TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
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NL-6827 AV Arnhem
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info@nl.tuv.com
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Version
2021-04
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Certification Report
SLS37CSAEU 01.03.4091
Sponsor and developer: Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Evaluation facility: TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
Langemarckstr. 2
45141 Essen
Germany
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0238862-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0238862
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 04 August 2021
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 7
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Evaluation Results 8
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 8
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
SLS37CSAEU 01.03.4091. The developer of the SLS37CSAEU 01.03.4091 is Infineon Technologies
AG located in Neubiberg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and
certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a V2X HSM (Vehicle-to-anything Hardware Security Module) which is used for secure
cryptographic operations and key management according to the V2X HSM Protection Profile [PP]. The
TOE serves a communication device (VCS) in Cooperative Intelligent Transport System (C-ITS). The
TOE is intended to be used in vehicle or in stationary deployments and has an interface towards the
VCS.
The TOE has been evaluated by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH located in Essen, Germany. The
evaluation was completed on 04 August 2021 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the SLS37CSAEU 01.03.4091, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the SLS37CSAEU 01.03.4091 are
advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic Flaw Remediation)
and AVA_VAN.4 (Methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the SLS37CSAEU 01.03.4091 from Infineon
Technologies AG located in Neubiberg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware Platform
Hardware IFX_CCI_00003Dh with embedded software G11
Firmware
Boot-OS (BOS) 80.203.00.3
Flash Loader 8.06.001
Software
ACL v3.03.003
SCL v2.13.001
HCL v1.13.001
RCL v1.10.006
HSL v2.01.6198
Composite TOE
Software
V2X application 01.03.4091
VFUL application 01.03.3526
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the SLS37CSAEU
01.03.4091. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.4.3.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a discreet chip security controller and realises an external V2X HSM according to the V2X
HSM Protection Profile [PP]. The TOE encompasses the following main features:
 Global Platform SCP03 protected communication
 Random number generation
 Digital signature generation
 User data ECIES encryption/decryption
 Protection of user data during transport and storages
 Supporting functions for Butterfly key derivation and implicit certificates
 Role based private key access control
 Private key import
 V2X Key Management
 Genuiness proof
 In field software update
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.3 of the [ST].
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2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The following figure describes the main TOE architecture. The Host is not part of the TOE.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version Date
SLS37CSAEU V2X Databook 1.3 2021-06-23
SLS37CSAEU V2X Errata and Update 1.2 2021-06-16
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing, all TSFs and related security mechanisms, subsystems
and modules were tested in order to assure complete coverage of all SFRs. The developer tests were
consistent with the definition of each TSFI given in the functional specification, the modules of the
TOE design and the security mechanisms described in the security architecture.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and supported the test
environment preparation. The evaluator did not repeat developer tests but used them as input to
specify independent functional test cases. The evaluators proposed functional tests for each APDU.
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2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The independent vulnerability analysis has been performed according to [CC], [JIL-AAPS], and [JIL-
AM]. The ratings have been calculated according to [JIL-AAPS].
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 7 weeks. During that test campaign, 48% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 29% on side-channel testing, and 23% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST].
In some specific functional and penetration tests, an earlier revision of the TOE or the HW platform
was used. The assurance gained from testing on an earlier revision or the HW platform was assessed
to be valid for the final TOE version, because the changes introduced were minimal and did not have
an impact on the TSF.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 9 site certificates and 28 Site Technical Audit Reuse report
approaches.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number SLS37CSAEU 01.03.4091.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the SLS37CSAEU 01.03.4091, to
be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented
with ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP]. Note that the Protection
profile used was not certified and ASE activities were carried out as specified in [CEM]..
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
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for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
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3 Security Target
The SLS37CSAEU V2X HSM Security Target, Version 1.2, 20 July 2021 [ST] is included here by
reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
C-ITS Cooperative Intelligent Transport System
HSM Hardware Security Module
IC Integrated Circuit
ITS Intelligent Transport System
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
V2X Vehicle to anything
VCS Vehicle C-ITS Station
VFUL V2X Field Upgrade Loader
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), NSCIB-
CC-02238862, version 4, 30 July 2021
[HW-CERT] Certification Report IFX_CCI_00003Fh,IFX_CCI_000059h,IFX_CCI_00005Bh,
IFX_CCI_00003Ch, IFX_CCI_00003Dh, IFX_CCI_00005Ah, design step G11
with optional HSL v2.01.6198, optional SCL v2.13.001, optional ACL v3.03.003,
optional HCL v1.13.001, optional RCL v1.10.006 and with specific IC-dedicated
firmware identifier 80.203.00.3, Version 1, 22 April 2021.
[HW-ST] Public Security Target IFX_CCI_00003Fh IFX_CCI_000059h
IFX_CCI_00005Bh IFX_CCI_00003Ch IFX_CCI_00003Dh IFX_CCI_00005Ah
G11 including optional software libraries: Flash Loader according Package1
and Package2, HCL, RCL, HSL, ACL and SCL, v1.5, 14 April 2021.
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP] CAR 2 CAR Communication Consortium, Protection Profile V2X Hardware
Security Module, version 1.4.1, SHA2-512 hash:
346efc021fb47fedf770d705e93be16effa6812fb6a95b009bf2d46ac64c52cb90
af6524c6a5252b946e0202a999edf87eaaf930b3a764319adc3d8aa06bbbf0
[ST] SLS37CSAEU V2X HSM Security Target, Version 1.2, 20 July 2021
(This is the end of this report.)