KECS-CR-26-27
MagicDBPlus v2.1
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1409-2026
2026. 7. 8.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2026. 7. 8. -
Certification report for MagicDBPlus v2.1
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report
for MagicDBPlus v2.1 of Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center (ITSCC)
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance, Inc. (KOSYAS)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................9
3. Security Policy ................................................................................................... 11
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................12
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................13
5.1 Physical Scope of TOE...........................................................................13
5.2 Logical Scope of TOE.............................................................................13
6. Documentation...................................................................................................19
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................20
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................21
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................22
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................22
9.2 Development Evaluation (ADV)..............................................................22
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................23
9.4 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................23
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................23
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................24
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................25
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................26
11. Security Target...................................................................................................27
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................28
12.1 Acronyms ...............................................................................................28
12.2 Glossary.................................................................................................28
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................32
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the evaluation result drawn by the evaluation facility on the results
of the MagicDBPlus v2.1 developed by Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd. with reference to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter)[1]. It
describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation(hereinafter referred to as “TOE”) is database encryption
software to prevent unauthorized exposure of the information from DBMS. Also, the TOE
shall provide a variety of security features: security audit, cryptographic operation using
cryptographic module, the user identification and authentication including mutual
authentication between TOE components, security management, the TOE access
session management, and the TSF protection function, etc.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
and completed on June 26, 2026.
The ST claims conformance to the Korean National Database Encryption Protection
V3.1[3]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon
assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation
Assurance Level EAL1+. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3
conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs
in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
As shown in [Figure 1], the operational environment is consisted of MagicDBPlus v2.1
Server(“Management Server”), MagicDBPlus v2.1 Admin(“Administrative Tool”),
MagicDBPlus v2.1 Agent(“Agent”).
Installed as a plug-in to the DBMS which has to be protected, the Agent receives TSF
data from the Management Server and performs encryption/decryption of user data upon
the request from the Application Server. In addition, the authorized administrator
manages the scope and policies of encryption befitting security policy required in the
organization via the Management Server, using the Administrative Tool. Upon the request
of Application Service Users, the Application Server makes a request to the Database
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Server while the Agent encrypts/decrypts user data, if necessary, and deliver them to
Application Service Users.
Moreover, if a critical event(e.g., reaching to audit data threshold, etc.) arises in the
Management Server, a mail is sent to a user designated by the authorized administrator
via a mail server.
[Figure 1] Plug-in type operational environment of the TOE
Communications among TOE components, which rely on a self-implemented protocol,
carry out cryptographic communication, using an approved algorithm of the validated
cryptographic module(MagicCrypto V2.3.0).
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The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the TOE are
shown in [Table 1].
Component Requirement
Management
Server
HW
CPU Intel Core i5 CPU 2.20 GHz or higher
Memory 4 GB or higher
HDD
100 GB or more of space required for TOE
installation
NIC Ethernet 100/1000 Mbps * 1 Port or more
SW OS Rocky 9.6(Linux Kernel 5.14.0, 64 bit)
Agent
HW
CPU Intel Core i5 CPU 2.20 GHz or higher
Memory 4GB or higher
HDD
500 MB or more of space required for
TOE installation
NIC Ethernet 100/1000 Mbps * 1 Port or more
SW
OS Rocky 9.6(Linux Kernel 5.14.0, 64 bit)
DBMS to be
protected
Db2 11.5.8.0, 64 bit
Oracle 19.3.0.0.0, 64 bit
Administrative Tool
HW
CPU Intel Core i5 CPU 2.50 GHz or higher
Memory 4 GB or higher
HDD
500 MB or more of space required for
TOE installation
NIC Ethernet 100/1000 Mbps * 1 Port or more
SW OS Windows 11 Pro 64 bit
[Table 1] TOE Hardware and Software specifications
External IT Entity Description
Mail Server It is used to send information mail to administrator in case of
potential security threat of the TOE
[Table 2] External IT Entity
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Validated cryptographic modules included the TOE are as follows.
Category Description
Cryptographic Module MagicCrypto V2.3.0
Validation No. CM-263-2030.1
Developer DreamSecurity Co., Ltd.
Module type S/W(library)
Validation Date January 24, 2025
Effective Expiration Date January 24, 2030
[Table 3] Validated Cryptographic Module
The 3rd
party S/W Included in TOE is as follows.
Component 3rd
party S/W Description
Management Server
SQLite v3.53.2
Used as file DB storage for TSF data (DEK
for user data, TOE configuration, audit
data, etc.) on Management Server
OpenSSL 3.6.3
Used for TLS v1.3 encrypted
communication
Agent OpenSSL 3.6.3
Used for TLS v1.3 encrypted
communication
Administrative Tool OpenSSL 3.6.3
Used for TLS v1.3 encrypted
communication
[Table 4] The 3rd
party S/W included in TOE
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of Republic
of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the certificate, is either
expressed or implied.
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2. Identification
The TOE reference is identified as follows.
Category Contents
TOE MagicDBPlus v2.1
TOEVersion v2.1.0.1
TOE
Component
MagicDBPlus v2.1 Server v2.1.0.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.1_Server_v2.1.0.1sh
MagicDBPlus v2.1Agent v2.1.0.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.1_Agent_v2.1.0.1sh
MagicDBPlus v2.1Admin v2.1.0.1
: MagicDBPlus v2.1_Admin_v2.1.0.1.exe
Manual
MagicDBPlus v2.1 Installation Guide v1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.1_PRE_v1.1.pdf
MagicDBPlus v2.1 OperationalGuidance v1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.1_OPE_v1.1.pdf
[Table 5] TOE identification
[Table 6] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation,
facility, certification body, etc.
Scheme
Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Guidelines
(Ministry of Science and ICT Guidance No. 2022-61, October
31, 2022)
Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Regulation(Ministry of
Science and ICT·ITSCC,April07, 2026)
TOE MagicDBPlus v2.1
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (CC:2022 Revision 1)
Part 1: Introduction and general model, CC:2022 R1(CCMB-2022-11-
001, 2022.11.)
Part 2: Security functional components, CC:2022 R1(CCMB-2022-11-
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002, 2022.11.)
Part 3: Security assurance components, CC:2022 R1(CCMB-2022-
11-003, 2022.11.)
Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and
activities, CC:2022 R1(CCMB-2022-11-004, 2022.11.)
Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements, CC:2022
R1(CCMB-2022-11-005, 2022.11.)
Evaluation methodology, CEM:2022 R1(CCMB-2022-11-006,
2022.11.)
Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022
(Release 1), Version 1.2, CCMB-2025-001, October2025
EAL EAL1+ (ATE_FUN.1)
Protection Profile Korean National Database Encryption Protection V3.1
Developer DreamSecurity Co., Ltd.
Sponsor DreamSecurity Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
June 26, 2026
[Table 6] Additional identification information
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3. Security Policy
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Prtoection of the TSF
- User Data Protection
- TOE Access
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the
Security Target (ST) [4]
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the ST. The scope of this
evaluation is limited to the functionality and assurance covered in the Security Target.
This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. (for
the detailed information of TOE version and TOE Components version refer
to the [Table 5])
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5. Architectural Information
5.1 Physical Scope of TOE
The physical scope of the TOE consists of the MagicDBPlus v2.1 Server, MagicDBPlus
v2.1 Agent, MagicDBPlus v2.1 Admin and Manual. Verified Cryptographic
Module(MagicCrypto V2.3.0) is embedded in the TOE components.
Hardware and OS where the TOE is installed are not included in the scope of the TOE.
Category Type Delivery
TOE MagicDBPlus v2.1 - -
TOE
Version
v2.1.0.1 - -
TOE
Component
MagicDBPlus v2.1 Server v2.1.0.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.1_Server_v2.1.0.1.sh
S/W
CD
MagicDBPlus v2.1Agent v2.1.0.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.1_Agent_v.2.1.0.1.sh
MagicDBPlus v2.1Admin v2.1.0.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.1_Admin v2.1.0.1.exe
Manual
MagicDBPlus v2.1 Installation Guide v1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.1_PRE_v1.1.pdf
PDF
MagicDBPlus v2.1 OperationalGuidance v1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.1_OPE_v1.1.pdf
[Table 7] Physical scope of TOE
5.2 Logical Scope of TOE
The logical scope of the TOE is as in [Figure 2] below.
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[Figure 2] TOE Logical Scope
▣ Security Audit (FAU)
The TOE records and manages audit data including event date/time, event type,
subject's ID (identity) and privileges, event result, and event detail in the Management
Server. The generated audit data can be queried by the administrator through the
Administrative Tool MagicDBPlus v2.1 Admin, and there is only one authorized
administrator who can perform security management and view audit records.
Security audit records can be selectively queried in descending order by event
occurrence date/time based on event date, access IP, access ID, event type, and event
result.
The results of self-tests performed by each TOE component are stored and managed in
the Management Server. If a self-test fails, an alert is sent to the email address set by
the authorized administrator.
When the space for storing audit data exceeds the capacity designated by the
administrator, a warning message is sent to the administrator's email. When the audit
data storage is full, old audited event data is overwritten and a warning message is sent
to the administrator's email.
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All audit data is encrypted and stored in a local file DB on the Management Server, and
access is managed to allow only authorized Management Server processes.
▣ Cryptographic support (FCS)
The validated cryptographic module (KCMVP) MagicCrypto V2.3.0 used by the TOE
supports random number generator algorithms and constructs entropy input with noise
sources satisfying entropy of 128 bits or more that have passed the entropy test
(TTAK.KO-12.0341/R1 randomness test). It performs health tests (RCT, APT) on
collected entropy noise sources when the RNG entropy is first collected or reseeded.
After passing the noise source health test, input/output data uses hexadecimal binary
data by default to input/output messages and hash values. When input is received
through the console, it is converted to hexadecimal, and additional seed values (QRNG
output, etc.) from users are input using algorithm parameters.
The TOE uses the validated cryptographic module (KCMVP) MagicCrypto V2.3.0 to
perform cryptographic key generation, distribution, destruction, operations, and random
number generation. The cryptographic module is also used for cryptographic key
generation and exchange during encrypted communication between physically
separated TOE components.
The TOE generates TSF data encryption keys and user data encryption keys using the
random number generator (HASH_DRBG 256) of the validated cryptographic module. It
encrypts user data of the target DBMS using symmetric key encryption algorithms (ARIA-
CBC 128/192/256-bit, SEED-CBC 128-bit, LEA-CBC 128/192/256-bit) and hash
algorithms (SHA-256/384/512).
TSF data is protected using symmetric key encryption algorithm (ARIA-CBC 256-bit),
digital signature algorithm (RSA-PSS 2048-bit), hash algorithm (SHA-256), and MAC
algorithm (HMAC-SHA 256-bit).
Distribution of encryption keys between TOE components is performed securely using
public key encryption (RSAES 2048-bit), and encryption keys are overwritten three times
with '0x00'.
The KEK is derived using the PBKDF2(SHA-256) algorithm of the validated
cryptographic module (KCMVP) with the password entered at startup, Salt (16 bytes)
stored in the configuration file, and Iteration Count of 1024. The entered password is
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destroyed by overwriting it with zeros three times.
▣ User Data Protection (FDP)
The TOE uses the validated cryptographic module (KCMVP) MagicCrypto V2.3.0
through the user data encryption/decryption policy set by the authorized administrator to
perform encryption/decryption when storing and modifying user data in the target DB.
The TOE operates as a plug-in and supports column-level user data
encryption/decryption in the Agent.
The TOE generates different encryption result values each time encryption is performed
on the same user data.
When encryption/decryption is complete, the TOE initializes so that the previous original
user data value cannot be recovered.
▣ Identification and authentication (FIA)
The TOE provides identification and authentication functions for administrators who
perform security management functions, and the ID and password must be changed
upon first login after product installation. To protect authentication feedback during
administrator identification and authentication data input, '*' is displayed as a protection
indicator when entering a password.
Additionally, feedback on the reason for failure is not provided in case of authentication
failure, and the account is locked (for 5 minutes) after consecutive authentication failures
(5 times).
The TOE blocks authentication information reuse attempts for administrators logging into
the TOE.
The TOE provides the following criteria for password verification:
- Password length: minimum 9 to maximum 16 characters
- Available password characters: digits (0-9), uppercase (English), lowercase
(English), special characters (~, `, !, @, #, $, %, ^, &, *, (, ), -, _, +, =)
- Password must include at least one character from each valid character type
The TOE performs TLS 1.3 communication and performs mutual authentication for
secure communication between TOE components.
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▣ Security Management (FMT)
The TOE has only one authorized administrator account, and the ID and password must
be changed upon first login.
The TOE provides security management functions including cryptographic key
generation and deletion, policy registration and deletion, mail notification configuration,
audit threshold configuration, and user data encryption/decryption. The authorized
administrator performs security management through the Administrative Tool's security
management interface.
▣ Protection of the TSF (FPT)
The TOE protects TSF data using the TSF data encryption key (DEK) in TSF-controlled
storage, generates the KEK through password-based derivation (PBKDF2), and
encrypts and stores the DEK. The TOE also protects TSF data transmitted between TOE
components via TLS 1.3 and performs inspections of major security function processes
through TSF self-testing. The TOE performs self-tests on major processes, key files, and
cryptographic modules at startup and periodically during operation (every 3 hours after
startup). For key files, the authorized administrator can also perform integrity tests
manually through the security management screen. If a self-test result is abnormal, an
alert email is sent to the administrator.
When RCT/APT test errors occur for the health test on collected entropy noise sources
of the validated cryptographic module, or when integrity is compromised, the
Administrative Tool, Agent, and Management Server can be manually reinstalled to
return to a safe state.
▣ TOE access (FTA)
The management access session available for performing security management
functions is limited to 1. If an administrator session already logged into the Management
Server exists, no further authorized administrator access is permitted.
If no activity is detected for a certain period (default: 10 minutes) after the authorized
administrator logs into the Management Server through the Administrative Tool, the
session connected to the Management Server is terminated.
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Additionally, the authorized administrator IP addresses are limited to 2. During initial
Management Server installation, one accessible administrator IP address is pre-
specified during the installation process.
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6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identification Date
MagicDBPlus v2.1 Installation Guide v1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.1_PRE_v1.1.pdf
June 9, 2026
MagicDBPlus v2.1 OperationalGuidance v1.1
: MagicDBPlus_v2.1_OPE_v1.1.pdf
June 9, 2026
[Table 8] Documentation
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7. TOE Testing
The evaluator conducted independent testing listed in Independent Testing Report [5],
based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The evaluator took a testing approach
based on the security services provided by each TOE components based on the
operational environment of the TOE. Each test case includes the following information:
- Test no.: Identifier of each test case
- Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
- Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
- Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
- Expected result: Result expected from testing
- Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
- Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected
and actual result
The evaluator set up the test configuration and testing environment consistent with the
ST [4]. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases
devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities. These tests cover weakness analysis of privilege check of executable
code, bypassing security functionality, invalid inputs for interfaces, vulnerability scanning
using commercial tools, disclosure of secrets, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities
by attackers possessing basic attack potential were found from penetration testing. The
evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected testing
results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and
results are summarized in the Penetration Testing Report [6].
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8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: MagicDBPlus v2.1(v2.1.0.1)
- MagicDBPlus v2.1 Server v2.1.0.1
- MagicDBPlus v2.1 Agent v2.1.0.1
- MagicDBPlus v2.1 Admin v2.1.0.1
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 7
were evaluated with the TOE.
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9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility wrote the evaluation result in the ETR which references Single
Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports. The
evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2]. The TOE was evaluated based
on Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. (EAL1+).
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC
and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned
to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defined the security problems that the TOE and
operational environment are intended to address. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and
it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specify a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and
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SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented
and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and
interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use
of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes the
TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
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By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1. Thus, the TOE behaves as
described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation evidence (described in the ADV
class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
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9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_INT.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1
ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
AGD
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1
ATE_IND.1.1E PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1
AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 9] Evaluation Result Summary
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10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
- The TOE must be installed and operated in a physically secure environment
accessible only by authorized administrators and should not allow remote
management from outside.
- The administrator shall maintain a safe state such as application of the latest
security patches, eliminating unnecessary service, change of the default
ID/password, etc., of the operating system and DBMS in the TOE operation.
- The administrator should periodically check a spare space of audit data storage
in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup to prevent
audit data loss.
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11. Security Target
MagicDBPlus v2.1 Security Target v1.2[4] is included in this report for reference.
Certification Report Page 28
12. Acronyms and Glossary
12.1 Acronyms
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
12.2 Glossary
Approved cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm selected by Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Authority
for block cipher, secure hash algorithm, message authentication code, random bit
generation, key agreement, public key cipher, digital signatures cryptographic algorithms
considering safety, reliability and interoperability
Application Server
The application server defined in this PP refers to the server that installs and operates
the application, which is developed to provide a certain application service by the
organization that operates the TOE. The pertinent application reads the user data from
the DB, which is located in the database server, by the request of the application service
user, or sends the user data to be stored in the DB to the database server.
Authorized Administrator
Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE
Authorized User
The TOE user who may, in accordance with the SFRs, perform an operation
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Column
A set of data values of a particular simple type, one for each row of the table in a relational
database
Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
Information related to security that can erode the security of the encryption module if
exposed or changed (e.g., verification data such as secret key/private key, password, or
Personal Identification Number).
Database
A set of data that is compiled according to a certain structure in order to receive, save,
and provide data in response to the demand of multiple users to support multiple
application duties at the same time. The database related to encryption by column, which
is required by this PP, refers to the relational database.
DBMS (Database Management System)
A software system composed to configure and apply the database. The DBMS related
to encryption by column, which is required by this PP, refers to the database
management system based on the relational database model.
Data Encryption Key (DEK)
Key that encrypts and decrypts the data
Decryption
The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key
Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG)
An algorithm that generates a bit sequence from an initial value called a seed, producing
the same bit sequence when the same seed is input
Encryption
The process of transforming plaintext into ciphertext using an encryption key
External Entity
A human technical system or one of its components that interacts with the TOE from
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outside the TOE boundary
Key Encryption Key (KEK)
Key that encrypts and decrypts another cryptographic key
Management Console
Application program such as GUI (Graphical User Interface) or CLI (Command Line
Interface) provided to an administrator for management and configuration of a system /
It is also used as a synonym with the Administrative Tool in this document.
Private Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is
uniquely associated with an entity (the subject using the private key), not to be disclosed
Public Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is
associated with an unique entity (the subject using the public key), it can be disclosed
Random bit generator
A device or algorithm that outputs a binary string that is statistically independent and is
not biased. The RBG used for cryptographic application generally generates 0 and 1 bit
string, and the string can be combined into a random bit block. The RBG is classified into
the deterministic and non-deterministic type. The deterministic type RBG is composed
of an algorithm that generates bit strings from the initial value called a “seed key,” and
the non-deterministic type RBG produces output that depends on the unpredictable
physical source.
※ A cryptographic random number generator consists of an entropy source used to
construct the seed and a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG)
Secret Key
Cryptographic key that is used along with a secret key cryptographic algorithm and can
be uniquely combined with an entity or more / It shall not be made public.
Self-test
Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the cryptographic module
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Symmetric cryptographic technique
Encryption scheme that uses the same secret key in mode of encryption and decryption,
also known as secret key cryptographic technique
TSF Data
Data for the operation of the TOE upon which the enforcement of the SFR relies
User Data
Data for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF
Validated Cryptographic Module
A cryptographic module that has been verified and approved by the cryptographic mod
ule validation authority and assigned a validation number
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13. Bibliography
The evaluation facility has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
CC:2022 Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-001 ~ CCMB-2022-11-005, November, 2022
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
CC:2022 Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-006, November, 2022
[3] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V3.1
[4] MagicDBPlus v2.1 Security Target v1.2, July 6, 2026
[5] MagicDBPlus v2.1 Independent Testing Report(ATE_IND.1) V2.00, July 6, 2026
[6] MagicDBPlus v2.1 Penetration Testing Report (AVA_VAN.1) V2.00, July 6, 2026