UNCLASSIFIED
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
Arista Networks Switches EOS 4.22.1FX-CC
Arista Networks, Inc.
3 December 2019
383-4-483
V1.0
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian CC Scheme,
and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report,
and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other
organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product
by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its
associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Contact Centre and Information Services
Edward Drake Building
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation
Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) for
the Canadian CC Scheme and posted on the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common
Criteria Project).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Description................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................................... 7
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 8
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................................................................... 8
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ....................................................................................................... 9
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................................................. 9
3.2 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................................................10
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................11
4.1 Documentation.................................................................................................................................................11
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................12
5.1 Development....................................................................................................................................................12
5.2 Guidance Documents........................................................................................................................................12
5.3 Life-Cycle Support ............................................................................................................................................12
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................13
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests.........................................................................................................................13
6.2 Conduct of Testing...........................................................................................................................................13
6.3 Independent Functional Testing ........................................................................................................................13
6.3.1 Functional Test Results.................................................................................................................................13
6.4 Independent Penetration Testing.......................................................................................................................14
6.4.1 Penetration Test results................................................................................................................................14
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................15
7.1 Recommendations/Comments..........................................................................................................................15
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................16
8.1 List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................16
8.2 References.......................................................................................................................................................16
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LIST OF FIGURES
TOE Architecture..................................................................................................................................................7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification ................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s).........................................................................................................................8
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Arista Networks Switches EOS 4.22.1FX-CC (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Arista
Networks, Inc. , was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2.
The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Table 1
for the evaluated security functionality.
CygnaCom Solutions, Inc. is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 3 December 2019
and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that
their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common
Criteria Project).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Arista Networks Switches EOS 4.22.1FX-CC
Developer Arista Networks, Inc.
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance:
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.1
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is a network switch (modular and fixed form) that provides OSI model Layer 2, 3, and 4 Ethernet interconnectivity
and network management services (Data Link, Network, and Transport Layers respectively). Each switch model runs Arista’s
Linux-based network operating system called Extensible Operating System (EOS). The same EOS binary image runs on all
TOE hardware models.
1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2 of this report.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic implementations have been evaluated by the CAVP and are used by the TOE:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)
Cryptographic Algorithm Certificate Number
RSA 2301
CVL 1012
AES 4280
SHS 3516
HMAC 2816
DRBG 1340
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 The device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks
that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation.
This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains.
 The device is assumed to provide networking and filtering functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general-purpose computing. For example, the device should not
provide computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
 A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses
it. The intent is for the network device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include
administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the network device, destined for another network entity,
is not covered by the Protection Profile.
 The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of
security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance
documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy
and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The network device is not expected to be capable of
defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully
validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into
the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
 The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
 The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the device are protected by the platform on which they
reside.
 It is assumed that the administrator will ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the
equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.
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3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Only the functionality claimed in the Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile was tested.
The following functionality was not included in the evaluated configuration:
 Telnet management interface
 HTTP and HTTPS web GUI management interface
 Integration with external authentication server over RADIUS and TACACS+
 Management interfaces for XMPP, Openconfig, CloudVision eXchange (CVX) and CloudVision Portal (CVP)
 SNMP for management and notification
 SMTP to post email notifications
 Real-time streaming of switch state to remote server using `TerminAttr’ service
 Remote configuration backup with CLI command
 FTP server
 Integration with orchestration services such as Puppet, Ansible, Chef, Prometheus
 1+1 redundant supervisor modules in modular switches
 Routing Information Protocol v1 and v2, Open Shortest Path First v2, Border Gateway Protocol, Intermediate System
to Intermediate System, and Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises the EOS 4.22.1FX-CC running on the 7500R, 7320X, 7300X, 7300X3,
7280R, 7260X, 7260X3, 7250QX, 7170, 7160, 7060X, 7060X4, 7050X3, 7050X, 7020R, 7010T and 720XP series switches.
The TOE requires the following components in the operational environment:
 RS-232 serial console
 VT-100 terminal emulation program
 SSH client
 eAPI JSON-RPC Client
 Syslog server
 Certificate Revocation List server
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a) User Manual Arista EOS Version 4.21.0F, August 6, 2019.
b) Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version 1.14, October 17, 2019.
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance, and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and
performing penetration tests.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance
documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP; and
b. Verification of the Cryptographic Implementation: The evaluator verified that the claimed cryptographic
implementations were present and used in the TOE.
6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE
behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited
independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
a) Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application layer
vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, Shellshock, FREAK, POODLE, and GHOST; and
b) Fuzz Testing: The evaluator conducted fuzz testing using unexpected inputs and malformed packets on the TOE
interfaces.
6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This is not an
endorsement of the IT product by CCCS or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by CCCS or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, is
expressed or implied.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GC Government of Canada
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Security
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Arista Networks Switches Running EOS Common Criteria Security Target, Version 2.9, December 3, 2019.
Evaluation Technical Report for Arista Networks Switches Running EOS, Version 0.7, December 03, 2019.
Assurance Activity Report for Arista Networks Switches Running EOS, Version 1.4, December 03, 2019.