Lexmark Multi-Function Printers with Hard Drive
Security Target
Version 1.20
10 September 2024
Lexmark International, Inc.
740 New Circle Road
Lexington, KY 40550
www.lexmark.com
Prepared by:
Common Criteria Consulting, LLC
10346 Royal Woods Ct
Montgomery Village, MD 20886
www.consulting-cc.com
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Revision History
Date Version Author Modifications
2023-03-27 0.1 CCC Initial Draft
2023-04-22 0.2 CCC Removed “with Fax” from ST title and TOE ID to match submission
name.
2023-04-29 0.3 CCC • Added manuals.
• Added CX737 printer.
2023-05-23 0.4 CCC Addressed OR1 and OR2.
2023-06-01 0.5 CCC Removed CX737 and updated the FW to 222.028.
2023-07-03 0.6 CCC Addressed KMD OR3 and as the result modified FAU_CKM.4.
2023-07-14 0.7 CCC Addressed OR4 from QA.
2023-08-30 0.8 CCC • Moved Chapter 9 and 10 into their correct chapters (from
OR4).
• Updated FW to 222.030.
• Updated CC Admin Guide date.
• Added second CAVP cert #.
• Addressed ASE OR5.
2023-08-31 0.9 CCC • Addressed Lab responses to my ASE OR5 responses.
2023-09-07 0.10 CCC Iterated FPT_WIPE_EXT.1 into /Disk and /Flash to account for hard
drive and flash overwrite with different data.
2023-09-08 0.10a CCC Made some additional mods for the above fix.
2023-09-28 1.0 CCC Modified TOE ID from vfirmware_version to “with firmware version
firmware_version”
2024-01-04 1.1 CCC • Modified FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 and 1.6 to remove AES CBC 128.
• Updated FW to 222.033.
• Updated FMT_MTD.1 SMTP Setup Settings to Settings > Email.
• Modified the FDP_DSK_EXT.1 TSS to include the flash
partitions.
• Modified FCS_CKM.4.1 to overwrite Flash with zeroes vs ones.
• Addressed OR8 ATE.
• Added selection to FCS_CKM.4.1
2024-02-18 1.2 CCC • Addressed OR8 ATE
• Removed selection from FCS_CKM.4.1
2024-02-20 1.3 CCC • Added selection to FCS_CKM.4.1
Track changes on for 1.1, 1.2, & 1.3.
2024-02-20 1.4 CCC Modified the self-test list.
2024-02-21 1.5 CCC Addressed 4 items from lab 02-21-2024 ad #4 and #5 from OR8.
2024-03-09 1.6 CCC Addressed the errata and modified FPT_WIPE_EXT.1/Flash to ones.
2024-03-12 1.7 CCC Minor errata changes.
2024-03-18 1.8 CCC Addressed evaluator comment.
2024-04-09 1.9 CCC Updated manuals.
2024-04-30 1.10 CCC Updated for NIAP submission.
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Revision History
Date Version Author Modifications
2024-05-01 1.11 CCC Minor mod in section 6.1.4.
2024-05-13 1.12 CCC Updated firmware version to 222.035.
2024-06-09 1.13 • Downgraded firmware to 222.034
• Made mods to FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3 SFR operations and TSS.
• Updated guidance dates.
• Added IKE version to RFCs ID.
2024-07-01 1.14 CCC SFR mods for PSK.
2024-07-14 1.15 CCC IP_SEC mod.
2024-07-31 1.16 CCC Update firmware to 222.036
2024-08-20 1.17 CCC Updated TOE Documentation dates.
2024-08-20 1.18 CCC Updated firmware to 222.037.
2024-09-29 1.19 CCC Addressed OR concerning CAVP table.
2024-09-10 1.20 CCC Addressed lab comments.
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Table of Contents
1. Security Target Introduction ............................................................................................................1
1.1 Overview...................................................................................................................................1
1.2 Security Target, Target of Evaluation, and Common Criteria Identification.................................1
1.3 Conformance Claims..................................................................................................................1
1.4 Technical Decisions....................................................................................................................2
1.5 Conventions ..............................................................................................................................2
1.5.1 Definitions..........................................................................................................................3
2. TOE Description...............................................................................................................................5
2.1 Type..........................................................................................................................................5
2.2 TOE Overview............................................................................................................................5
2.2.1 Keywords ...........................................................................................................................6
2.2.2 Physical Boundary ..............................................................................................................6
2.2.3 Logical Boundary..............................................................................................................11
2.3 TOE Documentation ................................................................................................................12
3. Security Problem Definition...........................................................................................................13
3.1 Users.......................................................................................................................................13
3.2 Assets......................................................................................................................................13
3.2.1 User Data .........................................................................................................................14
3.2.2 TSF Data...........................................................................................................................14
3.3 Threats....................................................................................................................................14
3.4 Organizational Security Policies ...............................................................................................15
3.5 Assumptions............................................................................................................................15
4. Security Objectives ........................................................................................................................17
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE................................................................................................17
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ..............................................................18
5. IT Security Requirements...............................................................................................................19
5.1 Extended Requirements ..........................................................................................................19
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements ....................................................................................19
5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU) .........................................................................................................22
5.2.2 Cryptographic Support(FCS) .........................................................................................23
5.2.3 User Data Protection (FDP)...........................................................................................28
5.2.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA) ........................................................................32
5.2.5 Security Management (FMT).........................................................................................35
5.2.6 Privacy (FPR)...................................................................................................................38
5.2.7 Protection of the TSF (FPT)............................................................................................39
5.2.8 Resource Utilization (FRU) .............................................................................................40
5.2.9 TOE Access (FTA) .............................................................................................................40
5.2.10 Trusted Paths/Channels (FTP).......................................................................................40
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements.....................................................................................41
6. TOE Summary Specification ...........................................................................................................43
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6.1 Security Functions ...................................................................................................................43
6.1.1 Identification, Authentication and Authorization ..............................................................43
6.1.2 Access Control..................................................................................................................49
6.1.3 Encryption........................................................................................................................51
6.1.4 Trusted Communications..................................................................................................52
6.1.5 Administrative Roles.........................................................................................................55
6.1.6 Auditing............................................................................................................................56
6.1.7 Trusted Operation............................................................................................................58
6.1.8 PSTN Fax-Network Separation ..........................................................................................59
6.1.9 Data Clearing and Purging.................................................................................................60
6.1.10 Common Functionality Regarding Key Destruction in Flash Memory.................................61
6.1.11 CAVP Certificates..............................................................................................................61
7. Protection Profile Claims ...............................................................................................................62
8. Rationale.......................................................................................................................................63
8.1 Conformance Claim Rationale..................................................................................................63
8.2 TOE Security Objective Rationale.............................................................................................63
8.2.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale..............................................................63
8.2.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements Rationale..............................................................71
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List of Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Representative TOE Deployment...............................................................................................7
Table 1: Acronyms and Abbreviations......................................................................................................3
Table 2: MFP TOE Configurations.............................................................................................................5
Table 3: Technical Characteristics of the MFP Models..............................................................................6
Table 4: Source-Destination Combinations ............................................................................................10
Table 5: User Categories........................................................................................................................13
Table 6: Asset Categories.......................................................................................................................13
Table 7: User Data types........................................................................................................................14
Table 8: TSF Data types..........................................................................................................................14
Table 9: Threats.....................................................................................................................................14
Table 10: Organizational Security Policies..............................................................................................15
Table 11: Assumptions...........................................................................................................................16
Table 12: Security Objectives for the TOE ..............................................................................................17
Table 13: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment .............................................................18
Table 14: TOE Security Functional Components.....................................................................................20
Table 15: Auditable Events ....................................................................................................................22
Table 16: D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP.............................................................................................29
Table 17: D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP ..............................................................................................30
Table 18: Management of the TSF .........................................................................................................36
Table 19: Assurance Components..........................................................................................................41
Table 20: Permissions............................................................................................................................45
Table 21: TOE User Function Access Control..........................................................................................49
Table 22: NIST SP800-56B Conformance................................................................................................54
Table 23: Function Correspondence to Permissions...............................................................................55
Table 24: CAVP Certificates....................................................................................................................61
Table 25: TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale ...................................................................63
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1. Security Target Introduction
1.1 Overview
This Security Target (ST) defines the Lexmark MX532, MX632, CX532, and CX635 Multi-Function Printers
with Hard Drive and with Firmware Version 222.037 Target of Evaluation (TOE) for the purposes of
Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.
The Security Target (ST) contains the following sections:
• TOE Description (Section 2)
• Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
• Security Objectives (Section 4)
• IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
• Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)
• Rationale (Section 8)
1.2 Security Target, Target of Evaluation, and Common Criteria Identification
ST Title: Lexmark Multi-Function Printers with Hard Drive Security Target
ST Version: 1.20
ST Date: 10 September 2024
Target of Evaluation (TOE) Identification: Lexmark MX532, MX632, CX532, and CX635 Multi-Function
Printers with Hard Drive and with Firmware Version 222.037.
TOE Developer: Lexmark International, Inc.
Evaluation Sponsor: Lexmark International, Inc.
CC Identification: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision
5, April 2017
1.3 Conformance Claims
The language used in this Security Target is consistent with the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5. As such, the spelling of terms is presented using
the internationally accepted English.
This ST and the TOE it describes claims exact conformance to the following CC specifications:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Version 1.0e, 4 March 2024 with the
following conditionally mandatory, optional and selection based SFRs:
o Conditionally Mandatory SFRs:
- FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining
- FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
- FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
- FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
- FTP_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
- FTP_TRP.1/NonAdmin Trusted path (for Non-Administrators)
o Optional SFRs
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- FDP_UDU_EXT.1 Extended: Document Unavailability
- FPT_WIPE_EXT.1/Disk Data Wiping
- FPT_WIPE_EXT.1/Flash Data Wiping
o Selection Based SFRs
- FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
- FCS_COP.1/StorageEncryption Cryptographic operation (Data Encryption/Decryption)
- FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected
- FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
- FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation
- FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
- FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
o Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
o Part 3 Conformant
1.4 Technical Decisions
All NIAP Technical Decisions issued to date and applicable to HCDcPP have been considered.
1.5 Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
• Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that
may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. An
iterated SFR is indicated by a slash followed by a descriptor for the purpose of the iteration.
For example, FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client indicates that the FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 requirement
applies specifically to HTTPS client functionality.
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated
using italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment item]). Note that an
assignment within a selection would be identified in both italics and underline, with the
brackets themselves underlined since they are explicitly part of the selection text, unlike the
brackets around the selection itself (e.g., [selection item, [assignment item inside
selection]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are
indicated using underlines and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection item]). Note that
a selection within a selection would be identified underlined with the brackets themselves
underlined since they are explicitly part of the selection text, unlike the brackets around the
selection itself (e.g., [selection item, [selection inside selection]]).
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o Refinement: allows technical changes to a requirement to make it more restrictive and
allows non-technical changes to grammar and formatting. Refinements are indicated using
bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big
things …”). Note that minor grammatical changes that do not involve the addition or
removal of entire words (e.g., for consistency of quantity such as changing “meets” to
“meet”) do not have formatting applied.
• The ST does not show operations that have been completed by the PP authors, though it does
preserve brackets to show where such operations have been made.
1.5.1 Definitions
Table 1: Acronyms and Abbreviations
Acronym/
Abbreviation
Definition
AD Active Directory
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BSD Berkeley Software Distribution
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
CM Configuration Management
CTR_DRBG Counter Mode DRBG
DLE Downloadable Emulators
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FAC Function Access Control
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GB Gigabyte
GCM Galois Counter Model
GSSAPI Generic Security Services Application Program Interface
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
I&A Identification & Authentication
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IP Internet Protocol
IPP Internet Printing Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
ISO International Standards Organization
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Acronym/
Abbreviation
Definition
IT Information Technology
KAT Known Answer Test
KDC Key Distribution Center
KMD Key Management Description
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MB Megabyte
MFD Multi-Function Device
MFP Multi-Function Printer
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NAND Not And
NTP Network Time Protocol
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PIV Personal Identity Verification
PJL Printer Job Language
P/N Part Number
PP Protection Profile
PSK Pre-Shared Key
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
RBG Random Bit Generator
RFC Request For Comments
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SP Special Publication
ST Security Target
TD Technical Decision
TOE Target of Evaluation
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSF TOE Security Function
UI User Interface
USB Universal Serial Bus
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2. TOE Description
2.1 Type
This TOE is a digital Multi-Function Printer (MFP), which is an IT device that inputs, stores, and outputs
electronic and hardcopy documents.
2.2 TOE Overview
The MFPs are multi-functional printer systems with scanning, fax, and network capabilities. Their
capabilities extend to walk-up scanning and copying; scanning to fax; scanning to email; and servicing
print jobs through the network. The MFPs feature an integrated touch-sensitive operator panel.
The major security features of the TOE are:
1. All Users are identified and authenticated as well as authorized before being granted permission
to perform any restricted TOE functions.
2. Administrators authorize Users to use the functions of the TOE.
3. User Document Data are protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration.
4. TSF Data, of which unauthorized disclosure threatens operational security, are protected from
unauthorized disclosure.
5. TSF Data, of which unauthorized alteration threatens operational security, are protected from
unauthorized alteration.
6. Document processing and security-relevant system events are recorded, and such records are
protected from disclosure to anyone except for authorized personnel. Records may not be
altered.
The TOE includes four Lexmark Muti-Function printers. Each of the MFPs in the TOE include a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM), fax capability, and a hard disk drive. The components that provide the TPM and
fax are standard printer components. The hard drive is an optional component that must be ordered and
installed.
The Lexmark printers are sold in predefined configurations, providing groupings of added options such as
duplex printing, analog fax, and hard drive. The configurations are identified by a character string
appended to the model number. The following table provides details of the models and their
configurations that are included in the evaluation.
Table 2: MFP TOE Configurations
Build Models
Included in the
Evaluation
Model
Reference
TPM Fax Hard Drive
(optional component
installed)
MXTSN MX532adwe MX532 Standard Standard Lexmark P/N 27x0400
MX632adwe MX632 Standard Standard Lexmark P/N 27x0400
CXTGV CX532adwe CX532 Standard Standard Lexmark P/N 27x0805
CX635adwe CX635 Standard Standard Lexmark P/N 27x0805
a=analog fax, d=duplex, e=e-task (touch screen device), f=staple finishing option, h=hard disk, m=mailbox, n=network, p=staple
with hole punch finisher, s=stacker, t=additional tray included, v=vinyl, w=wireless, x=high-capacity feeder, z=VariTherm™
technology
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The firmware version of the TOE is build.222.037. Where build is one of the following:
• MXTSN for the MX532 and MX632 printers,
• CXTGV for the CX532 and CX635 printers,
The first letter in the build identifier is M for mono printers or C for color printers. The next two letters
are always XT, signifying multi-function devices. The last two letters in the build identifier identify a
specific processor used in the printer models.
2.2.1 Keywords
Hardcopy, Paper, Document, Printer, Scanner, Copier, Facsimile, Fax, Document Server, Nonvolatile
storage, Residual data, Temporary data, Disk overwrite, Network interface, Shared communications
medium, Multifunction Device, Multifunction Product, All-In-One, MFD, MFP
2.2.2 Physical Boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE is the software and hardware of the MFPs that include a standard TPM
and fax component and an optional Lexmark Hard Disk component installed.
The functionality of all models is the same; the differences is limited to color support, paper sizes
supported, and pages per minute the printers support. The following table provides the printer specifics.
Table 3: Technical Characteristics of the MFP Models
Model Processor Word Size Color/Mono Pages Per Minute
MX532 Marvell 88PA6270 (G2) 64-bit Mono 46
MX632 Marvell 88PA6270 (G2) 64-bit Mono 50
CX532 Marvell 88PA6270 (G2) 64-bit Color 35
CX635 Marvell 88PA6270 (G2) 64-bit Color 42
The TPM included in the printers is an Infineon OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module SLB9672_2.0 version
15.21.16430.00. The TPM provides a DRBG that is used to supply entropy to the Lexmark software DRBG.
The TPM implements a NIST SP 800-90B CTR_DRBG and has been evaluated and included on CAVP
certificate #A1582 and CMVP certificate #4347. Additionally, the TPM has been Common Criteria EAL4+
(AVA_VAN.4, ALC_FLR.1) certified (Infineon Technologies AG OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module
SLB9672_2.0, v15.20.15686.00, v15.21.16430.00, v15.22.16832.00, April 25, 2022).
The hard disk components are Lexmark P/N 27X0400 for the black and white printers and Lexmark P/N
27X0805 for the color printers. Both hard disks are 500+ GB. The hard disk component may be installed
at the factory or by the customer. Installation depends on how the component is ordered (individually or
as a predefined configuration). Installation instructions are included with the component if the customer
is installing the components.
Lexmark uses reputable shipping firms that provide shipment tracking functionality to deliver printers and
hard disks (ordered separately). Delivery of the guidance docs via web site is addressed in ST section 2.3.
The following diagram depicts a representative TOE deployment.
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Figure 1: Representative TOE Deployment
2.2.2.1 Required Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
To be fully operational, the following items may be connected to the MFP:
1. A LAN for network connectivity. The TOE supports IPv4 and IPv6.
2. An IT system acting as the remote syslog recipient of audit event records sent from the TOE.
3. IT systems that submit print jobs to the MFP via the network using standard print protocols.
4. An OCSP Server to verify the validity of X.509 certificates.
5. An IT system that connects remotely to the printer to perform remote configuration. Remote
configuration is optional.
6. An LDAP Server to support Identification and Authentication (I&A). This component is optional
depending on the type(s) of I&A mechanisms used.
7. A card reader and cards to support Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards. This component is
optional depending on the type(s) of I&A mechanisms used. The supported card reader is the
Identiv uTrust 2700 F Contact Smart Card Reader.
8. A Network Time Protocol Server. This system is optional based on if the time source is configured
locally or remotely.
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9. A Key Distribution Center (KDC). This system is optional and required only if smart card
authentication is selected.
10. An email Server to receive outgoing emails from the printers. This system is optional and required
only if email output is configured.
11. A phone line and a fax machine to receive outgoing faxes from the printers and receive incoming
faxes. This system is optional and required only if fax capability is configured.
2.2.2.2 The Evaluated Configuration
2.2.2.2.1 Configuration of the Evaluated Configuration
The following configuration options apply to the evaluated configuration of the TOE. Refer to the Lexmark
Common Criteria Installation Supplement and Administrator Guide for guidance on configuration.
1. No optional network interfaces are installed on the MFPs. Note that one physical LAN interface
is standard on all MFPs and must be used for the evaluated configuration. The wireless Ethernet
connection needs to be disabled.
2. No optional parallel or serial interfaces are installed on the MFPs. These are for legacy
connections to specific IT systems only.
3. No option card for downloadable emulators is installed in the TOE.
4. All USB ports on the MFPs that perform document processing functions (print, scan, fax send) are
disabled via configuration. If Smart Card authentication is used, the card reader is physically
connected to a specific USB port during TOE installation; in the evaluated configuration this USB
port is limited in functionality to acting as the interface to the card reader. A reader is shipped
with the MFP. If Smart Card authentication is not used, the card reader may be left unconnected.
5. All unnecessary network ports are disabled.
6. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) support is disabled.
7. No Java applications other than those stated in this section are loaded into the MFP by
Administrators. These applications are referred to as eSF applications in the Lexmark user
documentation. If PIV smart card authentication is going to be used, the following eSF
applications must be installed by an administrator during TOE installation and enabled: “Smart
Card Authentication”, “Smart Card Authentication Client”, and “Background and Idle Screen”.
8. All other eSF applications installed by Lexmark before the TOE is shipped must be disabled.
9. NPAP, PJL and Postscript have the ability to modify system settings. The capabilities specific to
modifying system settings via these protocols are disabled.
10. All network communication is required to use IPSec with ESP to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the information exchanged, including management sessions that exchange
D.TSF.CONF and D.TSF.PROT. Certificates presented by remote IT systems are validated.
11. The only supported Diffie-Hellman group for IKE is Group 14 (2048-bit MODP) and Group 15
(3072-bit MODP).
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12. Operational management functions are performed via browser sessions to the embedded web
server or via the management menus available through the touch panel.
13. I&A may use Username/Password Accounts and/or the LDAP+GSSAPI login method on a per-user
basis. Smart Card authentication may be used for touch panel users. No other I&A mechanisms
are included in the evaluation because they provide significantly lower strength than the
supported mechanisms.
14. LDAP+GSSAPI and Smart Card authentication require integration with an external LDAP server
such as Active Directory. This communication uses default certificates; the LDAP server must
provide a valid certificate to the TOE. Binds to LDAP servers for LDAP+GSSAPI use device
credentials (not anonymous bind) so that the information retrieved from Active Directory can be
restricted to a specific MFP. Binds to LDAP servers for Smart Card authentication use user
credentials from the card (not anonymous bind) so that the information retrieved from Active
Directory can be restricted to a specific user.
15. Audit event records are transmitted to a remote IT system as they are generated using the syslog
protocol. Because all network traffic is required to use IPSec with ESP, syslog records sent to a
remote IT system also are protected by IPSec with ESP.
16. The severity level of audit events to log must be set to 5 (Notice).
17. Access controls are configured for all TSF data so that only authorized administrators are
permitted to manage those parameters.
18. Configure Login failures parameter to a three or greater.
19. Administrators are directed (through operational guidance) to specify passwords adhering to the
following composition rules for Username/Password Accounts:
• A minimum of 8 characters (note that the minimum size is configurable and can be set to a
minimum of 32 characters)
• At least one lower case letter, one upper case letter, and one non-alphabetic character
• No dictionary words or permutations of the username
20. All administrators must be authorized for all of the document processing functions (print, copy,
scan, fax).
21. The B/W Print and Color Print permissions must be configured for the Public permissions, which
apply to all users including the Guest user. These permissions authorize the MFP to accept print
jobs from remote IT systems. No other permissions may be configured for the Public permissions.
22. All network print jobs are held until released via the touch panel. Every network print job must
include a PJL SET USERNAME statement to identify the userid of the owner of the print job. Held
print jobs may only be released by an authenticated user with the same userid as specified in the
print job.
23. All fax jobs are stored on disk (rather than NAND) to ensure their contents are wiped upon
completion of each job.
24. All incoming fax jobs are held until released via the touch panel. Held fax jobs may only be
released by an authenticated user with the U.ADMIN role.
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25. Fax forwarding is disabled to limit the destinations for incoming faxes to the local printer only.
26. User data sent by the MFP in email messages is sent as an attachment (not as a web link).
27. The following parameters are disabled: Use Intelligent Storage Drive parameter; Internet Printing
Protocol (IPP) support; Create Profiles; Remote Management; User Profiles
28. Create Profiles is disabled.
29. The hard drives are only designed to be removed by authorized Lexmark service personnel, and
only upon failure of the hard drive as part of a replacement operation to bring the TOE back into
operational status. Under nocircumstances arehard drives reinserted intothesameor a different
printer after removal.
2.2.2.2.2 Evaluated Configuration Input/Destination
The following table defines the combinations of possible input sources and destinations that are included
in the evaluated configuration. In the table, the following meanings are used:
• “May Be Disabled or Restricted” indicates that the functionality is included in the evaluation but
may be disabled or restricted to an authorized set of users at the discretion of an administrator.
• “Disabled” indicates the functionality exists within the TOE but is always disabled by an
administrator for the evaluated configuration.
• “n/a” indicates the functionality does not exist in the TOE.
Table 4: Source-Destination Combinations
Destination
Source
Print Protocols
(via the Network
Interface)
Scanner Incoming Fax
Printer May Be Disabled
Or Restricted*
May Be Disabled Or
Restricted*
May Be Disabled Or
Restricted
Outgoing Fax Disabled May Be Disabled Or
Restricted
Disabled
Email (via the Network Interface) n/a May Be Disabled Or
Restricted
Disabled
FTP (via the Network Interface) n/a Disabled Disabled
*Note: The HCDcPP requires either printing from a network request or printing from a scanned document enabled.
Therefore, both functions cannot be disabled.
2.2.2.2.3 Functionality Excluded in the Evaluated Configuration
The following functionality is supported in the Lexmark printers but is not included in the evaluation.
1. In addition to Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards, Common Access Card (CAC) and Secret
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) cards are also supported.
2. In addition to the Identiv uTrust 2700 F Contact Smart Card Reader, the following card readers
are also supported:
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a. Identiv uTrust 2700 R Contact Smart Card Reader,
b. Omnikey 3121 SmartCard Reader,
c. Any other Omnikey SmartCard Readers that share the same USB Vendor IDs and Product
IDs with the Omnikey 3121 (example Omnikey 3021),
d. SCM SCR 331,
e. SCM SCR 3310v2.
2.2.3 Logical Boundary
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
• Identification, Authentication and Authorization
• Access Control
• Encryption
• Trusted Communications
• Administrative Roles
• Auditing
• Trusted Operation
• PSTN Fax-Network Separation
• Data Clearing and Purging
2.2.3.1 Identification, Authentication and Authorization
When a touch panel or web session is initiated, the user is implicitly assumed to be the Guest (default)
user. Per the evaluated configuration, the permissions for this user must be configured such that no
access to TSF data or functions is allowed other than print job submission (job submission is authorized
regardless of what user is logged in). Therefore, the user mustsuccessfully log in as a different user before
any TSF data or functions other than print job submission may be accessed.
The TOE supports I&A with a per-user selection of Username/Password Accounts (processed by the TOE)
or integration with an external LDAP server (in the operational environment) using GSSAPI/Kerberos.
Smart Card authentication may also be specified for users of the touch panel.
2.2.3.2 Access Control
Access controls configured for functions (e.g., fax usage) and menu access are enforced by the TOE.
2.2.3.3 Encryption
All user data submitted to the TOE and stored on the hard disk is encrypted to protect its confidentiality
in the event the hard drive was to be removed from the MFP.
The TOE protects the confidentiality and integrity of all information exchanged over the attached network
by using IPSec with ESP for all network communication.
2.2.3.4 Trusted Communications
The TOE ensures communication is performed with known endpoints by using IPSec with pre-shared keys
or by validating supplied certificates.
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2.2.3.5 Administrative Roles
Through web browser and touch panel sessions, authorized administrators may configure access controls
and perform other TOE management functions.
2.2.3.6 Auditing
The TOE generates audit event records for security-relevant events. Audit records are stored internally
and securely transmitted to a remote IT system using the syslog protocol over IPsec.
2.2.3.7 Trusted Operation
Software updates are verified to ensure the authenticity of the software before being applied. During
initial start-up, the TOE performs self-tests on its cryptographic components and the integrity of the
executable code.
2.2.3.8 PSTN Fax-Network Separation
The TOE ensures that only fax traffic is sent or received via the attached phone line. Incoming traffic is
processed as fax data only; no management access or other data access is permitted. In the evaluated
configuration, the only source for outgoing faxes from the TOE is the scanner.
2.2.3.9 Data Clearing and Purging
In the evaluated configuration, the TOE automatically overwrites disk blocks used to store user data as
soon as the data is no longer required.
2.3 TOE Documentation
Lexmark provides the following product documentation in support of the installation and secure use of
the TOE. The TOE guidance documentation shown below is available through the vendor’s support portal
and is available in .pdf and HTML format (Manuals and Guides (lexmark.com)).
• Lexmark Common Criteria Installation Supplement and Administrator Guide, August 2024.
• Lexmark MX532, MX632, XM3350 MFPs User’s Guide, July 2024
• Lexmark CX532, CX635, XC2335 MFPs User’s Guide, July 2024.
• Lexmark Embedded Web Server Administrator’s Guide, January 2023
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3. Security Problem Definition
This ST includes the Security Problem Definition, composed of threats, assumptions, and organizational
security policies in the following sections.
In general, the threat model of the HCDcPP is designed to protect against the following:
• Disclosure of sensitive data at rest or in transit that the user has a reasonable expectation of
security for.
• Excessive or poorly-implemented interfaces with the underlying platform that allow an
application to be used as an intrusion point to a system.
This threat model is applicable to the TOE because data is transferred across the network and stored. It is
also applicable because the TOE is a collection of executable binaries that an attacker could attempt to
use to compromise the underlying OS platform if it was designed in such a manner that this exploitation
was possible.
This Security Problem Definition is reproduced from Appendix I.1 through I.5 from the HCDcPP.
3.1 Users
There are two categories of Users defined in this ST, Normal and Admin.
Table 5: User Categories
Designation Category Name Definition
U.NORMAL Normal User A User who has been identified and authenticated and does
not have an administrative role.
U.ADMIN Administrator A User who has been identified and authenticated and has an
administrative role
A conforming TOE may define additional roles, sub-roles, or groups. In particular, a conforming
TOE may define several administrative roles that have authority to administer different aspects
of the TOE.
3.2 Assets
Assets are passive entities in the TOE that contain or receive information. In the HCDcPP, Assets
are Objects (as defined by the CC). There are two categories of Assets defined in the HCDcPP:
Table 6: Asset Categories
Designation Asset Category Definition
D.USER User Data Data created by and for Users that do not affect the
operation of the TSF
D.TSF TSF Data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the
operation of the TSF
There are no additional Asset categories defined in this ST.
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3.2.1 User Data
User Data are composed of two types:
Table 7: User Data types
Designation User Data type Definition
D.USER.DOC User Document Data Information contained in a User’s Document, in electronic or
hardcopy form
D.USER.JOB User Job Data Information related to a User’s Document or Document
Processing Job
There are no additional User Data types defined in this ST.
3.2.2 TSF Data
TSF Data are composed of two types:
Table 8: TSF Data types
Designation TSF Data type Definition
D.TSF.PROT Protected TSF Data TSF Data for which alteration by a User who is neither the data
owner nor in an Administrator role might affectthe security of
the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable
D.TSF.CONF Confidential TSF
Data
TSF Data for which either disclosure or alteration by a User
who is neither the data owner nor in an Administrator role
might affect the security of the TOE
There are no additional TSF Data types defined in this ST.
3.3 Threats
Threats are defined by a threat agent that performs an action resulting in an outcome that has
the potential to violate TOE security policies.
Table 9: Threats
Designation Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_AC CESS An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete) User Document Data or
change (modify or delete) User Job Data in the TOE through one of the
TOE’s interfaces or the physical Nonvolatile Storage component.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF Data in the TOE
through one of the TOE’s interfaces or the physical Nonvolatile Storage
component.
T.TSF_FAILURE A malfunction of the TSF may co mpro mise the dev ice security
status if the TOE is permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE An attacker may install unauthorized firmware/software on the TOE to
modify the Device security status.
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T.NET_COMPROMISE An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise compromise the
security of the TOE by monitoring or manipulating network
communication.
T.WEAK_CRYPTO An attacker may exploit poorly chosen cryptographic algorithms, random
bit generators, ciphers or key sizes to access (read, modify, or delete) TSF
and User data.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
Organizational Security Policies are used to provide a basis for Security Objectives that are not
practical to define on the basis of Threats to Assets or that originate primarily from customer
expectations.
Table 10: Organizational Security Policies
Designation Definition
P.AUTHORIZATION Users must be authorized before performing Document Processing and
administrative functions.
P.AUDIT Security-relevant activities must be audited and the log of such actions
must be stored within the TOE as well as protected and transmitted to
an External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTIO N The TOE must be able to identify itself to other devices on the LAN.
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPT ION If the TOE stores User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data on
Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such data on those devices.
P.KEY_MATERIAL Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or any other values that
contribute to the creation of encryption keys for Nonvolatile Storage of
User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data must be protected from
unauthorized access and must not be stored on that storage device.
P.FAX_FLOW (conditionally
mandatory)
If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will ensure separation
between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.
P.IMAGE_OVERWRITE (optional) Upon completion or cancellation of a Document Processing job, the TOE
shall overwrite residual image data from its Nonvolatile Storage Devices.
P.WIPE_DATA (optional) The TOE shallprovide a function that an authorized administrator can
invoke to make all customer-supplied User Data and TSF Data
permanently irretrievable from Nonvolatile Storage Devices.
P.ROT_INTEGRITY The vendor provides a Root of Trust (RoT) that is comprised of the TOE
firmware, hardware, and pre-installed public keys or required critical
security parameters.
3.5 Assumptions
Assumptions are conditions that must be satisfied in order for the Security Objectives and
functional requirements to be effective.
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Table 11: Assumptions
Designation Definition
A.PHYSICAL Physical security,commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data
it stores or processes, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.NETWORK The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE from
direct, public access to its LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according to site
security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site security
policies.
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4. Security Objectives
This ST includes the security objectives defined in the HCDcPP in the following sections. This includes
security objectives for the TOE (used to mitigate threats) and for its operational environment (used to
satisfy assumptions). The ST includes the conditionally mandatory objective, O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION,
and the two optional objectives O.IMAGE_OVERWRITE and O.WIPE_DATA.
The Security Objectives are reproduced from Appendix I.6 from the HCDcPP.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
Table 12: Security Objectives for the TOE
Designation Definition
O.USER_I&A TheTOE shall perform identification and authentication of Users for
operations that require access control, User authorization, or
Administrator roles.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL The TOE shall enforce access controls to protect User Data and TSF Data
in accordance with security policies.
O.USER_AUTHORIZAT ION The TOE shallperform authorization of Users in accordance with
security policies.
O.ADMIN_ROLES The TOE shall ensure that only authorized Administrators are permitted
to perform administrator functions.
O.UPDATE_VERIFICAT ION The TOE shall provide mechanisms to verify the authenticity of
firmware/software updates.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST The TOE shalltest some subset of its security functionality to help
ensure that subset is operating properly.
O.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE shall have the capability to protect LAN communications of User
Data and TSF Data from Unauthorized Access, replay, and
source/destination spoofing.
O.AUDIT TheTOE shall generate audit data and store it internally as wellas be
capable of sending it to a trusted External IT Entity.
O.STORAGE_ENCRYPT ION If the TOE stores User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data in
Nonvolatile Storage devices, then the TOE shall encrypt such data on
those devices.
O.KEY_MATERIAL The TOE shall protect from unauthorized access any cleartext keys,
submasks, random numbers, or other values that contribute to the
creation of encryption keys for storage of User Document Data or
Confidential TSF Data in Nonvolatile Storage Devices; The TOE shall
ensure that such key material is not stored in cleartext on the storage
device that uses that material.
O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION
(conditionally mandatory)
If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, then the TOE shall ensure
separation of the PSTN fax telephone line and the LAN, by system design
or active security function.
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Designation Definition
O.IMAGE_OVERWRITE
(optional)
Upon completion or cancellation of a Document Processing job, the TOE
shall overwrite residual image data from its Nonvolatile Storage Devices.
O.WIPE_DATA (optional) TheTOE provides a function that an authorized administrator can invoke
to make all customer-supplied User Data and TSF Data permanently
irretrievable from Nonvolatile Storage Devices.
O.AUTH_FAILURES
(conditionally mandatory)
The TOE resists repeated attempts to guess authorization data by
responding to consecutive failed attempts in a way that prevents an
attacker from exploring a significant amount of the space of possible
authorization data values.
O.FW_INTEGRITY The TOE ensures its own integrity has remained intact and attests its
integrity to outside parties on request.
O.STRONG_CRYPTO The TOE implements strong cryptographic mechanisms and algorithms
according to recognized standards, including support for random bit
generation based on recognized standards and a source of sufficient
entropy. The TOE uses key sizes that are recognized as providing
sufficient resistance to current attack capabilities.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Table 13: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Designation Definition
OE.PHYSICAL_PROTE CTION The Operational Environment shall provide physical security,
commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores or
processes.
OE.NETWORK_PROTE CTION The Operational Environment shall provide network security to protect
the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
OE.ADMIN_TRUST The TOE Owner shall establish trust that Administrators will not use their
privileges for malicious purposes.
OE.USER_TRAINING The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of site security
policies and have the competence to follow them.
OE.ADMIN_TRAINING The TOE Owner shall ensure that Administrators are aware of site
security policies and have the competence to use manufacturer’s
guidance to correctly configure the TOE and protect passwords and keys
accordingly.
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5. IT Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements
(SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to
scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the following Protection Profile (PP):
• collaborative Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Version 1.0e, 4 March 2024 (HCDcPP)
As a result, any selection, assignment, or refinement operations already performed by that PP on the
claimed SFRs are not identified here (i.e., they are not formatted in accordance with the conventions
specified in section 1.5 of this ST). Formatting conventions are only applied on SFR text that was chosen
at the ST author’s discretion.
5.1 Extended Requirements
All the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the HCDcPP. This document defines the
extended SFRs; since they have not been redefined in this ST, the HCDcPP should be consulted for more
information regarding these extensions to CC Parts 2 and 3.
• FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: External Audit Trail Storage
• FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
• FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected
• FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended Key Chaining
• FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended Random Bit Generation
• FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
• FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
• FDP_UDU_EXT.1 Document Unavailability
• FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management
• FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
• FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation
• FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
• FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests
• FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
• FPT_SBT_EXT.1 Extended: Secure Boot
• FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
• FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
• FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
• FPT_WIPE_EXT.1 Data Wiping
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the TOE.
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Table 14: TOE Security Functional Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
Security Audit (FAU) FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: External Audit Trail Storage
Cryptographic Support (FCS) FCS_CKM.1/AKG Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys)
FCS_CKM.1/SKG Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys)
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash
Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation
and Verification)
FCS_COP.1/StorageEncryption Cryptographic operation (Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation
User Data Protection (FDP) FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
FDP_UDU_EXT.1 Document Unavailability
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Identification and
Authentication (FIA)
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management
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Requirement Class Requirement Component
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
Security Management (FMT) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Privacy (FPR) There are no class FPR requirements.
Protection of the TSF (FPT) FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
FPT_SBT_EXT.1 Extended: Secure Boot
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
FPT_WIPE_EXT.1/Disk Data Wiping
FPT_WIPE_EXT.1/Flash Data Wiping
Resource Utilization (FRU) There are no class FRU requirements.
TOE Access (FTA) FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Trusted Paths/Channels (FTP) FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted path (for Administrators)
FTP_TRP.1/NonAdmin Trusted path (for Non-Administrators)
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5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)
5.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b. All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c. All auditable events specified in Table 15, [no other auditable events].
Refinement Rationale: The table reference is changed to reflect the contents of the ST.
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, additional information
specified in Table 15, [no other information].
Refinement Rationale: The table reference is changed to reflect the contents of the ST.
Table 15: Auditable Events
Auditable Event Relevant SFR Additional Information
Job Completion FDP_ACF.1 Type of Job
Unsuccessful login attempts limit
is met or exceeded
FIA_AFL.1 None
Unsuccessful User authentication FIA_UAU.1 Supplied User ID/Name and
origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address)
Unsuccessful User identification FIA_UID.1 Supplied User ID/Name and
origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address)
Use of management functions FMT_SMF.1 None
Modification to the group of
Users that are part of a role
FMT_SMR.1 None
Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 None
Failure to establish session FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1/Admin,
FTP_TRP.1/NonAdmin
Reason for failure
Unsuccessful attempt to validate
a certificate
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev Reason for failure of certificate
validation
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5.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able
to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the
event.
5.2.1.3 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [an Administrator] with the capability to read [all records]
from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.
5.2.1.4 FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except
those users that have been granted explicit read-access.
5.2.1.5 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from
unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [ prevent] unauthorized modifications to the
stored audit records in the audit trail.
5.2.1.6 FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FAU_STG.4.1 Refinement: The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records]
and [take no other actions] if the audit trail is full.
5.2.1.7 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: External Audit Trail Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an
External IT Entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1/AKG Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys)
FCS_CKM.1.1/AKG Refinement: The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that
meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Appendix B.3;
• FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: “NIST
Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise
Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and
[RFC 3526].
].
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5.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.1/SKG Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys)
FCS_CKM.1.1/SKG Refinement: The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using
a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified
cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [NIST SP 800-
133 Rev.2 Section [6.1]].
5.2.2.3 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refinement)
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [
• FFC Schemes using “safe-prime” groups that meet the following: ‘NIST
Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [RFC
3526].
].
5.2.2.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall destroy all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and
cryptographic critical security parameters when no longer needed.
5.2.2.5 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method [
• For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [removal
of power to the memory];
• For non-volatile storage that consists of the invocation of an
interface provided by the underlying platform that [
o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a
[[single] overwrite consisting of [zeroes, a new value of a key of the
same size]]
o instructs the underlying platform to destroy the abstraction that
represents the key
] that meets the following: [no standard].
5.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform [ encryption/decryption ] in accordance
with specified cryptographic algorithms [
• AES used in [CBC] mode,
] and cryptographic key sizes [
Case: AES algorithm [
[
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o 256 bits],
] that meet the following [
Case: AES algorithm
• ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116],
].
5.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash Refinement: The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• SHA-256,
• SHA-384
] and message digest sizes [
• 256,
• 384
] bits that meet the following: [ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004].
5.2.2.8 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash Refinement: The TSF shall perform [keyed-hash message
authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384] and cryptographic key sizes [256, 384]
and message digest sizes [256, 384] bits that meet the following:
[ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”].
5.2.2.9 FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and
Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform [ cryptographic signature services (generation
and verification)] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes
(modulus) [2048 bits, 3072 bits]
] that meet the following: [
Case: RSA schemes
• FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using
PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5;
ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3
].
5.2.2.10 FCS_COP.1/StorageEncryption Cryptographic operation (Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/StorageEncryption The TSF shall perform [ data encryption and decryption]
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
Lexmark Multi-Function Printers with Hard Drive Security Target Version 1.20, 2024.09.10
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• AES used in [CBC] mode
] and cryptographic key sizes [
Case: AES algorithm
• [256 bits],
] that meet the following [
Case: AES algorithm
• ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116]
].
5.2.2.11 FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything
that is otherwise unmatched and discards it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall implement [transport mode].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using
the cryptographic algorithms [AES-CBC-256 (RFC 3602)] together with a
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC [HMAC-SHA- 256, HMAC-SHA-
384].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [
• IKEv1, using Main Mode for Phase 1 exchanges, as defined in RFCs
2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [RFC 4304 for extended sequence
numbers], and [no other RFCs for hash functions];
• IKEv2 as defined in RFC 5996 and [with no support for NAT traversal], and
[no other RFCs for hash functions]
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv1, IKEv2] protocol
uses the cryptographic algorithms [AES-CBC-256 (specified in RFC 3602].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [
• IKEv1 Phase 1 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator
based on [
o length of time, where the time values can be configured within
[1-24] hours;];
• IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based
on [
o length of time, where the time values can be configured within
[1-24] hours]
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [
Lexmark Multi-Function Printers with Hard Drive Security Target Version 1.20, 2024.09.10
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• IKEv1 Phase 2 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator
based on [
o length of time, where the time values can be configured within
[1-8] hours; ];
• IKEv2 Child SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator
based on [
o length of time, where the time values can be configured within
[1-8] hours; ]
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman
key exchange (“x” in g^x mod p) using the random bit generator specified
in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, and having a length of at least [256] bits.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall generate nonces used in [IKEv1, IKEv2] exchanges of length [
• according to the security strength associated with the negotiated Diffie-
Hellman group
• at least 128 bits in size and at least half the output size of the negotiated
pseudorandom function (PRF) hash;
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The TSF shall ensure that IKE protocols implement DH Group(s) [
• [14 (2048-bit MODP), 15 (3072-bit MODP)] according to RFC 3526
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 The TSF shall be able to ensure by default that the strength of the
symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key)
negotiated to protect the [IKEv1 Phase 1, IKEv2 IKE_SA] connection is
greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in
terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the
[IKEv1 Phase 2, IKEv2 CHILD_SA] connection.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer authentication
using [RSA] that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945 and
[Pre- shared Keys].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 The TSF shall only establish a trusted channel if the presented identifier in
the received certificate matches the configured reference identifier,
where the presented and reference identifiers are of the following fields
and types: [SAN: IP address] and [no other reference identifier type].
5.2.2.12 FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [one] while maintaining an effective
strength of [256 bits].
Lexmark Multi-Function Printers with Hard Drive Security Target Version 1.20, 2024.09.10
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5.2.2.13 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG ([AES])].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source
that accumulates entropy from [[1] hardware- based noise source] with a
minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security
strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength
Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.2.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.2.3.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP on
subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects specified in
Table 16 and Table 17.
Refinement Rationale: The table reference is changed to reflect the contents of the ST.
5.2.3.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to
objects based on the following: subjects, objects, and attributes specified
in Table 16 and Table 17.
Refinement Rationale: The table reference is changed to reflect the contents of the ST.
FDP_ACF.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects
using controlled operations on controlled objects specified in Table 16
and Table 17].
Refinement Rationale: The table reference is changed to reflect the contents of the ST.
FDP_ACF.1.3 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects based on the following additional rules: [
• Received faxes are automatically received and stored when receipt of faxes
is enabled via device configuration. No U.ADMIN action is required per-fax.
• Only U.ADMIN with the Release Held Faxes permission may release held
faxes for printing.
].
FDP_ACF.1.4 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: [
• The Job Owner of submitted print jobs is determined by a Userid included in
the embedded PJL. Print jobs received without a Userid, or with an unknown
Userid, or with a Userid of a user that does not have the Held Jobs Access
permission, are deleted after the specified timeout period for releasing held
Lexmark Multi-Function Printers with Hard Drive Security Target Version 1.20, 2024.09.10
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print jobs. During this time, no access to the print jobs is possible since
access is restricted to the job owner.
].
Table 16: D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP
PRINT “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation: Submit a
document to be
printed
View image or
Release printed
output
Modify stored
document
Delete stored
document
Job owner (with Held
Jobs Access)
Yes Release No Yes
Job owner (without
Held Jobs Access)
Yes, but deleted denied denied denied
Unknown user Yes, but deleted denied denied denied
No userid specified Yes, but deleted denied denied denied
U.ADMIN
U.ADMIN has no inherent privileges; rather this role can only create/access
his/her own jobs and will fall into one of the categories listed above.
U.NORMAL
U.NORMAL has no inherent privileges; rather this role can only create/access
his/her own jobs and will fall into one of the categories listed above.
Unauthenticated
See above
categories
denied denied denied
SCAN “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation: Submit a
document for
scanning
View scanned
image
Modify stored
document
Delete stored
document
Job owner (with E-
mail Function
permission)
Yes No No No
U.ADMIN denied denied denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
COPY “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation:
Submit a
document for
copying
View scanned
image or Release
printed copy
output
Modify stored
document
Delete stored
document
Job owner (with Copy
Function permission)
Yes No No Yes
U.ADMIN denied denied denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
FAX SEND “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
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PRINT “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation: Submit a
document to be
printed
View image or
Release printed
output
Modify stored
document
Delete stored
document
Operation: Submit a
document to
send as a fax
View scanned
image
Modify stored
document
Delete stored
document
Job owner (with Fax
Function permission)
Yes Yes No No
U.ADMIN denied denied denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
FAX RECEIVE “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation:
Receive a fax and
store it
View fax image
or Release
printed fax
output
Modify image of
received fax
Delete image of
received fax
Fax owner (U.ADMIN
with Release Held
Faxes)
Automatic Release No No
U.ADMIN (without
Release Held Faxes)
Automatic denied denied denied
U.NORMAL Automatic denied denied denied
Unauthenticated Automatic denied denied denied
STORAGE/RETRIEVAL “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation:
Store document
Retrieve stored
document
Modify stored
document
Delete stored
document
Job owner n/a n/a n/a n/a
U.ADMIN (without
Release Held Faxes)
n/a n/a n/a n/a
U.NORMAL n/a n/a n/a n/a
Unauthenticated n/a n/a n/a n/a
Table 17: D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP
PRINT “Create”* “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation:
Create a print job
View print queue
/ job
Modify print job Cancel print job
Job owner (with Held
Jobs Access)
Yes Yes, for itself
Modify # of
copies
Yes, for itself
Job owner (without
Held Jobs Access)
Yes, but deleted denied denied denied
Unknown user Yes, but deleted denied denied denied
No userid specified Yes, but deleted denied denied denied
Lexmark Multi-Function Printers with Hard Drive Security Target Version 1.20, 2024.09.10
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PRINT “Create”* “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation:
Create a print job
View print queue
/ job
Modify print job Cancel print job
U.ADMIN
U.ADMIN has no inherent privileges; rather this role can only create/access
his/her own jobs and will fall into one of the categories listed above.
U.NORMAL
U.NORMAL has no inherent privileges; rather this role can only create/access
his/her own jobs and will fall into one of the categories listed above.
Unauthenticated
See above
categories
denied denied denied
SCAN “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation:
Create scan job
View scan status
/ log
Modify scan job Cancel scan job
Job owner (with E-
mail Function
permission)
Yes No No No
U.ADMIN denied denied denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
COPY “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation:
Create copy job
View copy status
/ log
Modify copy job Cancel copy job
Job owner (with Copy
Function permission)
Yes No No Yes
U.ADMIN denied denied denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
FAX SEND “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation: Create fax send
job
View fax job
queue / log
Modify fax send
job
Cancel fax send
job
Job owner (with Fax
Function permission)
Yes Yes No No
U.ADMIN denied denied denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
FAX RECEIVE “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation: Create fax
receive job
View fax receive
status / log
Modify fax
receive job
Cancel fax
receive job
Fax owner (U.ADMIN
with Release Held
Faxes)
Automatic Release No No
U.ADMIN (without
Release Held Faxes)
Automatic denied denied denied
U.NORMAL Automatic denied denied denied
Unauthenticated Automatic denied denied denied
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PRINT “Create”* “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation:
Create a print job
View print queue
/ job
Modify print job Cancel print job
STORAGE/RETRIEVAL “Create” “Read” “Modify” “Delete”
Operation: Create storage /
retrieval job
View storage /
retrieval log
Modify storage /
retrieval job
Cancel storage /
retrieval job
Job owner n/a n/a n/a n/a
U.ADMIN n/a n/a n/a n/a
U.NORMAL n/a n/a n/a n/a
Unauthenticated n/a n/a n/a n/a
5.2.3.3 FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [perform encryption in accordance with
FCS_COP.1/StorageEncryption], such that any Nonvolatile Storage Device
contains no plaintext User Document Data and no plaintext Confidential TSF
Data.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
5.2.3.4 FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
FDP_FXS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except
transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols.
5.2.3.5 FDP_UDU_EXT.1 Document Unavailability
FDP_UDU_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content stored on a
[non-wear-leveled storage device] of a resource is made unavailable [by
overwriting data] upon the deallocation of the resource from the
following objects: D.USER.DOC.
5.2.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.2.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [an administrator configurable positive integer
within [1 to 10] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
[local and remote login attempts].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been [met], the TSF shall [lock the account for an administrative
configurable amount of time].
5.2.4.2 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users: [
• Username
• Password
Lexmark Multi-Function Printers with Hard Drive Security Target Version 1.20, 2024.09.10
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• Associated groups
• User permissions, as specified by associated groups,
• Number of consecutive authentication failures,
• Time of the earliest authentication failure (since the last successful login
if any have occurred),
• Account lock status
].
5.2.4.3 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
User passwords:
• Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper
and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [
“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, [other ASCII characters
except CR and NL]];
• Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator, and
have the capability to require passwords of 15 characters or greater.
5.2.4.4 FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that are:
• 22 characters in length and [[lengths from 1 to 256 characters]];
• composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters,
numbers, and special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”,
“^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”).
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [[a pseudo-
random function (PRF) using HMAC-SHA2-256 or HMAC-SHA2-384]] and be able
to [use no other pre-shared keys].
5.2.4.5 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shallallow [
• submit print jobs;
• view operational status of the device,
• receive faxes (if that function is enabled by the administrator)
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.2.4.6 FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [only asterisks (“*”) or dots (“●”)] to the user
while the authentication is in progress.
Application Note: asterisks are displayed for smart card users and dots are displayed for a touch screen user.
Lexmark Multi-Function Printers with Hard Drive Security Target Version 1.20, 2024.09.10
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5.2.4.7 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shallallow [
• submit print jobs;
• view operational status of the device,
• receive faxes (if receive faxes is enabled by the administrator)
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.2.4.8 FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [
• Username
• Associated groups
• User permissions
].
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [
• The username are the values supplied by the user.
• The associated groups are the values configured for the user account.
• User permissions are determined by combining the configured permissions
for each associated group.
].
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
[the security attributes do not change during a session].
5.2.4.9 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev Refinement The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the
following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a
minimum path length of three certificates.
• The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate
designated as a trust anchor.
• The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates
in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA
flag set to TRUE.
• The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [the
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960].
Lexmark Multi-Function Printers with Hard Drive Security Target Version 1.20, 2024.09.10
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• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the
following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity
verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server
Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication
purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP
Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the
basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.2.4.10 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [IPsec] and [no additional uses].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a
certificate, the TSF shall [accept the certificate].
5.2.4.11 FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests
FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986 and be
able to provide the following information in the request: public key and
[Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country].
FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon
receiving the CA Certificate Response.
5.2.5 Security Management (FMT)
5.2.5.1 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behaviour
of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of] the functions [
• Audit
• Identification and authentication
• Authorization and access controls
• Communication with External IT Entities
• Network communications
• System or network time source
Lexmark Multi-Function Printers with Hard Drive Security Target Version 1.20, 2024.09.10
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• Device functions (e.g., Fax)
] to [U.ADMIN].
5.2.5.2 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the [User Data Access Control SFP] to
restrict the ability to [
• query,
• modify,
• delete,
• [create]
] the security attributes [
• Username,
• associated groups,
• user permissions
] to [administrators authorized for access to the Security Menu].
5.2.5.3 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to
provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 Refinement: The TSF shall allow the [no role] to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
5.2.5.4 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the specified
operations on the specified TSF Data to the roles specified in Table 18.
Refinement Rationale: The table reference is changed to reflect the contents of the ST.
Table 18: Management of the TSF
Data Operation Authorized role(s) (for the
user’s own jobs only)
TSF Data owned by a U.NORMAL or associated with Documents or jobs owned by a U.NORMAL
D.USER.JOB Query, Modify Held Jobs Access (for the
user’s own jobs only)
TSF Data not owned by a U.NORMAL
Active Directory Configuration Create Security Menu
Analog Fax - Cancel Faxes Query, Modify Function Configuration
Menus
Analog Fax - Enable Fax Receive Query, Modify Function Configuration
Menus
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Data Operation Authorized role(s) (for the
user’s own jobs only)
Analog Fax - Enable Manual Fax Query, Modify Function Configuration
Menus
Analog Fax - Holding Faxes Query, Modify, Delete, Create Function Configuration
Menus
Date and Time Parameters Query, Modify Device Menu
Disk Encryption Query, Modify Security Menu
Enable Audit Query, Modify Security Menu
Enable Fax Scans Query, Modify Function Configuration
Menus
Enable HTTP Server Query, Modify Network/Ports Menu
Enable Remote Syslog Query, Modify Security Menu
Fax Mode Query, Modify Function Configuration
Menus
Fax Server - Enable Analog Receive Query, Modify Function Configuration
Menus
Groups Query, Modify, Delete, Create Security Menu
Held Print Job Expiration Timer Query, Modify Security Menu
IPSec Settings Query, Modify Network/Ports Menu
Job Waiting Query, Modify Device Menu
Kerberos Setup Query, Modify Security Menu
LDAP Certificate Verification Query, Modify Security Menu
LDAP+GSSAPI – MFP Credentials Query, Modify Security Menu
LDAP+GSSAPI Configuration Query, Modify, Delete, Create Security Menu
Login Restrictions Query, Modify Security Menu
Network Port Query, Modify Security Menu
Permissions Query, Modify Security Menu
Remote Syslog Parameters Query, Modify Security Menu
Security Reset Jumper Query, Modify Security Menu
Smart Card Authentication Client
Configuration
Query, Modify Security Menu
SMTP Setup Settings Query, Modify Settings > Email
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Data Operation Authorized role(s) (for the
user’s own jobs only)
SMTP Setup Settings - User-Initiated E-mail Query, Modify Settings > Email
USB Buffer Query, Modify Network/Ports Menu
Username/Password Accounts Query, Modify, Delete, Create Security Menu
Visible Home Screen Icons Query, Modify Device Menu
Software, firmware, and related configuration data
Firmware Query Reports Menu
Modify Firmware Updates
5.2.5.5 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1: The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [
• User management (e.g., add/change/remove local user)
• Role management (e.g., assign/deassign role relationship with user)
• Configuring identification and authentication (e.g., selecting between local
and external I&A)
• Configuring authorization and access controls (e.g., access control lists for
TOE resources)
• Configuring communication with External IT Entities
• Configuring network communications
• Configuring the system or network time source
• Configuring data transmission to audit server
• Configuring internal audit log storage
• Configure applications
• Perform firmware updates
• Configure device functions
• Sanitize device.
].
5.2.5.6 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [U.ADMIN, U.NORMAL].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
5.2.6 Privacy (FPR)
There are no class FPR requirements.
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5.2.7 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.2.7.1 FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material (cm)
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [
• only store plaintext keys that meet any one of the following criteria [
o the non-volatile memory the key is stored on is located in a protected
storage device
]
].
5.2.7.2 FPT_SBT_EXT.1 Extended: Secure Boot
FPT_SBT_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall contain one or more chains of trust with each chain of trust
anchored in a Root of Trust that is implemented in immutable code or a HW-
based write-protection mechanism.
FPT_SBT_EXT.1.2 At boot time the TSF shall use the chain(s) of trust to confirm integrity of
its firmware/software using a [hash, digital signature] verification
method.
FPT_SBT_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [halt boot process] in the event of a boot time verification
failure so that the corrupted firmware/software isn’t executed.
FPT_SBT_EXT.1.4 Following failure of verification, the TSF shall provide a mechanism to:
[indicate a need to contact vendor support].
FPT_SBT_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall contain [hash data] in the Hardware Root of Trust.
FPT_SBT_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall make the symmetric key accessible only to the Hardware Root
of Trust
5.2.7.3 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and
private keys.
5.2.7.4 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
5.2.7.5 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (and power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
5.2.7.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the
current version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate
updates to TOE firmware/software.
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FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the
TOE using [digital signature] and [no other functions] prior to installing
those updates.
5.2.7.7 FPT_WIPE_EXT.1 Data Wiping
FPT_WIPE_EXT.1.1/Disk The TSF shall ensure that any previous customer-supplied
information content of a resource in non-volatile storage is made
unavailable upon the request of an Administrator to the following objects:
[D.USER] using the following method(s): cryptographic erase and [
• logically addresses the storage location of the data and performs a
[single] overwrite consisting of [zeroes]
] that meets the following: [no standard].
FPT_WIPE_EXT.1.1/Flash The TSF shall ensure that any previous customer-supplied
information content of a resource in non-volatile storage is made
unavailable upon the request of an Administrator to the following objects:
[D.TSF] using the following method(s): cryptographic erase and [
• logically addresses the storage location of the data and performs a
[single] overwrite consisting of [ones]
] that meets the following: [no standard].
5.2.8 Resource Utilization (FRU)
There are no class FRU requirements.
5.2.9 TOE Access (FTA)
5.2.9.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [configurable time
interval of user inactivity in the range of 1 to 120 minutes for the web interface
and 10 to 300 seconds for the touch panel].
5.2.10 Trusted Paths/Channels (FTP)
5.2.10.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall use [IPsec] to provide a trusted
communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities
supporting the following capabilities: remote audit server,
[authentication server, [email server, network time server]] that is logically
distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
Application Note: Authentication server refers to both a KDC and a LDAP server (including Active
Directory).
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FTP_ITC.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via
the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 Refinement: The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel
for remote audit, [remote authentication, network time synchronization,
sending email].
5.2.10.2 FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted path (for Administrators)
FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin Refinement: The TSF shall use [IPsec] to provide a trusted communication
path between itself and remote administrators that is logically distinct from
other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and
detection of modification of the communicated data.
FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin Refinement: The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin Refinement: The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [initial
administrator authentication and all remote administration actions].
5.2.10.3 FTP_TRP.1/NonAdmin Trusted path (for Non-Administrators) (cm)
FTP_TRP.1.1/NonAdmin Refinement: The TSF shall use [IPsec] to provide a trusted
communication path between itself and [remote] users that is logically
distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data
from [disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data].
FTP_TRP.1.2/NonAdmin Refinement: The TSF shall permit [the TSF, remote users] to initiate
communication via the trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.3/NonAdmin Refinement: The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for
[initial user authentication and all remote user actions].
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference to the HCDcPP.
Table 19: Assurance Components
Assurance Class Assurance Component
Security Target (ASE) Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
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Assurance Class Assurance Component
Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life cycle support (ALC) Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent testing – conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the following security functions:
• Identification, Authentication and Authorization
• Access Control
• Encryption
• Trusted Communications
• Administrative Roles
• Auditing
• Trusted Operation
• PSTN Fax-Network Separation
• Data Clearing and Purging
6.1 Security Functions
6.1.1 Identification, Authentication and Authorization
Users are required to successfully complete the I&A process before they are permitted to access any
restricted data or functionality. The set of restricted user functionality is under the control of the
administrators, with the exception of submission of network print jobs which is always allowed.
A new session is established for the touch panel when the system boots and for web sessions when the
connection is established. All sessions are initially bound to the Guest (default) user. In the evaluated
configuration, the Guest user has no access to restricted functions or data other than allowing print jobs
to be submitted.
Users must log in as a different user in order to gain access to TOE functionality. Multiple login
mechanisms are supported in the evaluated configuration: Smart Card authentication,
Username/Password Accounts and LDAP+GSSAPI. Note that Smart Card and LDAP+GSSAPI
authentications also use Kerberos functionality when authenticating certificates or credentials.
Username/Password information is stored in flash.
For Smart Card authentication, no functions at the touch panel are allowed until I&A successfully
completes. Thetouch panel displays a messagedirecting theuser toinserta card intotheattached reader.
Once a card is inserted, the user is prompted for a PIN. When the PIN is entered, only asterisks (“*”) are
displayed. Once the PIN is collected (indicated by the user touching the Next button), the TOE passes the
PIN to the card for validation. If it is not valid, a message is displayed on the touch panel and the user is
asked to re-enter the PIN. After the card-configured number of consecutive invalid PINs, the card will lock
itself until unlocked by a card administrator.
Upon successful card validation, the TOE forwards the certificate from the card to the configured Kerberos
Key Distribution Center (KDC) (Windows Domain Controller) for validation. If the certificate validation is
not successful, an error message is displayed on the touch panel until the current card is removed from
the reader. If the certificate validation is successful, the TOE binds the username, account name, and
email address (all obtained from the KDC/LDAP server) to the user session for future use. An audit record
for the successful authentication is generated. All communication with the KDC and LDAP server uses
IPsec.
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For Username/Password Accounts and LDAP+GSSAPI, the TOE collects a username and password via the
touch panel or via the browser session. When the password is entered, only asterisks (“*”) or dots (“●”)
are displayed. Asterisks are displayed on the touch panel; dots are displayed on the web interface. Once
the username and password are collected, the next step in the process depends on the I&A mechanism
being used.
For Username/Password Accounts, the TOE performs the validation of the username and password
against the set of configured Username/Password Accounts. If the validation fails because of an invalid
password (for a valid username), the count of failed authentication attempts is incremented for that
account. If the threshold for failed attempts within a time period is reached, then the account is marked
as being locked for the configured amount of time to mitigate against brute force password attacks.
For LDAP+GSSAPI, the TOE hashes the supplied password and forwards the username in an authentication
request signed by the hashed password to the configured KDC for validation (using the configured
machine credentials) and waits for the response. If no response is received, the validation is considered
to have failed.
In the case of failed validations, an error message is displayed via the touch panel or browser session, and
then the display returns to the previous screen for further user action. An audit record for the failed
authentication attempt is generated.
If validation is successful, the TOE retrieves the account name and email address from the LDAP server
and binds them to the user session for future use. An audit record for the successful authentication is
generated.
Permissions for the user session are determined from group memberships. Authorized Administrators
assign roles to user accounts by configuring permissions for each configured group and then assigning
user accounts to groups. At minimum, during installation Authorized Administrators must perform the
user account configuration activities in the guidance documentation to establish the evaluated
configuration:
• Create new groups for Authorized Administrators and Authorized Users. The group names must
correspond to names used in the LDAP server of Smart Card or LDAP+GSSAPI authentication is
used.
• Configure appropriate permissions for each of those groups
• Assign all users and administrators using Username/Password Accounts to groups
• Modify the Public permissions (which are the only permissions for the Guest user account so that
only B/W Print and Color Print are configured
For Username/Password accounts, the permissions for each group that the user is a member of (as
specified in the account configuration) are combined. For Smart Cards and LDAP+GSSAPI, a list of group
memberships areretrieved from the LDAP server. For each of those groups thatmatch a group configured
in the TOE, the permissions are combined. If the group memberships or permissions are changed, active
sessions are not affected; the changes take effect at the next login.
The user session is considered to be active until the user explicitly logs off, removes the card or the
administrator-configured inactivity timer for sessions expires. The timer values are separately
configurable: 1 to 120 minutes for the web interface and 10 to 300 seconds for the touch panel.
Users of the TOE, whether accessing the TOE via the touch panel or web interface, are considered to be
in one or more of the following categories:
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• Authorized Users – permitted to perform one or more of the user functions defined in FDP_ACC.1
and FDP_ACF.1.
• Authorized Administrators – permitted to access administrative functionality for control and
monitoring of the MFP operation.
• Any Users – Authorized Users and Authorized Administrators
The following Permissions may be configured for groups:
Table 20: Permissions
Item Description Comment
Address Book Controls the ability to manage the
Address Book contents.
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
Apps Configuration Controls access to the
configuration of any installed
applications
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration.
B/W Print Controls the ability to accept black
and white print jobs.
Permission must be granted to the
Public permissions
Cancel Jobs at the device Controls access to the functionality
to cancel jobs via the touch panel.
Permission may only be granted to
authorized users in the evaluated
configuration
Change Language from Home
Screen
Controls access to the Change
Language button on the Home
screen (when displayed); this
button is NOT displayed by default,
but a user can activate it via the
“General Settings Menu”
Permission may be granted to any
users
Color Dropout Controls a user’s ability to activate
the Color Dropout functionality as
part of a job; if protected and the
user fails to authenticate, then the
device DOES NOT use the color
dropout functionality in the job
Permission may only be granted to
authorized users in the evaluated
configuration
Color Print Controls the ability to print color
jobs.
Permission must be granted to the
Public permissions
Copy Color Printing Controls a user’s ability to copy
content in color
Permission may only be granted to
authorized users in the evaluated
configuration
Copy Function Controls a user’s access to the
Copy functionality
Permission may only be granted to
authorized users in the evaluated
configuration
Create Profiles Controls the ability to create scan
profiles from remote systems.
Permission must not be specified
for any user
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Item Description Comment
Device Menu Controls access to the Device
administrative menu
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
E-mail Function Control’s a user’s access to the
Email functionality (scan to email)
Permission may only be granted to
authorized users in the evaluated
configuration
Fax Function Control’s a user’s ability to perform
a scan to fax job
Note that when “Disabled” via fax
configuration, all analog faxing
(scan send and receive) and the fax
server are disabled. The fax icon is
never displayed.
Permission may only be granted to
authorized users in the evaluated
configuration
Firmware Updates Controls a user’s ability to update
the device’s firmware code via the
network
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
Flash Drive Color Printing Controls whether USB interfaces
may be used for color print
operations
Permission must not be specified
for any user
Flash Drive Print Controls whether USB interfaces
may be used for black and white
print operations
Permission must not be specified
for any user
Flash Drive Scan Controls whether USB interfaces
may be used for scan operations
Permission must not be specified
for any user
FTP Function Controls a user’s ability to access
the FTP button on the Home
Screen (when displayed).
Permission must not be specified
for any user
Function Configuration Menus Controls access to the
configuration menus for the print,
copy, fax, e-mail and FTP functions.
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
Held Jobs Access Controls access to the Held Jobs
function
Permission may only be granted to
authorized users in the evaluated
configuration
Import/Export Settings Controls the ability to import and
export configuration files
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
Internet Printing Protocol (IPP) Controls access to print job
submission via IPP
Permission must not be specified
for any user
Manage Bookmarks Controls access to the Delete
Bookmark, Create Bookmark, and
Create Folder buttons from both
Permission must not be specified
for any user
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Item Description Comment
the bookmark list screen and from
the individual bookmark screen
Manage Shortcuts Controls access to the Manage
Shortcuts Menu
Permission must not be specified
for any user
Network/Ports Menu Controls access to the Network/
Ports Menu
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
New Apps Controls access to configuration
parameters for apps subsequently
added to the device.
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
Operator Panel Lock Controls access to the “Lock
Device” and “Unlock Device”
buttons
Permission may only be granted to
authorized users in the evaluated
configuration
Option Card Menu Controls a user’s ability to access
the “Option Card Menu” that
displays menu nodes associated
with installed DLEs
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
Out of Service Erase Controls the ability to wipe the
storage of the MFP when it is being
taken out of service.
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
Paper Menu Controls access to the Paper Menu Permission may be granted to any
users
Release Held Faxes Controls access to the Held Faxes
button and the Release Held Faxes
button on the Home screen
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
Remote Management Controls whether or not
management functions may be
invoked from remote IT systems
Permission must not be specified
for any user
Reports Menu Controls access to the Reports
Menu. This includes information
about user jobs, which can’t be
disclosed to non-administrators.
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
Search Address Book Controls access to the Search
Address Book button that appears
as part of the E-mail, FTP, and Fax
functions that are available from
the panel’s Home screen
Permission may be granted to any
users
Security Menus Controls access to the Security
Menu
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
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Item Description Comment
Supplies Menus Controls access to the Security
Menu
Permission may only be granted to
authorized administrators in the
evaluated configuration
Use Profiles Controls a user’s ability to execute
any profile
Permission must not be specified
for any user
The following SFRs satisfy Identification, Authentication, and Authorization.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 When Username/Password accounts are deleted, the associated password is
destroyed in flash.
FIA_AFL.1 Consecutive login failures for each user account within a configured time period
are tracked, and if the configured limit is reached the user account is
automatically locked for the configured amount of time.
FIA_ATD.1 The TSF maintains the following security attributes for users:
• Username (configured for internal account, acquired from LDAP server AD
and Smartcards)
• Password (internal accounts)
• Associated groups (configured for internal account, acquired from LDAP
server AD and Smartcards)
• Permissions (dynamically determined by group memberships)
• Number of consecutive login failures
• Time of earliest login failure (since last successful login)
• Account lock status
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Passwords for internal accounts are configured by administrators. The minimum
password length is configurable from 1-32 characters. Passwords may contain
any ASCII characters other than NL and CR.
FIA_UAU.1 User interaction through the touch panel and web interface prior to successful
authentication is limited to viewing the operational status of the device (e.g., low
paper). Users may submit print jobs without authenticating, but the jobs are not
printed until released by the authenticated user.
FIA_UAU.7 When a password or PIN is entered for authentication, only asterisks (“*”) or dots
(“●”) are displayed.
FIA_UID.1 User interaction through the touch panel and web interface prior to successful
identification is limited to viewing theoperational status of the device. Users may
submit print jobs and supply identification via embedded PJL, but the jobs are not
printed until released by the authenticated user. Invalid and missing
identification in print jobs results in those print jobs being deleted.
FIA_USB.1 Upon successful login, the username, associated groups and permissions are
bound to the session. The username is the value specified during login or the
username associated with the certificate from a smartcard. The groups are those
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configured internally or on the LDAP server. The permissions are the union of the
permissions for each associated group. These bindings do not change during an
active session.
FTA_SSL.3 Upon expiration of an inactivity timer, the corresponding session is automatically
terminated.
6.1.1.1 Active Directory Additional Information
If Active Directory parameters are supplied and Join is selected, the parameter values are used to join the
Active Directory Domain. If successful, machine credentials are generated and the LDAP+GSSAPI
configuration parameters are automatically updated with the Domain and machine information.
Once the Domain has been joined, subsequent I&A attempts may use the LDAP+GSSAPI configuration to
validateuser credentials using thenewly-created machinecredentials as described above. Thecredentials
specified for Active Directory by an authorized administrator are not saved.
Communication with the Active Directory server uses IPsec.
6.1.2 Access Control
Access control validates a user access request against the session’s permissions.
Authorization is restricted by not associating a permission with a function.
When the FAC is a menu, access is also restricted to all submenus (a menu that is normally reached by
navigating through the listed item). This is necessary for instances where a shortcut could bypass the
listed menu. If a shortcut is used to access a sub-menu, the access control check for the applicable menu
item is still performed (as if normal menu traversal was being performed).
When a function is restricted, the access control function determines if the user has permission to access
the function. Normally the icons for the functions the user is not permitted to access are not displayed in
the GUI.
The following table summarizes the access controls and configuration parameters used by the TOE to
control user access to the MFP functions provided by the TOE. Additional details for each function are
provided in subsequent sections.
Table 21: TOE User Function Access Control
Function Access Control Rules Configuration Parameter Rules
Print Network print jobs can always be submitted. The
job is held until released by a user who is
authorized for the Held Jobs Access function and
has the same userid as was specified in the SET
USERNAME PJL statement. Network print jobs
without a PJL SET USERNAME statement are
automatically deleted after the expiry period for
held jobs.
Allowed
Allowed for incoming faxes if the user has
permission to access Release Held Faxes.
Allowed if the “Enable Fax Scans”
parameter is On and the “Fax
Mode” parameter is “Analog Fax”.
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Function Access Control Rules Configuration Parameter Rules
Fax Send Allowed if the user has permission to access Fax
Function.
Allowed if the “Enable Fax Scans”
parameter is On and the “Fax
Mode” parameter is “Analog Fax”.
Copy Allowed if the user has permission to access Copy
Function.
Allowed
Fax Receive Incoming faxes are not subject to access control.
All incoming faxes are held until released by a
user who has permission to access Release Held
Faxes.
Allowed if the “Enable Fax Receive”
or “Enable Analog Receive”
parameter is “On”.
Scan (Fax E-mail
Server)
Allowed if the user has permission to access E-
mail Function.
Allowed if the “Enable Fax Scans”
parameter is On and the “Fax
Mode” parameter is “Fax Server”.
The following SFRs satisfies Access Control.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 Access to user functions is controlled as specified in these SFRs.
6.1.2.1 Printing
Submission of print jobs from users on the network is always permitted. Jobs that do not contain a PJL
SET USERNAME statement are discarded after the configured held jobs expiry period. Submitted jobs are
always held In the TOE until released or deleted by a user authorized for the appropriate access control
and who’s userid matches the username specified when the job was submitted. Users are able to display
the queue of their pending print jobs. If a held job is not released within the configured expiration time,
the job is automatically deleted.
In the evaluated configuration, the setdevparams, setsysparams and setuserparams Postscript operators
are made non-operational so that the Postscript DataStream cannot modify configuration settings in the
TOE.
6.1.2.2 Fax Sending and Scan (Fax E-mail Server)
Only authorized users may send faxes. Scanning for fax is allowed if the Enable Fax Scans configuration
parameter is “On” and the user is authorized for the Fax Function access control. Scanning for email is
allowed if the user is authorized for the E-mail Function access control.
The destination of the fax scan is determined by the setting of the “Fax Mode” configuration parameter.
If it is configured for “Analog Fax” then the scanned data is transmitted out the phone line as a fax. If it is
configured for “Fax Server” then the scanned data is forwarded to the configured email server via SMTP.
6.1.2.3 Copying
Copying is allowed if the user is authorized for the Copy Function access control.
6.1.2.4 Incoming Fax
Incoming faxes are allowed if the “Enable Fax Receive” (for analog fax mode) or “Enable Fax Receive” (for
fax server mode) configuration parameter is “On”.
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Incoming faxes are always held in the queue (until released) in the evaluated configuration. Only users
authorized for the Release Held Faxes access control may release or delete the faxes.
6.1.3 Encryption
All document data saved on the Hard Disk and configuration data in flash is encrypted using 256-bit AES.
Encryption of the disk and flash is automatically enabled upon receipt of the printer from the factory.
There is no administrator action required to enable printer encryption. Document data includes
submitted print jobs, copy jobs waiting to be printed, received faxes waiting to be printed, scan jobs
waiting to be emailed, and faxes waiting to be sent. The contents of each file are automatically encrypted
(AES-CBC) as they are written to the Hard Disk and automatically decrypted when the contents are read.
This security function is intended to protect against data disclosure if a malicious agent is able to gain
physical possession of the Hard Disk. The entire disk drive is a single encrypted partition. Note that
software is not stored on the drive and the drive is not the boot device. All TSF configuration data is
automatically encrypted (AES-CBC) as it is written to flash and automatically decrypted when the contents
are read.
A common key is used to encrypt all document data files, and a separate key is used to encrypt flash data.
These keys are generated using the internal random number generator during initial installation of the
HCD firmware. Details of the key chain for the key are provided in the ancillary Key Management
Description document. The random number generator function conforms to NIST SP 800-90A Revision 1
using CTR_DRBG(AES) and is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy by a single hardware source
described in the ancillary Entropy document.
The encryption keys are specific to the MFP. Any copy of the disk encryption key in RAM is destroyed
when power is turned off. Section 6.1.10 provides information concerning destruction of the disk
encryption key stored in flash memory.
The following SFRs satisfy Encryption.
FCS_CKM.1/SKG An AES-256 key is generated for encryption of each of hard disk and flash
configuration data.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 The keys are destroyed when an administrator commands the decommission
process to be performed.
FCS_CKM.4 Information regarding key destruction is provided in the KMD.
FCS_COP.1/StorageEncryption Document and configuration data is encrypted using AES-CBC-256.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption TSF configuration data in flash is encrypted using AES-CBC-256.
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 A key chain consisting of a single key is used. Details of the key chain are provided
in the ancillary Key Management Description document. The key chain supports
DEK outputs of no fewer than 256 bits.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 An RBG function conforming to NIST SP 800-90A using CTR_DRBG(AES) is used to
generate the 256-bit AES key for disk encryption. Entropy is provided by a
hardware source that is described in more detail in the ancillary Entropy
document.
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FDP_DSK_EXT.1 All TSF is transparently encrypted in Flash. Flash encryption cannot be disabled.
One Flash partition is dedicated to configuration data. The other Flash partitions
are not encrypted.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Plaintext keys are not stored on the hard disk. Details of the key chain for the key
are provided in the ancillary Key Management Description document.
6.1.4 Trusted Communications
During TOE installation, a 3072-bit self-signed certificate for the device is generated in accordance with
NIST SP 800-56B Revision 1 (“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography” for RSA- based key establishment schemes).
IPSec with ESP operating in transport mode is required for all network datagram exchanges of any type
with remote IT systems. This includes the following IT systems:
• Workstations submitting print jobs
• Workstations initiating connections to the web interface
• Remote Syslog server
• KDC
• LDAP server (including Active Directory)
• E-mail server
• OCSP server
• NTS
IPSec provides confidentiality, integrity and authentication of the endpoints. Supported encryption
options for IKE and ESP is AES-CBC-256. SHA-256 and SHA-384 are supported for HMACs. AES-CBC-256
may only be used if the IKE negotiation also selects AES-CBC-256.
ISAKMP and IKEv1/v2 are used to establish the Security Association (SA) and session keys for the IPSec
exchanges. For IKEv1, Main Mode is always used for Phase 1 exchanges (Aggressive Mode is never used).
No configuration is necessary. Diffie-Hellman is used for the IKE Key Derivation Function as specified in
RFC2409, using Oakley Group 14 or Group 15. SA lifetimes for both IKEv1 and IKEv2 can be limited to
separately configurable times for each phase: 1 to 24 hours for Phase 1, and 1 to 8 hours for Phase 2.
IKEv1 complies with RFC2409 AND IKEv2 complies with RFC5996.
When the TOE receives an IKE proposal, it selects the first proposed DH group that matches a DH group
configured in the TOE (DH Group 14 and Group 15 as specified in RFC 3526 Section 3 is the only supported
group) and the negotiation will fail if there is no match. Similarly, when the TOE initiates the IKE protocol,
a proposal is sent with all of the DH groups that are configured. The peer will select the first match from
the IKE proposal against its configured DH groups; the negotiation fails if no match is found.
Peer authentication is performed using the RSA algorithm and certificates and/or pre-shared keys.
During the ISAKMP exchange, the TOE requires the remote IT system to provide a certificate or text-based
Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs) may be configured by administrators and validated between endpoints. PSKs
configured in the system may be 1 to 256 characters in length, composed of the characters specified in
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2, and are conditioned using a pseudo-random function (PRF) using HMAC-SHA2-256 or
HMAC-SHA2-384 according to RFC 2409 (for IKEv1) or RFC 5996 (for IKEv2). The key size specified in the
SA exchange is 256 bits, the encryption algorithm is AES-CBC, and the Hash Authentication Algorithm is
SHA-256 or SHA-384.
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The secret value x used in the IKE key exchange using a 256-bit value obtained from the DRBG. Nonces
used in IKE exchanges are generated using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, with
length atleastequal to thesecurity strength ofthenegotiated Diffie-Hellman group(112 bits for DHGroup
14 (2048-bit MODP), 128 bits for DH Group 15 (3072-bit MODP)) and at least half the output size of the
negotiated PRF hash (256 bits for HMAC-SHA2-256, 384 bits for HMAC-SHA2-384), with a minimum of 128
bits.
When certificates are used, the following certificate validation is performed:
• The certificate path is validated, supporting a path length of 3.
• The signature in each certificate in the path, using 2048-bit or 3072-bit RSA digital signature
algorithm, is verified using the public key of the issuing CA certificate in the device’s trust store.
• The path must terminate with a CA certificate that has been configured as a trusted anchor.
• All CA certificates in the path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
• Certificaterevocation status is checked using OCSP as specified in RFC 6960. Ifan OCSP Responder
can’t be contacted, the certificate is accepted.
• Revocation checking is performed for the entire certificate chain for certificates received from
IPsec peers and when certificates are imported.
In received certificates, the SAN: IP Address must be present and is used as the presented identifier. The
certificate of the OCSP Responder mustcontain the OCSP Signing purpose. Validation of the CodeSigning,
Server Authentication and Client Authentication purposes is not performed by the TOE since TLS is not
supported and code updates are not validated via certificates.
X.509 Certificate Signing Requests may be generated, containing Common Name, Organization,
Organizational Unit, and Country values along with a generated 3072-bit RSA public key. Responses from
a Certificate Authority are validated.
If an incoming IP datagram does not use IPSec with ESP, the datagram is discarded. The Security Policy
Database is dynamically built with an accept/protect rule for each of the configured pre-shared keys and
certificates, permitting packets from the addresses associated with them, and a default “final rule” to
discard all other traffic. Incoming packets are validated against the SPD. Essentially incoming IP
datagrams from authorized addresses (with PSKs or certificates) are accepted, and all other IP datagrams
are discarded per the default final rule.
If external accounts are defined, LDAP+GSSAPI is used for the exchanges with the LDAP server. Kerberos
v5 is supported for exchanges with the LDAP server.
All session keys are stored in dynamic RAM. Any copy of an RSA private key or PSK in RAM is destroyed
when power is turned off. Section in 6.1.10 provides information concerning destruction of keys stored
in flash memory.
The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-
384, which operate on blocks of512, 1024 bits respectively, use key sizes of 256 and 384 bits respectively,
and yield message digest sizes of 256 and 384 bits respectively. The following SFRs satisfy Trusted
Communications.
FCS_CKM.1/AKG A 3072-bit asymmetric key pair is generated in accordance with NIST SP 800-56B
during installation.
FCS_CKM.2 DH Group 14 and Group 15 are used in exchanges with peers to establish IPSec
connections.
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FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Session keys are destroyed when sessions terminate. PSKs are destroyed when
the PSKs are deleted from the configuration by an authorized administrator.
FCS_CKM.4 Session keys are destroyed when power is removed.
FCS_COP.1/ DataEncryption IPsec traffic is encrypted using AES-CBC-256.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash IPsec uses keyed-hash message authentication codes that are authenticated by
the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/Hash IPsec uses keyed-hash message authentication codes that are authenticated by
the TOE.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec is implemented as described in the preceding text.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 certificates used in IPsec exchanges are validated.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 certificates may be used in IPsec exchanges for endpoint authentication.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Signing Requests can be generated.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 An RBG function conforming to NIST SP 800-90A using CTR_DRBG(AES) is used to
generate the asymmetric key pair. Entropy is provided by a hardware source that
is described in more detail in the ancillary Entropy document.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Text-based PSKs are supported and conditioned using a pseudo-random function
(PRF) using HMAC-SHA2-256 or HMAC-SHA2-384 according to RFC 2409 (for
IKEv1) or RFC 5996 (for IKEv2).
FTP_ITC.1 Trusted channels using IPsec are supported for authentication servers, remote
audit servers, network time servers and email servers.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted paths using IPsec are supported for administrators using the web
interface.
FTP_TRP.1/NonAdmin Trusted paths using IPsec are supported for users submitting print jobs.
The following table includes the NIST SP 800-56B Rev. 2 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, March 2019 Conformance.
Table 22: NIST SP800-56B Conformance
Section # “should”, “should not”, or “shall not”
Implemented
accordingly?
Rational for deviation
5.6 should Yes n/a
5.8 shall not Yes n/a
5.9 shall not (first occurrence) Yes n/a
5.9 shall not (second occurrence) Yes n/a
6.1 should not Yes n/a
6.1 should (first occurrence) Yes n/a
6.1 should (second occurrence) Yes n/a
6.1 should (third occurrence) Yes n/a
6.1 should (fourth occurrence) Yes n/a
6.1 shall not (first occurrence) Yes n/a
6.1 shall not (second occurrence) Yes n/a
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Section # “should”, “should not”, or “shall not”
Implemented
accordingly?
Rational for deviation
6.2.3 should Yes n/a
6.5.1 should Yes n/a
6.5.2 should Yes n/a
6.5.2.1 should Yes n/a
6.6 shall not Yes n/a
7.1.2 should Yes n/a
7.2.1.3 should Yes n/a
7.2.1.3 should not Yes n/a
7.2.2.3 should (first occurrence) Yes n/a
7.2.2.3 should (second occurrence) Yes n/a
7.2.2.3 should (third occurrence) Yes n/a
7.2.2.3 should (fourth occurrence) Yes n/a
7.2.2.3 should not Yes n/a
7.2.2.3 shall not Yes n/a
7.2.3.3 should (first occurrence) Yes n/a
7.2.3.3 should (second occurrence) Yes n/a
7.2.3.3 should (third occurrence) Yes n/a
7.2.3.3 should (fourth occurrence) Yes n/a
7.2.3.3 should (fifth occurrence) Yes n/a
7.2.3.3 should not Yes n/a
8 should Yes n/a
8.3.2 should not Yes n/a
6.1.5 Administrative Roles
The TOE provides the ability for authorized administrators to manage TSF data from remote IT systems
via a browser session or locally via the touch panel. Authorization is granular, enabling different
administrators to be granted access to different TSF data.
Authorized administrators (U.ADMIN) have one or more permissions to access management menus
and/or functions (as defined in FMT_SMF.1). The following table provides a correlation between functions
and the required permission.
Table 23: Function Correspondence to Permissions
Management Function Required Permission
User management Security Menus
Role management Security Menus
Configuring identification and authentication Security Menus
Configuring authorization and access controls Security Menus
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Management Function Required Permission
Configuring communication with External IT Entities Network/Ports Menu
Configuring network communications Network/Ports Menu
Configuring the system or network time source Network/Ports Menu
Configuring data transmission to audit server Security Menus
Configuring internal audit log storage Security Menus
Configure applications Apps Configuration
Perform firmware updates Firmware Updates
Configure device functions Function Configuration Menus
Sanitize device Out of Service Erase
If defined users have no management permissions, they are considered to have the U.NORMAL role and
have no access to management functions or data. When new users are defined, by default they have no
associated groups, and therefore no access to management functions or job functions (restrictive
default attributes).
Neither the web interface nor the touch panel provide the ability to view the values of PSKs, symmetric
keys or private keys for any administrator or user.
The following SFRs satisfy Administrative Roles.
FMT_MOF.1 Administrators with the appropriate permissions have the ability to disable,
enable and control the behavior of the specified functions.
FMT_MSA.1 Only administrators with the Security Menus permission may query, modify,
delete or create user accounts or groups.
FMT_MSA.3 By default, new users have no group memberships and therefore restrictive
permissions.
FMT_MTD.1 Administrator operations on specific TSF data is determined by their permissions
as described in Table 18.
FMT_SMF.1 Management functionality for the listed functions is provided to administrators
as described in section 5.2.5.5.
FMT_SMR.1 Administrators have one or more permission related to management
functionality. Users have job function permissions only.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 PSKs, symmetric keys and private keys are stored in flash. No mechanism is
provided to read PSKs, symmetric keys or private keys.
6.1.6 Auditing
The TOE generates audit event records for security-relevant events. The events that cause audit records
to be generated are specified in section Table 15. A time stamp is inserted into each record; reliable time
is maintained via internal hardware or NTP. When NTP is used, it must be transmitted over IPsec (all
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communication with the TOE must use IPsec). A severity level is associated with each type of auditable
event; only events at or below the severity level configured by an administrator are generated. Per the
evaluated configuration, the severity level must be set to 5 (Notice).
Audit records are stored internally as well as being sent to a configured remote syslog server.
Communication with the remote syslog server uses the Syslog protocol with IPsec.
Audit records for Successful Login events include the userid of the user as well as a session identifier.
Other audit records include the session identifier, enabling the userid associated with other audit records
to be determined via the corresponding Successful Login record. The time field in audit records is supplied
by the TOE if internal time is configured by an administrator or by an NTP server if external time is
configured.
Audit records sent to the remote syslog server follow the syslog format defined in the Berkeley Software
Distribution (BSD) Syslog Protocol (RFC 3164). The TOE supplies the PRI, HEADER, MSG/TAG, and
MSG/CONTENT fields for all messages. The CONTENT portion may contain the following fields (in order,
separated by commas):
• Event Number
• ISO 8601 time ([YYYY-MM-DD]T[hh:mm:ss])
• Severity
• Process (same as TAG)
• Remote IPv4 address
• Remote IPv6 address
• Remote Hostname
• Remote Port
• Local Port
• Authentication/Authorization method
• Username
• Setting ID
• Setting’s old and new values
• Event name
• Event data
Fields in the CONTENT section thatarenotrelevant for specific events areblank. TheremoteIPv4 address,
remote IPv6 address, remote hostname, remote port, and local port fields are always blank for events
resulting from actions at the MFP (e.g., usage of the touch panel).
Audit records are stored in the internal log as they are generated. If the internal audit log storage space
usage reaches 98% of capacity, the oldest records are purged until used space is lowered to 80%.
Using the web interface, administrator with the Security Menu permission may upload the audit log in
syslog or CSV format to their remote system via the browser connection. The audit log is saved as a local
file and may be reviewed by the administrator. These administrators may also clear (empty) the audit log.
When this action is performed, an Audit Log Cleared record is generated to note this action. Auditrecords
may not be modified.
No users, or administrators without the Security Menu permission, may view, modify or delete audit
records.
The following SFRs satisfy Auditing.
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FAU_GEN.1 Auditrecords aregenerated for theevents and with thecontent specified in Table
15. Audit records are stored in an internal log and transmitted to a remote syslog
server. Storage space allocated for internal audit log storage is 1 MB.
FAU_GEN.2 Users can be associated with audit events performed by identified users.
FAU_SAR.1 Administrators with the Security Menu permission may view the internal audit
log via the web interface.
FAU_SAR.2 Only Administrators with the Security Menu permission may view the internal
audit log.
FAU_STG.1 Only Administrators with the Security Menu permission may clear the internal
audit log. No functionality is provided to modify audit records.
FAU_STG.4 When internal audit log space is exhausted, the oldest records in the log are
discarded.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Audit records are transmitted to a remote audit server via the syslog protocol
over IPsec.
FPT_STM.1 The TOE maintains a reliable time stamp via internal hardware or NTP.
6.1.7 Trusted Operation
During initial start-up, the TOE performs self-tests on the cryptographic components.
The following tests are performed during start-up:
• Executable code integrity testing – A digital signature (RSA 2048, SHA256) of the executable code
is calculated and compared to a saved value in flash.
• Cryptographic algorithm testing – Uses Known Answer Tests (KATs) to verify proper operation of
cryptographic functions.
During the boot cycle, the integrity of the executable code is validated. During manufacturing, write-once
fuses are programmed with a hash of Lexmark’s public code signing key. The boot ROM will refuse to load
any code that is not signed by the key whose hash does not match that which was programmed at
manufacturing.
At power on, the boot ROM looks for an image description table on the designated boot device. The
image description table provides the size and location of the next stage boot loader (g2-loader), a
signature of that data, and the public key that generated the signature. The boot ROM loads g2-loader
into SRAM, verifies the signature, and verifies that the hash of the public key matches the one
programmed in fuses. If all those checks pass, then control is passed to g2-loader.
g2-loader initializes DRAM and some other platform-specific pieces before loading the next stage boot
loader, u-boot. g2-loader uses the same image description table and key as the boot ROM for validating
u-boot. If its signature checks pass, then control is passed to u-boot.
u-boot then looks for a kernel (and optionally initramfs) to load. The entire cramfs partition is loaded into
memory. At the end of the partition is a certificate with signature. u-boot verifies the signature of the
entire partition, and verifies that the signature was made by the same key that is baked into u-boot (the
public side of the key is hard-coded in u-boot source code). Control is passed on to the kernel in the boot
partition.
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The boot partition also contains information that is used by the dm-verity subsystem of the Linux kernel.
This information is covered by the same signature as the rest of the boot partition. The kernel uses this
information to create a dm-verity device, which the kernel then mounts for the root filesystem. Since
changing any part of the root filesystem would invalidate the verity hashes, a read-only filesystem is
required, for which Lexmark uses squashfs.
If code verification fails, all the imaging and mechanism control blocks of the HCD, as well as network and
PCIe functionality, is disabled and the system halts. The only way to proceed is to reboot the HCD. The
lack of the normal display on the HCD at boot completion indicates that vendor support should be
contacted.
Other code partitions may be mounted by Linux at run-time, in which case a dm-verity device is created
and mounted to ensure that the code is trusted.
Any writable filesystems are mounted as noexec so as to avoid inadvertently executing code from them,
since any code stored there would not be covered by a trusted signature.
Lexmark uses full partition images for code update. That is, the code update file contains the entire
partition for the new version of code, as opposed to doing per-file updates or delta-images. When a code
update file is received by the device, it is saved to a writable filesystem, and then the device is rebooted
into recovery mode (i.e., using therecovery bootand recovery root partitions). This avoids the complexity
of rewriting a partition while concurrently running from it.
The code update information is validated in the same manner as described above for operational code –
the code must be signed with a public key whose hash matches the value burned into fuses during
manufacturing.
During operation, a SHA256 hash is maintained for each executable page. Before any page is loaded into
memory, the hash is verified to ensure the code has not been modified since boot.
Administrators may use the web interface to query the current firmware version or supply firmware
updates. Firmware updates must be digitally signed, and the TOE verifies the signature before applying
the update.
The following SFRs satisfy Trusted Operation.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen Digital signatures of update files are authenticated before being applied.
FCS_COP.1/Hash Digital signatures verification relies on hash algorithms supplied by the TOE.
FPT_SBT_EXT.1 On each boot, a hardware-based chain of trust is used to validate the integrity
of the executable code.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 A set of self-tests are executed at start-up to verify correct operation of the TOE.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Administrators may use the web interface to query the current firmware version
and supply signed updates.
6.1.8 PSTN Fax-Network Separation
The Fax Separation security function assures that the information on the TOE, and the information on the
network to which the TOE is attached, is not exposed through the phone line that provides connectivity
for the fax function. This function assures that only printable documents are accepted via incoming fax
connections, and that the only thing transmitted over an outgoing fax connection (in the evaluated
configuration) is a document that was scanned for faxing.
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Use cases of sending and receiving PSTN faxes are supported. Sending a PSTN fax involves a user scanning
a document and sending that image via the PSTN interface. Receiving a fax involves receipt of an image
from the PSTN interface and saving it until faxes are released by an authorized administrator. When
released, the saved images are printed.
The only source for outgoing fax transmissions is the scanner. Control of the fax functionality is
incorporated directly into the TOE’s firmware. The modem chip (Conexant CX95110-53Z) is in a mode that
is more restrictive than Class 1 mode (the fax modem will not answer a data call), and relies on the TOE
firmware for composition and transmission of fax data. The TOE firmware explicitly disallows the
transmission of frames in data mode and allows for the sending and receiving of facsimile jobs only. There
is no mechanism by which telnet, FTP, or other network protocols can be used over the analog fax line.
The fax modem is on a separate card from the network adapter to provide separation between the
interfaces and is only capable of sending and receiving fax data. The modem and the network adapter are
incapable of communicating directly with one another. The modem is designed only for fax
communications (T.4 and T.30), thus preventing any type of remote configuration or management of the
TOE over the fax line.
The following SFR satisfies PSTN Fax-Network Separation.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 The fax interface is separated from the network interface.
6.1.9 Data Clearing and Purging
6.1.9.1 Data Overwrite
D.USER.DOC is not stored on a wear-leveled device.
Once a job has been completed, the document file on the hard disk (non-wear-leveled) is logically deleted
and marked as needing to be overwritten. Until the overwriting occurs, the disk blocks containing the
files are not available for use by any user. Every 5 seconds, the TOE checks to see if any “deleted” files
are present and begins the disk overwriting process.
The TOE overwrites each block associated with each deleted file (including bad and remapped sectors)
three times: first with “0x0F” (i.e., 0000 1111), then with “0xF0” (i.e., 1111 0000), and finally with a block
of random data (supplied by the internal random number generator). Each time that the device
overwrites a different file, it selects a different block of random data.
Once the disk overwriting is complete, the disk blocks used for the deleted files are once again available
for use by the system. If the disk overwriting process is interrupted by a power cycle or reset, the status
is remembered across the restart and the process resumes when operation resumes.
If any error occurs during the disk overwriting process, an audit record is generated, and the file system
is considered to be corrupt and must be re-initialized.
The TOE also overwrites RAM with zeroes upon deallocation of any buffer used to hold user data.
The following SFR satisfy Data Overwrite
FDP_UDU_EXT.1 Document data is overwritten when the file or memory containing the data is
released.
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6.1.9.2 Data Wiping
An administrator may command the TOE to be sanitized (e.g., prepared for decommissioning). For this
operation, the hard disk is zeroized, and all flash configuration data is overwritten with ones (flash is a
wear-leveled device). In addition, the keys for the hard disk and flash configuration data are overwritten
with zeroes. This wipes all D.USER from the hard disk (which contains no D.TSF) and D.TSF from flash
storage (which contains no D.USER).
The following SFRs satisfy Data Wiping.
FPT_WIPE_EXT.1/Disk When purging is commanded by an administrator, the disk storage is zeroized.
FPT_WIPE_EXT.1/Flash When purging is commanded by an administrator flash storage is overwritten
with ones.
6.1.10 Common Functionality Regarding Key Destruction in Flash Memory
Multiple types of keys are stored in flash memory: RSA private keys and PSKs. The flash component
performs wear leveling/garbage collection; therefore, physical copies of these keys may continue to exist
inside the flash component for some period of time after they have been “overwritten” by the software.
The keys stored in flash are the RSA private keys associated with the device certs and the IPSec PSKs.
When a single PSK is modified from the configuration by an administrator, the new value of the same size
overwrites theold value. When an administrator requests the TOE tobesanitized (e.g., decommissioning),
the location in flash holding the PSKs are overwritten once with ones. Therefore, the visible storage
locations for these items from the flash component reflect the overwrites.
The disk encryption key (DEK) and the flash encryption key are stored in the TPM. These keys are cleared
when the administrator requests the TOE to be sanitized. When this occurs, the Erase Printer Memory
function is invoked. This function invokes the TMP2_Clear command which overwrites both keys with
zeroes (instructs the underlying platform to destroy the abstraction that represents the key).
The flash component supports the TRIM command and implements garbage collection to destroy the
persistent copies of the old storage locations when not actively engaged in other tasks. The file system
that maps to the flash component, and on which these keys are stored, also supports the TRIM command
and the file system is configured to use it.
6.1.11 CAVP Certificates
The following CAVP certificates apply to the Lexmark software for this evaluation.
Table 24: CAVP Certificates
Crypto Function CAVP Certificate #s Associated SFRs
AES (CBC) #A3901, #A3900 (88PA6270 (G2)-64bit) FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
FCS_COP.1/StorageEncryption
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1
FDP_DSK_EXT.1
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Crypto Function CAVP Certificate #s Associated SFRs
DRBG (CTR_DRBG(AES)) #A3901 (88PA6270 (G2)-64bit) FCS_CKM.1/SKG
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
HMAC #A3901, #A3900 (88PA6270 (G2)-64bit) FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1
RSA #A3901 (88PA6270 (G2)-64bit) FCS_CKM.1/AKG
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
SHA #A3901, #A3900 (88PA6270 (G2)-64bit) FCS_COP.1/Hash
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1
CVL (IKEv1, IKEv2) #A3901 (88PA6270 (G2)-64bit) FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1
Finite field-based scheme #A3901 (88PA6270 (G2)-64bit) FCS_CKM.2
Users can verify the CAVP certificates by comparing the Lexmark module version listed in the certificate
with the module version displayed when an administrator selects “device information” from the touch
panel.
7. Protection Profile Claims
This ST claims exact conformance to the collaborative Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Version 1.0e, 4 March
2024 (HCDcPP) along with all applicable errata and interpretations from the certificate issuing scheme.
The Security Problem Definition of the HCDcPP have been included in section 3 of this ST.
The Security Objectives of the HCDcPP have been included in section 4 of this ST.
All claimed SFRs are defined in the HCDcPP. All mandatory SFRs are claimed. The conditional mandatory
FCS_KYC_EXT.1, FDP_DSK_EXT.1, FDP_FXS_EXT.1, FIA_AFL.1, FPT_KYP_EXT.1, and FTP_TRP.1/NonAdmin
SFRs are claimed. The Selection-Based FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash, FCS_COP.1/StorageEncryption,
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, FIA_PSK_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev, FIA_X509_EXT.2, and FIA_X509_EXT.3 are
claimed and are consistent with the selections made in the mandatory SFRs that prompt their inclusion.
The optional FDP_UDU_EXT.1 and FPT_WIPE_EXT.1 SFRs are claimed. Additionally, FPT_WIPE_EXT.1 is
iterated to reflect different operations performed on hard disk and flash storage.
.
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8. Rationale
8.1 Conformance Claim Rationale
This Security Target includes the HCDcPP Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, and Security
Assurance Requirements. The Security Target does not add, remove, or modify any of these items.
Security Functional Requirements have been reproduced with the Protection Profile operations
completed. All selections, assignments, and refinements made on the claimed Security Functional
Requirements have been performed in a manner that is consistent with what is permitted by the HCDcPP.
The proper set of selection-based requirements have been claimed based on the selections made in the
mandatory requirements. Consequently, the claims made by this Security Target are sufficient to address
the TOE’s security problem.
8.2 TOE Security Objective Rationale
8.2.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following information is copied from the HCDcPP.
Table 25: TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale
Objective Addressed by Rationale
O.USER_AUTHORIZATION FDP_ACC.1 This requirement defines an access
control policy that governs the
authorization required to interact with
user data.
FDP_ACF.1 This requirement defines the rules
enforced by the access control policy
defined in FDP_ACC.1 to control access
to user data.
FIA_ATD.1 This requirement defines the list of
security attributes belonging to
individual users that supports user
authentication.
FMT_MSA.1 This requirement enforces restrictions
on the subjects that can interact with
user data and their security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3 This requirement defines the default
access restrictions that are enforced on
user data security attributes if not
overridden by specific access control
policy rules.
FMT_SMF.1 This requirement defines the
management functions that are provided
by the TOE to authorized users.
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Objective Addressed by Rationale
FMT_SMR.1 This requirement defines the different
security-related roles that the TOE
recognizes.
O.USER_I&A FIA_AFL.1 This requirement defines how many
consecutive unsuccessful
authentication failures to prove a user’s
identity trigger actions by the TOE and
what those actions will be.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 This requirement defines the rules for
passwords used by users for purposes
of proving their identity to the TOE at
the TOE itself.
FIA_UAU.1 This requirement defines the allowed
actions that can be performed on
behalf of a user before the user is
authenticated and requires users to be
authenticated before security
functions by the TOE can be
performed.
FIA_UAU.7 This requirement defines what type of
feedback to the user is to be provided
while authentication is in progress.
FIA_UID.1 This requirement defines what actions
users can perform before being
identified by the TOE.
FIA_USB.1 This requirement defines the rules
governing the association of the user’s
security attributes to a subject acting
on the user’s behalf.
FTA_SSL.3 This requirement enforces that the TOE
terminates an interactive user session
after a defined period of inactivity.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL FDP_ACC.1 This requirement defines an access
control policy that governs the
authorization required to interact with
user data.
FDP_ACF.1 This requirement defines the rules
enforced by the access control policy
defined in FDP_ACC.1 to control access
to user data.
FMT_MSA.1 This requirement enforces restrictions
on the subjects that can interact with
user data and their security attributes.
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FMT_MSA.3 This requirement defines the default
access restrictions that are enforced on
user data security attributes if not
overridden by specific access control
policy rules.
FMT_MTD.1 This requirement defines the roles that
can perform specified operations on
TSF data.
FMT_SMF.1 This requirement defines the
management functions that are provided
by the TOE to authorized users.
FMT_SMR.1 This requirement defines the different
security-related roles that the TOE
recognizes.
O.ADMIN_ROLES FIA_UID.1 This requirement defines what admin
actions users can perform before being
identified by the TSF.
FMT_MOF.1 This requirement enforces access
control on the admin functions
provided by the TOE.
FMT_SMF.1 This requirement defines the
management functions that are provided
by the TOE to authorized users.
FMT_SMR.1 This requirement defines the different
security-related roles that the TOE
recognizes.
O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION FCS_COP.1/SigGen This requirement defines the
cryptographic algorithms that must be
applied to generate digital signatures
that are used verify the integrity of
software/firmware upgrade files for
the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/Hash This requirement defines the
cryptographic algorithms that must be
applied to generate cryptographic hash
values that are used to verify the
integrity of software/firmware upgrade
files for the TOE.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 This requirement defines the ability of
the admin to initiate and verify
firmware/software updates to the TOE.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST FPT_TST_EXT.1 This requirement enforces the use of
self-tests during initial start-up (and
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power on) to demonstrate the correct
operation of the TOE.
O.COMMS_PROTECTION FCS_CKM.1/SKG This requirement generates the
symmetric keys needed to encrypt data
being transmitted to/from the TOE.
FCS_CKM.2 This requirement provides the
methods for performing key
establishment between the TOE and IT
entity that data is to be transferred
either to the TOE or from the TOE.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 This requirement enforces that all
plaintext secret and private
cryptographic keys and cryptographic
critical security parameters must be
destroyed when no longer needed.
FCS_CKM.4 This requirement enforces the methods
that must be used to destroy all
cryptographic keys.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption This requirement defines the
cryptographic algorithms that must be
applied to encrypt/decrypt data that is
to be transmitted to/from the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen This requirement defines the
cryptographic algorithms that must be
applied to generate digital signatures
that help to verify the integrity of data
transmitted to/from the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/Hash This requirement ensures the use of
strong hash mechanisms.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 This requirement defines the random
bit generation mechanisms that must
be applied to generate cryptographic
keys and cryptographic critical security
parameters.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 This requirement enforces the
prevention of reading all pre-shared
keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.
FTP_ITC.1 This requirement provides for a trusted
communications channel to transmit
the user and TSF data between the TOE
and a trusted external IT entity.
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FTP_TRP.1/Admin This requirement provides for a trusted
communications path between the TOE
and the admin
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 This requirement defines the IPsec
protocol for the secure transmission of
user and TSF data between the TOE and
a trusted external IT entity.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash This requirement defines the
cryptographic algorithms that must be
applied to perform keyed-hash
message authentication.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 This requirement defines the
components of pre-shared keys for the
IPsec protocol.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev This requirement defines the rules for
thevalidation of X.509 certificates.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 This requirement defines the use of
X.509 certificates for authentication of
theprotocols used for secure
transmission of user and TSF data
between the TOE and a trusted external
IT entity.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 This requirement defines the rules for
a certificate request for an
X.509 certificate.
FCS_CKM.1/AKG This requirement defines the
cryptographic algorithms that must be
applied to generate asymmetric
cryptographic keys.
FTP_TRP.1/NonAdmin This requirement provides for a trusted
communications path between the TOE
and a user who is not an admin.
O.AUDIT FAU_GEN.1 This requirement defines the minimum
required auditable events and the
required contents of each audit record.
FAU_GEN.2 This requirement enforces associating
each auditable event with the identity
of the user that caused the event
FAU_SAR.1 This requirement provides for the
reading of audit records in an
interpretable manner.
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FAU_SAR.2 This requirement enforces only allowing
users with explicit read- access to read
audit records.
FAU_STG.1 This requirement enforces protection of
stored audit records from unauthorized
deletion or modification.
FAU_STG.4 This requirement defines actions to be
taken when the audit log is full.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 This requirement provides for the
transmission of audit log records to a
trusted external IT entity over a trusted
communications channel.
FPT_STM.1 This requirement provides reliable
system time services that are used to
provide time stamps on audit log
records.
FTP_ITC.1 This requirement provides for a trusted
communications channel to transmit
the audit log records between the TOE
and a trusted external IT entity.
O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION FCS_CKM.1/SKG This requirement generates the
symmetric keys needed to encrypt data
being stored on the TOE.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 This requirement enforces that all
plaintext secret and private
cryptographic keys and cryptographic
critical security parameters must be
destroyed when no longer needed.
FCS_CKM.4 This requirement enforces the methods
that must be used to destroy all
cryptographic keys.
FCS_COP.1/Hash This requirement defines the
cryptographic algorithms that must be
applied to generate cryptographic hash
values that are used verify the integrity
of user and TSF data stored on the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption This requirement defines the
cryptographic algorithms that must be
applied to encrypt/decrypt user and TSF
data.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 This requirement defines the random
bit generation mechanisms that must
be applied to generate cryptographic
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keys and cryptographic critical security
parameters used to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of user and
TSF data stored on the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/StorageEncryption This requirement defines the
cryptographic algorithms that must be
applied to encrypt/decrypt user and TSF
data stored on the TOE.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 This requirement defines the random
bit generation mechanisms that must
be applied to generate cryptographic
keys and cryptographic critical security
parameters used to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of user and
TSF data stored on the TOE.
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 This requirement defines the rules for
creating a key chain to unlock a self-
encrypting drive.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 This requirement defines the rules for
theprotection of user and TSF data
stored on the TOE.
O.KEY_MATERIAL FPT_KYP_EXT.1 This requirement defines the rules for
theprotection of cryptographic keys
and key material.
O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION
(conditionally mandatory)
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 This requirement enforces the
prohibition of communication via the
fax interface, except for transmitting or
receiving User Data using fax protocols.
O.IMAGE_OVERWRITE
(optional)
FDP_UDU_EXT.1 This requirement enforces the
overwriting of user document data
stored on the TOE after each job is
processed or cancelled.
O.WIPE_DATA(optional) FCS_CKM_EXT.4 This requirement enforces that all
plaintext secret and private
cryptographic keys and cryptographic
critical security parameters must be
destroyed when no longer needed.
FCS_CKM.4 This requirement enforces the methods
that must be used to destroy all
cryptographic keys.
FPT_WIPE_EXT.1/Disk
FPT_WIPE_EXT.1/Flash
This requirement enforces that
customer-supplied user and TSF data is
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made unavailable at the request of the
admin.
O.AUTH_FAILURES FIA_AFL.1 This requirement defines how many
consecutive unsuccessful
authentication failures to prove a user’s
identity trigger actions by the TOE and
what those actions will be.
O.FW_INTEGRITY FPT_SBT_EXT.1 This requirement defines how the
integrity of firmware/software at boot
time is to be verified via chains of trust,
each one anchored in its own root of
trust.
FCS_COP.1/Hash This requirement ensures the use of
strong hash mechanisms.
O.STRONG_CRYPTO FCS_CKM.1/SKG This requirement ensures the
generation of strong symmetric keys.
FCS_CKM.2 This requirement ensures the use of
strongkey establishment mechanisms.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption This requirement ensures the use of
strong methods to perform data
encryption/decryption.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen This requirement ensures the use of
strong digital signature services.
FCS_COP.1/Hash This requirement ensures the use of
strong hash mechanisms.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 This requirement ensures the use of
strongrandom bit generation
mechanisms.
FPT_STM.1 This requirement provides reliable
system time services that may be used
as inputs to cryptographic functions.
FCS_COP.1/StorageEncryption This requirement ensures the use of
strong methods to perform data
encryption/decryption.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 This requirement defines the
implementation of IPsec using strong
cryptography.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash This requirement ensures the use of
strong methods to perform keyed-hash
message authentication.
FCS_CKM.1/AKG This requirement ensures the
generation of strong asymmetric keys.
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FCS_KYC_EXT.1 This requirement ensures the use of
strong methods to perform key chaining.
8.2.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The rationale for choosing these security assurance requirements is that they define a minimum security
baseline that is based on the anticipated threat level of the attacker, the security of the Operational
Environment in which the TOE is deployed, and the relativevalue of the TOE itself. The assuranceactivities
throughout the cPP are used to provide tailored guidance on the specific expectations for completing the
security assurance requirements.