National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon Edition
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11258-2022
Dated: 05/03/2022
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jim Donndelinger
Swapna Katikaneni
Dave Thompson
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Anthony Busciglio
Lucas Shaefer
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 7
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ................................................................. 9
5.1 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................................9
5.2 Threats.............................................................................................................................................................9
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................10
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 11
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 12
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................12
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................12
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 13
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................13
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................14
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 15
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................15
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................15
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................15
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................16
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................16
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................16
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................17
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 18
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 19
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 20
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 21
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 22
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon Edition Target of Evaluation (TOE). It
presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not
an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE
is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in May 2022. The information in this report
is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all
written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems Version 4.2.1, dated 2019-04-22
[OSPP].
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as
interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile for General Purpose
Operating Systems, version 4.2.1, dated 2019-04-22 [OSPP]. This Validation Report applies
only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against the Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation
contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion
of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon Edition Version 1.0
Protection Profile Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, version 4.2.1, dated 2019-
04-22 [OSPP]
Security Target INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon Edition Security Target version 1.2 dated April
26,2022
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for INTEGRITY Enterprise OS - Archon Edition, 1.0
version 1.0
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Extended
Sponsor Archon Secure LLC
Developer Archon Secure LLC
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Jim Donndelinger, Swapna Katikaneni, Dave Thompson
The Aerospace Corporation
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3 Architectural Information
The TOE is the INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon Edition, which provides a secure
computing environment for mobile platforms. The TOE provides end users with the ability to
install their own custom user software in a high security sandbox, while maintaining a secure
operating system enclave logically isolated from the end user’s application.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE implements the following security functional requirements from [OSPP] as listed below:
4.1 Audit Data Generation (FAU)
The TOE audits the following events and details:
• Audit all administrative functions.
• Audit all security-relevant functions of the OS.
• Audit the causing user, calling process, and specific error messages for any logged
events.
4.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE includes the INTEGRITY Crypto Library v1.0 (ICL). Functions implemented with
ICL are in service of all cryptographic functionality required by the SFRs. The TOE supports
the following cryptographic functions:
SFR Cryptographic Algorithm Operating Env. Modes & Key Sizes CAVP
FCS_CKM.1 ECC KeyGen in accordance
with FIPS 186-4 Appendix
B.4
SWIC Operating System 1.0
on INTEGRITY-IoT-2020.24
RTOS Microkernel
NIST Curves P-256, P-384, P-521 C1871
FCS_CKM.2 Elliptic Curve key
establishment in
accordance with NIST SP
800-56A
SWIC Operating System 1.0
on INTEGRITY-IoT-2020.24
RTOS Microkernel
NIST Curves P-384 C1871
FCS_COP.1(1) AES-XTS in accordance
with NIST SP 800-38E
SWIC Operating System 1.0
on INTEGRITY-IoT-2020.24
RTOS Microkernel
256-bit C1871
AES-GCM in accordance
with NIST SP 800-38D
SWIC Operating System 1.0
on INTEGRITY-IoT-2020.24
RTOS Microkernel
256-bit C1871
FCS_COP.1(2) SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512 in accordance
with FIPS Pub 180-4
SWIC Operating System 1.0
on INTEGRITY-IoT-2020.24
RTOS Microkernel
160 bits for SHA-1, 256 bits for SHA-
256; 384 bits for SHA-384; 512 bits for
SHA-512
C1871
FCS_COP.1(3) ECDSA SigGen and SigVer
in accordance with FIPS
Pub 186-4 Section 5
SWIC Operating System 1.0
on INTEGRITY-IoT-2020.24
RTOS Microkernel
NIST curve P-384 C1871
RSA SigGen and SigVer in
accordance with FIPS Pub
186-4
SWIC Operating System 1.0
on INTEGRITY-IoT-2020.24
RTOS Microkernel
2048-bit C1871
FCS_COP.1(4) SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512 in accordance
with FIPS Pub 198-1 and
FIPS Pub 180-4
SWIC Operating System 1.0
on INTEGRITY-IoT-2020.24
RTOS Microkernel
For SHA-256, a 256-bit key size and
message size.
For SHA-384, a 384-bit key size and
message size.
For SHA-512, a 512-bit key size and
message size.
C1871
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SFR Cryptographic Algorithm Operating Env. Modes & Key Sizes CAVP
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 HMAC_DRBG in
accordance with NIST SP
800-90A
SWIC Operating System 1.0
on INTEGRITY-IoT-2020.24
RTOS Microkernel
Random number generation for all
cryptography
C1871
4.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
The TOE protects all user data on disk via always-on encryption. All data on the disk, including
the OS files and all user data, are automatically encrypted. This includes all Protection Profile-
defined Sensitive Data, including:
• User application private keys, secrets, and key material.
• Certificates and keys used for trusted path establishment, trusted channel establishment,
and trusted update verification.
4.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
The TOE implements user identification and authentication, including authentication failure
limiting, at all administrative interfaces. No more than three consecutive unsuccessful
authentication attempts on any given power cycle. The TOE requires that the administrator
successfully authenticate prior to performing any management or configuration functions.
The TOE supports the use of X.509v3 certificates, including revocation and validity checking.
The administrator may choose which certificate is used for any given trusted path or trusted
channel.
4.5 Security Management (FMT)
The TOE permits authorized and authenticated administrators to perform the following
management functions:
• Set the inactivity timeout.
• Configure trusted paths and channels.
• Configure the networking parameters.
• Configure automatic updates.
• Management of user accounts.
4.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
The TOE implements protection of the kernel, audit logs and functions, and credential
repositories. The TOE implements Address Space Layout Randomization and Stack-Based
Buffer Overflow protection. The TOE performs self-tests of the cryptographic functions prior to
operation and implements security checking prior to installing updates.
4.7 Trusted Paths and Channels (FTP)
The TOE provides a TLS trusted communication path to both administrators and trusted IT
entities that protects the channel data from modification or compromise.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
ID Assumption
A.PLATFORM The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution.
This underlying platform is out of scope of this PP.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy. At
the same time, malicious software could act as the user, so requirements
which confine malicious subjects are still in scope.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied
enterprise security policy.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
ID Threat
T.NETWORK_ATT
ACK
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on
the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications
with applications and services running on or part of the OS with the
intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of altering existing
legitimate communications.
T.NETWORK_EAV
ESDROP
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on
the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to
data exchanged between applications and services that are running on or
part of the OS.
T.LOCAL_ATTAC
K
An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The
compromised application may provide maliciously formatted input to
the OS through a variety of channels including unprivileged system calls
and messaging via the file system.
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T.LIMITED_PHYSI
CAL_ACCESS
An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a limited
amount of time with the physical device.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating
Systems, version 4.2.1, dated 2019-04-22 [OSPP].
• Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
• The evaluated configuration of the TOE is the INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon
Edition Version 1.0 software product and not any earlier or later versions released or in
process.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon Edition Security Target version 1.2
• INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon Edition Common Criteria Administrative
Guidance version 1.2
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is the INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon Edition, which provides secure computing
on the Archon ZV secure mobility platform. This includes the bootloader and all code that
executes from device power on until the full OS is loaded, and runs only on the secure mobile
platforms below:
Platform Name CPU HDD RAM
Archon ZV 5400 Intel Core i5-8365U (Whiskey Lake 64-bit
microarchitecture)
250 GB 8 GB or 16GB
Furthermore, the TOE requires the operational environment to provide the following to support
its security functions:
• For administration of the TOE, at least one authorized administration server.
• For TOE updates, at least one authorized update server.
• For handling of TOE-generated audit records, at least one authorized audit server.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The following interfaces are not included as part of the evaluated configuration:
Functions Exclusion discussion
None All TOE functions are evaluated as part of the Common Criteria Evaluation.
13
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon
Edition, which is not publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview
of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Test Configuration
Testing was carried at the Acumen Security offices located in 2400 Research Blvd Suite #395,
Rockville, MD 20850 by the evaluator. Testing occurred from February 2021 through February
2022. Testing was performed within Acumen’s Common Criteria lab in a controlled, isolated
environment using the test configuration depicted below and completed by the Acumen Security
Evaluation Team following the CCTL’s NVLAP-accredited test procedure.
Name OS Version Function &
Location
Protocols Tools (version)
Archon ZV 5400 INTEGRITY
Enterprise OS
Archon
Edition 1.0
TOE
TLS
ICMP
• Anyconnect VPN 4.7
• Aruba VPN 3.4
Administration/
Management
Server
Ubuntu 20 Archon
Edition 1.0
Third-party VPN
Testing
ICMP
ISAKMP
ESP
• INTEGRTY
Administration Server
(Archon Edition 1.0)
• INTEGRITY
Management Server
(Archon Edition 1.0)
• Anyconnect VPN
(4.7)
• Aruba VPN (3.4)
• Wireshark (3.0)
Administration/
Management
Server
Ubuntu 20 Archon
Edition 1.0
Third-party VPN
Testing
ICMP • INTEGRTY
Administration Server
(Archon Edition 1.0)
• INTEGRITY
Management Server
(Archon Edition 1.0)
• Anyconnect VPN
(4.7)
• Aruba VPN (3.4)
14
Name OS Version Function &
Location
Protocols Tools (version)
• Wireshark (3.0)
Network Switch IOS XE 15.2 Lab Switch
N/A
N/A
Administration/
Management
Server
Ubuntu 20 Archon
Edition 1.0
Remote
administration
TLS/X509 Testing
Certificate
Authority
TLS • INTEGRTY
Administration Server
(Archon Edition 1.0)
• INTEGRITY
Management Server
(Archon Edition 1.0)
• OpenSSL (1.1.1)
• Acumen_TLSC (8-
23-21)
• Wireshark (3.0)
Tester Laptop Windows 10 10 Test Interface TLS N/A
8.2 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.3 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems,
version 4.2.1, dated 2019-04-22 [OSPP]. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the
Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
15
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the INTEGRITY Enterprise OS
– Archon Edition to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally
the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon Edition
that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that
support the requirements. Additionally the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance
Activities specified in the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, version
4.2.1, dated 2019-04-22 [OSPP].
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the General Purpose Operating Systems, version 4.2.1, dated
2019-04-22 [OSPP] related to the examination of the information contained in the TOE
Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
16
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the General Purpose Operating Systems, version 4.2.1, dated 2019-04-22
[OSPP] related to the examination of the information contained in the operational guidance
documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the General Purpose Operating Systems, version
4.2.1, dated 2019-04-22 [OSPP] and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the
Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the General Purpose Operating Systems, version 4.2.1, dated 2019-04-22 [OSPP], and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed
a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any
issues with the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the General Purpose Operating Systems, version
4.2.1, dated 2019-04-22 [OSPP], and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the General Purpose
Operating Systems, version 4.2.1, dated 2019-04-22 [OSPP], and correctly verified that the
product meets the claims in the ST.
18
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the INTEGRITY Enterprise OS –
Archon Edition Common Criteria Administrative Guidance version 1.2 document. No versions
of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were evaluated.
19
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
20
12 Security Target
INTEGRITY Enterprise OS – Archon Edition Security Target version 1.2 dated April 26,2022
21
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
22
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.