Apple Inc.

Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
Version: 1.2
Status: Final
Last Update: 2025-05-08
Validation Body: NIAP
Validation ID: VID11448
Classification: Public
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Trademarks
Apple's trademarks applicable to this document are listed in https://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-property/tra
demark/appletmlist.html
The following terms are trademarks or registered trademarks of Intel Corporation in the United States and/or other
countries.
● Core™
● Intel®
● Xeon®
Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks or service marks of others.
Legal Notice
This document is provided AS IS with no express or implied warranties. Use the information in this document at
your own risk.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision.
Revision History
Version Date Author(s) Changes to Previous Revision
1.1 2025-04-11 atsec First published version.
1.2 2025-05-08 atsec Improved based on the comments from validators.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 2 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 8
1.1 Security Target Identification .................................................................................................................... 8
1.2 TOE Identification ..................................................................................................................................... 8
1.3 TOE Type .................................................................................................................................................. 8
1.4 TOE Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 8
1.5 TOE Description ........................................................................................................................................ 8
1.5.1 Physical boundary ............................................................................................................................ 9
1.5.1.1 Apple silicon ........................................................................................................................... 9
1.5.1.2 Intel with T2 ........................................................................................................................... 9
1.5.1.3 Secure Enclave ..................................................................................................................... 10
1.5.2 TOE security functionality .............................................................................................................. 10
1.5.2.1 Cryptographic support (FCS) ............................................................................................... 10
1.5.2.2 User data protection (FDP) ................................................................................................... 11
1.5.2.3 Security management (FMT) ................................................................................................ 11
1.5.2.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................. 12
1.5.3 TOE operational environment ........................................................................................................ 12
2 CC Conformance Claim ............................................................................................................... 13
2.1 collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization Acquisition
[CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E] ...................................................................................................................................... 13
2.2 collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine [CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E] ..... 14
3 Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................................ 15
3.1 Threat Environment ................................................................................................................................. 15
3.1.1 Threats countered by the TOE ....................................................................................................... 15
3.2 Assumptions ........................................................................................................................................... 16
3.3 Organizational Security Policies ............................................................................................................. 18
4 Security Objectives .................................................................................................................... 19
4.1 Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................................................ 19
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment ........................................................................................... 19
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................................................................ 20
5 Extended Components Definition ................................................................................................ 21
6 Security Requirements ............................................................................................................... 22
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements .................................................................................................. 22
6.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS) ........................................................................................................ 24
6.1.1.1 FCS_AFA_EXT.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition ............................................................... 24
6.1.1.2 FCS_AFA_EXT.2 Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition ............................................... 24
6.1.1.3 FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys) ....................................... 24
6.1.1.4 FCS_CKM.1(c) Cryptographic Key Generation (Data Encryption Key) ................................ 24
6.1.1.5 FCS_CKM.4(a)/AA Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) - Authorization
Acquisition ......................................................................................................................................... 24
6.1.1.6 FCS_CKM.4(a)/EE Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) - Encryption
Engine ............................................................................................................................................... 25
6.1.1.7 FCS_CKM.4(b) Cryptographic Key Destruction (TOE-Controlled Hardware) ...................... 25
6.1.1.8 FCS_CKM.4(d) Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd Party Storage) ........... 25
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 3 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
6.1.1.9 FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a) Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
............................................................................................................................................................ 26
6.1.1.10 FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b) Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power
Management) .................................................................................................................................... 26
6.1.1.11 FCS_CKM_EXT.6 Cryptographic Key Destruction Types ................................................... 26
6.1.1.12 FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification) ...................................... 26
6.1.1.13 FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) ................................................ 27
6.1.1.14 FCS_COP.1(c)/AA Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) ............................... 27
6.1.1.15 FCS_COP.1(c)/EE Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication) ............................. 27
6.1.1.16 FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping) .................................................. 27
6.1.1.17 FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) ...................... 27
6.1.1.18 FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) ................................................ 28
6.1.1.19 FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining (Initiator) ........................................................................... 28
6.1.1.20 FCS_KYC_EXT.2 Key Chaining (Recipient) ....................................................................... 28
6.1.1.21 FCS_PCC_EXT.1 Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning ............................ 28
6.1.1.22 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) ................................ 29
6.1.1.23 FCS_SNI_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector
Generation) ....................................................................................................................................... 29
6.1.1.24 FCS_VAL_EXT.1/AA Validation .......................................................................................... 30
6.1.1.25 FCS_VAL_EXT.1/EE Validation .......................................................................................... 30
6.1.2 User data protection (FDP) ........................................................................................................... 30
6.1.2.1 FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Protection of Data on Disk ....................................................................... 30
6.1.3 Security management (FMT) ......................................................................................................... 31
6.1.3.1 FMT_MOF.1 Management of Functions Behavior ................................................................ 31
6.1.3.2 FMT_SMF.1/AA Specification of Management Functions - Authorization Acquisition ......... 31
6.1.3.3 FMT_SMF.1/EE Specification of Management Functions - Encryption Engine ..................... 31
6.1.3.4 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles - Authorization Acquisition ...................................................... 31
6.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT) .......................................................................................................... 32
6.1.4.1 FPT_FUA_EXT.1 Firmware Update Authentication .............................................................. 32
6.1.4.2 FPT_KYP_EXT.1/AA Protection of Key and Key Material (AA) ............................................. 32
6.1.4.3 FPT_KYP_EXT.1/EE Protection of Key and Key Material (EE) .............................................. 32
6.1.4.4 FPT_PWR_EXT.1/AA Power Saving States (AA) ................................................................. 33
6.1.4.5 FPT_PWR_EXT.1/EE Power Saving States (EE) .................................................................. 33
6.1.4.6 FPT_PWR_EXT.2 Timing of Power Saving States ............................................................... 33
6.1.4.7 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Testing ...................................................................................................... 33
6.1.4.8 FPT_TUD_EXT.1/AA Trusted Update .................................................................................. 34
6.1.4.9 FPT_TUD_EXT.1/EE Trusted Update .................................................................................. 34
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale .......................................................................................... 34
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................................................... 34
6.3.1 ASE Security Target evaluation ..................................................................................................... 35
6.3.1.1 ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ............................................................................... 35
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ......................................................................................... 36
7 TOE Summary Specification ........................................................................................................ 37
7.1 TOE Security Functionality ...................................................................................................................... 37
8 Abbreviations, Terminology, and References .............................................................................. 46
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 4 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
8.1 Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................................... 46
8.2 References ............................................................................................................................................. 49
A Appendixes ................................................................................................................................ 51
A.1 Devices Covered by this Evaluation .......................................................................................... 51
A.2 SFR to CAVP Mapping ............................................................................................................. 54
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 5 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
List of Tables
Table 1: Cryptographic algorithms ................................................................................................................... 11
Table 2: TOE operational environment ............................................................................................................ 12
Table 3: NIAP TDs for CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E ..................................................................................................... 13
Table 4: NIAP TDs for CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E ..................................................................................................... 14
Table 5: SFRs for the TOE .............................................................................................................................. 22
Table 6: SARs .................................................................................................................................................. 35
Table 7: TOE summary specification for SFRs ................................................................................................ 37
Table 8: Hardware platforms ........................................................................................................................... 51
Table 9: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (USR cryptographic module) ................................................ 54
Table 10: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (KRN cryptographic module) .............................................. 55
Table 11: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SKS-FW cryptographic module) ........................................ 55
Table 12: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SKS-HW cryptographic module) ....................................... 55
Table 13: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (DMA cryptographic module) ............................................. 56
Table 14: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Apple silicon SoCs .................................................................... 56
Table 15: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Intel Processors ........................................................................ 57
Table 16: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Apple T2 Security Chip ............................................................. 57
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 6 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
List of Figures
Figure 1: Apple silicon: Major components of TOE ........................................................................................... 9
Figure 2: Intel with T2: Major components of TOE .......................................................................................... 10
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 7 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
1 Introduction
1.1 Security Target Identification
Title: Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault Security Target
Version: 1.2
Status: Final
Date: 2025-05-08
Sponsor: Apple Inc.
Developer: Apple Inc.
Validation Body: NIAP
Validation ID: VID11448
Keywords: FileVault, Full Drive Encryption, Encryption Engine, Authorization Acquisition
1.2 TOE Identification
The TOE is Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault.
1.3 TOE Type
The TOE type is Full Drive Encryption (Authorization Acquisition and Encryption Engine).
1.4 TOE Overview
The Security Target (ST) serves as the basis for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation and identifies the Target of
Evaluation (TOE), the scope of the evaluation, and the assumptions made throughout. This document also describes
the intended operational environment of the TOE and the functional and assurance requirements that the TOE meets.
The TOE is Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault, which is a Full Drive Encryption (FDE) solution including both
Authorization Acquisition (AA) and Encryption Engine (EE) components. The TOE is a built-in security feature
providing data-at-rest protection on Apple Mac computers. It is a hybrid FDE implementation based on a single
vendor's combination of hardware and software.
The Mac computers run Apple macOS operating system. Apple macOS is a POSIX-compliant operating system (OS)
built on top of the XNU kernel. The TOE is part of the macOS operating system which leverages the Apple silicon
System on Chip (SoC) or the Apple T2 Security Chip. Included in the Apple silicon SoC and the Apple T2 Security Chip
are Apple Secure Enclave and DMA Storage Controller. The Secure Enclave is a dedicated secure subsystem where
all FDE cryptographic key handling occurs. The DMA Storage Controller provides a dedicated AES crypto engine
built into the Direct Memory Access (DMA) path between the storage and main memory, making data encryption
with AES-XTS efficient. A special channel from the Secure Enclave securely transfers necessary keying material to
the AES engine.
The tested version of the TOE is:
● Apple macOS 14.2.1
1.5 TOE Description
This section provides a general description of the TOE, including physical boundaries, security functions, and relevant
TOE documentation and references.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 8 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
1.5.1 Physical boundary
The TOE includes both hardware and software running on the Mac computers listed in Appendix A.1 "Devices Covered
by this Evaluation". These Mac computers are organized into the following two groups:
● Apple silicon Mac
● "Intel with T2" Mac
The Apple silicon Mac group represents all systems listed in Appendix A.1 that use an Apple silicon SoC. The "Intel with
T2" Mac group represents all systems listed in Appendix A.1 that use an Intel processor with the Apple T2 Security
Chip. These groups have implementation differences as indicated in this document.
The TOE also includes the TOE documentation providing information for installing, configuring, and maintaining the
evaluated configuration:
● Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault Common Criteria Configuration Guide v1.0
1.5.1.1 Apple silicon
The Apple silicon SoC includes
● the application processor, which is the main processor of the TOE device and runs the macOS operating
system;
● the Secure Enclave, which contains the Secure Enclave Processor (SEP) running the sepOS operating
system; and
● the DMA Storage Controller, which performs the storage encryption.
The EE component is instantiated in the Secure Enclave and the DMA Storage Controller. The AA component
is instantiated in the application processor (Password Acquisition) and the Secure Enclave. The Secure Enclave
provides security related functionality for EE (other than encryption/decryption of storage data), as well as all of
the cryptographic functionality for AA (i.e., PBKDF2). The DMA Storage Controller provides a dedicated AES crypto
engine built into the DMA path between storage and main memory of the host platform. The Password Acquisition
function of AA component is implemented as the pre-boot component on the storage drive. It captures the user
password and passes it to the Secure Enclave.
Figure 1: Apple silicon: Major components of TOE
1.5.1.2 Intel with T2
The Apple T2 Security Chip includes
● the application processor, which serves as a co-processor to the Intel processor and runs the T2OS
operating system; the Intel processor is the main processor running macOS;
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 9 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
● the Secure Enclave, which contains the SEP running the sepOS operating system; and
● the DMA Storage Controller, which performs the storage encryption.
The EE component is instantiated on the T2. The AA component is instantiated on both the Intel processor (Password
Acquisition) and the T2. The Secure Enclave provides security related functionality for EE (other than encryption/
decryption of storage data), as well as all of the cryptographic functionality for AA (i.e., PBKDF2). The DMA Storage
Controller provides a dedicated AES crypto engine built into the DMA path between the storage and main memory of
the host platform. The Password Acquisition function of AA component is implemented as the pre-boot component
on the storage drive. It captures the user password and passes it to the Secure Enclave.
Figure 2: Intel with T2: Major components of TOE
1.5.1.3 Secure Enclave
The Secure Enclave is a dedicated secure subsystem integrated into the Apple silicon SoC and the Apple T2 Security
Chip. It is isolated from the application processor to provide an extra layer of security and is designed to keep sensitive
user data secure even when the application processor's kernel becomes compromised.
The Secure Enclave contains the SEP, which runs sepOS. The sepOS is bundled with macOS. The Secure Enclave
also includes a hardware True Random Number Generator (TRNG) and a hardware AES engine. The TRNG and AES
engine are directly connected to the SEP and are only accessible through the SEP.
Each SEP is provisioned during fabrication with its own 256-bit Unique ID (UID). This UID is
● used as a key by the TOE device;
● not accessible to other parts of the system, and
● not known to Apple.
1.5.2 TOE security functionality
The TOE provides the security functions required by the protection profiles listed in Section 2 "CC Conformance
Claim".
1.5.2.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)
The TOE employs a collection of cryptographic modules to satisfy the cryptographic requirements claimed in this ST.
On Apple silicon Mac computers, the TOE uses the following cryptographic modules:
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]
Cryptographic library offering various cryptographic mechanisms in the macOS user space.
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software, SL1]
Cryptographic library offering various cryptographic mechanisms in the macOS kernel space.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 10 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
Cryptographic library offering various cryptographic mechanisms in the Secure Enclave Processor
environment. It contains both firmware and hardware cryptographic algorithm implementations. Secure Key
Store is also known as SKS.
Apple DMA Storage Controller v2.0 [Hardware]
The AES-XTS cryptographic algorithm implementation in the DMA Storage Controller.
On "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE uses the following cryptographic modules:
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Intel, User, Software, SL1]
Cryptographic library offering various cryptographic mechanisms in the macOS user space.
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1]
Cryptographic library offering various cryptographic mechanisms in the macOS kernel space.
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
Cryptographic library offering various cryptographic mechanisms in the Secure Enclave Processor
environment. It contains both firmware and hardware cryptographic algorithm implementations. Secure Key
Store is also known as SKS.
Apple DMA Storage Controller v1.0 [Hardware]
The AES-XTS cryptographic algorithm implementation in the DMA Storage Controller.
Table 1 lists the cryptographic algorithms claimed in this evaluation along with their respective standards.
Table 1: Cryptographic algorithms
Algorithm Standard
AES-CBC NIST SP 800-38A [SP800-38A]☝
AES-KW NIST SP 800-38F [SP800-38F]☝
AES-XTS NIST SP 800-38E [SP800-38E]☝
ECDSA FIPS 186-4 [FIPS186-4]☝
RSA FIPS 186-4 [FIPS186-4]☝
HMAC FIPS 198-1 [FIPS198-1]☝
SHA FIPS 180-4 [FIPS180-4]☝
CTR_DRBG (AES) NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1 [SP800-90Ar1]☝
1.5.2.2 User data protection (FDP)
The TOE encrypts all user data using the following algorithms:
● Apple silicon: AES-XTS-256 using two independent 256-bit keys
● Intel with T2: AES-XTS-128 using two independent 128-bit keys
1.5.2.3 Security management (FMT)
The TOE can perform management functions. The administrator has full access to carry out all management functions
and the user have limited privilege. The System Settings » Privacy & Security menu on macOS invokes management
functionality of the AA component.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 11 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
1.5.2.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
The TOE implements the following protection of TSF data:
● Protection of key and key material
● Power saving states
● Timing of power saving states
● TSF testing
● Trusted software updates using digital signatures
The macOS operating system retrieves the update package from the Apple Update Server and forwards the package
to the AA component. The TOE validates the digital signature for the package before it is installed.
1.5.3 TOE operational environment
The following environmental components interoperate with the TOE in the evaluated configuration:
Table 2: TOE operational environment
Component Description
Hardware platform See Table 8
Apple Update Server Server that allows the TOE to download updates
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 12 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
2 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. Common Criteria [CC] version 3.1 revision 5
is the basis for this conformance claim.
This Security Target claims exact conformance to the following PP-Configuration and Protection Profiles (PPs):
● [CFG_CPP_FDE_AA-CPP_FDE_EE_V1.0]☝: PP-Configuration for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization
Acquisition and Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 1.0 as of 2024-05-31, which consists
of the following components:
❍ [CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E]☝: collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization
Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201 as of 2019-02-01.
❍ [CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E]☝: collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption
Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201 as of 2019-02-01.
2.1 collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization
Acquisition [CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E]
Table 3 contains the NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) for this protection profile at the time of the evaluation and a
statement of applicability to the evaluation.
Table 3: NIAP TDs for CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
NIAP TD TD description Applicable? Non-applicability rationale
TD0901 FIT Technical Decision: Clarification
to FCS_PCC_EXT.1.1
Yes
TD0769 FIT Technical Decision for
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1
No The TOE does not claim any of
the modified items.
TD0767 FIT Technical Decision for
FMT_SMF.1.1
Yes
TD0766 FIT Technical Decision for
FCS_CKM.4(d) Test Notes
No The TOE does not claim any of
the modified items.
TD0765 FIT Technical Decision for
FMT_MOF.1
Yes
TD0764 FIT Technical Decision for
FCS_PCC_EXT.1
Yes
TD0760 FIT Technical Decision for
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3, FCS_COP.1(f)
Yes
TD0759 FIT Technical Decision for
FCS_AFA_EXT.1.1
No The TOE does not include the use
of smartcard.
TD0606 FIT Technical Recommendation for
Evaluating a NAS against the FDE AA
and FDEE
No The TOE is not a NAS device.
TD0458 FIT Technical Decision for
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 evaluation activities
Yes
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 13 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
2.2 collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption
Engine [CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E]
Table 4 contains the NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) for this protection profile at the time of the evaluation and a
statement of applicability to the evaluation.
Table 4: NIAP TDs for CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
NIAP TD TD description Applicable? Non-applicability rationale
TD0769 FIT Technical Decision for
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1
No The TOE does not claim any of
the modified items.
TD0766 FIT Technical Decision for
FCS_CKM.4(d) Test Notes
No The TOE does not claim any of
the modified items.
TD0606 FIT Technical Recommendation for
Evaluating a NAS against the FDE AA
and FDEE
No The TOE is not a NAS device.
TD0464 FIT Technical Decision for
FPT_PWR_EXT.1 compliant power
saving states
Yes
TD0460 FIT Technical Decision for
FPT_PWR_EXT.1 non-compliant
power saving states
Yes
TD0458 FIT Technical Decision for
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 evaluation activities
Yes
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 14 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
3 Security Problem Definition
The security problem definition has been taken from [CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E]☝ and [CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E]☝ and is
reproduced here for the convenience of readers.
3.1 Threat Environment
3.1.1 Threats countered by the TOE
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
The cPP addresses the primary threat of unauthorized disclosure of protected data stored on a storage
device. If an adversary obtains a lost or stolen storage device (e.g., a storage device contained in a laptop
or a portable external storage device), they may attempt to connect a targeted storage device to a host
of which they have complete control and have raw access to the storage device (e.g., to specified disk
sectors, to specified blocks).
T.KEYING_MATERIAL_COMPROMISE/AA
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Possession of any of the keys, authorization factors, submasks, and random numbers or any other values
that contribute to the creation of keys or authorization factors could allow an unauthorized user to defeat
the encryption. The cPP considers possession of key material of equal importance to the data itself. Threat
agents may look for key material in unencrypted sectors of the storage device and on other peripherals in
the operating environment (OE), e.g. BIOS configuration, SPI flash.
T.KEYING_MATERIAL_COMPROMISE/EE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Possession of any of the keys, authorization factors, submasks, and random numbers or any other values
that contribute to the creation of keys or authorization factors could allow an unauthorized user to defeat
the encryption. The cPP considers possession of keying material of equal importance to the data itself.
Threat agents may look for keying material in unencrypted sectors of the storage device and on other
peripherals in the operating environment (OE), e.g. BIOS configuration, SPI flash, or TPMs.
T.AUTHORIZATION_GUESSING/AA
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Threat agents may exercise host software to repeatedly guess authorization factors, such as passwords
and PINs. Successful guessing of the authorization factors may cause the TOE to release BEV or otherwise
put it in a state in which it discloses protected data to unauthorized users.
T.AUTHORIZATION_GUESSING/EE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Threat agents may exercise host software to repeatedly guess authorization factors, such as passwords
and PINs. Successful guessing of the authorization factors may cause the TOE to release DEKs or
otherwise put it in a state in which it discloses protected data to unauthorized users.
T.KEYSPACE_EXHAUST
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Threat agents may perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption
algorithms and/or parameters allow attackers to exhaust the key space through brute force and give them
unauthorized access to the data.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 15 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
T.KNOWN_PLAINTEXT
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Threat agents know plaintext in regions of storage devices, especially in uninitialized regions (all zeroes) as
well as regions that contain well known software such as operating systems. A poor choice of encryption
algorithms, encryption modes, and initialization vectors along with known plaintext could allow an attacker
to recover the effective DEK, thus providing unauthorized access to the previously unknown plaintext on
the storage device.
T.CHOSEN_PLAINTEXT
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Threat agents may trick authorized users into storing chosen plaintext on the encrypted storage device
in the form of an image, document, or some other file. A poor choice of encryption algorithms, encryption
modes, and initialization vectors along with the chosen plaintext could allow attackers to recover the
effective DEK, thus providing unauthorized access to the previously unknown plaintext on the storage
device.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE/AA
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Threat agents may attempt to perform an update of the product which compromises the security features
of the TOE. Poorly chosen update protocols, signature generation and verification algorithms, and
parameters may allow attackers to install software and/or firmware that bypasses the intended security
features and provides them unauthorized access to data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE/EE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Threat agents may attempt to perform an update of the product which compromises the security features
of the TOE. Poorly chosen update protocols, signature generation and verification algorithms, and
parameters may allow attackers to install software that bypasses the intended security features and
provides them unauthorized access to data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_FIRMWARE_UPDATE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
An attacker attempts to replace the firmware on the SED via a command from the AA or from the host
platform with a malicious firmware update that may compromise the security features of the TOE.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_FIRMWARE_MODIFY
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
An attacker attempts to modify the firmware in the SED via a command from the AA or from the host
platform that may compromise the security features of the TOE.
3.2 Assumptions
A.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE/AA
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Users enable Full Drive Encryption on a newly provisioned or initialized storage device free of protected
data in areas not targeted for encryption. The cPP does not intend to include requirements to find all the
areas on storage devices that potentially contain protected data. In some cases, it may not be possible -
for example, data contained in "bad" sectors.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 16 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
While inadvertent exposure to data contained in bad sectors or un-partitioned space is unlikely, one may
use forensics tools to recover data from such areas of the storage device. Consequently, the cPP assumes
bad sectors, un-partitioned space, and areas that must contain unencrypted code (e.g., MBR and AA/EE
pre-authentication software) contain no protected data.
A.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE/EE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Users enable Full Drive Encryption on a newly provisioned storage device free of protected data in areas
not targeted for encryption. It is also assumed that data intended for protection should not be on the
targeted storage media until after provisioning. The cPP does not intend to include requirements to find all
the areas on storage devices that potentially contain protected data. In some cases, it may not be possible
- for example, data contained in "bad" sectors. While inadvertent exposure to data contained in bad
sectors or un24 partitioned space is unlikely, one may use forensics tools to recover data from such areas
of the storage device. Consequently, the cPP assumes bad sectors, un-partitioned space, and areas that
must contain unencrypted code (e.g., MBR and AA/EE pre-authentication software) contain no protected
data.
A.SECURE_STATE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Upon the completion of proper provisioning, the drive is only assumed secure when in a powered off state
up until it is powered on and receives initial authorization.
A.TRUSTED_CHANNEL
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Communication among and between product components (e.g., AA and EE) is sufficiently protected
to prevent information disclosure. In cases in which a single product fulfils both cPPs, then the
communication between the components does not extend beyond the boundary of the TOE (e.g.,
communication path is within the TOE boundary). In cases in which independent products satisfy the
requirements of the AA and EE, the physically close proximity of the two products during their operation
means that the threat agent has very little opportunity to interpose itself in the channel between the two
without the user noticing and taking appropriate actions.
A.TRAINED_USER/AA
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Authorized users follow all provided user guidance, including keeping password/passphrases and external
tokens securely stored separately from the storage device and/or platform.
A.TRAINED_USER/EE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Users follow the provided guidance for securing the TOE and authorization factors. This includes
conformance with authorization factor strength, using external token authentication factors for no other
purpose and ensuring external token authorization factors are securely stored separately from the storage
device and/or platform. The user should also be trained on how to power off their system.
A.PLATFORM_STATE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external storage device is connected) is free of
malware that could interfere with the correct operation of the product.
A.SINGLE_USE_ET
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 17 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
External tokens that contain authorization factors are used for no other purpose than to store the external
token authorization factors.
A.POWER_DOWN/AA
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
The user does not leave the platform and/or storage device unattended until all volatile memory is cleared
after a power-off, so memory remnant attacks are infeasible.
Authorized users do not leave the platform and/or storage device in a mode where sensitive information
persists in non-volatile storage (e.g., lock screen). Users power the platform and/or storage device down
or place it into a power managed state, such as a "hibernation mode".
A.POWER_DOWN/EE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
The user does not leave the platform and/or storage device unattended until the device is in a Compliant
power saving state or has fully powered off. This properly clears memories and locks down the device.
Authorized users do not leave the platform and/or storage device in a mode where sensitive information
persists in non-volatile storage (e.g., lock screen or sleep state). Users power the platform and/or storage
device down or place it into a power managed state, such as a "hibernation mode".
A.PASSWORD_STRENGTH
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Authorized administrators ensure password/passphrase authorization factors have sufficient strength and
entropy to reflect the sensitivity of the data being protected.
A.PLATFORM_I&A
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
The product does not interfere with or change the normal platform identification and authentication
functionality such as the operating system login. It may provide authorization factors to the operating
system's login interface, but it will not change or degrade the functionality of the actual interface.
A.STRONG_CRYPTO
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
All cryptography implemented in the Operational Environment and used by the product meets the
requirements listed in the cPP. This includes generation of external token authorization factors by a RBG.
A.PHYSICAL
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
The platform is assumed to be physically protected in its Operational Environment and not subject to
physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the platform's correct operation.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no organizational security policies addressed by the PPs.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 18 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
4 Security Objectives
The security objectives have been taken from [CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E]☝ and [CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E]☝ and are
reproduced here for the convenience of readers.
There are no security objectives for the TOE defined in the PPs.
4.1 Objectives for the TOE
This ST does not define security objectives for the TOE.
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.TRUSTED_CHANNEL
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Communication among and between product components (i.e., AA and EE) is sufficiently protected to
prevent information disclosure.
OE.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
The OE provides a newly provisioned or initialized storage device free of protected data in areas not
targeted for encryption.
OE.PASSPHRASE_STRENGTH
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
An authorized administrator will be responsible for ensuring that the passphrase authorization factor
conforms to guidance from the Enterprise using the TOE.
OE.POWER_DOWN/AA
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Volatile memory is cleared after power-off so memory remnant attacks are infeasible.
OE.POWER_DOWN/EE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Volatile memory is cleared after entering a Compliant power saving state or turned off so memory remnant
attacks are infeasible.
OE.SINGLE_USE_ET
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
External tokens that contain authorization factors will be used for no other purpose than to store the
external token authorization factor.
OE.STRONG_ENVIRONMENT_CRYPTO
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
The Operating Environment will provide a cryptographic function capability that is commensurate with the
requirements and capabilities of the TOE and Appendix A.
OE.TRAINED_USERS
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Authorized users will be properly trained and follow all guidance for securing the TOE and authorization
factors.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 19 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
OE.PLATFORM_STATE
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external storage device is connected) is free of
malware that could interfere with the correct operation of the product.
OE.PLATFORM_I&A
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
The Operational Environment will provide individual user identification and authentication mechanisms that
operate independently of the authorization factors used by the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
The Operational Environment will provide a secure physical computing space such than an adversary is not
able to make modifications to the environment or to the TOE itself.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
The rationale is defined in the protection profiles listed in Section 2 "CC Conformance Claim".
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 20 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
5 Extended Components Definition
The extended components are defined in the protection profiles listed in Section 2 "CC Conformance Claim".
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 21 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
6 Security Requirements
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
For brevity, the following convention has been used in the tables of this section to identify the source of a security
requirement:
● AA: [CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E]☝
● EE: [CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E]☝
● AA_EE: [CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E]☝ and [CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E]☝
● CC: Common Criteria [CC] version 3.1 revision 5
The table below summarizes the SFRs for the TOE and the operations performed on the components according to
CC part 1. Operations in the SFRs use the following convention:
● Iterations (Iter.) are identified by appending a suffix to the original SFR.
● Refinements (Ref.) added to the text are shown in italic text, deletions are shown as strikethrough text.
● Assignments (Ass.) are shown in bold text.
● Selections (Sel.) are shown in bold text.
Table 5: SFRs for the TOE
Operations
Security
functional class
Security functional requirement Source
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
FCS_AFA_EXT.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition AA No No No Yes
FCS_AFA_EXT.2 Timing of Authorization Factor
Acquisition
AA No Yes No No
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric
Keys)
AA_EE No No No Yes
FCS_CKM.1(c) Cryptographic Key Generation (Data
Encryption Key)
EE No No No Yes
FCS_CKM.4(a)/AA Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power
Management) - Authorization Acquisition
AA No Yes No Yes
FCS_CKM.4(a)/EE Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power
Management) - Encryption Engine
EE No Yes No Yes
FCS_CKM.4(b) Cryptographic Key Destruction (TOE-
Controlled Hardware)
EE No No No Yes
FCS_CKM.4(d) Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software
TOE, 3rd Party Storage)
AA No No No Yes
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a) Cryptographic Key and Key Material
Destruction (Destruction Timing)
AA_EE No No No No
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b) Cryptographic Key and Key Material
Destruction (Power Management)
AA_EE No Yes No No
FCS_CKM_EXT.6 Cryptographic Key Destruction Types EE No No No Yes
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Signature
Verification)
AA_EE No No No Yes
FCS -
Cryptographic
support
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) AA_EE No No No Yes
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 22 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Operations
Security
functional class
Security functional requirement Source
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
FCS_COP.1(c)/AA Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash
Algorithm)
AA No No Yes Yes
FCS_COP.1(c)/EE Cryptographic Operation (Message
Authentication)
EE No No Yes Yes
FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping) AA_EE No No No Yes
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
EE No No No Yes
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) AA No No No Yes
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining (Initiator) AA No Yes Yes Yes
FCS_KYC_EXT.2 Key Chaining (Recipient) EE No No No Yes
FCS_PCC_EXT.1 Cryptographic Password Construct and
Conditioning
AA No No Yes Yes
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
AA_EE No No Yes Yes
FCS_SNI_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and
Initialization Vector Generation)
AA_EE No No No Yes
FCS_VAL_EXT.1/AA Validation AA No Yes Yes Yes
FCS_VAL_EXT.1/EE Validation EE No Yes Yes Yes
FDP - User data
protection
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Protection of Data on Disk EE No No No No
FMT_MOF.1 Management of Functions Behavior AA No No No No
FMT_SMF.1/AA Specification of Management Functions -
Authorization Acquisition
AA No No No Yes
FMT_SMF.1/EE Specification of Management Functions -
Encryption Engine
EE No Yes No Yes
FMT - Security
management
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles - Authorization Acquisition AA No No No No
FPT_FUA_EXT.1 Firmware Update Authentication EE No Yes No Yes
FPT_KYP_EXT.1/AA Protection of Key and Key Material
(AA)
AA No No No Yes
FPT_KYP_EXT.1/EE Protection of Key and Key Material
(EE)
EE No No No Yes
FPT_PWR_EXT.1/AA Power Saving States (AA) AA No No No Yes
FPT_PWR_EXT.1/EE Power Saving States (EE) EE No No No Yes
FPT_PWR_EXT.2 Timing of Power Saving States AA_EE No Yes No Yes
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Testing AA_EE No No Yes Yes
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/AA Trusted Update AA No No No Yes
FPT - Protection of
the TSF
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/EE Trusted Update EE No No No Yes
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 23 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
6.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)
6.1.1.1 FCS_AFA_EXT.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_AFA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall accept the following authorization factors:
● a submask derived from a password authorization factor conditioned as defined in
FCS_PCC_EXT.1
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_AFA_EXT.1
6.1.1.2 FCS_AFA_EXT.2 Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_AFA_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall reacquire the authorization factor(s) specified in FCS_AFA_EXT.1 upon transition from any
Compliant power saving state specified in FPT_PWR_EXT.1/AA FPT_PWR_EXT.1 prior to permitting access to
plaintext data.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_AFA_EXT.2
6.1.1.3 FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM.1.1(b)
The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random Bit Generator as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes 256 bit that meet the following: [no standard].
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM.1(b)
6.1.1.4 FCS_CKM.1(c) Cryptographic Key Generation (Data Encryption Key)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM.1.1(c)
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm method
● generate a DEK using the RBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1
and specified cryptographic key sizes 256 bits.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM.1(c)
6.1.1.5 FCS_CKM.4(a)/AA Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) -
Authorization Acquisition
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 24 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
FCS_CKM.4.1(a)/AA
The TSF shall erase cryptographic keys and key material from volatile memory when transitioning to a
Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1/AA FPT_PWR_EXT.1 that meets the following: [a
key destruction method specified in FCS_CKM.4(d)].
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM.4(a)/AA
6.1.1.6 FCS_CKM.4(a)/EE Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) -
Encryption Engine
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM.4.1(a)/EE
The TSF shall erase cryptographic keys and key material from volatile memory when transitioning to a
Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1/EE FPT_PWR_EXT.1 that meets the following: [a
key destruction method specified in FCS_CKM_EXT.6].
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM.4(a)/EE
6.1.1.7 FCS_CKM.4(b) Cryptographic Key Destruction (TOE-Controlled Hardware)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM.4.1(b)
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction
method:
● For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a
❍ single overwrite consisting of
➤ zeroes
❍ removal of power to the memory
● For non-volatile memory
❍ that employs a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be executed by a
➤ single overwrite consisting of zeroes
that meets the following: [no standard].
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM.4(b)
6.1.1.8 FCS_CKM.4(d) Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd Party
Storage)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_CKM.4.1(d)
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction
method
● For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a
❍ single overwrite consisting of
➤ zeroes
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 25 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
❍ removal of power to the memory
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM.4(d)
6.1.1.9 FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a) Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction
(Destruction Timing)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(a)
The TSF shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer needed.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a)
6.1.1.10 FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b) Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power
Management)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(b)
The TSF shall destroy all key material, BEV, and authentication factors stored in plaintext when transitioning to
a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1/AA and FPT_PWR_EXT.1/EE FPT_PWR_EXT.1.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b)
6.1.1.11 FCS_CKM_EXT.6 Cryptographic Key Destruction Types
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1
The TSF shall use FCS_CKM.4(b) key destruction methods.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM_EXT.6
6.1.1.12 FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(a)
The TSF shall perform [cryptographic signature services (verification)] in accordance with a
● RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size (modulus) of 4096-bit ;
● Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size of 256 bits or greater
that meet the following
● FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature
Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme
2 or Digital Signature scheme 3, for RSA schemes
● FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing
"NIST curves" P-521 ; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4, for ECDSA schemes
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(a)
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 26 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
6.1.1.13 FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(b)
The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-256, SHA-512 that meet the following: [ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004].
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(b)
6.1.1.14 FCS_COP.1(c)/AA Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(c)/AA
The TSF shall perform cryptographic [keyed-hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm HMAC-SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits used in HMAC that meet
the following: [ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2"].
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(c)/AA
6.1.1.15 FCS_COP.1(c)/EE Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(c)/EE
The TSF shall perform cryptographic [message authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm HMAC-SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits used in HMAC that meet the following:
ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2".
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(c)/EE
6.1.1.16 FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(d)
The TSF shall perform [key wrapping] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES] in the
following modes KW and the cryptographic key size 256 bits that meet the following: [AES as specified in
ISO/IEC 18033-3, NIST SP 800-38F].
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(d)
6.1.1.17 FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(f)
The TSF shall perform [data encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [AES used in XTS mode] and cryptographic key sizes 128 bits, 256 bits that meet the following:
[AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, XTS as specified in IEEE 1619].
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 27 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(f)
6.1.1.18 FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_COP.1.1(g)
The TSF shall perform [key encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[AES used in CBC mode] and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits that meet the following: [AES as specified in
ISO /IEC 18033-3, CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116].
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(g)
6.1.1.19 FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining (Initiator)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a key chain of:
● one, using a submask as the BEV
while maintaining an effective strength of 256 bits for symmetric keys and an effective strength of not
applicable for asymmetric keys.
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide at least a 256 bit BEV to EE
● after the TSF has successfully performed the validation process as specified in FCS_VAL_EXT.1/
AA FCS_VAL_EXT.1
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_KYC_EXT.1
6.1.1.20 FCS_KYC_EXT.2 Key Chaining (Recipient)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_KYC_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall accept a BEV of at least 256 bits from [the AA].
FCS_KYC_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall maintain a chain of intermediary keys originating from the BEV to the DEK using the following
method(s):
● symmetric key generation as specified in FCS_CKM.1(b)
● key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(d)
while maintaining an effective strength of 256 bits for symmetric keys and an effective strength of not
applicable for asymmetric keys.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_KYC_EXT.2
6.1.1.21 FCS_PCC_EXT.1 Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 28 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Applied TDs: TD0764, TD0901
FCS_PCC_EXT.1.1
A password used by the TSF to generate a password authorization factor shall enable at least 255
characters in the set of {upper case characters, lower case characters, numbers, and all other 8-bit special
characters} and shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm HMAC-SHA-256, with an iteration count of 1 and at least 50,000 subsequent
rounds of AES operations with a device key and PBKDF2 output per FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e),
and output cryptographic key sizes 256 bits that meet the following: [NIST SP 800-132].
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_PCC_EXT.1
6.1.1.22 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with NIST SP 800-90A
using CTR_DRBG (AES).
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from
● 1 hardware-based noise source(s)
with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/
IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 "Security Strength Table for Hash Functions", of the keys and hashes that it will
generate.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_RBG_EXT.1
6.1.1.23 FCS_SNI_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector
Generation)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Applied TDs: TD0760
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall use salts that are generated by a DRBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall use no nonces.
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner
● CBC: IVs shall be non-repeating and unpredictable;
● XTS: No IV. Tweak values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively, and starting
at an arbitrary non-negative integer;
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_SNI_EXT.1
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 29 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
6.1.1.24 FCS_VAL_EXT.1/AA Validation
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1/AA
The TSF shall perform validation of the BEV using the following method(s):
● key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1(d)
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2/AA
The TSF shall require validation of the [BEV] prior to [forwarding the BEV to the EE].
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.3/AA
The TSF shall
● require power cycle/reset the TOE after 10 of consecutive failed validation attempts.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_VAL_EXT.1/AA
6.1.1.25 FCS_VAL_EXT.1/EE Validation
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1/EE
The TSF shall perform validation of the [BEV] using the following method(s):
● key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1(d)
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2/EE
The TSF shall require validation of the [BEV] prior to [allowing access to TSF data after exiting a Compliant
power saving state].
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.3/EE
The TSF shall
● require power cycle/reset the TOE after 10 of consecutive failed validation attempts.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_VAL_EXT.1/EE
6.1.2 User data protection (FDP)
6.1.2.1 FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Protection of Data on Disk
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform Full Drive Encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(f), such that the drive contains no
plaintext protected data.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
TSS Link: TSS for FDP_DSK_EXT.1
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 30 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
6.1.3 Security management (FMT)
6.1.3.1 FMT_MOF.1 Management of Functions Behavior
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FMT_MOF.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the functions [use of Compliant power saving
state] to [authorized users].
TSS Link: TSS for FMT_MOF.1
6.1.3.2 FMT_SMF.1/AA Specification of Management Functions - Authorization
Acquisition
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Applied TDs: TD0767
FMT_SMF.1.1/AA
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
a) forwarding requests to change the DEK to the EE
b) forwarding requests to cryptographically erase the DEK to the EE
c) allowing authorized users to change authorization values or set of authorization values used within the
supported authorization method
d) initiate TOE firmware/software updates
e) configure authorization factors
TSS Link: TSS for FMT_SMF.1/AA
Note: The term "cryptographically erase" refers to the fact that if a key is protected by using a cryptographic
algorithm (e.g. AES-KW), and the key encryption key is zeroized, although the encrypted key is still present in
storage it cannot be decrypted as the KEK does not exist anymore.In this particular case, the DEK may be erased
by destroying the Key Encryption Key (KEK) that protects it.
6.1.3.3 FMT_SMF.1/EE Specification of Management Functions - Encryption Engine
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FMT_SMF.1.1/EE
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
a) change the DEK, as specified in FCS_CKM.1(c), when re-provisioning or when commanded
b) erase the DEK, as specified in FCS_CKM.4(a)/EE FCS_CKM.4(a)
c) initiate TOE firmware/software updates
d) no other functions
TSS Link: TSS for FMT_SMF.1/EE
6.1.3.4 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles - Authorization Acquisition
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 31 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [authorized user].
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
TSS Link: TSS for FMT_SMR.1
6.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.4.1 FPT_FUA_EXT.1 Firmware Update Authentication
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FPT_FUA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall authenticate the source of the firmware update using the digital signature algorithm specified in
FCS_COP.1(a) using the RTU that contains the public key.
FPT_FUA_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall only allow installation of update if the digital signature has been successfully verified as
specified in FCS_COP.1(a).
FPT_FUA_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall only allow modification of the existing firmware after the successful validation of the digital
signature, using a mechanism as described in FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2/EE FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2.
FPT_FUA_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall return an error code if any part of the firmware update process fails.
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_FUA_EXT.1
6.1.4.2 FPT_KYP_EXT.1/AA Protection of Key and Key Material (AA)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1/AA
The TSF shall
● only store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1(d) , or
encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)
● only store plaintext keys that meet any one of the following criteria
❍ the plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.1
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_KYP_EXT.1/AA
6.1.4.3 FPT_KYP_EXT.1/EE Protection of Key and Key Material (EE)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 32 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1/EE
The TSF shall
● only store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1(d) , or
encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)
● only store plaintext keys that meet any one of the following criteria
❍ the plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.2
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_KYP_EXT.1/EE
6.1.4.4 FPT_PWR_EXT.1/AA Power Saving States (AA)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1/AA
The TSF shall define the following Compliant power saving states: G2(S5).
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_PWR_EXT.1/AA
6.1.4.5 FPT_PWR_EXT.1/EE Power Saving States (EE)
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Applied TDs: TD0464
FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1/EE
The TSF shall define the following Compliant power saving states: G2(S5).
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_PWR_EXT.1/EE
6.1.4.6 FPT_PWR_EXT.2 Timing of Power Saving States
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FPT_PWR_EXT.2.1
For each Compliant power saving state defined in FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1/AA and FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1/EE
FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF shall enter the Compliant power saving state when the following conditions occur:
user-initiated request, shutdown.
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_PWR_EXT.2
6.1.4.7 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Testing
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF:
a) authenticity and integrity check of software/firmware
b) Known Answer Tests (KATs)
1. AES-XTS-128 and AES-XTS-256 encrypt and decrypt
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 33 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
2. AES-CBC 256-bit encrypt and decrypt
3. CTR_DRBG with AES-256
4. ECDSA P-521 with SHA-512 signature verification
5. HMAC-SHA-256 MAC generation
6. RSA 4096 with SHA-256 signature verification
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_TST_EXT.1
6.1.4.8 FPT_TUD_EXT.1/AA Trusted Update
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1/AA
The TSF shall provide [authorized users] the ability to query the current version of the TOE software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2/AA
The TSF shall provide [authorized users] the ability to initiate updates to TOE software, firmware.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3/AA
The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE software using a [digital signature as specified in FCS_COP.1(a)] by
the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_TUD_EXT.1/AA
6.1.4.9 FPT_TUD_EXT.1/EE Trusted Update
PP Origin: CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1/EE
The TSF shall provide [authorized users] the ability to query the current version of the TOE software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2/EE
The TSF shall provide [authorized users] the ability to initiate updates to TOE software, firmware.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3/EE
The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE software, firmware using a authenticated firmware update
mechanism as described in FPT_FUA_EXT.1 by the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_TUD_EXT.1/EE
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The rationale is defined in the protection profiles listed in Section 2 "CC Conformance Claim".
FCS_COP.1(a) has an unresolved dependency on FCS_CKM.1. Signature verification requires the use of preexisting
asymmetric public keys; therefore, asymmetric key generation is not required.
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE assurance requirements have been taken from [CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E]☝ and [CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E]☝.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 34 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Given the criticality of the key management scheme, a Key Management Description (KMD) document is required in
the CC evaluation of Full Drive Encryption. In addition, an Entropy Essay regarding the quality of the entropy is required
if the TOE includes a random bit generator. The SAR element ASE_TSS.1.1C is refined in [CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E]☝ and
[CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E]☝ to specify the requirements of KMD and Entropy Essay.
The security assurance requirements (SARs) for the TOE are defined in CC assurance packages.
The following table shows the SARs, and the operations performed on the components according to CC part 3:
iteration (Iter.), refinement (Ref.), assignment (Ass.) and selection (Sel.).
Table 6: SARs
Operations
Security
assurance class
Security assurance requirement Source
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification AA_EE No No No Yes
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims CC No No No No
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition CC No No No No
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction CC No No No No
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational
environment
CC No No No No
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements CC No No No No
ASE Security
Target evaluation
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition CC No No No No
ADV Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification CC No No No No
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance CC No No No No
AGD Guidance
documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures CC No No No No
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE CC No No No No
ALC Life-cycle
support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage CC No No No No
ATE Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance CC No No No No
AVA Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey CC No No No No
6.3.1 ASE Security Target evaluation
6.3.1.1 ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Developer action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1D
The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1C
The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR, including a proprietary Key
Management Description (Appendix E), and Entropy Essay.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 35 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation
of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E
The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent with the TOE overview and the
TOE description.
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The rationale is defined in the protection profiles listed in Section 2 "CC Conformance Claim".
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 36 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Security Functionality
This chapter identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met by the TOE.
Table 7: TOE summary specification for SFRs
TOE SFRs TOE summary specification
FCS_AFA_EXT.1,
FCS_PCC_EXT.1
(Authorization factor,
PBKDF2)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE accepts the password
authorization factor from the user. Passwords of up to 255 characters are supported and can be
comprised of any combination of uppercase characters, lowercase characters, numbers, and any
other 8-bit special characters.
For each user authenticating to the TOE, a 256-bit AES key, termed Password-Derived Key (PDK) in
the ST, is derived using the following information:
● User login password,
● Per-user salt,
● Secure Enclave UID (refer to section 1.5.1.3).
The PDK is defined as the password submask and Border Encryption Value (BEV) in the TOE.
The TOE applies the PDK as the key to unwrap a given ciphertext associated with the user account
using the 256-bit AES-KW algorithm [SP800-38F]☝. If the decryption succeeds, the authentication
is successful and the user is logged in to the system. Considering the self-authenticating feature of
AES-KW algorithm, a failed unwrapping operation implies that the user's password must be wrong,
as all other parts used to derive the PDK remain unchanged.
The TOE implements PBKDF2 in the Secure Enclave to derive a 256-bit key from the user's
password. The PBKDF2 is implemented as specified in [SP800-132]☝ following "Option 2b" defined
in section 5.4 of the standard. It uses HMAC-SHA-256 as the pseudorandom function (PRF). The
input to the PBKDF2 is the 128-bit random salt generated by the TRNG, the user's password without
any pre-processing, and an iteration count of one. The output is the 256-bit key mentioned above.
Next, the output of the PBKDF2 is repeatedly encrypted with the AES-CBC-256 hardware cipher
using the 256-bit UID as the encryption key to generate 256 bits of data with each loop iteration.
The loop is performed as often as needed to reach a duration between 100 and 150 milliseconds on
the TOE device, with a minimum of 50,000 iterations.
The final output, after all AES iterations have completed, forms the 256-bit PDK.
FCS_AFA_EXT.2
(Authorization factor
acquisition)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, to resume from a compliant power
state, the user must reauthenticate to the TOE. The user can reauthenticate using username and
password.
FCS_CKM.1(b)
(Symmetric key
generation)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, at the time of creating a data volume, the
TOE uses the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 to generates the following 256-bit
AES keys:
● A Volume Encryption Key (VEK) for encrypting the volume.
● A Key Encryption Key (KEK) for protecting the VEK.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 37 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
TOE SFRs TOE summary specification
Volume and metadata contents are encrypted with the VEK, which is wrapped with the KEK.
FCS_CKM.1(c)
(Data encryption key
generation)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, when creating a data volume, the TOE
uses the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 to generates a 256-bit AES key, which
is termed Volume Encryption Key (VEK). This key serves as the Data Encryption Key (DEK) for
encrypting the data volume.
FCS_CKM.4(a)/AA,
FCS_CKM.4(a)/EE,
FCS_CKM.4(b),
FCS_CKM.4(d),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b),
FCS_CKM_EXT.6,
FPT_KYP_EXT.1/AA,
FPT_KYP_EXT.1/EE
(Key destruction)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE leverages NAND flash for non-
volatile memory, and leverages DRAM for volatile memory. In NAND flash, reading and writing data
occur at the page level. To protect data from hardware errors, the flash drive associates each page
with an error correcting code (ECC) checksum. In DRAM, data is read and written at the byte level
without redundant bits.
All symmetric keys stored in non-volatile memory are cryptographically wrapped. The TOE erases
cryptographic keys and key material from non-volatile memory by performing a single overwrite of
zeroes.
Keys are introduced into volatile memory only when they are required to perform a specific
cryptographic operation. Since the keys are being used by the Secure Enclave to perform the
operation, the Secure Enclave tracks the memory location of the key until the operation is complete.
Once a key is no longer needed for the specific operation, the key is erased from volatile memory.
The TOE erases cryptographic keys and key material from volatile memory by performing a single
overwrite of zeroes and/or by removal of power to the memory.
The erase operation is performed by the Secure Enclave and is not configurable by a user. There are
no circumstances that do not conform to the key destruction requirement (e.g., sudden unexpected
power loss).
The Secure Enclave UID is fused into the Secure Enclave. The UID is not accessible by any
component outside of the Secure Enclave and cannot be erased.
The TOE will destroy all key material and cryptographic keys stored in plaintext when transitioning to
a Compliant power saving state as defined in FPT_PWR_EXT.1/AA and FPT_PWR_EXT.1/EE.
FCS_COP.1(a)
(Signature verification)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, Signature Verification (SigVer) is
performed as part of the following features:
● Installing firmware/software updates
❍ TSS for FPT_FUA_EXT.1 and FPT_TUD_EXT.1
● Secure Boot
❍ TSS for FPT_TST_EXT.1
Installation and Secure Boot signature verification involves different TOE components in different
layers of the TOE and, thus, use the user space, kernel space, and SKS corecrypto modules.
Apple silicon
Algorithm: ECDSA P-521 SigVer
Standard: [FIPS186-4]☝
Modules:
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software, SL1]
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 38 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
TOE SFRs TOE summary specification
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
On Apple silicon Mac computers, signatures are verified using ECDSA P-521 and SHA-512. The CA
public key is embedded in the Boot ROM code during manufacturing. The TOE image is signed using
this key's corresponding private key.
Intel with T2
Algorithm: RSA 4096 SigVer
Standard: [FIPS186-4]☝
Modules:
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Intel, User, Software, SL1]
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1]
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
On "Intel with T2" Mac computers, signatures are verified using RSA 4096-bit and SHA-256. The CA
public key is embedded in the Boot ROM code during manufacturing. The TOE image is signed using
this key's corresponding private key.
FCS_COP.1(b)
(Hash)
Summary
The TSS for FCS_COP.1(a) describes which hash functions are used and where the hash functions
are used.
Apple silicon
Algorithm: SHA-512
Standard: [FIPS180-4]☝
Modules:
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software, SL1]
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
Intel with T2
Algorithm: SHA-256
Standard: [FIPS180-4]☝
Modules:
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Intel, User, Software, SL1]
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1]
● Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
FCS_COP.1(c)/AA,
FCS_COP.1(c)/EE
(Keyed-hash message
authentication)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the PBKDF2 uses the keyed hash
algorithm HMAC-SHA-256 from the corecrypto SKS module as described in the TSS for
FCS_PCC_EXT.1. The following parameters are used in the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm:
● Key length: 256 bits
● Block size: 512 bits
● Output MAC length: 256 bits
Algorithm: HMAC-SHA-256
Standard: [FIPS198-1]☝
Apple silicon
Module: Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 39 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
TOE SFRs TOE summary specification
Intel with T2
Module: Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
FCS_COP.1(d)
(Key wrapping)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE performs key wrapping using the
AES in KW mode according to [SP800-38F]☝. The TOE uses 256-bit keys for this algorithm.
AES-KW is an authentication cipher that provides integrity: the decryption operation will only
succeed when there is no authentication error. This ensures that the unwrapping operation is
performed with the correct key.
The TOE uses key wrapping for the following purposes:
● Protect the key chain originating from the BEV to the DEK: the TOE uses AES-KW to provide
integrity and confidentiality protection of the DEK and intermediate keys.
● User authentication: the TOE verifies that the BEV derived from the password is able to
successfully unwrap a given ciphertext associated with the user account. The failure of
unwrapping operation is a user authentication failure and therefore access will be denied.
Algorithm: AES-KW-256
Standard: [SP800-38F]☝
Apple silicon
Module: Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
Intel with T2
Module: Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
FCS_COP.1(f)
(Data encryption and
decryption)
Summary
The TOE uses the AES-XTS mode for data encryption and decryption. The DEK is generated as per
the TSS for FCS_CKM.1(c).
Apple silicon
Algorithm: AES-XTS-256
Standard: [SP800-38E]☝
Module: Apple DMA Storage Controller v2.0 [Hardware]
On Apple silicon Mac computers, The TOE uses the DEK to encrypt and decrypt data using AES-
XTS-256 as described in TSS for FCS_COP.1(f). The DMA storage controller derives a 256-bit tweak
and a 256-bit cipher key from this DEK.
Intel with T2
Algorithm: AES-XTS-128
Standard: [SP800-38E]☝
Module: Apple DMA Storage Controller v1.0 [Hardware]
On "Intel with T2" Mac computers, The TOE uses the DEK to encrypt and decrypt data using AES-
XTS-128 as described in TSS for FCS_COP.1(f). The DMA storage controller splits the DEK into a
128-bit tweak and a 128-bit cipher key.
FCS_COP.1(g)
(Key encryption)
Summary
The TOE uses the hardware AES-CBC-256 key encryption implementation when generating the PDK
as described in the TSS for FCS_PCC_EXT.1. The key size supported is 256 bits.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 40 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
TOE SFRs TOE summary specification
Algorithm: AES-CBC-256
Standard: [SP800-38A]☝
Apple silicon
Module: Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
Intel with T2
Module: Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
FCS_KYC_EXT.1,
FCS_KYC_EXT.2
(Key chaining initiator
& recipient)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE supports BEV sizes of 256 bits.
As a key chaining initiator, the TOE maintains a key chain of one key, using a 256-bit
password submask as the BEV. The password conditioning process is described in the TSS for
FCS_PCC_EXT.1
As a key chaining recipient, the TOE maintains the chain of intermediary keys originating from the
BEV to the DEK using the following methods:
● Symmetric key generation as specified in FCS_CKM.1(b)
● Key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(d)
The chain of intermediary keys maintains an effective strength of 256 bits for symmetric keys.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
(Random bit
generation)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE performs deterministic random
bit generation services according to [SP800-90Ar1]☝ using CTR_DRBG(AES). The DRBG is
implemented in hardware as part of the Secure Enclave TRNG (part of the TOE hardware).
FCS_SNI_EXT.1
(Salt, nonce, and IV
generation)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE generates salts and initialization
vectors (IVs) using the Secure Enclave DRBG.
● Salts are 16 bytes and are used with the PBKDF2.
● The AES-CBC IVs are used when deriving the PDK from password.
Tweaks are used with the AES-XTS mode of operation. The tweak values should be non-negative
integers, assigned consecutively, and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer. The tweak value
is the physical block number of the media on which the file is being written. This ensures that values
cannot be negative. The number is incremented based on the block number values.
FCS_VAL_EXT.1/AA,
FCS_VAL_EXT.1/EE
(BEV validation)
Summary
Since the TOE consists of both FDE AA and FDE EE components, the BEV validation processes in
both AA and EE components are implemented as a single process in the TOE.
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE validates a BEV using the 256-
bit AES-KW algorithm. The TOE applies the BEV as the key to unwrap a given ciphertext associated
with the user account. If the decryption succeeds, the BEV is regarded as valid. Otherwise, the BEV
is invalid.
The TOE requires the validation of the BEV prior to allowing access to TSF data after exiting a
Compliant power saving state. The TOE shall power cycle/reset after 10 consecutive failed validation
attempts.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Summary
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 41 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
TOE SFRs TOE summary specification
(Protection of data on
disk)
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE provides a dedicated AES-
XTS crypto engine built into the DMA path between the flash storage and the main memory of the
host platform. This DMA Storage Controller is placed in the middle of the data path between the
application processor and the storage device.
The DMA Storage Controller performs the encryption/ decryption of the data prior to reaching
the application processor or the storage. When a read operation is made, the data must first be
decrypted by the DMA Storage Controller before the application processor has access to the data.
When a write operation is made, the data is first encrypted by the DMA Storage Controller and then
written to storage as a block of encrypted data. This arrangement ensures that standard methods of
accessing the storage drive via the operating system will pass through these functions.
When the host platform is provisioned at first run, the user is prompted to enable the TOE's
embedded FDE encryption management program (FileVault) and enter a username and password.
Once enabled, the storage drive of the host platform remains encrypted and protected from
unauthorized access; even if the physical storage device is removed and connected to another host
platform.
The entire storage drive is encrypted with the exception of the following: partition table, Extensible
Firmware Interface (EFI) service partition, Apple File System (APFS) container metadata (allocation
bitmaps, checkpoint area, EFI jumpstart driver storage, container locker area), recovery volumes,
pre-boot volumes, virtual machine (VM) volumes (used by macOS for storing encrypted swap files),
system volumes (protected by the signed system volume feature), and CoreDump partitions (if
present).
Valid credentials are required to be entered before the drive will be decrypted. If the user does
not enable FileVault when provisioning the host platform at first run, FileVault can be enabled later
through the System Settings » Privacy & Security menu available on macOS. By default, the host
platform's storage drive is always encrypted. The TOE cryptographic key management changes after
enabling FileVault.
A recovery key is a randomly generated 28-character code that the user can use to reset their
password. The recovery key is generated during the process and manually saved by the user. The
recovery key is never stored in the TOE. The recovery key is hashed (SHA-256) and the resulting
value is stored in the Secure Enclave. If FileVault is disabled and re-enabled, a new recovery key is
generated.
See the TSS for FCS_COP.1(f) for details on the AES-XTS implementation.
FMT_MOF.1
(Function behavior
management)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE supports only one Compliant
power saving state:
● G2(S5) - soft off state: the system is powered down.
This behaviour cannot be modified by users.
FMT_SMF.1/AA,
FMT_SMF.1/EE
(Management
functions)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE supports the following
management functions:
● Authorization Acquisition:
❍ Forwarding requests to change the DEK to the EE:
➤ Since the TOE consists of both FDE AA and FDE EE components, the requests to
change the DEK are processed by the EE component directly.
❍ Forwarding requests to cryptographically erase the DEK to the EE:
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 42 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
TOE SFRs TOE summary specification
➤ Since the TOE consists of both FDE AA and FDE EE components, the requests to
erase the DEK are processed by the EE component directly.
❍ Allowing authorized users to change authorization factors or set of authorization factors
used:
➤ Once the user successfully authenticates to the TOE, the TOE can be configured
to change the authorization factors that can be used: password.
➤ The above can be achieved by navigating to System Settings » Users & Groups »
Select the appropriate user » Change Password.
❍ Configure authorization factors:
➤ Once the user successfully authenticates to the TOE, the TOE can be configured
to change the authorization factors that can be used: password.
➤ The above can be achieved by navigating to System Settings » Users & Groups »
Select the appropriate user » Change Password.
● Encryption Engine:
❍ Change the DEK:
➤ The DEK can be changed by starting the Disk Utility and select the appropriate
volume to be erased. This forces the TOE to cryptographically erase the DEK and
create a new one. Data cannot be recovered after this action.
❍ Erase the DEK:
➤ The DEK can be cryptographically erased by starting the Disk Utility as an
administrator and select the appropriate volume to be erased.
● Authorization Acquisition and Encryption Engine:
❍ Initiate TOE firmware/software updates:
➤ The user can check for and install updates to the TOE via either the System
Settings app or the softwareupdate command on macOS.
When creating a data volume, the TOE randomly generate a Data Encryption Key (DEK) and a Key
Encryption Key (KEK). The DEK is protected by wrapping it with the KEK. Furthermore, the KEK
is wrapped with the Password-Derived Key (PDK), thus providing data confidentiality based on
passwords.
The DEK and KEK are stored as part of the volume's metadata. The PDK is ephemerally stored in a
dedicated region of the TOE device's memory, which is protected by the Secure Enclave. Multiple
layers of protection isolate the Secure Enclave protected memory from the Application Processor.
The PDK is deleted right after the user authentication process has been completed and the KEK has
been unwrapped.
The wrapped DEK is further wrapped using the media key, which is stored in the Effaceable Storage
of the Secure Enclave to facilitate fast wipe rather than confidentiality. The media key is generated
during system installation, or re-generated on system wipe.
When deleting a volume, its DEK is securely deleted by the Secure Enclave.
The media key is designed to be quickly erased on demand; for example, via remote wipe using
Find My Mac or when enrolled in a mobile device management (MDM) solution. Effaceable storage
accesses the underlying storage technology to directly address and erase a small number of blocks
at a very low level. Once the media key is deleted by the Secure Enclave, the DEK will become
cryptographically inaccessible and, therefore, the volume will be cryptographically inaccessible.
FMT_SMR.1
(Security roles)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE supports authorized user role and
it can associate users to roles.
FPT_FUA_EXT.1, Summary
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 43 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
TOE SFRs TOE summary specification
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/AA,
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/EE
(Software/firmware
updates)
Apple Update Server is leveraged for downloading software/firmware update packages. The update
package contains the TOE software, T2OS/firmware (for "Intel with T2" Mac computers only), and
sepOS/firmware. All of them are bundled into the macOS update package.
The TOE stores the download in a temporary location on flash. Once the download is complete, the
TOE verifies the digital signature of the update package using the RTU public key and the algorithm
described in TSS for FCS_COP.1(a). If the verification succeeds, the TOE installs the update and
reboots the TOE device. If the verification fails, the TOE terminates the update process with an error
message.
The user can check for and install updates to the TOE via either the System Settings app or the
softwareupdate command on macOS.
FPT_PWR_EXT.1/AA,
FPT_PWR_EXT.1/EE,
FPT_PWR_EXT.2
(Power saving states)
Summary
On both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac computers, the TOE supports the following Compliant
power saving state:
● G2(S5) - soft off state: the system is powered down.
For the TOE to enter the Compliant power saving state, the user should either select the menu option
Apple menu » Shut Down, or press and hold the physical power button .
FPT_TST_EXT.1
(Testing)
Summary
Secure boot
When the TOE device is turned on, the boot process starts with executing code from read-only
memory referred to as Boot ROM. This immutable code, known as the hardware root of trust, is
laid down during chip fabrication and is implicitly trusted. Each following step of the boot process
contains components that are cryptographically signed by Apple to enable integrity checking. The
boot process proceeds only after verifying the integrity of the software at every step, which creates a
chain of trust rooted in hardware.
● Apple silicon:
When an Apple silicon Mac is turned on, the application processor executes code from the
Boot ROM in the first step in the chain of trust. The Boot ROM code contains the Apple Root
CA public key, which is used to verify that the Low-Level Bootloader (LLB) is signed by Apple's
private key before allowing it to load. When LLB is launched, it verifies and loads the iBoot
bootloader. When the iBoot finishes its tasks, it verifies and runs the macOS kernel.
● Intel with T2:
When an "Intel with T2" Mac in turned on, the Apple T2 Security Chip performs a secure boot
from its Boot ROM in the same fashion as a Mac with Apple silicon. It executes the Boot ROM
code to verifies and loads the iBoot bootloader. The iBoot bootloader verifies the kernel and
kernel extension code on the T2 chip, which subsequently verifies the Intel Unified Extensible
Firmware Interface (UEFI) firmware. After verification, the UEFI firmware image is mapped into
a portion of the T2 chip memory and this memory is made available to the Intel processor. The
boot process continues on the Intel processor, with the UEFI firmware evaluating the signature
for boot.efi, which is the macOS bootloader. The boot.efi code in turn verifies and load the
macOS kernel.
Self-tests
Self-tests are performed by the cryptographic modules included in the TOE. The FIPS Self-Tests
application runs all required module self-tests. This application is invoked by the TOE OS startup
process when the TOE device powers on. At start-up, the cryptographic modules perform Known
Answer Tests (KATs) to ensure the correctness of the cryptographic functions.
● CTR_DRBG: health testing implemented as KAT
● HMAC-SHA-256: KAT
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 44 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
TOE SFRs TOE summary specification
● AES-CBC: KAT
● Apple silicon:
❍ AES-XTS-256: KAT
❍ ECDSA SigVer: KAT
● Intel with T2:
❍ AES-XTS-128: KAT
❍ RSA SigVer: KAT
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 45 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
8 Abbreviations, Terminology, and References
8.1 Abbreviations
AA
Authorization Acquisition
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard
APFS
Apple File System
API
Application Programming Interface
app
Application
BEV
Border Encryption Value
BIOS
Basic Input/Output System
CA
Certificate Authority
CAVP
Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining
CC
Common Criteria
CEM
Common Evaluation Methodology
cPP
collaborative Protection Profile
CSP
Critical Security Parameters
DAR
Data At Rest
DEK
Data Encryption Key
DFU
Device Firmware Upgrade
DMA
Direct Memory Access
DNS
Domain Name System
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 46 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
DRAM
Dynamic Random-Access Memory
DRBG
Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDSA
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EE
Encryption Engine
EFI
Extensible Firmware Interface
FDE
Full Drive Encryption
HMAC
Keyed-hash Message Authentication Code
ISO/IEC
International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical Commission
IV
Initialization Vector
KAT
Known Answer Test
KEK
Key Encryption Key
KMD
Key Management Description
KW
Key Wrap
MBR
Master Boot Record
NAND
Not AND (inverted boolean AND operation)
OS
Operating System
PII
Personally Identifiable Information
PIN
Personal Identification Number
PBKDF
Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PDK
Password-Derived Key
PP
Protection Profile
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 47 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
RBG
Random Bit Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
RTU
Root of Trust for Update
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SED
Self-Encrypting Drive
SEP
Secure Enclave Processor
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SHA
Secure Hash Algorithm
SKS
Secure Key Store
SoC
System on Chip
SPI
Serial Peripheral Interface
ST
Security Target
TD
Technical Decision
TLS
Transport Layer Security
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TPM
Trusted Platform Module
TRNG
True Random Number Generator
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
UEFI
Unified Extensible Firmware Interface
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 48 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
UID
Unique Identifier
VEK
Volume Encryption Key
VM
Virtual Machine
VPN
Virtual Private Network
XEX
XOR Encrypt XOR
XTS
XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing
8.2 References
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1R5
Date April 2017
Location http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART1V3.1R5.pdf
Location http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART2V3.1R5.pdf
CC
Location http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R5.pdf
PP-Configuration for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization Acquisition and Full
Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine
Version 1.0
Date 2024-05-31
CFG_CPP_FDE_AA-CPP_
FDE_EE_V1.0
Location https://www.niap-ccevs.org/protectionprofiles/437
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization
Acquisition
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201
Date 2019-02-01
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E
Location https://www.niap-ccevs.org/protectionprofiles/437
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201
Date 2019-02-01
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
Location https://www.niap-ccevs.org/protectionprofiles/438
Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
Date 2015-08-04
FIPS180-4
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/180-4/upd1/final
Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
Date 2013-07-19
FIPS186-4
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-4/final
FIPS198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 49 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Date 2008-07-16
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/198-1/final
Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation: Part 1: Storage
Applications
Date 2010-12-22
SP800-132
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/132/final
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques
Date 2001-12-01
SP800-38A
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/a/final
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices
Date 2010-01-18
SP800-38E
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/e/final
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key
Wrapping
Date 2012-12-13
SP800-38F
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/f/final
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators
Date 2015-06-24
SP800-90Ar1
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/90/a/r1/final
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 50 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
A Appendixes
A.1 Devices Covered by this Evaluation
Table 8 contains the hardware platforms covered by this evaluation.
For brevity, the processor manufacturer names were left out of the table leaving only the processor names. The
Apple silicon SoCs start with the letter M. The Intel® processors start with either Core™ or Xeon®.
The T2 contains the SEP v2.0 core. The T2 micro-architecture (i.e., instruction set architecture) is the following:
● T2: ARMv8.1-A
Table 8 contains the other micro-architectures used in this evaluation in the "MicroArch" column.
Table 8: Hardware platforms
Marketing Name Model # Model Identifier SoC/Processor MicroArch Security
Chip
2023
Mac15,10 M3 Max ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Mac15,8 M3 Max ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
A2992
Mac15,6 M3 Pro ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (14-inch, Nov 2023)
A2918 Mac15,3 M3 ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Mac15,11 M3 Max ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Mac15,9 M3 Max ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (16-inch, Nov 2023) A2991
Mac15,7 M3 Pro ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
iMac (24-inch, 2023, Two ports) A2874 Mac15,4 M3 ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
iMac (24-inch, 2023, Four ports) A2873 Mac15,5 M3 ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Mac14,14 M2 Ultra ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Mac Studio (2023) A2901
Mac14,13 M2 Max ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Mac Pro (2023) A2786 Mac14,8 M2 Ultra ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Mac Pro (Rack, 2023) A2787 Mac14,8 M2 Ultra ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
MacBook Air (15-inch, M2, 2023) A2941 Mac14,15 M2 ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Mac14,6 M2 Max ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (16-inch, 2023) A2780
Mac14,10 M2 Pro ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Mac14,5 M2 Max ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (14-inch, 2023) A2779
Mac14,9 M2 Pro ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Mac mini (M2 Pro, 2023) A2816 Mac14,12 M2 Pro ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Mac mini (M2, 2023) A2686 Mac14,3 M2 ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
2022
MacBook Pro (13-inch, M2, 2022) A2338 Mac14,7 M2 ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
MacBook Air (M2, 2022) A2681 Mac14,2 M2 ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 51 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Marketing Name Model # Model Identifier SoC/Processor MicroArch Security
Chip
Mac13,2 M1 Ultra ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0
Mac Studio (2022) A2615
Mac13,1 M1 Max ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0
2021
MacBookPro18,2 M1 Max ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (16-inch, 2021) A2485
MacBookPro18,1 M1 Pro ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0
MacBookPro18,4 M1 Max ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (14-inch, 2021) A2442
MacBookPro18,3 M1 Pro ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0
A2438 iMac21,1 M1 ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0
iMac (24-inch, M1, 2021)
A2439 iMac21,2 M1 ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0
2020
Mac mini (M1, 2020) A2348 Macmini9,1 M1 ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0
MacBook Air (M1, 2020) A2337 MacBookAir10,1 M1 ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0
MacBook Pro (13-inch, M1, 2020) A2338 MacBookPro17,1 M1 ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0
MacBook Air (Retina, 13-inch, 2020) A2179 MacBookAir9,1 Core i7-1060NG7 Ice Lake T2
MacBook Pro (13-inch, 2020, Four
Thunderbolt 3 ports)
A2251 MacBookPro16,2 Core i7-1068NG7 Ice Lake T2
MacBook Pro (13-inch, 2020, Two
Thunderbolt 3 ports)
A2289 MacBookPro16,3 Core i5-8257U
Core i7-8557U
Coffee Lake T2
iMac20,1 Core i5-10500
Core i5-10600
Core i7-10700K
Core i9-10910
Comet Lake T2
iMac (Retina 5K, 27-inch, 2020) A2115
iMac20,2 Core i7-10700K
Core i9-10910
Comet Lake T2
2019
MacBook Air (Retina, 13-inch, 2019) A1932 MacBookAir8,2 Core i5-8210Y Amber Lake T2
MacBook Pro (13-inch, 2019, Two
Thunderbolt 3 ports)
A2159 MacBookPro15,4 Core i5-8257U
Core i7-8557U
Coffee Lake T2
MacBookPro16,1 Core i7-9750H
Core i9-9880H
Core i9-9980HK
Coffee Lake T2
MacBook Pro (16-inch, 2019) A2141
MacBookPro16,4 Core i7-9750H
Core i9-9880H
Core i9-9980HK
Coffee Lake T2
Mac Pro (2019) A1991 MacPro7,1 Xeon W-3223
Xeon W-3235
Xeon W-3245
Xeon W-3265M
Xeon W-3275M
Cascade Lake T2
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 52 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Marketing Name Model # Model Identifier SoC/Processor MicroArch Security
Chip
Mac Pro (2019 Rack) A2304 MacPro7,1 Xeon W-3223
Xeon W-3235
Xeon W-3245
Xeon W-3265M
Xeon W-3275M
Cascade Lake T2
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 53 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
A.2 SFR to CAVP Mapping
The CAVP certificates contain several different SoCs and micro-architectures in the operating environment. The
relationship between the SoCs and micro-architectures used by the devices claimed in this evaluation are specified
in Appendix A.1.
The following convention has been used in this section to identify the cryptographic modules:
USR
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]
The user space software module v14.0 on Apple silicon Mac computers.
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Intel, User, Software, SL1]
The user space software module v14.0 on "Intel with T2" Mac computers.
KRN
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software, SL1]
The kernel space software module v14.0 on Apple silicon Mac computers.
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1]
The kernel space software module v14.0 on "Intel with T2" Mac computers.
SKS-FW
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2] (firmware)
The Secure Key Store (SKS) firmware module v14.0 on both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac
computers.
Note: The Apple T2 Security Chip runs T2OS 14 operating system.
SKS-HW
Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2] (hardware)
The Secure Key Store (SKS) hardware module v2.0 on both Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Mac
computers.
DMA
Apple DMA Storage Controller v2.0 [Hardware]
DMA module on Apple silicon Mac computers.
Apple DMA Storage Controller v1.0 [Hardware]
DMA module on "Intel with T2" Mac computers.
Note: The DMA modules of the TOE cannot be tested through the CAVP as of the time of evaluation,
therefore a compliance test accepted by NIAP has been used for verifying the correctness of the AES-
XTS algorithm implementation.
The tables below show the cryptographic services used by the TOE and provided by the cryptographic modules
that are included in the TOE, describing the algorithms, their supported key sizes, applicable standard and
purpose. The table also includes the certificates obtained from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
(CAVP) in the evaluated configuration for each of the cryptographic algorithms.
Table 9: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (USR cryptographic module)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP
ECDSA SigVer
(Apple silicon)
Curve: P-521
Hash: SHA2-512
[FIPS186-4]☝ A5988
FCS_COP.1(a)
RSA SigVer
(Intel)
Modulus: 4096 bits
Hash: SHA2-256
Padding: PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS
[FIPS186-4]☝ A6192
FCS_COP.1(b) SHA2-512
(Apple silicon)
Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4]☝ A5988
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 54 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP
SHA2-256
(Intel)
Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4]☝ A6198
Table 10: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (KRN cryptographic module)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP
ECDSA SigVer
(Apple silicon)
Curve: P-521
Hash: SHA2-512
[FIPS186-4]☝ A5949
FCS_COP.1(a)
RSA SigVer
(Intel)
Modulus: 4096 bits
Hash: SHA2-256
Padding: PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS
[FIPS186-4]☝ A6201
SHA2-512
(Apple silicon)
Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4]☝ A5949
FCS_COP.1(b)
SHA2-256
(Intel)
Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4]☝ A6207
Table 11: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SKS-FW cryptographic module)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP
ECDSA SigVer
(Apple silicon)
Curve: P-521
Hash: SHA2-512
[FIPS186-4]☝ A5981
FCS_COP.1(a)
RSA SigVer
(T2)
Modulus: 4096 bits
Hash: SHA2-256
Padding: PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS
[FIPS186-4]☝ A5981
SHA2-512
(Apple silicon)
Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4]☝ A5981
FCS_COP.1(b)
SHA2-256
(T2)
Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4]☝ A5981
HMAC-SHA2-256
(Apple silicon)
N/A [FIPS198-1]☝ A5982
FCS_COP.1(c)/AA,
FCS_COP.1(c)/EE
HMAC-SHA2-256
(T2)
N/A [FIPS198-1]☝ A5981
FCS_COP.1(d) AES-KW 256 bits
encrypt, decrypt
[SP800-38F]☝ A5976
Table 12: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SKS-HW cryptographic module)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP
FCS_COP.1(g) AES-CBC 256 bits
encrypt
[SP800-38A]☝ C330, A1469,
A3496, A6547
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG AES-256 [SP800-90Ar1]☝ DRBG 2029,
A1362, A3490,
A6548
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 55 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Table 13: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (DMA cryptographic module)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP
AES-XTS
(Apple silicon)
256 bits
encrypt, decrypt
[SP800-38E]☝ CCTL Tested
FCS_COP.1(f)
AES-XTS
(Intel)
128 bits
encrypt, decrypt
[SP800-38E]☝ CCTL Tested
The following table shows the full coverage of CAVP tests for the Apple silicon SoCs used in the devices covered
by this evaluation and specified in Appendix A.1.
Table 14: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Apple silicon SoCs
USR KRN SKS-FW SKS-HW
SoC Micro
Architecture
ECDSA
SigVer
SHA-512 ECDSA
SigVer
SHA-512 ECDSA
SigVer
SHA-512 HMAC
SHA-256
AES-KW AES-
CBC
CTR_DRBG
M1 ARMv8.5-A A5988 A5988 A5949 A5949 A5981 A5981 A5982 A5976 A1469 A1362
M1 Pro ARMv8.5-A A5988 A5988 A5949 A5949 A5981 A5981 A5982 A5976 A3496 A3490
M1 Max ARMv8.5-A A5988 A5988 A5949 A5949 A5981 A5981 A5982 A5976 A3496 A3490
M1 Ultra ARMv8.5-A A5988 A5988 A5949 A5949 A5981 A5981 A5982 A5976 A3496 A3490
M2 ARMv8.6-A A5988 A5988 A5949 A5949 A5981 A5981 A5982 A5976 A3496 A3490
M2 Pro ARMv8.6-A A5988 A5988 A5949 A5949 A5981 A5981 A5982 A5976 A3496 A3490
M2 Max ARMv8.6-A A5988 A5988 A5949 A5949 A5981 A5981 A5982 A5976 A3496 A3490
M2 Ultra ARMv8.6-A A5988 A5988 A5949 A5949 A5981 A5981 A5982 A5976 A6547 A6548
M3 ARMv8.6-A A5988 A5988 A5949 A5949 A5981 A5981 A5982 A5976 A6547 A6548
M3 Pro ARMv8.6-A A5988 A5988 A5949 A5949 A5981 A5981 A5982 A5976 A6547 A6548
M3 Max ARMv8.6-A A5988 A5988 A5949 A5949 A5981 A5981 A5982 A5976 A6547 A6548
The following table shows the coverage of CAVP tests for the Intel processors used in the devices covered by this
evaluation and specified in Appendix A.1. For those processor models not tested, the last column indicates the
equivalent processor on which the CAVP tests were performed. The equivalence argument for these processors
is that the reference testing is performed on a processor of the same Intel Micro Architecture and Intel processor
Generation.
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 56 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
Apple macOS 14 Sonoma: FileVault
Security Target
VID11448
Table 15: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Intel Processors
USR KRN
Processor Gen Micro
Architecture
RSA
SigVer
SHA-256 RSA
SigVer
SHA-256
Equivalent processor
Intel Xeon W-3223 W Cascade Lake A6192 A6198 A6201 A6207 Tested
Intel Xeon W-3235 W Cascade Lake Intel Xeon W-3223
Intel Xeon W-3245 W Cascade Lake Intel Xeon W-3223
Intel Xeon W-3265M W Cascade Lake Intel Xeon W-3223
Intel Xeon W-3275M W Cascade Lake Intel Xeon W-3223
Intel Core i5-8210Y 8th
Amber Lake A6192 A6198 A6201 A6207 Tested
Intel Core i5-8257U 8th
Coffee Lake A6192 A6198 A6201 A6207 Tested
Intel Core i7-8557U 8th
Coffee Lake Intel Core i5-8257U
Intel Core i7-9750H 9th
Coffee Lake Intel Core i9-9880H
Intel Core i9-9880H 9th
Coffee Lake A6192 A6198 A6201 A6207 Tested
Intel Core i9-9980HK 9th
Coffee Lake Intel Core i9-9880H
Intel Core i5-10500 10th
Comet Lake A6192 A6198 A6201 A6207 Tested
Intel Core i5-10600 10th
Comet Lake Intel Core i5-10500
Intel Core i7-10700K 10th
Comet Lake A6192 A6198 A6201 A6207 Tested
Intel Core i9-10910 10th
Comet Lake A6192 A6198 A6201 A6207 Tested
Intel Core i7-1060NG7 10th
Ice Lake A6192 A6198 A6201 A6207 Tested
Intel Core i7-1068NG7 10th
Ice Lake Intel Core i7-1060NG7
The following table shows the full coverage of CAVP tests for the Apple T2 Security Chip, used as the security chip
in devices using Intel processors, as specified in Appendix A.1.
Table 16: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Apple T2 Security Chip
SKS-FW SKS-HW
SoC Micro
Architecture
RSA
SigVer
SHA-256 HMAC
SHA-256
AES-KW AES-
CBC
CTR_DRBG
T2 ARMv8.1-A A5981 A5981 A5981 A5976 C330 DRBG 2029
Version: 1.2 Classification: Public Page 57 of 57
Last update: 2025-05-08 © 2025 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.