BSI-DSZ-CC-0553-2012
for
SafeGuard Enterprise – Device Encryption,
Version 5.60 for Microsoft Windows XP
Professional and Microsoft Windows 7
from
Utimaco Safeware AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-326 V4.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-0553-2012
SafeGuard Enterprise – Device Encryption, Version 5.60 for
Microsoft Windows XP Professional and Microsoft Windows 7
from Utimaco Safeware AG
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 18 June 2012
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0553-2012
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0553-2012 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0553-2012
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................17
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................18
11 Security Target............................................................................................................18
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................18
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................18
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................19
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................21
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0553-2012
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SafeGuard Enterprise – Device Encryption, Version 5.60 for Microsoft
Windows XP Professional and Microsoft Windows 7 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SafeGuard Enterprise – Device Encryption, Version 5.60 for
Microsoft Windows XP Professional and Microsoft Windows 7 was conducted by SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 9 May 2012.
The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Utimaco Safeware AG
The product was developed by: Utimaco Safeware AG
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5 Publication
The product SafeGuard Enterprise – Device Encryption, Version 5.60 for Microsoft
Windows XP Professional and Microsoft Windows 7 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Utimaco Safeware AG
Germanusstraße 4
52080 Aachen
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0553-2012 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption,
Version 5.60 provided by Utimaco Safeware AG. The TOE is a software that prevents
unauthorized access to clear text of data stored on mobile or stationary block devices. This
is achieved by data encryption which is completely transparent to users.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2.
Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
Power On Authentication (POA) POA is a mechanism of the TOE to check the user’s
authenticity before the operating system on a PC is booted
from its boot device.
Protection of Data on Protected Devices After a successful authentication the cryptographic keys
needed to boot the PC are determined out of the user’s key
ring stored in TSF data. The user’s key ring is compiled from
one or more key tables after a successful logon to Windows.
An access to any encrypted device is only possible if the
cryptographic key used for encryption of that specific device
is known. Hence, the TOE security function ensures that data
provided by authorised users are protected when being
stored on encrypted devices and when the PC is not in
operation or the device is detached from a PC in operation.
Secure Server-Based Administration The administration of the TOE is done in the administration
server. The TOE retrieves its administration data from the
administration server over a network connection. Besides the
TOE installation, uninstallation and user password change,
there is no administration function available at the client side
for the TOE. The local administration data (TSF data) is
secured by symmetric encryption. Only a successful
identification and authentication grants access to the TSF
data.
Random Number Generation and Key
Generation
During installation of the TOE and initial encryption of local
block devices a deterministic random number generator
(DRNG) is used for the generation of the cryptographic keys.
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'medium' (SOF-medium) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 2.3 is confirmed. The rating of the
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Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as specified in chapter 8.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SafeGuard Enterprise – Device Encryption, Version 5.60 for Microsoft Windows XP
Professional and Microsoft Windows 7
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW SafeGuard®
Enterprise 5.60.0.192 – Version
5.60.0.192 – Application for Windows XP /
Vista / Windows 7
2011 DVD
2 DOC SafeGuard Enterprise, Product version: 5.60 -
Installation guide [10]
Guidance for the installation of the TOE
4/2011 DVD
3 DOC SafeGuard Enterprise, Product version: 5.60 -
Administrator help [11]
Guidance for the administrators of the TOE
4/2011 DVD
4 DOC SafeGuard Enterprise, Product version: 5.60 -
User Help: SafeGuard Enterprise (managed) +
Sophos SafeGuard (standalone) [12]
User’s Guide for operating SafeGuard
Enterprise and SafeGuard Enterprise
4/2011 DVD
5 DOC SafeGuard Enterprise, Product version: 5.60 -
Manual for certification-compliant operation
[13]
User's Guide Enhancement for secure
operation
11/2011 DVD
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery of the TOE is secured in a way that any user can determine the authenticity of
the software package received. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter
3.5, and in the installation guide [10].
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3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Access Control:
The TOE controls access to block devices (hard disk partitions, floppy disks, USB
memory sticks, memory cards, compact flash etc.). Each block device is treated as a
whole, i.e. there is no specific access control to any subset of data (directories, files) on
a block device. For each user known to the TOE and each block device under control of
the TOE it can be defined if the user has access to the block device or not.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
● The TOE is properly installed and configured regarding the required settings for the
security attributes.
● All authorised individuals protect their passwords and PINs.
● Untrusted software is not placed on the PC’s hard disk and not executed while the
computer is operated.
● Administrators can be trusted and the administration server is operated in a secure
environment.
● Authorised users do not actively or negligently compromise the security of the computer
on which the TOE is installed.
● The computer secured by the TOE shall not fall under temporary and undetected
physical control of an attacker. If a token or a smart card is used for authentication, the
assumption extends to the token or the smart card and smart card reader.
● If a token or smart card is used for user authentication it is assumed that the device
implements secure storage of the user’s private key through its hardware and
firmware/operating system, and that it requires a PIN before any operation using this key
can be performed.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.3, 4.2 and 6.4.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the following main components:
● [C1] “Power On Authentication” component, performing boot control and user
identification and authentication;
● [C2] Real mode kernel for device encryption on BIOS level and TSF data management;
● [C3] Windows 32-bit filter driver for device encryption;
● [C4] Administration component including remote administration interface and local
administration tools;
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During their examination the evaluators got the following overview showing the
decomposition of the TOE into subsystems:
Subsystems of the main component [C1]: Power On Authentication component
● [S1.1] Modified Master Boot Record
● [S1.2] POA User Interface Application
● [S1.3] POA Cryptographic Subsystem
Subsystems of the main component [C2]: Real mode kernel for device encryption
on BIOS level and TSF data management
● [S2.1] Real Mode Encryption Driver
Subsystems of main component [C3]: Windows 32-bit filter driver for device
encryption
● [S3.1] Windows 32-bit Filter Driver Frame
● [S3.2] Windows 32-bit Crypto Modules
Subsystems of main component [C4]: Administration component including remote
administration interface and local administration tools
● [S4.1] Initialization Subsystem
● [S4.2] Administration Server Interface
● [S4.3] User and Password Synchronisation Subsystem
● [S4.4] Device Encryption Controller Subsystem
● [S4.5] Event Subsystem
● [S4.6] Status User Interface
● [S4.7] Auditing Subsystem
Please note that the italic marked subsystems don’t provide any explicit security function.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
Tests of the Developer
The test configuration consists of a TOE installed according to the installation guidance
[10] as well as the user guidance documents [12] and [13]. The tests are exercised on
three operating system versions by the developer: for the operating system "Microsoft
Windows XP Service Pack 3" ("XP " in short), using the operating system "Microsoft
Windows 7 32-bit" (“Win7-32” in short) and “Microsoft Windows 7 64-bit” (“Win7-64” in
short) . The configuration of the TOE is the same for all three operating systems
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The TOE is tested by the developer in the normal operational state which is reached after
the installation according to the installation guidance for the three different operating
systems XP, Win7-32 and Win7-64. Hence the test approach consists of the interaction
with the TOE using the user reachable interfaces and so stimulating the security functions.
Some test cases stimulate the security functions according to their normal using and the
error-free situations are tested. Other test cases stimulate the security functions under
failure provoking circumstances and the correct reaction of the TOE is checked.
For the check of the cryptographic algorithms additional test tools are used. These test
tools are implemented using a different crypto implementation – implemented
independently from the TOE implementation – to find evidence about the correctness of
the TOE’s implementation of the cryptographic mechanism.
Overall the developer introduces 26 different test cases for the coverage and depth
analysis. The actual test results of all test cases documented by the developer are "Tested
and OK". This shows that the execution of each test case was successful and all actual
test results were as the expected ones. Therefore the overall developer testing result is
"OK".
Independent Evaluator Tests
Since there are no different configurations of the TOE the evaluators’ testing addresses
the TOE as defined by the denotation SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption, Version
5.60. The test configuration consists of a TOE installed according to the installation
guidance [10] as well as the user guidance documents [12] and [13]. Since the dedication
of the TOE is intended for the two different operating systems Microsoft Windows XP
Professional Service Pack 3 (XP) and Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit (Win7-64) the
tests were conducted twice, once for each operating system. Please note that the use of
these two different operating system platforms corresponds with the information about the
operating system platform in the Security Target [6] and [9].
From the evaluators’ point of view these two different operating system versions are not
different configurations for the TOE itself in the sense of the CC. Since the TOE is used in
the same manner on both operating systems and in particular the same security functions
are active as well as during the installation of the TOE no different configurations have to
be performed. Except for a different look-and-feel - which is not based on the TOE itself -
no differences of both installations exist.
The developer delivered test cases for the TSF that the TOE operates as specified. The
evaluators decided to re-conduct all developer test cases used by the developer for the
argumentation regarding the test coverage of the functional specification except one test
case which addresses the explicit test of the random number generator during machine
key generation for the following reasons:
● The use of the random number generator and of the key generation is implicitly tested in
every case a new block device is initially encrypted. For the initial device encryption
process a new cryptographic key is generated. For the key generation the random
number generator of the TOE is used. The evaluators tested the randomness of the
seeding of the random number generator. The evaluators did not verify the structure of
the API return values. The evaluators assume that the involved internal functionality will
not be changed.
● The developer provided a separate document regarding the quality assessment of the
random number generator.
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● The developer provided a source code fragment providing evidence about the usage of
the random number generator in the context of the key generation.
The test subset conducted by the evaluator consists of a few additional tests, more
precisely of enhancing four test cases, and therefore it refers to the actual test cases
describing the TSF.
The independent testing took place on 19.8.2011 – 18.11.2011 at the evaluators’ site.
For two specific aspects the developer provided additional test tools to find evidence about
the correct functionality of the security functions. The first test tool KeytestSGN contains a
second implementation of the security functionality to access the key hierarchy stored in a
PKCS#12 archive. The other test tool CryptoTestVBE realizes a second implementation of
the cryptographic mechanism used for the encryption/decryption of the user data. By the
successful application of both test tools during testing evidence is provided that the
respective cryptographic functionality implemented in the TOE works as specified.
8 Evaluated Configuration
There are no different configurations of the TOE. The TOE is defined by the denotation
SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption, Version 5.60.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : medium
SF1 (Power On Authentication), SF4 (Random Number Generation and Key
Generation).
In order to assess the Strength of Function the scheme interpretations AIS 20 (see [4])
were used.
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
● AES in CBC mode of operation and block size 128 bits, key size 128 and 256 bits
● AES-256 in Key Wrap mode (RFC 3394) with block size 128 bits, key size 256 bits
● RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 with CRT option, modulus size 1024, 1536, 2048 or 4096 bits
● PKCS #12 using SHA-1 as pseudorandom function and 3-key-Triple- DES as
encryption function (Identifier: pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC, OID:
1.2.840.113549.1.12.1.3)
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all
aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered
by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The determination of the existence of a watermarked file on the encrypted device is not
considered as violating the security objectives of the TOE, hence not considered as
vulnerability here. However it could be stated that the cryptographic mechanism used to
protect the integrity and confidentiality of the user data doesn’t provide protection against
Watermarking attacks.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
DES Data Encryption Standard
DOC Document
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
POA Power On Authentication
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
RSAES RSA Encryption Scheme
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
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Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0553-2012, Version 2.40.03, 19.04.2012, Security Target –
SafeGuard Enterprise - Device Encryption, version 5.60, Utimaco Safeware AG,
file name: SGN_EAL4_ST.pdf (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.4, 02.05.2012, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE (confidential documents)
Configuration List for Evaluation Documentation, SafeGuard Enterprise - Device
Encryption Version 5.60, Version 7, 01.12.2011, file name: SGN_EAL4_cfgList.pdf
Configuration List for source code and binary files, Utimaco Safeware AG, Version
1, May 23, 2011, file name: SGN_EAL4_cfgList_source.pdf
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0553-2012, Version 1.00.00, 02.05.2012, Security Target –
SafeGuard Enterprise - Device Encryption, version 5.60, Utimaco Safeware AG,
file name: SGN_EAL4_ST_L.docx (sanitised public document)
[10] SafeGuard Enterprise - Installation guide, Product version: 5.60, Sophos Group,
April 2011, file name: sgn_56_ig_eng_installation.pdf
[11] SafeGuard Enterprise, Product version: 5.60 – Administrator help, Sophos Group,
April 2011, file name: sgn_56_h_eng_admin_help.pdf
[12] SafeGuard Enterprise Product version: 5.60 – User help, Sophos Group, April 2011,
file name: sgn_56_h_eng_user_help.pdf
[13] SafeGuard Enterprise, Product version: 5.60 - Manual for certification compliant
operation, Sophos Group, November 2011, file name: sgn_cg_eng_certification.pdf
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0553-2012 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
“The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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