2}. However, if a user with ALTER access authority to a discrete data set profile
renames the data set, changing the high-level qualifier to his or her own user ID, both the data set
and the profile are renamed, and the OWNER of the profile is changed to the new user ID
{AC.4::AC.4.3}.
When specified in a generic profile, ALTER gives users no authority over the profile itself
{AC.4::AC.4.4}.
· CONTROL
RACF requires users to have at least CONTROL authority for some of the privileges associated
with RACF and managed by profiles that RACF itself uses. The semantics are described with the
individual profiles that RACF uses itself. See the sections where the semantics of profiles used by
RACF with the semantics of the different access modes is described (e. g. in the processing of
privileges used by the RACDCERT command).
· UPDATE
RACF requires users to have at least UPDATE authority for some of the privileges associated with
RACF and managed by profiles that RACF itself uses. The semantics are described with the
individual profiles that RACF uses itself. See the sections where the semantics of profiles used by
RACF with the semantics of the different access modes is described (e. g. in the processing of
privileges used by the RACDCERT command).
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· READ
RACF requires users to have at least READ authority for some of the privileges associated with
RACF and managed by profiles that RACF itself uses. The semantics are described with the
individual profiles that RACF uses itself. See the sections where the semantics of profiles used by
RACF with the semantics of the different access modes is described (e. g. in the processing of
privileges used by the RACDCERT command).
· EXECUTE
RACF requires users to have at least EXECUTE authority for some of the privileges associated
with RACF and managed by profiles that RACF itself uses. The semantics are described with the
individual profiles that RACF uses itself. See the sections where the semantics of profiles used by
RACF with the semantics of the different access modes is described. EXECUTE authority is used
by RACF itself in the context of program control (see the related section in this ST).
· NONE
The specified user or group is not permitted to access the resource or list the profile
{AC.4::AC.4.11}.
These access types can be defined per user, group or for all users not addressed specifically by a
user or group access entry (“universal access”) {AC.4::AC.4.12}. It is also possible to specify ID(*) in
an ACL, which then applies to all RACF defined users, while the value for UACC applies to users not
defined in RACF {AC.4::AC.4.13}. To modify those entries (as well as other parts of the resource
profile) a user must be the owner of the profile, have ALTER access to the discrete profile of the
resource or must have the SPECIAL attribute in his user profile {AC.4::AC.4.14}.
The access lists defined in a profile can be either a standard access lists, allowing access in general
or a conditional access lists allowing access under defined conditions. Possible conditions are:
· the user must be logged on using a defined terminal that the user has been granted access to
{AC.4::AC.4.15}
· the user must be logged on to a defined console {AC.4::AC.4.16}
· the batch job requesting access must have been submitted from a defined JES input device
{AC.4::AC.4.17}
· the user must have entered the system from a defined network port {AC.4::AC.4.18}
· the resource manager has asserted a criteria, such as the name of an SQL role (SQLROLE),
which applies to this check, on the authorization request (note: this applies only to a FASTAUTH
type of authorization check) {AC.4::AC.4-R8-RACF-1}.
Access to resources can be controlled by discrete resource profiles or generic profiles for a set of
resources of the same type. Discrete profiles protect one single resource (e. g. one data set) while
generic profiles can be used to define a whole set of resources and protect them using a single profile
based on patterns in the resource name. Whenever a discrete profile exists for a resource it has
precedence over a generic profile that also would apply for the resource {AC.4::AC.4.19}. If more than
one generic profiles would apply, z/OS always chooses the most specific profile applicable based on
a matching algorithm {AC.4::AC.4.20}.
The access types above also apply to MVS resources other than data sets (called general
resources). However while the usages remain hierarchical in definition (ALTER includes UPDATE,
UPDATE includes READ, etc.) the interpretation and usage of the access types is the responsibility
of each resource manager. For most resource managers and resources, the meaningful access
types are NONE (the user/group has no access) or READ (ther user/group does have access). For
most cases access levels higher than READ convey no added authority (except that ALTER allows
administration of a discrete profile). Iin specific cases the resource manager may treat UPDATE,
CONTROL, and ALTER as granting additional authority. This security target and evaluation will not
address all of those cases.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 109 of 179
8.3.4.2 Algorithm to check for DAC access to general resources and data sets
RACF performs the following checks to identify, if a subject has the requested type of access to a
resource protected by RACF. This algorithm is performed after RACF has checked that the resource
is protected by RACF and (in Labeled Security Mode) after the checks for the mandatory access
control have been performed:
1. If users attempt to access their own resources, RACF grants the request {AC.4::AC.4.43}. For
example:
• For tape and DASD data sets, if the user ID of the requesting user is the high-level qualifier
of the data set name, RACF grants the request
• For spool data sets, if the JESSPOOL class is active, RACF compares the user ID and node
of the requester with the user ID and node of the creator of the spool data set (using the
security token). If the user IDs match, RACF grants the request.
2. If the resource manager has performed the authorization check using RACROUTE
REQUEST=FASTAUTH (rather than RACROUTE REQUEST=AUTH) and in addition has
specified AUTHCHKS=CRITONLY for this check, and has specified a criteria value using the
CRITERIA keyword, RACF uses only the criteria-related conditional access list entries to make
the determination, and skips to the criteria checking step below {AC.4::AC.4-R8-RACF-2}.
3. RACF checks the user’s access authority in the standard access list. If the user is in the list and if
the specified access authority is sufficient to allow access, RACF grants the request
{AC.4::AC.4.44}. If the user is in the list and if the specified access authority is less than the
requested access, RACF continues processing at Step 7 (conditional access list checking)
{AC.4::AC.4.45}. This prevents access based on ID(*), UACC, or the OPERATIONS attribute.
This could happen if, for example, user JOE requests UPDATE access, and the standard access
list includes ID(JOE) ACCESS(READ).
4. RACF determines whether the user has access to the resource because the user is a member of
a group and the group is on the standard access list {AC.4::AC.4.46}.
Which group is used depends on whether list-of-groups processing is in effect.
(List-of-groups processing is in effect if the SETROPTS command has been issued with the
GRPLIST operand.) RACF determines which group to use according to the following rules:
· If list-of-groups processing is not in effect, RACF uses only the user’s current connect group
{AC.4::AC.4.47}.
· If list-of-groups processing is in effect, RACF finds all of the groups to which the user is
connected that are also in the access list. Of these groups, RACF uses the group that has the
highest access authority to the resource {AC.4::AC.4.48}. (For example, assume that a user
is a member of groups A, B, and C. If group A has NONE access authority, group B has
READ access authority, and group C has UPDATE access authority, RACF uses group C to
determine the user’s access.)
If the highest access authority is sufficient to allow the requested access, RACF grants the
request. If the highest group that was found in the list does not have the requested authority,
RACF continues processing at Step 8 {AC.4::AC.4.49} (conditional access list checking). This
prevents access based on ID(*), UACC, or the OPERATIONS attribute
5. If a user ID of * is found on the standard access list, the current user is defined to RACF without
the RESTRICTED attribute, and the access authority granted to * is:
· Sufficient to allow the requested access, RACF grants the request {AC.4::AC.4.50}
· Not sufficient to allow the requested access, RACF continues processing at Step 7
{AC.4::AC.4.51} (OPERATIONS attribute checking)
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6. If the universal access authority (UACC) for the resource provides sufficient access authority and
the requesting user is not defined with the RESTRICTED attribute, RACF grants the request
{AC.4::AC.4.52}
7. If the requesting user has the OPERATIONS attribute (or group-OPERATIONS if the resource is
within the scope of that group) and OPERATIONS access is allowed for the class, RACF grants
the request {AC.4::AC.4.53}
8. RACF checks the user’s access authority in the conditional access list specified with
WHEN(TERMINAL), WHEN(CONSOLE), WHEN(SERVAUTH), or WHEN(JESINPUT). If the user
is in the list, if the user meets the specified condition (such as logged on at the specified
terminal), and if the specified access authority is sufficient to allow access, RACF grants the
request {AC.4::AC.4.54}. If the user is in the list with insufficient authority RACF continues
processing at step 11. {AC.4::AC.4-R12-RACF-54}.
9. RACF determines whether the user has access to the resource because the user is a member of
a group that meets a condition specified on the conditional access list specified with
WHEN(TERMINAL), WHEN(CONSOLE), WHEN(SERVAUTH), or WHEN(JESINPUT). Which
group is used depends on whether list-of-groups processing is in effect.
If the group to be used according to the preceding rules has sufficient access authority to allow
the requested access, RACF grants the request {AC.4::AC.4.55}. If none of the user’s groups has
sufficient authority, RACF continues with the next step
10. If a user ID of * is found on the conditional access list specified with WHEN(TERMINAL),
WHEN(CONSOLE), WHEN(SERVAUTH), or WHEN(JESINPUT), and if the current user is
defined to RACF without the RESTRICTED attribute, and if the current user meets the specified
condition (such as logged on at the specified terminal), and the access authority granted to * is
sufficient to allow the requested access, RACF grants the request {AC.4::AC.4.56}
11. RACF checks the user’s access authority in the conditional access list specified with
WHEN(PROGRAM). If the user is in the list, if the user meets the specified condition (such as
running the specified program), and if the specified access authority is sufficient to allow access,
RACF grants the request {AC.4::AC.4.57}.
Note: For DASD data sets, if program control is active and a controlled program is executing,
RACF performs authorization checking for program access to data sets. If the user/program
combination is in the conditional access list with sufficient authority to allow access to the data
sets, RACF grants the request {AC.4::AC.4.58}.
12. RACF determines whether the user has access to the resource because the user is a member of
a group that meets a condition specified on the conditional access list (such as running a
specified program). Which group is used depends on whether list-of-groups processing is in
effect.
If the group to be used according to the preceding rules has sufficient access authority to allow
the requested access, RACF grants the request {AC.4::AC.4.59}. If the group is in the list and if
the specified access authority is NONE, RACF denies the request {AC.4::AC.4.60}.
13. If a user ID of * is found on the conditional access list specified with WHEN(PROGRAM), and if
the current user is defined to RACF without the RESTRICTED attribute, and if the current user
meets the specified condition (such as logged on at the specified terminal or running the specified
program), and the access authority granted to * is sufficient to allow the requested access, RACF
grants the request {AC.4::AC.4.61}
14. Criteria Checking: For RACROUTE REQUEST=FASTAUTH, if the resource manager has
asserted an SQL role name (SQLROLE) via the CRITERIA keyword, RACF checks for authority
(via the user ID, a group, or * (for non-RESTRICTED users)) in the conditional access list
specified with WHEN(SQLROLE(…)), and if the specified access authority is sufficient to allow
access, RACF grants the request {AC.4::AC.4-R8-RACF-3}. If the resource manager has also
specified AUTHCHKS=CRITONLY, and this step did not grant access, RACF denies the request
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 111 of 179
{AC.4::AC.4-R8-RACF-4}.
15. For access to uncataloged data sets, if SETROPTS CATDSNS is in effect, and none of the
following is true, then RACF denies the request {AC.4::AC.4.62}:
· The data set is newly-created in this job, or is a system temporary data set;
· The data set is protected by a discrete profile;
· The data set is cataloged in the Master catalog;
· The user has access to FACILITY resource ICHUNCAT.data set-name (truncated to 39
characters total, if needed);
· The user has the SPECIAL attribute
16. For the DATASET class, if no profile is found and the SETROPTS PROTECTALL(FAILURES)
option is in effect, RACF denies the request {AC.4::AC.4.63}.
If none of the above steps has granted access and the call to RACF has provided a nested ACEE and
RACF is called with RACROUTE REQUEST=FASTAUTH and the object is eligible for nested ACEE
processing, the algorithm for both mandatory and discretionary access control is repeated using the
user ID specified in the nested ACEE {AC.4::AC.4-V1R7.1}. If audit is configured to audit the access
attempt, both user IDs (the original and the nested) are contained in the audit record
{AC.4::AC.4.V1R7.2}.
8.3.4.3 DAC for UNIX objects
DAC controls for UNIX objects involve the user’s effective UID and effective GID (which may be
different from the user’s real UID and real GID) {AC.4::AC.4-R8-USS-1} and the user’s supplemental
GIDs. If the user is connected to 5 groups, and 3 of them have GIDs, then he would have one real
GID and 2 supplemental GIDs {AC.4::AC.4-R8-USS-2}.
DAC checking for UNIX file objects (files, directories) involves permission bits that specify the
permissions (read, write, execute/search) separately for the object’s owner, the owning group, and
everyone else (the world), and optional access list entries (ACLs) with similar permission settings.
DAC checking for UNIX IPC objects (semaphores, shared memory) involves only permission bits.
8.3.4.4 Algorithm to check DAC access to UNIX file system objects
The following algorithm is used in the evaluated configuration to check the access to UNIX file system
objects. The checks are performed by RACF using the effective user and group ID respectively.
1. (Step performed in Labeled Security Mode only) Access to the file system object must be
allowed by the mandatory access control function. If not, access is denied {AC.4::AC.4.21}.
2. If the file is in a file system mounted as NOSECURITY and the attempt to open the file is
made by a setuid program and the file has an owning UID of 0 or the owning UID of that of
the setuid program, access is denied {AC.4::AC.4-V2R1-1}.
3. If the program control extended attribute is turned on for a file in a file system mounted as
NOSECURITY or NOSETUID, this extended attribute is not honored {AC.4::AC.4-V2R1-2}. A
user must have READ permission to the BPX.FILEATTR.PROGCTL profile in the FACILITY
class to update the program control extended attribute of a file {AC.4::AC.4-V2R1-3}.
Page 112 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
4. If the FSACCESS class is active and SETROPTS RACLISTed, and if the user is accessing
the root directory in a mounted zFS file system (but not the system root directory), then if the
MVS data set name of the file system container is protected by a profile in the FSACCESS
class the user must have UPDATE access to that FSACCESS profile or the request will fail.
Note that this is a standard RACF access check using the capabilities described above for
DAC for MVS resources {AC.4:: AC.4-R13-UNIX-1}. Checking the FSACCESS class is not
performed when the user has the AUDITOR or ROAUDIT attribute {AC.4::AC.4-V2R2-x}.
5. If the user has the RACF AUDITOR attribute or the RACF ROAUDIT attribute, or if the
UNIXPRIV class is active and RACLISTed and the user has at least READ access to the
SUPERUSER.FILESYS.DIRSRCH profile in the UNIXPRIV class, and read or search access
for a directory is requested, access is granted {AC.4::AC.4.V2R2-1}.
6. If the user has UID(0), or has the TRUSTED or PRIVILEGED attribute, then access is
granted automatically unless the user is executing a file. If the user is executing a file, access
is denied only if none of the permissions bits grant execute access, and, if an ACL is present
and the FSSEC class is active, no ACL entry grants execute access. Otherwise, access is
granted {AC.4::AC.4.23}.
7. If the user does not have search permission to all directories in the path of the file system
object, access is denied {AC.4::AC.4.24}.
8. If the UID matches the file owner UID, the file’s “owner” permission bits are checked. If the
“owner” bits allow the requested access, then access is granted {AC.4::AC.4.25}. If the UID
matches the file owner UID and the owner bits do not allow the requested access, go to Step
15 {AC.4::AC.4.26}.
9. If the FSSEC class is active, and an ACL exists, and there is an ACL entry for the requesting
UID, then the permission bits of that ACL entry are checked. If the ACL entry allows the
requested access, then access is granted {AC.4::AC.4.27}. Otherwise, if the ACL for the UID
exists, but does not allow access, go to Step 19 {AC.4::AC.4.28}.
10. If the GID matches the file owner GID, the file’s “group” permission bits are checked. If the
“group” bits allow the requested access, then access is granted {AC.4::AC.4.29}.
11. If the FSSEC class is active, and an ACL exists, and there is an ACL entry for the requesting
GID, then the permission bits of that ACL entry are checked. If the ACL entry allows the
requested access, then access is granted {AC.4::AC.4.30}. If not, then the next ACL entry is
checked until there are no more entries {AC.4::AC.4.31}.
12. If any of the user’s supplemental GIDs match the file owner GID, the file’s “group” permission
bits are checked. If the “group” bits allow the requested access, then access is granted
{AC.4::AC.4.32}.
13. If the FSSEC class is active, and an ACL exists, and there is an ACL entry for any of the
user’s supplemental GIDs, then the permission bits of that ACL entry are checked. If the ACL
entry allows the requested access, then access is granted {AC.4::AC.4.33}. If not, then the
next ACL entry is checked until there are no more entries {AC.4::AC.4.34}.
14. If at least one matching ACL entry was found for the GID, or any of the supplemental GIDs,
then processing continues with Step 18 {AC.4::AC.4.35}. If the GID, or any of the
supplemental GIDs, matched the file owner GID, then processing continues with Step 19
{AC.4::AC.4.36}. Otherwise (neither the GID nor any of the supplemental GIDs matched
either the file owner GID or an ACL entry), processing continues with the next step
{AC.4::AC.4.37}.
15. If the requesting user has the RESTRICTED attribute, and the UNIXPRIV class is active and
RACLISTed, and the RESTRICTED.FILESYS.ACCESS resource is protected by a profile in
the UNIXPRIV class, and the user does not have at least READ access, then go to Step 16
{AC.4::AC.4.38}.
16. The file’s “other” permission bits are checked. If the “other” bits allow the requested access,
then access is granted {AC.4::AC.4.39}.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 113 of 179
17. If the requested access type is 'execute' for a file system in a zFS, and the matching
<FILESYSTEM name> profile in the FSEXEC class is defined and the user does not have
UPDATE authority to the profile, access is denied{AC.4::AC.4-V2R2-3}.
18. If the UNIXPRIV class is active and RACLISTed, and if the
SUPERUSER.FILESYS.ACLOVERRIDE resource is protected by a profile in the UNIXPRIV
class, then the user must have the correct access level as documented for the ck_access
(IRRSKA00) callable service in z/OS Security Server RACF Callable Services. If the profile
exists, it determines whether file access is granted or denied {AC.4::AC.4.40}.
19. If the request is for a directory search and the SUPERUSER.FILESYS.DIRSRCH profile in
the UNIXPRIV class is active and RACLISTed and the user has at least read access to the
resource, access is granted {AC.4::AC4-V2R2-2}.
20. If the UNIXPRIV class is active and RACLISTed, and if the SUPERUSER.FILESYS resource
is protected by a profile in the UNIXPRIV class, then the user must have the correct access
level as documented for the ck_access (IRRSKA00) callable service in z/OS Security Server
RACF Callable Services. If the profile exists, it determines whether file access is granted or
denied {AC.4::AC.4.41}.
Access is denied, if none of the above steps has explicitly granted access {AC.4::AC.4.42}.
8.3.4.5 Algorithm to check DAC access to UNIX IPC objects
The discretionary access control rules allow access to an IPC object,
· if the user has an effective user ID of zero {AC.4::AC.2.70}
· if the user is the owner or creator of the IPC object and the requested type of access is allowed by
the owner related permission bits {AC.4::AC.2.71}
· if the user is neither the owner or creator of the IPC object but is a member of the IPC object’s
creating group or owning group and the requested type of access is allowed by the group related
permission bits {AC.4::AC.2.72}
· if the user is neither owner nor creator of the IPC object and also is not a member of the IPC
object’s creating group or owning group and the access is allowed by the other related permission
bits {AC.4::AC.2.73}
If none of the above mentioned conditions is satisfied, permission is denied by the discretionary
access control rules for IPC objects {AC.4::AC.2.74}.
8.3.5 Digital Certificates, Key Rings, and Certificate Mappings in RACF and
PKCS#11 Cryptographic Tokens
RACF provides the RACDCERT command which can be used to
1. create certificate requests to send to a Certifying Authority {SM.1::SM.1-R8-RACF-
RACDCERT-1}
2. generate public/private key pairs and certificates (DIGTCERT class) {SM.1::SM.1-R8-RACF-
RACDCERT-2}
3. export a certificate or certificate packages to a data set, optionally with the private key
{SM.1::SM.1-R8-RACF-RACDCERT-3}
4. install certificates into the RACF database and register them as belonging to a user or to a
certifying authority {SM.1::SM.1-R8-RACF-RACDCERT-4}. The __certificate() and
InitACEE() services can also register/deregister certificates {SM.1::SM.1-R8-RACF-
RACDCERT-5}, and administrators an allow users to register their own certificates by
granting them READ access to FACILITY resource IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD {SM.1::SM.1-R8-
RACF-RACDCERT-6}.
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5. delete or list certificates in the RACF database {SM.1::SM.1-R8-RACF-RACDCERT-7}
6. maintain (create, list, delete) key rings containing certificates (DIGTRING class) {SM.1::SM.1-
R8-RACF-RACDCERT-8}
7. add certificates to or delete them from key rings {SM.1::SM.1-R8-RACF-RACDCERT-9}
8. create mapping rules (certificate name filters) that can map client certificates that are not
installed/registered in the database to specified user IDs based on subject or issuer
information (DIGTNMAP class) {SM.1::SM.1-R8-RACF-RACDCERT-10}. This can allow a
many-to-one mapping for applications that do not need to have each user run under his own
ID. In this case, accountability can be maintained for auditing purposes by having the
application provide the subject’s distinguished name via the X500Name parameter when
creating the security environment (ACEE) for the user {SM.1::SM.1-R8-RACF-RACDCERT-
11}. The mapping process can also make use of mapping criteria specified by the DIGTCRIT
class when it is necessary to map a client certificate into different IDs depending on
characteristics of the user’s session (such as the application name, or system name where
the application is running) {SM.1::SM.1-R8-RACF-RACDCERT-12}.
9. create and manage the contents of PKCS#11 cryptographic tokens contained in the ICSF
TKDS {SM.1::SM-1.R9-RACF-RACDCERT-13}.
{SM.1:: SM-1.R12-RACF-RACDCERT-14} RACDCERT supports installing or generating certificates
that have the following key characteristics, subject to US export regulations and the available
cryptographic hardware present on the system:
• RSA keys up to 4096 bits;
• DSA keys up to 2048 bits;
• NIST ECC keys up to 521 bits;
• Brainpool ECC keys up to 512 bits.
{SM.1::SM-1.R21-RACF-RACDCERT-15} RSA keys can be generated through
• RACF software and stored in the RACF DB (clear key)
• RACF software and stored in the ICSF PKDS (clear key)
• Cryptographic cards and stored in the ICSF PKDS (secure key)
• CryptoExpress4s card (on EC12 only) and stored in the ICSF TKDS (secure key)
{SM1.::SM-1.R21-RACF-RACDCERT-16} NIST/Brainpool keys can be generated through
• ICSF software and stored in the ICSF PKDS (clear key)
• CryptoExpress3 coprocessor cards (z114 or z196 processor) and stored in the ICSF PKDS
(secure key)
• CryptoExpress4s card (on EC12 only) and stored in the ICSF TKDS (secure key)
Profiles in the DIGTCERT class contain information about digital certificates contained in the RACF
database, as well as the certificate itself and optionally the certificate’s private key. Additionally, the
user’s USER profile will have information about a certificate associated with the user.
Profiles in the DIGTRING class contain information about key rings and the certificates contained in a
key ring. Each key ring is a named collection of the personal, site, and CA certificates associated with
a user. When the user represents a server, the key ring has the allowable CA certificates that must be
used to sign certificates presented by clients of the server during SSL handshaking.
Profiles in the DIGTNMAP and DIGTCRIT classes contain profiles used during certificate name
filtering, a process during client authentication that can derive a user ID to use for the session from a
certificate that is not specifically registered in the RACF database.
Note that only the RACDCERT command may be used to administer profiles in the DIGTCERT,
DIGTRING, and DIGTNMAP classes.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 115 of 179
8.3.5.1 Management for RACF Digital Certificates, Key Rings, Certificate Mappings,
and Criteria
Administrators can use the RACDCERT command to generate or delete digital certificates, generate
certificate requests, maintain key rings, and maintain certificate mappings. RACF maintains
certificates in the DIGTCERT class, key rings in the DIGTRING class, and certificate mappings in the
DIGTNMAP class.
Additionally RACF provides programming interfaces to allow applications to maintain RACF key rings.
Management for RACF digital certificates, key rings, certificate mappings, and certificate mapping
criteria occurs during processing of the RACDCERT command or the use of the associated
programming interfaces as described above. It also occurs during TLS processing, Communications
Server Network Security Server processing, or other processing using the R_datalib programming
interfaces to read or update RACF key ring information.
The authority to perform the individual management operations is determined by checking the user's
access to specific RACF profiles. This access check processing generally follows the normal MVS
DAC algorithm for general resources described above in the section on discretionary access control,
using specific resource names in the FACILITY class that depend on the function requested. It also
allows users with SPECIAL to perform certain of the functions, as explained below.
8.3.5.2 Authority checking for RACDCERT Processing
Note: Since the check for sufficient authority to perform one of the management functions of
RACDCERT is performed by checking the user's authority to specific profiles using the standard
RACF access check algorithm, the claims in this section start with "AC" instead of "SM".
In general to use RACDCERT users need either the SPECIAL attribute (AC.4-R9-RACF-1) or
 READ access to FACILITY resource IRR.DIGTCERT.function to issue RACDCERT
commands for themselves {SM.7::AC.4-R9-RACF-2};
 UPDATE access to FACILITY resource IRR.DIGTCERT.function to issue RACDCERT
commands for other users {SM.7::AC.4-R9-RACF-3};
 CONTROL access to FACILITY resource IRR.DIGTCERT.function to issue RACDCERT
commands for SITE and CERTAUTH certificates {SM.7::AC.4-R9-RACF-4}.
 Sufficient authority to the appropriate resources in the RDATALIB class as defined in the
additional tables for this class when Granular Authority Checking has been enabled by
defining the IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR resource in the RDATALIB class.
Note that access to the LISTCHAIN function is controlled by the IRR.DIGTCERT.LIST profile
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R1-RACF-30}.
Note that if the CSFSERV class is active, a number of RACDCERT functions require additional
authorizations to resources in this class, caused by the ICSF functions called as part of the
RACDCERT processing. For details of the access rights and resources required see the description
of the RACDCERT subcommands in [RACF.CMD].
For certificate access, control is based on the certificate owner, certificate label and the RACDCERT
function
• IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.LST.<RACDCERT function>
• IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.<RACDCERT function>
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-1}
For key ring access that does not involve a certificate, the control is based on the ring owner, ring
name and the function
• <ring owner>.<ring name>.UPD.<RACDCERT function>
Page 116 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-2}
For key ring access that involves a certificate, the control is based on the ring owner, ring name and
the certificate owner, certificate label and function.
• <ring owner>.<ring name>.UPD.<RACDCERT function> and
• <cert owner>.<cert label>.LST.<RACDCERT function>
• <cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.<RACDCERT function>
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-3}
The following tables describe the basic functions and the authorities used for each RACDCERT
function in more detail {SM.7::AC.4-V2R1-RACF-29}:
FUNCTION READ UPDATE CONTROL
ADD Add a certificate to
one's own ID
Add a certificate to an-
other user’s ID
Add a site or certificate
authority certificate
ADDRING Create a key ring for
one’s own ID
Create a key ring for an-
other user’s ID
n/a
ADDTOKEN (controlled
only via CRYPTOZ
class)
n/a n/a n/a
ALTER Change the trust sta-
tus or label of one’s
own certificate
Change the trust status
or label of another user’s
certificate
Change the trust status
or label of a site or certifi-
cate authority certificate
ALTMAP Alter a mapping asso-
ciated with one’s own
ID
Alter a mapping associ-
ated with another user’s
ID or with MULTIID
n/a
BIND (Also see CRYP-
TOZ class)
See BIND table See BIND table See BIND table
CHECKCERT (Note:
uses LIST as the func-
tion in the DAC check)
Check one’s own cer-
tificate
Check another user’s
certificate
Check a site or certificate
authority certificate
CONNECT See Connect tables See Connect tables See Connect tables
DELETE Delete one’s own cer-
tificate
Delete another user’s
certificate
Delete a site or certifi-
cate authority certificate
DELMAP Delete a mapping as-
sociated with one’s
own ID
Delete a mapping associ-
ated with another user’s
ID or with MULTIID
n/a
DELRING Delete one’s own key
ring
Delete another user’s key
ring
n/a
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 117 of 179
FUNCTION READ UPDATE CONTROL
DELTOKEN (controlled
only via CRYPTOZ
class)
n/a n/a n/a
EXPORT See Export table See Export table See Export table
GENCERT See Gencert table See Gencert table See Gencert table
GENREQ Generate a request
based on one’s own
certificate
Generate a request
based on another user’s
certificate
Generate a request
based on a site or certifi-
cate authority certificate
IMPORT (also see
CRYPTOZ class)
See ADD above. See ADD above. See ADD above.
LIST List one’s own certifi-
cate
List another user’s certifi-
cate
List a site or certificate
authority certificate
LISTCHAIN
(Note: use of this sub-
command is controlled
by the IR-
R.DIGTCERT.LIST pro-
file in the FACILITY
class)
No access, comand
will terminate with an
error
No access, command will
terminate with an error
Display information
about a digital certificate
and its issuer chain of
certificates in the RACF
database.
LISTMAP List mapping informa-
tion associated with
one’s own ID
List mapping information
associated with another
user’s ID or MULTIID
n/a
LISTTOKEN (also see
CRYPTOZ class)
See LIST above See LIST above See LIST above
MAP Create a mapping as-
sociated with one’s
own ID
Create a mapping associ-
ated with another user’s
ID or MULTIID
n/a
REMOVE Remove a certificate
from one’s own key
ring
Remove a site or certifi-
cate authority certificate
from one’s own key ring
Remove a certificate
from another user’s key
ring
REKEY Rekey one’s own cer-
tificate
Rekey another user’s
certificate
Rekey a site or certificate
authority certificate
ROLLOVER Rollover one’s own
certificate
Rollover another user’s
certificate
Rollover a site or certifi-
cate authority certificate
Page 118 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
FUNCTION READ UPDATE CONTROL
UNBIND (controlled
only via CRYPTOZ
class)
n/a n/a n/a
Table 29: User Profile Authorizations required for RACDCERT functions
This table describes the authorities needed to perform the BIND function to bind a certificate to a
PKCS#11 token:
USAGE One’s own certificate Another user’s certifi-
cate
A site or certificate
authority certificate
PERSONAL READ authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.BIND
UPDATE authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.BIND
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.BIND
SITE
CERTAUTH
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD and
READ authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.BIND
CONTROL authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and UP-
DATE authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.BIND
UPDATE authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.BIND
Table 30: Authorizations required for RACDCERT BIND
This table describes the authorities needed to perform the CONNECT function to connect a certificate
to one’s own key ring:
USAGE One’s own certificate Another user’s certificate A site or certificate au-
thority certificate
PERSONAL READ authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
UPDATE authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CON-
NECT
SITE
CERTAUTH
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD
and READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CON-
NECT
CONTROL authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and UP-
DATE authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
UPDATE authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
Table 31: Authorizations required for RACDCERT CONNECT (own key ring)
This table describes the authorities needed to perform the CONNECT function to connect a certificate
to another user’s key ring:
USAGE One’s own certificate Another user’s certificate A site or certificate au-
thority certificate
PERSONAL CONTROL authority to CONTROL authority to IR- CONTROL authority to
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 119 of 179
USAGE One’s own certificate Another user’s certificate A site or certificate au-
thority certificate
IRR.DIGTCERT.CON-
NECT
R.DIGTCERT.CONNECT IRR.DIGTCERT.CON-
NECT
SITE
CERTAUTH
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD
and CONTROL authority
to IRR.DIGTCERT.CON-
NECT
CONTROL authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and
CONTROL authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CON-
NECT
Table 32: Authorizations required for RACDCERT CONNECT (not own key ring)
This table describes the authorities needed to perform the EXPORT function:
Function READ UPDATE CONTROL
EXPORT
(in CERT format)
Export one’s own cer-
tificate
Export another user’s
certificate
Export a site or certificate
authority certificate
EXPORT
(in PKCS#7 format)
Export one’s own cer-
tificate but not the par-
ent CA chain
Export another user’s
certificate but not the
parent CA chain
Export site or certificate au-
thority certificates or the en-
tire parent CA chain for
oneself or another user.
EXPORT
(in PKCS#12 format.
Note: uses EX-
PORTKEY as the
function in the DAC
check)
Export one’s own cer-
tificate and the private
key
Export another user’s
certificate and the pri-
vate key
Export a site or certificate
authority certificate and the
private key
Table 33: Authorizations required for RACDCERT EXPORT
This table describes the authorities needed to perform the GENCERT function:
SIGNWITH op-
tion chosen
To generate one’s own
certificate
To generate another
user’s certificate
To generate a site or cer-
tificate authority certifi-
cate
SIGNWITH
one’s own cer-
tificate
READ authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and
READ authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.GENCERT
UPDATE authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and
READ authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.GENCERT
CONTROL authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and
READ authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.GENCERT
SIGNWITH a
SITE or CER-
TAUTH certifi-
cate
READ authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.-
GENCERT
UPDATE authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.-
GENCERT
CONTROL authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and
CONTROL authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.GENCERT
Page 120 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
SIGNWITH op-
tion chosen
To generate one’s own
certificate
To generate another
user’s certificate
To generate a site or cer-
tificate authority certifi-
cate
SIGNWITH not
specified
READ authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and
READ authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.GENCERT
UPDATE authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and
UPDATE authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.GENCERT
CONTROL authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.ADD and
CONTROL authority to IR-
R.DIGTCERT.GENCERT
Table 34: Authorizations required for RACDCERT GENCERT
The following tables define the additional access control protections available when the
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR profile in the RDATALIB class is defined:
RADCERT ADD {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-1}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label * Purpose
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.ADD Add a certificate under <cert owner>
with specified <cert label>
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.LABEL*.UPD.ADD Add a certificate under <cert owner>
with no label specified
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.ADD, and
IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.LABEL*.UPD.ADD
Add a certificate chain under <cert
owner> with specified <cert label>
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.LABEL*.UPD.ADD, and
IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.LABEL*.UPD.ADD
Add a certificate chain under <cert
owner> with no label specified
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<friendly name>.UPD.ADD, and
IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.LABEL*.UPD.ADD
Add a certificate chain under <cert
owner> with the <friendly name>
label from the PKCS#12 package
Table 35: Authority required for the RACDCERT ADD function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note that 'cert owner' is the RACF user ID, CERTIFAUTH (for CERTAUTH), or SITECERTIF (for
SITE).
RACDCERT ADDRING {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-2}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label * Purpose
<ring owner>.<ring name>.UPD.ADDRING Add a key ring under <ring owner>
with specified <ring name>
Table 36: Authority required for the RACDCERT ADDRING function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'ring owner' is the RACF user ID.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 121 of 179
RACDCERT ALTER {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-3}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label * Purpose
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.ALTER Alter a certificate status under <cert
owner> with specified <cert label>
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<source cert label>.UPD.ALTER, and
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<target cert label>.UPD.ALTER
Alter a certificate label under <cert
owner> with specified <source cert
label> and <target cert label>
Table 37: Authority required for the RACDCERT ALTER function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'cert owner' is the RACF user ID, or CERTIFAUTH (for CERTAUTH), or SITECERTIF (for SITE)
RACDCERT CONNECT {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-4}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label,
ring owner and ring name *
Purpose
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.LST.CONNECT
and
<ring owner>.<ring name>.UPD.CONNECT
Connect a certificate with specified
<cert label> owned by <cert owner>
to a key ring with specified <ring
name> owned by <ring owner> with
no USAGE keyword specified.
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.CONNECT
and
<ring owner>.<ring name>.UPD.CONNECT
Connect a certificate with specified
<cert label> owned by <cert owner>
to a key ring with specified <ring
name> owned by <ring owner> with
USAGE keyword specified.
Table 38: Authority required for the RACDCERT CONNECT function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'cert owner' is the RACF user ID, or CERTIFAUTH (for CERTAUTH), or SITECERTIF (for SITE);
ring owner is the RACF user ID.
RACDCERT DELETE {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-5}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert la-
bel *
Purpose
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.DELETE Delete a certificate under <cert
owner> with specified <cert label>
Page 122 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
Table 39: Authority required for the RACDCERT DELETE function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'cert owner' is the RACF user ID, or CERTIFAUTH (for CERTAUTH), or SITECERTIF (for SITE)
RACDCERT DELRING {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-6}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label * Purpose
<ring owner>.<ring name>.UPD.DELRING Delete a key ring under <ring owner>
with specified <ring name>
Table 40: Authority required for the RACDCERT DELRING function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'ring owner' is the RACF user ID
RACDCERT EXPORT {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-7}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label * Purpose
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.LST.EXPORT Export a certificate with specified
<cert label> owned by <cert owner>
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.EXPORT Export a certificate and the private
key with specified <cert label> owned
by <cert owner> with or without its
parent chain in PKCS#12 format
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.LST.EXPORT
and
IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.<cert label>.LST.EXPORT
Export a certificate with specified
<cert label> owned by <cert owner>
together with its parent chain in a
PKCS#7 format
Table 41: Authority required for the RACDCERT EXPORT function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'cert owner' is the RACF user ID, or CERTIFAUTH (for CERTAUTH), or SITECERTIF (for SITE)
RACDCERT GENCERT {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-8}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label * Purpose
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.GENCERT Create a certificate under <cert
owner> with specified <cert label>
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.LABEL*.UPD.GENCERT Create a certificate under <cert
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 123 of 179
owner> with no label specified.
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.GENCERT
and
IRR.DIGTCERT.<signer id>.<signer cert label> .UPD.GENCERT
Create a certificate under <cert
owner> with specified <cert label>
signed by <signer cert label> owned
by <signer id>
Table 42: Authority required for the RACDCERT GENCERT function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'cert owner' is the RACF user ID, or CERTIFAUTH (for CERTAUTH), or SITECERTIF (for SITE);
'signer id' is CERIFAUTH or SITECERTIF.
RACDCERT GENREQ {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-9}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label * Purpose
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.GENREQ Generate a request based on a cer-
tificate with specified <cert label>
owned by <cert owner>
Table 43: Authority required for the RACDCERT GENREQ function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'cert owner' is the RACF user ID, or CERTIFAUTH (for CERTAUTH), or SITECERTIF (for SITE)
RACDCERT IMPORT {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-10}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label * Purpose
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.IMPORT Import a certificate under <cert
owner> with specified <cert label>
Table 44: Authority required for the RACDCERT GENREQ function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'cert owner' is the RACF user ID, or CERTIFAUTH (for CERTAUTH), or SITECERTIF (for SITE)
RACDCERT REKEY {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-11}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label * Purpose
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<source cert label>.UPD.REKEY,
and
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<target cert label>.UPD.REKEY
Replicate (rekey) a certificate under
<cert owner> with <source cert label>
to a new certificate with <target cert
label>
Page 124 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<source cert label>.UPD.REKEY,
and
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.LABEL*.UPD.REKEY
Replicate (rekey) a certificate under
<cert owner> with <source cert label>
to a new certificate with a system
generated label
Table 45: Authority required for the RACDCERT REKEY function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'cert owner' is the RACF user ID, or CERTIFAUTH (for CERTAUTH), or SITECERTIF (for SITE)
RACDCERT REMOVE {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-12}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label * Purpose
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.LST.REMOVE
and
<ring owner>.<ring name>.UPD.REMOVE
Remove a certificate with a specified
<cert label> owned by <cert owner>
from a key ring with specified <ring
name> owned by <ring owner>
Table 46: Authority required for the RACDCERT REMOVE function under the RDATALIB class when
IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'cert owner' is the RACF user ID, or CERTIFAUTH (for CERTAUTH), or SITECERTIF (for SITE)
RACDCERT ROLLOVER {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-13}:
READ access to the resource based on cert owner and cert label * Purpose
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<source cert label>.UPD .ROLLOVER,
and
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<target cert label>.UPD .ROLLOVER
Supersede (rollover) a certificate un-
der <cert owner> with <source cert
label> to a certificate with <target cert
label>
Table 47: Authority required for the RACDCERT ROLLOVER function under the RDATALIB class
when IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR is defined
Note: 'cert owner' is the RACF user ID, or CERTIFAUTH (for CERTAUTH), or SITECERTIF (for SITE)
8.3.5.3 Authority Checking for R_datalib Processing
The R_datalib callable services provides access to some fields of certificates and key rings, including
when appropriate the private keys when stored in RACF. R_datalib allows reading, creation, or
modification of key rings As with RACDCERT functions, the SPECIAL attribute authorizes some
functions. In addition, profiles in the RDATALIB class or in the FACILITY class can authorize various
R_datalib functions.
There are two authorization modes for the R_datalib callable service: global or granular. Global
checking uses the FACILITY class; granular checking uses the RDATALIB class. Global checking
applies to all the key rings and certificates.
Granular checking applies to a specific ring and / or a specific certificate. To use the granular
checking, the RDATALIB class must be RACLISTed.
With ring-specific checking using the RDATALIB class, a resource with the format
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 125 of 179
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.LST is used to provide access control to a specific key ring on R_datalib
READ functions, that are, DataGetFirst, DataGetNext, GetUpdateCode and GetRingInfo. A resource
with the format <ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD is used to provide access control to a specific key ring
on the UPDATE functions, that are, NewRing, DataPut, DataRemove, and DelRing.
With certificate-specific checking using the RDATALIB class, a resource with the format
IRR.DIGTCERT.<certOwner>.<certLabel>.UPD.ADD/DELETE/ALTER is used to provide access
control to a specific certificate on the DataPut (when it is used to add a certificate without connecting
to a key ring), DataRemove (when it is used to delete a certificate) or DataAlter functions.
Global profile checking using the IRR.DIGTCERT.<function> resource in the FACILITY class is
applicable in the following circumstances:
• For the CheckStatus and IncSerialNum functions, only global profile checking is used.
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-14}
• For the DataGetFirst, DataGetNext, GetUpdateCode and GetRingInfo functions, global profile
checking is used when there is no matching profile to the <ringOwner>.<ringName>.LST
resource in the RDATALIB class {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-15}. If the profile exists, access is
decided by that profile.
• For the NewRing, DataPut, DataRemove, and DelRing functions, global profile checking is
used when there is no matching profile to the <ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD resource in the
RDATALIB class {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-16}.
• For the DataPut function (when it is used to add a certificate without connecting to a key ring),
global profile checking is used when there is no matching profile to the
IRR.DIGTCERT.<certOwner>.<certLabel>.UPD.ADD resource in the RDATALIB class
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-17}.
• For the DataRemove function (when it is used to delete a certificate), global profile checking
is used when there is no matching profile to the
IRR.DIGTCERT.<certOwner>.<certLabel>.UPD.DELETE resource in the RDATALIB class
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-18}.
• For the DataAlter function, global profile checking is used when there is no matching profile to
the IRR.DIGTCERT.<certOwner>.<certLabel>.UPD.ALTER resource in the RDATALIB class
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-19}.
With ring-specific profile checking, the ringOwner must be in uppercase. The ringName is folded into
uppercase during profile checking {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-20}.
Note: ringNames which differ only in case use the same profile.
If the data entered in the ringOwner and ringName fields has reached the field size limits, and you
want to create a discrete profile, you can truncate the ring name from the end to make the whole
profile name length 246 characters {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-21}.
Authority required for the DataGetFirst, DataGetNext, and GetUpdateCode functions
Note: Supervisor or system key callers can bypass the authorization checks for the DataGetFirst,
DataGetNext, and GetUpdateCode functions by setting the CDDL(X)_ATT_SKIPAUTH flag in the
Attributes parameter.
The resource <ringOwner>.<ringName>.LST in the RDATALIB class is checked first. If there is no
match for <ringOwner>.<ringName>.LST, the IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING resource is used.
Function Authority required under RDATALIB class
List certificates and get the sequence number
for a real key ring
READ authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.LST
List certificates and get the sequence number
for a virtual key ring
READ authority to <virtual ring
owner>.IRR_VIRTUAL_KEYRING.
LST Note: The virtual ring owner can be an
ordinary user ID, a CERTAUTH user ID
Page 126 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
(CERTIFAUTH), or a SITE user ID
(SITECERTIF).
Table 48: Ring-specific profile checking for the DataGetFirst, DataGetNext, and GetUpdateCode
functions {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-22}
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
List certificates and get the sequence number
for one's own key ring, a CERTAUTH, or a
SITE's virtual key ring
READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING
List certificates and get the sequence number
for other's ring
UPDATE authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING
Table 49: Global profile checking for the DataGetFirst, DataGetNext, and GetUpdateCode functions
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-23}
Authority required for the CheckStatus function
Note: Supervisor or system key callers can bypass the authorization checks for the CheckStatus
function by setting the CDDL(X)_ATT_SKIPAUTH flag in the Attributes parameter.
The CheckStatus function requires READ authority to the resource IRR.DIGTCERT.LIST in the
FACILITY class.
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
Return the TRUST or NOTRUST status for
a specified certificate
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.LIST
Table 50: Profile checking for the CheckStatus function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-24}
Authority required for the DataAbortQuery function
The DataAbortQuery function requires no authority {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-25}.
Authority required for the IncSerialNum function
If the caller is RACF special, no authority checking is done {SM.7::AC.4-R9-RACF-9}; otherwise
appropriate authority to the resource IRR.DIGTCERT.GENCERT in the FACILITY class is required:
READ authority if the certificate is owned by the caller, or CONTROL authority if the certificate is a
SITE or CERTAUTH certificate.
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
Increment and return the last serial number
field (CERTLSER) associated with one's own
input certificate
READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.GENCERT
Increment and return the last serial number
field (CERTLSER) associated with a SITE or
CERTAUTH certificate
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.GENCERT
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 127 of 179
Table 51:Profile checking for the IncSerialNum function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-26}
Authority required for the NewRing function
If the caller is RACF special, no authority checking is done {SM.7::AC.4-R9-RACF-12}; otherwise the
resource <ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD is checked first. If there is no match for
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD, the IRR.DIGTCERT.ADDRING and IRR.DIGTCERT.REMOVE
resources are used.
Function Authority required under RDATALIB class
Create a new ring for <ringOwner> named
<ringName>
READ authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD
Remove all certificates from an existing ring READ authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD
Table 52:Ring-specific profile checking for the NewRing function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-27}
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
Create a new ring for oneself READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.ADDRING
Create a new ring for someone else UPDATE authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.ADDRING
Remove all certificates from one's own ring READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.REMOVE
Remove all certificates from someone else's
ring
UPDATE authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.REMOVE
Table 53:Global profile checking for the NewRing function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-28}
Authority required for the DelRing function
If the caller is RACF special, no authority checking is done {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-29}; otherwise
the resource <ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD is checked first. If there is no match for
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD, the IRR.DIGTCERT.DELRING resource is used.
Function Authority required under RDATALIB class
Delete a ring owned by <ringOwner> named
<ringName>
READ authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD
Table 54:Ring-specific profile checking for the DelRing function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-30}
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
Delete one's own ring READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.DELRING
Delete someone else's ring UPDATE authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.DELRING
Table 55:Global profile checking for the DelRing function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-31}
Authority required for the DataRemove function
Page 128 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
When the DataRemove function is used for removing a certificate from a key ring.
If the caller is RACF special, no authority checking is done {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-32}; otherwise
the resource <ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD is checked first. If there is no match for
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD, the IRR.DIGTCERT.REMOVE resource is used.
Function Authority required under RDATALIB class
Remove one's own certificate READ authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD
Remove someone else's certificate UPDATE authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD
Remove a SITE or CERTAUTH certificate CONTROL authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD
Table 56:Ring-specific profile checking for the DataRemove function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-33}
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
Remove one's own certificate from
one's own ring
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.REMOVE
Remove someone else's certificate from
one's own ring
UPDATE authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.REMOVE
Remove one's own certificate from other's
ring
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.REMOVE
Remove someone else's certificate
from other's ring
Removes a SITE or CERTAUTH
certificate from other's ring
Removes a SITE or CERTAUTH
certificate from one's own ring
UPDATE authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.REMOVE
Table 57:Global profile checking for the DataRemove function if the removed certificate is not to be deleted
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-34}
If CDDL(X)_ATT_DEL_CERT_TOO is also specified, IRR.DIGTCERT.DELETE is checked in addition
to the checking on the <ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD resource or the IRR.DIGTCERT.REMOVE
resource {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-35}.
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
Delete one's own certificate after it is
removed from the ring
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.DELETE
Remove someone else's certificate after it is
removed from the ring
UPDATE authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.DELETE
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 129 of 179
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
Remove a SITE or CERTAUTH certificate
after it is removed from the ring
CONTROL authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.DELETE
Table 58:Additional profile checking for the DataRemove function if the removed certificate is to be deleted
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-36}
When the DataRemove function is used for deleting a certificate only:
• The authority on the 'remove from key ring' step is not required, only authority on the existing
delete step is needed if the ring name is an '*', as follows:
Function Authority required under RDATALIB class
Delete one's own certificate READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.<CERT_user_ID>.<cert
label>.UPD.DELETE
Delete someone else's certificate
Delete a SITE certificate
READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.SITECERTIF.<cert
label>.UPD.DELETE
Delete a CERTAUTH certificate
READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.<cert
label>.UPD.DELETE
Table 59:Certificate-specific profile checking for the DataRemove function {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-37}
Authority required for the DataPut function
If the DataPut function is used for adding a certificate and connecting the certificate to a key ring:
• If the caller is RACF special, no authority checking is done {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-38};
otherwise the resource <ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD is checked first. If there is no match
for <ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD, the IRR.DIGTCERT.CONNECT, and possibly
IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD, or IRR.DIGTCERT.ALTER resources are used, because "Add" and
"Alter" might be involved in the operation {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-39}. "Add" might be
involved if the input certificate does not exists in RACF; "Alter" might be involved if the input
certificate already exists with a different status.
The following tables show the breakdown of profile checking for the DataPut function with the two
different methods: ring-specific profile checking and global profile checking.
Function Authority required under RDATALIB class
Connect one's own certificate to the ring READ authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD
Connect someone else's certificate to the
ring
CONTROL authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD (If the
private key is not specified)
UPDATE authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD (If the
private key is specified)
Page 130 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
Function Authority required under RDATALIB class
Connect a SITE or CERTAUTH certificate to
the ring
CONTROL authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD (If the private
key is not specified)
UPDATE authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD (If the private
key is specified)
Table 60:Ring-specific profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required to connect with the
Personal usage {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-40}
Function Authority required under RDATALIB class
Connect one's own certificate to the ring UPDATE authority to
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.UPD
Connect someone else's certificate to the ring
Connect a SITE or CERTAUTH certificate to
the ring
Table 61:Ring-specific profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required to connect with the SITE
or CERTAUTH usage {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-41}
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
Connect one's own certificate to one's own
ring
READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
Connect someone else's certificate to one's
own ring
UPDATE authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
Connect one's own certificate to someone
else's ring
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
Connect someone else's certificate to
someone else's ring
Connect a SITE or CERTAUTH certificate to
one's own ring
Connect a SITE or CERTAUTH certificate to
someone else's ring
Table 62:Global profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required to connect with the Personal
usage {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-42}
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
Connect one's own certificate to one's own
ring
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD and READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
Connect someone else's certificate to one's
own ring
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD and UPDATE authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
Connect one's own certificate to someone
else's ring
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD and CONTROL authority to
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 131 of 179
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
IRR.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
Connect someone else's certificate to
someone else's ring
Connect a SITE or CERTAUTH certificate to
one's own ring
UPDATE authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
Connect a SITE or CERTAUTH certificate to
someone else's ring
CONTROL authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CONNECT
Table 63:profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required to connect with the SITE or CERTAUTH
usage {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-43}
Note: For information about the additional authority required to add or alter, see the following table.
Function Authority required under FACILITY class
Add one's own certificate READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD
Add someone else's certificate UPDATE authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD
Add a SITE or CERTAUTH certificate CONTROL authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD
Re-add one's own certificate READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.ALTER
Re-add someone else's certificate UPDATE authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.ALTER
Re-add a SITE or CERTAUTH certificate CONTROL authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.ALTER
Table 64:Global profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required under the FACILITY class to add
or re-add a certificate {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-44}
NOTE: ALTER authority is checked only when no private key is to be added, otherwise ADD authority
is checked.
If the DataPut function is used for adding a certificate only (when Ring_name is '*'):
If the caller is RACF special, no authority checking is done {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-45}; otherwise
the resource IRR.DIGTCERT.<CERT_user_ID>.<cert label>.UPD.ADD and possibly
IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert label>.UPD.ALTER in the RDATALIB class will be checked first. If there is no
match, the IRR.DIGTCERT.ADD, or possibly IRR.DIGTCERT.ALTER in the FACILITY class will be
used.
Function Authority required using the RDATALIB class
Add one's own or someone
else's certificate with label
specified
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.<CERT_user_ID>.<cert
label>.UPD.ADD
Add a SITE certificate with
label specified
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.SITECERTIF.<cert
label>.UPD.ADD
Add a CERTAUTH certificate READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.<cert
label>.UPD.ADD
Add one's own or someone
else's certificate with no label
specified
READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.<CERT_user_ID>.LABEL*.UPD.ADD
Add a SITE certificate with no
label specified
READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.SITECERTIF.LABEL*.UPD.ADD
Add a CERTAUTH certificate
with no label specified
READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.LABEL*.UPD.ADD
Page 132 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
Function Authority required using the RDATALIB class
Add one's own existing
certificate with a different
status
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.<CERT_user_ID>.<cert
label>.UPD.ADD
Add someone else's existing
certificate with a different
status
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.<CERT_user_ID>.<cert
label>.UPD.ADD
Add a SITE's existing
certificate with a different
status
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.SITECERTIF.<cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
Add a CERTAUTH's existing
certificate with a different
status
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.<cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
Re-add one's own or
someone else's certificate's
status
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.<CERT_user_ID>.<cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
Re-add a SITE certificate's
status
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.SITECERTIF.<cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
Re-add a CERTAUTH
certificate's status
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.<cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
Table 65:Certificate-specific profile checking for the DataPut function - Authority required under the RDATALIB
class to add or re-add a certificate {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-46}
NOTE: ALTER authority is checked only when no private key is to be added, otherwise ADD authority
is checked..
Authority required for the DataAlter function
Profile in the RDATALIB class will be checked first. If it doesn't exist, check that in the FACILITY class
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-47}.
Function Authority required using the RDATALIB class
Alter one's own or someone
else's certificate's status
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.<CERT_user_ID>.<cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
Alter a SITE certificate's
status
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.SITECERTIF.<cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
Alter a CERTAUTH
certificate's status
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.<cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
Alter one's own or someone
else's certificate's label
READ authority to
IRR.DIGTCERT.<CERT_user_ID>.<original cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
and
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.<CERT_user_ID>.<new cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 133 of 179
Function Authority required using the RDATALIB class
Alter a SITE certificate's label READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.SITECERTIF.<original cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
and
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.SITECERTIF.<new cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
Alter a CERTAUTH
certificate's label
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.<original cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
and
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.<new cert
label>.UPD.ALTER
Table 66:Certificate-specific profile checking for the DataAlter function - Authority required under the
RDATALIB class to alter a certificate {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-48}
Function Authority required using the Facility class
Alter one's own certificate's
status
READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.ALTER
Alter one's own certificate's
label
Alter someone else's
certificate's status
UPDATE authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.ALTER
Alter someone else's
certificate's label
Alter a SITE or CERTAUTH
certificate's status
CONTROL authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.ALTER
Alter a SITE or CERTAUTH
certificate's label
Table 67:Global profile checking for the DataAlter function - - Authority required under the FACILITY class to
alter a certificate {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-49}
Authority required for the DataRefresh function
If the caller is RACF special, no authority checking is done {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-50}; otherwise
if the DIGTCERT class is RACLISTed, the caller must have class authority for the DIGTCERT class
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-51}.
Authority required for the GetRingInfo function
Profile in the RDATALIB class will be checked first {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-52}. If it doesn't exist,
check that in the FACILITY class.
Function Authority required using the RDATALIB class
List a specific ring owned by a
specific user
READ authority to <Ring owner>.<Ring name>.LST
List all the rings owned by a
specific user
READ authority to <Ring owner>.*.LST
List all rings in the RACF
database with a specific name
READ authority to *.<Ring name>.LST
Page 134 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
Function Authority required using the RDATALIB class
List all rings in the RACF
database
READ authority to *.*.LST
Table 68:Ring-specific profile checking for the GetRingInfo function - Authority required under the RDATALIB
class to list information for one or more key ring's {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-53}
Note: For search type 0 which is used for getting ring information for a specific ring, if insufficient
authority is granted, 8 8 8 will be returned. For other search types which are used for getting ring
information for multiple rings, only the authorized entries will be returned, with return/reason code 4 4
8.
Function Authority required using the FACILITY class
List one's own rings READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING
List someone else's rings UPDATE authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING
Table 69:Global profile checking for the GetRingInfo function - Authority required under the FACILITY class to
list information for one or more key ring's {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-54}
Note: If access control to ICSF services is used, callers of R_datalib need to be granted access to
ICSF services used by R_datalib. For the list of ICSF services used and the access required, see ta-
ble 66 in the RACF Callable Services Manual for z/OS V2R2.
The following additional restrictions apply:
For extracting private keys from certificates when access to the key ring is granted:
• for RACF real key rings
• for user certificates:
• when the certificate is connected to the key ring with the PERSONAL usage {SM.7::AC.4-
V2R2-RACF-55}, or
• when one of the following two conditions is true {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-56}:
• The caller's user ID is the user ID associated with the certificate if the access
to the key ring is through the checking on IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING in the
FACILITY CLASS, or
• The caller's user ID has READ or UPDATE authority to the
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.LST resource in the RDATALIB class.
READ access enables retrieving one's own private key, UPDATE access en-
ables retrieving other's.
• For CERTAUTH and SITE certificates:
• An application can extract the private key from a CERTAUTH or SITE certificate if the
following conditions are met:
• The certificate is connected to its key ring with the PERSONAL usage option
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-57}.
• Or one of the following three conditions is true {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-58}:
• The caller's user ID is RACF special regardless of access checking method,
or
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 135 of 179
• The caller's user ID has CONTROL authority to the IRR.DIGTCERT.-
GENCERT resource in the FACILITY class if the access to the key ring is
through the checking on IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING in the FACILITY CLASS,
or
• The caller's user ID has CONTROL authority to the
<ringOwner>.<ringName>.LST resource in the RDATALIB class.
• For RACF virtual key rings:
• User certificates
• An application can extract the private key from a user certificate if either of the follow-
ing conditions is met {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-59}:
• The caller's user ID is the user ID associated with the certificate if the access
to the key ring is through the checking on the IRR.DIGTCERT.LISTRING in
the FACILITY CLASS, or
• The caller's user ID has READ or UPDATE authority to the <virtual ring
owner>.IRR_VIRTUAL_KEYRING.LST resource in the RDATALIB class.
READ access enables retrieving one's own private key, UPDATE access en-
ables retrieving other's.
• CERTAUTH and SITE certificates:
• An application can extract the private key from a CERTAUTH or SITE certificate if ei-
ther of the following conditions is met:
• Caller is SPECIAL {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-60}
• Caller has the authority required based on the RDATALIB class, using one of
the following access methods:
1. Base on virtual key ring – similar to the case for virtual key ring of a
regular user described above, but use special Id CERTIFAUTH or
SITECERTIF for ring owner:
• CONTROL authority to
CERTIFAUTH.IRR_VIRTUAL_KEYRING.LST for CER-
TAUTH's virtual ring {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-61}
• CONTROL authority to
SITECERTIF.IRR_VIRTUAL_KEYRING.LST for SITE's virtual
ring {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-62}
2. Base on certificate:
• READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.CERTIFAUTH.<cert
label>.UPD.EXPORT for CERTAUTH's certificate with label
<cert label> {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-63}
• READ authority to IRR.DIGTCERT.SITECERTIF.<cert
label>.UPD.EXPORT for SITE's certificate with label <cert la-
bel> {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-64}
• For z/OS PKCS #11 tokens:
• An application can extract the private key from a user certificate if all of the following condi-
tions are met:
Page 136 of 179 z/OS RACF Security Target
• The certificate's token usage is PERSONAL {SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-65}.
• The caller has permission to read private objects in the token, as determined by ICSF
{SM.7::AC.4-V2R2-RACF-66}.
• A private key object exists for the certificate (CKA_ID attributes match) {SM.7::AC.4-
V2R2-RACF-67}.
• The private key object contains all the attributes defined in PKCS #1 {SM.7::AC.4-
V2R2-RACF-68}.
8.4 Security management (SM)
8.4.1 User and group management
8.4.1.1 Definition of users and groups
z/OS users and groups are defined in RACF.
Local Kerberos users are defined as z/OS users who also have a KERB segment in their RACF
USER profile. A remote (foreign) Kerberos user may be defined locally by mapping the foreign
principal name to a local z/OS (RACF) user via KERBLINK profiles.
To create a z/OS user, a user profile for the new user has to be created in RACF. Each user profile
consists of a base segment and optional segments for the use of specific subsystems. In the
evaluated configuration, the base segment, the KERB segment, and the OMVS segment for the
specification of attributes for z/OS UNIX System Services contain the information required by the
security functions defined in this Security Target. Other segments of the user profile may exist but the
effects of any values in those segments do not influence the security policy defined in this Security
Target. RACF also supports a special user profile segment, CSDATA, for which the security
administrator can specify the format and content of the data fields using other profiles in the CFIELD
class, as well as specifying access rules in the FIELD class to determine which users can view or
update data in the segment {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-19}.
To create or modify a user profile, a user must have one of the following authorities:
· the SPECIAL role as a general system administrator {SM.1::SM.1.1}
· the UPDATE authority to the fields in a non-base segment of the profile he wants to modify
through field-level access checking {SM.1::SM.1.2}
· to create a new user: is connected to a group that has the group-SPECIAL role and has the
CLAUTH attribute for the USER class and is the owner of or has JOIN authority in the new
user’s default group. Note that the following roles of the ADDUSER command can not be
assigned in this case: OPERATIONS, SPECIAL, ROAUDIT and AUDITOR {SM.1::SM.1-
V2R2-1}
· to modify the attribute of a user: the CLAUTH attribute for the user class {SM.1::SM.1.4}.
Note that only the CLAUTH and NOCLAUTH attribute can be changed {SM.1::SM.1.5}.
To list the contents of a user (user-2) profile using the LISTUSER command, a user (user-1) must
have one of the following authorities:
• The SPECIAL role as a general system administrator, or the group-SPECIAL role as a group-
administrator for user-2, the AUDITOR role, the ROAUDIT role, the group-AUDITOR role as a
group auditor for user-2, or user-1 must own user-2 {SM.1::SM.1-V2R2-RACF-1}
• READ authority to the fields in a non-base segment of the profile he wants to list through
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 137 of 179
field-level access checking {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-2}
• When user-2 does not have the SPECIAL, OPERATIONS, AUDITOR, or ROAUDIT
{SM.1::SM.1-V2R2-RACF-69} roles:
○ READ authority to FACILITY resource IRR.LISTUSER {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-3}
○ READ authority to FACILITY resource IRR.LU.OWNER.owner-of-profile to allow use of
LISTUSER for any non-excluded user-2 owned by “owner-of-profile” (which specifies a
user ID or group name). {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-4}
○ READ authority to FACILITY resource IRR.LU.TREE.owner-of-tree to allow use of
LISTUSER for any non-excluded user-2 who would be in the group-SPECIAL scope of
“owner-of-tree” (which specifies a user ID or group name). That is, users owned by
“owner-of-tree” or owned by groups owned by “owner-of-tree” {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-
21}
○ To exclude a user-2 from being listed using IRR.LU.OWNER.owner-of-profile or
IRR.LU.TREE.owner-of-tree authority, the administrator can define a profile that protects
the resource IRR.LU.EXCLUDE.excluded-user-2 in the FACILITY class. With such a
profile defined, a user also needs READ authority to it in order to gain authority via
IRR.LU.OWNER.owner-of-profile or IRR.LU.TREE.owner-of-tree {SM.1::SM.1-R10-
RACF-5}.
To reset the password or password phrase for another user (user-2) or to resume user-2 using the
ALTUSER command, a user (user-1) must have one of the following authorities:
• To specify a new expired or non-expired password/phrase, the SPECIAL role as a general
system administrator {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-7}
• To specify a new expired password/phrase, the group-SPECIAL role as a group-administrator
for user-2 ,or user-1 must own user-2 {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-8}
• When user-2 does not have the SPECIAL, OPERATIONS, ROAUDIT, or AUDITOR roles, or
the PROTECTED attribute, one of:
○ READ authority to FACILITY resource IRR.PASSWORD.RESET to specify a new expired
password/phrase when not within the minimum change window for user-2, or resume
user-2 without specifying a resume date. User-1 can not set a phrase for a user-2 who
does not have one already {SM.1::SM.1-V2R2-RACF-9}
○ UPDATE authority to FACILITY resource IRR.PASSWORD.RESET to specify a new non-
expired password/phrase when not within the minimum change window for user-2, or
resume user-2 without specifying a resume date. User-1 can not set a phrase for a user-
2 who does not have one already {SM.1::SM.1-V2R2-RACF-10}.
CONTROL authority allows the same as UPDATE, but also allows changing the
password/phrase even when within the minimum change window for user-2 {SM.1::SM.1-
R10-RACF-11}.
○ READ authority to FACILITY resource IRR.PWRESET.OWNER.owner-of-profile to
specify a new expired password/phrase or resume a user without specifying a resume
date, for any non-excluded user-2 owned by “owner-of-profile” (which specifies a user ID
or group name) {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-12}
UPDATE authority allows the same as READ, and also allows setting a non-expired
password or password phrase {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-13}.
CONTROL authority allows the same as UPDATE, and also allows setting a new
password/phrase even when within the minimum change window for user-2 {SM.1::SM.1-
R10-RACF-14}.
○ READ authority to FACILITY resource IRR.PWRESET.TREE.owner-of-tree to specify a
new expired password/phrase or resume a user without specifying a resume date, for any
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non-excluded user-2 who would be in the group-SPECIAL scope of “owner-of-tree”
(which specifies a user ID or group name). That is, users owned by “owner-of-tree” or
owned by groups owned by “owner-of-tree” {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-15}.
UPDATE authority allows the same as READ, and also allows setting a non-expired
password or password phrase {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-16}.
CONTROL authority allows the same as UPDATE, and also allows setting a new
password/phrase even when within the minimum change window for user-2 {SM.1::SM.1-
R10-RACF-17}.
○ To exclude a user-2 from being altered using IRR.PWRESET.OWNER.owner-of-profile or
IRR.PWRESET.TREE.owner-of-tree authority, the administrator can define a profile that
protects the resource IRR.PWRESET.EXCLUDE.excluded-user-2 in the FACILITY class.
With such a profile defined, a user also needs READ authority to it in order to gain
authority via IRR.PWRESET.OWNER.owner-of-profile or IRR.PWRESET.TREE.owner-of-
tree {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-18}.
RACF allows groups of users to be defined, making the management of users and user attributes and
roles easier. To create a new group, a group profile must be defined in RACF. A group profile (as a
user profile) consists of a base segment and (optional) other segments. As with the user profiles all
group attributes related to the Security Policy as defined in this Security Target are contained in the
base segment and the OMVS segment of the group profile. Each group defined in RACF must be
owned by a RACF-defined user or by its superior group. Ownership of a group is assigned with the
ADDGROUP command when a new group profile is created and can be changed with the
ALTGROUP command used to change an existing group profile {SM.1::SM.1.6}.
RACF also supports a special group profile segment, CSDATA, for which the security administrator
can specify the format and content of the data fields using other profiles in the CFIELD class, as well
as specifying access rules in the FIELD class to determine which users can view or update data in
the segment {SM.1::SM.1-R10-RACF-20}.
The owner of a group or a user connected to a group that has the group-SPECIAL role can:
· Define new users to RACF (provided he also has the CLAUTH attribute for the USER class)
{SM.1::SM.1.7}.
· Connect and remove users from the group {SM.1::SM.1.8}.
· Delegate and change group authorities and set the default UACC for all new resources
belonging to members of the group {SM.1::SM.1.9}.
· Modify, list, and delete the group profile {SM.1::SM.1.10}.
· Define, delete, and list the names of the subgroups under the group {SM.1::SM.1.11}.
· Specify the group terminal option {SM.1::SM.1.12}.
Users can be connected to a number of groups and have the group-related authorities of all the
groups they are connected to {SM.1::SM.1.13}.
The OMVS segment of a group profile contains the group’s z/OS UNIX group identifier.
Management of z/OS user and group profiles occurs primarily via the RACF commands described
later (ADDUSER, ALTUSER, DELUSER, LISTUSER, ADDGROUP, ALTGROUP, DELGROUP,
LISTGRP). Administrators enter these commands while running in a TSO session.
8.4.1.2 User profiles
The base segment of a user profile within RACF contains (among other data not relevant for the
security functions defined in this Security Target) the following:
Name Description
USERID User’s identification (a maximum of 8 characters).
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 139 of 179
NAME User’s name (not security relevant, because the user is allowed to
change his name).
OWNER Owner of the user’s profile.
DFLTGRP User’s default group. (Note: A user may specify, at login time, any group
he or she is connected to as the current default group. This does not
change the DFLTGRP value in the profile.)
AUTHORITY User’s authority in the default group (use, create, connect, join).
PASSWORD User’s password. The user ID is either DES-encrypted using the
password (padded with blanks) as a key or encrypted using the
KDFAES algorithm. Users who have no password and no password
phrase are said to have the PROTECTED attribute, and can not logon
to the system via any mechanism that uses a password, password
phrase, or PassTicket.
PHRASE Optional password phrase. Users who have a phrase must also have a
password.
REVOKE This attribute consists of a flag and a date. The date parameter
specifies the date on which the user is revoked. The flag indicates that
the user is revoked. The user is revoked, if either the flag is set or the
actual date is after the revoke date, if defined.
RESUME Date on which RACF lets the user have access to the system again.
UACC Default universal access authority for resource profiles that the user
defines. Only applicable to DATASET and a few general resource
classes).
WHEN Days of the week and hours of the day during which the user has
access to the system (applies only to login through a terminal, not to
other ports-of-entry).
CLAUTH Classes in which the user can define profiles.
SPECIAL Gives the user the system-wide SPECIAL attribute.
AUDITOR Gives the user the system-wide AUDITOR attribute.
ROAUDIT Gives the user the system-wide ROAUDIT attribute.
OPERATIONS Gives the user the system-wide OPERATIONS attribute.
MODEL Name of the data set model profile to be used when creating new data
set profiles, either generic or discrete.
SECLABEL User’s default security label (evaluated in Labeled Security Mode only).
CERTNAME The names of the profiles in the DIGTCERT (digital certificate) class
that are related this RACF user ID.
CERTLABL The certificate labels associated with the profiles in the DIGTCERT
class that are related to this RACF user ID.
Table 70: User Profile
The OMVS segment in a user profile contains the following fields (among other information not
relevant for the security policy as defined in this Security Target:
HOME User’s z/OS UNIX initial directory path name
PROGRAM User’s z/OS UNIX program path name, such as a default shell program
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UID User’s z/OS UNIX user identifier
Administrators have several choices when establishing OMVS information for users:
1. They may define the OMVS segment for users completely manually, via ADDUSER or
ALTUSER with the OMVS keyword, and explicit specifications for the value of HOME,
PROGRAM, and UID {SM.1::SM.1-R11-RACF-1}.
2. They may define the OMVS segment via ADDUSER or ALTUSER with the OMVS keyword
and explicit specifications for HOME and PROGRAM, but allowing RACF to automatically
choose the UID via the AUTOUID keyword , in conjunction with the BPX.NEXT.USER profile
in the FACILITY class, where the administrator specifies an APPLDATA field containing the
allowable range of automatically-assigned UIDs. RACF will then assign the lowest available
unique UID and update the APPLDATA information to indicate the UID it used {SM.1::SM.1-
R11-RACF-2}.
The KERB segment in a user profile contains the following fields :
ENCRYPT Encryption methods allowable for this user : DES, DES3 (Triple DES), DES with key
derivation, AES128, or AES256. For this evaluation only DES3, AES128, or AES256
is allowable.
KERBNAME The Keberos principal ID for a locally-defined Kerberos user.
MAXTKTLFE The maximum lifetime of a Kerberos ticket for this user.
8.4.1.3 Group profiles
The base segment of a group profile within RACF contains (among other data not relevant for the
security functions defined in this Security Target) the following:
Name Description
GROUPNAME Name of the group
OWNER Owner of the group profile
SUPGROUP The profile’s superior group
MODEL Name of a profile to be used as a model
TERMUACC or
NOTERMUACC
The group’s terminal authorization
Table 71: Group profiles
The OMVS segment of the group profile contains the group’s z/OS UNIX group identifier in the GID
field.
Administrators have several choices when establishing OMVS information for groups:
1. They may define the OMVS segment for groups completely manually, via ADDGROUP or
ALTGROUP with the OMVS keyword, and explicit specification of the value of the GID
{SM.1::SM.1-R11-RACF-5}.
2. They may define the OMVS segment via ADDGROUP or ALTGROUP with the OMVS
keyword but allowing RACF to automatically choose the GID via the AUTOGID keyword , in
conjunction with the BPX.NEXT.USER profile in the FACILITY class, where the administrator
specifies an APPLDATA field containing the allowable range of automatically-assigned GIDs.
RACF will then assign the lowest available unique GID and update the APPLDATA
information to indicate the GID it used {SM.1::SM.1-R11-RACF-6}.
3. They may define the OMVS information automatically, by specifying the BPX.NEXT.USER
profile in the FACILITY class to record the allowable range of automatically-assigned GIDs
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 141 of 179
(as above), and the BPX.UNIQUE.USER profile to indicate that whenever a user whose
default (or current connect) group has no OMVS segment makes use of UNIX functions,
RACF should automatically create a permanent OMVS segment for that group. {SM.1::SM.1-
R11-RACF-8}. This process will also occur if someone inquires about the GID for a group that
does not have one using the getgmap() callable service {SM.1::SM.1-R11-RACF-9}.
8.4.1.4 User roles and attributes
User roles and attributes are extraordinary capabilities, restrictions, or environments that can be
assigned to a user, either all of the time or when the user is connected to a specific group or groups.
User attributes are stored and managed within the RACF database.
When a role or attribute is to apply only to a specific group or groups, it is specified at the group level
and is called a group-related user attribute. For example, user attributes that are specified in an
ADDUSER or ALTUSER command are stored in the user’s profile and are in effect regardless of the
group to which the user is connected {SM.1::SM.1.14}.
RACF maintains the roles and attributes specified in this section in fields in the user profile. The
distinction between roles and attributes in this Security Target is artificial and reflects the definition in
Chapter 5 for roles and user attributed. RACF does not make this distinction and the IBM guidance
describes all of the following as user attributes.
Apart from the explicitly mentioned roles and attributes described below, users are assigned certain
roles implicitly:
· Users implicitly are in the “user” role which allows them to change their own authentication
data
· Users can be assigned the operator role by authorizing them to issue an operator command in
the command’s own profile.
· Ownership of objects entitles users to change the object’s security attributes. Ownership for
non-UNIX objects is identical to ownership of the profile protecting the object.
8.4.1.4.1 RACF Roles
SPECIAL and group-SPECIAL
A user who has the SPECIAL attribute at the system level can issue all RACF commands (but not all
operands. There are AUDITOR-only operands related to the configuration of the audit function that
only a user with the AUDITOR attribute is allowed to use) {SM.1::SM.1.15}. The SPECIAL attribute
gives the user full control over all of the RACF profiles in the RACF database. The SPECIAL attribute
can also be assigned at the group level. Such a user with the group-SPECIAL attribute has full control
over all of the profiles within the scope of the group.
A user with the SPECIAL role in his user profile is regarded as a system administrator. He can:
· add, delete, list and modify user, group, DATASET and other profiles {SM.1::SM.1.16}
· list and define RACF general options (except options related to auditing) {SM.1::SM.1.17}
A system administrator can delegate administrative activities to users such that they can administer
profiles belonging to a defined group. He does this by assigning such users the group-SPECIAL
attribute. Those users then have administrative capabilities within the group they were assigned the
group SPECIAL attribute {SM.1::SM.1.18}. Users with the attribute group-SPECIAL can not use
general RACF options of the SETROPTS command (except for the REFRESH GENERIC and LIST
operands) {SM.1::SM.1.19}.
AUDITOR and group-AUDITOR
The AUDITOR attribute is given only to users who are responsible for auditing RACF security controls
and functions. To provide a check and balance on RACF security measures, the AUDITOR attribute
should be given to security or group administrators other than those who have the SPECIAL attribute.
The AUDITOR attribute can also be assigned at the group level. Such a user with the group-
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AUDITOR attribute can control the audit configuration within the scope of the group where the
attribute was assigned {SM.1::SM.1.20}.
A user with the AUDITOR attribute can define and modify the audit related options in user and the
auditor related options for resource profiles {SM.1::SM.1.21}. This allows him to define which activities
are to be recorded in the audit trail. He can also list the content of any profile and set the system wide
audit related options using the SETROPTS command. Those options are:
· AUDIT or NOAUDIT (for each profile class) {SM.1::SM.1.22}
· CMDVIOL or NOCMDVIOL {SM.1::SM.1.23}
· LOGOPTIONS (for each profile class) {SM.1::SM.1.24}
· OPERAUDIT or NOOPERAUDIT {SM.1::SM.1.25}
· SAUDIT or NOSAUDIT {SM.1::SM.1.26}
· SECLABELAUDIT or NOSECLABELAUDIT {SM.1::SM.1.27}
Audit configuration can also be delegated at the group level by giving the group-AUDITOR attribute to
a user.
A user with the group-Auditor attribute can define and modify the audit related options in user, and
resource profiles associated with his group {SM.1::SM.1.28}. He can not modify or set audit related
attributes that operate system-wide {SM.1::SM.1.29}. Note that a user with SPECIAL controls the
activation/deactivation of the OMVS audit related classes (DIRACC, DIRSRCH, FSOBJ, FSSEC,
IPOBJ, PROCACT and PROCESS).
ROAUDIT
A user who has the ROAUDIT attribute can monitor audit information and view RACF profiles to verify
that appropriate audit controls have been defined, but can not alter the auditing controls.
OPERATIONS and group-OPERATIONS
A user who has the OPERATIONS attribute has full access authorization to all RACF-protected
resources in the DATASET, DASDVOL, GDASDVOL and TAPEVOL classes except when restricted
by an access list entry granting less authority {SM.1::SM.1.30}. The OPERATIONS attribute can also
be assigned at the group level {SM.1::SM.1.31}.
z/OS UNIX superuser
A user operating with an effective UID of zero or a user that has been authorized to the
BPX.SUPERUSER profile in the FACILITY class is defined to have the role of a z/OS UNIX
superuser.
Pseudo user
A user defined with the NOPASSWORD, NOPHRASE, and NOOIDCARD parameter in his user
profile is defined as having the role of a "pseudo-user". The TOE prohibits that a user with those
attributes can log into the TOE. Those IDs can be used by SURROGAT-submitted batch jobs or by
started procedures defined in the STARTED class or the started procedures table.
8.4.1.4.2 RACF Attributes
CLAUTH
If a user has the CLAUTH attribute in a class, RACF allows the user to define profiles in that class
{SM.1::SM.1.32}.
Users receive the CLAUTH attribute on a class-by-class basis. {SM.1::SM.1.33}.
A user with the CLAUTH(USER) attribute can add and modify users except for setting or modifying
the following attributes:
· SPECIAL or NOSPECIAL {SM.1::SM.1.34}
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 143 of 179
· AUDITOR or NOAUDITOR {SM.1::SM.1.35}
· OPERATIONS or NOOPERATIONS {SM.1::SM.1.36}
· ROAUDIT or NOROAUDIT {SM.1::SM.1-V2R2-RACF-70}
REVOKE
A user can be prevented from entering the system by assigning the REVOKE attribute
{SM.1::SM.1.37}. This attribute is useful when a user needs to be prevented from entering the
system, but cannot be deleted using the DELUSER command because the user still owns RACF
resource profiles. It is also useful when a user must be temporarily prevented from using the system
for some reason.
User accounts can be revoked automatically after a period of inactivity {SM.1::SM.1.38}. This applies
also to accounts that have never been active {SM.1::SM.1.39}.
8.4.1.5 User Revocation
User revocation can take two forms in the TOE:
1. Revocation of the RACF user ID associated with a user: As all user authentication occurs via
RACF, and all users have a RACF identity, the administrator can revoke a user by using the
ALTUSER command with the REVOKE operand {SM.1::SM.1-R8-REV-1}. Note that this will
not cover immediate revocation, but it will prevent the user from entering the system in the
future.
2. Revocation of a user’s digital certificate: For certificates registered in RACF via the
RACDCERT command, the administrator can delete the certificate using RACDCERT
{SM.1::SM.1-R8-REV-2}. This will prevent the system from recognizing that certificate in the
future and associating it with the user’s RACF identity.
For immediate revocation of a user in extreme situations a simple ALTUSER or certificate revocation
may not suffice. In that case the administrator may determine which applications the user has access
to (e.g., TSO/E, z/OS UNIX System Services, FTP server, HTTP server, LDAP). The administrator
can then issue appropriate system or application commands to determine if the user is active in the
system, and if so issue the appropriate system or application commands to terminate the user’s
sessions.
For example, for a TSO/E user the administrator could issue the CANCEL U=user-ID command. For
a batch job the administer could issue CANCEL jobname.
As a final resort the administrator could stop servers such as the HTTP server, FTP server, or LDAP
server if the administrator is not sure how to locate the user’s sessions on the system, as well as
stopping all UNIX processing, TSO/E processing, and batch processing.
8.4.2 Resource management
RACF makes access decisions based on information stored in profiles or in the metadata associated
with z/OS UNIX objects. RACF manages the following resource profiles:
· Data set profiles
· General resource profiles
General resource profiles apply to a number of resources defined as protected resources in this
Security Target. The structure of the profiles in RACF used to protect those resources is identical, but
the semantics of specific access rights is defined by the manager of the resource and may therefore
differ depending on the type of resource.
Profiles consists of a base segment and optionally a set of non-base segments. Fields within non-
base segments can be individually protected using the field-level access control possibilities provided
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by RACF.
Field-level access control allows the control of READ and UPDATE access to individual fields within a
segment other than the base segment of a RACF profile. This access is based on RACF profiles in
the FIELD class. Profiles in this class have the structure of profile-type.segment-name.field-name
where profile-type is either the class name of a general resource profile or one of DATASET, GROUP,
or USER. Different profile classes/types can have different segments and the name of the segment
that contains the field for which access is controlled is specified as the second part of the profile.
Different segments have different fields identified by their name and the name of the field is the third
part of the profile controlling access to the field. The access control algorithm for access to general
resources is used also for the FIELD class.
Fields in segments are related to operands of RACF commands or the R_admin callable service used
to manage profiles and the purpose of field level access control is to provide a mechanism that allows
the definition of fine-grained access control to use those command operands or list the content of
individual fields. Table 18 in [RACF.SAG] provides a complete list of the segment names and the
fields within each of those segments that are subject to field-level access control. The table also maps
the field names to the command operands that are used to update the fields. Note that use of those
operands requires to have at least UPDATE authority to the field through field-level access control
unless the user has the SPECIAL attribute {SM.4::SM.4-R12-RACFEAL5-FLA-1}. When profiles are
listed, the user will only get information about the content of fields in segments protected by field-level
access control, if he has at least READ access to the field, unless the user has the SPECIAL or
AUDITOR attribute {SM.4::SM.4-R12-RACFEAL5-FLA-2}.
In order to use field-level access control, the FIELD class needs to be active and SETROPTS
RACLIST needs to be activated for the FIELD class. Otherwise only a user with the SPECIAL or
AUDITOR attribute has access to fields {SM.4::SM.4-R12-RACFEAL5-FLA-3}.
When the FIELD class is active and SETROPTS RACLIST is activated for the FIELD class, users
with the SPECIAL or AUDITOR attribute can list all fields regardless of the access definition in the
profile protecting access to the field {SM.4::R12-RACFEAL5-FLA-4}.
To allow users to read or update fields in their own user profile protected by field-level access control
a userid of &RACUID can be specified in the PERMIT command for the profiles in the FIELD class
related to the fields in profiles of type USER {SM.4::R12-RACFEAL5-FLA-5}. This does not allow this
user access to those fields in the user profiles of other users {SM.4::R12-RACFEAL5-FLA-6}.
For information on z/OS UNIX objects see z/OS UNIX file system resources.
8.4.2.1 Granular Field Access Checking
A user with access to a FIELD class profile for a given segment or field can manipulate that field in all
profiles. Field level access can be optionally restricted such that access to a particular segment or
field, as granted by FIELD profiles, is limited to profiles to which the user has BASE-segment access.
BASE-segment access is obtained by way of profile ownership, group-special, or other means, as de-
termined by the RACF command being processed. The optional BASE-segment authority requirement
to field-level access checking, is controlled by defining a profile in the FIELD class:
“FLAC.SKIP.BASECHECK”
If the FLAC.SKIP.BASECHECK profile exists, and a command-issuing user lacks READ access to it,
the field level access is granted only if the user performing the profile operation has BASE-segment
access as well as authorization to the appropriate FIELD class profile.
There are two ways to set up the FLAC.SKIP.BASECHECK profile:
1) If the profile is defined with UACC(READ), field-level-access checking processes without taking
BASE-segment authorization into consideration. Namely, anyone with FIELD access to a particular
field may access that field for all profiles defined to RACF {SM.4::SM.4-V2R3-RACFEAL5-FLA-7}.
2) Alternatively, the FLAC.SKIP.BASECHECK profile can be given UACC(NONE). This immediately
limits all use of field-level-access to users who have BASE-segment access in accordance to the
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 145 of 179
profile manipulation rules as specified by the command processors. {SM.4::SM.4-V2R3-RACFEAL5-
FLA-8}.
8.4.2.2 Data set profiles
A data set profile within RACF contains (among other data not relevant for the security functions
defined in this Security Target) the following:
Name Description
Profile name Name of the data set profile
GENERIC,
MODEL, or TAPE
Indicates if it is a generic, a model or a tape data set profile
OWNER Owner of the data set profile
NOTIFY The TSO user who is to be notified whenever RACF uses this profile to
deny access to a data set
UACC The universal access authority for the data set or data sets protected by
the profile
AUDIT The type of auditing to be performed for the data set or data sets
protected by the profile
CATEGORY The security categories to be assigned to the data set or data sets
protected by the profile
SECLABEL The security label of the data set or data sets protected by the profile
(evaluated in Labeled Security Mode only)
SECLEVEL The security level of the data set or data sets protected by the profile
(evaluated in Labeled Security Mode only)
ERASE A setting that indicates whether the data set or data sets protected by
the profile are to be erased when they are scratched
UNIT The unit type on which the data set resides (for discrete profiles only)
VOLUME The volume on which the data set resides (for discrete profiles only)
Table 72: Data Set profile
Associated with those profiles is the access control list (ACL) for the profile. Each ACL entry defines
the access rights of a user or a group with respect to the resource protected by the profile.
Attributes within an ACL entry are:
· access type (none, execute, read, update, control, alter)
· user IDs and group IDs allowed for the access type
· conditions of access (among other):
o WHEN(CONSOLE( console-id ...))
Modifies the access authority. Specifies that the identified users or groups have the
specified access authority when executing commands originating from the specified
system console
o WHEN(JESINPUT( device-name ...))
Modifies the access authority. Specifies that the identified users or groups have the
specified access authority when entering the system through the specified JES input
device
o WHEN(PROGRAM( program-name...))
Modifies the access authority. Specifies that the identified users or groups have the
specified access authority when executing the specified program
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o WHEN(TERMINAL( terminal-id ...))
Modifies the access authority. Specifies that the identified users or groups have the
specified access authority when logged on to the specified terminal
8.4.2.3 General resource profiles
Other protected resources defined in this Security Target (except the z/OS UNIX file system objects
and z/OS UNIX IPC objects) are protected by general resource profiles that contains the resource
class and the resource attributes. As with profiles for z/OS data sets, an access control list with
entries defining the access types for individual users and / or groups can be defined for each such
resource profile. The semantics of the individual access rights are defined by the resource manager
responsible for the management of the resources protected by such a profile. Different resource
classes may have different resource managers responsible for the protection and management of the
resources within the class.
The structure of a general resource profile is defined in the following table (omitting fields that are not
relevant for the Security Policy as defined in this Security Target:
Name Description
Class name Name of the resource class the profile belongs to
Profile name Name of the generic resource profile
OWNER( user ID or groupname) The owner of the profile
NOTIFY The user who is to be notified whenever RACF uses this profile to
deny access to a resource
UACC The universal access authority for the resource or resources
protected by the profile
AUDIT The type of auditing to be performed for the resource or resources
protected by the profile
FROM The name of a profile that is to be used as a model
FCLASS The class of the model profile
FGENERIC A setting that indicates that the model profile name is to be treated
as a generic name
FVOLUME The volume that is to be used to locate the model profile
CATEGORY The security categories to be assigned to the resource or
resources protected by the profile (evaluated in Labeled Security
Mode only)
SECLABEL The security label of the resource or resources protected by the
profile (evaluated in Labeled Security Mode only)
SECLEVEL The security level of the resource or resources protected by the
profile (evaluated in Labeled Security Mode only)
LEVEL An installation-defined level
SINGLEDSN The tape volume protected by this profile can contain only one data
set (TAPEVOL class only)
TIMEZONE The time zone in which a terminal resides (TERMINAL class only)
TVTOC A setting that specifies that RACF is to create a tape volume table
of contents (TVTOC) when a user creates the first output data set
on the tape volume (TAPEVOL class only)
WHEN The times when the terminal or terminals protected by the profile
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 147 of 179
can be used to access the system (TERMINAL class only)
Table 73: General Resource profile
8.4.2.4 z/OS UNIX file system resources
z/OS UNIX file system resources are not protected by RACF profiles but by permission bits and
extended attributes stored in the z/OS UNIX file system. The evaluated configuration supports two
different z/OS UNIX file system types: zFS and HFS. A file system for both file system types is always
implemented in a single z/OS data set.
In the case of zFS the extended attributes also contain the security label (evaluated in Labeled
Security Mode only); therefore, a zFS file system can have different security labels associated with
different files. If varying security labels are to be used within one zFS file system, the data set
containing the zFS file system must be created with the SYSMULTI security label. After creation of the
file system, the security label of the data set must then be set to SYSHIGH.
In the case of HFS, the extended attributes do not contain a security label and therefore in Labeled
Security Mode a HFS file system must be contained in a z/OS data set with a defined security label.
All z/OS UNIX files in this HFS will then automatically inherit the security label of the hosting z/OS
data set.
See DAC for UNIX objects for details of the access control strategy for z/OS UNIX file system
objects.
8.4.3 RACF configuration and management
8.4.3.1 Configuring RACF with the SETROPTS command
The SPECIAL and AUDITOR roles can define system wide-options of RACF with the SETROPTS
command. This command can be used (among other actions) to:
· Choose the resource classes that RACF is to protect (requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.1}
· Set the universal access authority (UACC) for otherwise undefined terminals (requires
SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.2}
· Specify logging of certain RACF commands and events (requires AUDITOR). {SM.3::SM.3.3}
· Enable or disable list-of-groups access checking (requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.4}
· Display options currently in effect. {SM.3::SM.3.5}
· Enable generic profile checking for all active classes (requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.6}
· Establish password syntax rules (requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.7}
· Activate password processing for checking previous passwords, limit invalid password
attempts, and warn of password expiration (requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.8}
· Control global access checking for selected individual resources or generic names with
selected generalized access rules (requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.9}
· Set the passwords for authorizing use of the RVARY command (requires SPECIAL).
{SM.3::SM.3.10}
· Initiate refreshing of in-storage generic profile lists and global access checking tables
(requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.11}
· Enable or disable shared profiles through RACLIST processing for general resources
(requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.12}
· Activate auditing of access attempts to RACF-protected resources based on installation-
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defined security levels (requires AUDITOR). {SM.3::SM.3.13}
· Activate enhanced generic naming (requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.14}
· Activate profile modeling for GDG, group, and user data sets (requires SPECIAL).
{SM.3::SM.3.15}
· Activate protection for data sets with single-level names (requires SPECIAL).
{SM.3::SM.3.16}
· Control logging of real data set names (requires AUDITOR). {SM.3::SM.3.17}
· Control the job entry subsystem (JES) options implemented in RACF (requires SPECIAL).
{SM.3::SM.3.18}
· Activate tape data set protection (requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.19}
· Enable protection of data sets by default (PROTECTALL(FAILURES)) (requires SPECIAL).
{SM.3::SM.3.20}
· Enable the erasure of scratched DASD data sets (requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.21}
· Activate program control (requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.22}
· Control whether a profile creator’s user ID is automatically added to the profile’s access list
(requires SPECIAL). {SM.3::SM.3.23}
Some administration activities can be delegated to user with other roles. See the definition of those
roles for the administrative options that can be set or defined by those roles.
To operate in correspondence with the requirements in this Security Target, the system administrator
needs to configure RACF (using the SETROPTS command) with the following options:
CATDSNS(FAILURES), NOCOMPATMODE, ERASE(ALL), GENERIC(*), PROTECTALL(FAILURES),
CLASSACT (TEMPDSN), JES(BATCHALLRACF). In Labeled Security Mode the following options
need to be set in addition: MLACTIVE(FAILURES), MLFSOBJ(ACTIVE), MLIPCOBJ(ACTIVE),
MLS(FAILURES), MLSTABLE, SECLABELCONTROL. {SM.3::SM.3.24}. Additional parameter for the
PASSWORD operand need to be set to define the password policy. See RACF Passwords and
Password Phrases for more information.
8.4.3.2 RACF commands
The administration of RACF is performed by a set of commands. Users need the required authorities
or roles to issue those commands or specific parameter of those commands, which are defined in a
table later in this section. The main RACF commands are:
· ADDGROUP, ALTGROUP, DELGROUP
Commands to define a new group profile, modify an existing group profile or delete a group
profile {SM.3::SM.3.25}
· ADDUSER, ALTUSER, DELUSER
Commands to define a new user profile, modify an existing user profile or delete a user profile
{SM.3::SM.3.26}
· ADDSD, ALTDSD, DELDSD
Commands to define a new z/OS data set profile, modify an existing z/OS data set profile or
delete an existing z/OS data set profile {SM.3::SM.3.27}
· CONNECT, REMOVE
Command to connect a user to or remove a user from a group {SM.3::SM.3.28}
· LISTGROUP, LISTUSER, LISTDSD
Commands to list user, group or z/OS data set profiles {SM.3::SM.3.29}
· RDEFINE, RALTER, RDELETE
Commands to define, modify or delete a general resource profile {SM.3::SM.3.30}
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 149 of 179
· RLIST
Command to list a general resource profile {SM.3::SM.3.31}
· PASSWORD
Command to specify a user’s password {SM.3::SM.3.32}
· PHRASE
Command to specify a user’s password phrase {SM.3::SM.3-R10-RACF-1}
· PERMIT
Command to maintain the access list of a resource profile {SM.3::SM.3.33}
· RACDCERT
Command to maintain X5.09v3 digital certificates, certificate mapping filters, certificate
mapping criteria, and key rings in the RACF database. {SM.3::SM.3-R13-RACF-3}
· RACMAP
Command to establish mappings between distributed user identities and local RACF user IDs
{SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACF-2}.
· RACPRMCK
Command to validate the syntax of one or more RACF parmlib members and verify that the
content of the member is valid prior to IPLing {SM.3::SM.3-V2R3-RACF-1}.
· SETROPTS
Command to set specific RACF options (see section above for details) {SM.3::SM.3.34}
There are the following options how a RACF command can be issued:
• as a TSO command
• as an operator command
• with command direction (command can be directed to run under the authority of a user ID on
a remote node, or the same node using the AT operand. Use of this operand is usually
restricted as indicated in the table below). [Note: This method is part of the RACF Remote
Sharing Facility (RRSF) which is not a part of this evaluation, and will not be considered
further.]
• with automatic command direction (activated using the SET AUTODIRECT command. Use is
restricted by RACF profiles as for command direction)[Note: This method is part of the RACF
Remote Sharing Facility (RRSF) which is not a part of this evaluation, and will not be
considered further.]
• from the RACF parameter library
• via the R_admin callable service
Not all commands can be issued in all options. For example some commands can not be used as
TSO commands, and some can not be used as operator commands.
{SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-30} For commands (except RVARY) that can be issued as either a
TSO command or as an operator command, the following security requirements apply in addition to
any specified by the commands themselves when the command is issued as an operator command:
• The command issuer must be logged on to the console.
• If the OPERCMDS class is active and SETR RACLISTed then the command issuer must
have READ authority to the OPERCMDS profile protecting the command, if one exists:
Command Name OPERCMDS Resource name
ADDGROUP Subsystem-name.ADDGROUP
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Command Name OPERCMDS Resource name
(Note: for all the RACF TSO commands, when
issued as an operator command the
OPERCMDS resource name uses the full
command name, even if the user issued the
command using an abbreviation such as AG)
ADDSD Subsystem-name.ADDSD
ADDUSER Subsystem-name.ADDUSER
ALTDSD Subsystem-name.ALTDSD
ALTGROUP Subsystem-name.ALTGROUP
ALTUSER Subsystem-name.ALTUSER
CONNECT Subsystem-name.CONNECT
DELDSD Subsystem-name.DELDSD
DELGROUP Subsystem-name.DELGROUP
DELUSER Subsystem-name.DELUSER
LISTDSD Subsystem-name.LISTDSD
LISTGRP Subsystem-name.LISTGRP
LISTUSER Subsystem-name.LISTUSER
PASSWORD Subsystem-name.PASSWORD
PHRASE Subsystem-name.PASSWORD
PERMIT Subsystem-name.PERMIT
RALTER Subsystem-name.RALTER
RACPRMCK Subsystem-name.RACPRMCK
RDEFINE Subsystem-name.RDEFINE
RDELETE Subsystem-name.RDELETE
REMOVE Subsystem-name.REMOVE
RLIST Subsystem-name.RLIST
SEARCH Subsystem-name.SEARCH
SETROPTS Subsystem-name.SETROPTS
(Note: READ authority is required to issue
SETROPTS LIST, but UPDATE is required if
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 151 of 179
Command Name OPERCMDS Resource name
any other operands are specified.)
Table 74: RACF Commands and related OPERCMDS resource names – TSO commands
{SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-31} For commands that can be issued as operator commands but not
as TSO commands, the following security requirements apply:
• If you are logged on to the console, and the command is protected by an OPERCMDS profile,
then you must have READ authority to that profile:
Command Name OPERCMDS Resource name
DISPLAY Subsystem-name.DISPLAY.SIGNON
Note: No OPERCMDS authority check is
performed when this command is issued
from a RACF parameter library member.
RESTART Subsystem-name.RESTART
SET subsystem-name.SET.AUTOAPPL
subsystem-name.SET.AUTODIRECT
subsystem-name.SET.AUTOPWD
subsystem-name.SET.INCLUDE
subsystem-name.SET.JESNODE
subsystem-name.SET.LIST
subsystem-name.SET.PWSYNC
subsystem-name.SET.TRACE
Note: No OPERCMDS authority check is
performed when this command is issued
from a RACF parameter library member.
SIGNOFF Subsystem-name.SIGNOFF
Note: No OPERCMDS authority check is
performed when this command is issued
from a RACF parameter library member.
STOP Subsystem-name.STOP
TARGET subsystem-name.TARGET.DESCRIPTION
subsystem-name.TARGET.LIST
subsystem-name.TARGET.LOCAL
subsystem-name.TARGET.NODE
subsystem-name.TARGET.OPERATIVE
Note: TARGET.OPERATIVE also
protects the DELETE and DORMANT
operands.
subsystem-name.TARGET.PREFIX
subsystem-name.TARGET.PROTOCOL
subsystem-name.TARGET.PURGE
subsystem-name.TARGET.WDSQUAL
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Command Name OPERCMDS Resource name
subsystem-name.TARGET.WORKSPACE
Note: No OPERCMDS authority check is
performed when this command is issued
from a RACF parameter library member.
Table 75: RACF Commands and related OPERCMDS resource names – Console only commands
• If you are not logged on to the console, or the command is not protected by an OPERCMDS
profile, then (except for the DISPLAY command) you must issue the command from a
console with MASTER or SYSTEM authority.
To use a specific RACF command, a user needs the specific authority to use the command or specific
parameter of the command. The authorities required are listed in the following table:
Command Authorities required for use
ADDGROUP {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-1} General:
• SPECIAL or
• group-SPECIAL and the superior group is within the scope of group-
SPECIAL authority, or
• owner of the superior group, or
• JOIN authority to the superior group
Special parameter authorization:
• SPECIAL or UPDATE authority via field-level access control to add
segments to a group’s profile
• For use of the SHARED keyword: SPECIAL or READ authority to the
SHARED.IDS resource in the UNIXPRIV class
ADDSD {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-2} The level of authority required to use the
ADDSD command and the types of profiles the caller can define are:
To protect a user data set with RACF, one of the following must be true:
• The high-level qualifier of the data set name (or the qualifier supplied
by the RACF naming conventions table) must match the caller’s user
ID, or
• SPECIAL, or
• The user ID for the data set profile must be within the scope of a
group in which the caller has the group-SPECIAL attribute.
To protect a group data set with RACF, one of the following must be true:
• CREATE authority in the group, or
• SPECIAL, or
• OPERATIONS attribute and not be connected to the group, or
• The data set profile must be within the scope of the group in which
the caller has the group-SPECIAL attribute.
• The data set profile must be within the scope of the group in which
the caller has the group-OPERATIONS attribute, and he must not be
connected to the group.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 153 of 179
Command Authorities required for use
Special parameter authorization:
• To assign a security category to a profile, you must have the SPE-
CIAL attribute or have the category in your user profile.
• To assign a security level to a profile, you must have the SPECIAL at-
tribute or, in your own profile, a security level that is equal to or
greater than the security level you are defining.
• To assign a security label to a profile, you must have the SPECIAL at-
tribute or (when SETROPTS SECLABELCONTROL is not active)
READ authority to the security label profile.
• To add non-base segments, SPECIAL or UPDATE authority via field-
level access control.
• To add a discrete profile for a VSAM data set already RACF-pro-
tected by a generic profile, you must have ALTER access authority to
the catalog or to the data set through the generic profile.
• To specify a model data set profile (using, as required, FROM,
FCLASS, FGENERIC, and FVOLUME), you must have sufficient au-
thority over the model profile (the from profile). RACF makes the fol-
lowing checks until one of the conditions is met:
• You have the SPECIAL attribute.
• The from profile is within the scope of a group in which you
have the group-SPECIAL attribute.
• You are the owner of the from profile.
• The high-level qualifier of the profile name (or the qualifier
supplied by the naming conventions routine ) is your user ID.
• For a discrete profile, you are on the access list in the from
profile with ALTER authority. (If you have any lower level of
authority, you cannot use the profile as a model.)
• For a discrete profile, your current connect group (or, if list-of-
groups checking is active, any group to which you are con-
nected) is on the access list in the from profile with ALTER
authority.
• For a discrete profile, the UACC is ALTER.
ADDUSER {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-V2R2-3} General:
• SPECIAL or
• CLAUTH for the USER class and one of the following is true:
◦ The caller is the owner of the default group specified
◦ The caller has JOIN authority in the default group specified
◦ The default group specified is within the scope of a group where
the caller has group-SPECIAL
Special parameter authorization:
• SPECIAL to give the new user the OPERATIONS, SPECIAL, AUDI-
TOR, or ROAUDIT attribute
• SPECIAL to assign a security category to a profile or the category
must be in the caller’s user profile
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Command Authorities required for use
• SPECIAL to assign a security level to a profile or the security level in
the caller’s profile is equal or greater than the security level assigned
to the new user
• When defining information within a segment other than the base seg-
ment:
◦ SPECIAL, or
◦ UPDATE authority to the desired field through field-level access
control
For use of the SHARED keyword: SPECIAL or READ authority to the
SHARED.IDS resource in the UNIXPRIV class
•
ALTDSD {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-4} The level of authority required to use the
ALTDSD command and the types of profiles the caller can define are:
To protect a user data set with RACF, one of the following must be true:
• The high-level qualifier of the data set name (or the qualifier supplied
by the RACF naming conventions table) must match the caller’s user
ID, or
• SPECIAL, or
• The user ID for the data set profile must be within the scope of a
group in which the caller has the group-SPECIAL attribute.
• The caller is the owner of the profile
• For a discrete profile: the caller has ALTER authority to the profile or
the caller’s current connect group (or, if list-of-groups checking is ac-
tive) has ALTER authority
Special parameter authorization:
• For use of the GLOBALAUDIT keyword: AUDITOR or the data set
profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller has the
group-AUDITOR attribute
• For access to the DFP or TME segment: field-level access authority
to those segments
• SPECIAL to assign a security label, or when SETR SECLABELCON-
TROL is not active, READ authority to the specified SECLABEL.
• SPECIAL to assign a security category to a profile or remove a secu-
rity category from a profile, or the category must be in the caller’s
user profile. SPECIAL to assign a security level to a profile or the se-
curity level in the caller’s profile is equal or greater than the security
level assigned to the new user
ALTGROUP {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-5} General:
• To issue the command,, except as specified below:
• SPECIAL
• The group profile is within the scope of a group in which you
have the group-SPECIAL attribute
• You are the current owner of the group.
Special parameter authorization:
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 155 of 179
Command Authorities required for use
• To change the superior group of a group:
• SPECIAL or
• group-SPECIAL and the current and new superior group is
within the scope of group-SPECIAL authority, or
• owner of the current and new superior group, or
• JOIN authority to the current and new superior group
• A combination of group-SPECIAL, owner or JOIN authority
where one of those applies for the current and one of those
applies for the new superior group
• SPECIAL or permission through field-level access checking in order
to add, delete, or alter segments of a group’s profile
• For use of the SHARED keyword: SPECIAL or READ authority to the
SHARED.IDS resource in the UNIXPRIV class
ALTUSER {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-V2R2-6} General:
• SPECIAL (allows use of all operands except UAUDIT/NOUAUDIT)
Special parameter authorization:
• If the owner of the user profile is within the scope of a group in which
the group-SPECIAL attribute, he can use all of the operands except
SPECIAL, AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, OPERATIONS, NOEXPIRED and
UAUDIT/NOUAUDIT.
• The owner of the user’s profile can use any of the following operands
for user-related attributes:
◦ ADSP | NOADSP
◦ DATA | NODATA
◦ DFLTGRP
◦ GRPACC | NOGRPACC
◦ MODEL | NOMODEL
◦ NAME
◦ OIDCARD | NOOIDCARD
◦ OWNER
◦ PASSWORD | NOPASSWORD
◦ PHRASE | NOPHRASE
◦ RESTRICTED | NORESTRICTED
◦ RESUME | NORESUME
◦ REVOKE | NOREVOKE
◦ WHEN
• Each user can change his or her name field, default group or model
data set profile name (using the NAME, DFLTGRP, or MODEL oper-
and, respectively).
• You can use the GROUP, AUTHORITY, and UACC operands for
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Command Authorities required for use
group-related user attributes if you have JOIN or CONNECT au-
thority, if the group profile is within the scope of a group in which you
have the group-SPECIAL attribute, or if you are the owner of the
specified group.
• To specify the AUDITOR/NOAUDITOR, ROAUDIT/NOROAUDIT,
SPECIAL/NOSPECIAL, and OPERATIONS/NOOPERATIONS oper-
ands as system-wide user attributes, the caller must have the SPE-
CIAL attribute.
• To specify the UAUDIT/NOUAUDIT operand, either the caller must
have the AUDITOR attribute, or the user profile must be within the
scope of a group in which the caller has the group-AUDITOR at-
tribute.
• The CLAUTH and NOCLAUTH operands can be specified if the caller
is the owner of the user’s profile and has the CLAUTH attribute for
the class to be added or deleted.
• To assign a security category to a profile, or to delete a category from
a profile, one of the following must be true:
• If the user profile is within the scope of a group in which you
have the group-SPECIAL attribute, or if you are the owner of
the specified user, the category you are adding or deleting
must be in your user profile.
• You have the SPECIAL attribute.
• To assign a security level to a profile, or to delete a security level from
a profile, one of the following must be true:
• If the user profile is within the scope of a group in which you
have the group-SPECIAL attribute, or if you are the owner of
the specified user, the security level in your user profile must
be equal to or greater than the security level you are assign-
ing or deleting.
• You have the SPECIAL attribute.
• To change information within a segment other than the base seg-
ment, the caller must have one of the following:
◦ The SPECIAL attribute
◦ At least UPDATE authority to the desired field within the segment
through field-level access control.
• To reset passwords and password phrases or to resume user IDs, the
caller must have at least one of the following authorizations:
◦ SPECIAL.
◦ group-SPECIAL authority over the user profile.
◦ The caller is the OWNER of the user profile.
◦ The caller has sufficient access to the IRR.PASSWORD.RESET
resource in the FACILITY class.
◦ The caller has sufficient access to an appropriate resource in the
FACILITY class (IRR.PWRESET.OWNER.owner or IRR.PWRE-
SET.TREE.owner), and both of the following conditions are also
true:
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 157 of 179
Command Authorities required for use
▪ The other user does not have the SPECIAL, OPERATIONS,
AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, or PROTECTED attribute.
▪ The caller is not excluded from altering the user by the IR-
R.PWRESET.EXCLUDE.excluded-user resource in the FA-
CILITY class.
• When the caller’s reset and resume authority is through access to
the IRR.PASSWORD.RESET resource, the IRR.PWRESET.OWN-
ER.owner resource, or the IRR.PWRESET.TREE.owner resource, the
following requirements apply:
◦ If the caller has READ access, he can:
▪ Use the PASSWORD operand to reset a password (to an ex-
pired password) for a user who does not have the SPECIAL,
OPERATIONS, AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, or PROTECTED at-
tribute.
▪ Use the PHRASE operand to reset a password phrase (to an
expired password phrase) for a user with an assigned pass-
word phrase who does not have the SPECIAL, OPERA-
TIONS, AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, or PROTECTED attribute.
Note: The caller cannot use the PHRASE operand to add a
password phrase for a user who does not have one.
▪ Use the RESUME operand, without specifying a date, for a
user who does not have the SPECIAL, OPERATIONS, AUDI-
TOR, ROAUDIT, or PROTECTED attribute.
◦ If the caller has UPDATE access, he can:
▪ Use the PASSWORD, PHRASE, and RESUME operands as
noted for READ access.
▪ Use the NOEXPIRED operand (with PASSWORD or
PHRASE) for a user who does not have the SPECIAL, OP-
ERATIONS, AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, or PROTECTED attribute.
◦ If the caller has CONTROL access, he can:
▪ Use the PASSWORD, PHRASE, RESUME, and NOEX-
PIRED operands as noted for READ and UPDATE access.
▪ Reset the password or password phrase within the minimum
change interval for a user who does not have the SPECIAL,
OPERATIONS, AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, or PROTECTED at-
tribute.
• For use of the SHARED keyword: SPECIAL or READ authority to the
SHARED.IDS resource in the UNIXPRIV class
CONNECT {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-7} General:
• SPECIAL, or
• Group-SPECIAL in the group
• Ownership of the group
• JOIN authority in the group
• CONNECT authority in the group
• A caller can not give a higher level of authority in the group than he
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Command Authorities required for use
has himself.
DELDSD {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-8} General:
• SPECIAL, or
• The data set profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has the group-SPECIAL attribute, or
• The high-level qualifier of the profile name or the qualifier supplied by
the RACF naming conventions table is the caller’s user ID, or
• The caller is the owner of the profile
• For a discrete profile: the caller is on the access list with ALTER au-
thority, or
• For a discrete profile, the caller’s group or one of the caller’s groups
(if checking list of groups is active) is on the access list and has AL-
TER authority.
• For a discrete profile, the universal access authority is ALTER.
DELGROUP {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-9} General:
• SPECIAL, or
• The group to be deleted is within the scope of a group where the
caller has the group-SPECIAL in the group, or
• The caller is the Owner of the group to be deleted, or
• The caller is the Owner of a superior group of the group to be deleted
• JOIN authority in the superior group
DELUSER {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-10} General:
• SPECIAL, or
• Group-SPECIAL for the group where the user profile to be deleted is
within the scope of the group, or
• Ownership of the user profile
Other:
• A user profile that has a distributed identity filter associated with it can
only be deleted after the distributed identity filter has been deleted.
DISPLAY {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-25} None (can be used an operator command
only. RACF allows restricting the use of specific operator commands to de-
fined users).
HELP No restrictions
LISTDSD {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-V2R2-11} For listing the RACF segment of a
data set profile:
• SPECIAL, or
• The data set profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has the group-SPECIAL attribute, or
• OPERATIONS, or
• The data set profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has the group-OPERATIONS attribute, or
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Command Authorities required for use
• AUDITOR, or
• ROAUDIT, or
• The data set profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has the group-AUDITOR attribute, or
• The high-level qualifier of the profile name (or the qualifier supplied
by the naming convention table) is the caller’s user ID, or
• The caller is the owner of the profile
• The caller is on the access list with READ authority, or
• The caller’s group or one of the caller’s groups (if checking list of
groups is active) is on the access list and has READ authority, or
• The universal access authority is READ, or
• The caller has READ access for the profile name from the GLOBAL
ENTRY TABLE (if the table contains an entry for the profile)
For listing the DFP or TME segment of a data set profile:
• SPECIAL, or
• AUDITOR, or
• ROAUDIT, or
• READ authority to the desired field within the segment through field-
level access control.
Special parameter authorization:
• To specify the AUTHUSER operand to display the access list for a
profile, one of the following conditions must be met for each profile to
be listed:
◦ SPECIAL, or
◦ The data set profile is within the scope of a group in which the
caller has the group-SPECIAL attribute, or
◦ OPERATIONS, or
◦ The data set profile is within the scope of a group in which the
caller has the group-OPERATIONS attribute, or
◦ AUDITOR, or ROAUDIT, or
◦ The data set profile is within the scope of a group in which the
caller has the group-AUDITOR attribute, or
◦ The high-level qualifier of the profile name (or the qualifier sup-
plied by the naming convention table) is the caller’s user ID, or
◦ The caller is the owner of the profile
◦ The caller has ALTER access for the profile name from the
GLOBAL ENTRY TABLE (if this table contains an entry for the
profile).
◦ For a discrete profile, the caller is on the profile’s access list with
ALTER authority.
◦ For a discrete profile, the caller’s current connect group (or, if list-
of-groups checking is active, any group to which the caller is con-
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Command Authorities required for use
nected) is in the access list and has ALTER authority.
◦ For a discrete profile, the universal access authority is ALTER.
Other:
• To display the type of access attempts (as specified by the GLOBAL-
AUDIT operand on the ALTDSD command) that are being logged on
the SMF data set, either the caller must have the AUDITOR or
ROAUDIT attribute or the profile must be within the scope of a group
in which the caller has the group-AUDITOR attribute.
LISTGRP {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-V2R2-12} For listing the RACF segment of a
group profile:
• SPECIAL, or
• AUDITOR, or ROAUDIT, or
• For each group to be listed at least one of the following is true:
◦ The caller has group-SPECIAL the group or the group profile is
within the scope of a group in which the caller has the group-
SPECIAL attribute, or
◦ The caller has group-AUDITOR for the group or the group profile
is within the scope of a group in which the caller has the group-
AUDITOR attribute, or
◦ The caller is the owner of the group, or
◦ The caller has JOIN or CONNECT authority for the group
For listing the other segments of a group profile:
• SPECIAL, or
• AUDITOR, or
• ROAUDIT, or
• READ access to the desired field through field-level access control
LISTUSER {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-V2R2-13} For listing the RACF segment of a
user profile:
• SPECIAL, or
• AUDITOR, or
• ROAUDIT, or
• For each user to be listed at least one of the following is true:
◦ the user profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has the group-SPECIAL attribute, or
◦ the user profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has the group-AUDITOR attribute, or
◦ The caller is the owner of the user profile, or
◦ The caller has READ access to the IRR.LISTUSER resource in
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 161 of 179
Command Authorities required for use
the FACILITY class and the user does not have the SPECIAL,
AUDITOR, ROAUDIT, or OPERATIONS attribute.
◦ The caller has READ access to an appropriate resource
(IRR.LU.OWNER.owner or IRR.LU.TREE.owner) in the FACILITY
class, and both of the following conditions are also true:
▪ The user does not have the SPECIAL, AUDITOR, ROAUDIT,
or OPERATIONS attribute.
▪ The caller is not excluded from listing the user by the IR-
R.LU.EXCLUDE.excluded-user resource in the FACILITY
class.
For listing other segments of a user profile:
• SPECIAL, or
• AUDITOR, or
• ROAUDIT, or
• READ authority to the desired field within the segment through field-
level access checking
Other:
• If the caller has the group-SPECIAL or group-AUDITOR attribute and
the installation has assigned security levels and security categories to
user profiles, the caller must have the following to be able to display
the RACF segment of a user’s profile:
◦ A security level equal to, or greater than, that in the user profile
the caller is trying to display
◦ All security categories contained in the user profile the caller is
trying to display are contained in the caller’s own user profile.
• The value of the UAUDIT/NOUAUDIT operand is only listed if the au-
thorization is given by the AUDITOR, ROAUDIT or group-AUDITOR
authorities.
PASSWORD {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-14} General:
• To change a user’s password or password phrase or change interval:
◦ The caller is the user himself, or
◦ SPECIAL, or
◦ the user’s profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has group-SPECIAL
• To reset another user’s password to the default value:
◦ The caller is the owner of the user’s profile
◦ SPECIAL, or
◦ the user’s profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has group-SPECIAL
PERMIT {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-15} General:
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Command Authorities required for use
• SPECIAL, or
• The profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller has the
group-SPECIAL attribute, or
• The caller is the owner of the resource, or
• For a discrete profile: the caller has ALTER authority (either via the
standard access list, or via group access or via UACC)
• For profiles in the DATASET class: the high-level qualifier of the pro-
file name (or the qualifier supplied by the naming conventions
routine ) is the caller’s user ID.
• For profiles in the FILE or DIRECTRY class: the second qualifier of
the profile name is the caller’s user ID. (Note: the FILE and DIREC-
TRY classes apply only in z/VM systems, and will not be considered
in this evaluation even though the classes exist in RACF for z/OS.)
PHRASE See PASSWORD
RACDCERT See separate table
RACMAP {SM.3::SM.3-R13-RACFEAL5-16} General:
• SPECIAL, or
• Sufficient authority to the IRR.IDIDMAP.function resource in
the FACILITY class, where function is MAP, DELMAP, QUERY,
or LISTMAP. READ authority is required for the caller to cre-
ate, delete, or list a distributed identity filter for his own
RACF user ID. UPDATE authority is required for the caller to
create, delete, or list a distributed identity filter for another
RACF user ID.
RACPRIV {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-17} General:
• READ access to the profile IRR.WRITEDOWN.BYUSER in the FA-
CILITY class.
RALTER {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-18} General (with the exception of the GLOB-
ALAUDIT parameter):
• SPECIAL, or
• The profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller has the
group-SPECIAL attribute, or
• The caller is the owner of the profile, or
• For a discrete profile: the caller has ALTER authority (either via the
standard access list, or via group access or via UACC)
• For profiles in the FILE or DIRECTRY class: the second qualifier of
the profile name is the caller’s user ID. (Note: the FILE and DIREC-
TRY classes apply only in z/VM systems, and will not be considered
in this evaluation even though the classes exist in RACF for z/OS.)
• To assign a security category to a profile, or to delete a category from
a profile, the caller must have the SPECIAL attribute, or the category
must be in the caller’s user profile.
• To assign a security level to a profile, or to delete a security level from
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Command Authorities required for use
a profile, the caller must have the SPECIAL attribute, or, in his own
profile, a security level that is equal to or greater than the security
level he is assigning or deleting.
• To assign a security label, SPECIAL, or when SETROPTS SECLA-
BELCONTROL is not active, the caller must have READ access to
the security label profile.
Special parameter authorization:
• For defining a delegated resource (by specifying the RACF-DELE-
GATED string in the APPLDATA of the profile), when the profile has a
SECLABEL and SETR SECLBELCONTROL is active, SPECIAL
• For modifying information in segments other than the base segment:
◦ SPECIAL, or
◦ UPDATE Access allowed by field-level access control for the
fields to be modified
• For use of the GLOBALAUDIT parameter:
◦ AUDITOR, or
◦ The profile is within the scope of a group for which the caller has
the group-AUDITOR attribute.
• For use of the ADDMEM parameter:
◦ For classes other than SECLABEL, PROGRAM, SECDATA,
GLOBAL, RACFVARS, and NODES, if the member resources are
already RACF-protected by a member class profile or as a mem-
ber of a profile in the same grouping class, one of the following
must be true:
▪ The caller has ALTER access authority to the member, or
▪ The caller is the owner of the member resource, or
▪ The member resource is within the scope of a group in which
the caller has the group-SPECIAL attribute, or
▪ The caller has the SPECIAL attribute.
◦ For classes other than SECLABEL, PROGRAM, SECDATA,
GLOBAL, RACFVARS, and NODES, if the member resources are
not RACF-protected (that is, there is no profile defined for that
member), one of the following must be true:
▪ The caller has CLAUTH authority to define resources in the
member resource class.
▪ The caller has the SPECIAL attribute.
◦ To add a member to a profile in the RACFVARS or NODES class,
one of the following must be true:
▪ The caller has CLAUTH authority to define resources in the
specified class
▪ The caller has the SPECIAL attribute.
▪ The caller is the owner of the profile indicated by profile-
name.
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Command Authorities required for use
▪ The caller has ALTER access authority to the profile indicated
by profile-name.
◦ To add a member to a profile in the PROGRAM or SECDATA
class, one of the following must be true:
▪ You have CLAUTH authority to define resources in the speci-
fied class (for example, PROGRAM or SECDATA).
▪ You have the SPECIAL attribute.
◦ To add a member to a profile in the GLOBAL class (other than the
GLOBAL DATASET, GLOBAL DIRECTRY, or GLOBAL FILE pro-
file)
▪ If the profile resource-name is already RACF-protected by a
profile in class class-name:
• ALTER access authority to the profile resource-name in
class class-name, or
• The caller is the OWNER of the profile resource-name, or
• The profile resource-name in class class-name is within
the scope of a group in which the caller has the group-
special attribute, or
• The caller has the SPECIAL attribute.
▪ If the profile resource-name is not already RACF-protected
(that is, there is no profile defined for that member in class
class-name):
• The caller has CLAUTH authority to define resources in
the class class-name, or
• The caller has the SPECIAL attribute.
◦ To add a member to the GLOBAL DATASET profile, one of the
following must be true:
▪ The caller is the owner of the DATASET profile in the
GLOBAL class.
▪ The member is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has the group-SPECIAL attribute.
▪ The caller has the SPECIAL attribute.
◦ To add a member to the GLOBAL DIRECTRY or GLOBAL FILE
profile, the caller must have the SPECIAL attribute. (Note: the
FILE and DIRECTRY classes apply only in z/VM systems, and
will not be considered in this evaluation even though the classes
exist in RACF for z/OS.)
• For use of the DELMEM operand:
◦ If class-name is specified as GLOBAL, the rules for member are
the same as given for ADDMEM. If class-name is specified as
SECDATA, member should be a valid SECLEVEL name or cate-
gory name.
• For use of the ADDVOL operand:
◦ SPECIAL, or
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 165 of 179
Command Authorities required for use
◦ CLAUTH attribute for the TAPEVOL resource class in addition to
the other authorization requirements for using the RALTER com-
mand.
• For use of the GLOBALAUDIT operand:
◦ AUDITOR, or
◦ The resource profile must be within the scope of a group in which
the caller has the group-AUDITOR attribute.
RACPRMCK {SM.3::SM.3-V2R3-RACFEAL5-2} None.
RDEFINE {SM.3::SM.3-V2R3-RACFEAL5-19} General (with the exception of the GLOB-
ALAUDIT parameter):
• SPECIAL, or
• If the caller has CLAUTH authority for the GLOBAL class, and group-
SPECIAL authority in a group, he can add members whose high-level
qualifier is the group name or a user ID in the scope of the group.
This applies only to classes that are sensitive to high-level qualifiers,
such as DATASET.
• If the name to be defined is not already defined to RACF as a mem-
ber of a resource group and the caller is defining a profile in a normal
(non-member, non-grouping) class, a member class, or a member of
a grouping class, he must have CLAUTH authority for the specified
class.
• If the resource to be defined is a discrete name already defined to
RACF as a member of a resource group, the caller can define it as a
resource to RACF if he has ALTER authority, or if the resource group
profile is within the scope of a group in which he has the group-SPE-
CIAL attribute, or if he is the owner of the resource group profile. If
authority conflicts arise because the resource is a member of more
than one group and the user’s authority in those groups differs, RACF
resolves the conflict by using the least restrictive authority.
• If the caller defines a profile in the FILE or DIRECTRY class, one of
the following must be true:
◦ The second qualifier of the profile name must match the caller’s
user ID
◦ The caller has the SPECIAL attribute
◦ The profile name must be within the scope of a group in which
the caller has the group-SPECIAL attribute.
(Note: the FILE and DIRECTRY classes apply only in z/VM sys-
tems, and will not be considered in this evaluation even though
the classes exist in RACF for z/OS.)
• If the caller does not have the SPECIAL attribute and the
SETROPTS GENERICOWNER option is in effect, and if an ex-
isting generic profile protects the profile name the caller is
defining, he needs to own the less specific profile. GENERI-
COWNER does not apply to the PROGRAM class. If the EN-
HANCEDGENERICOWNER option is in effect, the caller is pre-
vented from the creation of a more specific profile if the
more specific profile is created in the grouping class and is
specified on the ADDMEM operand..
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Command Authorities required for use
• To assign a security category to a profile, the caller must have the
category in his user profile.
• To assign a security level to a profile, the caller’s own profile must
have a security level that is equal to or greater than the security level
he is defining.
• To define segments other than the base segment, the caller must
have the SPECIAL attribute or he must be permitted to do so through
field-level access checking.
Other:
• Only a SPECIAL user can define a delegated resource (by specifying
the RACF-DELEGATED string in the APPLDATA of the profile protect-
ing the resource) when the resource has a SECLABEL and
SETROPTS SECLABELCONTROL is in effect.
• For Model profiles: To specify a model profile (using, as required,
FROM, FCLASS, FGENERIC, and FVOLUME), the caller must have
sufficient authority over the model profile (the from profile). RACF
makes the following checks until one of the conditions is met:
◦ The caller has the SPECIAL attribute.
◦ The from profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has the group-SPECIAL attribute.
◦ The caller the owner of the from profile.
◦ If the FCLASS operand is DATASET, the high-level qualifier of the
profile name (or the qualifier supplied by the naming conventions
routine) is the caller’s user ID.
◦ For a discrete profile, the caller is on the access list in the from
profile with ALTER authority.
◦ For a discrete profile, the caller’s current connect group (or, if list-
of-groups checking is active, any group to which the caller is con-
nected) is in the access list in the from profile with ALTER author-
ity.
◦ For a discrete profile, the universal access authority (UACC) is
ALTER.
Special parameter authorization:
• For use of the ADDMEM operand: In addition to the authority needed
to issue the RDEFINE command, the caller needs one of the follow-
ing authorities to add members using the RDEFINE command:
◦ See the requirements specified for the use of the ADDMEM oper-
and for the RALTER command.
RDELETE {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-20} General:
• SPECIAL, or
• The profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller has the
group-SPECIAL attribute, or
• The caller is the owner of the profile, or
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 167 of 179
Command Authorities required for use
• For a discrete profile: the caller has ALTER authority (either via the
standard access list, or via group access or via UACC)
• For profiles in the FILE or DIRECTRY class: the second qualifier of
the profile name is the caller’s user ID. (Note: the FILE and DIREC-
TRY classes apply only in z/VM systems, and will not be considered
in this evaluation even though the classes exist in RACF for z/OS.)
REMOVE {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-21} General:
• SPECIAL, or
• The profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller has the
group-SPECIAL attribute, or
• The caller is the owner of the group, or
• The caller has JOIN or CONNECT authority in the group.
RESTART None (can be used an operator command only. RACF allows restricting the
use of specific operator commands to defined users).
RLIST {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-V2R2-22} General:
• SPECIAL, or
• The resource profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has the group-SPECIAL attribute, or
• OPERATIONS, or
• The resource profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has the group-OPERATIONS attribute, or
• AUDITOR, or
• ROAUDIT, or
• The resource profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller
has the group-AUDITOR attribute, or
• The caller is the owner of the resource.
• If the profile is in the FILE or DIRECTRY class and the second quali-
fier of the profile name is the caller’s user ID. (Note: the FILE and DI-
RECTRY classes apply only in z/VM systems, and will not be consid-
ered in this evaluation even though the classes exist in RACF for z/
OS.)
• To list the contents of segments other than the base segment, the
caller must have the SPECIAL, AUDITOR, or ROAUDIT attribute or
the installation must permit the caller to do so through field-level ac-
cess checking.
• If the caller is on the access list for the resource and has at least
READ authority. If you specify ALL, RACF lists only information perti-
nent to the caller’s user ID.
• If the caller’s current connect group (or, if list-of-groups checking is
active, any group to which the caller is connected) is in the access list
and has at least READ authority.
• The universal access authority of the resource is at least READ.
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Command Authorities required for use
• The caller has at least read access for the profile name from the
GLOBAL ENTRY TABLE (if this table contains an entry for the pro-
file).
Other:
• The caller will see the type of access attempts, as specified by the
GLOBALAUDIT operand, only if he has the AUDITOR or ROAUDIT
attribute or if the resource profile is within the scope of a group in
which he has the group-AUDITOR attribute.
{SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-V2R2-22-2} To see the access list for a
resource with the AUTHUSER operand, the level of authority is
checked for each resource. The level of authority must be such that
one of the following conditions is met:
• the caller has the SPECIAL attribute.
• The resource profile is within the scope of a group in which
the caller has the group-SPECIAL attribute.
• The caller has the OPERATIONS attribute.
• The resource profile is within the scope of a group in which
the caller has the group-OPERATIONS attribute.
• The caller is the owner of the resource.
• The caller has the AUDITOR or ROAUDIT attribute.
• The resource profile is within the scope of a group in which
the caller has the group-AUDITOR attribute.
• The caller has alter access for the profile name from the
GLOBAL ENTRY TABLE (if this table contains an entry for the
profile).
• If the profile is in the FILE or DIRECTRY class, the second
qualifier of the profile name is the caller's user ID.
• For a discrete profile, the caller is on the access list for the re-
source and has ALTER authority. (If the caller has any other
level of authority, you cannot use the operand.)
• For a discrete profile, the caller's current connect group (or, if
list-of-groups checking is active, any group to which the caller
is connected) is in the access list and has ALTER authority.
• For a discrete profile, the universal access authority of the re-
source is ALTER.
RVARY General: none
{SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-32} Other :
• No special authority is needed to issue the RVARY command. How-
ever, the operator (at the operator console or security console) must
approve a change in RACF status or the RACF data sets - or a
change in the operational mode if RACF is enabled for sysplex com-
munication - before RACF allows the command to complete.
• If the RVARY command changes RACF or database status (ACTIVE/
INACTIVE), RACF issues an informational message and the operator
is required to enter the password defined by RVARYPW STATUS(sta-
tus-pw) to authorize the change. If the RVARY command switches the
RACF data sets (SWITCH) or changes the RACF operating mode
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 169 of 179
Command Authorities required for use
(DATASHARE/NODATASHARE), RACF issues an informational mes-
sage and the operator is required to enter the password defined by
RVARYPW SWITCH(switch-pw). When RVARY is issued as a RACF
operator command from a console with master authority, the default
password YES is also accepted for RVARY ACTIVE, RVARY NO-
DATASHARE or RVARY SWITCH commands.
SEARCH {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-V2R2-23} General:
• SPECIAL, or
• AUDITOR, or
• ROAUDIT, or
• The profile is within the scope of a group in which the caller has the
group-SPECIAL or group-AUDITOR attribute, or
• If the profile is for a DASD data set, the high-level qualifier of the data
set name (or the qualifier supplied by the naming convention table) is
the caller’s user ID, or
• If the profile is in the FILE or DIRECTRY class, the second qualifier of
the profile name is the caller’s user ID (note: the FILE and DIREC-
TRY classes apply only in z/VM systems, and will not be considered
in this evaluation even though the classes exist in RACF for z/OS.),
or
• The caller is on the access list for the profile and has at least READ
authority, or
• The caller’s current connect group (or, if list-of-groups checking is ac-
tive, any group to which the caller is connected) is on the access list
and has at least READ authority, or
• The caller has the OPERATIONS attribute, or the profile is within the
scope of a group in which the caller has the group-OPERATIONS at-
tribute, and the class is DATASET or a general resource class that
specifies OPER=YES in the static class descriptor table or OPERA-
TIONS(YES) in the dynamic class descriptor table, or
• The universal access authority is at least READ (or GLOBAL when
listing discrete profiles).
Special parameter authorization:
• In order to use the USER operand, one of the following must be true:
◦ SPECIAL, or
◦ AUDITOR, or
◦ ROAUDIT, or
◦ The caller is the owner of the user profile, or
◦ The parameter entered for the USER operand is the caller’s user
ID
◦ The caller has group-SPECIAL or group-AUDITOR authority in a
group that owns the user profile.
Other:
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Command Authorities required for use
• If the SECLABEL class is active, the caller’s current security label
must dominate the security label of the DASD data set or general re-
source profile.
• No authorization is required to the user or group profiles that are
listed when the UID or GID keyword is specified.
• Inactive SECLABEL profiles and profiles that contain inactive security
labels may not be listed if SETROPTS SECLBYSYSTEM is active be-
cause only users with SPECIAL, AUDITOR, or ROAUDIT authority
are allowed to view inactive security labels.
SET {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-26} None (can be used an operator command
only. RACF allows restricting the use of specific operator commands to de-
fined users).
SETROPTS {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-V2R2-24} General:
• SPECIAL, for all operands except:
◦ APPLAUDIT | NOAPPLAUDIT
◦ AUDIT | NOAUDIT
◦ CMDVIOL | NOCMDVIOL
◦ LOGOPTIONS
◦ OPERAUDIT | NOOPERAUDIT
◦ SAUDIT | NOSAUDIT
◦ SECLABELAUDIT | NOSECLABELAUDIT
◦ SECLEVELAUDIT | NOSECLEVELAUDIT
• AUDITOR, for use of the following operands:
◦ APPLAUDIT | NOAPPLAUDIT
◦ AUDIT | NOAUDIT
◦ CMDVIOL | NOCMDVIOL
◦ LOGOPTIONS
◦ OPERAUDIT | NOOPERAUDIT
◦ SAUDIT | NOSAUDIT
◦ SECLABELAUDIT | NOSECLABELAUDIT
◦ SECLEVELAUDIT | NOSECLEVELAUDIT
Special parameter authorization:
• For using the LIST operand: SPECIAL, AUDITOR, or ROAUDIT
Other:
In some situations, a caller can use SETROPTS even if he does not have the
SPECIAL or AUDITOR attributes. These situations are:
• The LIST operand can be used if the caller has the group-SPECIAL
or group-AUDITOR attribute in the current connect group or (if GR-
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 171 of 179
Command Authorities required for use
PLIST is active) in any group that the caller is connected to.
• The REFRESH operand together with GENERIC can be used if the
caller has the group-SPECIAL, AUDITOR, group-AUDITOR, OPERA-
TIONS, group-OPERATIONS attribute, or CLAUTH authority for the
classes specified.
• The REFRESH operand together with GLOBAL can be used if the
caller has the OPERATIONS attribute or CLAUTH authority for the
classes specified.
• The REFRESH operand together with RACLIST can be used if the
caller has CLAUTH authority to the specified class.
• The REFRESH operand together with WHEN(PROGRAM) can be
used if the caller has CLAUTH authority for the program class or the
OPERATIONS attribute.
SIGNOFF {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-27} None (can be used an operator command
only. RACF allows restricting the use of specific operator commands to de-
fined users).
STOP {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-28} None (can be used an operator command
only. RACF allows restricting the use of specific operator commands to de-
fined users).
TARGET {SM.3::SM.3-R12-RACFEAL5-29} None (can be used an operator command
only. RACF allows restricting the use of specific operator commands to de-
fined users).
Table 76: RACF command authorizations
8.4.3.3 Management of z/OS UNIX file system objects and IPC objects
Access permissions to z/OS UNIX file system objects and IPC objects are managed by functions of
the RACF callable services. For example the function R_setfacl can be used to manage the access
control lists of UNIX file system objects and the function R_IPC_ctl can be used to manage access
rights to IPC objects and the function R_chmod can be used to change the permission bits
{SM.3::SM.3.35}. Default values for IPC access control can not be managed.
An application executing in supervisor state may change the group IDs of a subject representing a
user with the R_setegid, R_setgid, or R_exec callable services according to the following rules:
• R_setegid: If the high-order bit of the input GID is on, the real, effective, and saved GIDs are
changed for the current process.
• R_setegid: If the high-order bit of the input GID is off and if the user is the superuser or if the
input GID is equal to the real or saved GID of the calling process, the effective GID of the
process is changed to the input GID. The real and saved GIDs are not changed.
• R_setgid: If the calling process is a superuser, the real, saved, and effective GIDs are
changed. If the calling process is not a superuser but the input GID is equal to the real or
saved GID, the effective GID of the process is changed. If neither condition is met, the GIDs
of the process are not changed.
• R_exec: sets the effective and saved UNIX group identifier to the specified values (if the call
requested a change of the GID)
• The new GID must be known to RACF.
An application executing in supervisor state may change the user IDs of a subject representing a user
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with the R_seteuid, R_setuid, or R_exec callable services according to the following rules.
• R_seteuid: If the high-order bit of the input UID is on, the real, effective, and saved UIDs are
changed for the current process.
• R_seteuid: If the high-order bit of the input z/OS UNIX user identifier (UID) is off and if the
user is the superuser or if the input UID is equal to the real or saved UID of the calling
process, the effective UID of the process is changed to the input UID. The real and saved
UIDs are not changed.
• R_setuid: If the calling process is a superuser, the real, saved, and effective z/OS UNIX user
identifiers (UIDs) are changed. If the calling process is not a superuser, but the input UID is
equal to the real or saved UID, the effective UID of the process is changed. If neither
condition is met, the UIDs of the process are not changed.
• R_exec: sets the effective and saved UNIX user identifier to the specified values (if the call
requested a change of the UID)..
8.5 Auditing (AU)
8.5.1 Generation of audit records
The TOE provides a general facility to collect data required for auditing and accounting services,
which the TOE forwards to a component of z/OS for recording. This component of the TOE
environment, the System Management Facilities (SMF), collects and records system and job-related
information that an installation can use for such tasks as the following:
· Billing users
· Reporting reliability
· Analyzing the configuration
· Scheduling jobs
· Summarizing direct access volume activity
· Evaluating data set activity
· Profiling system resource use
· Maintaining system security
This component is used by the TOE to store and manage the security-related auditing information the
TOE has generated as required by FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2.
Each SMF record consists of a standard header which contains (among other information) the type of
the record and the time the record was produced {AU.1::AU.1.1}. The standard header is produced by
the calls to the SMFWTM or SMFEWTM services or the smf_record UNIX System Services callable
service. Especially the time and date are filled in by SMF and not by the caller.
One record type is usually reserved for a whole class of events where the individual events are
identified by the record subtype or event code in the header of the SMF record.
RACF as the central access control function has three SMF record types reserved for its use (80, 81,
83), with record type number 80 being the most important one. The information recorded in this
record type contains (among other non security related information):
· The record type
· Time stamp (time and date) (filled in by the SMF component of z/OS)
· System identification
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 173 of 179
· Event code and qualifier
· User identification
· Group name
· Authorities used to successfully execute commands or access resources
· Reasons for logging
· Command processing error flag
· Foreground user terminal ID or other port-of-entry information
· Job log number (job name, entry time, and date)
· RACF version, release, and modification number
· SECLABEL of user (relevant in Labeled Security Mode only)
Each record contains further data specific to the event code and qualifier {AU.1::AU.1.3}.
The administrator can configure RACF and other elements of the TOE to generate audit records for
all events listed in Table 6, Auditable Events {AU.1::AU.1-R9-MULTI-1}.
z/OS provides the capability to search the audit trail for specific events and relate them such that
events related to a specific user, specific user/job sensitivity label (Labeled Security Mode) or specific
object sensitivity label ( Labeled Security Mode) can be extracted from the audit trail {AU.1::AU.1.4}.
Tools exist that allow user with access to the audit trail data to search the audit trail for specific
events, for audit events related to specific jobs / users and other criteria {AU.1::AU.1.5}. Tools exist
that transfer the audit data into human readable format {AU.1::AU.1.6}.
RACF also allows LDAP clients (typically servers outside of the TOE, residing on the network) that
have authenticated using an ICTX-style DN to request RACF to generate audit records to record
events that have occurred externally to the TOE. The requester provides information about the user
involved with the event, the kind of event, and the resource name and resource class name (any
class except DATASET) associated with the event.
If an application has created an ACEE and specified ICTX= on the RACROUTE REQUEST=VERIFY
to associate a X.500-format distributed identity with the RACF user's ACEE, RACF will include that
distributed identity in the SMF records that it creates. {AU.1::AU.1-R12-RACF-1}
8.5.2 Event Notifications generated by RACF
RACF can send an ENF type 62 signal to listeners when a SETROPTS RACLIST command affects
in-storage profiles used for authorization checking. RACF sends a signal when a SETROPTS
RACLIST, SETROPTS NORACLIST, or SETROPTS RACLIST REFRESH command is issued for a
class, activating, deactivating, or updating the profiles. Signals are sent for a class in the static class
descriptor table if SIGNAL=YES was specified on the ICHERCDE macro that defined the class.
Signals are sent for a class in the dynamic class descriptor table if SIGNAL(YES) was specified on
the CDTINFO keyword of the RDEFINE or RALTER command that defined the class.{SM.3::SM.3-
R12-RACFEAL5-33}
8.5.3 Audit configuration and management
Within the system configuration it needs to be decided, which SMF records shall be generated by
z/OS. Three record types (type 80, 81, and 83) are dedicated to RACF and are the most important
ones for security. Which events are actually recorded with those records can be configured by a user
with the AUDITOR attribute in his RACF user profile {AU.3::AU.3.1}. In addition record type 30 is
generated for a number of security related events.
Because a set of mandatory events is always audited, not all audit records (such as unauthorized
attempts to access the system or changes to the status of the RACF database) can be configured.
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In addition, resource profiles can define which events related to this resource are audited
{AU.3::AU.3.2}. The owner of a resource profile as well as a user in the AUDITOR role are able to
change the entries related to auditing within the resource profile {AU.3::AU.3.3}.
The system can be configured to send certain audit messages to the security console to immediately
alert operators of detected policy violations {AU.3::AU.3.4}.
Users that have the ROAUDIT attribute can read the audit trail and obtain audit related information
from RACF profiles, but can not manage audit policy related aspects {AU.3::AU-V2R2-1}.
RACF uses the interfaces defined by the SMF component of z/OS to have SMF finalize and store the
audit records. SMF adds a standard header to the audit record, which contains the time and date the
record was produced.
The RACF SMF data unload utility (IRRADU00) can be used to create a sequential file from the
security relevant audit events stored in the SMF audit trail. The resulting sequential file can either be
viewed directly or used for further processing like with the utility DFSORT (which is part of the TOE
environment), which can be used to create reports by selecting specific records and further structure
the reports.
8.6 RACF support for program signing and verification (SP)
RACF provides the R_PgmSignVer callable service to support the signing and signature verification
of z/OS program objects. The function can be used for both signing a program object and verifying
the signature of a program object. The function is intended to be used by the z/OS program binder
(for signing program objects) and the z/OS loader (to verify the signature of a program object). Callers
of this service need to have sufficient authority to use the key ring, which is either specified in the
parameter list or using the APPLDATA field of FACILITY class profile
IRR.PROGRAM.SIGNATURE.VERIFICATION) and the private key contained within it as determined
by the R_datalib RACF callable service. The signature will be generated using SHA256 as the hash
function and RSA as the public key encryption algorithm. The maximum RSA key size is 4096 bit.
{SP.4::SP.4-R12-RACF-2} A key ring used for program signing needs to contain all of the following
certificate objects:
• An RSA private key to apply the digital signature.
• The X.509 certificate, called a code-signing certificate, that corresponds to the RSA private
key.
• Each certificate-authority (CA) certificate (up to and including the root CA certificate) in the
certificate chain of the code-signing certificate.
The code-signing certificate and each CA certificate in the chain must be signed using one of the
following signature algorithms:
• sha256WithRSAEncryption
• sha1WithRSAEncryption
The code-signing certificate must have code-signing capability in one of the following ways:
• Either the certificate has no KeyUsage extension, or the certificate has a KeyUsage extension
with at least the digitalSignature and nonRepudiation indicators enabled.
Each CA certificate in the chain must have certificate-signing capability in both of the following ways:
• Either the certificate has no BasicConstraints extension, or the certificate has a
BasicConstraints extension with the cA indicator enabled.
• Either the certificate has no KeyUsage extension, or the certificate has a KeyUsage extension
with at least the keyCertSign indicator enabled.
© Copyright IBM Corp. 2019 Page 175 of 179
{SP.4::SP.4-R12-RACF-1}The Security Administrator authorizes users to perform program signing by
(a) creating FACILITY class profiles of the form IRR.PROGRAM.SIGNING.groupname.userid or
IRR.PROGRAM.SIGNING.userid or IRR.PROGRAM.SIGNING.groupname or
IRR.PROGRAM.SIGNING (listed here in priority order, and where groupname is the user's
current connect group) and
(b) providing APPLDATA information in that profile that specifies a hashing algorithm to use and
the key ring (both owning userid and key-ring-name) that contains the code signing digital
certificate to use, and
(c) authorizing the user to access that key ring.
{SP.4::SP.4-R12-RACF-3}The Security Administrator enables program signature verification by:
• Defining the FACILITY class profile IRR.PROGRAM.SIGNATURE.VERIFICATION and
specifying in the APPLDATA the owning user ID and key-ring name of the key ring that holds
the CA certificates associated with the various code signing certificates, including the IBM-
supplied certificate with the label 'STG Code Signing CA – G2'.
• Defining a PROGRAM profile for IRRPVERS, e. g.
RDEFINE PROGRAM IRRPVERS ADDMEM('SYS1.SIEALNKE'//NOPADCHK) UACC(READ)
SIGVER(SIGREQUIRED(YES) FAILLOAD(ANYBAD) SIGAUDIT(ANYBAD))
• Defining PROGRAM profiles to protect each signed program that the administrator wants
verified during use, and specifying in that profile's SIGVER segment various options that tell
RACF how to process the verification for the protected programs:
• SIGREQUIRED (YES | NO):
• YES indicates that the program must have a digital signature;
• NO indicates that it might have one, but is not required to have one.
• FAILLOAD( ANYBAD | BADSIGONLY | NEVER ):
• ANYBAD indicates that if any failures occur during program signature
verification (including administrative setup errors such as missing or
incorrectly defined keyrings, signatures by untrusted signers, or incorrect or
missing signatures) the system should disallow use of the program.
• BADSIGONLY indicates that if the signature itself is incorrect or missing the
system should disallow use of the program.
• NEVER (the default) indicates that a problem with signature verification
should not prevent use of the program.
• SIGAUDIT (ALL | SUCCESS | ANYBAD | BADSIGONLY | NONE):
• ALL indicates that RACF should audit the result of all signature verification
operations using an SMF type 80 audit record.
• SUCCESS indicates that RACF should audit any successful signature
verification operations.
• ANYBAD indicates that RACF should audit any failing signature verification
operation.
• BADSIGONLY indicates that RACF should audit signature verification
operations that fail due to an incorrect or missing signature.
• NONE indicates that RACF should not audit any program verification
operations.
• Refreshing the PROGRAM profiles using SETR WHEN(PROGRAM) REFRESH, and running
program IRRVERLD. (Note: IRRVERLD must be run at least once per IPL per system.)
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9. TOE Assurance Measures
The assurance measures provided by the developer to meet the security assurance requirements for
the TOE are based on the developer action elements and the requirements on content and
presentation of evidence elements defined for the individual assurance requirements in CC Part 3:
SAR Assurance Measure
ADV_ARC.1 The architecture is described in [ZARCH], which describes the protection
functionality provided by the underlying hardware and firmware, in [z/OS
Concepts], which describes the concepts of z/OS and in [ABC-V6], which
describes how RACF is integrated in z/OS. Further details are described in a
dedicated RACF architecture document. The structure of the RACF database is
described as part of the TOE design.
ADV_FSP.5 The functional specification of RACF consists of all the interfaces that are
callable by external entities. This includes programming interfaces as well as
RACF commands and utilities and also includes configuration data RACF reads
from storage managed by z/OS (e. g. the RACF related members of
SYS1.PARMLIB). Interfaces are described partly in external documents, partly in
design documents (for interfaces intended to be used IBM internally only). The
description of those interfaces uses a semi-formal style.
ADV_IMP.1 IBM provides access to the source code for the evaluation team in the IBM
environment. The implementation representation includes all modules that
comprise the TSF.
ADV_INT.2 IBM provides detailed design information showing the internal structure of the
entire TSF.
ADV_TDS.4 A high-level design of the security functions of RACF is provided which
describes the TOE design at the subsystem level. This document provides an
overview of the implementation of the security functions within the subsystems of
RACF and points to other existing documents for further details where
appropriate.
In addition IBM provides dedicated low-level design documentation for the whole
TOE. Part of this design documentation has been extracted from the source
code, which contains structured module headers with detailed interface and
design information for all source code modules of RACF as well as a generalized
description of the control flow within each module. A semi-formal description of
the subsystems exists.
The correspondence information is provided in the form of a spreadsheet
showing the correspondence between the functional specification and the TOE
design.
AGD_OPE.1 A number of documents exist that provide operational guidance for the user and
the system administrators. This includes guides for the management of RACF.
Especially for the management of RACF a System Administrator Guide and an
Auditor Guide exists, that describes and explains in detail the administration
commands and parameters.
AGD_PRE.1 Guidance is provided in a number of documents related to the individual
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SAR Assurance Measure
components of RACF describing the configuration parameter required to
configure the TOE to prepare for a secure operation.
ALC_CMC.4 All configuration management of z/OS source code uses automated CM
systems. This has been analyzed as part of the z/OS evaluation and as far as
possible the results of the analysis performed for z/OS will be reused.
ALS_CMS.5 RACF is developed at the IBM Poughkeepsie site each using a well defined and
highly automated configuration management system. The site has a detailed
description of how the configuration management for the z/OS parts maintained
at the site is performed.
Source code, generated binaries, documentation, test plan, test cases, test
results, and development tools are all maintained under configuration
management.
ALC_DEL.1 RACF is delivered together with z/OS through sales channels controlled by IBM.
ALC_DVS.1 IBM has a set of guidance documents for physical, logical and procedural
security measures that all IBM facilities have to use in their specific
implementation of a Security Plan. Each site then has their specific Site Security
Plan as a site specific instantiation of those global guidelines.
Several sites of IBM (including the site in Poughkeepsie) have been subject to
an analysis of the developer security measures in other evaluations. Where
possible this evaluation will re-use the results of those evaluations.
ALC_FLR.3 RACF follows the development practices for z/OS and the z/OS Development
within IBM has a well-defined system for reporting flaws and tracing the status of
the corrective actions for those flaws. In addition, well-defined procedures exist
for IBM’s z/OS clients to report security problems via the IBM Support Center,
and for IBM to distribute security fixes to clients, and clients can register with
IBM to receive special notification of security flaws and fixes.
ALC_LCD.1 IBM’s Integrated Product Development (IPD) fulfils the requirements for the
development life cycle model and the life cycle related processes.
ALC_TAT.2 The tools used in the development process and product generation are
documented with their behavior, options and usage assumptions.
The developer provides a description of the implementation standards applied.
ATE_COV.2 IBM has detailed test plans to test the functions of z/OS. Those test plans
include an analysis of the test coverage, an analysis of the functional interfaces
tested and an analysis of the testing against the high level design.
ATE_DPT.3 Testing of internal interfaces is defined and described in the test plan documents
and the test case descriptions.
ATE_FUN.1 Testing has been performed on the platforms that are defined in the Security
Target. Test results are documented such that the tests can be repeated.
ATE_IND.2 All the required resources to perform their own tests will be provided to the
evaluation facility to perform their test. The evaluation facility will perform and
document the tests they have created and performed as part of the evaluation
technical report for testing. Due to the size of the systems the evaluator tests will
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SAR Assurance Measure
be performed at the appropriate IBM development sites.
AVA_VAN.4 IBM has its own team that performs vulnerability analysis and penetration testing
for z/OS, which also covers RACF. This team has a long term experience with
potential security problems within z/OS and RACF and is also integrated in the
design reviews. The developer vulnerability analysis will report the activities and
findings of this team.
The evaluator will perform a methodical vulnerability analysis.
End of document
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