.
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
eIDAS QSCD Security Target
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
eIDAS QSCD Security Target
II
Table of contents
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 ST and TOE Reference ....................................................................................................................1
1.2 TOE Overview ................................................................................................................................1
1.3 TOE Description .............................................................................................................................1
1.3.1 Intended Usage ...................................................................................................................................1
1.3.2 TOE Boundary......................................................................................................................................2
1.3.3 Other Required Hardware and Software.............................................................................................2
1.3.4 TOE Life Cycle......................................................................................................................................2
1.3.5 TOE Delivery........................................................................................................................................3
1.4 Compatibility Statement.................................................................................................................4
1.4.1 Platform SFRs Used By This Composite ST...........................................................................................4
1.4.2 Security Assurance Requirements Mapping........................................................................................8
1.4.3 Compatibility Mapping Between This ST and the Platform ST ............................................................8
2 Conformance Claims........................................................................................................ 12
2.1 CC Conformance Claim.................................................................................................................12
2.2 PP Conformance Claim.................................................................................................................13
2.3 Package Claim..............................................................................................................................13
2.4 Conformance Rationale................................................................................................................13
3 Security Problem Definition ............................................................................................. 13
3.1 Users ...........................................................................................................................................13
3.2 Assets ..........................................................................................................................................13
3.3 Threats ........................................................................................................................................13
3.4 Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) .........................................................................................14
3.5 Assumptions ................................................................................................................................15
4 Security Objectives .......................................................................................................... 15
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ....................................................................................................15
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment....................................................................16
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale .......................................................................................................18
5 Extended Components Definition .................................................................................... 19
5.1 FPT_EMS TOE Emanation .............................................................................................................19
5.1.1 FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation...............................................................................................................20
6 Security Requirements..................................................................................................... 20
6.1 Security Functional Requirements ................................................................................................20
6.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS) .............................................................................................................20
6.1.2 User data protection (FDP)................................................................................................................22
6.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)..............................................................................................26
6.1.4 Security management (FMT).............................................................................................................27
6.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)................................................................................................................30
6.1.6 Trusted path/channels (FTP) .............................................................................................................31
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements.................................................................................................32
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale..................................................................................................33
7 TOE Summary Specifications............................................................................................ 34
7.1 Security Services ..........................................................................................................................34
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
eIDAS QSCD Security Target
III
7.1.1 SS.Access_Control .............................................................................................................................34
7.1.2 SS.Authentication_Management.......................................................................................................35
7.1.3 SS.Key_Management.........................................................................................................................35
7.1.4 SS.RSA/ECC_Key_Generation ............................................................................................................36
7.1.5 SS.RSA/ECC_Signature_Creation .......................................................................................................36
7.1.6 SS.Secure_Messaging........................................................................................................................36
7.1.7 SS.User_Authentication.....................................................................................................................36
7.2 Security Features .........................................................................................................................37
7.2.1 SF.Applet_Hardening.........................................................................................................................37
7.2.2 SF.Platform_Security_Functions........................................................................................................37
7.3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale...........................................................................................38
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
eIDAS QSCD Security Target
IV
Warning Notice
All information herein is either public information or is the property of and owned solely by A.E.T. Europe B.V. who shall have and keep the sole right
to file patent applications or any other kind of intellectual property protection in connection with such information.
Installation and use of A.E.T. Europe B.V. products are subject to your acceptance of the terms and conditions set out in the license Agreement that
accompanies each product. Nothing herein shall be construed as implying or granting to you any rights, by license, grant or otherwise, under any
intellectual and/ or industrial property rights of or concerning any of A.E.T. Europe B.V. information.
Cryptographic products are subject to export and import restrictions. You are required to obtain the appropriate government licenses prior to
shipping this Product.
© Copyright A.E.T. Europe B.V., 2000-2024 All rights reserved.
SafeSign IC is a trademark of A.E.T. Europe B.V. All A.E.T. Europe B.V. product names are trademarks of A.E.T. Europe B.V. All other product and
company names are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners.
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
eIDAS QSCD Security Target
V
Document Information
Document ID:
Project Information:
Document revision history:
Version Date Author Changes
1.0 14 Jun 2019 Arjan Jeckmans Initial version for release
1.1 21 Aug 2020 Arjan Jeckmans Update to JCOP 4 P71
1.2 8 Oct 2020 Arjan Jeckmans Updated references
1.3 4 Dec 2020 Arjan Jeckmans Updated PP references, TOE overview, and table 1
1.4 9 Mar 2021 Arjan Jeckmans Updated to latest JCOP 4 P71 certification
1.5 12 Apr 2021 Arjan Jeckmans Updated guidance references
1.6 8 Jun 2022 Gerben van der Lubbe Added new applet version for maintenance update
1.7 7 Sep 2022 Arjan Jeckmans Updated to latest JCOP 4 P71 certification
1.8 5 Oct 2022 Arjan Jeckmans Updated to latest JCOP 4 P71 certification
1.9 16 Dec 2022 Arjan Jeckmans Updated references
1.10 29 Aug 2023 Goran Djordjevic
Updated to JCOP 4 P71 re-certification, TOE
overview, added new applet version
1.11 15 Dec 2023 Gerben van der Lubbe Updated ST and TOE Reference fields
1.12 15 Dec 2023 Gerben Pelgrim Updated AET logo
1.13 28 Dec 2023 Goran Djordjevic Updated references
1.14 6 Mar 2024 Gerben van der Lubbe
Added clarification that PSS is specific to applet
version 3.0.1.14
1.15 26 Mar 2024 Gerben van der Lubbe
Clarified distinction between assignment values and
references
1.16 27 Mar 2024 Gerben van der Lubbe Fixed “ST and TOE Reference” inconsistency
1.17 29 Apr 2024 Gerben van der Lubbe Updated NXP ST references
1.18 2 May 2024 Gerben van der Lubbe Updated references to latest version
1.19 14 May 2024 Gerben van der Lubbe Updated references to latest version
1.20 30 Jul 2024 Gerben van der Lubbe Updated references to latest version
1.21 16 Aug 2024 Gerben van der Lubbe Clarified FSP reference for different applet versions
1.22 29 Aug 2024 Goran Djordjevic Removed applet pre-loaded status
1.23 27 Sep 2024 Gerben van der Lubbe Clarified TOE reference
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
eIDAS QSCD Security Target
VI
About the Product
SafeSign Identity Client (IC) is a software package that can be used to enhance the security of
applications that support hardware tokens through PKCS #11 and Microsoft CryptoAPI.
The SafeSign IC package provides a standards-based PKCS #11 Library as well as a Cryptographic
Service Provider (CSP) and CNG Key Storage Provider (KSP) allowing users to store public and
private data on a personal token, either a smart card, USB token or SIM card. It also includes the
SafeSign IC PKI applet, enabling end-users to utilise any Java Card 2.1.1 / Java Card 2.2 and higher
compliant card with the SafeSign IC middleware.
Combining full compliance with leading industry standards and protocols, with flexibility and
usability, SafeSign IC can be used with multiple smart cards / USB tokens, multiple Operating
Systems and multiple smart card readers.
SafeSign IC allows users to initialise and use the token for encryption, authentication or digital
signatures and includes all functionality necessary to use hardware tokens in a variety of PKI
environments.
SafeSign IC comes in a standard version with an installer for Windows, MAC and Linux
environments. It is also available for many other environments like mobile devices.
For more information, refer to the latest SafeSign IC Product Description on www.aeteurope.com.
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
eIDAS QSCD Security Target
VII
References
• BSI Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key Lengths v2023-01 (BSI TR-
02102-1), 09-01-2023
• CC1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and general model v3.1r5 (CCMB-2017-04-001), 04-2017
• CC2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional components v3.1r5 (CCMB-2017-04-002), 04-2017
• CC3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance components v3.1r5 (CCMB-2017-04-003), 04-2017
• CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology v3.1r5 (CCMB-2017-04-004), 04-2017
• EU Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July
2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal
market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, 23-07-2014
• FSP SafeSign IC PKI Applet Interface Specification, generated with applet, dependent on
applet version:
 3.0.1.12/3.0.1.13: SafeSign IC PKI Applet v3 Interface Specification, version 3.4
 3.0.1.14: SafeSign IC PKI Applet v3.0.1.14 Interface Specification, version 2024.0501
• JCP Published by Oracle. Java Card 3 Platform, Application Programming Interface, Classic
Edition, Version 3.0.5, 05-2015
• OPE Operational Guidance SafeSign IC eIDAS QSCD on JCOP4 P71 v1.13, 27-09-2024
• PP2 EN-419211-2:2013 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2:
Device with key generation v2.0.1 (BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02), 07-2013
• PP3 EN-419211-3:2013 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 3:
Device with key import v1.0.2 (BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012-MA-01), 10-2013
• PRE Preparative Procedures SafeSign IC eIDAS QSCD on JCOP4 P71 v1.13, 27-09-2024
• PST JCOP 4 P71 Security Target Lite v4.14, 17-01-2024
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
eIDAS QSCD Security Target
VIII
Abbreviated Terms
• CGA Certificate Generation Application
• CSP Certification Service Provider
• DTBS Data to be Signed
• DTBS/R Data to be Signed or its Unique Representation
• eIDAS Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services
• QSCDQualified Signature/Seal Creation Device
• RAD Reference Authentication Data
• SCA Signature Creation Application
• SCD Signature Creation Data
• SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
• SVD Signature Verification Data
• VAD Verification Authentication Data
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
1: Introduction
1
1 Introduction
1.1 ST and TOE Reference
ST Title: SafeSign IC PKI applet on JCOP 4 P71 eIDAS QSCD Security Target
ST Revision: v1.23
ST Date: 27 September 2024
ST Author: A.E.T. Europe B.V.
TOE Reference: SafeSign IC PKI applet on JCOP 4 P71 eIDAS QSCD 3.0.1.12, 3.0.1.13 and 3.0.1.14
1.2 TOE Overview
The TOE, of type smart card, consists of a Java Card applet on top of an OS providing the Java Card
and GlobalPlatform interface on top of a micro controller. The applet provides PKI and PKCS#15
functionality. The TOE fulfils the requirements and is certified as a qualified signature creation
device according Article 29 and a qualified seal creation device according Article 39 of the eIDAS
regulation [EU]. The TOE provides the functionality of an eIDAS QSCD with protection of private key
material and qualified certificates. In order for applications to communicate with the TOE, the
appropriate middleware is required.
1.3 TOE Description
This TOE is a composite TOE consisting of a Java Card applet combined with the JCOP 4 P71 Java
Card. The reference for this Java Card is as follows:
Reference: JCOP 4 P71
Certification ID: NSCIB-CC-2300172-01
ST Reference: JCOP 4 P71 Security Target Lite, Revision 4.14, 2024-01-17 [PST]
This Java Card is also a composite, but its components are not listed here. Please refer to the
security target lite for a complete overview of the JCOP 4 P71 components.
The TOE can be identified by issuing the following APDU command to the applet “0x00CA010304”,
this should result in the response “0x0300010C9000” for applet version 3.0.1.12, in the response
“0x0300010D9000” for applet version 3.0.1.13, and in the response “0x0300010E9000” for applet
version 3.0.1.14. The Java Card can be identified by means detailed in section 1.3.4 of the JCOP 4
P71 Security Target Lite [PST].
1.3.1 Intended Usage
The TOE is intended to be used as a portable personal electronic signature or electronic seal
creation device in a managed IT environment where the electronic signature or electronic seal is
used as proof of authenticity and/or presence of the signatory. The TOE interacts with the
environment by means of standard smart card interfaces.
The signatory is required to provide authentication information to the TOE before it creates an
electronic signature or electronic seal, thereby preventing unauthorized use of the TOE.
The physical shape of the TOE is not defined here, although it is typically a smart card form factor
and could carry printed information about the signatory.
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
1: Introduction
2
1.3.2 TOE Boundary
The following diagram shows a simplified view of the components present in the composite TOE.
Figure 1. TOE components and boundary
The TOE boundary is indicated by the dashed line. In this boundary are:
• The Secure IC with cryptographic library (CL) combined with the Java Card OS, is the already
certified component of the TOE.
• The SafeSign IC PKI applet eIDAS QSCD implementing the TSF.
The platform is defined as an open Java Card platform and other applications may be present on
this platform. Such other applets are not part of the TOE and are placed outside the TOE boundary.
Note that as part of the production phase, the platform is transitioned to a closed Java Card
platform. This means that other applets cannot be loaded and installed during the usage phase.
1.3.3 Other Required Hardware and Software
In order to use the TOE a standard smart card acceptance device is required, as well as software to
allow the signatory and the other roles to interact with the TOE.
The software also provides integration of the TOE functionality for the operating system.
1.3.4 TOE Life Cycle
The TOE life cycle consists of 3 phases; development, production, and usage.
In the development phase the SafeSign IC PKI applet part of the TOE is developed, reviewed and
tested. After development is completed, the applet is built and prepared for delivery. The
development phase ends with the delivery of the delivery package (see the next section) to the TOE
producer.
In the production phase the TOE is assembled and bound to a specific signatory. First the Java Card
is prepared, the applet (loaded and) initialized, and the Java Card is secured. Second, the TOE is
personalized. The RAD (or a transport equivalent) for the signatory is defined and entered, key
material (SCD/SVD) is either generated or imported, and certificates are loaded. Generally, the
signatory is not present in this phase and keys are marked as non-operational.
eIDAS
QSCD
Java Card OS
Secure IC CL
Other
Applets
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
1: Introduction
3
Upon delivery, the signatory validates the TOE and activates the keys. Also the RAD can be set upon
delivery if required (transport equivalent). With the delivery to the signatory the production phase
ends.
In the usage phase the signatory can use the available SCD to produce signatures and possibly
generate new SCD/SVD pairs. Keys generated and imported in this phase are automatically
operational.
1.3.5 TOE Delivery
The TOE is not delivered as the final composite product. In case of the package for TOE initialisers
the applet is delivered separately from the platform.
The delivery package for TOE initialisers consists of a binary archive containing:
• A signed container file containing the following elements:
 The signed application binary file of the applet.
 The public key matching the private key used to sign the application binary file of the
applet.
 The SafeSign IC PKI Applet v3 Interface Specification [FSP].
 The test report of the applet.
 An information file containing:
− The used configuration.
− The unique identifier of the toolchain versions.
− The fingerprint of the used revision from all version control repositories.
− The unique identifier of the applet.
• The preparative procedures document [PRE].
• The operational guidance document [OPE].
The TOE personalizer receives a composite product from the TOE initializer (which includes a secure
platform and a loaded, installed applet) along with an information package from the TOE developer.
The delivery package for TOE personalizers consists of a binary archive containing:
• A container file containing the following elements:
 The SafeSign IC PKI Applet v3 Interface Specification [FSP].
 The test report of the applet.
 An information file containing:
− The used configuration.
− The unique identifier of the toolchain versions.
− The fingerprint of the used revision from all version control repositories.
− The unique identifier of the applet.
• The preparative procedures document [PRE].
• The operational guidance document [OPE].
The customer is required to complete the TOE by installing the application binary file on the
platform according to the guidance presented in the preparative procedures in order to meet the
certified configuration of the TOE.
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
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4
1.4 Compatibility Statement
The TSF for this TOE includes SFRs that rely on the TSF of the platform component. The
compatibility of the platform TSF with the TOE TSF is confirmed by:
• The statement of the platform ST that it complies with the Java Card Protection Profile –
Open Configuration, which defines the security mechanisms of the Java Card specification.
• Mapping the dependencies of specific TOE SFRs on identified security functionality provided
by the platform in SF.Platform_Security_Functions (section 7.2.2),
• Following platform user guidance in development of the TOE and TOE guidance
documentation.
• Ensuring the conformance claims made by the platform meet or supersedes the claims made
by the TOE.
1.4.1 Platform SFRs Used By This Composite ST
The following table is a mapping of the SFRs listed in order of appearance in chapter 7 of [PST] and
the SFRs of this ST.
Table 1. Mapping Platform SFR to usage by TOE SFR
Platform SFR Used by TOE SFR Remarks
COREG_LC Security Functional Requirements
Firewall Policy
FDP_ACC.2/FIREWALL Not used
FDP_ACF.1/FIREWALL Not used
FDP_IFC.1/JCVM Not used
FDP_IFF.1/JCVM Not used
FDP_RIP.1/OBJECTS Not used
FMT_MSA.1/JCRE Not used
FMT_MSA.1/JCVM Not used
FMT_MSA.2/FIREWALL_JCVM Not used
FMT_MSA.3/FIREWALL Not used
FMT_ MSA.3/JCVM Not used
FMT_ SMF.1 Not used
FMT_ SMR.1 Not used
Application Programming Interface
FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.1/ECC,
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1 FCS_COP.1/ECC,
FCS_COP.1/RSA
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
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FDP_RIP.1/ABORT Not used
FDP_RIP.1/APDU Not used
FDP_RIP.1/GlobalArray_Refined Not used
FDP_RIP.1/bArray Not used
FDP_RIP.1/KEYS FDP_RIP.1
FDP_RIP.1/TRANSIENT Not used
FDP_ROL.1/FIREWALL Not used
Card Security Management
FAU_ARP.1 FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.1
FDP_SDI.2/DATA FDP_SDI.2/Persistent,
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
FDP_SDI.2/SENSITIVE_RESULT Not used
FPR_UNO.1 Not used
FPT_FLS.1 FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TDC.1 Not used
Aid Management
FIA_ATD.1/AID Not used
FIA_UID.2/AID Not used
FIA_USB.1/AID Not used
FMT_MTD.1/JCRE Not used
FMT_MTD.3/JCRE Not used
INSTG Security Functional Requirements
FMT_SMR.1/Installer Not used
FPT_FLS.1/Installer Not used
FPT_RCV.3/Installer Not used
ADELG Security Functional Requirements
FDP_ACC.2/ADEL Not used
FDP_ACF.1/ADEL Not used
FDP_RIP.1/ADEL Not used
FMT_MSA.1/ADEL Not used
FMT_MSA.3/ADEL Not used
FMT_SMF.1/ADEL Not used
FMT_SMR.1/ADEL Not used
FPT_FLS.1/ADEL Not used
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
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RMIG Security Functional Requirements
ODELG Security Functional Requirements
FDP_RIP.1/ODEL Not used
FPT_FLS.1/ODEL Not used
CarG Security Functional Requirements
FDP_UIT.1/CCM Not used
FDP_ROL.1/CCM Not used
FDP_ITC.2/CCM Not used
FPT_FLS.1/CCM Not used
FDP_ACC.1/SD Not used
FDP_ACF.1/SD Not used
FMT_MSA.1/SD Not used
FMT_MSA.3/SD Not used
FMT_SMF.1/SD Not used
FMT_SMR.1/SD Not used
FCO_NRO.2/SC Not used
FDP_IFC.2/SC Not used
FDP_IFF.1/SC Not used
FMT_MSA.1/SC Not used
FMT_MSA.3/SC Not used
FMT_SMF.1/SC Not used
FIA_UID.1/SC Not used
FIA_UAU.1/SC Not used
FIA_UAU.4/SC Not used
FTP_ITC.1/SC FTP_ITC.1/SCD
EMG Security Functional Requirements
FDP_ACC.1/EXT_MEM Not used
FDP_ACF.1/EXT_MEM Not used
FMT_MSA.1/EXT_MEM Not used
FMT_MSA.3/EXT_MEM Not used
FMT_SMF.1/EXT_MEM Not used
ConfG Configuration Security Functionality
FDP_IFC.2/CFG Not used
FDP_IFF.1/CFG Not used
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
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FMT_MSA.1/CFG Not used
FMT_MSA.3/CFG Not used
FMT_SMF.1/CFG Not used
FMT_SMR.1/CFG Not used
FIA_UID.1/CFG Not used
SecBoxG SecureBox Security Functional Requirements
FDP_ACC.2/SecureBox Not used
FDP_ACF.1/SecureBox Not used
FMT_MSA.1/SecureBox Not used
FMT_MSA.3/SecureBox Not used
FMT_SMF.1/SecureBox Not used
ModDesG Security Functional Requirements
FDP_IFC.1/MODULAR_DESIGN Not used
FDP_IFF.1/MODULAR_DESIGN Not used
FIA_ATD.1/MODULAR_DESIGN Not used
FIA_UID.1/MODULAR_DESIGN Not used
FIA_USB.1/MODULAR_DESIGN Not used
FMT_MSA.1/MODULAR_DESIGN Not used
FMT_MSA.3/MODULAR_DESIGN Not used
FMT_SMF.1/MODULAR_DESIGN Not used
FMT_SMR.1/MODULAR_DESIGN Not used
FPT_FLS.1/MODULAR_DESIGN Not used
RMG Security Functional Requirements
FDP_ACC.2/RM Not used
FDP_ACF.1/RM Not used
FMT_MSA.1/RM Not used
FMT_MSA.3/RM Not used
FMT_SMF.1/RM Not used
FIA_UID.1/RM Not used
FIA_UAU.1/RM Not used
Further Security Functional Requirements
FAU_SAS.1/SCP Not used
FCS_RNG.1 FCS_CKM.1/ECC,
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
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FCS_RNG.1/HDT Not used
FIA_AFL.1/PIN FIA_AFL.1
FPT_EMSEC.1 FPT_EMS.1
FPT_PHP.3 FPT_PHP.1, FPT_PHP.3
FCS_CKM.2 Not used
FCS_CKM.3 Not used
1.4.2 Security Assurance Requirements Mapping
The platform is certified EAL6 with augmentations ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.2. The TOE certification
level is EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5. The Composite TOE assurance requirements of the EAL4
package augmented with AVA_VAN.5 are a subset of the platform EAL6 package.
1.4.3 Compatibility Mapping Between This ST and the Platform ST
This section provides a listing of the platform ST security objectives, and security problem
definitions, indicating for each item if this ST contradicts it, or how it is handled by this ST.
1.4.3.1 TOE Security Objectives
Table 2. Platform TOE security objectives mapping
Platform TOE security
objectives
Contradiction/mapping Remark
Identification
OT.SID None
OT.SID_MODULE None
Execution
OT.FIREWALL None
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID None
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG Maps to
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.NATIVE None
OT.OPERATE None
OT.REALLOCATION None
OT.RESOURCES None
OT.SENSITIVE_RESULTS_INTEG Maps to OT.Sigy_SigF
Services
OT.ALARM Maps to OT.Tamper_ID,
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.CIPHER None
OT.RNG Maps to OT.SCD_Unique
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
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OT.KEY-MNGT Maps to OT.SCD_Secrecy,
OT.Sigy_SigF,
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen,
OT.SCD_Unique,
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp,
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
OT.PIN-MNGT Maps to OT.Sigy_SigF,
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen,
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
OT.TRANSACTION None
Object Deletion
OT.OBJ-DELETION None
Applet Management
OT.APPLI-AUTH None
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS None
OT.COMM_AUTH None
OT.COMM_INTEGRITY None
OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY None
External Memory
OT.EXT-MEM None
Card Management
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT None
Smart Card Platform
OT.SCP.IC Maps to OT.EMSEC_Design,
OT.Tamper_ID,
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.SCP.RECOVERY None
OT.SCP.SUPPORT None
OT.IDENTIFICATION None
SecureBox
OT.SEC_BOX_FW None
Random Numbers
OT.RND Maps to OT.SCD_Unique
Configuration Module
OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION None
Restricted Mode
SafeSign IC PKI Applet on JCOP 4 P71
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OT.ATTACK-COUNTER Maps to
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.RESTRICTED-MODE Maps to
OT.Tamper_Resistance
1.4.3.2 Environmental Objectives
Table 3. Platform environmental objectives mapping
Platform Environmental
Objectives
Contradiction/mapping Remark
OE.APPLET Maps to [PRE]
OE.VERIFICATION Maps to [PRE]
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE Maps to [PRE]
OE.APPS-PROVIDER Maps to [PRE]
OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY Maps to [PRE]
OE.KEY-CHANGE Maps to [PRE]
OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS Not contradicting.
OE.USE_DIAG Maps to [PRE],
OE.SCD_Secrecy
OE.USE_KEYS Maps to OE.SVD_Auth,
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen,
OE.SCD_Secrecy,
OE.SCD_Unique,
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC Mapped to [PRE]
1.4.3.3 Threats
Table 4. Platform threats mapping
Platform Threats Contradiction/mapping Remark
Confidentiality
T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA Maps to T.SCD_Divulg,
T.SCD_Derive, T.Hack_Phys,
T.SigF_Misuse
T.CONFID-JCS-CODE None
T.CONFID-JCS-DATA None
Integrity
T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE None
T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD None
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T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA[REFINED] Maps to T.SCD_Divulg,
T.SCD_Derive, T.Hack_Phys,
T.SigF_Misuse
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD None
T.INTEG-JCS-CODE None
T.INTEG-JCS.DATA None
Identity Usurpation
T.SID.1 None
T.SID.2 Maps to T.SCD_Divulg,
T.Hack_Phys, T.SigF_Misuse
Unauthorized Execution
T.EXE-CODE.1 None
T.EXE-CODE.2 None
T.NATIVE None
T.MODULE_EXEC None
Denial of Service
T.RESOURCES None
Card Management
T.UNAUTHORIZED_CARD_MNGT None
T.COM_EXPLOIT None
T.LIFE_CYCLE None
Services
T.OBJ-DELETION None
Miscellaneous
T.PHYSICAL Maps to T.Hack_Phys
Operating System
T.OS_OPERATE None
Random Numbers
T.RND Maps to T.SCD_Derive
Configuration Module
T.CONFIG None
Secure Box
T.SEC_BOX_BORDER None
Module Replacement
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T.MODULE_REPLACEMENT None
Restricted Mode
T.ATTACK_COUNTER None
1.4.3.4 Assumptions
Table 5. Platform assumptions mapping
Platform Assumptions Contradiction/mapping Remark
A.APPLET Maps to [PRE]
A.VERIFICATION Maps to [PRE]
A.USE_DIAG Maps to A.SCA, OE.HID_VAD,
OE.DTBS_Protect
A.USE_KEYS Maps to A.CGA, A.SCA, A.CSP
A.PROCESS-SEC-IC Maps to [PRE]
A.APPS-PROVIDER Maps to [PRE]
A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY Maps to [PRE]
1.4.3.5 Organizational Security Policies
Table 6. Platform organizational security policies mapping
Platform OSPs Contradiction/mapping Remark
OSP.VERIFICATION Maps to [PRE]
OSP.PROCESS-TOE Maps to [PRE], [OPE]
OSP.KEY-CHANGE Maps to [PRE]
OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS Not contradicting
OSP.SECURE-BOX Not contradicting
2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation version 3.1 according to:
• “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017” [CC1]
• “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017” [CC2]
• “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017” [CC3]
This Security Target claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.
The methodology “Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5” [CEM] will be used for the evaluation.
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2.2 PP Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims strict conformance with EN-419211-2:2013 Protection profiles for
secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation (v2.0.1, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-
MA-02) [PP2] and with EN-419211-3:2013 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 3: Device with key import (v1.0.2, BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012-MA-01) [PP3].
2.3 Package Claim
This Security Target claims conformance with assurance package EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5
(“Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”).
2.4 Conformance Rationale
This ST conforms to all elements in both PPs. Where there is no full overlap between the PPs, the
combination of the two is taken. This is marked throughout this document.
3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Users
The following users are taken directly from the PPs and are also present in this TOE.
• User End user of the TOE who can be identified as administrator or signatory. The subject
S.User may act as S.Admin in the role R.Admin or as S.Sigy in the role R.Sigy.
• Administrator User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialisation, TOE personalisation or
other TOE administrative functions. The subject S.Admin is acting in the role R.Admin for this
user after successful authentication as administrator.
• Signatory User who hold the TOE and use it on their own behalf or on behalf of the natural or
legal person or entity they represent. The subject S.Sigy is acting in the role R.Sigy for this
user after successful authentication as signatory.
3.2 Assets
The following assets are taken directly from the PPs and are also present in this TOE.
• SCD Private key used to perform an electronic signature operation.
The confidentiality, integrity and signatory’s sole control over the use of the SCD shall be
maintained.
• SVD Public key linked to the SCD and used to perform electronic signature verification.
The integrity of the SVD when it is exported shall be maintained.
• DTBS and DTBS/R Set of data, or its representation, which the signatory intends to sign.
Their integrity and the unforgeability of the link to the signatory provided by the electronic
signature shall be maintained.
3.3 Threats
The attacker model is taken from the PPs;
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• Attacker Human or process acting on their behalf located outside the TOE.
The main goal of the attacker is to access the SCD or to falsify the electronic signature. The
attacker has got a high attack potential and knows no secret.
The following threats are taken from the PPs:
• T.SCD_Divulg Storing, copying and releasing of the signature creation data.
An attacker stores or copies the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can obtain the SCD during
generation, storage and use for signature creation in the TOE.
• T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature creation data.
An attacker derives the SCD from publicly known data, such as SVD corresponding to the SCD
or signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data exported outside the TOE, which
is a threat against the secrecy of the SCD.
• T.Hack_Phys Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces.
An attacker interacts physically with the TOE to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in arbitrary
security compromises. This threat is directed against SCD, SVD and DTBS.
• T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature verification data.
An attacker forges the SVD presented by the CSP to the CGA. This results in loss of SVD
integrity in the certificate of the signatory.
• T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE.
An attacker misuses the signature creation function of the TOE to create SDO for data the
signatory has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts
possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and
concepts employed by the TOE.
• T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS/R.
An attacker modifies the DTBS/R sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS/R used by the TOE for
signing does not match the DTBS the signatory intended to sign.
• T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature.
An attacker forges a signed data object, maybe using an electronic signature that has been
created by the TOE, and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object is not
detectable by the signatory or by third parties. The signature created by the TOE is subject to
deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of
security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies (OSPs)
Organizational Security Policies are taken from the PP:
• P.CSP_QCert Qualified certificate.
The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate a qualified certificate or non-qualified certificate
for the SVD. The certificates contain at least the name of the signatory and the SVD matching
the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory. The CSP ensures that
the use of the TOE as SSCD is evident with signatures through the certificate or other publicly
available information.
• P.QSign Qualified electronic signatures.
The signatory uses a signature creation system to sign data with an advanced electronic
signature, which is a qualified electronic signature if it is based on a valid qualified certificate.
The DTBS are presented to the signatory and sent by the SCA as DTBS/R to the SSCD. The
SSCD creates the electronic signature created with a SCD implemented in the SSCD that the
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signatory maintain under their sole control and is linked to the DTBS/R in such a manner that
any subsequent change of the data is detectable.
• P.Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature creation device.
The TOE meets the requirements for an SSCD laid down in Annex III of DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC.
This implies the SCD is used for digital signature creation under sole control of the signatory
and the SCD can practically occur only once.
• P.Sig_Non-Repud Non-repudiation of signatures.
The lifecycle of the SSCD, the SCD and the SVD shall be implemented in a way that the
signatory is not able to deny having signed data if the signature is successfully verified with
the SVD contained in their unrevoked certificate.
3.5 Assumptions
The following assumptions are taken from the PPs:
• A.CGA Trustworthy certificate generation application.
The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name or pseudonym and the SVD in the
(qualified) certificate by an advanced electronic signature of the CSP.
• A.SCA Trustworthy signature creation application.
The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS/R of the
data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
The following assumption is only taken from the EN-419211-3 PP [PP3] and has no impact on the
EN-419211-2 PP [PP2] (as in this PP the TOE is responsible and no assumption is needed).
• A.CSP Secure SCD/SVD management by CSP.
The CSP uses only a trustworthy SCD/SVD generation device and ensures that this device can
be used by authorised user only. The CSP ensures that the SCD generated practically occurs
only once, that generated SCD and SVD actually correspond to each other and that SCD
cannot be derived from the SVD. The CSP ensures the confidentiality of the SCD during
generation and export to the TOE, does not use the SCD for creation of any signature and
irreversibly deletes the SCD in the operational environment after export to the TOE.
4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The following security objectives for the TOE are taken from the PPs:
• OT.Lifecycle_Security Lifecycle security.
The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage. The
TOE shall securely destroy the SCD on demand of the signatory.
• OT.SCD_Secrecy Secrecy of the signature creation data.
The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature creation) shall be reasonably assured against
attacks with a high attack potential.
• OT.Sig_Secure Cryptographic security of the electronic signature.
The TOE shall create digital signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD
through robust encryption techniques. The SCD shall not be reconstructable using the digital
signatures or any other data exportable from the TOE. The digital signatures shall be resistant
against these attacks, even when executed with a high attack potential.
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• OT.Sigy_SigF Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only.
The TOE shall provide the digital signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only
and protects the SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall resist attacks with high attack
potential.
• OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE.
The TOE shall not alter the DTBS/R. As by definition of the DTBS/R this may consist of the
DTBS themselves, this objective does not conflict with a signature creation process where the
TOE hashes the provided DTBS (in part or entirely) for signature creation.
• OT.EMSEC_Design Provide physical emanations security.
The TOE shall be designed and built in such a way as to control the production of intelligible
emanations within specified limits.
• OT.Tamper_ID Tamper detection.
The TOE shall provide system features that detect physical tampering of its components, and
uses those features to limit security breaches.
• OT.Tamper_Resistance Tamper resistance.
The TOE shall prevent or resist physical tampering with specified system devices and
components.
The following security objectives for the TOE are taken from the EN-419211-2 PP [PP2]:
• OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorised SCD/SVD generation.
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke the
generation of the SCD and the SVD.
• OT.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature creation data.
The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of an SCD/SVD pair it creates as suitable for
the advanced or qualified electronic signature. The SCD used for signature creation shall
practically occur only once and shall not be reconstructable from the SVD. In that context
‘practically occur once’ means that the probability of equal SCDs is negligible.
• OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD.
The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by the
TOE. This includes unambiguous reference of a created SVD/SCD pair for export of the SVD
and in creating an electronic signature creation with the SCD.
The following security objective for the TOE is taken from the EN-419211-3 PP [PP3]:
• OT.SCD_Auth_Imp Authorised SCD import.
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke the
import of the SCD.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The following security objectives for the Operational Environment are taken from the PPs:
• OE.SVD_Auth Authenticity of the SVD.
The operational environment shall ensure the integrity of the SVD sent to the CGA of the CSP.
The CGA verifies the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the signatory and the
SVD in the qualified certificate.
• OE.CGA_QCert Generation of qualified certificates.
The CGA shall generate a qualified certificate that includes (amongst others):
a) the name of the signatory controlling the TOE;
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b) the SVD matching the SCD stored in the TOE and being under sole control of the signatory;
c) the advanced signature of the CSP.
The CGA shall confirm with the generated qualified certificate that the SCD corresponding to
the SVD is stored in a SSCD.
• OE.SSCD_Prov_Service Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD-provisioning service.
The SSCD-provisioning service shall initialise and personalise for the signatory an authentic
copy of the TOE and deliver this copy as SSCD to the signatory.
• OE.HID_VAD Protection of the VAD.
If an external device provides the human interface for user authentication, this device shall
ensure confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method
employed from import through its human interface until import through the TOE interface. In
particular, if the TOE requires a trusted channel for import of the VAD, the HID shall support
usage of this trusted channel.
• OE.DTBS_Intend SCA sends data intended to be signed.
The signatory shall use a trustworthy SCA that:
- generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory
intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing by the TOE;
- sends the DTBS/R to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of the DTBS/R by the
TOE;
- attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately.
• OE.DTBS_Protect SCA protects the data intended to be signed.
The operational environment shall ensure that the DTBS/R cannot be altered in transit
between the SCA and the TOE. In particular, if the TOE requires a trusted channel for import
of the DTBS/R, the SCA shall support usage of this trusted channel.
• OE.Signatory Security obligation of the signatory.
The signatory shall check that the SCD stored in the SSCD received from SSCD-provisioning
service is in non-operational state. The signatory shall keep their VAD confidential.
The following security objectives for the Operational Environment are taken from the EN-419211-3
PP [PP3] and only apply in case of key import:
• OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorised SCD/SVD generation.
The CSP shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke the
generation of the SCD and the SVD.
• OE.SCD_Secrecy SCD Secrecy.
The CSP shall protect the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to the TOE.
The CSP shall not use the SCD for creation of any signature and shall irreversibly delete the
SCD in the operational environment after export to the TOE.
• OE.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature creation data.
The CSP shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair, which is generated in the
environment, for the qualified or advanced electronic signature. The SCD used for signature
creation shall practically occur only once, i.e. the probability of equal SCDs shall be negligible,
and the SCD shall not be reconstructable from the SVD.
• OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD.
The CSP shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by the
CSP. This includes the correspondence between the SVD send to the CGA and the SCD
exported to the TOE of the signatory identified in the SVD certificate.
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4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
The security objectives rationale is outlined by the PPs. The specifics will not be repeated here, but
the combined tracing tables are given below.
Table 7. Security objectives for the TOE tracing
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
T.SCD_Divulg X X
T.SCD_Derive X X
T.Hack_Phys X X X X
T.SVD_Forgery X
T.SigF_Misuse X X X
T.DTBS_Forgery X
T.Sig_Forgery X X
P.CSP_QCert X X X
P.QSign X X
P.Sigy_SSCD X X X X X X X X X X
P.Sig_Non-Repud X X X X X X X X X X
A.CGA
A.SCA
A.CSP
Table 8. Security objectives for the operational environment tracing
OE.SVD_Auth
OE.CGA_QCert
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service
OE.HID_VAD
OE.DTBS_Intend
OE.DTBS_Protect
OE.Signatory
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OE.SCD_Secrecy
OE.SCD_Unique
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
T.SCD_Divulg X X
T.SCD_Derive X
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T.Hack_Phys
T.SVD_Forgery X X
T.SigF_Misuse X X X X
T.DTBS_Forgery X X
T.Sig_Forgery X X
P.CSP_QCert X X X
P.QSign X X
P.Sigy_SSCD X X X X
P.Sig_Non-Repud X X X X X X X X X
A.CGA X X
A.SCA X
A.CSP X X X X
5 Extended Components Definition
The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined
here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks
against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical
phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic
radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, radio
emanation, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible
emanations. The family FPT_EMS belongs to the Class FPT because it is the class for TSF protection.
Other families within the Class FPT do not cover the TOE emanation. The definition of the family
FPT_EMS is taken from the EN-419211-2 and EN-419211-3 PPs [PP2, PP3].
5.1 FPT_EMS TOE Emanation
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
• FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to
TSF data or user data.
• FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access
to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
FPT_EMS TOE Emanation 1
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There are no actions identified that shall be auditable if FAU_GEN (Security audit data generation) is
included in a PP or ST using FPT_EMS.1.
5.1.1 FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
• FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
• FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF
data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
6 Security Requirements
6.1 Security Functional Requirements
6.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)
6.1.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/ECC Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate an SCD/SVD pair in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm JCOP RNG and specified cryptographic key sizes ECC 256, 384, 512, 521 bit that meet the
following: BSI TR-02102-1 v2023-01.
• [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] →1 JCOP RNG
• [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] →2 ECC 256, 384, 512, 521 bit
• [assignment: list of standards] →3 BSI TR-02102-1 v2023-01
6.1.1.2 FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate an SCD/SVD pair in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
1
According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST]
2 According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST] and BSI TR-02102-1 [BSI]
3 ref [BSI]
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algorithm JCOP RNG and specified cryptographic key sizes RSA from 2000 to 4096 bit that meet the
following: BSI TR-02102-1 v2023-01.
• [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] →4 JCOP RNG
• [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] →5 RSA from 2000 to 4096 bit
• [assignment: list of standards] →6 BSI TR-02102-1 v2023-01
6.1.1.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method physically overwriting the keys in a randomized manner that meets the
following: none.
• [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] →7 physically overwriting the keys in a
randomized manner
• [assignment: list of standards] →8 none
6.1.1.4 FCS_COP.1/ECC Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes ECC 256, 384, 512, 521 bit that meet the following:
Regulation (EU) No 910/2014.
• [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] →9 ECDSA
• [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] →10 ECC 256, 384, 512, 521 bit
• [assignment: list of standards] →11 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014
4
According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST]
5 According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST] and BSI TR-02102-1 [BSI]
6 ref [BSI]
7 According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST]
8 According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST]
9
According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST]
10 According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST] and BSI TR-02102-1 [BSI]
11 ref [EU]
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6.1.1.5 FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm RSA signature with padding according to the PKCS#1-PSS scheme (IEEE 1363-2000) (since
applet version 3.0.1.14) and RSA signature with padding according to the PKCS#1 (v1.5) scheme and
cryptographic key sizes RSA from 2000 to 4096 bit that meet the following: Regulation (EU) No
910/2014.
• [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] →12 RSA signature with padding according to the
PKCS#1-PSS scheme (IEEE 1363-2000) (since applet version 3.0.1.14) and RSA signature with
padding according to the PKCS#1 (v1.5) scheme
• [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] →13 RSA from 2000 to 4096 bit
• [assignment: list of standards] →14 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014
6.1.2 User data protection (FDP)
6.1.2.1 FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP on:
1) subjects: S.User,
2) objects: SCD, SVD,
3) operations: generation of SCD/SVD pair.
6.1.2.2 FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP to objects based on the following: the user
S.User is associated with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management“.
FDP_ACF.1.2/SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
12
According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST] and Java Card Application Programming Interface [JCP]
13 According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST] and BSI TR-02102-1 [BSI]
14 ref [EU]
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and controlled objects is allowed: S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to
“authorised” is allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair.
FDP_ACF.1.3/SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management” set to “not authorised” is not allowed to
generate SCD/SVD pair.
6.1.2.3 FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP on:
1) subjects: S.User;
2) objects: SVD;
3) operations: export.
6.1.2.4 FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1/SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP to objects based on the following:
1) the S.User is associated with the security attribute Role;
2) the SVD.
FDP_ACF.1.2/SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed: R.Admin and R.Sigy are allowed to export SVD.
• [selection: R.Admin, R.Sigy] → R.Admin and R.Sigy are.
FDP_ACF.1.3/SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
none.
6.1.2.5 FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/SCD_Import
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP on
(1) subjects: S.User,
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(2) objects: SCD,
(3) operations: import of SCD.
6.1.2.6 FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/SCD_Import
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to objects based on the following: the S.User is associated
with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management”.
FDP_ACF.1.2/SCD_Import
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed: S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to
“authorised” is allowed to import SCD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/SCD_Import
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/SCD_Import
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management” set to “not authorised” is not allowed to
import SCD.
6.1.2.7 FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/Signature_Creation
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP on:
1) subjects: S.User;
2) objects: DTBS/R, SCD;
3) operations: signature creation.
6.1.2.8 FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/Signature_Creation
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to objects based on the following:
1) the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “Role”; and
2) the SCD with the security attribute “SCD Operational”.
FDP_ACF.1.2/Signature_Creation
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed: R.Sigy is allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with
SCD which security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “yes”.
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FDP_ACF.1.3/Signature_Creation
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/Signature_Creation
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
S.User is not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with SCD which security attribute
“SCD operational” is set to “no”.
6.1.2.9 FDP_ITC.1/SCD Import of user data without security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ITC.1.1/SCD
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from
outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/SCD
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the SCD when imported from outside
the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/SCD
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from
outside the TOE: none.
• [assignment: additional importation control rules] → none
6.1.2.10 FDP_UCT.1/SCD Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1/SCD
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to receive SCD in a manner protected from unauthorised
disclosure.
6.1.2.11 FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource from the following objects: SCD.
6.1.2.12 FDP_SDI.2/Persistent Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FDP_SDI.2.1/ Persistent
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for integrity error on all
objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked stored data.
FDP_SDI.2.2/ Persistent
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall:
1) prohibit the use of the altered data;
2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.
6.1.2.13 FDP_SDI.2/DTBS Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1/DTBS
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for integrity error on all
objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked stored DTBS.
FDP_SDI.2.2/DTBS
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall:
1) prohibit the use of the altered data;
2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.
6.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
6.1.3.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall allow:
1) self-test according to FPT_TST.1;
2) none
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
• [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions] → none
FIA_UID.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.3.2 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow:
1) self-test according to FPT_TST.1;
2) identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA_UID.1;
3) none
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
• [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions] → none
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FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.3.3 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within the range from 1 to
15 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to consecutive failed authentication
attempts.
• [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive
integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] → an administrator configurable
positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]
• [assignment: range of acceptable values] → the range from 1 to 15
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall
block RAD.
6.1.4 Security management (FMT)
6.1.4.1 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles R.Admin and R.Sigy.
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.4.2 FMT_SMF.1 Security management functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1) creation and modification of RAD;
2) enabling the signature creation function;
3) modification of the security attribute SCD/SVD management, SCD operational;
4) change the default value of the security attribute SCD Identifier;
5) none.
• [assignment: list of other security management functions to be provided by the TSF] → none
6.1.4.3 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.
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FMT_MOF.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions signature creation function to R.Sigy.
6.1.4.4 FMT_MSA.1/Admin Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/Admin
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP and SCD Import SFP to restrict the ability to
modify, none, the security attributes SCD/SVD management to R.Admin.
• [assignment: other operations] → none
Note that the security functional requirements FMT_MSA.1.1/Admin from the EN 419211-2 PP
[PP2] and EN 419211-3 PP [PP3] are merged to include both SCD/SVD Generation and SCD Import.
6.1.4.5 FMT_MSA.1/Signatory Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/Signatory
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to restrict the ability to modify the security
attributes SCD operational to R.Sigy.
6.1.4.6 FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.2.1
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for SCD/SVD Management and SCD
operational.
6.1.4.7 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
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FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP, SVD Transfer SFP, SCD Import SFP and Signature
Creation SFP to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the
SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow the R.Admin to specify alternative initial values to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
Note that the security functional requirements FMT_MSA.3.1 from the EN 419211-2 PP [PP2] and
EN 419211-3 PP [PP3] are merged to include both SCD/SVD Generation and SCD Import.
6.1.4.8 FMT_MSA.4 Security attribute value inheritance
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.4.1
The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security attributes:
1) If S.Admin successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair without S.Sigy being authenticated the
security attribute “SCD operational of the SCD” shall be set to “no” as a single operation.
2) If S.Sigy successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair the security attribute “SCD operational of the
SCD” shall be set to “yes” as a single operation.
3) If S.Admin imports SCD while S.Sigy is not currently authenticated, the security attribute “SCD
operational” of the SCD shall be set to “no” after import of the SCD as a single operation.
4) If S.Admin imports SCD while S.Sigy is currently authenticated, the security attribute “SCD
operational” of the SCD shall be set to “yes” after import of the SCD as a single operation.
Note that the security functional requirements FMT_MSA.4.1 from the EN 419211-2 PP [PP2] and
EN 419211-3 PP [PP3] are merged to include both SCD/SVD Generation and SCD Import.
6.1.4.9 FMT_MTD.1/Admin Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/Admin
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create the RAD to R.Admin.
6.1.4.10 FMT_MTD.1/Signatory Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/Signatory
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify, unblock the RAD to R.Sigy.
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• [assignment: other operations] →15 unblock
6.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.5.1 FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1
The TOE shall not emit variations in power consumption or timing during command execution in
excess of non-useful information enabling access to RAD and SCD.
• [assignment: types of emissions] →16 variations in power consumption or timing during
command execution
• [assignment: specified limits] →17 non-useful information
FPT_EMS.1.2
The TSF shall ensure that unauthorized users are unable to use the following interface electrical
contacts or Radio Frequency (RF) field to gain access to RAD and SCD.
• [assignment: type of users] → that unauthorized users
• [assignment: type of connection] →18 electrical contacts or Radio Frequency (RF) field
6.1.5.2 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1) self-test according to FPT_TST fails;
2) control flow and authentication checks (in accordance with FPT_PHP), executed before
cryptographic operations, fail.
• [assignment: list of other types of failures in the TSF] → control flow and authentication
checks (in accordance with FPT_PHP), executed before cryptographic operations, fail
6.1.5.3 FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.1.1
The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the
TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2
The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF’s devices
or TSF’s elements has occurred.
15 According to PPs EN 419211-2 [PP2] and EN 419211-3 [PP3]
16
According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST]
17 According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST]
18 According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST], this includes sending APDUs
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6.1.5.4 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by responding
automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
• [assignment: physical tampering scenarios] →19 physical manipulation and physical probing
• [assignment: list of TSF devices/elements] →20 TSF
6.1.5.5 FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions:
1) during initial start-up
2) periodically during normal operation
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
• [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the
authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should
occur]] → at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur]
• [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur] → during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF.
6.1.6 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
6.1.6.1 FTP_ITC.1/SCD Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/SCD
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that
is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/SCD
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/SCD
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
19 According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST]
20 According to JCOP 4 P71 [PST]
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1) Data exchange integrity according to FDP_UCT.1/SCD,
2) none.
• [assignment: list of other functions for which a trusted channel is required] → none
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
Security assurance level EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5.
Table 9. Security assurance overview
Assurance class Assurance components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures
and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
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6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
Coverage:
Table 10. SFRs to security objectives for the TOE tracing
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
FCS_CKM.1/ECC X X X X
FCS_CKM.1/RSA X X X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1/ECC X X
FCS_COP.1/RSA X X
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X X
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer X
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import X X
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation X X
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X X
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer X
FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import X X
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation X X
FDP_ITC.1/SCD X
FDP_RIP.1 X X
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent X X X
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS X X
FDP_UCT.1/SCD X X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X
FIA_UID.1 X X X
FMT_MOF.1 X X
FMT_MSA.1/Admin X X
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory X X
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FMT_MSA.2 X X X
FMT_MSA.3 X X X
FMT_MSA.4 X X X X
FMT_MTD.1/Admin X X
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X
FPT_EMS.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X
FPT_PHP.1 X
FPT_PHP.3 X X
FPT_TST.1 X X X
FTP_ITC.1/SCD X X
Sufficiency and satisfaction of dependencies of security requirements follow from the PPs will not
be repeated here.
7 TOE Summary Specifications
7.1 Security Services
7.1.1 SS.Access_Control
The applet provides configurable access controls to manage the use of data object and
cryptographic support.
Access control is configured by specifying the authentication objects, or combinations thereof, that
are permitted access to perform read/write/use operations on objects.
This service provides:
• FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before
SCD/SVD generation.
• FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before SVD transfer.
• FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before SCD import.
• FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before signature
creation.
• FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before
SCD/SVD generation.
• FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before SVD transfer.
• FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before SCD import.
• FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before signature
creation.
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• FDP_ITC.1/SCD: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before SCD import.
• FIA_UAU.1: Access control lists prevent other TSF-mediated actions before authentication.
• FIA_UID.1: Access control lists prevent other TSF-mediated actions before identification.
• FMT_MOF.1: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before TOE activation by the
signatory.
• FMT_MSA.1/Admin: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before security attribute
modification.
• FMT_MSA.1/Signatory: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before security attribute
modification.
• FMT_MSA.3: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before security attribute
initialization.
• FMT_MSA.4: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before SCD/SVD generation SCD and
import.
• FMT_MTD.1/Admin: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before RAD creation.
• FMT_MTD.1/Signatory: Access control lists are checked by the TOE before RAD modification.
7.1.2 SS.Authentication_Management
Security management allows blocking, unblocking and modification of authentication objects. These
operations are subject to access control.
This service provides:
• FIA_AFL.1: The TOE allows the configurable number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
upon construction of the authentication object. This cannot be modified afterwards.
• FMT_MSA.1/Admin: The security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” can only be set by the
administrator upon construction of the authentication object. This cannot be modified
afterwards.
• FMT_MSA.2: Only secure values are accepted for security attribute “SCD/SVD Management”.
• FMT_MTD.1/Admin: Creation functionality of a new RAD is provided by the TOE.
• FMT_MTD.1/Signatory: Modification functionality of a RAD is provided by the TOE.
• FMT_SMR.1: Users are associated with roles through authentication objects.
• FMT_SMF.1: Management functions of security attributes related to authentication objects
are implemented by the TOE.
7.1.3 SS.Key_Management
Key Management provides the ability of import, export and destruction of keys. The ability is
controlled by access control policies and properties defined by the object.
This service provides:
• FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic key destruction is instrumented by the applet.
• FDP_ITC.1/SCD: Security attributes associated with the SCD are ignored as part of the SCD
import process.
• FDP_RIP.1: References to keys are completely removed during key destruction.
• FDP_UCT.1/SCD: Imported SCDs are protected from unauthorized disclosure by symmetric
key encryption.
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• FMT_MSA.1/Signatory: The security attribute “SCD operational” can only be changed to yes
by the signatory.
• FMT_MSA.2: Only secure values are accepted for security attribute “SCD operational”.
• FMT_MSA.3: Security attributes have to always be specified by the administrator.
• FMT_MSA.4: The security attribute “SCD operational” is set appropriately as part of the key
import process.
• FMT_SMF.1: Management functions of security attributes related to keys are implemented by
the TOE.
7.1.4 SS.RSA/ECC_Key_Generation
The TOE supports generation of cryptographic keys for usage. For this it uses the cryptographic
libraries provided by the platform. Key generation is subject to access control.
This service provides:
• FCS_CKM.1/ECC: ECC key generation is instrumented by the applet.
• FCS_CKM.1/RSA: RSA key generation is instrumented by the applet.
• FMT_MSA.4: The security attribute “SCD operational” is set appropriately as part of the key
generation process.
7.1.5 SS.RSA/ECC_Signature_Creation
The TOE supports the creation of signatures. For this it uses the cryptographic libraries provided by
the platform. Signature creation is subject to access control.
This service provides:
• FCS_COP.1/ECC: ECC operations are instrumented by the applet to allow for signature
creation.
• FCS_COP.1/RSA: RSA operations are instrumented by the applet to allow for signature
creation.
7.1.6 SS.Secure_Messaging
The TOE utilizes the platform secure messaging services to provide authenticated and confidential
communications with the TOE and external entities.
This service provides:
• FDP_UCT.1/SCD: The SCD is protected from unauthorized disclosure by the secure messaging
channel.
• FTP_ITC.1/SCD: The secure messaging channel provides a logically distinct, authenticated
channel with protection from modification and disclosure.
7.1.7 SS.User_Authentication
The TOE provides configurable authentication mechanisms to be used by SS.Access_Control for
operating the TOE security functionality.
This service provides:
• FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation: The user needs to be authenticated to the TOE as input for
SS.Access_Control.
• FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer: The user needs to be authenticated to the TOE as input for
SS.Access_Control.
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• FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import: The user needs to be authenticated to the TOE as input for
SS.Access_Control.
• FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation: The user needs to be authenticated to the TOE as input for
SS.Access_Control.
• FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation: The user needs to be authenticated to the TOE as input for
SS.Access_Control.
• FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer: The user needs to be authenticated to the TOE as input for
SS.Access_Control.
• FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import: The user needs to be authenticated to the TOE as input for
SS.Access_Control.
• FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation: The user needs to be authenticated to the TOE as input for
SS.Access_Control.
• FIA_AFL.1: Authentication failure is handled by returning an error code containing also the
number of tries remaining. After an authentication failure, the corresponding authentication
object is guaranteed to not be authenticated.
• FIA_UAU.1: The user is authenticated after a successful authentication.
• FIA_UID.1: The user is identified as part of the authentication process.
7.2 Security Features
7.2.1 SF.Applet_Hardening
Specific coding strategies are applied to strengthen the applet resilience against advanced attack
types such as fault injection and side channel analysis.
This feature, combined with the underlying platform security features, realizes:
• FPT_EMS.1: The TOE relies on the platform where possible for critical code execution. When
not possible, for critical code, coding strategies that minimize emanation are used.
• FPT_FLS.1: The TOE does not modify state before all tests have been checked.
• FPT_PHP.1: The TOE uses control flow monitoring and defensive coding strategies.
• FPT_PHP.3: The TOE requires additional security checks to pass before executing critical
sections.
• FPT_TST.1: The self test of the TOE is ran during applet selection, and randomly while
processing APDU commands.
7.2.2 SF.Platform_Security_Functions
The TOE is a composite product and uses security services and security features provided by the
underlying platform. See the JCOP 4 P71 Security Target Lite [PST] for an overview of security
features provided by the platform. This security feature defines the combined platform security
services and security features used for realizing the security functional requirements in this TOE.
This feature realizes:
• FCS_CKM.1/ECC: The TOE uses the platform cryptographic libraries for its ECC key generation
(SF.CRYPTO: Cryptographic Functionality).
• FCS_CKM.1/RSA: The TOE uses the platform cryptographic libraries for its RSA key generation
(SF.CRYPTO: Cryptographic Functionality).
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• FCS_CKM.4: The TOE uses the platform cryptographic libraries for its cryptographic key
destruction (SF.CRYPTO: Cryptographic Functionality).
• FCS_COP.1/ECC: The TOE uses the platform cryptographic libraries for its ECC operations
(SF.CRYPTO: Cryptographic Functionality).
• FCS_COP.1/RSA: The TOE uses the platform cryptographic libraries for its RSA operations
(SF.CRYPTO: Cryptographic Functionality).
• FDP_SDI.2/Persistent: The TOE uses the platform for integrity checks (SF.JCVM: Java Card
Virtual Machine).
• FDP_SDI.2/DTBS: The TOE uses the platform for integrity checks (SF.JCVM: Java Card Virtual
Machine).
• FIA_AFL.1: The TOE uses the platform to keep track of failed authentication attempts and
blocking the RAD after this has met the configurable number of attempts (SF.PIN: PIN
Management).
• FPT_EMS.1: The TOE uses the platform’s emanation protection (SF.SMG_NSC: No Side-
Channel).
• FPT_FLS.1: Realized by the platform tearing, transaction, and memory management functions
(SF.PERS_MEM: Persistent Memory Management).
• FPT_PHP.1: The TOE uses the platform’s physical attack detection (SF.HW_EXC: Hardware
Exception Handling).
• FPT_PHP.3: The TOE uses the platform’s physical attack resistance (SF.HW_EXC: Hardware
Exception Handling).
• FTP_ITC.1/SCD: The TOE uses the platform’s secure channel implementation (SF.OPEN: Card
Content Management).
7.3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
Table 11. SFRs to security services/features tracing
SS.Access_Control
SS.Authentication_Management
SS.Key_Management
SS.RSA/ECC_Key_Generation
SS.RSA/ECC_Signature_Creation
SS.Secure_Messaging
SS.User_Authentication
SF.Applet_Hardening
SF.Platform_Security_Functions
FCS_CKM.1/ECC X X
FCS_CKM.1/RSA X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1/ECC X X
FCS_COP.1/RSA X X
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FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X X
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer X X
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import X X
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation X X
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X X
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer X X
FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import X X
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation X X
FDP_ITC.1/SCD X X
FDP_RIP.1 X
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent X
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS X
FDP_UCT.1/SCD X X
FIA_AFL.1 X X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X
FIA_UID.1 X X
FMT_MOF.1 X
FMT_MSA.1/Admin X X
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory X X
FMT_MSA.2 X X
FMT_MSA.3 X X
FMT_MSA.4 X X X
FMT_MTD.1/Admin X X
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory X X
FMT_SMR.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X X
FPT_EMS.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X
FPT_PHP.1 X X
FPT_PHP.3 X X
FPT_TST.1 X
FTP_ITC.1/SCD X X