Certification Report
EAL 2+ Evaluation of RSA®
Data Loss Prevention Suite
v6.5
Issued by:
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Certification Body
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
© Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada, 2009
Evaluation number: 383-4-99-CR
Version: 1.0
Date: 12 May 2009
Pagination: i to iii, 1 to 12
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DISCLAIMER
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its
associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established
under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using
the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 2, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 2. This certification report, and its associated certificate,
apply only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the
IT product by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization
that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed
or implied.
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FOREWORD
The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a
third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology
(IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria
Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is
managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the
Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the
Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the
Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is EWA-Canada located in Ottawa, Ontario.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the
product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A
security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the
evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security
target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any
assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security
requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the
product satisfies the security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 12 May
2009, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the
CCS Certified Products list at: http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/its-sti/services/cc/cp-pc-eng.html
and http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
This certification report makes reference to the following trademarked name:
• RSA®
, which is a registered trademark of RSA, The Security Division of EMC.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Disclaimer..................................................................................................................................................... i
Foreword..................................................................................................................................................... ii
Executive Summary.....................................................................................................................................1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ..............................................................................................3
2 TOE Description .................................................................................................................................3
3 Evaluated Security Functionality......................................................................................................3
4 Security Target....................................................................................................................................4
5 Common Criteria Conformance........................................................................................................4
6 Security Policy.....................................................................................................................................4
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope...........................................................................................4
7.1 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................... 5
7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................... 5
7.3 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.......................................................................................... 5
8 Architectural Information .................................................................................................................5
9 Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................................................6
10 Documentation....................................................................................................................................7
11 Evaluation Analysis Activities ...........................................................................................................7
12 ITS Product Testing ...........................................................................................................................8
12.1 ASSESSING DEVELOPER TESTS................................................................................... 9
12.2 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING ........................................................................ 9
12.3 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING..................................................................... 10
12.4 CONDUCT OF TESTING ............................................................................................. 10
12.5 TESTING RESULTS.................................................................................................... 10
13 Results of the Evaluation..................................................................................................................10
14 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations .......................................................10
15 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations.................................................................................11
16 References..........................................................................................................................................11
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Executive Summary
The RSA®
Data Loss Prevention Suite v6.5 (hereafter referred to as DLP Suite), from RSA,
The Security Division of EMC, is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation
Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented evaluation.
The DLP Suite helps uncover an organization's risk associated with sensitive data loss and
lowers that risk through policy based remediation and enforcement mechanisms. The DLP
Suite is an integrated suite of products which allows an enterprise to identify sensitive
information in text format stored on its computers and as it is being transmitted between IT
entities or being copied, cut, moved, saved or printed. There are four products within the
DLP Suite: DLP Datacenter, DLP Network, DLP Endpoint and the DLP Enterprise Manager.
The DLP Suite takes actions based on pre-defined policies to determine whether the action
being taken on the information should be permitted. Each policy action taken is captured in
an event record and passed to the DLP Enterprise Manager for viewing by the administrator.
The DLP Suite also generates “incidents”, which are higher-level issues that require manual
remediation by an administrator.
EWA-Canada is the Common Criteria Evaluation Facility that conducted the evaluation. This
evaluation was completed on 04 May 2009 and was carried out in accordance with the rules
of the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions
made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the DLP Suite, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their
operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)1
for this product provide
sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 2 augmented assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 2 for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
version 3.1 Revision 2. The following augmentation is claimed:
a. ALC_FLR.1 – Basic Flaw remediation.
1
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares
that the DLP Suite evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition
of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of IT Security and that the product will be listed
on the CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official
website of the Common Criteria Project).
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1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented
evaluation is the RSA®
Data Loss Prevention Suite v6.5 (hereafter referred to as DLP Suite),
from RSA, The Security Division of EMC.
2 TOE Description
The DLP Suite is an integrated suite of products which allows an enterprise to identify
sensitive information in text format stored on its computers and as it is being transmitted
between IT entities or being copied, cut, moved, saved or printed. The DLP Suite takes
actions based on pre-defined policies to determine whether the action being taken on the
information should be permitted. An allow action causes the attempted end-user action to be
permitted. An audit action generates an event describing the violation. A quarantine action
forces access to the sensitive content to be restricted to a designated end-user or group. A
block action disallows the attempted violation. A notify action causes a notification of the
violation to be sent to the end-user who committed it. A justify action causes a popup
message to appear to the end-user, requiring the end-user to provide text justifying the
attempted action. Each policy action taken is captured in an event record, and passed to the
DLP Enterprise Manager for viewing by the administrator. The DLP Suite also generates
“incidents”, which are higher-level issues that require manual remediation by an
administrator.
There are four products within the DLP Suite briefly described as follows:
• The DLP Datacenter product provides the ability to identify sensitive content stored
on laptops, desktops, and servers distributed through a corporate environment;
• The DLP Network product detects sensitive data while it is being transmitted across
the network, and generates events and incidents reflecting policy violations;
• The DLP Endpoint product provides control over sensitive information being
manipulated by end-users; and
• The DLP Enterprise Manager is a web application with a consistent user interface
which is used to manage the DLP Datacenter, DLP Network and DLP Endpoint
products.
3 Evaluated Security Functionality
The complete list of evaluated security functionality for the DLP Suite is identified in
Sections 5 and 6 of the Security Target (ST).
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4 Security Target
The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:
Title: RSA, The Security Division of EMC RSA®
Data Loss Prevention Suite v6.5 Security
Target
Version: 0.7
Date: 20 April 2009
5 Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 2, for conformance to the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 2.
The DLP Suite is:
a. Common Criteria Part 2 extended, with functional requirements based upon functional
components in Part 2, except for the following explicitly stated requirements defined in
the ST;
• EXT_FIH_ARP.1 (Incident Alarms)
• EXT_FIH_SAA.1 (Incident Analysis)
b. Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based only
upon assurance components in Part 3; and
c. Common Criteria EAL 2 augmented, with all the security assurance requirements in the
EAL 2 package, as well as ALC_FLR.1 – Basic Flaw Remediation.
6 Security Policy
The DLP Suite implements an access control policy for administrators accessing the TOE
and end-user access control polices which enforce rules governing the ability of end-users to
take actions on data. The TOE also implements an information flow control policy which
enforces rules governing the ability of end-users to transmit sensitive data across or out of
the network. Details of these security policies can be found in Section 6 of the ST.
In addition, the DLP Suite implements policies pertaining to security audit, identification and
authentication, security management, TOE access and incident handling. Further details on
these security policies may be found in Section 6 of the ST.
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Consumers of the DLP Suite should consider assumptions about usage and environmental
settings as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This
will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
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7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following are the assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE:
• Personnel authorized to install, configure, and operate the DLP Suite possess
appropriate training and will adhere to the procedures for secure usage of the product
described in the ST and all user guidance.
7.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following assumptions are made about the operating environment of the TOE:
• The host machine upon which DLP Suite is installed resides in a physically secure
location and only authorized individuals are granted physical access to the host.
• It is assumed that the IT environment will provide a secure line of communication
between distributed parts of the TOE.
7.3 Clarification of Scope
The DLP Suite provides a level of protection that is appropriate against obvious
vulnerabilities in IT environments that require that information flows be controlled and
restricted among network nodes and where the DLP Suite can be appropriately protected
from physical attack.
A policy rule which can be selected by an administrator is “tag for encryption” which will
encrypt emails containing sensitive information. For the purposes of this evaluation the term
“tag for encryption” represents a rule selector and not the action of encryption. Encryption, if
selected and available, is performed by a third-party product, and is outside the scope of this
evaluation.
8 Architectural Information
The DLP Suite consists of four products that cover the three areas of potential data loss; data
moving as network traffic, at rest in a data center, or out at an endpoint. Each product
consists of the following components briefly described below.
The DLP Network product consists of the following software and hardware components:
• DLP Network Controller is the appliance that maintains information about sensitive
data and content transmission policies.
• DLP Network Sensor passively monitors traffic crossing the network boundaries and
analyzes it for the presence of sensitive content.
• DLP Network Interceptor allows administrators to implement policies that
quarantine or reject email traffic that contains sensitive content.
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• DLP Network ICAP Server allows administrators to implement monitoring or
blocking of HTTP, HTTPS or FTP traffic containing sensitive content.
The DLP Endpoint product consists of the following software components:
• DLP Endpoint Enterprise Coordinator manages the policies and the collection of
events from the DLP Endpoint Site Coordinator throughout the network and passes
the information to the DLP Enterprise Manager for display in the Graphical User
Interface (GUI).
• DLP Endpoint Site Coordinator provides services that manage scans for a local
network.
• DLP Endpoint Agent enforces policies on usage of data, resulting in blockages,
justifications, or notifications and generates events that describe the violations and the
actions taken to enforce the policies.
The DLP Datacenter product consists of the following software components:
• DLP Datacenter Enterprise Coordinator provides instructions and gathers scan
results from all DLP Datacenter Site Coordinators installed in the enterprise.
• DLP Datacenter Site Coordinator provides services that manage scans for a local
network.
• DLP Datacenter Grid Worker retrieves and analyzes data from large storage
repositories.
• DLP Datacenter Agent performs the analysis of data on the designated machines.
The DLP Enterprise Manager is a stand-alone component that comprises the DLP Enterprise
Manager software. The DLP Enterprise Manager enables an administrator to configure and
manage the DLP Network, Endpoint and Datacenter products.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE runs on RSA appliances or customer-provided hardware compliant to the minimum
software and hardware requirements as listed in the Security Target, Table 2 of Section 1.3.7
TOE Environment.
The essential software components for the proper operation of the TOE in the evaluated
configuration are:
• DLP Enterprise Manager v6.5.0.2179 software
• DLP Network Controller v6.5.0.2164 software
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• DLP Network Sensor v6.5.0.2164 software
• DLP Network Interceptor v6.5.0.2164 software
• DLP Network ICAP Server v6.5.0.2164 software
• DLP Endpoint Enterprise Coordinator v6.5.0.86 software
• DLP Endpoint Site Coordinator v6.5.0.86 software
• DLP Endpoint Agent v6.5.0.86 software
• DLP Datacenter Enterprise Coordinator v6.5.0.86 software
• DLP Datacenter Site Coordinator v6.5.0.86 software
• DLP Datacenter Agent v6.5.0.86 software
• DLP Datacenter Grid Worker v6.5.0.86 software
The essential physical components for the proper operation of the TOE which are outside the
TOE boundary and were not evaluated are:
• DLP Network appliances running TabOS based on CentOS v5.1
• Customer-provided hardware for DLP Endpoint and DLP Datacenter running
Microsoft Windows 2003 Server or Vista
• Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 web browser installed on the Enterprise Manager
• Targeted customer workstations, servers, and laptops on which DLP Endpoint
Agents, DLP Datacenter Agents, and DLP Datacenter Grid Workers will be installed
running Microsoft Windows 2003 Server or Vista
• A Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Database to serve as the Enterprise Results Database
10 Documentation
The RSA documents provided to the consumer are as follows:
• RSA DLP Network 6.5 User Guide, 08 December 2008
• RSA DLP Network 6.5 Deployment Guide, 08 December 2008
• RSA DLP Datacenter 6.5 User Guide, 08 December 2008
• RSA DLP Datacenter 6.5 Deployment Guide, 08 December 2008
• RSA DLP Endpoint 6.5 User Guide, 08 December 2008
• RSA DLP Endpoint 6.5 Deployment Guide, 08 December 2008
• RSA, The Security Division of EMC Data Loss Prevention Suite v6.5 Guidance
Supplement, Document Version 0.2, 10 February 2009
11 Evaluation Analysis Activities
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the DLP Suite,
including the following areas:
Development: The evaluators analyzed the DLP Suite functional specification and design
documentation; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE
security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems and how the TSF implements the
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security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the DLP Suite security
architectural description and determined that the initialization process is secure, that the
security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are
maintained. The evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings
between the design documents were correct.
Guidance documents: The evaluators examined the DLP Suite preparative user guidance
and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously
described how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and
operational guidance, and determined that they were complete and sufficiently detailed to
result in a secure configuration.
Life-cycle support: An analysis of the DLP Suite configuration management system and
associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the DLP Suite
configuration items were clearly and uniquely marked. The developer’s configuration
management system was observed during a site visit, and it was found to be mature and well-
developed.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of
the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the DLP Suite during distribution to the
consumer.
The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by RSA for the DLP Suite.
During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by adherence to the
procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to track and correct
security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to consumers of the
product.
Vulnerability assessment: The evaluators conducted an independent vulnerability analysis
of DLP Suite. Additionally, the evaluators conducted a search of public domain vulnerability
databases to identify DLP Suite potential vulnerabilities. The evaluators identified potential
vulnerabilities for testing applicable to the DLP Suite in its operational environment.
All these evaluation activities resulted in PASS verdicts.
12 ITS Product Testing
Testing at EAL 2 consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing
independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.
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12.1 Assessing Developer Tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining
their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR2
.
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage analysis and found it to be complete
and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s test
documentation and the functional specification was complete.
RSA employs a rigorous testing process that tests the changes and fixes in each release of the
DLP Suite. Comprehensive regression testing is conducted for all releases.
12.2 Independent Functional Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining
design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation,
executing a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the
developer tests.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability
of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach is the
following list of EWA-Canada test goals:
a. Initialization: The objective of this test goal is to confirm that the TOE can be installed and
configured into the evaluated configuration, as identified in the TOE Description of the
Security Target, by following all instructions in the developer’s Installation and
Administrative guidance;
b. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the
developer's tests to gain assurance in the developers testing process;
c. User Data Protection: The objective of this test goal is to determine the TOE’s ability to
protect data from loss and misuse in accordance with administrator pre-defined polices;
d. Identification and Authentication: The objective of this test goal is to confirm that TOE
administrators are identified and authenticated prior to allowing any activity to be
performed by them;
e. Security Audit: The objective of this test goal is to ensure that the TOE is capable of
generating audit data related to management actions; and
2
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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f. Incident Handling: The objective of this test goal is to ensure that the TOE will generate
and deliver alerts to administrators according to configured policies.
12.3 Independent Penetration Testing
Subsequent to independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all
evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted.
The penetration tests focused on:
• Generic vulnerabilities;
• Port scanning;
• Direct attacks to verify the TOE can self-protect itself in its intended environment; and
• Forced exception behaviour of the TOE to verify that an operator of the TOE is prevented
from disrupting the proper operation of the TOE through invalid use of processes or
configuration parameters.
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the
intended operating environment.
12.4 Conduct of Testing
The DLP Suite was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent
functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Information Technology
Security Evaluation and Testing (ITSET) Facility at EWA-Canada. The CCS Certification
Body witnessed a portion of the independent testing. The detailed testing activities,
including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
12.5 Testing Results
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results,
giving assurance that the DLP Suite behaves as specified in its ST and functional
specification.
13 Results of the Evaluation
This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 2+ level of assurance. The overall verdict
for the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
14 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations
The complete documentation for the DLP Suite includes comprehensive installation,
administration, deployment, and reference guides.
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The RSA Quality Assurance facilities were used during a portion of the testing activities.
RSA Support was consulted during the initialization of the product in the EWA-Canada
ITSET lab.
15 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations
Acronym/Abbreviation/
Initialization
Description
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and
Certification Scheme
CPL Certified Products List
CM Configuration Management
DLP Data Loss Prevention
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IT Information Technology
ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation
and Testing
OS Operating System
PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of
Laboratories-Canada
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
16 References
This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:
a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.1, August 2005.
b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 2, September 2007.
c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 2, September 2007.
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d. RSA, The Security Division of EMC RSA®
Data Loss Prevention Suite v6.5 Security
Target, Revision No. 0.7, 20 April 2009.
e. Evaluation Technical Report for EAL 2+ Common Criteria Evaluation of RSA, The
Security Division of EMC RSA®
Data Loss Prevention Suite v6.5, Document No.
1599-000-D002, Version 1.1, 04 May 2009.
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