BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019
for
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.10
V05.00
from
Intellic GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019 (*)
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.10
V05.00
from Intellic GmbH
PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version
1.0, 9 May 2017, BSI-CC-PP-0094-2017
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations , by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 25 September 2019
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Branch
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................17
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................17
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................17
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................17
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................19
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................22
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................23
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.10, V05.00 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.10, V05.00 was conducted by
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on
20. September 2019. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Intellic GmbH.
The product was developed by: Intellic GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on
25 September 2019 is valid until 24.09.2024. Validity can be renewed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.10, V05.00 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Intellic GmbH
Fernitzerstraße 5
A-8071 Hausmannstätten
Österreich
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of evaluation (TOE) is the product “EFAS-4.10 digital tachograph with SW
Version 05.00 as developed by intellic Germany GmbH, based on INFINEON M7892 G12"
(EFAS-4.10 for short in the following) which is a Vehicle Unit (VU for short) in the sense of
Annex 1 C of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016
[EU]. It is intended to be installed in road transport vehicles and will be used within the
Tachograph System to store, display, print and output data related to driver activities in
accordance with the requirements of [EU].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 9 May 2017, BSI-
CC-PP-0094-2017 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.]
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.ACS Security Attribute Based Access Control
SF.SECAUDIT Audit
SF.EX_CONF Confidentiality of Data Exchange
SF.EX_INT Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange
SF.GEN_SKEYS Generation of Session Keys
SF.GEN_DIGSIG Generation of Digital Signatures optionally with
Encryption
SF.VER_DIGSIG Verification of Digital Signatures optionally with
Decryption
SF.DATA_INT Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
SF.IA_KEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication
SF.INF_PROT Residual Information Protection
SF.FAIL_PROT Failure and Tampering Protection
SF.SELFTEST Self Test
SF.UPDATE VU Software Upgrade
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] , chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.10, V05.00
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
Vehicle Unit EFAS-
4.10 with software
version V05.00
The TOE’s reference
“EFAS-4.10 V05.00” is
shown on the machine
readable label.
The software version
can be displayed or
printed as “05.00”.
The VU is delivered as entire
device (packed together with its
accessories and the Operating
Manual [OM]).
The possible variants of the VU
are a combination of non-
security relevant options as
described below.
2 DOC Operating Manual
[OM]
(“Bedienungsanleitun
g Smart Tachograph
EFAS-4.10”)
German version
document number:
1250-130-SEC-DE01 file
name: 1250-130-SEC-
DE01_BDA_E4_10.pdf
Copyright 2019
The Operating Manual is
delivered in paper form (together
with the VU) or in electronic pdf-
form.
3 DOC Service and
Installation Manual
[SIM] (“Werkstatt-
Handbuch Smart
Tachograph EFAS-
4.10” for workshop
personnel)
German version
document number:
1250-131-SEC-
DE01_WHB_E4_10 file
name: 1250-131-SEC-
DE01_WHB_E4_10.pdf
Copyright 2011-2019
The Service and Installation
Manual is delivered in paper
form or in electronic pdf-form.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery of the TOE from the production facility to the customer which is a distributor or
a workshop is described briefly in the following: At delivery the TOE is completely
assembled and the TOE's case is leaded. The TOE is packed together with its accessories
and the Operating Manual [OM]. The Service and Instruction Manual [SIM] will be
delivered usually in electronic form as pdf-file embedded into a pgp-encrypted file secured
by password via download from the intellic-website portal. The TOE is marked with a
machine readable label which shows the TOE’s reference, the serial number and the
configuration. The serial number is also fixed within the TOE and can be read out from
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019 Certification Report
outside. The firmware of the Security Controller and the Main Controller cannot be
modified anymore except by means of an update procedure based on VU specific and EU
secrets (loaded into the Security Controller during personalisation). The TOE software
version (V05.00) is stored within the Security Controller, can be read out from outside and
is readable on the print outs. The customer orders the TOE from the Intellic GmbH. In case
of an order the customer is informed about the delivery process by fax or by email. The
information about the delivery process contains the serial numbers of the Vehicle Units
sent to the consumer. Furthermore the consumer is informed that he has to compare the
serial numbers after receipt.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The data to be measured (the physical data measurement is performed by the motion
sensor which is not part of this TOE) and recorded and then to be checked by control
authorities must be available and reflect fully and accurately the activities of controlled
drivers and vehicles in terms of driving, work, availability and rest periods and in terms of
vehicle speed.
It concretely means that security of the VU aims to protect
a) the data recorded and stored in such a way as to prevent unauthorized access to
and manipulation of the data and detecting any such attempts,
b) the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the motion sensor and the
vehicle unit,
c) the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the recording equipment
and the tachograph cards, and
d) the integrity and authenticity of data downloaded (locally and remotely).
The main security feature stated above is provided by the following major security
services:
a) Identification and authentication of motion sensor und tachograph cards,
b) Access control to functions and stored data,
c) Accountability of users,
d) Audit of events and faults,
e) Object reuse for secret data,
f) Accuracy of recorded and stored data,
g) Reliability of services,
h) Data exchange with motion sensor, tachograph cards and external media
(download function).
‘Identification and Authentication’ as well as ‘data exchange’ directly require
cryptographic support according to [6], sec. 6.1.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
Secure development and manufacturing environment, secure data generation and
cryptographically strong security data, secure transport procedures, secure delivery
processes, secure upgrade process, removal of test points in final TOE, availability and
traceability of tachograph cards, law enforcement controls and regular inspections, faithful
drivers that possess only one driver card and type approval of motion sensors. Details can
be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed of the Security Controller hardware
including crypto library provided by INFINEON (Subsystem SC-HW), the software of the
Security Controller developed by intellic Germany GmbH (Subsystem SC-SW), and all
other components of the TOE (Subsystem VU Plattform) as Main Controller (MC) including
its software, MC-Flash ROM as well as MC-RAM, internal GNSS Receiver, power supply,
Case Open Supervision (COS) and Real Time Clock (RTC).
For details concerning the CC evaluation of the INFINEON Security Controller (SC-HW)
see the evaluation documentation under the certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer Testing
The test configuration is based on the TOE as described in [6]. For testing the developer
provided the release version R010. The tests conducted are based on R010. The TOE’s
software version V05.00 is identical to the actual and proved release version R010.
There are three different kinds of test procedures used by the developer.
The first procedure is to test the TOE through a python script which automatically starts the
tachograph card simulator and triggers all operations. The second procedure is to prove
the behaviour of the TOE by conducting a code review. The third type of tests is debug-
testing. They are conducted with a special version of the TOE software where the
developer can use breakpoints and hooks.
The evaluator has verified that all descriptions and interactions are tested. All SFR-
enforcing descriptions and interactions are mapped to appropriate tests. By mapping each
subsystem and module to at least one test case every subsystem except of SC-HW is
covered. The subsystem SC-HW is tested implicitly because it comprises the utilised
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019 Certification Report
Security Controller which is tested functionally by all tests. The tests cover all TSFIs by
testing all related SFs.
All test results were as expected.
7.2. Independent Evaluator Testing
The evaluators repeated a wide range of the developer tests in the lab of the ITSEF and
defined some additional independent tests, which were executed by the developer
because they required the debug test environment.
The evaluator centered his test activities with tests on
• commands and operations / sequences according to the identification and
authentication process,
• access control according to rights to functions,
• accountability by holding identification data permanent available,
• audit capabilities in case of security breaches,
• object re-use of temporary storage objects,
• reliability on the availability of data,
• cryptographic support.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.3. Penetration Testing
On the basis of the methodical vulnerability analysis some potential vulnerabilities have
been identified by the evaluator. These potential vulnerabilities have been analyzed, if they
are exploitable in the planned operational environment. For every potential vulnerability
which was identified to be a candidate to be exploitable in the planned operational
environment the evaluator devised and conducted penetration tests.
The rating shows that the TOE is resistant against an attacker possessing High attack
potential.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The hardware
components include the Main Controller (STM32F429) with Flash and RAM, the Security
Controller (SLE78CFX4000P), an internal GNSS Receiver MAX-M8Q-0-10 ROM TCXO,
the Real Time Clock (PCF2127T), the Case Open Supervision, the Card Readers #1 and
#2 (C702 10M008 925 4), the Printer (ELM208-V10-LV), the Display, the Keypad, LED and
Buzzer, the Power Supply hardware and the battery as well as the metal case.
The TOE software V05.00 is divided into the following four parts:
• EUApplication, identifier " E4_V05.00_010"
• EUBootcode, identifier " E4_V05.00_004"
• LangEu, identifier " E4_V05.00_003"
• EUSC, identifier " V5.00_00006"
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) JIL Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
(i.e. on hardware [14. 15] have been applied in the TOE evaluation.(see [4], AIS 25,
AIS 26, AIS 36).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was mainly on the adaption of a new
protection profile [8] for 2nd Generation Tachograph Systems which refers to new
components such as a GNSS receiver and a DSRC component.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 9 May
2017, BSI-CC-PP-0094-2017 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019 Certification Report
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Table 27 in [6] gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code
COS Case Open Supervsion
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSM Common Security Mechanism
DES Data Encryption Standard
DSRC Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC)
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Code Book (an operation mode of a block cipher)
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MC Main Controller
MS Motion Sensor
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
RTC Real Time Clock
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SC Security Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TR Technische Richtlinie / Technical Guideline
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VU Vehicle Unit
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13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Flash - Multiple programmable ROM memory with sector erase.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019, Version 10, 29.08.2019, intellic Germany
GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, 20.09.2019, SRC GmbH, (confidential
document)
[8] Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 9 May 2017, BSI-CC-PP-
0094-2017
[9] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016
implementing Regulation (EU) 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council laying down the requirements for the construction, testing, installation,
operation and repair of tachographs and their components, Annex I C
[10] Appendix 11 of Annex I C of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 –
Common Security Mechanisms
[11] EFAS-4.10 V05.00, Konfigurationsliste, INTELLIC, Version 04, Approved,
02.09.2019 file name: 1250-111-SEC-DE04_APPR_Konfigurationsliste.docx
(confidential document)
[12] Bedienungsanleitung Smart Tachograph EFAS-4.10, INTELLIC, Version 01, 2019,
file name: 1250-130-SEC-DE01_BDA_E4_10.pdf
[13] Werkstatt-Handbuch Smart Tachograph EFAS-4.10, INTELLIC, Version 01, 2019,
file name: 1250-131-SEC-DE01_WHB_E4_10.pdf
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 40, Version 1, Use of Interpretation for Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital
Tachographs
• AIS 46, Version 3, Info zur Evaluierung von Krypto und RNG
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[14] Public Security Target, Common Criteria EAL6 augmented / EAL6+, M7892 Design
Steps D11 and G12, Author: Oleg Rudakov, Revision 1.2 as of 2017-11-21, Infineon
Technologies AG
[15] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR
COMP) - M7892 G12 and D11- BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH, Version 1, 2017-11-29 (confidential document)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1117-2019
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.10, V05.00 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has
been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice
of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 25 September 2019, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) intellic Germany GmbH, Innungsstraße 40, 13509 Berlin (Tegel), Germany
(Development)
b) Bosch Car Multimedia Portugal S.A. Rua Max Grundig, 35 Lomar, Apartado
2458, 4705 820 Braga PORTUGAL (Production, Delivery)
c) For the development and production sites of the underlying HW platform
SLE78CFX4000P please see Annex B of the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-
0891-V3-2018 for Infineon Security Controller [14]
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] ) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Note: End of report
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