Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 20FMV3898-33
Dokument ID CSEC2020019
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2023-08-14
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and
KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions 44444-
E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
Issue: 1.0, 2023-aug-14
Authorisation: Helén Svensson, Lead certifier , CSEC
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 2 (20)
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Security Audit 6
3.2 User Data Protection 6
3.3 Identification and Authentication 6
3.4 Security Management 6
3.5 Protection of the TSF 6
3.6 TOE Access 6
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
4.1 Assumptions 7
4.2 Clarification of Scope 7
5 Architectural Information 8
5.1 TOE Design 8
6 Documentation 12
7 IT Product Testing 13
7.1 Developer Testing 13
7.2 Evaluator Testing 13
7.3 Penetration Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
8.1 Excluded from the TOE Evaluated Configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 16
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 18
11 Bibliography 19
Appendix A Scheme Versions 20
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 20
A.2 Scheme Notes 20
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 3 (20)
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devic-
es Firmware Versions 44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7, including the fol-
lowing models:
Model Type FW
SC820DPH KVM 44404-E7E7
SC840DPH KVM 44404-E7E7
SC920DPH KVM 44404-E7E7
SC940DPH KVM 44404-E7E7
SC845DPH KVM 44444-E7E7
SC945DPH KVM 44444-E7E7
SC840DPHC KVM 44404-E7E7
SC845DPHC KVM 44444-E7E7
SC940DPHC KVM 44404-E7E7
SC945DPHC KVM 44444-E7E7
SC840DVI KVM 44404-E7E7
SC940DVI KVM 44404-E7E7
SC985DPH KVM 44444-E7E7
SCKM145PP4 KM 40444-E7E7
SCM145DPH KVM Matrix 44444-E7E7
SCM185DPH KVM Matrix 44444-E7E7
The TOE is a KVM Switch and allow users to share keyboard and mouse functionality
between a number of connected computers. Security features ensure isolation between
computers and peripherals1 to prevent data leakage between connected systems.
The TOE is delivered as a single package including the device hardware and software
and the cables required to connect to the computers. The TOE is delivered to the cus-
tomer via trusted courier.
The ST does not make conformance claims to any protection profile.
There are four assumptions being made in the Security Target (ST) regarding the
TOE. The TOE relies on these to counter the five threats. The assumptions and the
threats are described in chapter 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB in Växjö, Sweden (critical loca-
tions), and by Intertek/EWA-Canada in Ottawa, Canada (foreign location).
The evaluation was completed on 2023-07-21. The evaluation was conducted in ac-
cordance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC), version. 3.1 release 5.
Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe-
dish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also
accredited by the Swedish accreditation body according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Com-
mon Criteria. EWA-Canada Ltd. operates as a Foreign location for Combitech AB
within scope of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 4 (20)
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports and by observing site-visit and testing. The certifier de-
termined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security Target
(ST) and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level:
EAL4 + ALC_FLR.3.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 5 (20)
2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2020019
Name and version of the
certified IT product
Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices
Firmware Versions 44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and
40444-E7E7
Security Target Identification Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices
Firmware Versions 44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and
40444-E7E7, Security Target, 2021-09-24, document
version 0.5
EAL EAL4 + ALC_FLR.3
Sponsor Vertiv
Developer Vertiv
ITSEF Combitech AB and EWA Canada Ltd
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
CEM version 3.1 release 5
QMS version 2.4
Scheme Notes Release 20.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS and EA/MLA
Certification date 2023-08-14
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 6 (20)
3 Security Policy
 Security Audit
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
3.1 Security Audit
Audit entries are generated for security related events.
3.2 User Data Protection
The TOE ensures that only authorized device types may be successfully connected to
the TOE. The TOE ensures that user data only flows from the peripheral devices to the
selected computer, and video data flows only from the connected computer to the dis-
play.
3.3 Identification and Authentication
Administrators must be identified and authenticated prior to accessing administrative
functions. Users may only switch the connected computer channel.
3.4 Security Management
The TOE ensures that no user is able to modify the security attributes used to deter-
mine authorized peripheral devices and to provide data isolation between connected
computers. Only switching between connected computers is permitted. Administrators
may perform security management functions.
3.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE provides clear indications of tampering attempts. The TOE provides reliable
time stamps.
3.6 TOE Access
The TOE provides a visual indication showing which channel is currently selected.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 7 (20)
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes four assumptions on the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL
Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data that passes
through the TOE, is assumed to be provided by the environment is provided for the
TOE, the peripheral devices and all cabling.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG
Personnel installing and configuring the TOE and its operational environment will fol-
low the applicable guidance.
A.TRUSTED_USER
TOE users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance and security procedures in a re-
liable manner.
A.USER_IDENT
The operational environment is responsible for the identification and authentication of
users. This determines physical access to the TOE, and access to the connected com-
puters and their applications and resources.
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains five threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation.
T.DATA_LEAK
An unauthorized user may be able to access data that is transmitted via an unauthor-
ized data transfer through the TOE or its connected peripherals.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER
A malicious user could physically tamper with or modify the TOE to allow unauthor-
ized information flows between connected devices.
T.SWITCHING
A poorly designed TOE could result in a situation where a user is connected to a com-
puter other than the one to which the user intended to connect, resulting in an unin-
tended flow of data.
T.UNAUTH
A malicious user could tamper with the security attributes that determine allowed pe-
ripheral devices and allowed data flows, resulting in the use of unauthorized peripher-
al devices that may allow unauthorized data flows between connected devices, or an
attack on the TOE or its connected computers.
T.UNAUTH_DEVICE
A malicious user could connect an unauthorized peripheral device to the TOE, and
that device could cause information to flow between connected devices in an unau-
thorized manner, or could enable an attack on the TOE or its connected computers.
There are no Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) applicable to this TOE.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 8 (20)
5 Architectural Information
Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices allow users to share keyboard and
mouse functionality between a number of connected computers. Security features en-
sure isolation between computers and peripherals to prevent data leakage between
connected systems.
TOE devices include:
 Keyboard, Video, Mouse (KVM) Switches
 Firmware version 44444-E7E7 and 44404-E7E7
 Keyboard, Mouse (KM) Switches
 Firmware version 40444-E7E7
 KVM Matrix Switches
 Firmware version 44444-E7E7
Devices that support keyboard, video, mouse, audio and user authentication (DPP) de-
vices have firmware version 44444-E7E7. Devices that do not support DPP have
firmware version 44404-E7E7. The KM device does not support video, but does sup-
port DPP, and therefore the firmware version is 40404-E7E7. The firmware for each
programmable component is the same for all devices. The devices that do not support
video or DPP do not have firmware for those functions.
5.1 TOE Design
The TOE is a combined software and hardware TOE.
Figure 1 shows a basic evaluated configuration for KVM Switches. In the evaluated
configuration, the TOE may be connected to two or four computers. The video input
may be DisplayPort, HDMI, DVI-D or USB Type-C with DisplayPort as an alternate
function, and one or two displays may be connected. The peripheral sharing device is
connected to speakers or headphones, and some devices are connected to a user au-
thentication device.
Figure 1 – KVM Switch Evaluated Configuration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 9 (20)
This configuration applies to the following TOE models:
 SC820DPH
 SC840DPH
 SC920DPH
 SC940DPH
 SC845DPH
 SC945DPH
 SC840DPHC
 SC845DPHC
 SC940DPHC
 SC945DPHC
 SC840DVI
 SC940DVI
 SC985DPH
Figure 2 shows the evaluated configuration for the KM switches. In the evaluated con-
figuration, the peripheral sharing device may be connected to a user authentication de-
vice.
Figure 2: KM Switch Evaluated Configuration
This configuration applies to the following model:
 SCKM145PP4
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 10 (20)
The evaluated configuration for the KVM Matrix devices is similar to the configura-
tion for KVM devices (Figure 1), with four or eight connected computers, two con-
nected displays, keyboard, mouse, audio and authentication device. This configuration
applies to the following models:
 SCM145DPH
 SCM185DPH
The TOE Security Functional Interfaces (TSFIs) and subsystems that support the TOE
Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are shown in Figure 3:
Figure 3: TOE Diagram
The following security features are provided by all the Vertiv TOE devices:
 Keyboard and Mouse Security
 The keyboard and mouse are isolated by dedicated, Universal Serial Bus
(USB) device emulation for each computer
 One-way, peripheral-to-computer data flow is enforced through unidirectional
optical data diodes
 Communication from computer-to-keyboard/mouse is blocked
 Non HID (Human Interface Device) data transactions are blocked
 Audio Security
 One-way computer to speaker sound flow is enforced through unidirectional
optical data diodes
 Hardware Anti-Tampering Indication
 Special holographic tampering evident labels on the product’s enclosure pro-
vide a clear visual indication if the product has been opened or compromised
The following security features are provided by the Vertiv Secure KVM and KVM
Matrix Devices:
 Video Security
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 11 (20)
 Computer video input interfaces are isolated through the use of different elec-
tronic components, power and ground domains.
 The display is isolated by a dedicated, read-only, Extended Display
 Identification Data (EDID) emulation for each computer
 Access to the monitor’s EDID is blocked
 Access to the Monitor Control Command Set (MCCS commands) is blocked
The following security features are provided by the SC845DPH, SC945DPH,
SC845DPHC, SC945DPHC, SCM185DPH, SC985DPH and SCKM145PP4 Devices:
 Authentication Device
 Unauthorized USB devices are blocked
 USB authentication devices are authorized by default; all other devices are
blocked by default
 Devices may be whitelisted or blacklisted based on Vendor Identifica-
tion/Product Identification (VID/PID) characteristics
 Secure management functions allow configuration of allowed devices, and
maintain a record of any changes to that configuration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 12 (20)
6 Documentation
The TOE includes the following guidance documentation, which may be downloaded
in Portable Document Format (pdf) from the Vertiv website:
 CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES SC800/900DPH, SC800/900DVI,
and SCKM100PP4 Quick Installation Guide
 CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES SC800DPHC/SC900DPHC Quick
Installation Guide
 CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES SCM100DPH DESKTOP MA-
TRIX Quick Installation Guide
 Cybex™ SC/SCM Switching System Additional Operations and Configuration
Technical Bulletin
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 13 (20)
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer’s testing covers the security functional behaviour of all TSFIs and
SFRs as well as the interactions of the modules. All the SFR enforcing modules are
mapped to test cases. Subsystems are not applicable for the TOE.
All tests are performed manually and are well described and sequenced in at number
of steps.
The result for all test cases for all the 16 models are Pass. All test cases are executed
for all the TOE models, with a few exceptions.
All developer tests result in a Pass.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The tests are divided into four test groups depending on the behaviour to be tested:
 Test Group 1: TOE Installation
 Test Group 2: Repetitions of a chosen subset of developer tests
 Test Group 3: Additional tests defined by the evaluator
 Test Group 4: Tests that complements the vulnerability assessment
Not all models of the TOE are used and only Windows 10 is used as operating system.
Evaluator site (hands-on tests):
 2 source computers and 2 displays.
Developer site (performed remotely, overseeing by the evaluator):
 4 source computers and 4 displays.
For the following sample of devices were used for the evaluator tests:
 SCM145DPH – KVM Matrix, FW 44444-E7E7
 Received unit from the developer, used for all tests at the evaluator site
 SCKM145PP4 – KM, FW 40444-E7E7
 The only device with FW 40444-E7E7, developer site
 SC820DPH - KVM, FW 44404-E7E7, developer site
 SC945DPH – KVM, FW 44444-E7E7, developer site
The evaluator decided to repeat quite many of the test cases for the received model
SCM145DPH.
This sample of test cases will cover TSFIs, and almost all of the TSFs and SFRs.
The coverage of the developer tests is assessed to be high, therefore the number of ad-
ditional tests was low, three test cases were added:
No differences for the actual results were identified between the developer’s tests and
the evaluators tests. All tests result in a pass.
7.3 Penetration Testing
Penetration testing was built on the evaluation of the vulnerability assessment activi-
ties.
One vulnerability is identified to be tested: “Bad quality of tamper protec-
tion/detection”. This test was executed for one model SCM145DPH.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 14 (20)
The test passed. The vulnerability is judged as not exploitable.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 15 (20)
8 Evaluated Configuration
The following components are required for operation of the TOE in the evaluated con-
figuration.
Component Description
Connected computers (2, 4
or 8 depending upon device
model)
General purpose computing hardware supporting Display-
Port or
High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) (supporting
Ultra-high-definition (UHD) 4K resolution up to 3840 x
2160) video and USB type B mouse and keyboard connec-
tions. Operating system as specified in section 2.4 below.
Video monitor (up to 2 mon-
itors)
HDMI 1.4, DisplayPort 1.1, 1.2 or Digital Visual Interface
Type D (DVI-D)
Keyboard USB Type A
Mouse USB Type A
Audio output device Analog audio output device (speakers or headphones)
User authentication device Standard USB smartcard reader/authentication device
Vertiv KVM Cables USB Type-A to USB Type-B (keyboard and mouse)
Video cable (DisplayPort, DVI-D, USB-C and HDMI)
3.5mm stereo cable (Audio cable)
USB Type-A to USB Type-B (authentication device)
8.1 Excluded from the TOE Evaluated Configuration
For the purposes of this evaluation, Windows Server 2008 R2 host machines were
used. However, the use of other operating systems does not affect the security func-
tionality provided by the TOE devices.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 16 (20)
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of enhanced-basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Security architecture description ADV_ARC.1 PASS
Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.4 PASS
Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Basic modular design ADV_TDS.3 PASS
Guidance documents AGD PASS
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle support ALC PASS
Production support, acceptance procedures
and automation ALC_CMC.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 PASS
Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Systematic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.3 PASS
Security Target evaluation ASE PASS
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment AVA PASS
Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 PASS
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 17 (20)
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 18 (20)
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 19 (20)
11 Bibliography
ST Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7, Security Target, Vertiv,
2021-09-24, document version 0.5
CCguide Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7, Common Criteria Guidance
Supplement, Vertiv, 2021-02-12, document version 0.2
QS_1 CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES SC800/900DPH,
SC800/900DVI, and SCKM100PP4 Quick Installation Guide
QS_2 CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES
SC800DPHC/SC900DPHC Quick Installation Guide
QS_3 CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES SCM100DPH DESK-
TOP MATRIX Quick Installation Guide
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
EP-002 EP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2021-10-26, document
version 34
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Certification Report - Vertiv Secure KVM, KM and KVM Matrix Devices Firmware Versions
44444-E7E7, 44404-E7E7 and 40444-E7E7
20FMV3898-33 1.0 2023-08-14
CSEC2020019 20 (20)
Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management sys-
tem (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application.
QMS 1.23.2 valid from 2020-05-11
QMS 1.24 valid from 2020-11-19
QMS 1.24.1 valid from 2020-12-03
QMS 1.25 valid from 2021-06-17
QMS 2.0 valid from 2021-11-24
QMS 2.1 valid from 2022-01-18
QMS 2.1.1 valid from 2022-03-09
QMS 2.2 valid from 2022-06-27
QMS 2.3 valid from 2023-01-26
QMS 2.3.1 valid from 2023-04-20
QMS 2.4 valid from 2023-06-15
In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has ex-
amined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.
The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista CSEC QMS
2.4”.
The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.23.2 to the current QMS 2.4, there are no
changes with impact on the result of the certification.
A.2 Scheme Notes
The following Scheme Notes have been considered during the evaluation:
 Scheme Note 15 - Testing
 Scheme Note 18 - Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
 Scheme Note 22 - Vulnerability assessment
 Scheme Note 27 - ST requirements at the time of application for certification
 Scheme Note 28 - Updated procedures for aplication, evaluation ad certification
 Scheme Note 31 - New procedures for site visit oversight and testing oversight