Belkin F1DN002MOD-KM-4,
F1DN004MOD-KM-4 and
F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 Firmware
Version 40404-0E7
Peripheral Sharing Devices
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4
Version: 1.6
8 November 2021
Belkin International, Inc.
12045 E. Waterfront Drive
Playa Vista, CA 90094 USA
Prepared by:
EWA-Canada, An Intertek Company
1223 Michael Street North, Suite 200
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1J 7T2
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page i of ii
CONTENTS
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION.............................................1
1.1 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION........................................................... 1
1.2 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE....................................................... 2
1.3 TOE REFERENCE........................................................................... 2
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW............................................................................ 2
Security Features ...........................................................................2
TOE Environment ...........................................................................5
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION ....................................................................... 5
Evaluated Configurations.................................................................5
Physical Scope ...............................................................................7
Logical Scope.................................................................................8
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS...............................................................9
2.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM ...................................... 9
2.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE CLAIM................................... 9
2.3 PACKAGE CLAIM........................................................................... 9
2.4 MODULE CLAIM.......................................................................... 10
2.5 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE ......................................................... 10
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION..............................................11
3.1 THREATS .................................................................................. 11
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ......................................... 12
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS........................................................................... 12
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES..............................................................13
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ............................................ 13
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......... 17
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE............................................... 17
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION......................................21
5.1 CLASS FDP: USER DATA PROTECTION ........................................... 21
FDP_APC_EXT Active PSD Connections............................................21
FDP_FIL_EXT Device Filtering ........................................................22
FDP_PDC_EXT Peripheral Device Connection....................................23
FDP_RDR_EXT Re-Enumeration Device Rejection .............................25
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page ii of iii
FDP_RIP_EXT Residual Information Protection .................................26
FDP_SWI_EXT PSD Switching ........................................................27
FDP_UDF_EXT Unidirectional Data Flow...........................................28
5.2 CLASS FPT: PROTECTION OF THE TSF ........................................... 28
FPT_FLS_EXT Failure with Preservation of Secure State ....................28
FPT_NTA_EXT No Access to TOE.....................................................29
FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing .............................................................30
5.3 CLASS FTA: TOE ACCESS ............................................................ 30
FTA_CIN_EXT Continuous Indications .............................................30
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ........................................................32
6.1 CONVENTIONS AND APPLICABILITY .............................................. 32
Conventions ................................................................................32
Section Applicability......................................................................32
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL DEVICES .............. 33
User Data Protection (FDP)............................................................34
Protection of the TSF (FPT)............................................................35
6.3 ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR F1DN002MOD-KM-4 AND
F1DN004MOD-KM-4 SWITCHES .............................................................. 36
User Data Protection (FDP)............................................................37
Protection of the TSF (FPT)............................................................38
TOE Access (FTA).........................................................................38
6.4 ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 ........ 38
User Data Protection (FDP)............................................................39
Protection of the TSF (FPT)............................................................39
7 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ....................................40
8 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE.....................................41
8.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ....................... 41
8.2 DEPENDENCY RATIONALE............................................................ 41
8.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ........................ 42
9 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION.................................................43
9.1 USER DATA PROTECTION ............................................................ 43
System Controller ........................................................................43
Keyboard and Mouse Functionality..................................................44
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page iii of iv
9.2 PROTECTION OF THE TSF ............................................................ 45
No Access to TOE .........................................................................45
Anti-tampering Functionality..........................................................46
TSF Testing .................................................................................46
9.3 TOE ACCESS.............................................................................. 46
Continuous Indications..................................................................46
Wired Remote Control...................................................................47
10 TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS ................................................48
10.1 TERMINOLOGY........................................................................... 48
10.2 ACRONYMS................................................................................ 48
11 REFERENCES..............................................................................50
ANNEX A – LETTER OF VOLATILITY .................................................... A-1
ANNEX B – SFR DEVICE MATRIX......................................................... B-1
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Non-TOE Hardware and Software................................................. 5
Table 2 – TOE Peripheral Sharing Devices and Features ................................ 7
Table 3 – Logical Scope of the TOE ............................................................ 8
Table 4 – Applicable Technical Decisions ..................................................... 9
Table 5 – Threats.................................................................................. 11
Table 6 – Assumptions........................................................................... 12
Table 7 – Security Objectives for the TOE ................................................. 16
Table 8 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..................... 17
Table 9 – Security Objectives Rationale .................................................... 20
Table 10 – Functional Families of Extended Components ............................. 21
Table 11 – Devices and Applicable Sections............................................... 32
Table 12 – Summary of Security Functional Requirements........................... 33
Table 13 – Summary of Additional Security Functional Requirements for
F1DN002MOD-KM-4, F1DN004MOD-KM-4 ............................................ 37
Table 14 – Summary of Additional Security Functional Requirements for F1DN-
FLTR-HID-4..................................................................................... 38
Table 15 – Security Assurance Requirements............................................. 40
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page iv of iv
Table 16 – Functional Requirement Dependencies ...................................... 42
Table 17 – Terminology ......................................................................... 48
Table 18 – Acronyms............................................................................. 49
Table 19 – References ........................................................................... 50
Table 20 – Security Functional Requirements and Devices .......................... B-1
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – Simplified Switching Diagram..................................................... 4
Figure 2 – Simplified Filter Diagram ........................................................... 5
Figure 3 – KM Switch Evaluated Configuration ............................................. 6
Figure 4 – USB Filter Evaluated Configuration.............................................. 7
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 1 of 50
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
This Security Target (ST) defines the scope of the evaluation in terms of the
assumptions made, the intended environment for the Target of Evaluation
(TOE), the Information Technology (IT) security functional and assurance
requirements to be met, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level)
to which it is asserted that the TOE satisfies its IT security requirements. This
document forms the baseline for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.
1.1 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION
Section 1, ST Introduction, provides the Security Target reference, the Target
of Evaluation reference, the TOE overview and the TOE description.
Section 2, Conformance Claims, describes how the ST conforms to the
Common Criteria, Protection Profile (PP) and PP Modules.
Section 3, Security Problem Definition, describes the expected environment
in which the TOE is to be used. This section defines the set of threats that are
relevant to the secure operation of the TOE, organizational security policies with
which the TOE must comply, and secure usage assumptions applicable to this
analysis.
Section 4, Security Objectives, defines the set of security objectives to be
satisfied by the TOE and by the TOE operating environment in response to the
problem defined by the security problem definition.
Section 5, Extended Components Definition, defines the extended
components which are then detailed in Section 6.
Section 6, Security Functional Requirements, specifies the security
functional requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE and the IT
environment.
Section 7, Security Assurance Requirements, specifies the security
assurance requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE and the IT
environment.
Section 8, Security Requirements Rationale, provides a rationale for the
selection of functional and assurance requirements.
Section 9, TOE Summary Specification, describes the security functions that
are included in the TOE to enable it to meet the IT security functional
requirements.
Section 10, Terminology and Acronyms, defines the acronyms and
terminology used in this ST.
Section 11, References, provides a list of documents referenced in this ST.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 2 of 50
1.2 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE
ST Title: Belkin F1DN002MOD-KM-4, F1DN004MOD-KM-4 and
F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 Firmware Version 40404-0E7
Peripheral Sharing Devices Security Target
ST Version: 1.6
ST Date: 8 November 2021
1.3 TOE REFERENCE
TOE Identification: Belkin F1DN002MOD-KM-4, F1DN004MOD-KM-4 and
F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 Firmware Version 40404-0E7
Peripheral Sharing Devices
TOE Developer: Belkin International, Inc.
TOE Type: Peripheral Sharing Device (Other Devices and Systems)
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW
The TOE is made up of two types of Peripheral Sharing Devices (PSDs): switches
and a filter.
The F1DN002MOD-KM-4 and F1DN004MOD-KM-4 Belkin Secure Peripheral
Sharing Devices are part of the Modular Secure KM Series product line. These
devices are Keyboard Mouse (KM) switches which allow a single keyboard and
mouse to be used by one of several connected computers. These Keyboard,
Mouse (KM) switches are modular KM switches that support keyboard and
mouse switching only. These devices are used with a remote control device. The
remote control allows switching between the connected computers at a distance
from the KM switch device.
The F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 is a keyboard and mouse Universal Serial Bus (USB)
filter. The F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 is a KM USB filter, which ensures secure
unidirectional communications between a keyboard and mouse and a single
connected computer. Since there is only one connected computer and no
switching functionality, this device is not used with a remote control.
Both device types are Peripheral Sharing Devices compliant with the National
Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) PP-Configuration for Peripheral
Sharing Device and Keyboard/Mouse Devices [CFG_PSD-KM_V1.0], which
references the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0
[PP_PSD_V4.0] and the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0
[MOD_KM_V1.0].
Security Features
The Belkin Secure KM Switches allow users to share keyboard and mouse
peripherals between two to four connected computers. The Belkin F1DN-FLTR-
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 3 of 50
HID-4 Universal Serial Bus (USB) filter provides secure unidirectional
communications between the peripherals and the connected computer. Security
features ensure isolation between computers and peripherals to prevent data
leakage between connected systems.
The following security features are provided by the Belkin Peripheral Sharing
Devices (PSDs):
• Keyboard and Mouse Security
• The keyboard and mouse are isolated by dedicated, USB device
emulation
• One-way, peripheral-to-computer data flow is enforced through
unidirectional optical data diodes
• Communication from computer-to-keyboard/mouse is blocked
• Non HID (Human Interface Device) data transactions are blocked
• Hardware Anti-Tampering
• Special holographic tampering evident labels on the product’s
enclosure provide a clear visual indication if the product has been
opened or compromised
Belkin secure peripheral sharing devices use isolated microcontrollers to emulate
connected peripherals in order to prevent display signaling, keyboard signaling,
and power signaling attacks.
Figure 1 is a simplified switching block diagram showing the TOE keyboard and
mouse data path for two ports. A Host Emulator (HE) communicates with the
user keyboard via the USB protocol. The Host Emulator converts user key
strokes into unidirectional serial data. That unidirectional serial data is passed
through the switch that is used to select between Computer A and Computer B.
Isolated Device Emulators (DE) are connected to the data switch on one side
and to the respective computers on the other side. Each key stroke is converted
by the selected DE into a bi-directional stream to communicate with the
computer.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 4 of 50
Figure 1 – Simplified Switching Diagram
Figure 2 is a simplified block diagram showing the TOE keyboard and mouse
data path for the USB Filter. A Host Emulator (HE) communicates with the user
keyboard via the USB protocol. The Host Emulator converts user key strokes
into unidirectional serial data. An isolated Device Emulator (DE) is connected to
the data diode on one side and to the computer on the other side. Each key
stroke is converted by the selected DE into a bi-directional stream to
communicate with the computer.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 5 of 50
Figure 2 – Simplified Filter Diagram
The TOE is a combined software and hardware TOE.
TOE Environment
The following components are required for operation of the TOE in the evaluated
configuration.
Component Description
Connected Computers 1-4 General purpose computers
Keyboard General purpose USB keyboard
Mouse General purpose USB mouse
Belkin KM Cables USB Type-A to USB Type-B (keyboard and mouse)
Table 1 – Non-TOE Hardware and Software
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION
Evaluated Configurations
Section 1.5.1.1 shows the evaluated configuration for the F1DN002MOD-KM-4
and F1DN004MOD-KM-4 KM switches. Section 1.5.1.2 shows the evaluated
configuration for the F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 USB Filter. Each TOE device is used
independently with a keyboard, mouse and one or more connected computers.
The KM switches and USB Filter are never connected together.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 6 of 50
1.5.1.1 F1DN002MOD-KM-4 and F1DN004MOD-KM-4 Evaluated
Configuration
Figure 3 – KM Switch Evaluated Configuration
Figure 3 shows a basic evaluated configuration for the F1DN004MOD-KM-4,
which is connected to four computers. The F1DN002MOD-KM-4 is connected to
two computers. The devices are used with a remote control.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 7 of 50
1.5.1.2 F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 Evaluated Configuration
Figure 4 – USB Filter Evaluated Configuration
Figure 4 shows a basic evaluated configuration for the F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 USB
Filter. The HID USB Filter is connected to keyboard and mouse peripherals, and
to the appropriate USB port on the computer.
Physical Scope
The TOE consists of the devices shown in Table 2.
Family
Family
Description
Part
Number
Model
Tamper
Evident
labels
Number
of
supported
connected
computers
Keyboard
and
Mouse
Modular
Secure
KM
Series
Secure KM
devices
CGA19181 F1DN002MOD-
KM-4
Yes 2 Yes
CGA19184 F1DN004MOD-
KM-4
Yes 4 Yes
HID
Filter
HID Filter CGA20741 F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 Yes 1 Yes
Remote
Control
Remote
Control
CPN23084 F1DN-MOD-REM4 Yes N/A N/A
CPN23047 F1DN-MOD-REM2 Yes N/A N/A
Table 2 – TOE Peripheral Sharing Devices and Features
1.5.2.1 TOE Delivery
The TOE, together with its corresponding cables are delivered to the customer
via trusted carrier, such as Fed-Ex, that provide a tracking service for all
shipments.
1.5.2.2 TOE Guidance
The TOE includes the following guidance documentation:
• Quick Installation Guide 2/4 Port Modular Secure KM Switches, 8820-
02950 Rev.A00
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 8 of 50
o https://www.belkin.com/support/assets/belkin/qig/Quick%20Install
ation%20Guide%202_4%20Port%20Modular%20Secure%20KM%2
0Switches%2C%208820-02950%20Rev.A00.pdf
• Quick Installation Guide USB Blockers and HID or Programmable Filter,
8820-02954 Rev.A00
o https://www.belkin.com/support/assets/belkin/qig/Quick%20Install
ation%20Guide%20USB%20Blockers%20and%20HID%20or%20Pr
ogrammable%20Filter%2C%208820-02954%20Rev.A00.pdf
• Belkin Regulatory Information, 8820-02969 Rev. A00
o https://www.belkin.com/support/assets/belkin/others/Belkin%20Re
gulatory%20Information%2C%208820-02969%20Rev.%20A00.pdf
Guidance may be downloaded from the Belkin website (www.belkin.com) in .pdf
format.
The following guidance is available upon request by emailing
support@highseclabs.com:
• Belkin F1DN002MOD-KM-4, F1DN004MOD-KM-4, F1DN-FLTR-HID-4
Firmware Version 40404-0E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Common Criteria
Guidance Supplement, Version 1.4
Logical Scope
The logical boundary of the TOE includes all interfaces and functions within the
physical boundary. The logical boundary of the TOE may be broken down by the
security function classes described in Section 6. Table 3 summarizes the logical
scope of the TOE.
Functional Classes Description
User Data Protection The TOE switches provide secure switching capabilities for
keyboard and mouse. The HID Filter TOE enforces
unidirectional data flow for keyboard and mouse. All TOE
devices ensure that only authorized peripheral devices may
be used.
Protection of the TSF1
The TOE ensures a secure state in the case of failure,
provides only restricted access, and performs self-testing.
The TOE provides passive detection of physical attack.
TOE Access The TOE switches provide a continuous indication of which
computer is currently selected.
Table 3 – Logical Scope of the TOE
1
TOE Security Functionality
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 9 of 50
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This Security Target claims to be conformant to Version 3.1 of Common Criteria
for Information Technology Security Evaluation according to:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components; CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
As follows:
• CC Part 2 extended
• CC Part 3 conformant
The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 has been taken into account.
2.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE
CLAIM
This ST claims exact conformance with the National Information Assurance
Partnership (NIAP) PP-Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device and
Keyboard/Mouse Devices [CFG_PSD-KM_V1.0], which references the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0] and the module
listed in Section 2.4. The Technical Decisions in Table 4 apply to the PP and the
module and have been accounted for in the ST and in the evaluation.
Technical Decision PP or Module
TD0507 [MOD_KM_V1.0]
TD0518 [PP_PSD_V4.0]
TD0583 [PP_PSD_V4.0]
TD0593 [MOD_KM_V1.0]
Table 4 – Applicable Technical Decisions
2.3 PACKAGE CLAIM
This Security Target does not claim conformance with any package.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 10 of 50
2.4 MODULE CLAIM
The following PP‐Module is specified in a PP‐Configuration with this PP:
• PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0
2.5 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE
The F1DN002MOD-KM-4 and F1DN004MOD-KM-4 modular Keyboard, Mouse
(KM) switches and F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 Human Interface Device (HID) USB filter
are inherently consistent with the Compliant Targets of Evaluation described in
the [PP_PSD_V4.0] and in the PP modules listed in Section 2.4, and with the PP‐
Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device and Keyboard/Mouse Devices
[CFG_PSD‐KM_V1.0].
The security problem definition, statement of security objectives and statement
of security requirements in this ST conform exactly to the security problem
definition, statement of security objectives and statement of security
requirements contained in [PP_PSD_V4.0] and the module listed in Section 2.4.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 11 of 50
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 THREATS
Table 5 lists the threats described in Section 3.1 of the [PP_PSD_V4.0].
Mitigation to the threats is through the objectives identified in Section 4.1,
Security Objectives for the TOE.
Threat Description
T.DATA_LEAK A connection via the PSD between one or more
computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
the PSD or its connected peripherals.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK A connection via the PSD between one or more
computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
bit‐by‐bit signaling.
T.RESIDUAL_LEAK A PSD may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data
between the intended connected computer and another
unintended connected computer.
T.UNINTENDED_USE A PSD may connect the user to a computer other than
the one to which the user intended to connect.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a
specific PSD peripheral port may allow unauthorized
data flows between connected devices or enable an
attack on the PSD or its connected computers.
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER An attached device (computer or peripheral) with
malware, or otherwise under the control of a
malicious user, could modify or overwrite code or
data stored in the PSD’s volatile or non‐volatile
memory to allow unauthorized information flows.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER A malicious user or human agent could physically
modify the PSD to allow unauthorized information
flows.
T.REPLACEMENT A malicious human agent could replace the PSD
during shipping, storage, or use with an alternate
device that does not enforce the PSD security
policies.
T.FAILED Detectable failure of a PSD may cause an
unauthorized information flow or weakening of PSD
security functions.
Table 5 – Threats
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 12 of 50
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
There are no Organizational Security Policies applicable to this TOE.
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions required to ensure the security of the TOE are listed in Table 6.
Assumptions Description
A.NO_TEMPEST Computers and peripheral devices connected to the
PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
The TSF may or may not isolate the ground of the
keyboard and mouse computer interfaces (the USB
ground). The Operational Environment is assumed not
to support TEMPEST red‐black ground isolation.
A.PHYSICAL The environment provides physical security
commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data
it processes and contains.
A.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES The environment includes no wireless peripheral
devices.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN PSD Administrators and users are trusted to follow and
apply all guidance in a trusted manner.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the PSD and its operational
environment follow the applicable security
configuration guidance.
A.USER_ALLOWED_ACCESS All PSD users are allowed to interact with all
connected computers. It is not the role of the PSD to
prevent or otherwise control user access to connected
computers. Computers or their connected network
shall have the required means to authenticate the user
and to control access to their various resources.
Table 6 – Assumptions
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 13 of 50
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the security objectives is to address the security concerns and to
show which security concerns are addressed by the TOE, and which are
addressed by the environment. Threats may be addressed by the TOE or the
security environment or both. Therefore, the CC identifies two categories of
security objectives:
• Security objectives for the TOE
• Security objectives for the environment
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
This section identifies and describes the security objectives that are to be
addressed by the TOE, and traces each SFR back to a security objective of the
TOE.
Security Objective Description
O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
The PSD shall prevent unauthorized data flow to ensure that
the PSD and its connected peripheral devices cannot be
exploited in an attempt to leak data. The TOE‐Computer
interface shall be isolated from all other PSD‐Computer
interfaces while TOE is powered.
Addressed by:
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
_TOE_UNPOWERED
The PSD shall not allow data to transit a PSD‐Computer
interface while the PSD is unpowered.
Addressed by:
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
O.USER_DATA
_ISOLATION
The PSD shall route user data, such as keyboard entries, only
to the computer selected by the user. The PSD shall provide
isolation between the data flowing from the peripheral device
to the selected computer and any non‐selected computer.
Addressed by:
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 14 of 50
Security Objective Description
O.NO_USER
_DATA_RETENTION
The PSD shall not retain user data in non‐volatile memory
after power up or, if supported, factory reset.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_RIP_EXT.1
MOD_KM FDP_RIP.1/KM
O.NO_OTHER
_EXTERNAL
_INTERFACES
The PSD shall not have any external interfaces other than
those implemented by the TSF.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_PDC_EXT.1
O.LEAK
_PREVENTION
_SWITCHING
The PSD shall ensure that there are no switching mechanisms
that allow signal data leakage between connected computers.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_SWI_EXT.1(1), FDP_SWI_EXT.1(2),
FDP_SWI_EXT.2
O.AUTHORIZED
_USAGE
The TOE shall explicitly prohibit or ignore unauthorized
switching mechanisms, either because it supports only one
connected computer or because it allows only authorized
mechanisms to switch between connected computers.
Authorized switching mechanisms shall require express user
action restricted to console buttons, console switches, console
touch screen, wired remote control, and peripheral devices
using a guard. Unauthorized switching mechanisms include
keyboard shortcuts, also known as “hotkeys,” automatic port
scanning, control through a connected computer, and control
through keyboard shortcuts. Where applicable, the results of
the switching activity shall be indicated by the TSF so that it
is clear to the user that the switching mechanism was
engaged as intended.
A conformant TOE may also provide a management function
to configure some aspects of the TSF. If the TOE provides this
functionality, it shall ensure that whatever management
functions it provides can only be performed by authorized
administrators and that an audit trail of management
activities is generated.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_SWI_EXT.1(1), FDP_SWI_EXT.1(2),
FDP_SWI_EXT.2, FTA_CIN_EXT.1
MOD_KM FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 15 of 50
Security Objective Description
O.PERIPHERAL
_PORTS_ISOLATION
The PSD shall ensure that data does not flow between
peripheral devices connected to different PSD interfaces.
Addressed by:
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_PERIPHERAL
The PSD shall reject unauthorized peripheral device types and
protocols.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_PDC_EXT.1
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3, FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_ENDPOINTS
The PSD shall reject unauthorized peripheral devices
connected via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) hub.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_PDC_EXT.1
MOD_KM FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_RDR_EXT.1,
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
O.NO_TOE_ACCESS The PSD firmware, software, and memory shall not be
accessible via its external ports.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_NTA_EXT.1
O.TAMPER
_EVIDENT
_LABEL
The PSD shall be identifiable as authentic by the user and the
user must be made aware of any procedures or other such
information to accomplish authentication. This feature must
be available upon receipt of the PSD and continue to be
available during the PSD deployment. The PSD shall be
labeled with at least one visible unique identifying tamper‐
evident marking that can be used to authenticate the device.
The PSD manufacturer must maintain a complete list of
manufactured PSD articles and their respective identification
markings’ unique identifiers.
Addressed by:
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 16 of 50
Security Objective Description
PP_PSD FPT_PHP.1
O.ANTI_TAMPERING The PSD shall be physically enclosed so that any attempts to
open or otherwise access the internals or modify the
connections of the PSD would be evident, and optionally
thwarted through disablement of the TOE. Note: This applies
to a wired remote control as well as the main chassis of the
PSD.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_PHP.1
O.SELF_TEST The PSD shall perform self‐tests following power up or
powered reset.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_TST.1
O.SELF_TEST
_FAIL_TOE
_DISABLE
The PSD shall enter a secure state upon detection of a critical
failure.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_FLS_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.1(1),
FPT_TST_EXT.1(2)
O.SELF_TEST
_FAIL_INDICATION
The PSD shall provide clear and visible user indications in the
case of a self‐test failure.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_TST_EXT.1(1), FPT_TST_EXT.1(2)
O.EMULATED_INPUT The TOE shall emulate the keyboard and/or mouse functions
from the TOE to the connected computer.
Addressed by:
MOD_KM FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_INPUT
The TOE shall enforce unidirectional keyboard and/or mouse
device’s data flow from the peripheral device to only the
selected computer.
Addressed by:
MOD_KM FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM
Table 7 – Security Objectives for the TOE
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 17 of 50
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
This section identifies and describes the security objectives that are to be
addressed by the IT environment or by non-technical or procedural means.
Security Objective Description
OE.NO_TEMPEST The operational environment will not use TEMPEST
approved equipment.
OE.PHYSICAL The operational environment will provide physical
security, commensurate with the value of the PSD
and the data that transits it.
OE.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES The operational environment will not include
wireless keyboards, mice, audio, user
authentication, or video devices.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN The operational environment will ensure that trusted
PSD Administrators and users are appropriately
trained.
OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG The operational environment will ensure that
administrators configuring the PSD and its
operational environment follow the applicable
security configuration guidance.
Table 8 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE
The security objectives rationale describes how the assumptions and threats
map to the security objectives.
Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
T.DATA_LEAK O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
Isolation of computer interfaces
prevents data from leaking between
them without authorization.
O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
_TOE_UNPOWERED
Maintaining interface isolation while
the TOE is in an unpowered state
ensures that data cannot leak
between computer interfaces.
O.USER_DATA
_ISOLATION
The TOE’s routing of data only to the
selected computer ensures that it will
not leak to any others.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 18 of 50
Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
O.NO_OTHER
_EXTERNAL
_INTERFACES
The absence of additional external
interfaces ensures that there is no
unexpected method by which data
can be leaked.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_INPUT
The TOE’s enforcement of
unidirectional input for
keyboard/mouse data prevents
leakage of computer data through a
connected peripheral interface.
O.PERIPHERAL_PORTS
_ISOLATION
Isolation of peripheral ports prevents
data from leaking between them
without authorization.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
Isolation of computer interfaces
prevents data leakage through bit‐
wise signaling because there is no
mechanism by which the signal data
can be communicated.
O.NO_OTHER
_EXTERNAL
_INTERFACES
The absence of additional external
interfaces ensures that there is no
unexpected method by which data
can be leaked through bitwise
signaling.
O.LEAK_PREVENTION
_SWITCHING
The TOE’s use of switching methods
that are not susceptible to signal
leakage helps mitigate the signal leak
threat.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_INPUT
The TOE’s enforcement of
unidirectional input for
keyboard/mouse data prevents
leakage of computer data through bit‐
by‐bit signaling to a connected
peripheral interface.
T.RESIDUAL
_LEAK
O.NO_USER_DATA
_RETENTION
The TOE’s lack of data retention
ensures that a residual data leak is
not possible.
T.UNINTENDED
_USE
O.AUTHORIZED
_USAGE
The TOE’s support for only switching
mechanisms that require explicit user
action to engage ensures that a user
has sufficient information to avoid
interacting with an unintended
computer.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 19 of 50
Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
T.UNAUTHORIZED
_DEVICES
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_ENDPOINTS
The TOE’s ability to reject
unauthorized endpoints mitigates the
threat of unauthorized devices being
used to communicate with connected
computers.
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_PERIPHERAL
The TOE’s ability to reject
unauthorized peripherals mitigates
the threat of unauthorized devices
being used to communicate with
connected computers.
O.EMULATED_INPUT The TOE’s emulation of
keyboard/mouse data input ensures
that a connected computer will only
receive this specific type of data
through a connected peripheral.
T.LOGICAL
_TAMPER
O.NO_TOE_ACCESS The TOE’s prevention of logical
access to its firmware, software, and
memory mitigates the threat of
logical tampering.
O.EMULATED_INPUT The TOE’s emulation of
keyboard/mouse data input prevents
logical tampering of the TSF ensuring
that only known inputs to it are
supported.
T.PHYSICAL
_TAMPER
O.ANTI_TAMPERING The TOE mitigates the threat of
physical tampering through use of an
enclosure that provides tamper
detection functionality.
O.TAMPER_EVIDENT
_LABEL
The TOE mitigates the threat of
physical tampering through use of
tamper evident labels that reveal
physical tampering attempts.
T.REPLACEMENT O.TAMPER_EVIDENT
_LABEL
The TOE’s use of a tamper evident
label that provides authenticity of the
device mitigates the threat that it is
substituted for a replacement device
during the acquisition process.
T.FAILED O.SELF_TEST The TOE mitigates the threat of
failures leading to compromise of
security functions through self‐tests
of its own functionality.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 20 of 50
Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL
_TOE_DISABLE
The TOE mitigates the threat of
failures leading to compromise of
security functions by disabling all
data flows in the event a failure is
detected.
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL
_INDICATION
The TOE mitigates the threat of
failures leading to compromise of
security functions by providing users
with a clear indication when it is in a
failure state and should not be
trusted.
A.NO_TEMPEST OE.NO_TEMPEST If the TOE’s operational environment
does not include TEMPEST approved
equipment, then the assumption is
satisfied.
A.NO_PHYSICAL OE.PHYSICAL If the TOE’s operational environment
provides physical security, then the
assumption is satisfied.
A.NO_WIRELESS
_DEVICES
OE.NO_WIRELESS
_DEVICES
If the TOE’s operational environment
does not include wireless peripherals,
then the assumption is satisfied.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN OE.TRUSTED
_ADMIN
If the TOE’s operational environment
ensures that only trusted
administrators will manage the TSF,
then the assumption is satisfied.
A.TRUSTED
_CONFIG
OE.TRUSTED
_CONFIG
If TOE administrators follow the
provided security configuration
guidance, then the assumption is
satisfied.
A.USER_ALLOWED
_ACCESS
OE.PHYSICAL If the TOE’s operational environment
provides physical access to connected
computers, then the assumption is
satisfied.
Table 9 – Security Objectives Rationale
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 21 of 50
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
The extended components definition is presented in Appendix C of the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device [PP_PSD_V4.0] and in the module for
keyboard/mouse devices [MOD_KM_V1.0]. It is repeated here to ensure the
completeness of this ST.
The families to which these components belong are identified in the following
table:
Functional Class Functional Families
User Data Protection (FDP) FDP_APC_EXT Active PSD Connections
FDP_FIL_EXT Device Filtering
FDP_PDC_EXT Peripheral Device Connection
FDP_RDR_EXT Re-Enumeration Device Rejection
FDP_RIP_EXT Residual Information Protection
FDP_SWI_EXT PSD Switching
FDP_UDF_EXT Unidirectional Data Flow
Protection of the TSF (FPT) FPT_FLS_EXT Failure with Preservation of Secure State
FPT_NTA_EXT No Access to TOE
FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing
TOE Access (FTA) FTA_CIN_EXT Continuous Indications
Table 10 – Functional Families of Extended Components
5.1 CLASS FDP: USER DATA PROTECTION
FDP_APC_EXT Active PSD Connections
Family Behavior
Components in this family define the requirements for when an external
interface to the TOE is authorized to transmit data related to peripheral sharing.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 22 of 50
Component Leveling
FDP_APC_EXT.1 Active PSD Connections, restricts the flow of data through the
TSF.
Management: FDP_APC_EXT.1
No specific management functions are identified.
Audit: FDP_APC_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_APC_EXT.1 Active PSD Connections
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_APC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall route user data only to or from the interfaces selected
by the user.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that no data flows between connected
computers whether the TOE is powered on or powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is
powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is
in a failure state.
FDP_FIL_EXT Device Filtering
Family Behavior
Components in this family define the requirements for device filtering.
Component Leveling
FDP_FIL_EXT.1 Device Filtering, requires the TSF to specify the method of
device filtering used for peripheral interfaces and defines requirements for
handling whitelists and blacklists.
FDP_APC_EXT Active PSD
Connections
1
FDP_FIL_EXT Device
Filtering
1
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 23 of 50
Management: FDP_FIL_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• Ability to configure whitelist/blacklist members
Audit: FDP_FIL_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation is
included in the PP/ST:
• Configuration of whitelist/blacklist members
FDP_FIL_EXT.1 Device Filtering
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection
FDP_FIL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall have [selection: configurable, fixed] device filtering for
[assignment: list of supported peripheral interface types] interfaces.
FDP_FIL_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall consider all [assignment: blacklist name] blacklisted
devices as unauthorized devices for [assignment: list of supported
peripheral interface types] interfaces in peripheral device
connections.
FDP_FIL_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall consider all [assignment: whitelist name] whitelisted
devices as authorized devices for peripheral device connections only
if they are not on the [assignment: blacklist name] blacklist or
otherwise unauthorized.
FDP_PDC_EXT Peripheral Device Connection
Family Behavior
Components in this family define the requirements for peripheral device
connections.
This family is defined in the PSD PP. The PP‐Module [MOD_KM_V1.0] augments
the extended family by adding two additional components, FDP_PDC_EXT.2 and
FDP_PDC_EXT.3. The new components and their impact on the extended
family’s component leveling are shown below; reference the PSD PP for all other
definitions for this family.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 24 of 50
Component Leveling
FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection, requires the TSF to limit external
connections to only authorized devices.
FDP_PDC_EXT.2 Authorized Devices, defines the types of physical devices that
the TSF will permit to connect to it.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3, Authorized Connection Protocols, defines the protocols that the
TSF will authorize over its physical/logical interfaces, as well as any rules that
are applicable to these interfaces.
Management: FDP_PDC_EXT.1, FDP_PDC_EXT.2, FDP_PDC_EXT.3
No specific management functions are identified.
Audit: FDP_PDC_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation is
included in the PP/ST:
• Acceptance or rejection of a peripheral
Audit: FDP_PDC_EXT.2, FDP_PDC_EXT.3
There are no specific auditable events foreseen.
FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall reject connections with unauthorized devices upon
TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a
powered‐on TOE.
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall reject connections with devices presenting
unauthorized interface protocols upon TOE power up and upon
connection of a peripheral device to a powered‐on TOE.
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.3 The TOE shall have no external interfaces other than those claimed
by the TSF.
FDP_PDC_EXT Peripheral
Device
1
2
3
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 25 of 50
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.4 The TOE shall not have wireless interfaces.
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.5 The TOE shall provide a visual or auditory indication to the User
when a peripheral is rejected.
FDP_PDC_EXT.2 Authorized Devices
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices as defined
in [assignment: devices specified in the PP or PP‐Module in which
this SFR is defined] and [assignment: devices specified in another
PP or PP‐Module that shares a PP Configuration with the PP or PP‐
Module in which this SFR is defined] upon TOE power up and upon
connection of a peripheral device to a powered‐on TOE.
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.2 The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices presenting
authorized interface protocols as defined in [assignment: devices
specified in the PP or PP Module in which this SFR is defined] and
[assignment: devices specified in another PP or PP‐Module that
shares a PP‐Configuration with the PP or PP‐Module in which this SFR
is defined] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral
device to a powered‐on TOE.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3 Authorized Connection Protocols
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall have interfaces for the [assignment: list of supported
protocols associated with physical and/or logical TSF interfaces]
protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported protocols:
[assignment: rules defining the handling for communications over
this protocol (e.g. any processing that must be done by the TSF
prior to transmitting it through the TOE, circumstances or frequency
with which the protocol is invoked)].
FDP_RDR_EXT Re-Enumeration Device
Rejection
Family Behavior
Components in this family define requirements to reject device spoofing
attempts through reenumeration.
Component Leveling
FDP_RDR_EXT Re-
Enumeration Device
Rejection
1
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 26 of 50
FDP_RDR_EXT.1 Re‐Enumeration Device Rejection, requires the TSF to reject re‐
enumeration as an unauthorized device.
Management: FDP_RDR_EXT.1
No specific management functions are identified.
Audit: FDP_RDR_EXT.1
There are no specific auditable events foreseen.
FDP_RDR_EXT.1 Re-Enumeration Device Rejection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection
FDP_RDR_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall reject any device that attempts to enumerate again as
a different unauthorized device.
FDP_RIP_EXT Residual Information Protection
Family Behavior
Components in this family define the requirements for how the TSF prevents
data disclosure from its memory.
Component Leveling
FDP_RIP_EXT.1 Residual Information Protection, requires the TSF to prevent the
writing of user data to non‐volatile memory.
Management: FDP_RIP_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• Ability to trigger the TSF’s purge function
Audit: FDP_RIP_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_RIP_EXT.1 Residual Information Protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_RIP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that no user data is written to TOE non‐volatile
memory or storage.
FDP_RIP_EXT Residual
Information Protection
1
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 27 of 50
FDP_SWI_EXT PSD Switching
Family Behavior
Components in this family define the requirements for how the TSF protects
against inadvertent data switching.
Component Leveling
FDP_SWI_EXT.1 PSD Switching, requires action on the part of a user in order for
the TSF’s switching mechanisms to be activated.
FDP_SWI_EXT.2 PSD Switching Methods, places restrictions on how the TSF’s
switching mechanisms can be controlled.
FDP_SWI_EXT.3 Tied Switching, requires the TSF to ensure that multiple
connected peripherals are always switched to the same connected computer.
Management: FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2, FDP_SWI_EXT.3
No specific management functions are identified.
Audit: FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2, FDP_SWI_EXT.3
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_SWI_EXT.1 PSD Switching
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_SWI_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that [selection: the TOE supports only one
connected computer, switching can be initiated only through express
user action].
FDP_SWI_EXT.2 PSD Switching Methods
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_SWI_EXT.1 PSD Switching
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that no switching can be initiated through
automatic port scanning, control through a connected computer, or
control through keyboard shortcuts.
FDP_SWI_EXT PSD
Switching
1
2
3
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 28 of 50
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that switching can be initiated only through
express user action using [selection: console buttons, console
switches, console touch screen, wired remote control, peripheral
devices using a guard].
FDP_SWI_EXT.3 Tied Switching
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_SWI_EXT.1 PSD Switching
FDP_SWI_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that [assignment: two or more tied peripheral
devices] are always switched together to the same connected
computer.
FDP_UDF_EXT Unidirectional Data Flow
Family Behavior
Components in this family define unidirectional transmission of user data.
Component Leveling
FDP_UDF_EXT.1 Unidirectional Data Flow, requires the TSF to provide
unidirectional (one‐way) communications between a given pair of interface
types.
Management: FDP_UDF_EXT.1
No specific management functions are identified.
Audit: FDP_UDF_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_UDF_EXT.1 Unidirectional Data Flow
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_APC_EXT.1 Active PSD Connections
FDP_UDF_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of data] data transits the
TOE unidirectionally from the [assignment: origin point of data]
interface to the [assignment: destination point of data] interface.
5.2 CLASS FPT: PROTECTION OF THE TSF
FPT_FLS_EXT Failure with Preservation of
Secure State
Family Behavior
Components in this family define the secure failure requirements for the TSF.
FDP_UDF_EXT
Unidirectional Data Flow
1
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 29 of 50
Component Leveling
FPT_FLS_EXT.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State, requires the TSF to go
into a secure state upon the detection of selected failures.
Management: FPT_FLS_EXT.1
No specific management functions are identified.
Audit: FPT_FLS_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_FLS_EXT.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack
FPT_FLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur: failure of the power‐on self‐test and [selection: failure
of the anti‐tamper function, no other failures].
FPT_NTA_EXT No Access to TOE
Family Behavior
Components in this family define what TSF information may be externally
accessible.
Component Leveling
FPT_NTA_EXT.1 No Access to TOE, requires the TSF to block access to non‐
authorized TSF data via external ports.
Management: FPT_NTA_EXT.1
No specific management functions are identified.
Audit: FPT_NTA_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_FLS_EXT Failure with
Preservation of Secure
State
1
FPT_NTA_EXT No Access to
TOE
1
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 30 of 50
FPT_NTA_EXT.1 No Access to TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_NTA_EXT.1.1 TOE firmware, software, and memory shall not be accessible via the
TOE’s external ports, with the following exceptions: [selection: the
EDID memory of Video TOEs may be accessible from connected
computers; the configuration data, settings, and logging data that
may be accessible by authorized administrators; no other
exceptions].
FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing
Family Behavior
Components in this family define how the TSF responds to a self‐test failure.
Component Leveling
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing, requires the TSF to shutdown normal functions and
provide a visual or auditory indication that a self‐test has failed.
Management: FPT_TST_EXT.1
No specific management functions are identified.
Audit: FPT_TST_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation is
included in the PP/ST:
• Indication that the TSF self‐test was completed
• Failure of self‐test
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall respond to a self‐test failure by providing users with a
[selection: visual, auditory] indication of failure and by shutdown of
normal TSF functions.
5.3 CLASS FTA: TOE ACCESS
FTA_CIN_EXT Continuous Indications
Family Behavior
Components in this family define how the TSF displays its switching status.
FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing 1
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 31 of 50
Component Leveling
FTA_CIN_EXT.1 Continuous Indications, requires the TSF to display a visual
indication of what computers are selected.
Management: FTA_CIN_EXT.1
No specific management functions are identified.
Audit: FTA_CIN_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FTA_CIN_EXT.1 Continuous Indications
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_APC_EXT.1 Active PSD Connections
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall display a visible indication of the selected computers
at all times when the TOE is powered.
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement the visible indication using the following
mechanism: [selection: a button, a panel with lights, a screen with
dimming function, a screen with no dimming function, [assignment:
description of visible indication]].
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that while the TOE is powered the current
switching status is reflected by [selection: the indicator, multiple
indicators which never display conflicting information].
FTA_CIN_EXT Continuous
Indications
1
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 32 of 50
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Section 6 provides security functional and assurance requirements that must be
satisfied by a compliant TOE.
6.1 CONVENTIONS AND APPLICABILITY
Conventions
The CC permits four types of operations to be performed on functional
requirements: selection, assignment, refinement, and iteration. These
operations are shown using the same conventions as those in the PSD PP. This is
defined in the PP as:
• Assignment: Indicated by surrounding brackets and italics, e.g., [assigned
item].
• Selection: Indicated by surrounding brackets and italics, e.g., [selected
item].
• Refinement: Refined components are identified by using bold for
additional information, or strikeout for deleted text.
• Iteration: Iteration operations are identified with a slash (‘/’) and an
identifier (e.g. “/KM”).
• Where an SFR does not apply equally to all devices, an additional tag has
been added to indicate the products to which the SFR applies. This tag
provides the applicable model names in brackets (e.g. FDP_SWI_EXT.1
(1) PSD Switching (F1DN002MOD-KM-4, F1DN004MOD-KM-4)).
Additionally, a number is appended to the SFR identifier where multiple
iterations of the SFR are required.
Extended Security Functional Requirement (SFRs) are identified by the inclusion
of “EXT” in the Security Functional Requirement SFR name.
Section Applicability
Table 11 shows the TOE models and the Section 6 Subsections that include the
SFRs claimed for that device.
TOE Model Sections Describing Security Functionality
F1DN002MOD-KM-4 Section 6.2 and Section 6.3
F1DN004MOD-KM-4 Section 6.2 and Section 6.3
F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 Section 6.2 and Section 6.4
Table 11 – Devices and Applicable Sections
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 33 of 50
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR ALL DEVICES
Section 6.2 details the security functional requirements that apply to all devices.
Class Identifier Name Source
User Data
Protection
(FDP)
FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM Active PSD Connections [MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM Device Filtering
(Keyboard/Mouse)
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device
Connection
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
[MOD_KM_V1.0]2
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM Authorized Devices
(Keyboard/Mouse)
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM Authorized Connection
Protocols
(Keyboard/Mouse)
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_RDR_EXT.1 Re-Enumeration Device
Rejection
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_RIP_EXT.1 Residual Information
Protection
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM Unidirectional Data Flow
(Keyboard/Mouse)
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
Protection of
the TSF (FPT)
FPT_FLS_EXT.1 Failure with Preservation
of Secure State
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
FPT_NTA_EXT.1 No Access to TOE [PP_PSD_V4.0]
FPT_PHP.1 Passive Detection of
Physical Attack
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing [PP_PSD_V4.0]
Table 12 – Summary of Security Functional Requirements
2
There is no modification to this SFR in the [MOD_KM_V1.0]. However, there are
additions to the Peripheral Device Connections associated with this SFR and additional
evaluation activities.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 34 of 50
User Data Protection (FDP)
6.2.1.1 FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM Active PSD Connections
FDP_APC_EXT.1.1/KM The TSF shall route user data only to or from the interfaces
selected by the user.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.2/KM The TSF shall ensure that no data or electrical signals flow
between connected computers whether the TOE is powered on
or powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.3/KM The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the
TOE is powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.4/KM The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the
TOE is in a failure state.
6.2.1.2 FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM Device Filtering (Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_FIL_EXT.1.1/KM The TSF shall have [fixed] device filtering for [keyboard,
mouse] interfaces.
FDP_FIL_EXT.1.2/KM The TSF shall consider all [PSD KM] blacklisted devices as
unauthorized devices for [keyboard, mouse] interfaces in
peripheral device connections.
FDP_FIL_EXT.1.3/KM The TSF shall consider all [PSD KM] whitelisted devices as
authorized devices for [keyboard, mouse] interfaces in
peripheral device connections only if they are not on the [PSD
KM] blacklist or otherwise unauthorized.
6.2.1.3 FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall reject connections with unauthorized devices upon
TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a
powered‐on TOE.
FDP_ PDC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall reject connections with devices presenting
unauthorized interface protocols upon TOE power up and upon
connection of a peripheral device to a powered‐on TOE.
FDP_ PDC_EXT.1.3 The TOE shall have no external interfaces other than those claimed
by the TSF.
FDP_ PDC_EXT.1.4 The TOE shall not have wireless interfaces.
FDP_ PDC_EXT.1.5 The TOE shall provide a visual or auditory indication to the User
when a peripheral is rejected.
6.2.1.4 FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM Authorized Devices
(Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.1/KM The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices and
functions as defined in [Appendix E] and [
• no other devices
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 35 of 50
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral
device to a powered-on TOE.
FDP_ PDC_EXT.2.2/KM The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices
presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in
[Appendix E] and [
• no other devices
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral
device to a powered-on TOE.
6.2.1.5 FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM Authorized Connection Protocols
(Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/KM The TSF shall have interfaces for the [USB (keyboard), USB
(mouse)] protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/KM The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported
protocols: [the TSF shall emulate any keyboard or mouse
device functions from the TOE to the connected computer].
6.2.1.6 FDP_RDR_EXT.1 Re-Enumeration Device Rejection
FDP_RDR_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall reject any device that attempts to enumerate again as
a different unauthorized device.
6.2.1.7 FDP_RIP_EXT.1 Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that no user data is written to TOE non‐volatile
memory or storage.
6.2.1.8 FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM Unidirectional Data Flow
(Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_UDF_EXT.1.1/KM The TSF shall ensure [keyboard, mouse] data transits the
TOE unidirectionally from the [TOE [keyboard, mouse]]
peripheral interface(s) to the [TOE [keyboard, mouse]]
interface.
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.2.2.1 FPT_FLS_EXT.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure
State
FPT_FLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur: failure of the power‐on self‐test and [no other
failures].
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 36 of 50
6.2.2.2 FPT_NTA_EXT.1 No Access to TOE
FPT_NTA_EXT.1.1 TOE firmware, software, and memory shall not be accessible via the
TOE’s external ports, with the following exceptions: [no other
exceptions].
6.2.2.3 FPT_PHP.1 Passive Detection of Physical Attack
FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering
that might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical
tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
6.2.2.4 FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests [during initial start-up and at
the conditions [no other conditions]] to demonstrate the correct
operation of [user control functions and [no other functions]].
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of [TSF data].
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of [TSF].
6.3 ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
FOR F1DN002MOD-KM-4 AND F1DN004MOD-
KM-4 SWITCHES
The F1DN002MOD-KM-4 and F1DN004MOD-KM-4 devices support switching. All
of the SFRs in Section 6.2 apply to this device.
Section 6.3 details the security functional requirements that are satisfied by the
F1DN002MOD-KM-4 and F1DN004MOD-KM-4 devices.
Class Identifier Name Source
User Data
Protection
(FDP)
FDP_RIP.1/KM Residual Information
Protection (Keyboard
Data) (F1DN002MOD-KM-
4, F1DN004MOD-KM-4)
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_SWI_EXT.1(1) PSD Switching
(F1DN002MOD-KM-4,
F1DN004MOD-KM-4)
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 37 of 50
Class Identifier Name Source
FDP_SWI_EXT.2 PSD Switching Methods
(F1DN002MOD-KM-4,
F1DN004MOD-KM-4)
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
[MOD_KM_V1.0]3
FDP_SWI_EXT.3 Tied Switching
(F1DN002MOD-KM-4,
F1DN004MOD-KM-4)
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
Protection of
the TSF (FPT)
FPT_TST_EXT.1(1) TSF Testing
(F1DN002MOD-KM-4,
F1DN004MOD-KM-4)
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
TOE Access
(FTA)
FTA_CIN_EXT.1 Continuous Indications
(F1DN002MOD-KM-4,
F1DN004MOD-KM-4)
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
Table 13 – Summary of Additional Security Functional Requirements for F1DN002MOD-
KM-4, F1DN004MOD-KM-4
User Data Protection (FDP)
6.3.1.1 FDP_RIP.1/KM Residual Information Protection
(Keyboard Data) (F1DN002MOD-KM-4, F1DN004MOD-
KM-4)
FDP_RIP.1.1/KM The TSF shall ensure that any keyboard data in volatile
memory is purged upon switching computers.
6.3.1.2 FDP_SWI_EXT.1(1) PSD Switching (F1DN002MOD-KM-4,
F1DN004MOD-KM-4)
FDP_SWI_EXT.1.1(1) The TSF shall ensure that [switching can be initiated only
through express user action].
6.3.1.3 FDP_SWI_EXT.2 PSD Switching Methods (F1DN002MOD-
KM-4, F1DN004MOD-KM-4)
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that no switching can be initiated through
automatic port scanning, control through a connected computer, or
control through keyboard shortcuts.
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that switching can be initiated only through
express user action using [console buttons, wired remote control].
3
There is no modification to this SFR in [MOD_KM_V1.0], and the additional evaluation
activities are not triggered by the selections in FDP_SWI_EXT.2.2.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 38 of 50
6.3.1.4 FDP_SWI_EXT.3 Tied Switching (F1DN002MOD-KM-4,
F1DN004MOD-KM-4)
FDP_SWI_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that [connected keyboard and mouse
peripheral devices] are always switched together to the same
connected computer.
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.3.2.1 FPT_TST_EXT.1(1) TSF Testing (F1DN002MOD-KM-4,
F1DN004MOD-KM-4)
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1(1) The TSF shall respond to a self‐test failure by providing users with
a [visual, auditory] indication of failure and by shutdown of
normal TSF functions.
TOE Access (FTA)
6.3.3.1 FTA_CIN_EXT.1 Continuous Indications (F1DN002MOD-
KM-4, F1DN004MOD-KM-4)
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall display a visible indication of the selected computers
at all times when the TOE is powered.
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement the visible indication using the following
mechanism: [[illuminated buttons]].
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that while the TOE is powered the current
switching status is reflected by [multiple indicators which never
display conflicting information].
6.4 ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
FOR F1DN-FLTR-HID-4
The F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 device is an HID Isolator. All of the SFRs in Section 6.2
apply to this device.
Section 6.4 details the security functional requirements that are satisfied by the
F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 device.
Class Identifier Name Source
User Data
Protection
(FDP)
FDP_SWI_EXT.1(2) PSD Switching (F1DN-
FLTR-HID-4)
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
Protection of
the TSF (FPT)
FPT_TST_EXT.1(2) TSF Testing (F1DN-FLTR-
HID-4)
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
Table 14 – Summary of Additional Security Functional Requirements for F1DN-FLTR-
HID-4
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 39 of 50
User Data Protection (FDP)
6.4.1.1 FDP_SWI_EXT.1(2) PSD Switching (F1DN-FLTR-HID-4)
FDP_SWI_EXT.1.1(2) The TSF shall ensure that [the TOE supports only one
connected computer].
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.4.2.1 FPT_TST_EXT.1(2) TSF Testing (F1DN-FLTR-HID-4)
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1(2) The TSF shall respond to a self‐test failure by providing users
with a [visual] indication of failure and by shutdown of normal
TSF functions.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 40 of 50
7 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The assurance requirements are summarized in Table 15.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
Identifier Name
Development (ADV) ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
Guidance Documents
(AGD)
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-Cycle Support
(ALC)
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
Security Target
Evaluation (ASE)
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended Components Definition
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security Objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived Security Requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
Tests (ATE)
ATE_IND.1
Independent Testing -
Conformance
Vulnerability
Assessment (AVA)
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey
Table 15 – Security Assurance Requirements
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 41 of 50
8 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
8.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
RATIONALE
Table 7 provides a mapping between the SFRs and Security Objectives.
8.2 DEPENDENCY RATIONALE
Table 16 identifies the Security Functional Requirements and their associated
dependencies. It also indicates whether the ST explicitly addresses each
dependency.
SFR Dependencies Rationale Statement
FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM None N/A
FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.1 None N/A
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_RDR_EXT.1 FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_RIP_EXT.1 None N/A
FDP_RIP.1/KM None N/A
FDP_SWI_EXT.1(1) None N/A
FDP_SWI_EXT.1(2) None N/A
FDP_SWI_EXT.2 FDP_SWI_EXT.1 Included
FDP_SWI_EXT.3 FDP_SWI_EXT.1 Included
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM FDP_APC_EXT.1 Included
FPT_FLS_EXT.1 FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3
Included
Included only if anti‐tamper is selected in
FPT_FLS_EXT.1.1
FPT_NTA_EXT.1 None N/A
FPT_PHP.1 None N/A
FPT_TST.1 None N/A
FPT_TST_EXT.1(1) FPT_TST.1 Included
FPT_TST_EXT.1(2) FPT_TST.1 Included
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 42 of 50
SFR Dependencies Rationale Statement
FTA_CIN_EXT.1 FDP_APC_EXT.1 Included
Table 16 – Functional Requirement Dependencies
8.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
RATIONALE
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST consist of the requirements
indicated in the [PP_PSD_V4.0].
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 43 of 50
9 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
This section provides a description of the security functions and assurance
measures of the TOE that meet the TOE security requirements.
9.1 USER DATA PROTECTION
System Controller
Each device includes a System Controller which is responsible for device
management, system control security functions, and device monitoring.
The System Controller includes a microcontroller with internal non-volatile, Read
Only Memory (ROM). The controller function manages the TOE functionality
through a pre-programmed state machine loaded on the ROM as read-only
firmware during product manufacturing.
9.1.1.1 F1DN002MOD-KM-4 and F1DN004MOD-KM-4 System
Controller Functions
For the KM switches, the System Controller is also responsible for user
interaction. It receives user input from the switches on the front panel or the
remote control device, and drives the TOE channel select lines that control
switching circuits within the TOE.
Following boot up of the TOE, the channel select lines are set to Channel 1 by
default.
The user determines which host computer is to be connected to the peripherals
by pressing a button on the TOE front panel of the KM Switches, or a button on
the remote control device. Switching can only be initiated through express user
action.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_SWI_EXT.1(1),
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.
9.1.1.2 F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 System Controller Functions
The F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 supports only one connected computer.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_SWI_EXT.1(2).
9.1.1.3 Active PSD Connections
The TOE ensures that data flows only between the peripherals and the
connected computer selected by the user. No data transits the TOE when the
TOE is powered off, or when the TOE is in a failure state. A failure state occurs
when the TOE fails a self-test when powering on.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM.
9.1.1.4 Connected Computer Interfaces
The connected computers are attached to the TOE as follows:
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 44 of 50
• The TOE connects to the keyboard and mouse port using a USB A to USB
B cable. The USB A end attaches to the computer, and the USB B end
attaches to the TOE.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_PDC_EXT.1.
9.1.1.5 Residual Information Protection
The Letter of Volatility is included as Annex A.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_RIP_EXT.1.
Keyboard and Mouse Functionality
9.1.2.1 Keyboard and Mouse Enumeration
The TOE determines whether or not a peripheral device that has been plugged
into the keyboard and mouse peripheral ports is allowed to operate with the
TOE. The TOE uses optical data diodes to enforce a unidirectional data flow from
the user peripherals to the coupled hosts, and uses isolated device emulators to
prevent data leakage through the peripheral switching circuitry.
The Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) in the host and device emulator
circuitry stores USB Host stack parameters and up to the last 4 key codes. User
data may be briefly retained; however, there are no data buffers. Data is erased
during power off of the device, and when the user switches channels (for KM
switches). When the TOE switches from one computer to another, the system
controller ensures that the keyboard and mouse stacks are deleted, and that
any data received from the keyboard in the first 100 milliseconds following
switching is deleted. This is done to ensure that any data buffered in the
keyboard microcontroller is not passed to the newly selected computer.
The TOE supports USB Type A HIDs on keyboard and mouse ports. The USB
bidirectional communication protocol is converted into a unidirectional
proprietary protocol, and is then converted back into the USB bidirectional
protocol to communicate with the coupled computer hosts.
A USB keyboard is connected to the TOE keyboard host emulator through the
console keyboard port. The keyboard host emulator is a microcontroller which
enumerates the connected keyboard and verifies that it is a permitted device
type. Once the keyboard has been verified, the USB keyboard sends scan codes,
which are generated when the user types. These scan codes are converted by
the keyboard host emulator into a proprietary protocol data stream that is
combined with the data stream from the mouse host emulator.
Similarly, the USB mouse is connected to the TOE mouse host emulator through
the USB mouse port. The mouse host emulator is a microcontroller which
enumerates the connected mouse and verifies that it is a permitted device type.
Once the mouse device has been verified, it sends serial data generated by
mouse movement and button use. The mouse serial data is converted by the
mouse host emulator into a proprietary protocol data stream that is combined
with the data stream from the keyboard host emulator.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 45 of 50
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM,
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM, FDP_RIP.1/KM.
9.1.2.2 Keyboard and Mouse Switching Functionality
For the KM Switch devices, the combined data stream is passed through the
channel select lines to the selected host channel. The channel select lines are
driven by the System Controller Module, and the selection is based on user input
through use of the mouse or keyboard. Once a channel is selected, the
combined mouse and keyboard data stream is passed through an optical data
diode and routed to the specific host channel device emulator. The optical data
diode is an opto-coupler designed to physically prevent reverse data flow. The
keyboard and mouse can only be switched together.
Device emulators are USB enabled microcontrollers that are programmed to
emulate a standard USB keyboard and mouse composite device. The combined
data stream is converted back to bidirectional data before reaching the selected
host computer.
Since the keyboard and mouse function are emulated by the TOE, the connected
computer is not able to send data to the keyboard that would allow it to indicate
that Caps Lock, Num Lock or Scroll Lock are set. These are indicated on the TOE
front panel, on the right hand side.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM, FDP_SWI_EXT.3.
9.1.2.3 Keyboard and Mouse Compatible Device Types
The TOE employs fixed device filtering and accepts only USB HID devices at the
keyboard and mouse peripheral ports. Only USB Type A connections are
permitted. The TOE does not support a wireless connection to a mouse,
keyboard or USB hub.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_PDC_EXT.1,
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM, FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM.
9.1.2.4 Re-Enumeration Device Rejection
If a connected device attempts to re-enumerate as a different USB device type,
it will be rejected by the TOE.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_RDR_EXT.1.
9.2 PROTECTION OF THE TSF
No Access to TOE
Connected computers do not have access to TOE firmware or memory.
TOE microcontrollers run from internal protected flash memory. Firmware
cannot be updated from an external source. Firmware cannot be read or
rewritten through the use of Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) tools. Firmware is
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 46 of 50
executed on SRAM with the appropriate protections to prevent external access
and tampering of code or stacks.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FPT_NTA_EXT.1.
Anti-tampering Functionality
The TOE enclosures were designed specifically to prevent physical tampering.
The F1DN002MOD-KM-4 and F1DN004MOD-KM-4 enclosures feature a stainless-
steel welded chassis and panels that prevent external access through bending or
brute force. The fitted molded plastic parts of the F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 enclosure
are specifically designed to prevent physical tampering.
Additionally, each device is fitted with one or more holographic Tampering
Evident Labels placed at critical locations on the TOE enclosure. If the label is
removed, the word ‘VOID’ or a honeycomb pattern appears on both the label
and the product surface.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FPT_PHP.1.
TSF Testing
The TOE performs a self-test at initial start-up. The self-test runs independently
on the microcontroller and performs verification of the integrity of the
microcontroller firmware. On the F1DN002MOD-KM-4 and F1DN004MOD-KM-4
devices, the self-test also performs the following checks:
• Verification of the front panel push-buttons
• Verification of computer port isolation. This is tested by sending test
packets to various interfaces and attempting to detect this traffic at all
other interfaces
If the self-test fails, the Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs) on the front panel blink to
indicate the failure. The F1DN002MOD-KM-4 and F1DN004MOD-KM-4 devices
also make a clicking sound, and the TOE disables the PSD switching
functionality. In all cases, the TOE disables the data flow functionality and
remains in a disabled state until the self-test is rerun and passes.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FPT_FLS_EXT.1, FPT_TST.1,
FPT_TST_EXT.1(1), FPT_TST_EXT.1(2).
9.3 TOE ACCESS
Section 9.3 applies to the F1DN002MOD-KM-4 and F1DN004MOD-KM-4 devices
only.
Continuous Indications
The TOE user switches between computers by pressing the corresponding front
panel button on the device, or on the remote control. The front panel button
corresponding to the selected computer will illuminate. The button on the
remote control corresponding to the selected computer will also illuminate.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 47 of 50
On power up or power up following reset, all peripherals are connected to
channel #1, and the corresponding push button LED will be illuminated.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FTA_CIN_EXT.1.
Wired Remote Control
The remote control device acts as a wired remote control as described in the
[PP_PSD_V4.0].
When the user selects a channel using the remote control, the selected channel
indicator on the remote control devices illuminates, and a signal is sent from the
wired remote control device to the KM switch. The corresponding channel on the
switch also illuminates and the TOE peripheral sharing device switches to the
indicated channel.
Additionally, a holographic Tampering Evident Label is placed at a critical
location on the remote control device. If the label is removed, the word ‘VOID’
appears on both the label and the product surface.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FTA_CIN_EXT.1, FPT_PHP.1.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 48 of 50
10TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS
10.1 TERMINOLOGY
The following terminology is used in this ST:
Term Description
KM KM refers to the requirements for Keyboard/Mouse Devices.
Table 17 – Terminology
10.2 ACRONYMS
The following acronyms are used in this ST:
Acronym Definition
CC Common Criteria
DE Device Emulator
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
HE Host Emulator
HID Human Interface Device
IT Information Technology
JTAG Joint Test Action Group
KM Keyboard, Mouse
LED Light Emitting Diode
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
OTP One Time Programming
PP Protection Profile
PSD Peripheral Sharing Device
ROM Read Only Memory
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 49 of 50
Acronym Definition
USB Universal Serial Bus
Table 18 – Acronyms
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with
Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page 50 of 50
11REFERENCES
Identifier Title
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation –
• Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB‐2017‐
04‐001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
• Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB‐2017‐
04‐002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
• Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB‐2017‐
04‐003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB‐2017‐04‐004,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[PP_PSD_V4.0] Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version: 4.0,
2019‐07‐19
[MOD_KM_V1.0] PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, 2019‐07‐
19
[CFG_PSD‐
KM_V1.0]
PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device and
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, 19 July 2019
Table 19 – References
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page A-1 of A-2
ANNEX A – LETTER OF VOLATILITY
The table below provides volatility information and memory types for the Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices. User
data is not retained in any TOE device when the power is turned off.
Product
Models
Number
in each
product
Function,
Manufacturer
and Part
Number
Storage Type Size Power Source
(if not the TOE)
Volatility Contains User Data
F1DN002MOD-
KM-4
F1DN004MOD-
KM-4
1 System Controller,
Host emulators:
ST Microelectronics
STM32F446ZCT
Embedded SRAM1
128KB Volatile May contain user data
Embedded Flash2
256KB Non-Volatile No user data
Embedded
EEPROM3
4KB Non-Volatile No user data
OTP Memory 512bytes Non-Volatile Event logs are saved
2 in 2 port
model or 4
in 4 port
model
Device emulators:
ST Microelectronics
STM32F070C6T6
Embedded SRAM1
6KB Connected computer Volatile May contain user data
Embedded Flash2
32KB Non-Volatile No user data
Embedded
EEPROM3
4KB Non-Volatile No user data
F1DN-FLTR-
HID-4
1 System Controller,
Host emulator:
ST Microelectronics
STM32F446ZCT
Embedded SRAM1
128KB Volatile May contain user data
Embedded Flash2
256KB Non-Volatile No user data
Embedded
EEPROM3
4KB Non-Volatile No user data
OTP Memory 512bytes Non-Volatile No user data
1 Device emulator:
ST Microelectronics
STM32F070C6T6
Embedded SRAM1
6KB Connected computer Volatile May contain user data
Embedded Flash2
32KB Non-Volatile No user data
Embedded
EEPROM3
4KB Non-Volatile No user data
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page A-2 of A-2
Notes:
1
SRAM stores USB Host stack parameters and up to the last 4 key-codes. Data is erased during power off of the device, and
when the user switches channels (if applicable). Device emulators receive power from the individual connected computer(s) and
therefore devices are powered on as long as the associated computer is powered on and connected.
2
Flash storage is used to store firmware code. It contains no user data. Flash storage is permanently locked by fuses after
initial programming to prevent rewriting. It is an integral part of the ST Microcontroller together with SRAM and EEPROM.
3
EEPROM is used to store operational parameters. They contain no user data. These devices receive power from the individual
computers connected to the TOE, and therefore are powered on as long as the associated computer is powered on and
connected.
Belkin Peripheral Sharing Devices with Keyboard and Mouse
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102B4 Version: 1.6 Date: 8 November 2021 Page B-1 of B-1
ANNEX B – SFR DEVICE MATRIX
Table 20 indicates the SFRs supported by each device.
FDP_APC_EXT.1
FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM
FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM
FDP_PDC_EXT.1
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM
FDP_RDR_EXT.1
FDP_RIP_EXT.1
FDP_RIP.1/KM
FDP_SWI_EXT.1(1)
FDP_SWI_EXT.1(2)
FDP_SWI_EXT.2
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM
FPT_FLS_EXT.1
FPT_NTA_EXT.1
FPT_PHP.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST_EXT.1(1)
FPT_TST_EXT.1(2)
FTA_CIN_EXT.1
F1DN002MOD-KM-4 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
F1DN004MOD-KM-4 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
F1DN-FLTR-HID-4 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
F1DN-MOD-REM4* X X X X X
F1DN-MOD-REM2* X X X X X
Table 20 – Security Functional Requirements and Devices
* The remote control device contributes to the enforcement of the specified SFRs. The remote control is only used
with another device.