KECS-CR-24-30
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1308-2024
2024. 6. 25.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2024.06.25. -
Certification report for MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 of
Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KoSyAs)
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Table of Contents
Certification Report ....................................................................................................1
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................8
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................10
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................10
1. Physical Scope of TOE..................................................................................10
2. Logical Scope of TOE ................................................................................... 11
6. Documentation...................................................................................................15
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................16
1. Security Target Evaluation (ASE) ..................................................................16
2. Development Evaluation (ADV).....................................................................17
3. Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD) .......................................................17
4. Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) .............................................................18
5. Test Evaluation (ATE)....................................................................................18
6. Vulnerability Assessment (AVA).....................................................................18
7. Evaluation Result Summary ..........................................................................19
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................20
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................20
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................20
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................23
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Executive Summary
This report describes the evaluation result drawn by the evaluation facility on the
results of the MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 developed by Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd. with
reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC”
hereinafter)[1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation(hereinafter reffered to as “TOE”) is database encryption
software to prevent unauthorized exposure of the information from DBMS. Also, the
TOE shall provide a variety of security features: security audit, cryptographic operation
using cryptographic module, the user identification and authentication including mutual
authentication between TOE components, security management, the TOE access
session management, and the TSF protection function, etc.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance
(KOSYAS) and completed on June 12, 2024.
The ST claims conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Database
Encryption V1.1[3]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based
only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1+. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC
Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE satisfies the
SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
As shown in [Figure 1], the operational environment is consisted of MagicDBPlus v2.0
SP1 Server(“Management Server”), MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Admin(“Administrative
Tool”), MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Agent(“Agent”).
Installed as a plug-in to the DBMS which has to be protected, the Agent receives TSF
data from the Management Server and performs encryption/decryption of user data
upon the request from the Application Server. In addition, the authorized administrator
manages the scope and policies of encryption befitting security policy required in the
organization via the Management Server, using the Administrative Tool. Upon the
request of Application Service Users, the Application Server makes a request to the
Database Server while the Agent encrypts/decrypts user data, if necessary, and
deliver them to Application Service Users.
Moreover, if a critical event(e.g., reaching to audit data threshold, etc.) arises in the
Management Server, a mail is sent to a user designated by the authorized
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administrator via a mail server.
[Figure 1] Plug-in type operational environment of the TOE
(Agent, Management Server separate type)
Communications among TOE components, which rely on a self-implemented protocol,
carry out cryptographic communication, using an approved algorithm of the validated
cryptographic module(MagicCrypto V2.2.0).
Component Requirement
MagicDBPlus
v2.0 SP1 Server
v2.0.4.1
(Management
Server)
HW
CPU
Intel(R) Core (TM) i3 CPU @ 2.27 GHz or
higher
Memory 4 GB or higher
HDD
Space required for installation of TOE
100 GB or higher
NIC
100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Port 1 unit or
higher
SW OS Ubuntu 22.04 (kernel 6.5.0) 64 bit
MagicDBPlus HW CPU Intel(R) Core (TM) i5 CPU @ 2.50GHz or
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v2.0 SP1 Admin
v2.0.4.1
(Administrative
Tool)
higher
Memory 4 GB or higher
HDD
Space required for installation of TOE
500 MB or higher
NIC
100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Port 1 unit or
higher
SW OS Windows 10 Pro 64 bit
MagicDBPlus
v2.0 SP1 Agent
v2.0.4.1 (Agent)
HW
CPU
Intel(R) Core (TM) i5 CPU @ 2.30GHz or
higher
Memory 4 GB or higher
HDD
Space required for installation of TOE
500 MB or higher
NIC
100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Port 1 unit or
higher
SW
OS Rocky Linux 8.4 (kernel 4.18.0) 64 bit
DBMS to be
protected
IBM DB2 V11.5 64 bit
[Table 1] TOE Hardware and Software specifications
External IT Entity Description
Mail Server To be used to notify or send an alarm (a warning mail) to an
administrator regarding threats that arise during operation of
the Management Server
[Table 2] External IT Entity
3rd
party S/W Description
SQLite v3.45.3 To be used as DB for repository files of TSF data (DEKs for
user data, critical security parameters, TOE configuration
values and audit data, etc.) in the Management Server
[Table 3] 3rd party S/W(TOE include)
Validated cryptographic modules included the TOE are as follows.
Classfication Description
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Cryptographic Module MagicCrypto V2.2.0
Validation No. CM-162-2025.3
Developer Dream Security Co., Ltd.
Validation Date 2020.03.03
Effective Expiration Date 2025.03.03
[Table 4] Validated Cryptographic Module
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of Republic
of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the certificate, is either
expressed or implied.
Identification
The TOE reference is identified as follows.
Cls. Contents
TOE
Component
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1Server v2.0.4.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_Server_v2.0.4.1.sh
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1Adminv2.0.4.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_Admin_v2.0.4.1.exe
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1Agent v2.0.4.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_Agent_v2.0.4.1.sh
Manual
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1InstallationGuidev1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_PRE_v1.1.pdf
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1OperationalGuidance v1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_OPE_v1.1.pdf
[Table 5] TOE identification
[Table 6] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation,
facility, certification body, etc.
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Scheme
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (October
31, 2022)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security (May 17,
2021)
TOE MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~
CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
EAL EAL1+ (ATE_FUN.1)
Protection Profile
Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption
V1.1
Developer Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd.
Sponsor Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
June 12, 2024
[Table 6] Additional identification information
Security Policy
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- User data protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the
Security Target (ST) [4]
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Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the ST. The scope of this
evaluation is limited to the functionality and assurance covered in the Security Target.
This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this document, and
not any earlier or later versions released or in process. (for the detailed information of
TOE version and TOE Components version refer to the [Table 5])
Architectural Information
1. Physical Scope of TOE
The physical scope of the TOE consists of the Management Server, Administrative Tool,
Agent and manuals(Install guide, Operational Guidance). Verified Cryptographic
Module(MagicCrypto V2.2.0) is embedded in the TOE components.
Hardware and OS where the TOE is installed are not included in the scope of the TOE.
Category Type Delivery
TOE
Compone
nt
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1Server v2.0.4.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_Server_v2.0.4.1.sh
S/W
Included in
an
installation
CD of the
product
package
provided to
users
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1Adminv2.0.4.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_Admin_v2.0.4.1.exe
S/W
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1Agent v2.0.4.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_Agent_v2.0.4.1.sh
S/W
Guidance
Document
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1InstallationGuidev1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_PRE_v1.1.pdf
PDF
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1OperationalGuidance v1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_OPE_v1.1.pdf
PDF
[Table 7] Physical scope of TOE
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2. Logical Scope of TOE
The logical scope of the TOE is as in [Figure 2] below.
[Figure 2] TOE Logical scope
▣ Security Audit (FAU)
The TOE records the data/time of an event, an event type, subject identity and authority,
results of an event and event details as audit data which are stored and controlled in the
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server. The audit data generated can be viewed by an
administrator, using the Administrative Tool called MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Admin. There
is only one super administrator who is capable of viewing security management and audit
records as an authorized administrator to which an alarm is send via mail in case of any
access from an unauthorized user.
Security audit records can be selectively searched in descending order based on the
date of incident occurrence, access IP, access ID, incident type, and incident result.
In addition, the result of a self-test administered at each component of the TOE is stored
and controlled in the MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server as well. In case a self-test fails, an
alarm is sent to an email defined by the authorized administrator.
In case the audit data storage reaches a certain threshold defined by the administrator,
a warning email is sent to the administrator. Also, if the audit storage is full, audited
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obsolete events are overwritten and a warning message is sent to the administrator via
email.
All audit data are encrypted and stored in the local file DB of the MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1
Server, with a limited access only from approved MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server
processes.
▣ Cryptographic support (FCS)
The TOE performs generation, distribution, destruction and operation of cryptographic
keys and random bit generation, using a validated cryptographic module, MagicCrypto
V2.2.0. The cryptographic module is also used to generate and exchange cryptographic
keys during cryptographic communications among TOE components(MagicDBPlus v2.0
SP1 Server ↔ MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Admin, MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1
Server↔MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Agent) physically separated.
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server is generate the cryptographic key is generated, a
cryptographic key is generated using a random bit through a random bit generator
(HASH_DRBG 256) of the validated cryptographic module, and to encrypt user data of
the DBMS to be protected is encrypted, a symmetric key encryption algorithm (ARIA-
CBC 128/192/256 bit, SEED-CBC 128 bit, LEA-CBC 128/192/256 bit) and hash
algorithm(SHA-256/384/512).
In addition, a symmetric key encryption algorittm (ARIA-CBC 256 bit), digital signature
algorittm (RSA-PSS 2048 bit), hash algorithm (SHA-256) and MAC algorithm(HMAC-
SHA 256) are used for protction of TSF data.
Cryptograchic key distribution between the TOE components(MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1
Server↔MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Admin, MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server↔MagicDBPlus
v2.0 SP1 Agent) is safely distributed through public key encryption method (RSAES 2048
bit), and the cryptographic key is overwritten with "0x00" three times to ensure complete
destruction.
▣ User data protection (FDP)
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Agent conducts encryption/decryption in case of storage and
modification of user data in DB to be encrypted, using the validated cryptographic module,
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MagicCrypto V2.2.0, in accordance with encryption/decryption policy for user data
defined by the authorized administrator. Operated as a plug-in, the TOE supports
encryption/decryption of user data as per column in the MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Agent.
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Agent generates different encryption values each time it
conducts encryption of the same user data. Once the encryption/decryption is completed,
it performs initialization to prevent the restoration of the previous value of the original
user data.
▣ Identification and authentication (FIA)
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server provides identification and authentication function to an
administrator who carries out security management function so that the ID and password
have to be changed during the initial login after installation of the product through
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Admin. When the identification and authentication data of an
administrator are entered, the password is masked with “*” to protect the authentication
feedback.
Moreover, in case of an authentication failure, feedback on a failure reason is not
provided, and the account become locked after consecutive authentication failures.
It also blocks an attempt to re-use authentication information regarding the administrator
who has logged in to the MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Admin.
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server provides the following criteria with respect to verification
of the password:
 Length of password: (Min.) 9 characters ~ (Max.) 16 characters
 Characters usable for the password: English upper and low cases, numbers and
special characters (~, `, !, @, #, $, %, ^, &, *, (, ), -, _, +, =)
 The password has to be a combination of the following three: English
upper/lower cases, numbers and special characters.
The TOE carries out mutual authentication, using a self-implemented protocol for secure
communications among TOE components(MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server ↔
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Admin, MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server ↔ MagicDBPlus v2.0
SP1 Agent).
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▣ Security Management (FMT)
There is only one account for an authorized administrator in the MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1
Admin and during the initial login, the ID and password have to be changed.
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server provides security management functions including
generation and destruction of cryptographic keys, registration and deletion of policies,
mail notification setting, audit threshold setting and encryption/decryption of user data.
The authorized administrator performs security management, using a security
management interface available in the MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Admin.
▣ Protection of the TSF (FPT)
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server protects TSF data using the TSF data encryption key
(DEK) in a storage controlled by the TSF. The key (KEK) that encrypts the TSF data
encryption key (DEK) is generated through the password-based derivation (PBKDF2)
function, and the TSF data encryption key (DEK) is encrypted and stored. The TOE
protects TSF data stored in repositories controlled by the TSF and those transmitted
among TOE components(MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server ↔ MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1
Admin, MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server ↔ MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Agent) and conducts
inspection on major security function processes based on TSF self-tests. The TOE runs
a self-test on the main process, major files and the cryptographic module during the initial
start-up of the TOE and normal operation on a periodical basis. In terms of major files,
the authorized administrator can manually run such a self-test via a security
management screen. In case the self-test shows any abnormal behavior, a warning mail
is sent to the administrator.
▣ TOE access (FTA)
The number of management access sessions available for the administrator to enforce
security management functions is limited to one. If there is an administrator session
already logged in to the MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server, no more authorized administrator
can access. In case no action is detected for a certain period of time after the
authorized administrator has logged in to the MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server via the
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Admin, the session accessible is closed.
In addition, the authorized administrator can have no more than two IPs, and during the
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initial installation of the MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server, one IP accessible during the
installation process has to be pre-defined.
Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identification Date
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1InstallationGuidev1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_PRE_v1.1.pdf
May 14, 2024
MagicDBPlus v2.0SP1OperationalGuidance v1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.0_SP1_OPE_v1.1.pdf
May 14, 2024
[Table 8] Documentation
TOE Testing
The evaluator conducted independent testing listed in Independent Testing Report [5],
based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The evaluator took a testing approach
based on the security services provided by each TOE components based on the
operational environment of the TOE. Each test case includes the following information:
- Test no.: Identifier of each test case
- Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
- Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
- Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
- Expected result: Result expected from testing
- Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
- Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected and
actual result
The evaluator set up the test configuration and testing environment consistent with the
ST [4]. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases
devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities. These tests cover weakness analysis of privilege check of executable
code, bypassing security functionality, invalid inputs for interfaces, vulnerability scanning
using commercial tools, disclosure of secrets, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities
by attackers possessing basic attack potential were found from penetration testing. The
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evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected testing
results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and
results are summarized in the Penetration Testing Report [6].
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1(v2.0.4.3)
- MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Server v2.0.4.1
- MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Admin v2.0.4.1
- MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Agent v.2.0.4.1
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6
were evaluated with the TOE.
Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility wrote the evaluation result in the ETR which references Single
Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports. The
evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2]. The TOE was evaluated based
on Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. (EAL1+).
1. Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC
and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned
to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
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The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and
it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
2. Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specify a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
3. Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented
and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and
interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use
of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents consider the various types of users (e.g.
those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect actions could
adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
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4. Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes the
TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
5. Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1. Thus, the TOE behaves as
described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation evidence (described in the ADV
class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
6. Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
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7. Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_INT.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1
ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
AGD
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1
ATE_IND.1.1E PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1
AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 9] Evaluation Result Summary
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Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
⚫ The TOE must be installed and operated in a physically secure environment
accessible only by authorized administrators and should not allow remote
management from outside.
⚫ The administrator shall maintain a safe state such as application of the latest security
patches, eliminating unnecessary service, change of the default ID/password, etc.,
of the operating system and DBMS in the TOE operation.
⚫ The administrator should periodically check a spare space of audit data storage in
case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup to prevent audit
data loss.
⚫ The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification and
authentication function in the operational environment of the business system shall
ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied in accordance
with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
⚫
Security Target
MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Security Target v1.2 [4] is included in this report for reference.
Acronyms and Glossary
(1) Acronyms
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
Certification Report Page 21
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
(2) Glossary
Approved cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm selected by Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Authority
for block cipher, secure hash algorithm, message authentication code, random bit
generation, key agreement, public key cipher, digital signatures cryptographic algorithms
considering safety, reliability and interoperability
Application Server
The application server defined in this PP refers to the server that installs and operates
the application, which is developed to provide a certain application service by the
organization that operates the TOE. The pertinent application reads the user data from
the DB, which is located in the database server, by the request of the application service
user, or sends the user data to be stored in the DB to the database server.
Authorized Administrator
Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE
Authorized User
The TOE user who may, in accordance with the SFRs, perform an operation
Column
A set of data values of a particular simple type, one for each row of the table in a relational
database
Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
Information related to security that can erode the security of the encryption module if
exposed or changed (e.g., verification data such as secret key/private key, password, or
Personal Identification Number).
Database
A set of data that is compiled according to a certain structure in order to receive, save,
Certification Report Page 22
and provide data in response to the demand of multiple users to support multiple
application duties at the same time. The database related to encryption by column, which
is required by this PP, refers to the relational database.
Database Server
The database server defined in this PP refer to the server in which the DBMS managing
the protected DB is installed in the organization that operates the TOE
DBMS (Database Management System)
A software system composed to configure and apply the database. The DBMS related
to encryption by column, which is required by this PP, refers to the database
management system based on the relational database model.
Data Encryption Key (DEK)
Key that encrypts and decrypts the data
Decryption
The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key
Encryption
The act that converts the plaintext into the ciphertext using the encryption key
External Entity
Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of the TOE boundary
Key Encryption Key (KEK)
Key that encrypts and decrypts another cryptographic key
Management Console
Application program such as GUI (Graphical User Interface) or CLI (Command Line
Interface) provided to an administrator for management and configuration of a system /
It is also used as a synonym with the Administrative Tool in this document.
Private Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is
uniquely associated with an entity (the subject using the private key), not to be disclosed
Public Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is
associated with an unique entity (the subject using the public key), it can be disclosed
Public Key (asymmetric) cryptographic algorithm
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A cryptographic algorithm that uses a pair of public and private keys
Random bit generator
A device or algorithm that outputs a binary string that is statistically independent and is
not biased. The RBG used for cryptographic application generally generates 0 and 1 bit
string, and the string can be combined into a random bit block. The RBG is classified into
the deterministic
and non-deterministic type. The deterministic type RBG is composed of an algorithm that
generates bit strings from the initial value called a “seed key,” and the non-deterministic
type RBG produces output that depends on the unpredictable physical source.
Secret Key
Cryptographic key that is used along with a secret key cryptographic algorithm and can
be uniquely combined with an entity or more / It shall not be made public.
Self-test
Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the cryptographic module
Symmetric cryptographic technique
Encryption scheme that uses the same secret key in mode of encryption and decryption,
also known as secret key cryptographic technique
TSF Data
Data for the operation of the TOE upon which the enforcement of the SFR relies
User Data
Data for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF
Bibliography
The evaluation facility has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017
[3] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1, December 11, 2019
[4] MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Security Target v1.2, May 14, 2024
[5] MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Independent Testing Report(ATE_IND.1) V1.00, May 30, 2024
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[6] MagicDBPlus v2.0 SP1 Penetration Testing Report (AVA_VAN.1) V2.00, June 24, 2024