1/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
Reference: 2023-39-INF-4729- v1
Target: Limitada al expediente
Date: 03.02.2026
Created by: I003
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2023-39
TOE MK Lotus GovID IMDa in BAC configuration v4.6.8.8
Applicant 2500218495 - MK Smart Joint Stock Company
References
[EXT-8838] Certification Request
[EXT-9950] Evaluation Technical Report
Certification report of the product MK Lotus GovID IMDa in BAC configuration v4.6.8.8, as
requested in [EXT-8838] dated 23/11/2023, and evaluated by Applus Laboratories, as detailed in
the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-9950] received on 19/12/2025.
2/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................5
IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................................................................6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS..................................................................................6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ...............................................................................7
ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................................7
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ....................................................................................................................7
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE...................................................................................................................8
DOCUMENTS..........................................................................................................................................8
PRODUCT TESTING.................................................................................................................................9
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ...............................................................................................................9
EVALUATION RESULTS ...........................................................................................................................9
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM...............................................10
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................................10
GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................................10
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................10
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)..............................................................11
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS...............................................................................................................12
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)......................................................12
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).....................................................................12
3/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product MK Lotus
GovID IMDa in BAC configuration v4.6.8.8.
The TOE type is an electronic travel document representing a contactless smart card programmed
according to ICAO Doc 9303, and BSI TR-03110.
Developer/manufacturer: MK Smart Joint Stock Company
Sponsor: MK Smart Joint Stock Company.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Applus Laboratories.
Protection Profile: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control (BAC PP), BSI-CC-PP-0055 (Version 1.10, 25 March 2009).
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 +
ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3
Evaluation end date: 19/12/2025.
Expiration Date1: 17/01/2031
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL 4 (augmented with ADV_FSP.5 +
ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3) have been assigned
a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to
the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL 4 + ADV_FSP.5 +
ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3, as defined by the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product MK Lotus GovID IMDa in BAC configuration v4.6.8.8, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine-readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) described on
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
4/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
ICAO Doc 9303 Part10 and providing the Basic Access Control and Passive Authentication
mechanism according to ICAO Doc 9303 Part11.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL 4 and the
evidences required by the additional component ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 +
ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3 to the table, according to Common Criteria v3.1
R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
ASE.TSS.1
ADV ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_INT.2
ADV_TDS.4
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.5
ALC_CMS.4
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DVS.2
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.2
ATE ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.3
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_VAN.3
5/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1/ENC
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_RND.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_AFL.1
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3
6/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
IDENTIFICATION
Product: MK Lotus GovID IMDa in BAC configuration v4.6.8.8
Security Target: Security Target Description – MK Lotus GovID IMDa V4.6.8.8 – Basic Access
Control, version 1.14 (12 December 2025).
Protection Profile: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control (BAC PP), BSI-CC-PP-0055 (Version 1.10, 25 March 2009).
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL 4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 +
ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product MK Lotus GovID IMDa in BAC configuration v4.6.8.8 shall implement a set of
security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 4.3 (“Organizational
Security Policies”).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 4.4 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product MK Lotus GovID IMDa in BAC
configuration v4.6.8.8, although the agents implementing attacks have the attack potential
according to the Enhanced-Basic of EAL 4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_CMS.5 +
ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper
security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Security Target,
section 4.2 (“Threats”).
7/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 5.2 (“Security Objectives
for the Operational Environment”).
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The operating system manages all the resources of the integrated circuit that equips the ePassport
ICAO document, providing secure access to data and functions.
In more detail, in each life cycle phase/step, access to data and functions is restricted by means of
cryptographic mechanisms as follows:
• In phase 3, Personalization, the Personalization Agent must prove his/her identity by means
of an authentication mechanism based on GlobalPlatform card specification SCP03 protocol.
• In phase 4, Operational use, the user must prove his entitlement to access less sensitive
data, i.e. DG1, DG2, and DG5 to DG16, by means of the BAC mechanism compliant to ICAO
Doc 9303-11.
After a successful authentication, the communication between the ePassport ICAO document and
the terminal is protected by the Secure Messaging mechanism defined in section 6 of the ISO 7816-
4 specification.
The integrity of the data stored under the LDS can be checked by means of the Passive
Authentication mechanism defined ICAO Doc 9303 part 11. Passive Authentication and BAC
mechanisms are described in more detail in the following subsections.
Passive Authentication
Passive Authentication uses a digital signature to authenticate data stored in the data groups on
the MRTD chip. This signature is generated in the personalization phase of the MRTD chip over a
Document Security Object containing the hash values of all data groups stored on the chip.
Basic Access Control
Authentication and Key Establishment is provided by a three-pass challenge-response protocol
according to ISO/IEC 11770-2, Key Establishment Mechanism 6 using 3DES FIPS 46-3 as block
cipher. A cryptographic checksum according to ISO/IEC 9797-1 MAC Algorithm 3 is calculated over
and appended to the ciphertexts. The modes of operation described in ICAO Doc 9303 are used.
8/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
Exchanged nonces must be of size 8 bytes, exchanged keying material must be of size 16 bytes. The
inspection system and the IC must not use distinguishing identifiers as nonces.
The BAC session keys generated during BAC authentication are used to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of the transmitted data. The key derivation function specified in ICAO Doc 9303 Part
11 is used, which requires using the hash function SHA-1 to derive the 112 bit Triple-DES key.
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE consists of the following parts:
• Dual-interface chip IFX_CCI_000039h with firmware 80.306.16.0, including HSL v3.52.9708,
UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, NRG SW 05.03.4097, SCL v2.15.000 and ACL v3.35.001.
• Smart card operating system (MK Lotus GovID IMDa in BAC Configuration, v4.6.8.8) with RTE
(JC Virtual Machine (JCVM), JC Runtime Environment (JCRE) and GlobalPlatform Runtime
Environment for personalization).
• An International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) application (ePassport information v1.8)
compliant with ICAO Doc 9303.
• Guidance documentation in PDF format about the preparation and use of the ICAO
application (described in detail in the next section).
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
Document Version Date Hash value
ICAO Applet Personalization
Guide – Additional Information
1.3 2025-08-21 B244C0F4D31D4F4F635785AAEE2861EB5
C79630B12E9C8F8DA02EED167D03D96
ePassport Applet Information 1.8 2025-08-08 A64FC1394E2A5237B57E81007375288CA
4F85139FE6B357CD2D06AC3076807DE
Operational User Guidance 1.8 2025-12-04 D515ABC2CEFB35AAD6C55D09E90BC40A
BD0B86CFDA380F0975D0D5691CD84A5E
Preparative Procedures 1.9 2025-12-04 DF80A6796B40E94DCD77E87D20E6D46C9
F08B75D4AEDD4DC9950412035D5C86A
scripts_v1.4_20250724.zip 1.4 2025-07-24 39F4EAA5BC85B4F6D39067AA1E08BAD17
595AA4807B36F6B7E6F4374C69 F5F15
9/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
PRODUCT TESTING
The Laboratory performed independent testing to verify the correct behavior of the functions of
the TOE. The independent testing was focused in the access conditions, TOE status, random
number generation and BAC authentication.
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in is operational environment,
the evaluation team has devised vulnerability analysis and attack scenarios for penetration testing
according to JIL supporting documents [JIL-ATTPOT]. Within these activities all aspects of the
security architecture which were not covered by functional testing have been considered.
No attack scenario with the attack potential enhanced-basic according to Common Criteria v3.1 R5
has been successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the Security Target when all
security measures required by the developer are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are indicated below.
Therefore, for the operation of the product MK Lotus GovID IMDa in BAC configuration v4.6.8.8 it is
necessary the disposition of the following components:
• Dual-interface chip IFX_CCI_000039h with firmware 80.306.16.0, including HSL v3.52.9708,
UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, NRG SW 05.03.4097, SCL v2.15.000 and ACL v3.35.001.
• Smart card operating system (MK Lotus GovID IMDa in BAC Configuration, v4.6.8.8) with RTE
(JC Virtual Machine (JCVM), JC Runtime Environment (JCRE) and GlobalPlatform Runtime
Environment for personalization).
• An International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) application (ePassport information v1.8)
compliant with ICAO Doc 9303.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product MK Lotus GovID IMDa in BAC configuration v4.6.8.8 has been evaluated against the
Security Target Security Target Description – MK Lotus GovID IMDa V4.6.8.8 – Basic Access Control,
version 1.14 (12 December 2025).
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL 4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 +
ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3 have been assigned a “PASS”
verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole
evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL 4 + ADV_FSP.5 +
ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3, as defined by the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1 R5.
10/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
The evaluation team makes the following security recommendations:
• To follow the security guidance’s of the TOE strictly.
• To keep the TOE under personal control and set all other security measures available from
the environment.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product MK Lotus GovID IMDa in BAC configuration v4.6.8.8, a positive resolution is proposed.
The Certification Body strongly recommends to the TOE consumer to review the application notes
defined in the applicable Security Target, especially those related to the cryptographic mechanisms.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
11/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[JIL-ATTPOT] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, version 3.2.1 February 2024. Joint
Interpretation Library.
[CCDB-2006-04-004] Common Criteria. Additional CCRA Supporting Documents. ST sanitising for
publication. Document number 2006-04-004, April 2006.
[ST] Security Target Description – MK Lotus GovID IMDa V4.6.8.8 – Basic Access Control, version
1.14 (12 December 2025).
[STLite] PENDIENTE DE ENVÍO POR EL FABRICANTE
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is stored and
protected in the Certification Body premises. This document is identified as:
- Security Target Description – MK Lotus GovID IMDa V4.6.8.8 – Basic Access Control, version
1.14 (12 December 2025).
The public version of this document constitutes the ST Lite. The ST Lite has also been reviewed for
the needs of publication according to [CCDB-2006-04-004], and it is published along with this
certification report in the Certification Body and CCRA websites. The ST Lite identifier is:
- <IdST LITE>. PENDIENTE DE ENVÍO POR EL FABRICANTE
12/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certifications of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
13/13
https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR.