National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01, Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11685-2026
Dated: 07/23/26
Version: 0.1
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
NIAP
Matthew Downey
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
Farid Ahmed
Anne Gugel
Robert Wojcik
Alexander Lee
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Furukh Siddique
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
3.1 TOE Overview ................................................................................................................................................6
3.2 Evaluated Configuration................................................................................................................................6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 8
4.1 Physical Boundary..........................................................................................................................................8
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 11
5.1 Assumptions and Threats ............................................................................................................................11
5.2 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................11
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 13
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 14
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................14
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................14
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 15
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................15
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 16
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................16
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................16
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................16
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................17
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................18
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 19
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 20
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 21
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 22
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 23
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01 Series Target of Evaluation (TOE).
It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not
an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE
is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in July 2026. The information in this report
is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all
written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and Virtual Private
Network Gateways, Version 2.0, 25 April 2024 (CFG_NDcPP-FW-VPNGW_V2.0)
This PP-Configuration includes the following components:
o Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e
(CPP_ND_V3.0E)
o PP-Module: PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4e
(MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E)
o PP-Module: PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3 (MOD_VPNGW_V1.3)
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as
interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile (PP). This VR applies
only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these findings,
the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions
justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories
called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against
PPs containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract
with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the
evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01
Protection Profile • CPP_ND_V3.0E
• MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E
• MOD_VPNGW_V1.3
Security Target CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01 Security Target, v1.2 July 2026
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01, v0.5 July
2026
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor CACI idt
Developer CACI idt
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Matthew Downey
Farid Ahmed
Anne Gugel
Robert Wojcik
Alexander Lee
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3 Architectural Information
3.1 TOE Overview
The GoSilent Server acts as the centralized management and external access system for the TOE
integrated into one system. The GoSilent Server provides the management GUI for
configuration of GoSilent Server as well as the GoSilent Cube user devices. Operationally, it
acts as the central peer for all IPsec connections from the GoSilent Cube devices and provides
gateway connectivity to external systems located behind a GoSilent Cube.
The GoSilent Cube is a portable enterprise-grade firewall and VPN, ideal for sensitive
communications, secure remote network access, and Internet of Things (IoT) deployments.
GoSilent Cube can be setup within minutes by non-technical users. Physical Ethernet
connections are supported on both the user side and VPN side of GoSilent Cube.
Together, GoSilent Cube and GoSilent Server provide a secure communications path to one or
more systems located “behind” each GoSilent Cube. These systems connect to GoSilent Cube
via physical Ethernet. Each GoSilent Cube establishes an IPsec VPN to the GoSilent Server, and
all traffic from the user systems is routed over that VPN. Physical Ethernet is supported on the
VPN side of GoSilent Cube.
The TOE applies policies to restrict the traffic that is permitted to pass between the user systems
and external networks.
Management of the system is performed via a GUI provided by GoSilent Server, accessed via a
browser on remote PCs using TLS/HTTPS. Authorized administrators may configure GoSilent
Server as well as the GoSilent Cubes.
GoSilent Cubes also provide a GUI accessed from a browser on a user system via a TLS/HTTPS
connection. This GUI only provides authorized administrators with the ability to configure that
specific GoSilent Cube with enough information to connect to GoSilent Server. All additional
configuration information is downloaded from GoSilent Server once the IPsec VPN is
established.
Both GoSilent Server and GoSilent Cube generate audit records that are stored locally as well as
sent to a remote syslog server via a TLS connection.
3.2 Evaluated Configuration
The GoSilent Server is a software TOE/virtual network device (vND) while GoSilent Cube is a
physical network device (pND). The following platforms apply to these components.
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Table 2: GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01 Platforms
TOE
Component
Hardware Model CPU
CPU
Microarchitecture
Virtualization OS
GoSilent
Server
Dell PowerEdge
R660 Server
Intel Xeon Silver
4514Y
Raptor Cove VMware ESXi
v8.0
Debian 12
Red Hat RHEL
v9.6 KVM
GoSilent
Cube
CACI idt GSC-100 AllWinner H5/
Cortex A-53
ARM v8-A N/A Armbian
25.05
CACI idt GSC-120
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4 Security Policy
4.1 Physical Boundary
The physical boundaries of the TOE are the vND of the GoSilent Server virtual appliance and the
custom physical enclosure of the GoSilent Cube pND. Figure 1 below illustrates the boundaries
of the TOE (shaded areas in the figure).
Figure 1: TOE Boundary
The TOE is deployed in a distributed configuration with the GoSilent Server virtual appliance
installed on a virtualization platform located at the enterprise destination and the GoSilent Cube
at the user device side. The GoSilent Cube can be connected between a specific device and the
LAN, or between an access switch with multiple user devices connected and the WAN. Figure 2
below shows the physical TOE deployment and the logical TOE boundary.
Figure 2: Representative TOE Deployment
The TOE management interfaces are depicted in
Figure 3.
GoSilent Cube
GoSilent Cube Apps
Armbian 25.05
GSC-100 or GSC-
120 Custom
Hardware
GoSilent Server
GoSilent Server
Apps
Debian 12 Linux
VMware ESXi 8.0
or RHEL v9.6 KVM
Dell PowerEdge
R660 Server
9
Figure 3: TOE Interfaces
The TOE interfaces are as follows:
• GUI (GoSilent Server). Administrative GUI interface for managing GoSilent Server
configurations and GoSilent Cubes. The GUI can be accessed via the GoSilent Server
MGMT interface or from GoSilent Cube clients whose users are authorized
administrators on GoSilent Server.
• GUI (GoSilent Cube). User GUI interface that provides limited functionality for initial
cube configuration and authorized admin access to the GoSilent Server GUI.
• Remote Logging. Forwards TOE audit events to a syslog server for storage.
• OCSP/CRL. Certificate checking for IPSec connections are conducted by OCSP while
CRLs are leveraged for syslog.
• VPN Gateway. VPN connections via IPSec.
The following items are required for the operational environment.
Table 3: Hardware and Software Environmental Components
Components
Mandatory/
Optional
Description
Ethernet dongle Mandatory Provides the WAN USB port of each GoSilent Cube for connection of
the Cube to the WAN.
TOE Network Mandatory Provides connectivity between the TOE components. Since IPsec
tunnels are layered on top of this network, the network itself is not
required to be trusted.
External Network Mandatory GoSilent Server provides user systems with connectivity to systems
on an External network, which may be limited to an Enterprise
Network or provide much wider access.
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Components
Mandatory/
Optional
Description
GoSilent Cube user
networks
Mandatory Physical Ethernet networks located on the user side of GoSilent Cube
that provide connectivity between user systems and GoSilent Cube.
In the simplest case, this is a direct connection using an Ethernet
cable interconnecting the GoSilent Cube RJ45 Device port and a user
system. To support multiple user systems, an Ethernet switch can be
used.
Syslog Server Mandatory The Syslog Server receives audit messages from the TOE over a TLS
connections and may be connected to the TOE Network or the
External Network.
OCSP Server Optional Server accessed via OCSP to determine X.509 certificate revocation
status for IPsec connections. The OCSP Server is connected to the
TOE Network.
Certificate Distribution
Points (CDP)
Optional Servers accessed using HTTP to determine X.509 certificate
revocation status for syslog connections. The CDPs may be connected
to the TOE Network or the External Network.
User systems Mandatory IT systems using GoSilent Cube as a secure path to external systems.
The Cube devices are delivered to customers via trusted courier. The following checks should be
performed upon receipt:
• Confirm that the correct device has been delivered per the packing slip and original order;
• Inspect all packaging to confirm there are no signs of tampering or damage incurred
during transport.
The GoSilent Server software can be obtained digitally via URL provided to the customer
directly by CACO idt.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions and Threats
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, can be found in the following
documents:
o Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 3.0e
(CPP_ND_V3.0E)
o PP-Module: PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4e
(MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E)
o PP-Module: PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3 (MOD_VPNGW_V1.3)
That information has not been reproduced here and CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E/
MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in
CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E, MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 as described for this TOE in
the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this
evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and
no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness. A list of excluded functionalities
has been documented in Sec 7.2.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated
configuration meets the security claims made in accordance with the assurance
activities specified in the CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E,
MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 and performed by the Evaluation team.
• This evaluation covers only the specific hardware models and software version
identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in
process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Firewall, VPN Gateway models was not included in the scope of the evaluation
and therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the
device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit,
vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed
in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily
exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication
and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E/
12
MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional
security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01 Security Target, v1.2 July 2026
• CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01 User Guidance, v1.1, June 2026
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product or that is available online was
not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in
the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
14
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
Please refer to the evaluated configuration listed in section 3.2.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The following product functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:
• Cloud instances of GoSilent Server. GoSilent server is supported on virtual platforms and
cloud instances; however, cloud deployments are not addressed by this evaluation.
• WiFi connectivity. The Cube is capable of accepting wireless connections from a client,
however no security claims are made with respect to wireless connectivity and is
therefore excluded from the evaluation.
15
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in ETR for CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01, which is not
publicly available. The AAR provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance
activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E,
MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 Protection Profiles. The Independent Testing activity is documented in
the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here. In particular, sections 3.1 and
3.2 of the AAR describe the configuration of the test environment and the testing tools used.
16
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR.
The reader of this document can assume that all activities and work units received a passing
verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 Rev. 5 and CEM version 3.1 Rev. 5. The evaluation determined the TOE to be Part 2
extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the claimed PP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01 that
are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support
the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance
Activities specified in the CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E, MOD_VPNGW_V1.3
Protection Profiles.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the ST's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E, MOD_VPNGW_V1.3
Protection Profiles related to the examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary
Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
17
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E,
MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 Protection Profiles related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E,
MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 Protection Profiles and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized
in the ETR and AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E, MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 Protection Profiles, and
that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public
search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with
the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E,
MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 Protection Profiles, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
18
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the
CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E, MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 Protection Profiles, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
19
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the documentation referenced in
Section 6 of this Validation Report. Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration
guide from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated. Any additional
customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online was not included
in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or
operating the device as evaluated.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this
evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment, needs to be
assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness. No
versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later, were evaluated.
20
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
21
12 Security Target
CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01 Security Target, v1.2, July 2026
22
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
23
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e (CPP_ND_V3.0E)
6. PP-Module: PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4e
(MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E)
7. PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3 (MOD_VPNGW_V1.3)
8. CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01 Security Target, v1.2, July 2026
9. Assurance Activity Report for CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01, v0.6 July
2026
10. Evaluation Technical Report for CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01, v0.5 July
2026
11. CACI idt GoSilent Server and Cube v26.01 User Guidance, v1.1 June 2026