National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Arista Networks
Series 7150 with EOS 4.12.0.5
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10523-2013
Dated: December 23, 2013
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
National Security Agency
Information Assurance Directorate
9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
2
Acknowledgements
Validation Panel
Jerome F. Myers
The Aerospace Corporation, 6940 Columbia Gateway Drive, Suite 400, Columbia, MD
Kenneth B. Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation, 6940 Columbia Gateway Drive, Suite 400, Columbia, MD
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Kenji Yoshino
Marvin Byrd
InfoGard Laboratories, Inc.
San Luis Obispo, CA
3
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................5
2 Identification of the TOE ..............................................................................6
3 Interpretations.............................................................................................9
3.1 Clarification of Scope ....................................................................................................... 9
4 Security Policy............................................................................................10
4.1 Audit............................................................................................................................... 10
4.2 Cryptography.................................................................................................................. 10
4.3 User Data Protection...................................................................................................... 11
4.4 Identification and Authentication.................................................................................. 11
4.5 Security Management.................................................................................................... 11
4.6 Protection of the TSF...................................................................................................... 11
4.7 TOE Access...................................................................................................................... 12
4.8 Trusted Path/Channels................................................................................................... 12
5 TOE Security Environment..........................................................................12
5.1 Secure Usage Assumptions ............................................................................................ 12
6 Architectural Information...........................................................................13
6.1 Architecture Overview ................................................................................................... 13
6.1.1 TOE Hardware.....................................................................................................................13
6.1.2 TOE Software ......................................................................................................................14
7 Documentation ..........................................................................................14
7.1 Guidance Documentation .............................................................................................. 14
7.2 Security Target ............................................................................................................... 15
8 IT Product Testing.......................................................................................15
8.1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing .......................................................................... 15
8.2 Vulnerability Analysis..................................................................................................... 15
9 Results of the Evaluation............................................................................16
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations....................................................16
11 Security Target ...........................................................................................16
4
12 Terms.........................................................................................................16
12.1 Acronyms.................................................................................................................... 16
13 Bibliography...............................................................................................17
5
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team’s
assessment of the CCEVS evaluation of the Arista Networks 7150 Series with EOS 4.12.0.5. This
Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S.
government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. in San Luis Obispo, California. The
evaluation completed in December 2013. The evaluation team determined that the Arista
Networks 7150 Series meets the assurance requirements specified by the Network Device
Protection Profile, June 8, 2012, Version 1.1 and the Security Requirements for Network
Devices Errata #1, December 19, 2013, Version 1.0.
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product with determining the suitability of
this IT product in their environment. End-users should review both the Security Target (ST),
which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this Validation Report
(VR), which describes how those security claims were evaluated.
The TOE, the Arista 7150 Series: 7150S-24, 7150S-52, 7150S-64 with EOS V4.12.0.5, is a
Network Device that provides layer 2, 3, and 4 Ethernet network management and
interconnectivity. The Ethernet management layers refer to the Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) model layers. They refer to the data link, network, and transport layers respectively. It
also contains a modern Linux-based operating system that allows for complex management
solutions. It is designed with high performance electronics to meet the requirements of latency-
critical applications such as financial Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) or High
Performance Computing (HPC) clusters.
The TOE can direct and filter network packets based on the contents within each of these
layers. It is also capable of supporting many modern layer-specific traffic management features
including the following unevaluated features:
• 802.1w, 802.1s Spanning Tree Protocol (STP)
• 802.3ad and Multi-Chassis Link Aggregation
• 802.3x Flow Control
• Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs)
• IPv4/IPv6 routing and Network Address Translation (NAT)
• Access Control Lists (ACLs)
• Virtualization support (VXLAN and VMware)
• Quality of Service (QoS) rate limiting and queuing
• Congestion monitoring and management
The TOE supports remote administration over the Secure Shell v2 (SSHv2) protocol that
supports cryptographic encryption and authentication using FIPS-certified algorithms.
The TOE also supports storage and forwarding of detailed audit logs. The process that manages
audit messages is capable of forwarding audit messages, encrypted using SSHv2, to any syslog-
compatible network entity.
6
2 Identification of the TOE
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated;
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product;
• The conformance result of the evaluation;
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation;
• The User Guidance, user facing documentation that is within the scope of the
evaluation;
• The Operational Environment, IT devices required to support the secure operation of
the TOE.
Evaluation Scheme United States Common Criteria Evaluation Validation Scheme
Evaluated Target of
Evaluation
Arista 7150 Series
Hardware Models
Part Number Description
DCS-7150S-24-F Arista 7150, 24x1/10G SFP+ switch,
front-to-rear airflow, 2x AC PSU
DCS-7150S-24-R Arista 7150, 24x1/10G SFP+ switch,
rear-to-front airflow, 2x AC PSU
DCS-7150S-24# Arista 7150, 24x1/10G SFP+ switch, no
fans, no PSU (requires fans and power
supplies from Table 2)
DCS-7150S-24-CL# Arista 7150, 24x1/10G SFP+ switch, high
precision clock, no fans, no PSU
(requires fans and power supplies from
Table 2)
DCS-7150S-24-CLD# Arista 7150, 24x1/10G SFP+ switch, high
precision clock, 50GB SSD, no fans, no
PSU (requires fans and power supplies
from Table 2)
DCS-7150S-52-CL-F Arista 7150, 52x1/10G SFP+ switch, high
precision clock, front-to-rear airflow, 2x
AC PSU
DCS-7150S-52-CL-R Arista 7150, 52x1/10G SFP+ switch, high
7
precision clock, rear-to-front airflow, 2x
AC PSU
DCS-7150S-52-CL# Arista 7150, 52x1/10G SFP+ switch, high
precision clock, no fans, no PSU
(requires fans and power supplies from
Table 2)
DCS-7150S-52-CLD# Arista 7150, 52x1/10G SFP+ switch, high
precision clock, 50GB SSD, no fans, no
PSU (requires fans and power supplies
from Table 2)
DCS-7150S-64-CL-F Arista 7150, 48x1/10G SFP+ & 4xQSFP+
switch, high precision clock, front-to-
rear airflow, 2x AC PSU
DCS-7150S-64-CL-R Arista 7150, 48x1/10G SFP+ & 4xQSFP+
switch, high precision clock, rear-to-
front airflow, 2x AC PSU
DCS-7150S-64-CL# Arista 7150, 48x1/10G SFP+ & 4xQSFP+
switch, high precision clock, no fans, no
PSU (requires fans and power supplies
from Table 2)
DCS-7150S-64-CLD# Arista 7150, 48x1/10G SFP+ & 4xQSFP+
switch, high precision clock, 50GB SSD,
no fans, no PSU (requires fans and
power supplies from Table 2)
Hardware Version (identical for all models)
CPU: 03.02,
Hardware: 04.00,
Security Chip:
R5H30211
Security hardware built into all Arista
7150 models.
Software
Arista EOS Version
4.12.0.5
Modular switch OS that separates
switch state from protocol processing
and application logic
Protection Profile Network Device Protection Profile, June 8, 2012, Version 1.1
Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata #1,
December 19, 2013, Version 1.0
Security Target Arista Networks Series 7150 Security Target, Version 1.9, Date
December 23, 2013
8
Dates of Evaluation May 2013 – October 2013-December 2013
Conformance Result Pass
Common Criteria Version v3.1 Revision 3
Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) Version
v3.1 Revision 3
Assurance Activities Report
(AAR)
Common Criteria Assurance Activity Report, Doc ID: 13-2624-R-
0030 V1.0
Sponsor/Developer Arista Networks, Inc.
Common Criteria Testing Lab
(CCTL)
InfoGard Laboratories, Inc.
CCTL Evaluators Kenji Yoshino, Marvin Byrd
CCEVS Validators Jerome F. Myers, Kenneth B. Stutterheim
Table 1: Evaluation Identification
The following User Guidance is considered part of the TOE, delivered via electronic download,
and within the scope of the evaluation:
• Common Criteria Guidance Supplement Arista 7150 Series 1/10 GbE SFP Ultra Low
Latency Switch Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, Version 1.9, Date:
December 17, 2013
• Arista Quick Start Guide 7000 Series Data Center Switches, PDOC-00019-11
• User Manual Arista Networks, Arista EOS Version 4.12.0.5, Date: September 24, 2013
• Arista EOS System Message Guide, Software Release 4.12.0.5, September 13, 2013
This table identifies components that must be present in the Operational Environment to
support the operation of the TOE.
Component Description
Syslog Server Syslog server conforming to RFC 5424
SSH server allowing port forwarding and supporting RSA 2048, AES-
128/256 CBC, HMAC-SHA1, and diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
NTP Server NTP server conforming to RFC 5095
SSH Client SSHv2 client supporting RSA 2048, AES-128/256 CBC, HMAC-SHA1,
and diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
RS-232 Terminal Serial console supporting 9600 baud, no flow control, 1 stop bit, no
parity bits, and 8 data bits
SPF Interfaces
9
40GBASE-CR4 QSPF+ 40 Gb/s
40GBASE-SR4 QSPF+ 40 Gb/s
40GBASE-LR4 QSPF+ 40 Gb/s
10GBASE-CR SPF+ 10 Gb/s
10GBASE-SRL SPF+ 10 Gb/s
10GBASE-SR SPF+ 10 Gb/s
10GBASE-LR SPF+ 10 Gb/s
10GBASE-ER SPF+ 10 Gb/s
10GBASE-DWDM SPF+ 10 Gb/s
1GbE-SX SPF+ 1 Gb/s
1GbE-LX SPF+ 1 Gb/s
1GbE-TX SPF+ 1 Gb/s
100Mb-TX SPF+ 100 Mb/s
Fan and Power Supply Modules1
FAN-7000-F Front-to-rear airflow fan module
FAN-7000-R Rear-to-front airflow fan module
PWR-460AC-F 460 Watt AC PSU with front-to-rear airflow
PWR-460AC-R 460 Watt AC PSU with rear-to-front airflow
PWR-460DC-F 460 Watt DC PSU with front-to-rear airflow
PWR-460DC-R 460 Watt DC PSU with rear-to-front airflow
Table 2: Operational Environment Components
3 Interpretations
The Evaluation Team performed an analysis of the international interpretations of the CC and
the CEM and determined that none of the International interpretations issued by the Common
Criteria Interpretations Management Board (CCIMB) were applicable to this evaluation.
The TOE is also compliant with all international interpretations with effective dates on or before
May 22, 2013.
3.1 Clarification of Scope
The TOE claims exact compliance to the Network Device Protection Profile, June 8, 2012,
1
A power supply and fan module is required for the models ending in #.
10
Version 1.1. Exact compliance indicates that the TOE implements the security functions exactly
as specified by the PP; however, functions not described in the Security Target may be used but
were not tested as part of this evaluation.
4 Security Policy
This section contains the product features and denotes which are within the logical boundaries
of the TOE. The following Security Functions are supported by the TOE:
• Audit
• Cryptography
• User Data Protection
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
4.1 Audit
The Arista EOS uses an internal syslog process that receives, stores, and forwards auditable
events from all system processes. When a user or system process triggers applicable TSF
functionality an audit message is generated, and sent to the internal syslog process. These
events are then sent to an external audit server for storage and review by an administrator. The
communication between the TOE and external audit server is protected by tunneling the syslog
protocol through an encrypted SSH tunnel.
4.2 Cryptography
The TSF performs the following cryptographic operations:
• SSH with the following algorithms:
o RSA-2048 for public-key authentication (FIPS algorithm Cert. #1315)
o AES-128/256 CBC for data encryption (FIPS algorithm Cert. #2567)
o HMAC-SHA1 for data integrity (FIPS algorithm Cert. #1584)
o diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 for key exchange
• SHA-512 for the following purposes: (FIPS algorithm Cert. #2163)
o Local administrator password storage and authentication
o CLI “verify” function which allows the SHA-512 hash calculation of any file
• SHA-1 for the following purposes: (FIPS algorithm Cert. #2163)
o Used within HMAC-SHA1 and diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
• HMAC-SHA1 for the following purposes: (FIPS algorithm Cert. #1584)
o SSH data verification
• Random bit generation using FIPS 140-2 X9.31-AES (FIPS algorithm Cert. #1218)
11
4.3 User Data Protection
The TOE uses various software and hardware mechanisms to ensure that network packets
traveling through the TOE are not re-used or accessible once they have finished being used by
the TOE. The hardware packet-routing architecture is built without the use of padding to ensure
that all data is passed between components exactly as-is. Therefore, when an Ethernet packet
is received by the switch, the exact size of the packet is known and allocated for in global
memory. When a packet is stored within global memory it is stored along with metadata to
ensure packet integrity.
The Linux kernel API, which handles padding in a safe manner, is leveraged to generate packets
internally. If the kernel is given a payload that does not meet the minimum payload size
requirement it will pad the payload with zeros. In addition, the kernel will not accept payloads
with a bit length non-divisible by eight. Therefore, each individual system process is responsible
for creating a payload that does not require padding past the minimum length requirement.
These features together protect user data from being disclosed.
4.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports password authentication for administrative users over console and SSH. The
TOE also supports RSA key-based authentication for administrative users over SSH. The TOE
stores the local system administrator password locally using SHA-512 hashing and allows special
characters and passwords in excess of 15 characters. The remote authentication server stores
the privilege level of each user along with all other information required to access the TOE. The
TOE enforces that administrative users authenticate through this mechanism before performing
any administrative actions. Communications between the TOE and the external authentication
server are protected by an encrypted SSH TCP tunnel between both systems.
4.5 Security Management
The TOE enforces protection of TSF data with encrypted and authenticated network
communications. The TOE also performs self-tests on boot to verify that each of these
cryptographic algorithms are functioning correctly.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects TSF data from disclosure using different cryptographic methods and security-
functionality. The TOE provides administrative access to users through a CLI that enforces user
and group profiles. The administrator configures user profiles on the authentication server that
specify varying degrees of access to the system. The limited CLI, user account system, and
underlying file system permissions serve to restrict access to TSF data such as private keys.
Plaintext private keys used for SSH authentication are stored on internal flash which is only
accessible through CLI commands performed by the local administrator. The local administrator
password stored by the TOE is kept in a hashed form so that it cannot be read in plaintext
format.
12
The TOE derives a reliable time source for logging and other system processes through the local
NTP service. The exact time can be provided by setting the value locally, or through
synchronizing the time from an external server via NTP.
When updating TSF functionality, a published cryptographic hash of the updated software is
provided to the user to ensure the integrity of the software.
The TOE is also able to verify that TSF protection is functioning properly by running a memory
test at boot-time and several diagnostic tools throughout the operation of the TOE. During the
EOS boot sequence the TOE also initializes FIPS self-tests which utilize known-answer tests
against each cryptographic algorithm supported by the TOE.
4.7 TOE Access
In order to prevent unauthorized access to the TOE, administrative sessions can be terminated
manually or automatically. If an administrator accesses the TOE the session may be terminated
by the administrator’s own actions or automatically after a specified time of inactivity. These
termination features apply to both local and remote connections to the TOE.
The TOE will also display a customizable warning message that is displayed to the user during
each administrative logon. The message can serve as an advisory notice and consent warning
regarding use of the TOE.
4.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE implements and requires a secured method of communication between itself, external
devices, and remote administrators. In order to accomplish a secure connection to external
devices, the TOE uses an SSHv2 connection with RSA based authentication and AES-based
encryption. A private/public key pair can either be generated by the TOE or imported from
another device and imported into the TOE. After an SSHv2 connection is authenticated via RSA
key pairs, AES encryption keys are exchanged via diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 key exchange
algorithm. After these steps, all further traffic between the TOE and the external device is
encrypted via AES-128/256-CBC encryption. This method provides assured identification of the
external device and prevents disclosure or undetected modification of data across the
communication channel. Communications between the TOE and external devices may be
initiated from either the TOE or the external device.
Remote administrators may also create a secured connection to the TOE that provides
cryptographic authentication and protection of data. Remote administrators connecting to the
TOE via SSHv2 have the option of using password-based authentication or RSA key-based
authentication.
5 TOE Security Environment
5.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following assumptions are made about the usage of the TOE:
13
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE It is assumed that there are no general-purpose computing
capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available to the
TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation,
administration and support of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
administrator guidance in a trusted manner.
6 Architectural Information
The TOE is classified as a Network Device for Common Criteria purposes. The TOE is made up of
hardware and software components.
The TOE is an ultra-low latency and feature rich network switch that is intended to connect
many Ethernet-based network devices together in an enterprise environment while maintaining
security, reliability, and wire-speed network connections.
6.1 Architecture Overview
Each non-administrative network interface uses a small form-factor pluggable (SFP) transceiver
to provide connectivity between the network device motherboard and a fiber optic or copper
cable. This allows the customer to use several different types of network cables with the
network device. The list of compatible SFPs is provided in Table 1 and the user guidance.
Each model of the TOE under evaluation varies by the amount and type of SFPs supported by
the hardware. The 7150S-24 supports 24 separate SFP+ modules, the 7150S-52 supports 52
separate SFP+ modules, and the 7150S-64 supports 48 separate SFP+ modules and 4 Quad
Small Form-factor Pluggable (QSFP+) modules.
The Arista Extensible Operating System, or Arista EOS, is built upon the mainline Linux kernel
(www.kernel.org) and an x86 dual-core CPU.
6.1.1 TOE Hardware
The TOE hardware is one of the following models:
• DCS-7150S-24-F
• DCS-7150S-24-R
• DCS-7150S-24#
• DCS-7150S-24-CL#
• DCS-7150S-24-CLD#
• DCS-7150S-52-CL-F
• DCS-7150S-52-CL-R
14
• DCS-7150S-52-CL#
• DCS-7150S-52-CLD#
• DCS-7150S-64-CL-F
• DCS-7150S-64-CL-R
• DCS-7150S-64-CL#
• DCS-7150S-64-CLD#
All of these models use CPU: 03.02, Hardware: 04.00, Security Chip: R5H30211
6.1.2 TOE Software
The TOE software is Arista EOS v4.12.0.5.
7 Documentation
This section details the documentation that is (a) delivered to the customer, and (b) was used
as evidence for the evaluation of the Arista 7150 Series. In these tables, the following
conventions are used:
• Documentation that is delivered to the customer is shown with bold titles.
• Documentation that was used as evidence but is not delivered is shown in a normal
typeface.
• Documentation that is delivered as part of the product but was not used as evaluation is
shown with a hashed background.
The TOE is shipped to the customer using a standard parcel service. The guidance documents
are provided via electronic download and apply to the CC Evaluated configuration:
7.1 Guidance Documentation
Document Revision Date
Common Criteria Guidance Supplement Arista
7150 Series 1/10 GbE SFP Ultra Low Latency
Switch Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1
1.9 December 17,
2013
Arista Quick Start Guide 7000 Series Data Center
Switches
PDOC-
00019-11
N/A
User Manual Arista Networks, Arista EOS Version
4.12.0.5
N/A September 24,
2013
Arista EOS System Message Guide, Software
Release 4.12.0.5
N/A September 13,
2013
15
7.2 Security Target
Document Revision Date
Arista Networks Series 7150 Security Target 1.9 December 23,
2013
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the Developer and the Evaluation Team.
8.1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team performed all of the test activities specified in the Network Device
Protection Profile, June 8, 2012, Version 1.1 and the Security Requirements for Network
Devices Errata #1, December 19, 2013, Version 1.0. The test environment consisted of:
• centos 6.2 final
o rsyslog 5.8.12
o OpenSSH 5.3p1, OpenSSL 1.0.0-fips 29 Mar 2010
• debian-7.0.0-amd64
o ntpd 4.2.6p5
o OpenSSH 6.0p1, OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013
The TOE passed all required test activities.
8.2 Vulnerability Analysis
On September 12, 2013, the evaluation team searched http://www.cvedetails.com for known
vulnerabilities in:
• Linux version 2.6.38.8.Ar-1398415
• OpenSSH_5.5p1
• OpenSSL 1.0.0e-fips 6 Sep 2011
• ntpd version 4.2.6p3-RC10
• Arista EOS 4.12.0
The evaluation team determined that suitable vulnerabilities would have Low CVSSv2 Access
Complexity, because a Medium Access complexity as defined by http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-
guide.html#i2.1.2 requires additional access, social engineering, and/or a non-default
configuration.
The evaluation team found three potential vulnerabilities. Of the three potential vulnerabilities,
a public exploit has only been released for one of the vulnerabilities. The evaluation team ran
the one exploit against the TOE and determined the TOE was not vulnerable.
16
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes and procedures. The TOE was evaluated against the
criteria contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 3. The evaluation methodology used by the Evaluation Team to conduct
the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 3.
InfoGard has determined that the TOE meets the security criteria in the Security Target, which
specifies an assurance requirements specified in Network Device Protection Profile, June 8,
2012, Version 1.1. A team of Validators, on behalf of the CCEVS Validation Body, monitored the
evaluation. The evaluation was completed in October 2013.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The evaluation team worked closely with the validation team to resolve issues arisen during the
consistency review – including retesting and re-scoping of the evaluation. It is important to note
for that the TOE’s default “admin” account is outside of the scope of evaluation after
configuration has been completed (other than to provide system updates, maintenance and
user management).
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the assurance activities in the NDPP, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Security Target
Arista Networks Series 7150 Security Target, Version 1.9, Date December 23, 2013.
12 Terms
12.1 Acronyms
AAA Authentication Authorization and Accounting
AAR Assurance Activity Report
CC Common Criteria
CSP Critical Security Parameters
DAC Discretionary Access Control
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
17
I/O Input/Output
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
PP Protection Profile
QSFP Quad Small Form-factor Pluggable
SF Security Functions
SFR Security Functional Requirements
SFP Small Form-factor Pluggable
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
STP Spanning Tree Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction
and general model, dated July 2009, Version 3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001.
[2] Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional components, July 2009, Version 3.1, Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-002.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance components, July 2009, Version 3.1, Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-003.
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation
methodology, July 2009, Version 3.1, Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-004.
[5] Network Device Protection Profile, June 8, 2012, Version 1.1.
[6] Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata #1, December 19, 2013, Version 1.0