Huawei Integrated Management Application Platform Security Target
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Classification: Huawei confidential Page 1
Huawei Integrated Management Application Platform
Security Target
Version: V0.63
Last Update: 2011-08-24
Author: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
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Table of Contents
HUAWEI INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT APPLICATION PLATFORM VERSION 3 RELEASE
1...................................................................................................................................................................... 1
SECURITY TARGET.................................................................................................................................. 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................. 2
LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................................................ 3
LIST OF FIGURES...................................................................................................................................... 3
1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................ 4
1.1 ST reference........................................................................................................................4
1.2 Target of Evaluation（TOE） reference............................................................................4
1.3 TOE Overview.....................................................................................................................4
1.3.1 TOE usage ..................................................................................................................5
1.3.2 TOE type ....................................................................................................................5
1.3.3 Non TOE Hardware and Software.............................................................................6
1.4 TOE Description .................................................................................................................6
1.4.1 Architectural overview..............................................................................................6
1.4.2 Scope of Evaluation...................................................................................................8
1.4.3 Summary of Security Features..................................................................................9
2 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM.........................................................................................................12
3 TOE SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION...................................................................................13
3.1 Threats .............................................................................................................................13
3.1.1 Assets.......................................................................................................................13
3.1.2 Agent........................................................................................................................13
3.1.3 Threats.....................................................................................................................14
3.2 Assumptions ....................................................................................................................14
3.2.1 Environment of use of the TOE...............................................................................14
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES................................................................................................................16
4.1 Objectives for the TOE.....................................................................................................16
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment..................................................................16
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale .........................................................................................16
4.3.1 Coverage..................................................................................................................16
4.3.2 Sufficiency ...............................................................................................................17
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION..................................................................................20
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................21
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements...........................................................................21
6.1.1 Security Audit(FAU).................................................................................................21
6.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP).....................................................................................23
6.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)..................................................................24
6.1.4 Security Management (FMT) ..................................................................................25
6.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)......................................................................................26
6.1.6 TOE access (FTA) ......................................................................................................26
6.1.7 Cryptographic operation ......................................................................................... 27
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale ................................................................. 27
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6.2.1 Coverage.................................................................................................................. 27
6.2.2 Sufficiency................................................................................................................28
6.2.3 Security Requirements Dependency Rationale......................................................29
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements...................................................................................31
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale..................................................................32
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ...............................................................................................33
7.1 TOE Security Functionality ..............................................................................................33
7.1.1 Authentication.........................................................................................................33
7.1.2 Access control..........................................................................................................33
7.1.3 Auditing ...................................................................................................................35
7.1.4 Communications security........................................................................................35
8 ABBREVIATIONS, TERMINOLOGY AND REFERENCES.......................................................36
8.1 Abbreviations...................................................................................................................36
8.2 Terminology .....................................................................................................................36
8.3 References........................................................................................................................36
List of Tables
Table 1: Asset List..........................................................................................................................13
Table 2: Agent List .........................................................................................................................13
Table 3: Mapping Objectives to Threats........................................................................................17
Table 4: Mapping Objectives for the Environment to Threats, Assumptions................................17
Table 5: Sufficiency analysis for threats ........................................................................................18
Table 6: Sufficiency analysis for assumptions................................................................................19
Table 7: Mapping SFRs to objectives.............................................................................................28
Table 8: SFR sufficiency analysis....................................................................................................29
Table 9: Dependencies between TOE Security Functional Requirements.....................................31
List of Figures
Figure 1: Hardware and software environment..............................................................................6
Figure 2: TOE Software architecture ...............................................................................................7
Figure 3: TOE Logical scope.............................................................................................................8
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1 Introduction
This Security Target is for the evaluation of Huawei Integrated Management
Application Platform which is the infrastructure for all the huawei’s Operations Support
System (OSS).
1.1 ST reference
Title: Huawei Integrated Management Application Platform Security Target
Version: V0.63
Author: Huawei
Publication date: 2011-08-24
1.2 Target of Evaluation（TOE） reference
TOE name: Huawei Integrated Management Application Platform
TOE version: Version 3 Release 1 C05 SPC500
TOE Developer: Huawei
TOE release date: 2011-07-24
Note: It is also used the acronym iMAP as TOE reference in the Security Target and
ancillary documents for CC evaluation.
1.3 TOE Overview
Operation Support System (OSS) is a software application used by operators to
manage network elements (NEs, which is hardware device) in telecommunication
domain. Usually an OSS will make network connection to NEs, collect alarms and
performance statistic data generated in these NEs, and then display these information
in an user interface (usually a graphic user interface, GUI). An OSS also provides
features to view and modify NE configuration.
iMAP is a software platform that help to build an OSS application. And iMAP is also an
Client-Server kind of application by itself, providing the basic functionality of an OSS. It
provide the system management feature for the OSS itself (like service
start/stop/status monitor) and implement some common feature of the OSS, like alarm
management/security management. To build a complete OSS system, the developers
will need to implement new service modules like performance
management/configuration management that are more specific to individual product
domain. Currently in Huawei, different product domains have their own OSS
applications based on iMAP, for example, M2000 for wireless domain, U2000 for core
network domain, N2000 for network domain and T2000 for transmission domain.
The ST contains a description of the security objectives and the requirements, as well
as the necessary functional and assurance measures provided by the TOE. The ST
provides the basis for the evaluation of the TOE according to the Common Criteria
(CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluations.
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1.3.1 TOE usage
As a software platform, iMAP provide following component to application developer to
help them build their own OSS system:
• Common utility: these are software Application Programming Interfaces(API) the
developer can use in their application directly. For example, iMAP provide APIs to
do string conversion between different code set, so the application developer do
not need to implement this feature themselves.
• Service framework: a service framework provide common functionality for certain
feature, the application developer will need to add their own specific program
logic according to the application requirement to implement the feature. For
example, OSS system need to communicate with network elements, different
network elements have different application interfaces, but for network protocol,
most of them are using TCP connection, so iMAP provide a mediation framework
that handle the network communication, application developer only need to add
code to prepare and parse the data package for the application interface.
• Common service: Some requirements are common to all of the OSS systems, for
example, the requirement for Alarm Management Subsystem is common, iMAP
implement this subsystem as a completed common service so that the OSS
developer do not need to developer their own.
As the OSS infrastructure, iMAP provide extensive security features, including account
based system access control that enforce only authenticated user can access
authorized system features; auditing of security-relevant user activities; as well as the
enforcement of network transmission against data peeking; Alarm processing is used
to collect NEs alarms and then analyze these; system management to
manage OSS own services.
The major security features implemented by iMAP and subject to evaluation are:
• Authentication. Operators using the GUI client to access the TOE in order to
execute device management functions are identified by individual user names
and authenticated by passwords.
• Authorization. An authenticated user of the TOE can only perform the operations
he is authorized to.
• Communications security. The TOE support SSL/SFTP protocol in communications
between client and server side; support SNMPv3 protocol in communications
between server side and northern bound.
• Auditing. Audit records are created for security-relevant events relative to the use
of The TOE.
• Security function management. The TOE offers management functionality for its
security functionality.
• Access Control List. From only the specified IP address or Network address can
users log on to the system.
• User session monitoring. Users who are authorized to perform this operation are
allowed to monitor online users and their behaviors. Those sessions that are
doing anything suspicious could be invalidated immediately to prevent damages
to the system and its data information from happening.
1.3.2 TOE type
The TOE is a software platform that helps to build an OSS application. And the TOE is
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also an Client-Server kind of application by itself, providing the basic functionality of an
OSS. It provide common utilities, service framework and common services to
application developers to Simplify and accelerate the development process.
The TOE implements basic functions of OSS: security features, including account
based system access control that enforces only authenticated user can access
authorized system features; auditing of security-relevant user activities; as well as the
enforcement of network transmission against data peeking; Alarm processing is used
to collect and analyze NEs alarms; system management to manage services of the
OSS its own.
1.3.3 Non TOE Hardware and Software
This section describes the Supported Platforms and hardware Environment of the
TOE.
Figure 1: Hardware and software environment
The TOE requires an operating environment which contains a Sun M4000 server with
Sun Solaris 10 operating system installed Sybase 15 database system which also
runs on M4000 server, a PC with Windows XP operating system and physical network
connection between M4000 server and the PC client.
1.4 TOE Description
1.4.1 Architectural overview
This section will introduce the TOE from a physical architectural view and a software
architectural view.
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1.4.1.1 Physical Architecture
The TOE need the following hardware and software requirements being satisfied: A
Sun M4000 hardware system with Sun Solaris 10 operating system and Sybase 15
database system installed to be deployed on. A PC with Windows XP operating
system installed is required to run the software client. Meanwhile, the physical network
connection between the client and server is mandatory.
All theses hardware and software components required for operating environment are
not included in this evaluation.
1.4.1.2 Software Architecture
Figure 2: TOE Software architecture
The software architecture of the TOE is an enhancement of the traditional
Client/Server (C/S) architecture, which consists of three layers:
• AS, Application Server
• DS, Desktop Server
• Client
Note that the Application Server is the main functional layer, the OSS features of
data collecting, data processing and data configuration are implemented in this layer,
and system authentication and authorization features are also included as well.
The Desktop Server layer can be considered as a data cache layer, it provides data
query feature. Client layer only communicates with desktop server layer, the data
retrieving requests are fulfilled in DS while the data modification requests are passed
down to AS layer.
The Client layer is the graphic user interface (GUI) of OSS system, it provides data
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presentation, and data query and data configuration interfaces to end users.
As illustrated above, almost all the system modules consist of three components which
located in these three layers separately.
1.4.2 Scope of Evaluation
This section will define the scope of the Huawei’s iMAP OSS Platform to be evaluated.
1.4.2.1 Physical scope
As a software application platform, the TOE is a software to be installed on specified
hardware server and do not contain any hardware itself.
However, the TOE require an operating environment which contain a Sun M4000
server with Sun Solaris 10 operating system installed, sybase 15 database system
which also run on M4000 server, a PC with Windows XP operating system and
physical network connection between M4000 server and the PC client.
1.4.2.2 Logical scope
Figure 3: TOE Logical scope
As illustrated in the figure above, the logical boundary of the TOE is represented by
the elements that are displayed within the large rectangle with light blue background.
The OSS system which based on iMAP OSS Platform (this TOE) will develop new
service module as displayed within the small rectangle with light grey background,
these elements are not included in this evaluation.
The main components of the TOE described as below:
• Security Service, provide system authentication and authorization features
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• Audit Service, record and display different types of audit info including security
audit
• System Administration and Control Service (SAC), manage all the system services,
monitor their status, and reload failed services.
• Alarm Service, receive alarm from different sources including security relevant
alarm, and info user by several means(GUI display, Email, Short message to
phone)
• Software bus, support both raw TCP and SSL network transmission
Based on physical scope and logical scope described so far, a list of configuration is to
be added:
• Raw TCP network connection (no encryption) between different OSS components
is not supported in this evaluated configuration thus raw TCP transmission mode
is disabled during this evaluation.
The environment for TOE comprises the following components:
• Computer hardware with OS system to run the TOE’s AS and DS software
• Personal Computer used by administrators and operators to run the TOE’s client
software to access the system function
• Physical networks, such as Ethernet subnets, interconnecting various networking
devices.
• Firewall: all the accesses to the TOE are performed through a firewall. Only the
following communications are allowed by the firewall:
A. TCP interface(with SSL enabled): this interface is used in communication
between GUI client and the server of the TOE (XRPC protocol).
B. SFTP interface: the TOE use this interface to communicate between the
GUI and the Server.
C. SNMPv3 interface: the TOE use this interface to communicate with upper
management system and act as SNMPv3 client.
D. CAU interface for updating the software.
E. Hedex interface for providing on-line help.
1.4.3 Summary of Security Features
1.4.3.1 Authentication
For any users of the TOE, before he can access any feature of the system from client
software, the TOE always enforced a login process. The TOE will authenticate users
by user name and password.
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1.4.3.2 Authorization
The administrator can use the security management GUI to assign access to user
accounts. When a user login to the system, the TOE will only display the network
elements and information (like alarm or audit record) the user has been authorized to
access, and the user can only perform authorized operation to these network element
and information.
The administrator can choose to use a role-based access control policy or to assign
access to individual user separately.
1.4.3.3 Auditing
The TOE generates audit records for security-relevant management actions and
stores the audit records in database:
• User login / logout, a failed login attempt is also recorded.
• User account create / delete / modification
• Grant or revoke access right from user account
Attempts of management operation regardless success or failure is logged, along with
user id, source IP address, timestamp etc.
A query GUI is provided for administrators to inspect the audit log, also backup feature
for audit record is provided.
1.4.3.4 Security function management
A security management GUI is provided in client software which only can only be
accessed by users that belong the Security Manager Group or the super user admin.
These administrators (Security Manager Group or the super user admin) use security
management GUI to manage user accounts, grant access rights to users, setup
system access control policy, etc.
1.4.3.5 System access control policy
The TOE offers a feature Access Control List (ACL) for controlling which terminals can
be used to login to the TOE. The ACL is based on IP address, the administrators can
specify individual IP address or IP address range in the ACL of a user account, the
user then only can login to the TOE from terminals that use one of these IP address.
The administrators also can control the time period which a user can login to the TOE,
for example, the administrator may want to limit the valid time period of a normal user
account to 9:00 – 17:00 working day ( Monday to Friday).
1.4.3.6 User session monitoring.
All online user sessions and their latest behaviors are monitored and presented in the
real-time. Once any of these sessions seems to be suspicious, the system
administrator can immediately invalidate the sessions by kicking the sessions out of
the system to prevent it from damages.
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1.4.3.7 Communication security
The TOE has following communication security enforcement:
• SSL enabled tcp connection to communicate between GUI client and the TOE and
between different components of the TOE
• SFTP to communicate between GUI and the Server
• SNMPv3 to communicate with external upper management system
1.4.3.8 Functionality without security claims
This evaluation does not make security claims with regard to the following functionality
offered by the TOE:
• No claims are made with regard to the logging function for network traffic.
• Application proxies, attack defense mechanisms, IPSec and VPN functionality can
be used where available, but have not been evaluated. It will be disabled during
evaluation.
• High availability (HA) features, such as the automatic switch-over to the redundant
host in case of hardware failure, may be provided as part of OSS solution, but not
included in this evaluation.
• Separate tools may be provided to enforce security of underlie operating system
and database system, but not included in this evaluation.
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2 CC Conformance Claim
This ST is CC Part 2 conformant [CC] and CC Part 3 conformant [CC]. The CC
version of [CC] is 3.1R3.
This ST is EAL3-conformant+ ALC_CMC.4 + ALC_CMS.4 as defined in [CC] Part 3.
No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed.
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3 TOE Security problem definition
3.1 Threats
3.1.1 Assets
The TOE has protected following assets:
Asset Description Type of Data
A. Configuration
Data
The confidentiality, availability and integrity of
the configuration data need to be protected
because the data is important to keep the
system function properly, for example, set the
system to maintenance mode will make all
users other than administrator unable to login
to the system.
Configuration
Data
A.NE
Connectivity
Data
NE Connectivity Data include network
address (like IP address and port) and user
account.
Loss of availability and integrity will make the
system to fail manage the network element.
Loss of confidentiality will let the attacker
gain control to the network element.
Account Data
A.Alarm Data
Alarm indicate abnormal situation of network
element that need to be handled by the
operator.
Loss of confidentiality, availability and
integrity may cause the operator fail to solve
the problem in time.
Alarm Data
Table 1: Asset List
3.1.2 Agent
The threat agent of the TOE identified as following:
Agent Description
Network
attacker
A user from the management network where the TOE reside in
trying to intercept the network communication and acquire
valued information asset, and potentially falsify the data
transferred on the network.
Unauthenticated
user
A user who is able to access client software of the TOE but
without a valid user account trying to gain access to the TOE.
Authenticated
user
An authenticated user trying to perform operations he is not
authorized to from client software
Table 2: Agent List
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3.1.3 Threats
As a result, the following threats have been identified:
Threat Attack
T.UnauthenticatedAccess
Attacker: Unauthenticated user
Asset: A. Configuration Data / A.NE Connectivity Data /
A.Alarm Data
Attack: A user without a valid user account of the TOE
successfully bypass the authentication process and
pretend to be an authenticated user of the TOE, then
gain access to the assets. Depend on the authorization
of the user he pretend to be, he may compromise the
availability, integrity and confidentiality of all the assets.
T.UnauthorizedAccess
Attacker: Authenticated User
Asset: A. Configuration Data / A.NE Connectivity Data /
A.Alarm Data
Attack: An authenticated user successfully bypass the
authorization control of the TOE and gain access to the
assets he is not authorized to. he may compromise the
availability, integrity and confidentiality of all the assets.
T.Eavesdrop
Attacker: Network attacker
Asset: A.NE Connectivity Data/ A. Configuration Data /
A.Alarm Data
Attack: A network attacker from management network
successfully intercept the data communication of the
TOE and compromise the confidentiality of NE
Connectivity, alarm and configuration Data and the
integrity of NE Connectivity and alarm Data.
T. BehaviorDeny
Attacker: Authenticated User
Asset: A. Configuration Data / A.NE Connectivity Data /
A.Alarm Data
Attack: An authenticated user perform an authorized
operation by means or by mistake, compromise the
availability and integrity of the assets(for example, delete
NE connectivity data), and deny what he has done.
3.2 Assumptions
3.2.1 Environment of use of the TOE
3.2.1.1 Physical
A.PhysicalProtection It is assumed that the hardware system ( usually a unix
server ) which the components of the TOE reside in is
protected against unauthorized physical access.
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3.2.1.2 NetworkSegregation
A.NetworkSegregation It is assumed that the sub-network which the TOE
reside in is separate from the application (or, public)
networks. The communications with the TOE are
performed through a firewall. See section 1.4.2.2
Logical scope for more information.
3.2.1.3 Operating System
A.OperatingSystem it is assumed that the operating system for the TOE has
been hardened properly and patched in time, so there is
no security weakness, and thus protected against
unauthorized access.
3.2.1.4 DataBase
A.DataBase It is assumed that the database system used by TOE
has been hardened properly and patched in time, so
there is no security weakness, and thus protected
against unauthorized access.
3.2.1.5 Administrator
A.Administrator It is assumed that the superuser admin and the users
that belong to the SMManagers and Administrator
groups behave correctly and do not perform harmful
operation in the TOE. Also, the users of the underlying
operating system.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Objectives for the TOE
The following objectives must be met by the TOE:
• O.Communication The TOE must implement logical protection measures for
network communication between different components of the TOE and in the
communication between the server and SNMP client.
• O.Authorization The TOE shall implement authorization measures to restrict the
functionality that is available to individual user account.
• O.Authentication The TOE must authenticate user before he can access any
functionality of the TOE. The TOE shall provide configurable system policy to
restrict user session establishment.
• O.Audit The TOE shall provide functionality to generate audit records for
security-relevant user actions and provide functionality for authorized user to
review these audit records.
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment
• OE.Physical The hardware system which the TOE server is running on shall
be protected against unauthorized physical access.
• OE.NetworkSegregation The operational environment shall provide protection
to the network in which the TOE hosts by separating it from the application (or
public) network. A firewall shall be installed in the environment.
• OE.OperatingSystem The operating system which the TOE server is running
on shall be protected against unauthorized access.
• OE.DataBase The database system used by the TOE shall be protected
against unauthorized access.
• OE.Administrator The superuser admin and the users that belong to the
SMManagers and Administrator groups of the TOE should behave correctly and
should not perform harmful operation in the TOE. Also, the users of the underlying
operating system.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of TOE objectives to threats and policies,
showing that each objective is at least covered by one threat or policy.
Objective Threat
O.Communication T.UnauthorizedAccess
T.UnauthenticatedAccess
T.Eavesdrop
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O.Authentication T.UnauthenticatedAccess
T.UnauthorizedAccess
O.Authorization T.UnauthorizedAccess
O.Audit T.UnauthenticatedAccess
T.UnauthorizedAccess
T.BehaviorDeny
Table 3: Mapping Objectives to Threats
The following table provides a mapping of the objectives for the operational
environment to assumptions, threats and policies, showing that each objective is at
least covered by one assumption, threat or policy.
Environmental Objective Threat / Assumption
OE.Physical A.PhysicalProtection
T.UnauthenticatedAccess
T.UnauthorizedAccess
OE.NetworkSegregation A.NetworkSegregation
OE.OperatingSystem A.OperatingSystem
T.UnauthenticatedAccess
T.UnauthorizedAccess
OE.DataBase A.DataBase
T.UnauthenticatedAccess
T.UnauthorizedAccess
OE.Administrator A.Administrator
T.BehaviorDeny
Table 4: Mapping Objectives for the Environment to Threats, Assumptions
4.3.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives are suitable to
counter each individual threat and that each security objective tracing back to a threat,
when achieved, actually contributes to the removal, diminishing or mitigation of that
threat:
Threat Rationale for security objectives
T.UnauthenticatedAccess The threat of unauthenticated access to the TOE is
countered by requiring the TOE to implement an
authentication mechanism for its users
(O.Authentication).
The implementation of a network communication
protection is able to help by avoiding attackers
eavesdrop account information from network.( O.
Communication)
The audit feature will help to find out the illegal login
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attempt to the TOE and take countermeasure in time.
(O.Audit)
The protection of hardware environment and
operating system and database will help to avoid the
attackers gain access to the account information. (
OE.Physical, OE.OperatingSystem, OE.DataBase)
T.UnauthorizedAccess The threat of unauthorized access is countered by
requiring the TOE to implement an authentication
mechanism for its users (O.Authentication) and an
access control mechanism (O.Authorization).
The implementation of a network communication
protection is able to help by avoiding attackers
eavesdrop account information from network ( O.
Communication) and thus gain unauthorized access
to the TOE.
The audit feature will help to detect the operation
user account involved in the unauthorized access,
and take countermeasure in time. (O.Audit)
The protection of hardware environment and
operating system and database will help to avoid the
attackers gain access to the account information and
and thus gain unauthorized access to the TOE. (
OE.Physical, OE.OperatingSystem, OE.DataBase)
T.Eavesdrop The threat of eavesdropping is countered by
requiring communications security via SSL network
communication between different components of the
TOE and in the communication between the server
and SNMP client (O. Communication).
T. BehaviorDeny The threat of behavior deny is countered by record all
the security-relevant operation and put the record in
database, provide review feature for audit record.
(O.Audit)
The superuser admin and the users that belong to
the SMManagers and Administrator groups of the
TOE should behave correctly and shall not perform
harmful operation in the TOE. Also, the users of the
underlying operating system. (OE.Administrator)
Table 5: Sufficiency analysis for threats
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives for the
environment are suitable to cover each individual assumption, that each security
objective for the environment that traces back to an assumption about the environment
of use of the TOE, when achieved, actually contributes to the environment achieving
consistency with the assumption, and that if all security objectives for the environment
that trace back to an assumption are achieved, the intended usage is supported:
Assumption Rationale for security objectives
A.PhysicalProtection The assumption that the TOE will be protected
against unauthorized physical access is expressed
by a corresponding requirement in OE.Physical.
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A.NetworkSegregation The assumption that the TOE is not accessible via
the application networks hosted by the networking
device is addressed by requiring just this in
OE.NetworkSegregation and installing a firewall.
A.OperatingSystem The assumption that the TOE will be protected
against unauthorized access is expressed by a
corresponding requirement in OE.OperatingSystem
A. DataBase The assumption that the database used by the TOE
will be protected against unauthorized access is
expressed by a corresponding requirement in
OE.DataBase.
A. Administrator The assumption that superuser admin and the users
that belong to the SMManagers and Administrator
groups of the TOE should behave correctly and shall
not perform harmful operation in the TOE. Also, the
users of the underlying operating system is
expressed by a corresponding requirement in OE.
Administrator.
Table 6: Sufficiency analysis for assumptions
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5 Extended Components Definition
No extended components have been defined for this ST.
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6 Security Requirements
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
6.1.1 Security Audit(FAU)
6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [selection: detailed ] level of
audit; and
c) [assignment: user login, logout
d) user account management
1. user account create, delete, modify
2. change user password
3. grant access right to user account
e) user group(role) management
1. user group create, delete, modify
2. grant access right to user group
f) security policy management
1. modify password policy
2. modify user account policy
g) user session management
1．Kick out individual user session
h) ACL management
1．ACL create, delete, modify
2．Specify ACL for individual user account ]
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST (Based on audit event type, the
following information may not be applicable):
i. [assignment: Operation Name
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ii. Risk Level
iii. User
iv. Operation Terminal
v. Operation Object
vi. Additional detail Information ]
6.1.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall
be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the
event.
6.1.1.3 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users ] with the
capability to read [assignment: all information ]from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user
to interpret the information.
6.1.1.4 FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except
those users that have been granted explicit read-access.
6.1.1.5 FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [assignment: selection ] of
audit data based on [assignment: operation user/operation terminal/operation
result/risk level/operation duration/operation name/certain characters contained
in detailed information field. ]
6.1.1.6 FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall [assignment: export oldest data to file(s) ] if the audit
trail exceeds [assignment: 30 days of log storage. ]
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6.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
6.1.2.1 FDP_ACC. 2 Complete access control
FDP_ACC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: iMAP access control policy] on
[assignment:users as subjects, managed objects as objects] and all operations among
subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the
TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
6.1.2.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security attributes based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce [assignment: the iMAP access control policy]
to objects based on the following:
a) [assignment: users and their following security attributes:
i. the group(s) to which the user bind
b) Managed Objects and their following security attributes:
i. operation(s) that can be performed on managed object ]
Please refer to 6.1.2.1 for definition of managed object.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
a) [assignment: the user has been granted authorization for the Managed
Object targeted by the request, and
b) the user is associated with operation(s) of the Managed Object targeted that
contains the requested operation(s) ]
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules:
a) [assignment: None ]
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:.
a) [assignment:None ]
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6.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.1.3.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: an administrator configurable
positive integer within [assignment: 1-99 ] ]unsuccessful authentication attempts
occur related to [assignment: user login from client GUI ].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been [selection:met ], the TSF shall [assignment: lock the user account and
generate an alarm event.] .
NOTE:The administrators can check the alarm in alarm GUI.
6.1.3.2 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users:
a) [assignment: Account status;
b) Account password;
c) Password status;
d) Password validity days;
e) Maximum number of online users;
f) Wait time for auto exit;
g) Inactive user policy;
h) Login duration control;
i) User groups;
j) User domain;
k) Operation rights;
l) ACL. ]
6.1.3.3 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet:
a) [assignment: Secret length should be within 6-16 characters
b) Secret should contain at least one letter and one number
c) When an individual user changes his secret, the secret
should be different from the last 5 secrets he has used. ]
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6.1.3.4 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.3.5 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.4 Security Management (FMT)
6.1.4.1 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce [assignment: the iMAP access control policy ]
to restrict the ability to [selection: query, modify ] the security attributes [assignment:
identified in FDP_ACF.1 ] to [assignment: Admin user and users who belong to
the Security Manager group]
6.1.4.2 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: iMAP access control policy ]
to provide [selection: permissive ] default values for security attributes that are used
to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow [assignment: Admin user and users who belong
to the Security Manager group ] to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
6.1.4.3 FMT_MSA.4 Security attribute value inheritance
FMT_MSA.4.1 The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security
attributes:
a) [assignment: The user’s rights that he inherits from the groups that he
belongs to;]
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6.1.4.4 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
a) [assignment: grant operation right to user
b) user management, user group management
c) definition of Managed Objects as object set
d) definition of Operations as operation set
e) definition of IP addresses and address ranges that will be accepted as
source addresses in client session establishment requests
f) definition of user account locking policy
g) account status specify if user allow to login
h) monitor user session and user operation
i) Modify the policy of user password
j) the time period when user allowed to login
k) Audit Date export Configuration]
6.1.4.5 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the super user admin,
Administrators group, security manager user group, Monitors group, Operators
group, Normal group and administrator-defined roles. ]
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.5.1 FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from [selection: disclosure] when it is
transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.
6.1.6 TOE access (FTA)
6.1.6.1 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory
warning message regarding unauthorized use of the TOE.
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6.1.6.2 FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on
a) [assignment: date and time
b) account locking status
c) source IP address. ]
6.1.7 Cryptographic operation
6.1.7.1 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: cipher and decipher operations]
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: DES] and
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 56 bits] that meet the following: [assignment:
None].
Application Note: DES algorithm is used to cipher/decipher the communication between
the server and a SNMP client.
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
6.2.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of SFR to the security objectives, showing that
each security functional requirement addresses at least one security objective.
O.Audit
O.Authentication
O.Authorization
O.
Communication
FAU_GEN.1 ×
FAU_GEN.2 ×
FAU_SAR.1 ×
FAU_SAR.2 ×
FAU_SAR.3 ×
FAU_STG.3 ×
FDP_ACC.2 ×
FDP_ACF.1 ×
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FIA_AFL.1 ×
FIA_ATD.1 × ×
FIA_SOS.1 ×
FIA_UAU.2 × ×
FIA_UID.2 × × ×
FMT_MSA.1 ×
FMT_MSA.3 ×
FMT_MSA.4 ×
FMT_SMF.1 × × ×
FMT_SMR.1 ×
FPT_ITT.1 ×
FTA_TAB.1 ×
FTA_TSE.1 ×
FCS_COP.1 ×
Table 7: Mapping SFRs to objectives
6.2.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE,
showing that the security functional requirements are suitable to meet and achieve the
security objectives:
Security
objectives
Rationale
O.Audit
The generation of audit records is implemented by
FAU_GEN.1. Audit records are supposed to include user
identities (FAU_GEN.2) where applicable, which are
supplied by the authentication mechanism (FIA_UID.2).
Audit records are in a string format, regular expressions
are provisioned to read and search these records
(FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3),and only authorized user can
read audit records(FAU_SAR.2). Functionality to delete the
oldest audit file is provided if the size of the log files
becomes larger than the capacity of the store device
(FAU_STG.3). Management functionality for the audit
mechanism is spelled out in (FMT_SMF.1).
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O.Communication
Communications security is implemented by the
establishment of a secure communications channel:
between separate parts of TOE is protected by FPT_ITT.1,
the data communication between the TOE and other IT
product(SNMP) is protected by ciphering the
communication (FCS_COP.1)
O.Authentication
User authentication is implemented by FIA_UAU.2 and
supported by individual user identifies in FIA_UID.2. The
necessary user attributes (passwords) are spelled out in
FIA_ATD.1. The authentication mechanism supports
authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1), restrictions as
to the validity of accounts for logon (FTA_TSE.1), and a
password policy (FIA_SOS.1). Warning of Non-
Authorization access is provided in FTA_TAB.1.
Management functionality is provided in FMT_SMF.1.
O.Authorization
User need to be authenticated first before being allowed to
perform any operations in the TOE(FIA_UAU.2).
The requirement for access control is spelled out in
FDP_ACC.2, and the access control policies are modeled
in FDP_ACF.1. Unique user IDs are necessary for access
control provisioning (FIA_UID.2), and user-related
attributes are spelled out in FIA_ATD.1. Access control is
based on the definition of roles as subject and functions as
object(FMT_SMR.1).Management functionality for the
definition of access control policies is provided
(FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.4, FMT_SMF.1).
Table 8: SFR sufficiency analysis
6.2.3 Security Requirements Dependency Rationale
Dependencies within the EAL3 package selected for the security assurance
requirements have been considered by the authors of CC Part 3 and are not analyzed
here again.
The security functional requirements in this Security Target do not introduce
dependencies on any security assurance requirement; neither do the security
assurance requirements in this Security Target introduce dependencies on any
security functional requirement.
The following table demonstrates the dependencies of SFRs modeled in CC Part 2
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and how the SFRs for the TOE resolve those dependencies:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Resolution
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1
Not resolved.
The audit time is depended on the
reliable time stamp. Reliable time
stamp is depended on external time
sources, such as GPS clock.
FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.1
Not resolved.
The audit records are stored in a
database outside the TOE. The
protection of audit trail storage
depended on the external database
system.
FDP_ACC.2 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.2
FMT_MSA.3
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.2
FIA_ATD.1 None
FIA_SOS.1 None
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2
FIA_UID.2 None
[FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_ACC.2
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.4
[FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_ACC.2
FMT_SMF.1 None
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FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FPT_ITT.1 None
FTA_TAB.1 None
FTA_TSE.1 None
FCS_COP.1
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without
security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction
Not resolved.
The key used to cipher the
communication is configured in the
TOE during the installation process.
Therefore, no mechanism is provided
in the TOE neither to import the key
nor to generate it.
The key is never zeroized given that it
is necessary for the operative of the
TOE.
Table 9: Dependencies between TOE Security Functional Requirements
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the Evaluation Assurance Level
3 components as specified in [CC] Part 3+ ALC_CMC.4 + ALC_CMS.4. No operations
are applied to the assurance components.
Assurance class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
ADV_ARC 1
ADV_FSP 3
ADV_IMP NA
ADV_INT NA
ADV_SPM NA
Development
ADV_TDS 2
AGD_OPE 1
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE 1
ALC_CMC 4
ALC_CMS 4
ALC_DEL 1
ALC_DVS 1
ALC_FLR NA
ALC_LCD 1
Life‐cycle support
ALC_TAT NA
ASE_CCL 1
Security Target
evaluation ASE_ECD 1
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ASE_INT 1
ASE_OBJ 2
ASE_REQ 2
ASE_SPD 1
ASE_TSS 1
ATE_COV 2
ATE_DPT 1
ATE_FUN 1
Tests
ATE_IND 2
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 2
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The evaluation assurance level has been chosen commensurate with the threat environment that
is experienced by typical consumers of the TOE.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Security Functionality
7.1.1 Authentication
The TOE offers the enforcement of timer-based account lockouts: administrators can
specify after how many consecutive failed authentication attempts an account will be
temporarily locked, and whether the counter for failed attempts will be reset
automatically after a certain amount of minutes. (FIA_AFL.1)
Authorized administrators are able to configure a system-wide password policy that is
then enforced by the TOE. Besides the minimum length of the password, which can be
set to be between 6 and 16 characters, administrators have the option to enforce the
use of specific characters (numeric, alphanumeric low or capital, and special
characters). (FIA_SOS.1)
The TOE authenticates the users in the management network based on individual
user IDs and passwords. User IDs are unique within the TOE and stored together with
associated passwords and other security attributes in the TOE’s configuration
database. (FIA_ ATD.1)
The TOE can identify administrators in the management network by a unique ID and
enforces their authentication before granting them access to the TSF management
interfaces. Warning of “error username or password” will be prompted when the user
fails to provide a correct username or password. (FIA_UID.2)
Authentication based on user name and password is enforced prior to any other
interaction with the TOE for all external interfaces of the TOE (FIA_UAU.2)
Before establishing a user session, the GUI will display an advisory warning message
regarding unauthorized use of the TOE. (FTA_TAB.1)
If applicable, i.e., if an administrator has specified values for these parameters for a
specific user, the TOE will deny authentication of the user if the user tries to
authenticate in a timeframe that lies outside of the “login start time” and “login end
time” specified for the user. When the user use an expired password to login, the
system will refuse the login request, the user must request the administrator to reset
his password (the Administrator can deactivate the password expiration policy).
The administrator can monitor online user sessions in GUI, he can see the operations
executed in each user session. If an user session behave improperly, the
administrator can force the user to logout.
(FMT_SMF.1)
The TOE provide login time control mechanism: Each account can be configured with
the login time segment, including the valid date range, time segment, and week
restriction. Any login is prohibited beyond the configured time segment. If the IP
address of the client is not in the specified IP address range from which the user is
allowed to login, the login request will be refused. Also a locked user account can not
be used to login to the TOE. (FTA_TSE.1)
7.1.2 Access control
The TOE controls which operations users can perform on Managed Objects. Managed
Objects(MO) are logical representations of product units that can be managed using
the TOE. For example, the TOE itself is a MO. The individual network elements that
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are managed by the TOE are Managed Objects.
Access control is enforced two-fold:
1. Managed Object authorization: operators can be authorized to see a Managed
Object (for example, in the topology GUI)
2. Operation authorization: operators can be authorized to perform specific operations
on a Managed Object (for example, to modify configuration data of a network
element)
(FDP_ACC.2)
In order to implement role-based access control, users can be grouped into User
Groups. Users and User Groups can be given MO authorization (also referred to as
“Application rights” or “Network element rights”) for specific Managed Object. This
merely represents the fact that users are authorized to know about the existence of
the MO (the MO will show up in GUI, etc.) – additional authorization to perform any
specific management commands on the MO are then assigned in separate
steps.(FDP_ACF.1)
The authorization specifies the operations a user can perform on a specific MO, such
as “Application rights: Create Subnet” to create a subnet on topology GUI.
The TOE provide device set and operation set to help authorized administrators to do
authorization. A device set contain a list of MOs and a operation set contain a list of
operation that can be performed on these MOs. Users or User Groups can be
assigned to a device set with a corresponding operation set, which grants them the
right to perform the operations specified in the operation set on the MOs specified in
the device set. The administrators can define device set and operation set to reflect
authorization needs. (FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMF.1)
As a result, authorized administrators who add new users to the system must specify
which MOs these users are allowed to see (MO authorization) and which operations
the users is allowed to perform on these MOs. (FMT_MSA.3)
There are some predefined special roles exist in the TOE:
1. The super user admin has all the rights in the system.
2. A Security Manager group, only the users belong to this group will be granted the
right to access security management GUI and perform security management
related job. The rights assigned to Security Manager group are all security
management related and there is no way to assign these rights to other roles in
the TOE, so it is impossible to create a new role with similar rights of Security
Manager group.
3. An Administrators group, users belong to this group can manage all the MOs in the
TOE, except for security management.
4. Three common groups (Monitors group, Operators group, Normal group) are
created automatically for convenience, there are no access rights assigned to
these groups by default.
In order to implement role-based access control, users can be grouped into User
Groups. The following pre-defined roles are included in the TOE: the super user
admin, administrator group, security manager group and three common groups
(Monitors group, Operators group, Normal group). (FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MSA.4)
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7.1.3 Auditing
The TOE generates audit records for security-relevant events. (Please refer to
FAU_GEN.1 for a list of event types, and the type of information recorded.)
The auditing functionality of the TOE cannot be started or stopped independently from
the operational TOE. (FAU_GEN.1)
Where appropriate, the data recorded with each audit record includes the unique user
ID associated with a subject during authentication. (FAU_GEN.2)
If the audit records stored in any of the logs exceed specified days, the TOE will
extract the expired records from the database and transfer them into a flat file in the
operational environment in order to keep the database from overflowing.
If the files in the operational environment use more space than a defined limit, they will
be deleted. (FAU_STG.3)
Only authorized users can use GUI to review the audit records available in the
database. The GUI offers search functionality based on time intervals, user IDs,
interface, workstation IP, result, and operation name. (FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2,
FAU_SAR.3)
7.1.4 Communications security
The TOE provides communications security for network connections to the TOE . This
includes connections via the following interfaces:
1. GUI connections between clients and the server (using SSL) (FTP_ITT.1)
SFTP connections between the server and the GUI(using SSL) (FTP_ITT.1)
2. SNMP connections between the server and external SNMP clients (using
SNMPv3) (FCS_COP.1)
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8 Abbreviations, Terminology and References
8.1 Abbreviations
CC Common Criteria
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
NE Network Element
GUI Graphical User Interface
iMAP Integrated Management Application Platform
MO Managed Object
8.2 Terminology
This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning
specific to this document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless
stated otherwise.
Administrator: An administrator is a user of the TOE who may have been
assigned specific administrative privileges within the TOE. This
ST may use the term administrator occasionally in an informal
context, and not in order to refer to a specific role definition –
from the TOE’s point of view, an administrator is simply a user
who is authorized to perform certain administrative actions on
the TOE and the objects managed by the TOE.
Operator See User.
User: A user is a human or a product/application using the TOE.
8.3 References
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 1-3.
July 2009. Version 3.1 Revision 3.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation. July
2009. Version 3.1 Revision 3.