Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung
Galaxy Devices on Android 11 – Fall
Security Target
Version: 0.1
2021/07/07
Prepared for:
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
416 Maetan-3dong, Yeongtong-gu, Suwon-si, Gyeonggi-do, 443-742 Korea
Prepared By:
www.gossamersec.com
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Table of Contents
1 Security Target Introduction .......................................................................................................4
1.1 Security Target Reference.............................................................................................................5
1.2 TOE Reference...............................................................................................................................6
1.3 TOE Overview................................................................................................................................6
1.4 TOE Description.............................................................................................................................6
1.4.1 TOE Architecture...................................................................................................................8
1.4.2 TOE Documentation............................................................................................................10
2 Conformance Claims.................................................................................................................11
2.1 Conformance Rationale ..............................................................................................................12
3 Security Objectives...................................................................................................................13
3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................................13
4 Extended Components Definition..............................................................................................14
5 Security Requirements..............................................................................................................17
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ......................................................................................17
5.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)............................................................................................................20
5.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)...............................................................................................21
5.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP).................................................................................................31
5.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA) ..............................................................................32
5.1.5 Security Management (FMT) ..............................................................................................38
5.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) .................................................................................................46
5.1.7 TOE Access (FTA).................................................................................................................49
5.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) ..............................................................................................49
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements.......................................................................................50
5.2.1 Development (ADV) ............................................................................................................50
5.2.2 Guidance Documents (AGD) ...............................................................................................51
5.2.3 Life-cycle Support (ALC) ......................................................................................................52
5.2.4 Tests (ATE)...........................................................................................................................53
5.2.5 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..........................................................................................53
6 TOE Summary Specification ......................................................................................................54
6.1 Security Audit..............................................................................................................................54
6.2 Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................56
6.3 User Data Protection...................................................................................................................65
6.4 Identification and Authentication...............................................................................................69
6.5 Security Management.................................................................................................................75
6.6 Protection of the TSF ..................................................................................................................76
6.7 TOE Access ..................................................................................................................................80
6.8 Trusted Path/Channels ...............................................................................................................81
6.9 Work Profile Functionality ..........................................................................................................81
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List of Tables
Table 1 - Glossary..........................................................................................................................................5
Table 2 - Evaluated Devices ..........................................................................................................................7
Table 3 - Equivalent Devices .........................................................................................................................7
Table 4 - Carrier Models................................................................................................................................8
Table 5 - Technical Decisions ......................................................................................................................12
Table 6 - Extended SFRs and SARs ..............................................................................................................16
Table 7 - TOE Security Functional Requirements........................................................................................20
Table 8 - Security Management Functions .................................................................................................45
Table 9 - Audit Events .................................................................................................................................55
Table 10 - Asymmetric Key Generation per Module ..................................................................................56
Table 11 - W-Fi Alliance Certificates ...........................................................................................................56
Table 12 - Salt Creation...............................................................................................................................58
Table 13 - BoringSSL Cryptographic Algorithms .........................................................................................58
Table 14 - Samsung Crypto Extension Cryptographic Algorithms ..............................................................59
Table 15 - Kernel Versions ..........................................................................................................................59
Table 16 - Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Algorithms ...............................................................................59
Table 17 - TEE Environments ......................................................................................................................59
Table 18 - SCrypto TEE Cryptographic Algorithms......................................................................................60
Table 19 - Hardware Components..............................................................................................................60
Table 20 - FMP Driver Algorithms...............................................................................................................60
Table 21 - Storage Hardware Algorithms....................................................................................................60
Table 22 - Wi-Fi Hardware Components.....................................................................................................60
Table 23 - Wi-Fi Chip Algorithms ................................................................................................................60
Table 24 - SoC Cryptographic Algorithms ...................................................................................................61
Table 25 - Key Management Matrix............................................................................................................64
Table 26 - Access Control Categories..........................................................................................................67
Table 27 – External Media Encrpytion........................................................................................................68
Table 28 - Device biometric sensor.............................................................................................................71
Table 29 - Allowed Lock Screen Authentication Methods..........................................................................73
Table 30 - Secure Boot Public Keys.............................................................................................................76
Table 31 - Power-up Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests...........................................................................79
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1 Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST
conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE consists of the Samsung Galaxy
Devices on Android 11 provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.. The TOE is being evaluated as a
Mobile Device.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• Conformance Claims (Section 2)
• Security Objectives (Section 3)
• Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
• Security Requirements (Section 5)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
Acronyms and Terminology
AA Assurance Activity
BAF Biometric Authentication Factor
CC Common Criteria
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
EAR Entropy Analysis Report
GUI Graphical User Interface
NFC Near Field Communication
PAD Presentation Attack Detection
PAI Presentation Attack Instrument
PCL Product Compliant List
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TrustZone)
TOE Target of Evaluation
U.S. United States
VR Validation Report
Glossary
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Device Lock Screen
Android Lock Screen
The Device Lock Screen is the Android OS lock screen.
File-Based Encryption
(FBE)
FBE allowed files to be encrypted with different keys and unlocked individually based
on different authentication/access controls. This is implemented as part of the ext4
or f2fs file system (using fscrypt).
Firmware Over-the-air
(FOTA)
Firmware Over-the-air is a term for the process of updating the firmware (operating
system and services) on the device via a wireless connection as opposed to a wired
(i.e. USB) connection.
Personal Profile
The personal profile is the common Android user on the device, such as when the
device is first setup. While the name implies this space is for the end user and not the
Enterprise, this can be configured as needed by the MDM. This is in contrast to a
work profile.
Work Profile
The work profile is a second profile on a device created specifically by the MDM and
used to segment enterprise data from what may be personal data. The work profile
maintains separate authentication to access any apps or data stored within.
Table 1 - Glossary
Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
• Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that
may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In
the ST, iteration is indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the
component. For example FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes
two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1 requirement.
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are
indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an
assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold
brackets (e.g., [[selected-assignment]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are
indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for
additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things
…”).
• Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special
interest, such as captions.
1.1 Security Target Reference
ST Title – Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11 – Fall Security Target
ST Version – Version 0.1
ST Date – 2021/07/07
Proprietary Documentation (sections with additional information are marked with KMD in the section
title)
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KMD Title – Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11 - Fall Key
Management Description
KMD Version – Version 0.1
KMD Date – 2021/07/07
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Identification – Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11
TOE Developer – Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Sponsor – Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
1.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11.
1.4 TOE Description
The TOE is a mobile device based on Android 11 with a built-in IPsec VPN client and modifications made
to increase the level of security provided to end users and enterprises. The TOE is intended for use as
part of an enterprise mobility solution providing mobile staff with enterprise connectivity.
The TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or “CC mode”) that an administrator can invoke using an
MDM. The TOE must meet the following prerequisites in order for an administrator to transition the TOE
to and remain in the CC configuration.
• Require a boot and device lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, accessibility (direction), screen
locks are not allowed). Acceptable biometrics vary with the device for the device lock.
• The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to 30.
• A screen lock password required to decrypt data on boot.
• Revocation checking must be enabled.
• External storage must be encrypted.
• When CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows:
o The TOE sets the system wide Android CC mode property to be enabled.
o The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all updates occur
through FOTA.
o The TOE utilizes ACVP/CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers for TLS.
The TOE includes the ability to create separate profiles part of the Knox Platform. A profile provides a
way to segment applications and data into two separate areas on the device, such as a personal area
and a work area, each with its own separate apps, data and security policies. For this effort, the TOE was
evaluated both without and with profiles created. Thus, the evaluation includes several Knox-specific
claims that apply when these profiles are created.
There are different models of the TOE, the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11, and these models
differ in their internal components (as described in the table below). All devices are A64 architecture.
The model numbers of the mobile devices used during evaluation testing are as follows:
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Device Name
Model
Number
Chipset
Vendor
SoC Arch Kernel Build Number
Galaxy A52 5G SM-A526B Qualcomm Snapdragon 750 ARMv8 4.19.152 RP1A.200720.012
Galaxy A71 5G SM-A716V Qualcomm Snapdragon 765 ARMv8 4.19.125 RP1A.200720.012
Galaxy Tab
Active3
SM-T575 Samsung Exynos 9810 ARMv8 4.9.191 RP1A.200720.012
Table 2 - Evaluated Devices
In addition to the evaluated devices, the devices in Table 3 - Equivalent Devices are claimed as
equivalent with a note about the differences between the evaluated device (first column) and the
equivalent models (noted in the third column with the differences in the fourth column). Equivalence in
this table is determined by the use of identical processors, kernel and build number, and is not made
across processor types.
The Differences column in the table denotes the differences between the evaluated device and those
listed in the Equivalent column (which typically contains multiple different derivative devices), and are
not meant to line up with the devices listed in the Equivalent column itself. Except in the case of a
different Wi-Fi radios or biometric sensors (in which case the radio or biometric is tested on a different
device and so always verified as part of the evaluation), any differences between the evaluated device
and claimed equivalent devices are outside the requirements of the evaluation requirements, such as
screen size/type/resolution, battery size, position of ports.
Evaluated Device SoC Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy A52 5G Snapdragon 750 Galaxy A42 5G A52 5G > A42 5G screen resolution & RAM
Galaxy A71 5G Snapdragon 765 Galaxy A51 5G A71 5G > A51 5G in terms of display size
Galaxy Tab Active3 Exynos 9810 Galaxy Tab Active3
T577 & T575 tablets have 5G
T570 tablets only have Wi-Fi
Table 3 - Equivalent Devices
In general, the devices include a final letter or number at the end of the name that denotes that the
device is for a specific carrier or region (for example, U = US Carrier build and F = International, which
were used during the evaluation).
For each device, there are specific models that are validated. This table lists the specific carrier models
that have the validated configuration (covering both evaluated and equivalent devices).
Device Name Chipset Vendor
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy A52 5G Qualcomm SM-A526 B, N, U, U1, W, SC-53B
Galaxy A42 5G
Qualcomm SM-A426 B, N, U, U1
Qualcomm SM-S426 DL
Galaxy A71 5G Qualcomm SM-A716 U, V
Galaxy A51 5G Qualcomm SM-A516 V, Q, SC-54A, SCG07
Galaxy Tab Active3 Samsung SM-T577 U
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Device Name Chipset Vendor
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
SM-T575 N, None
SM-T570 None
Table 4 - Carrier Models
1.4.1 TOE Architecture
The TOE combines with a Mobile Device Management solution (note that this evaluation does not
include an MDM agent nor server) that enables the Enterprise to watch, control and administer all
deployed mobile devices, across multiple mobile service providers as well as facilitate secure
communications through a VPN. This partnership provides a secure mobile environment that can be
managed and controlled by the environment and reduces the risks inherent in any mobile deployment.
Data on the TOE is protected through the implementation of Samsung File-Based Encryption (FBE) that
utilizes ACVP/CAVP certified cryptographic algorithms to encrypt device storage. This functionality is
combined with a number of on-device policies including local wipe, remote wipe, password complexity,
automatic lock and privileged access to security configurations to prevent unauthorized access to the
device and stored data.
The Knox Platform for Enterprise provides a set of flexible deployment options for work environments.
With Knox Platform for Enterprise, it is possible to segment the device into two separate areas, by
convention called the personal profile and the work profile. In creating a work profile, the Enterprise
establishes a completely separate workspace, with its own authentication, applications and services,
and ensure they are kept separate from anything the user may do in the personal profile. Another
option for deployment is Knox Separated Apps, a folder where the Enterprise can isolate a group of
applications from the rest of the device, restricting access to shared information, while maintaining
seamless access to the isolated applications for the user.
The Samsung Knox Software Development Kit (SDK) builds on top of the existing Android security model
by expanding the current set of security configuration options to more than 600 configurable policies
and including additional security functionality such as application allow and block listing.
1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a multi-user capable mobile device based on Android 11 that incorporates the Samsung Knox
SDK. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the operating system, but does
include controls that limit application behavior. The TOE includes an IPsec VPN client integrated into the
firmware (as opposed to a downloadable application). Within an Enterprise environment, the Enterprise
can manage the configuration of the mobile device, including the VPN client, through a compliant device
management solution.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data networks to
establish network connectivity, and then through that connectivity interacts with MDM servers that
allow administrative control of the TOE.
1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11:
• Security Audit
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• Cryptographic support
• User data protection
• Identification and authentication
• Security management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE access
• Trusted path/channels
1.4.1.2.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates logs for a range of security relevant events. The TOE stores the logs locally so they
can be accessed by an administrator or they can be exported to an MDM.
1.4.1.2.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with ACVP certified algorithms for a wide range of
cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation and establishment,
symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message
authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt
generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction.
These primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS,
IPsec, and HTTPS and to encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of data and key
encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services
to applications running on the TOE.
1.4.1.2.3 User Data Protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the Trust
Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data using encryption so that
even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The functionality provided by work
profiles and Knox Separated Apps enhance the security of user data by providing an additional layer of
separation between different categories of apps and data while the device is in use. The TOE ensures
that residual information is protected from potential reuse in accessible objects such as network
packets.
1.4.1.2.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user
perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password or Biometric
Authentication Factor (BAF) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. In addition, even when the
TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password or re-enroll the biometric
template. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display, the
frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE
will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower case
characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords between 4 and 16 characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X.509v3 and validate certificates for EAP-
TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges. The TOE can also act as a client or server in an authenticated Bluetooth
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pairing. In addition to storing X.509 certificates used for IPsec connections, the TOE can also securely
store pre-shared keys for VPN connections.
1.4.1.2.5 Security Management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions (including the VPN client)
identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices.
Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are restricted to
administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once the TOE has been
enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it removes all MDM policies and
disables CC mode.
1.4.1.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its
security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not
accessible or exportable. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time
information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page
protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to
minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It also protects itself from modification by
applications as well as isolates the address spaces of applications from one another to protect those
applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it
might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an
operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new
image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce
malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying
applications prior to their installation.
1.4.1.2.7 TOE Access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of inactivity. The
TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when users unlock the TOE for use.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
1.4.1.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS, HTTPS and IPsec to secure
communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
1.4.2 TOE Documentation
• Samsung Android 11 on Galaxy Devices Administrator Guide, version 7.2, June 15, 2021
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2 Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
o Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
o Part 3 Conformant
• PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals (MDF) and Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Clients, Version 1.1, 05 January 2021 (CFG_MDF-VPNC_V1.1)
o The PP-Configuration includes the following components:
▪ Base-PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1,
(PP_MD_V3.1)
▪ PP-Module: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.2,
(MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2)
• Package Claims:
o General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients,
Version 1.0, 08 February 2016 (PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0)
• Technical Decisions as of June 1, 2021:
TD No. PP Applied Rationale
TD0194 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 Yes Impacts required audit events
TD0244
PP_MD_V3.1
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0
Yes Allows additional TLSC curves
TD0301 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes
Biometrics supported and affects FMT_SMF_EXT.3
Assurance Activities
TD0304 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Impacts Assurance Activities
TD0305 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Impacts Assurance Activities
TD0346 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Removes selection from FMT_SMF_EXT.2.1
TD0347 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Updates Use Case 2
TD0351 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Adds DEK selections to FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1
TD0366 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes FCS_COP.1(5) updated language per TD
TD0369 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes LTTCKM present
TD0371 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Updates Use Case 2
TD0413 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Update to properly allow VPN PP-Module
TD0439 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 Yes Adds FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN requirement
TD0468 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Updates FIA_BLT_EXT.3.1
TD0470 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 Yes Updates to Wireless restrictions
TD0492 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 Yes EAP-TLS & TLS Cipher updates
TD0502 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Cryptographic selections and updates
TD0517 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 Yes EAP-TLS X509 clarifications
TD0523 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Updates to certificate revocation
TD0579 PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Updates to FAU_GEN.1
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Table 5 - Technical Decisions
2.1 Conformance Rationale
The ST conforms to the CFG_MDF-VPNC_V1.1 and PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_v1.0 requirements. For simplicity,
this shall be referenced as MDF/WLAN/VPNC. As explained previously, the security problem definition,
security objectives, and security requirements are defined in the PP.
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3 Security Objectives
The Security Problem Definition may be found in the MDF/WLAN/VPNC and this section reproduces only
the corresponding Security Objectives for operational environment for reader convenience. The
MDF/WLAN/VPNC offers additional information about the identified security objectives, but that has
not been reproduced here and the MDF/WLAN/VPNC should be consulted if there is interest in that
material.
In general, the MDF/WLAN/VPNC has defined Security Objectives appropriate for Mobile Devices and as
such are applicable to the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11 TOE.
3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
• OE.CONFIG TOE administrators will configure the Mobile Device security functions correctly to
create the intended security policy.
• OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS (PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0) Information cannot flow between external and
internal networks located in different enclaves without passing through the TOE.
• OE.NOTIFY The Mobile User will immediately notify the administrator if the Mobile Device is lost
or stolen.
• OE.PRECAUTION The Mobile User exercises precautions to reduce the risk of loss or theft of the
Mobile Device.
• OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN (PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0) TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and
apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner.
• OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS (MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2) Information cannot flow onto the network to which
the VPN client's host is connected without passing through the TOE.
• OE.PHYSICAL (MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2) Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE
and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
• OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG (MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2) Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational
environment will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
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4 Extended Components Definition
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the MDF/WLAN/VPNC. The
MDF/WLAN/VPNC defines the following extended SFRs and SARs and since they are not redefined in this
ST the MDF/WLAN/VPNC should be consulted for more information concerning those CC extensions.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS: Cryptographic
support
FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Key Random Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.3: Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Extended: Key Destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.5: Extended: TSF Wipe
FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Extended: Salt Generation
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: Extended: HTTPS Protocol
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: Extended: IPsec
FCS_IV_EXT.1: Extended: Initialization Vector Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_RBG_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_SRV_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
FCS_SRV_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
FCS_STG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.2: Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.3: Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: Extended: TLS Protocol
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended:
Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security - WLAN
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: Extended: TLS Protocol
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN: Extended: TLS
Client Protocol - WLAN
FDP: User data protection
FDP_ACF_EXT.1: Extended: Security access control
FDP_ACF_EXT.2: Extended: Security access control
FDP_ACF_EXT.3: Extended: Security attribute based access control
FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Extended: Protected Data Encryption
FDP_DAR_EXT.2: Extended: Sensitive Data Encryption
FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information flow control
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information
flow control
FDP_PBA_EXT.1: Extended: Storage of Critical Biometric Parameters
FDP_STG_EXT.1: Extended: User Data Storage
FDP_UPC_EXT.1: Extended: Inter-TSF user data transfer protection
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_AFL_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication failure handling
FIA_BLT_EXT.1: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
FIA_BLT_EXT.2: Extended: Bluetooth Mutual Authentication
FIA_BLT_EXT.3: Extended: Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth
Connections
FIA_BLT_EXT.4: Extended: Secure Simple Pairing
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Requirement Class Requirement Component
FIA_BLT_EXT.6: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
FIA_BMG_EXT.1(1): Extended: Accuracy of Biometric Authentication
FIA_BMG_EXT.1(2): Extended: Accuracy of Biometric Authentication
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_PAE_EXT.1: Extended: Port Access Entity
Authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Extended: Password Management
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Extended: Pre-Shared Key
Composition - VPN
FIA_TRT_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication Throttling
FIA_UAU_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic
Operation
FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Timing of Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.4: Extended: Secondary User Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1: Extended: Validation of certificates
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended: X.509
Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2: Extended: X509 certificate authentication
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN: Extended: X.509
Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS) - WLAN
FIA_X509_EXT.3: Extended: Request Validation of certificates
FMT: Security management
FMT_MOF_EXT.1: Extended: Management of security functions
behavior
FMT_SMF_EXT.1: Extended: Specification of Management Functions
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended:
Specification of Management Functions - WLAN
FMT_SMF_EXT.2: Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions
FMT_SMF_EXT.3 Extended: Current Administrator
FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
FPT_AEX_EXT.2: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page
Permissions)
FPT_AEX_EXT.3: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow
Protection)
FPT_AEX_EXT.4: Extended: Domain Isolation
FPT_AEX_EXT.5: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
FPT_AEX_EXT.6: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page
Permissions)
FPT_BBD_EXT.1: Extended: Application Processor Mediation
FPT_JTA_EXT.1: Extended: JTAG Disablement
FPT_KST_EXT.1: Extended: Key Storage
FPT_KST_EXT.2: Extended: No Key Transmission
FPT_KST_EXT.3: Extended: No Plaintext Key Export
FPT_NOT_EXT.1: Extended: Self-Test Notification
FPT_TST_EXT.1: Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended: TSF
Cryptographic Functionality Testing - WLAN
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN: Extended: TSF
Cryptographic Functionality Testing - VPN
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Requirement Class Requirement Component
FPT_TST_EXT.2(1): Extended: TSF Integrity Checking
FPT_TST_EXT.2(2): Extended: TSF Integrity Checking
FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query
FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Extended: TSF Update Verification
FTA: TOE access
FTA_SSL_EXT.1: Extended: TSF- and User-initiated Locked State
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FTA_WSE_EXT.1: Extended: Wireless
Network Access - WLAN
FTP: Trusted
Path/Channels
FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted channel Communication
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended: Trusted
Channel Communication (Wireless LAN) – WLAN
ALC: Life Cycle Support ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates
Table 6 - Extended SFRs and SARs
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5 Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements
(SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to
scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the MDF/WLAN/VPNC. The refinements and operations already
performed in the MDF/WLAN/VPNC are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements
have been copied from the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0/MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2 and any residual
operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, the MDF/WLAN/VPNC made a number of
refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that
PP should be consulted to identify those changes if necessary.
The SARs are also drawn from the MDF/WLAN/VPNC, which include all the SARs for EAL 1 augmented
with ALC_TSU_EXT.1. However, the SARs are effectively refined since requirement-specific 'Assurance
Activities' are defined in the MDF/WLAN/VPNC that serve to ensure corresponding evaluations will yield
more practical and consistent assurance than the assurance requirements alone. The MDF/WLAN/VPNC
should be consulted for the assurance activity definitions.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11
TOE.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FAU_GEN.1/WLAN: Audit Data Generation
FAU_SAR.1: Audit Review
FAU_SEL.1: Selective Audit
FAU_STG.1: Audit Storage Protection
FAU_STG.4: Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FCS: Cryptographic
support
FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic key generation
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_CKM.1/WLAN: Cryptographic Key
Generation (Symmetric Keys for WPA2 Connections) - WLAN
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FCS_CKM.1/VPN: Cryptographic Key
Generation (IKE) - VPN
FCS_CKM.2(1): Cryptographic key establishment
FCS_CKM.2(2): Cryptographic key establishment (While device is
locked)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_CKM.2/WLAN: Cryptographic Key
Distribution (GTK) - WLAN
FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Key Random Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.3: Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Extended: Key Destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.5: Extended: TSF Wipe
FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Extended: Salt Generation
FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic operation
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Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS_COP.1(3): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(4): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(5): Cryptographic operation
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: Extended: HTTPS Protocol
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: Extended: IPsec
FCS_IV_EXT.1: Extended: Initialization Vector Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_RBG_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_SRV_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
FCS_SRV_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
FCS_STG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.2: Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.3: Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: Extended: TLS Protocol
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended:
Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security - WLAN
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: Extended: TLS Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN: Extended: TLS Client Protocol - WLAN
FDP: User data protection
FDP_ACF_EXT.1: Extended: Security access control
FDP_ACF_EXT.2: Extended: Security access control
FDP_ACF_EXT.3: Extended: Security attribute based access control
FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Extended: Protected Data Encryption
FDP_DAR_EXT.2: Extended: Sensitive Data Encryption
FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information flow control
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information
flow control
FDP_PBA_EXT.1: Extended: Storage of Critical Biometric Parameters
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FDP_RIP.2: Full Residual Information Protection
FDP_STG_EXT.1: Extended: User Data Storage
FDP_UPC_EXT.1: Extended: Inter-TSF user data transfer protection
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_AFL_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication failure handling
FIA_BLT_EXT.1: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
FIA_BLT_EXT.2: Extended: Bluetooth Mutual Authentication
FIA_BLT_EXT.3: Extended: Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth
Connections
FIA_BLT_EXT.4: Extended: Secure Simple Pairing
FIA_BLT_EXT.6: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
FIA_BMG_EXT.1(1): Extended: Accuracy of Biometric Authentication
FIA_BMG_EXT.1(2): Extended: Accuracy of Biometric Authentication
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_PAE_EXT.1: Extended: Port Access Entity
Authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Extended: Password Management
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Extended: Pre-Shared Key
Composition - VPN
FIA_TRT_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication Throttling
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Requirement Class Requirement Component
FIA_UAU.5: Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6(1): Re-Authentication
FIA_UAU.6(2): Re-Authentication
FIA_UAU.7: Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UAU_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic
Operation
FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Timing of Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.4: Extended: Secondary User Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1: Extended: Validation of certificates
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended: X.509
Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2: Extended: X509 certificate authentication
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN: Extended: X.509
Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS) - WLAN
FIA_X509_EXT.3: Extended: Request Validation of certificates
FMT: Security management
FMT_MOF_EXT.1: Extended: Management of security functions
behavior
FMT_SMF_EXT.1: Extended: Specification of Management Functions
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended:
Specification of Management Functions - WLAN
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FMT_SMF.1/VPN: Specification of Management
Functions - VPN
FMT_SMF_EXT.2: Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions
FMT_SMF_EXT.3 Extended: Current Administrator
FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
FPT_AEX_EXT.2: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page
Permissions)
FPT_AEX_EXT.3: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow
Protection)
FPT_AEX_EXT.4: Extended: Domain Isolation
FPT_AEX_EXT.5: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
FPT_AEX_EXT.6: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page
Permissions)
FPT_BBD_EXT.1: Extended: Application Processor Mediation
FPT_JTA_EXT.1: Extended: JTAG Disablement
FPT_KST_EXT.1: Extended: Key Storage
FPT_KST_EXT.2: Extended: No Key Transmission
FPT_KST_EXT.3: Extended: No Plaintext Key Export
FPT_NOT_EXT.1: Extended: Self-Test Notification
FPT_STM.1: Reliable time stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1: Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended: TSF
Cryptographic Functionality Testing - WLAN
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN: Extended: TSF
Cryptographic Functionality Testing - VPN
FPT_TST_EXT.2(1): Extended: TSF Integrity Checking
FPT_TST_EXT.2(2): Extended: TSF Integrity Checking
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Requirement Class Requirement Component
FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query
FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Extended: TSF Update Verification
FTA: TOE access
FTA_SSL_EXT.1: Extended: TSF- and User-initiated Locked State
FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FTA_WSE_EXT.1: Extended: Wireless
Network Access - WLAN
FTP: Trusted
Path/Channels
FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted channel Communication
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended: Trusted
Channel Communication (Wireless LAN) - WLAN
Table 7 - TOE Security Functional Requirements
5.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)
5.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 & PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FAU_GEN.1/WLAN: Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
1. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
2. All auditable events for the not selected level of audit
3. All administrative actions
4. Start-up and shutdown of the Rich OS
5. Insertion or removal of removable media
6. Specifically defined auditable events in Table 9 (from Table 1 of the PP_MD_V3.1);
7. [Audit records reaching [95%] percentage of audit capacity].
8. [Auditable events as listed in Table 9 - Audit Events from Table 2 of the
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0].
9. [Objective audit events as listed in Table 9 - Audit Events from Table 2 of the
PP_MD_V3.1]
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
1. Date and time of the event
2. type of event
3. subject identity
4. the outcome (success or failure) of the event
5. additional information in Table 1 (of the PP_MD_V3.1)
6. [no additional information]
(TD0194 & TD0579 applied)
5.1.1.2 FAU_SAR.1: Audit Review
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide the administrator with the capability to read all audited events
and record contents from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
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The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
5.1.1.3 FAU_SEL.1: Selective Audit
FAU_SEL.1.1
The TSF shall be able to select the set of events to be audited from the set of all
auditable events based on the following attributes [
• success of auditable security events;
• failure of auditable security events; and
• [event group, event severity, UserID and kernel events]].
5.1.1.4 FAU_STG.1: Audit Storage Protection
FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2
The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records
in the audit trail.
5.1.1.5 FAU_STG.4: Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FAU_STG.4.1
The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records if the audit trail is full.
5.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm
• ECC schemes using [
o “NIST curves” P-256, P-384, and [P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-
4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4, and]
[
• FFC schemes using [
o Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC 3526, Section 3], and
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the
following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3
].
5.1.2.2 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_CKM.1/WLAN: Cryptographic Key Generation
(Symmetric Keys for WPA2 Connections) – WLAN
FCS_CKM.1.1/WLAN
Refinement: The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm PRF-384 and [no other] and specified
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cryptographic key sizes 128 bits and [no other key sizes] using a Random Bit Generator
as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 that meet the following: IEEE 802.11-2012 and [IEEE
802.11ac-2014].
5.1.2.3 MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FCS_CKM.1/VPN: Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE) - VPN
FCS_CKM.1.1/VPN
The TSF shall [invoke platform-provided functionality] to generate asymmetric
cryptographic keys used for IKE peer authentication in accordance with: [
• FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes;
• FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for ECDSA
schemes and implementing “NIST curves”, P-256, P-384 and [P-521]]
and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key
strength of 112 bits.
5.1.2.4 FCS_CKM.2(1): Cryptographic key establishment
FCS_CKM.2(1).1
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key establishment method:
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST
Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”, and
[
• Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST
Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”
• RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following [
o NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography”]
].
5.1.2.5 FCS_CKM.2(2): Cryptographic key establishment (While device is locked)
FCS_CKM.2(2).1
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key establishment method: [
Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: [NIST Special
Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography]]
for the purposes of encrypting sensitive data received while the device is locked.
5.1.2.6 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_CKM.2/WLAN: Cryptographic Key Distribution (GTK) -
WLAN
FCS_CKM.2.1/WLAN
Refinement: The TSF shall decrypt Group Temporal Key in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method [AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame] that
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meets the following: [RFC 3394 for AES Key Wrap, 802.11-2012 for the packet format
and timing considerations] and does not expose the cryptographic keys.
5.1.2.7 FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall support a [immutable hardware] REK(s) with a [symmetric] key of strength
[256 bits].
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.2
Each REK shall be hardware-isolated from Rich OS on the TSF in runtime.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.3
Each REK shall be generated by a RBG in accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
5.1.2.8 FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Key Random Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1
All DEKs shall be [
• randomly generated (for SD card encryption)
• from the combination of a randomly generated DEK with another DEK or salt in a
way that preserves the effective entropy of each factor by [concatenating the
keys and using a KDF (as described in SP 800-108)] (for FBE)
] with entropy corresponding to the security strength of AES key sizes of [256] bits.
(TD0351 applied)
5.1.2.9 FCS_CKM_EXT.3: Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall use [asymmetric KEKs of [128-bit] security strength, symmetric KEKs of
[256-bit] security strength corresponding to at least the security strength of the keys
encrypted by the KEK].
FCS_CKM_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall generate all KEKs using one of the following methods:
• derive the KEK from a Password Authentication Factor using according to
FCS_COP.1(5).1
and [
• generate the KEK using an RBG that meets this profile (as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1),
• generate the KEK using a key generation scheme that meets this profile (as
specified in FCS_CKM.1),
• Combine the KEK from other KEKs in a way that preserves the effective entropy of
each factor by [concatenating the keys and using a KDF (as described in SP 800-
108) (for FBE), encrypting one key with another]].
(TD0366 applied)
5.1.2.10 FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Extended: Key Destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1
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The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified cryptographic
key destruction methods:
• by clearing the KEK encrypting the target key
• in accordance with the following rules
o For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct
overwrite [consisting of zeroes].
o For non-volatile EEPROM, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct
overwrite consisting of a pseudo random pattern using the TSF's RBG (as
specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1), followed by a read-verify.
o For non-volatile flash memory, that is not wear-leveled, the destruction shall be
executed [by a single direct overwrite consisting of zeros followed by a read-
verify].
o For non-volatile flash memory, that is wear-leveled, the destruction shall be
executed [by a block erase].
o For non-volatile memory other than EEPROM and flash, the destruction shall be
executed by a single direct overwrite with a random pattern that is changed
before each write.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.2
The TSF shall destroy all plaintext keying material and critical security parameters when
no longer needed.
5.1.2.11 FCS_CKM_EXT.5: Extended: TSF Wipe
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1
The TSF shall wipe all protected data by [
• Cryptographically erasing the encrypted DEKs and/or the KEKs in non-volatile
memory by following the requirements in FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1
• Overwriting all Protected Data according to the following rules:
o For EEPROM, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite
consisting of a pseudo random pattern using the TSF’s RBG (as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1, followed by a read-verify.
o For flash memory, that is not wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed
[by a block erase that erases the reference to memory that stores data as well
as the data itself].
o For flash memory, that is wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed [by a
block erase].
o For non-volatile memory other than EEPROM and flash, the destruction shall
be executed by a single direct overwrite with a random pattern that is
changed before each write.
].
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.2
The TSF shall perform a power cycle on conclusion of the wipe procedure.
5.1.2.12 FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Extended: Salt Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1
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The TSF shall generate all salts using a RBG that meets FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
5.1.2.13 FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(1).1
The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm:
• AES-CBC (as defined in FIPS PUB 197, and NIST SP 800-38A) mode
• AES-CCMP (as defined in FIPS PUB 197, NIST SP 800-38C and IEEE 802.11-2012),
• AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D), and [
• AES Key Wrap (KW) (as defined in NIST SP 800-38F),
• AES-XTS (as defined in NIST SP 800-38E)]
and cryptographic key sizes 128-bit key sizes and [256-bit key sizes].
5.1.2.14 FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(2).1
The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and [SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and message digest
sizes 160 and [256, 384, 512] that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.
5.1.2.15 FCS_COP.1(3): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(3).1
The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the
following: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 4 and [
• ECDSA schemes using 'NIST curves' P-384 and [P-256, P-521] that meet the
following: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 5].
5.1.2.16 FCS_COP.1(4): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(4).1
The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-SHA-1 and [HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [160, 256, 384, 512-bits] and message
digest sizes 160 and [256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1, 'The
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code', and FIPS Pub 180-4, 'Secure Hash Standard'.
5.1.2.17 FCS_COP.1(5): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(5).1
The TSF shall perform conditioning in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm HMAC-[SHA-512] using a salt, and [PBKDF2 with [8192] iterations], and
output cryptographic key sizes [256] that meet the following: NIST [SP 800-132].
(TD0366 applied)
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5.1.2.18 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: Extended: HTTPS Protocol
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1).
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall notify the application and [no other action] if the peer certificate is
deemed invalid.
5.1.2.19 MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: Extended: IPsec
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall implement [tunnel mode].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is
otherwise unmatched, and discards it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using the
cryptographic algorithms AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106, [AES-
CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (both specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5
The TSF shall implement the protocol: [
• IKEv1, using Main Mode for Phase I exchanges, as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408,
2409, RFC 4109, [no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers], [no other RFCs
for hash functions] and [support for XAUTH];
• IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 7296 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal as
specified in section 2.23), RFC 8784, RFC 8247 and [no other RFCs for hash
functions]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6
The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv1, IKEv2] protocol uses the
cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 6379 and [AES-
GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282]1
.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7
The TSF shall ensure that [
• IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by [VPN Gateway] based on [length of time];
• IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be configured by [VPN Gateway] based on [length of time]].
If length of time is used, it must include at least one option that is 24 hours or less for
Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours or less for Phase 2 SAs.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8
1
Note that AES-GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256 are supported only for IKEv2.
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The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH groups 19 (256-bit Random
ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP), and [24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 14 (2048-bit
MODP)].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9
The TSF shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman key exchange
(“x” in gx
mod p) using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, and
having a length of at least [(224, 256, or 384)] bits.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10
The TSF shall generate nonces used in IKE exchanges in a manner such that the
probability that a specific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA
is less than 1 in 2^[(112, 128, or 192)].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11
The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer authentication using a [RSA,
ECDSA] that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945 and [Pre-Shared Keys].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12
The TSF shall not establish an SA if the [IP address, Fully Qualified Domain Name
(FQDN)] and [no other reference identifier type] contained in a certificate does not
match the expected value(s) for the entity attempting to establish a connection.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13
The TSF shall not establish an SA if the presented identifier does not match the
configured reference identifier of the peer.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14
The [VPN Gateway] shall be able to ensure by default that the strength of the
symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect
the [IKEv1 Phase 1, IKEv2 IKE_SA] connection is greater than or equal to the strength of
the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to
protect the [IKEv1 Phase 2, IKEv2 CHILD_SA] connection.
5.1.2.20 FCS_IV_EXT.1: Extended: Initialization Vector Generation
FCS_IV_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall generate IVs in accordance with PP_MD_V3.1 Table 11: References and IV
Requirements for NIST-approved Cipher Modes.
5.1.2.21 FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance
with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any),
CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy
from [TSF-hardware-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at
least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys
and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall be capable of providing output of the RBG to applications running on the
TSF that request random bits.
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5.1.2.22 FCS_RBG_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall save the state of the deterministic RBG at power-off, and shall use this
state as input to the deterministic RBG at startup.
5.1.2.23 FCS_SRV_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
FCS_SRV_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism for applications to request the TSF to perform the
following cryptographic operations:
• All mandatory and [selected algorithms] in FCS_CKM.2(2)
• The following algorithms in FCS_COP.1(1): AES-CBC, [AES-GCM]
• All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1(3)
• All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1(2)
• All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1(4)
• [No other cryptographic operations].
5.1.2.24 FCS_SRV_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
FCS_SRV_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism for applications to request the TSF to perform the
following cryptographic operations:
• Algorithms in FCS_COP.1(1)
• Algorithms in FCS_COP.1(3)
by keys stored in the secure key storage.
5.1.2.25 FCS_STG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide [software-based] secure key storage for asymmetric private keys
and [symmetric keys].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall be capable of importing keys/secrets into the secure key storage upon
request of [the user, the administrator] and [applications running on the TSF].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall be capable of destroying keys/secrets in the secure key storage upon
request of [the user, the administrator].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the application that imported the
key/secret the use of the key/secret. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [a
common application developer].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.5
The TSF shall allow only the application that imported the key/secret to request that the
key/secret be destroyed. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [a common
application developer].
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5.1.2.26 FCS_STG_EXT.2: Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall encrypt all DEKs and KEKs and [Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, VPN, and
SecurityLogAgent properties (related to SE Android)] and [all software-based key
storage] by KEKs that are [
1. Protected by the REK with [
a. encryption by a REK,
b. encryption by a KEK that is derived from a REK],
2. Protected by the REK and the password with [
a. encryption by a REK and the password-derived KEK,
b. encryption by a KEK that is derived from a REK and the password-derived or
biometric-unlocked KEK]].
FCS_STG_EXT.2.2
DEKs, KEKs, [Bluetooth and WPA2 PSK long-term trusted channel key material and
SecurityLogAgent properties (related to SE Android)] and [all software-based key
storage] shall be encrypted using one of the following methods: [using a SP800-56B key
establishment scheme, using AES in the [GCM, CBC mode]].
(TD0369 applied)
5.1.2.27 FCS_STG_EXT.3: Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage
FCS_STG_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall protect the integrity of any encrypted DEKs and KEKs and [long-term
trusted channel key material, all software-based key storage] by [
• [GCM] cipher mode for encryption according to FCS_STG_EXT.2
• a hash (FCS_COP.1(2)) of the stored key that is encrypted by a key protected by
FCS_STG_EXT.2
• a keyed hash (FCS_COP.1(4)) using a key protected by a key protected by
FCS_STG_EXT.2].
FCS_STG_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall verify the integrity of the [MAC] of the stored key prior to use of the key.
5.1.2.28 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: Extended: TLS Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a client
that supports the cipher suites [
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289]
and also supports functionality for [mutual authentication].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
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The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier
according to RFC 6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid [with
no exceptions].
(SFR changed per TRRT 857 from NIAP to match PKG_TLSC_V1.1)
5.1.2.29 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended: Extensible Authentication
Protocol-Transport Layer Security - WLAN
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] in
support of the EAP-TLS protocol as specified in RFC 5216 supporting the following
ciphersuites: [
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2/WLAN
The TSF shall generate random values used in the EAP-TLS exchange using the RBG
specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3/WLAN
The TSF shall use X509 v3 certificates as specified in FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4/WLAN
The TSF shall verify that the server certificate presented includes the Server
Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.5/WLAN
The TSF shall allow an authorized administrator to configure the list of CAs that are
allowed to sign authentication server certificates that are accepted by the TOE.
(TD0492, TD0517 applied)
5.1.2.30 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: Extended: TLS Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello
handshake message with the following NIST curves: [secp256r1, secp384r1].
(TD0244 applied)
5.1.2.31 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN: TLS Client Protocol - WLAN
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1/WLAN
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The TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the
following NIST curves: [secp256r1, secp384r1].
(TD0244 applied)
5.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.1.3.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1: Extended: Security access control
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to restrict the system services that are accessible to
an application.
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide an access control policy that prevents [application, groups of
applications] from accessing [all] data stored by other [application, groups of
applications]. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized for such sharing by [the
administrator, a common application developer].
5.1.3.2 FDP_ACF_EXT.2: Extended: Security access control
FDP_ACF_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a separate [address book, calendar] for each application group
and only allow applications within that process group to access the resource. Exceptions
may only be explicitly authorized for such sharing by [the user].
5.1.3.3 FDP_ACF_EXT.3: Extended: Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall enforce an access control policy that prohibits an application from granting
both write and execute permission to a file on the device except for [files stored in the
application’s private data folder].
5.1.3.4 FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Extended: Protected Data Encryption
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
Encryption shall cover all protected data.
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.2
Encryption shall be performed using DEKs with AES in the [CBC, GCM, XTS] mode with
key size [256] bits.
5.1.3.5 FDP_DAR_EXT.2: Extended: Sensitive Data Encryption
FDP_DAR_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism for applications to mark data and keys as sensitive.
FDP_DAR_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall use an asymmetric key scheme to encrypt and store sensitive data
received while the product is locked.
FDP_DAR_EXT.2.3
The TSF shall encrypt any stored symmetric key and any stored private key of the
asymmetric key(s) used for the protection of sensitive data according to
FCS_STG_EXT.2.1 selection 2.
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FDP_DAR_EXT.2.4
The TSF shall decrypt the sensitive data that was received while in the locked state upon
transitioning to the unlocked state using the asymmetric key scheme and shall re-
encrypt that sensitive data using the symmetric key scheme.
5.1.3.6 FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information flow control
FDP_IFC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [provide an interface which allows a VPN client to protect all IP traffic
using IPsec, provide a VPN client which can protect all IP traffic using IPsec] with the
exception of IP traffic required to establish the VPN connection.
5.1.3.7 MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information flow control
FDP_IFC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall ensure that all IP traffic (other than IP traffic required to establish the VPN
connection) flow through the IPsec VPN client.
5.1.3.8 FDP_PBA_EXT.1: Extended: Storage of Critical Biometric Parameters
FDP_PBA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall protect the authentication template [using a password as an additional
factor].
5.1.3.9 MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FDP_RIP.2: Full Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP.2.1
The [TOE] shall enforce that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the [allocation of the resource to] all objects.
5.1.3.10 FDP_STG_EXT.1: Extended: User Data Storage
FDP_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide protected storage for the Trust Anchor Database.
5.1.3.11 FDP_UPC_EXT.1: Extended: Inter-TSF user data transfer protection
FDP_UPC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide a means for non-TSF applications executing on the TOE to use TLS,
HTTPS, Bluetooth BR/EDR, and [Bluetooth LE, IPsec] to provide a protected
communication channel between the non-TSF application and another IT product that is
logically distinct from other communication channels, provides assured identification of
its end points, protects channel data from disclosure, and detects modification of the
channel data.
FDP_UPC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall permit the non-TSF applications to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
5.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.1.4.1 FIA_AFL_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.1
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The TSF shall consider password and [no other] as critical authentication mechanisms.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall detect when a configurable positive integer within [1-30] of [non-unique]
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to last successful authentication for
each authentication mechanism.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall maintain the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts that have
occurred upon power off.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.4
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has exceeded the
maximum allowed for a given authentication mechanism, all future authentication
attempts will be limited to other available authentication mechanisms, unless the given
mechanism is designated as a critical authentication mechanism.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.5
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for the last available
authentication mechanism or single critical authentication mechanism has been
surpassed, the TSF shall perform a wipe of all protected data.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.6
The TSF shall increment the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts prior to
notifying the user that the authentication was unsuccessful.
5.1.4.2 FIA_BLT_EXT.1: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
FIA_BLT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before pairing with a remote Bluetooth
device.
5.1.4.3 FIA_BLT_EXT.2: Extended: Bluetooth Mutual Authentication
FIA_BLT_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall require Bluetooth mutual authentication between devices prior to any
data transfer over the Bluetooth link.
5.1.4.4 FIA_BLT_EXT.3: Extended: Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections
FIA_BLT_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall discard pairing and session initialization attempts from a Bluetooth device
address (BD_ADDR) to which an active session already exists.
(TD0468 applied)
5.1.4.5 FIA_BLT_EXT.4: Extended: Secure Simple Pairing
FIA_BLT_EXT.4.1
The TOE shall support Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing, both in the host and the
controller. Furthermore, Secure Simple Pairing shall be used during the pairing process if
the remote device also supports it.
5.1.4.6 FIA_BLT_EXT.6: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
FIA_BLT_EXT.6.1
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The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before granting trusted remote devices
access to services associated with the following Bluetooth profiles: [OPP, MAP], and
shall require explicit user authorization before granting untrusted remote devices access
to services associated with the following Bluetooth profiles: [all available Bluetooth
profiles].
5.1.4.7 FIA_BMG_EXT.1(1): Extended: Accuracy of Biometric Authentication
FIA_BMG_EXT.1(1).1
The one-attempt BAF False Accept Rate (FAR) for [fingerprint] shall not exceed
[1:10,000] with a one-attempt BAF False Reject Rate (FRR) not to exceed 1 in [33].
(TD0301 applied)
FIA_BMG_EXT.1(1).2
The overall System Authentication False Accept Rate (SAFAR) shall be no greater than 1
in [1,000] within a 1% margin.
5.1.4.8 FIA_BMG_EXT.1(2): Extended: Accuracy of Biometric Authentication
FIA_BMG_EXT.1(2).1
The one-attempt BAF False Accept Rate (FAR) for [hybrid] shall not exceed [1:10,000]
with a one-attempt BAF False Reject Rate (FRR) not to exceed 1 in [33].
(TD0301 applied)
FIA_BMG_EXT.1(2).2
The overall System Authentication False Accept Rate (SAFAR) shall be no greater than 1
in [1,000,000] within a 1% margin.
5.1.4.9 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_PAE_EXT.1: Port Access Entity Authentication
FIA_PAE_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the
'Supplicant' role.
5.1.4.10 FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Extended: Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall support the following for the Password Authentication Factor:
1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of [upper and lower
case letters], numbers, and special characters: [! @ # $ % ^ & * ( ) + = _ / - ' " : ; , ? `
~ \ | < > { } [ ] ];
2. Password length up to [16] characters shall be supported.
5.1.4.11 MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition - VPN
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that:
• are 22 characters and [[between 1 and 64 characters]];
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• composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special
characters (that include: '!', '@', '#', '$', '%', '^', '&', '*', '(', and ')').
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [[the entered string as
ASCII Hex]], [be able to [accept] bit-based pre-shared keys].
5.1.4.12 FIA_TRT_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication Throttling
FIA_TRT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall limit automated user authentication attempts by [enforcing a delay
between incorrect authentication attempts] for all authentication mechanisms selected
in FIA_UAU.5.1. The minimum delay shall be such that no more than 10 attempts can be
attempted per 500 milliseconds.
5.1.4.13 FIA_UAU.5: Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide password and [fingerprint, hybrid] to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [following rules:
• Passwords
o Can be used at any time
• Biometric
o Can only be used
▪ When work environment is not enabled for the device lock screen,
▪ When there is an enrolled biometric,
▪ When the user enables the allow biometrics for unlock feature,
▪ The non-critical biometric failed limit has not been reached, and
▪ At device lock screen (not at the first lock screen after reboot/power-up)
• Hybrid
o For work environments unlock and hybrid authentication factor configured by
the user
].
5.1.4.14 FIA_UAU.6(1): Re-Authentication
FIA_UAU.6(1).1
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user via the Password Authentication Factor under the
conditions attempted change to any supported authentication mechanisms.
5.1.4.15 FIA_UAU.6(2): Re-Authentication
FIA_UAU.6(2).1
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user via an authentication factor defined in
FIA_UAU.5.1 under the conditions TSF-initiated lock, user-initiated lock, [no other
conditions].
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5.1.4.16 FIA_UAU.7: Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the device's display to the user while
the authentication is in progress.
5.1.4.17 FIA_UAU_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic Operation
FIA_UAU_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall require the user to present the Password Authentication Factor prior to
decryption of protected data and encrypted DEKs, KEKs and [long-term trusted channel
key material, all software-based key storage] at startup.
5.1.4.18 FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Timing of Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall allow [[
• enter password or supply biometric authentication factor to unlock
• make emergency calls (not available on Tab Active3)
• receive calls (not available on Tab Active3)
• take pictures and screen shots (automatically named and stored internally by the
TOE)
• see notifications
• configure sound/vibrate/mute
• set the volume (up and down) for various sound categories
• see the configured banner, access Notification Panel functions (including toggles
Always on Display
• Flashlight
• Do not disturb toggle
• Auto rotate
• Sound (on, mute, vibrate)
• Access user configured Edge applications (Edge applications not available on Tab
Active3)
]] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.4.19 FIA_UAU_EXT.4: Extended: Secondary User Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.4.1
The TSF shall provide a secondary authentication mechanism for accessing Enterprise
applications and resources. The secondary authentication mechanism shall control
access to the Enterprise application and shared resources and shall be incorporated into
the encryption of protected and sensitive data belonging to Enterprise applications and
shared resources.
FIA_UAU_EXT.4.2
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The TSF shall require the user to present the secondary authentication factor prior to
decryption of Enterprise application data and Enterprise shared resource data.
5.1.4.20 FIA_X509_EXT.1: Extended: Validation of certificates
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
• The certificate path must terminate with a certificate in the Trust Anchor Database
• The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and
that any path constraints are met.
• The TSF shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key
usage field
• The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [OCSP as
specified in RFC 6960 (for TLS, HTTPS, IPsec), CRL as specified in RFC 5759 (for TLS,
HTTPS)].
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification
shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority
(RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the
extendedKeyUsage field. [conditional]
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose
(id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing
purpose (id-dp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field. [conditional]
(TD0301 applied)
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension
is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.1.4.21 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended: X.509 Certificate
Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall validate certificates for EAP-TLS in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
• The certificate path must terminate with a certificate in the Trust Anchor Database
• The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
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o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose
(id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/WLAN
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension
is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
(TD0439 applied)
5.1.4.22 FIA_X509_EXT.2: Extended: X509 certificate authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication
for IPsec, and [TLS, HTTPS], and [no additional uses].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate,
the TSF shall [not accept the certificate].
5.1.4.23 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN: Extended: X.509 Certificate
Authentication (EAP-TLS) - WLAN
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1/WLAN
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication
for EAP-TLS exchanges.
(TD0517 applied)
5.1.4.24 FIA_X509_EXT.3: Extended: Request Validation of certificates
FIA_X509_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall provide a certificate validation service to applications.
FIA_X509_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall respond to the requesting application with the success or failure of the
validation.
5.1.5 Security Management (FMT)
5.1.5.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1: Extended: Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in column 3 of Table 8 -
Security Management Functions to the user.
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in column 5 of Table 8 -
Security Management Functions to the administrator when the device is enrolled and
according to the administrator-configured policy.
5.1.5.2 FMT_SMF_EXT.1: Extended: Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
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The TSF shall be capable of performing the functions in column 2 of Table 8 - Security
Management Functions.
5.1.5.3 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended: Specification of
Management Functions - WLAN
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions in rows 48-
55 of Table 8 - Security Management Functions.
(TD0470 applied)
5.1.5.4 MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FMT_SMF.1/VPN: Specification of Management Functions - VPN
FMT_SMF.1.1/VPN
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions in rows 56-
61 of Table 8 - Security Management Functions.
Management Function
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
Admin
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
1. configure password policy:
a. minimum password length
b. minimum password complexity
c. maximum password lifetime
The administrator can configure the required password characteristics (minimum
length, complexity, and lifetime) using the MDM APIs.
There are distinct settings for the passwords used to unlock the personal and work
profiles.
Length: an integer value of characters (0 = no minimum)
Complexity: Unspecified, Something, Numeric, Alphabetic, Alphanumeric, Complex.
Lifetime: an integer value of days (0 = no maximum)
M M M
2. configure session locking policy:
a. screen-lock enabled/disabled
b. screen lock timeout
c. number of authentication failures
The administrator can configure the session locking policy using the MDM APIs.
There are distinct settings for personal and work profile inactivity.
The user can also adjust each of the session locking policies for the personal and
work profile; however, if set by the administrator, the user can only set a more
restrictive policy (e.g., setting the device to allow fewer authentication failures than
configured by the administrator).
Screen lock timeout: an integer number of minutes before the TOE locks (0 = no lock
timeout)
Authentication failures: an integer number (0 = no limit)
M M M
Status Markers:
M – Mandatory
I – Implemented optional
function
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Management Function
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
Admin
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
3. enable/disable the VPN protection:
a. across device
[
b. on a per-app basis,
c. on a per-group of applications processes basis
]
The user can configure and then enable the TOE’s VPN to protect traffic across the
entire device.
The administrator (through an MDM Agent that utilizes the MDM APIs) can restrict
the TOE’s ability to connect to a VPN.
The administrator can configure per-app and per-work profile VPN connections with
the work profile MDM APIs.
M I I
4. enable/disable [NFC2
, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and cellular radios]
The administrator can disable the radios using the TOE’s MDM APIs. Once disabled,
a user cannot enable the radio. The administrator cannot fully disable/restrict
cellular voice capabilities. The TOE’s radios operate at frequencies of 2.4 GHz
(NFC/Bluetooth), 2.4/5 GHz (Wi-Fi), and 850 MHz (4G/LTE).
M I I
5. enable/disable [camera, microphone]:
a. across device
[ d. no other method]
An administrator may configure the TOE (through an MDM agent utilizing the MDM
APIs) to turn off the camera and or microphones. If the administrator has disabled
either the camera or the microphones, then the user cannot use those capture
devices.
The administrator can also disable the use of the camera or microphone inside a
work profile without affecting access to those devices when outside the work
profile.
M I I
6. transition to the locked state
Both users and administrators (using the MDM APIs) can transition the TOE into a
locked state.
M M -
7. TSF wipe of protected data
Both users and administrators (using the MDM APIs) can force the TOE to perform a
full wipe (factory reset) of data.
M M
8. configure application installation policy by:
a. restricting the sources of applications
M M M
2
Samsung Galaxy Tab Active3 devices do not have NFC radios.
Status Markers:
M – Mandatory
I – Implemented optional
function
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Management Function
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
Admin
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
[b. specifying a set of allowed applications based on [application name,
developer signature] (an application whitelist)
c. denying installation of applications]
The administrator using the TOE’s MDM APIs can configure the TOE so that
applications cannot be installed and can also block the use of the Google Play Store.
There are distinct settings for disabling the installation of applications for the
personal and work profile.
9. import keys/secrets into the secure key storage
Both users and administrators (using the MDM APIs) can import secret keys into the
secure key storage.
M I
10. destroy imported keys/secrets and [no other keys/secrets] in the secure key
storage
Both users and administrators (using the MDM APIs) can destroy secret keys in the
secure key storage.
M I
11. import X.509v3 certificates into the Trust Anchor Database
Both users and administrators (using the MDM APIs) can import X.509v3 certificates
into the Trust Anchor Database.
M M
12. remove imported X.509v3 certificates and [default X.509v3 certificates] in the
Trust Anchor Database
Both users and administrators (using the MDM APIs) can remove imported X.509v3
certificates from the Trust Anchor Database as well as disable any of the TOE’s
default Root CA certificates (in the latter case, the CA certificate still resides in the
TOE’s read-only system partition; however, the TOE will treat that Root CA
certificate and any certificate chaining to it as untrusted).
M I
13. enroll the TOE in management
TOE users can enroll the TOE in management according to the instructions specific
to a given MDM. Presumably any enrollment would involve at least some user
functions (e.g., install an MDM agent application) on the TOE prior to enrollment.
M M
14. remove applications
Both users and administrators (using the MDM APIs) can uninstall user and
administrator installed applications in the personal profile and applications inside a
work profile.
M M
15. update system software
Users can check for updates and cause the device to update if an update is available.
An administrator can use MDM APIs to query the version of the TOE and query the
installed applications and an MDM agent on the TOE could issue pop-ups, initiate
updates, block communication, etc. until any necessary updates are completed.
Note that the system software covers the entire mobile device (including all work
profile software).
M M
Status Markers:
M – Mandatory
I – Implemented optional
function
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Management Function
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
Admin
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
16. install applications
Both users and administrators (using the MDM APIs) can install applications in the
personal profile and applications inside a work profile. Only administrators (using
the MDM APIs) can specify to install applications in a Knox Separated Apps folder.
M M
17. remove Enterprise applications
Both users and administrators (using the MDM APIs) can uninstall user and
administrator installed applications in the personal profile and applications inside a
work profile. Applications installed within the work profile are marked as Enterprise
(work) applications
M M
18. configure the Bluetooth trusted channel:
a. disable/enable the Discoverable mode (for BR/EDR)
b. change the Bluetooth device name
[ e. allow/disallow Android Beam to be used with Bluetooth]
TOE users can enable Bluetooth discoverable mode for a short period of time and
can also change the device name which is used for the Bluetooth name. Additional
wireless technologies include Android Beam which are related to NFC and can be
enabled and disabled by the TOE user. Bluetooth profiles (not services) can be
managed on the device by the administrator. The administrator can restrict only
items a and e.
M I I
19. enable/disable display notification in the locked state of: [
f. all notifications]
TOE users can configure the TOE to allow or disallow notifications while in a locked
state.
M
20. enable data-at rest protection
The TOE always encrypts user data storage.
M
21. enable removable media’s data-at-rest protection
The administrator (using the MDM APIs) can configure a removable media
encryption policy (on supported devices). Once enabled, the device will prompt a
user to encrypt a newly inserted external SD cards (and the device will then encrypt
any files present after which the device can use the SD Card). If the user chooses not
to encrypt the newly inserted external SD card, then the device cannot access the SD
Card. If the administrator has set the policy to force encrypt removable media, then
the settings option to decrypt the SD Card is greyed out and the user cannot decrypt
the SD Card.
M I I
22. enable/disable location services:
a. across device
[d. no other method]
The administrator (using the MDM APIs) can disable location services.
M I I
Status Markers:
M – Mandatory
I – Implemented optional
function
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Management Function
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
Admin
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
Unless disabled by the administrator, TOE users can enable and disable location
services.
23. enable/disable the use of [Fingerprint, Hybrid Authentication]
The TOE supports disabling Biometric authentication for the both the TOE’s normal
device lock screen and for the TOE’s work profile lock screen. The TOE’s normal
device lock screen supports biometrics, which the administrator can disable. The
TOE’s work profile supports hybrid authentication (combination of password and
biometrics), which the administrator can also disable.
M I I
24. enable/disable all data signaling over [assignment: list of externally accessible
hardware ports]
25. enable/disable [assignment: list of protocols where the device acts as a server]
26. enable/disable developer modes
The administrator (using the MDM APIs) can disable Developer Mode.
Unless disabled by the administrator, TOE users can enable and disable Developer
Mode.
I I I
27. enable/disable bypass of local user authentication I I I
28. wipe Enterprise data
The TOE work profile provides the ability to remove only Enterprise data versus user
data.
I
29. approve [import, removal] by applications of X.509v3 certificates in the Trust
Anchor Database
30. configure whether to establish a trusted channel or disallow establishment if
the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate
31. enable/disable the cellular protocols used to connect to cellular network base
stations
32. read audit logs kept by the TSF
The administrator (using the MDM APIs) can view the TOE’s audit records.
I I
33. configure [selection: certificate, public-key] used to validate digital signature on
applications
34. approve exceptions for shared use of keys/secrets by multiple applications
35. approve exceptions for destruction of keys/secrets by applications that did not
import the key/secret
36. configure the unlock banner
The administrator (using the MDM APIs) can define a banner of a maximum of 256
characters to be displayed while the TOE is locked. There is no method for the user
to change the banner.
I I I
37. configure the auditable items I I I
38. retrieve TSF-software integrity verification values
39. enable/disable [ I I I
Status Markers:
M – Mandatory
I – Implemented optional
function
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Management Function
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
Admin
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
a. USB mass storage mode]
The administrator (using the MDM APIs) can disable USB mass storage mode.
40. enable/disable backup of [selection: all applications, selected applications,
selected groups of applications, configuration data] to [selection: local system,
remote system]
41. enable/disable [
a. Hotspot functionality authenticated by [pre-shared key],
b. USB tethering authenticated by [no authentication]]
The administrator (using the MDM APIs) can disable the wireless hotspot and USB
tethering.
If enabled by the administrator (and supported by the device3
), TOE users can
configure:
• A Wi-Fi hotspot with a pre-shared key
• A Bluetooth hotspot with another device that has been successfully
completed a Bluetooth pairing (establishing a pre-shared key)
• A USB tethering connection when the user has first authenticated to the
device (the tethering connection will be maintained when the device locks,
but initial setup requires the user to actively approve the connection via
authentication to the device)
I I I
42. approve exceptions for sharing data between [groups of application processes]
The TOE work profile and Knox Separated Apps folder provide separation between
groups of application processes along with the ability to control the ability to share
data between these groups
I I
43. place applications into application process groups based on [creating a Knox
Separated Apps folder]
I I I
44. unenroll the TOE from management I I I
45. Enable/disable the Always On VPN protection
The user can be required to use an Always On VPN
I I I
46. Revoke Biometric template
47. [enable/disable USB host storage
disable CC Mode
enable/disable manual Date/Time changes
enable/disable applications (including pre-installed)]
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
3
Not all devices support all (or any) options for tethering. Many carriers require additional subscriptions/payments
to enable tethering features on the device. The Tab Active3 devices do not support tethering.
Status Markers:
M – Mandatory
I – Implemented optional
function
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Management Function
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
Admin
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
The user can always disable CC Mode by entirely wiping the device (factory reset), as
this will return the phone to its factory state (in which CC Mode has not been
enabled)
FMT_SMF_EXT.1(1)/WLAN
48. configure security policy for each wireless network:
a. [specify the CA(s) from which the TSF will accept WLAN
authentication server certificate(s)]
b. security type
c. authentication protocol
d. client credentials to be used for authentication;
M M I
49. specify wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the TSF may connect; M M I
50. enable/disable certificate revocation list checking;
51. disable ad hoc wireless client-to-client connection capability;
52. disable wireless network bridging capability (for example, bridging a connection
between the WLAN and cellular radios on a smartphone so it can function as a
hotspot);
53. disable roaming capability
54. enable/disable IEEE 802.1X pre-authentication
55. enable/disable and configure PMK caching
a. set the amount of time (in minutes) for which PMK entries are cached
b. set the maximum number of PMK entries that can be cached
FMT_SMF.1/VPN
56. Specify VPN gateways to use for connections I
57. Specify IPsec VPN Clients to use for connections
58. Specify IPsec-capable network devices to use for connections
59. Specify client credentials to be used for connections M
60. Configure the reference identifier of the peer M
61. [any additional VPN management functions]
Table 8 - Security Management Functions
5.1.5.5 FMT_SMF_EXT.2: Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions
FMT_SMF_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall offer [
• wipe of protected data
• wipe of sensitive data
• remove Enterprise applications
• remove all device-stored Enterprise resource data
• remove Enterprise secondary authentication data
] upon unenrollment and [no other triggers].
(TD0346 applied)
Status Markers:
M – Mandatory
I – Implemented optional
function
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5.1.5.6 FMT_SMF_EXT.3: Extended: Current Administrator
FMT_SMF_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism that allows users to view a list of currently
authorized administrators and the management functions that each administrator is
authorized to perform.
5.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.1.6.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide address space layout randomization ASLR to applications.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The base address of any user-space memory mapping will consist of at least 8
unpredictable bits.
5.1.6.2 FPT_AEX_EXT.2: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions)
FPT_AEX_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall be able to enforce read, write, and execute permissions on every page of
physical memory.
5.1.6.3 FPT_AEX_EXT.3: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow Protection)
FPT_AEX_EXT.3.1
TSF processes that execute in a non-privileged execution domain on the application
processor shall implement stack-based buffer overflow protection.
5.1.6.4 FPT_AEX_EXT.4: Extended: Domain Isolation
FPT_AEX_EXT.4.1
The TSF shall protect itself from modification by untrusted subjects.
FPT_AEX_EXT.4.2
The TSF shall enforce isolation of address space between applications.
5.1.6.5 FPT_AEX_EXT.5: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
FPT_AEX_EXT.5.1
The TSF shall provide address space layout randomization (ASLR) to the kernel.
FPT_AEX_EXT.5.2
The base address of any kernel-space memory mapping will consist of at least 4
unpredictable bits.
5.1.6.6 FPT_AEX_EXT.6: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions)
FPT_AEX_EXT.6.1
The TSF shall prevent write and execute permissions from being simultaneously granted
to any page of physical memory [excluding memory used for JIT (just-in-time)
compilation and memory allocated with mmap].
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5.1.6.7 FPT_BBD_EXT.1: Extended: Application Processor Mediation
FPT_BBD_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall prevent code executing on any baseband processor (BP) from accessing
application processor (AP) resources except when mediated by the AP.
5.1.6.8 FPT_JTA_EXT.1: Extended: JTAG Disablement
FPT_JTA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [control access by a signing key] to JTAG.
5.1.6.9 FPT_KST_EXT.1: Extended: Key Storage
FPT_KST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall not store any plaintext key material in readable non-volatile memory.
5.1.6.10 FPT_KST_EXT.2: Extended: No Key Transmission
FPT_KST_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall not transmit any plaintext key material outside the security boundary of
the TOE.
5.1.6.11 FPT_KST_EXT.3: Extended: No Plaintext Key Export
FPT_KST_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall ensure it is not possible for the TOE user(s) to export plaintext keys.
5.1.6.12 FPT_NOT_EXT.1: Extended: Self-Test Notification
FPT_NOT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall transition to non-operational mode and [force User authentication failure]
when the following types of failures occur:
• failures of the self-test(s)
• TSF software integrity verification failures
• [no other failures].
5.1.6.13 FPT_STM.1: Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
5.1.6.14 FPT_TST_EXT.1: Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of all cryptographic functionality.
5.1.6.15 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN: Extended: TSF Cryptographic
Functionality Testing - WLAN
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The [TOE platform] shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
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FPT_TST_EXT.1.2/WLAN
The [TOE platform] shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF
executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the TSF-provided
cryptographic services.
5.1.6.16 MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN: Extended: TSF Self Test - VPN
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1/VPN
The [TOE Platform] shall run a suite of self -tests during initial start-up (on power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.2/VPN
The [TOE, TOE Platform] shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF
executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the [cryptographic
signature and hash for integrity].
5.1.6.17 FPT_TST_EXT.2(1): Extended: TSF Integrity Checking
FPT_TST_EXT.2(1).1
The TSF shall verify the integrity of the bootchain up through the Application Processor
OS kernel stored in mutable media prior to its execution through the use of [an
immutable hardware hash of an asymmetric key].
5.1.6.18 FPT_TST_EXT.2(2): Extended: TSF Integrity Checking
FPT_TST_EXT.2(2).1
The TSF shall verify the integrity of [[the /system partition]], stored in mutable media
prior to its execution through the use of [hardware-protected hash].
5.1.6.19 FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the
TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the
hardware model of the device.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of
installed mobile applications.
5.1.6.20 FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Extended: TSF Update Verification
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall verify software updates to the Application Processor system software and
[[communications processor software, bootloader software, carrier specific
configuration]] using a digital signature verified by the manufacturer trusted key prior
to installing those updates.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall [update only by verified software] the TSF boot integrity [key, hash].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3
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The TSF shall verify that the digital signature verification key used for TSF updates
[matches an immutable hardware public key].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.4
The TSF shall verify mobile application software using a digital signature mechanism
prior to installation.
5.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)
5.1.7.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1: Extended: TSF- and User-initiated Locked State
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall transition to a locked state after a time interval of inactivity.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall transition to a locked state after initiation by either the user or the
administrator.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall, upon transitioning to the locked state, perform the following operations:
a. clearing or overwriting display devices, obscuring the previous contents;
b. [no other actions].
5.1.7.2 FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory warning message
regarding unauthorized use of the TOE.
5.1.7.3 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FTA_WSE_EXT.1: Wireless Network Access
FTA_WSE_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to attempt connections only to wireless networks specified as
acceptable networks as configured by the administrator in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/WLAN.
(TD0470 applied)
5.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
5.1.8.1 FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted channel Communication
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall use 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS, IPsec and [TLS, HTTPS] protocol to
provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is
logically distinct from other communication channels, provides assured identification of
its end points, protects channel data from disclosure, and detects modification of the
channel data.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall permit the TSF to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for wireless access point
connections, administrative communication, configured enterprise connections, and [no
other connections].
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5.1.8.2 PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN: Trusted Channel Communication -
WLAN
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall use 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to provide a trusted communication
channel between itself and a wireless access point that is logically distinct from other
communication channels, provides assured identification of its end points, protects
channel data from disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.2/WLAN
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for wireless access point
connections.
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The SARs for the TOE are the EAL 1 augmented with ALC_TSU_EXT.1 components as specified in Part 3
of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have effectively been refined with the assurance activities
explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.
5.2.1 Development (ADV)
5.2.1.1 ADV_FSP.1: Basic Functional Specification
ADV_FSP.1.1d
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2d
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.1.1c
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-
enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2c
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-
enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3c
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of
interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4c
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2e
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and
complete instantiation of the SFRs.
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5.2.2 Guidance Documents (AGD)
5.2.2.1 AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance
AGD_OPE.1.1d
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible
functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment,
including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the
available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions
and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user,
indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of
security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be
performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control
of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5c
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE
(including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and
implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures
to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment
as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7c
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.2.2 AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures
AGD_PRE.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance
of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation
of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance
with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
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AGD_PRE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2e
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be
prepared securely for operation.
5.2.3 Life-cycle Support (ALC)
5.2.3.1 ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.1.1c
The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.3.2 ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM Coverage
ALC_CMS.1.1d
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.1.1c
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation
evidence required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2c
The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.3.3 ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1d
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are
made to the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1c
The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for
the TOE software.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2c
The description shall express the time window as the length of time, in days, between
public disclosure of a vulnerability and the public availability of security updates to the
TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.3c
The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security
issues pertaining to the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.4c
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The description shall include where users can seek information about the availability of
new updates including details (e.g. CVE identifiers) of the specific public vulnerabilities
corrected by each update.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.4 Tests (ATE)
5.2.4.1 ATE_IND.1: Independent Testing - sample
ATE_IND.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2e
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
5.2.5 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
5.2.5.1 AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability Survey
AVA_VAN.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2e
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3e
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential
vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an
attacker possessing Basic attack potential.
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6 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
• Security audit
• Cryptographic support
• User data protection
• Identification and authentication
• Security management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE access
• Trusted path/channels
6.1 Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 & PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FAU_GEN.1/WLAN
The following table enumerates the events that the TOE audits. Requirements marked with “(O)” are
from the Table 2: Additional Auditable Events of the PP_MD_V3.1.
Requirement Audit Event Content
FAU_GEN.1
Start-up and shutdown of the audit
functions
FAU_GEN.1 All administrative actions
FAU_GEN.1
Start-up and shutdown of the OS and
kernel
FAU_GEN.1 Insertion or removal of removable media
FAU_GEN.1
Establishment of a synchronizing
connection
FAU_GEN.1
Reaching the configured audit log critical
size limit
FCS_CKM.1
Failure of key generation activity for
authentication keys.
FCS_STG_EXT.1 Import or destruction of key.
Identity of key. Role and identity
of requestor.
FCS_STG_EXT.3 Failure to verify integrity of stored key. Identity of key being verified.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN Failure to establish an EAP-TLS session. Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN
Establishment/termination of an EAP-TLS
session.
Non-TOE endpoint of
connection.
FDP_DAR_EXT.2 Failure to encrypt/decrypt data.
FDP_STG_EXT.1
Addition or removal of certificate from
Trust Anchor Database.
Subject name of certificate.
FIA_UAU.6 (O)
User changes Password Authentication
Factor.
FIA_X509_EXT.1 Failure to validate X.509v3 certificate. Reason for failure of validation.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 (O)
Failure to establish connection to
determine revocation status.
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Requirement Audit Event Content
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Change of settings.
Role of user that changed
setting. Value of new setting.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 (O) Success or failure of function.
Role of user that performed
function. Function performed.
Reason for failure.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 (O) Initiation of software update. Version of update.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 (O)
Initiation of application installation or
update.
Name and version of application.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 &
FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN
Initiation of self-test. Failure of self-test. [none]
FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN
Execution of this set of TSF self-tests.
[none]
[none].
FPT_TST_EXT.2(1)
Start-up of TOE.
[none]
No additional Information.
[no additional information]
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 (O)
Success or failure of signature verification
for software updates.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 (O)
Success or failure of signature verification
for applications.
FTA_TAB.1 (O) Change in banner setting.
FTA_WSE_EXT.1 All attempts to connect to access points.
Identity of access point being
connected to as well as success
and failures (including reason for
failure).
FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN
All attempts to establish a trusted channel.
(TD0194 applied)
Identification of the non-TOE
endpoint of the channel.
Table 9 - Audit Events
FAU_SAR.1
The TOE provides the ability for the administrator to export and read the audit log.
FAU_SEL.1
The TOE provides the ability to select the audit events that are logged. There are three classes of audit
events that can be logged, system and apps, kernel and IP tables. Each can be controlled individually, so
the administrator can log just select classes of events. Within the classes, events can be selected based
upon success, failure, severity, event group, and UID.
FAU_STG.1
The TOE stores audit records in a file within the file system accessible only to Linux processes with
system permissions (effectively the TSF itself and MDM agents possessing a valid Knox license using the
defined APIs). These restrictions prevent the unauthorized modification or deletion of the audit records
stored in the audit files.
FAU_STG.4
The TOE pre-allocates a file system area (between 10MB and 50MB in size, depending upon available
storage on the device) by creating a /data/system/[admin_uid]_bubble/bubbleFile and directory
(/data/system/[admin_uid]) in which to archive compressed audit logs. If the TOE lacks sufficient space
(at least 10MB), then the TOE returns a failure code in response to the administrator’s attempt to
enable the AuditLog. Once enabled, the TOE writes audit events into nodes until they read a given size,
and then compresses and archives the records. The TOE utilizes a circular buffer approach to handle
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when the accumulated, compressed audit events exceed the allocated file system size. When the limit is
reached, the TOE removes the oldest audit logs, freeing space for new records.
6.2 Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1
The TOE supports asymmetric key generation for all types in accordance with FIPS 186-4. The TOE
generates RSA keys in its SCrypto library and generates DH/ECDH/ECDSA (including P-256, P384 and P-
521) keys in BoringSSL and ECDSA (including P-256, P384 and P-521) keys in in SCrypto. The TOE
supports generating keys with a security strength of 112-bits and larger, thus supports 2048-bit RSA and
DH keys, and 256-bit ECDH/ECDSA keys. The TOE’s RSA and ECDSA implementations have the CAVP
certificates described in the FCS_COP.1 section below.
Cryptographic Library RSA Generation DH (FFC) ECDH (ECC) EDCSA (ECC)
BoringSSL (user space) No Yes Yes Yes
Kernel Crypto (Kernel) No No No No
SCrypto (TrustZone) Yes No No Yes
Application Processor No No No No
Table 10 - Asymmetric Key Generation per Module
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_CKM.1/WLAN
The TOE adheres to IEEE 802.11-2012 and IEEE 802.11ac-2014 for key generation. The TOE’s
wpa_supplicant provides the PRF384 for WPA2 derivation of 128-bit AES Temporal Key (using the HMAC
implementation provided by BoringSSL) and employs its BoringSSL AES-256 DRBG when generating
random values used in the EAP-TLS and 802.11 4-way handshake. The TOE supports the AES-128 CCMP
encryption mode. The TOE has successfully completed certification (including WPA2 Enterprise) and
received Wi-Fi CERTIFIED Interoperability Certificates from the Wi-Fi Alliance. The Wi-Fi Alliance
maintains a website providing further information about the testing program: http://www.wi-
fi.org/certification.
Device Name Model Number Wi-Fi Alliance Certificate Numbers
Galaxy A52 SM-A526x 110242, 110243, 110475, 110613, 110614
Galaxy A42
SM-A426x 102133, 102135, 110678, 111052
SM-S426x 111054
Galaxy A71 5G SM-G715x 97494, 100309, 98205
Galaxy A51 5G SM-N976x 100038, 97686
Galaxy Tab Active3 SM-N975x 101265, 101555, 101556, 101557, 101558
Table 11 - W-Fi Alliance Certificates
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FCS_CKM.1/VPN
The VPN uses the TOE cryptographic libraries to generate asymmetric keys (RSA or ECDSA) for
authentication during the IKE key exchange. Note that ECDSA is only supported by IKEv2 connections.
FCS_CKM.2(1)
The TOE supports RSA (800-56B, as an initiator only), DHE (FFC 800-56A), and ECDHE (ECC 800-56A)
methods in TLS key establishment/exchange. The TOE has CVL KAS and ECDSA CAVP algorithm
certificates for Elliptic Curve key establishment and key generation respectively as described in the
FCS_COP.1 section below. Samsung vendor-affirms that the TOE’s RSA key establishment follows 800-
56B. The user and administrator need take no special configuration of the TOE as the TOE automatically
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generates the keys needed for negotiated TLS ciphersuites. Because the TOE only acts as a TLS client, the
TOE only performs 800-56B encryption (specifically the encryption of the Pre-Master Secret using the
Server’s RSA public key) when participating in TLS_RSA_* based TLS handshakes. Thus, the TOE does not
perform 800-56B decryption. However, the TOE’s TLS client correctly handles other cryptographic errors
(for example, invalid checksums, incorrect certificate types, corrupted certificates) by sending a TLS fatal
alert.
FCS_CKM.2(2)
The TOE uses ECDH with a P-256 curve key establishment for protection of application sensitive data
received while the device is locked.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_CKM.2/WLAN
The TOE adheres to RFC 3394, SP 800-38F, and 802.11-2012 standards and unwraps the GTK (sent
encrypted with the WPA2 KEK using AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame). The TOE, upon receiving an
EAPOL frame, will subject the frame to a number of checks (frame length, EAPOL version, frame payload
size, EAPOL-Key type, key data length, EAPOL-Key CCMP descriptor version, and replay counter) to
ensure a proper EAPOL message and then decrypt the GTK using the KEK, thus ensuring that it does not
expose the Group Temporal Key (GTK).
FCS_CKM_EXT.1
The TOE supports a Root Encryption Key (REK) within the main (application) processor. Requests for
encryption or decryption chaining to the REK are only accessible through the Trusted Execution
Environment, or TEE (TrustZone). The REK lies in a series of 256-bit fuses, programmed during
manufacturing. The TEE does not allow direct access to the REK but provides services to derive a HEK
(Hardware Encryption Key, which is derived from the REK through a KDF function) for encryption and
decryption.
The REK value is generated during manufacturing either by the TOE (if it detects that the REK fuses have
not been set) using its hardware DRBG or is generated during fabrication using an external RBG that
meets the requirements of this PP in that the process utilizes a SHA-256 Hash_DRBG seeded by a
hardware entropy source identical in architecture to that within the TOE. This fabrication process
includes strict controls (including physical and logical access control to the manufacturing room where
programming takes place as well as video surveillance and access only to specific, authorized, trusted
individuals) to ensure that the fabricator cannot access any REK values between generation and
programming.
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 (KMD)
The TOE supports Data Encryption Key (DEK) generation using its approved RBGs for use in SD card
encryption. The TOE RBGs are capable of generating AES 256-bit DEKs in response to applications and
services on the device. These can be accessed through both Android native APIs and C APIs depending
on the library being called. For FBE, the TOE supports using a SP800-108 KDF to concatenate keys
together to generate unique DEKs. The keys used in the SP800-108 KDF are generated by the approved
RBGs. The TOE can also generate 128-bit asymmetric keys used for sensitive data protection.
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 (KMD)
The TOE generates KEKs (which are always AES 256-bit keys generated by one of the TOE’s DRBGs)
through a combination of methods. First, the TOE generates a KEK (the Keystore masterkey) for each
user of the TOE. The TOE also generates encryption KEKs for FBE, the SD Card encryption (on applicable
devices), and work profile encryption (normal and sensitive).
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The TOE generates a number of different KEKs. In addition to the TSF KEKs, applications may request key
generation (through either the Android APIs or SCrypto APIs within the TEE), and the TOE utilizes its
BoringSSL/SCrypto CTR_DRBG (AES) and Kernel Crypto HMAC_DRBG to satisfy those requests. The
requesting application ultimately chooses whether to use that key as a DEK or a KEK, but it is worth
mentioning here, as an application can utilize such a key as a KEK, should it choose.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 (KMD)
The TOE destroys cryptographic keys when they are no longer in use by the system. The exceptions to
this are public keys (that protect the boot chain and software updates) and the REK, which are never
cleared. Keys stored in RAM during use are destroyed by a zero overwrite. Keys stored in Flash (i.e.
eMMC) are destroyed by cryptographic erasure through a block erase call to the flash controller for the
location where the FBE and SD Card keys are stored. Once these are erased, all keys (and data) stored
within the encrypted data partition of the TOE are considered cryptographically erased.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5
The TOE provides a TOE Wipe function that first erases the encrypted DEKs used to encrypt the data
partition using a block erase and read verify command to ensure that the UFS blocks containing the
encrypted DEKs (FBE and SD card) are now reported as empty. After the encrypted keys have been
erased, the TOE will delete the entire user partition with a block erase command and then reformat the
partition. Upon completion of reformatting the Flash partition holding user data, the TOE will perform a
power-cycle.
FCS_CKM_EXT.6
The TOE creates salt and nonces (which are just salt values used in WPA2) using its CTR_DRBG (AES).
Salt value and size RBG origin Salt storage location
User password salt (256-bit) BoringSSL’s CTR_DRBG (AES) Flash file system
TLS client_random (256-bit) BoringSSL’s CTR_DRBG (AES) N/A (ephemeral)
TLS pre_master_secret (384-bit) BoringSSL’s CTR_DRBG (AES) N/A (ephemeral)
TLS ECDHE private value (256, 384, 512) BoringSSL’s CTR_DRBG (AES) N/A (ephemeral)
WPA2 4-way handshake supplicant nonce
(SNonce)
BoringSSL’s CTR_DRBG (AES) through
wpa_supplicant
N/A (ephemeral)
Table 12 - Salt Creation
FCS_COP.1
The TOE performs cryptographic algorithms in accordance with the following NIST standards and has
received the following CAVP algorithm certificates.
The BoringSSL v1.5 library provides the following algorithms.
Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
AES 128/256 CBC, GCM, KW FIPS 197, SP 800-38A/D/F FCS_COP.1(1) A907
CVL ECC/FFC SP 800-56A
FCS_CKM.2(1)
FCS_CKM_EXT.3
A907
CTR_DRBG (AES) SP 800-90A FCS_RBG_EXT.1 A907
ECDSA PKG/PKV/SigGen/SigVer FIPS 186-4
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2(1)
FCS_COP.1(3)
A907
HMAC SHA-1/256/384/512 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 FCS_COP.1(4) A907
RSA KeyGen/SigGen/SigVer FIPS 186-4 FCS_COP.1(3) A907
SHS SHA-1/256/384/512 FIPS 180-4 FCS_COP.1(2) A907
Table 13 - BoringSSL Cryptographic Algorithms
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The Samsung Crypto Extension v1.0 library provides the following algorithms.
Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
KBKDF SP 800-108 FCS_CKM_EXT.3 A933
Table 14 - Samsung Crypto Extension Cryptographic Algorithms
The evaluated devices utilize the following kernels for the Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module
(Kernel Crypto).
Device Kernel Version
Kernel Crypto
Version
A52 5G/A42 5G 4.19 2.2
A71 5G/A51 5G 4.19 2.1
Tab Active3 4.9 1.9
Table 15 - Kernel Versions
The Samsung Kernel Cryptographic (“Kernel Crypto”) Module provides the following algorithms.
Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
AES 128/256 CBC FIPS 197, SP 800-38A FCS_COP.1(1)
A970, A969
A503, A502
5184, 5183
HMAC SHA-1/256 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 FCS_COP.1(4)
A970, A969
A503, A502
3440, 3439
DRBG SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG SP 800-90A FCS_RBG_EXT.1
A970, A969
A503, A502
1958
SHS SHA-1/256 FIPS 180-4 FCS_COP.1(2)
A970, A969
A503, A502
4188, 4187
A502
Table 16 - Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Algorithms
The evaluated devices utilize the Samsung SCrypto Cryptographic Module for cryptographic operations
within the TEE on each device. The following table lists the TEE operating systems for each device.
Device TEE OS Version SCrypto Version
A52 5G/A42 5G QSEE 5.10 2.5
A71 5G/A51 5G QSEE 5.8 2.5
Tab Active3 TEEGRIS 4.0 2.5
Table 17 - TEE Environments
The Samsung SCrypto TEE library provides the following algorithms. Note that the TOE only performs
RSA signing/decryption (using the private key) in the TEE, and performs public key
verification/encryption in the normal world using BoringSSL.
Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
AES CBC/GCM 128/256 FIPS 197, SP 800-38A/D FCS_COP.1(1) A889, C1360
DRBG CTR_DRBG (AES) SP 800-90A FCS_RBG_EXT.1 A889, C1360
ECDSA PKG/PKV/SigGen/SigVer FIPS 186-4
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1(3)
A889, C1360
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Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
HMAC SHA-1/256/384/512 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 FCS_COP.1(4) A889, C1360
RSA KeyGen and SigGen (no
verification)
FIPS 186-4
FCS_CKM.1FCS_CK
M.2(1)
FCS_COP.1(3)
A889, C1360
SHS SHA-1/256/384/512 FIPS 180-4 FCS_COP.1(2) A889, C1360
KBKDF SP 800-108 FCS_CKM_EXT.3 A889, C1360
Table 18 - SCrypto TEE Cryptographic Algorithms
The Chipset hardware for storage encryption has various modules that provide cryptographic functions.
The modules and versions are listed here. Only discrete modules are listed here.
Device Flash Crypto
A52 5G/A42 5G/A71 5G/A51 5G Qualcomm ICE v3.1.0
Tab Active3 Samsung FMP v2.0 (HW FX6_V4.0)
Table 19 - Hardware Components
The Samsung Flash Memory Protector (“FMP”) Driver Module provides the following software
algorithms.
Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
SHS SHA-256 (Exynos FMP) FIPS 180-4 FCS_COP.1(2) A505
HMAC SHA-256 (Exynos FMP) FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 FCS_COP.1(4) A505
Table 20 - FMP Driver Algorithms
The storage encryption modules provide the following algorithms.
Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
XTS-AES 128/256 (Exynos FMP) FIPS 197, SP 800-38E FCS_COP.1(1) A504
XTS-AES 128/256 (Qualcomm) FIPS 197, SP 800-38E FCS_COP.1(1)
A1010, A1009,
C1553, C1552
Table 21 - Storage Hardware Algorithms
The devices contain unique Wi-Fi chipsets based on the model of the device. The chipsets are listed
here.
Device Wi-Fi Chipset
A52 5G/A42 5G Qualcomm WCN3988
A71 5G/A51 5G Qualcomm WCN3998
Tab Active3 Broadcom BCM4361
Table 22 - Wi-Fi Hardware Components
The Wi-Fi chipset hardware provides the following algorithms.
Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
AES 128 CCM (Qualcomm Wi-Fi) FIPS 197, SP 800-38C FCS_COP.1(1) 4748, 4143
AES 128 CCM (BCM Wi-Fi) FIPS 197, SP 800-38C FCS_COP.1(1) 4152
Table 23 - Wi-Fi Chip Algorithms
The SoC hardware provides the following algorithms.
Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
KBKDF (Exynos) SP 800-108 FCS_CKM_EXT.3 196
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Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
AES 128/256 CBC/GCM (Exynos) FIPS 197, SP 800-38A/D FCS_COP.1(1) 5367
SHS SHA-256 (Exynos) FIPS 180-4 FCS_COP.1(2) 4309
HMAC SHA-256 (Exynos) FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 FCS_COP.1(4) 3555
AES 128/256 CBC (Qualcomm) FIPS 197, SP 800-38A FCS_COP.1(1) A242
DRBG SHA-256 Hash_DRBG
(Qualcomm)
SP 800-90A FCS_RBG_EXT.1 A50
SHS SHA-256 (Qualcomm) FIPS 180-4 FCS_COP.1(2) A50
Table 24 - SoC Cryptographic Algorithms
The TOE’s application processors include hardware entropy implementations that supply random data
within the TEE and to the Linux kernel RNG (/dev/random).
Note that kernel-space system applications utilize the cryptographic algorithm implementations in the
Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module (Kernel Crypto) or in the Chipset hardware, while user-space
system applications and mobile applications utilize the BoringSSL library (through the Android API). In
the case of each cryptographic library, the library itself includes any algorithms required (for example,
BoringSSL provides hash functions for use by HMAC and digital signature algorithms).
Trusted Applications executing with the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) utilize the SCrypto library.
For example, the trusted application implementing the Android Keymaster that supports the Android
Keystore utilizes the SCrypto library for all of its cryptographic functionality.
For its HMAC implementations, the TOE accepts all key sizes of 160, 256, 384, & 512; supports all SHA
sizes save 224 (e.g., SHA-1, 256, 384, & 512), utilizes the specified block size (512 for SHA-1 and 256, and
1024 for SHA-384 & 512); and outputs MAC lengths of 160, 256, 384, and 512.
The TOE conditions the user's password exactly as per SP 800-132 (and thus as per SP 800-197-1) with
no deviations by using PBKDF2. The key derivation function uses the input password (with no changes)
and a randomly generated 128-bit salt in 8,192 HMAC-SHA-512 iterations to generate a 256-bit KEK. The
time needed to derive keying material does not impact or lessen the difficulty faced by an attacker’s
exhaustive guessing as the combination of the password derived KEK with REK value entirely prevents
offline attacks and the TOE’s maximum incorrect password login attempts (between 1 and 30 incorrect
attempts with 4 character, minimum, passwords) prevents exhaustive online attacks.
The TOE’s algorithm certificates represent the BoringSSL library, Kernel Cryptographic module, SCrypto
library, Crypto Extensions library and Chipset hardware implementations. These implementations have
been tested upon Android 11 running atop both Exynos and Qualcomm ARMv8 chipsets. The TOE’s
Exynos processor devices include the Samsung Flash Memory Protector, while the TOE’s Qualcomm
processor devices include hardware XTS-AES (Inline Crypto Engine, ICE) implementations for internal
storage encryption and decryption.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
The TOE includes the ability to support the HTTPS protocol (compliant with RFC 2818) so that (mobile
and system client) applications executing on the TOE can securely connect to external servers using
HTTPS. Administrators have no credentials and cannot use HTTPS or TLS to establish administrative
sessions with the TOE as the TOE does not provide any such capabilities.
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1
The TOE’s VPN Client implements the IPsec protocol as specified in RFC 4301; however, the VPN Client
presents as few configuration options as possible to the User in order to minimize the possibility of
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misconfiguration and relies upon the Gateway to enforce organizational policies, for things like the
specific cipher suites, IKEv1 main mode (aggressive mode is not supported) and selection of traffic to
protect. For this reason, the VPN Client does not support editing of its SPD entries. The VPN Client will
insert a PROTECT rule to IPsec encrypt and send all TOE traffic to the VPN GW (as the VPN Client ignores
the IKEv1/IKEv2 Traffic Selector negotiated between the client and gateway and always sends all traffic).
The VPN Client routes all packets through the kernel’s IPsec interface (ipsec0) when the VPN is active.
The kernel compares packets routed through this interface to the SPDs configured for the VPN to
determine whether to PROTECT, BYPASS, or DISCARD each packet. The vendor designed the TOE’s VPN
Client, when operating in CC Mode, to allow no SPD configuration and always force all traffic through
the VPN. The VPN Client ignores any IKEv1/IKEv2 traffic selector negotiations with the VPN GW and will
always create an SPD PROTECT rule that matches all traffic. Thus, the kernel will match all packets,
subsequently encrypt those packets, and finally forward them to the VPN Gateway. The VPN Client
supports tunnel mode for its IPsec connections. The VPN Client provides IKEv1/IKEv2 key establishment
as part of its IPsec implementation. The IKEv1/IKEv2 implementation is conformant with RFCs 5996 and
4307 and supports NAT traversal. IKEv1 supports main mode when this is required by the Gateway.
The TOE provides RFC 4106 conformant AES-GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256, and RFC 3602 conformant
AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256 as encryption algorithms. The TOE Platform also provides SHA-1 (SHA-1
can only be used for IKEv2 connections), SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 in addition to HMAC-SHA1,
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 as integrity/authentication algorithms (producing
message digests of 160, 256, 384, and 512-bits in length) as well as Diffie-Hellman Groups 14, 19, 20 and
24. The VPN utilizes the algorithms from the BoringSSL and Kernel Cryptographic modules as part of the
IKEv1/IKEv2 and IPsec protocols (however, note that IKEv1 does not support SHA-1). The encrypted
payload for IKEv1/IKEv2 uses AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 6379 and (for IKEv2) AES-
GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282. The TOE relies upon the VPN Gateway to ensure
that by default the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key)
negotiated to protect the IKEv1 Phase 1/IKEv2 /IKE_SA connection is greater than or equal to the
strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the
IKEv1 Phase 2/IKEv2 CHILD_SA connection. The IKEv1 implementation includes XAUTH authentication.
An administrator can configure the VPN Gateway to limit SA lifetimes based on length of time to values
that include 24 hours for IKE SAs and 8 hours for IPsec SAs. The TOE includes hardcoded limits of 10
hours for an IKE SA and 3 hours for an IPsec SA. The TOE and VPN Gateway will rekey their IKE and IPsec
SAs after the shorter of either 10 hours or 3 hours respectively (the TOE’s fixed lifetimes) or the
administrator specified lifetime configured on the VPN Gateway.
The VPN Client generates the secret value x used in the IKEv1/IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange ('x' in
gx
mod p) using the FIPS validated RBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and having possible lengths of 224,
256, or 384 bits. When a random number is needed for a nonce, the probability that a specific nonce
value will be repeated during the life of a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2112
, 2128
, or 2192
.
The VPN Client implements peer authentication using RSA certificates or ECDSA certificates (IKEv1 does
not support using ECDSA certificates) that conform to RFC 4945 and FIPS 186-4, or pre-shared keys. If
certificates are used, the VPN Client ensures that the IP address or Fully Qualified Distinguished Name
(FQDN) contained in a certificate matches the expected IP Address or FQDN for the entity attempting to
establish a connection and ensures that the certificate has not been revoked (using the Online
Certificate Status Protocol [OCSP] in accordance with RFC 2560).
Pre-shared keys can include any letter from a-z, A-Z, the numbers 0 – 9, and the special character
located above the numbers on a US keyboard (“!@#$%^&*()”). The specific length of 22 characters
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required by the MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2 is supported by the VPN Client. The VPN Client processes the pre-
shared keys by using the entered string as ASCII Hex values.
The TOE supports a number of different Diffie-Hellman (DH) groups for use in SA negotiation including
DH Groups 14 (2048-bit MODP), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP), and 24 (2048-bit
MODP with 256-bit POS). The TOE selects the DH group by selecting the largest group configured by an
administrator that is offered by the VPN gateway.
During the Peer Authentication stage of IPsec, the TOE Platform will verify the authenticity of the VPN
gateway’s X.509v3 certificate by validating the certificate, validating the certificate path, validating the
certificate’s revocation status using OCSP, validating that the certificate path terminates in a trusted CA
certificate, and validating that the CA certificate has the basicConstraints extension present and the CA
flag set to true. The TOE will also ensure that the Subject Alternative Name IP address or DNS name in
the VPN gateway’s certificate matches the IP address or DNS name configured in the VPN profile. If the
configured IP address or DNS name does not match a Subject Alternative Name in the VPN gateway’s
certificate, the TOE will refuse to establish an IPsec connection with the VPN gateway.
The VPN Client relies upon the VPN Gateway to ensure that the cryptographic algorithms and key sizes
negotiated during the IKEv1/IKEv2 negotiation ensure that the security strength of the Phase 1/IKE_SA
are greater than or equal to that of the Phase 2/CHILD_SA.
FCS_IV_EXT.1 (KMD)
The TOE generates IVs for data storage encryption and for key storage encryption. The TOE uses XTS-AES
and AES-CBC mode for data encryption and AES-GCM for key storage.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (KMD)
The TOE provides a number of different RBGs including:
1. A CTR_DRBG (AES) provided by BoringSSL. The TOE provides mobile applications access (through
an Android API) to random data drawn from its CTR_DRBG (AES)
2. A CTR_DRBG (AES) provided by SCrypto in the TEE
3. A SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG provided by Kernel Crypto in the Android kernel
4. A hardware SHA-256 Hash_DRBG provided by the Qualcomm Application Processor hardware
The TOE ensures that it initializes each RBG with sufficient entropy ultimately accumulated from a TOE-
hardware-based noise source. The TOE uses its hardware-based noise source to fill /dev/random
continuously with random data that has full entropy, and in turn, the TOE draws from /dev/random to
seed both its CTR_DRBG (AES) and its SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG. The TOE seeds each of its software DRBGs
using 384-bits of data from /dev/random, thus ensuring at least 256-bits of entropy. These RBGs are all
capable of providing other amounts of entropy (such as 128-bits) to any requesting application. The TOE
itself always uses 256-bits of entropy, but other applications or services are not subject to this limitation,
and can request 128-bits or 256-bits of entropy subject its own requirements. The SHA-256 Hash_DRBG
in the Qualcomm AP is used to generate the REK on first boot.
FCS_RBG_EXT.2
The devices save a block of 4096-bits of random data, and upon the next boot, a service called entropy
mixer adds the block of saved random data into the Linux Kernel Random Number Generator’s input
pool.
FCS_SRV_EXT.1/2 (KMD)
The TOE provides applications access to the cryptographic operations including encryption (AES),
hashing (SHA), signing and verification (RSA & ECDSA), key hashing (HMAC), password-based key-
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derivation functions (PKBDFv2 HMAC-SHA-512), generating asymmetric keys for key establishment (RSA
and ECDH), and generating asymmetric keys for signature generation and verification (RSA, ECDSA). The
TOE provides access through Android API methods and through the kernel. The vendor also developed
testing applications to enable execution of the NIST algorithm test suite in order to verify the
correctness of the algorithm implementations.
FCS_STG_EXT.1
The TOE provides users, administrators and applications running on the TOE the ability to generate,
import, and securely store symmetric and asymmetric keys through the TOE’s Android Keystore. The
TOE allows a user or administrator (via the MDM) to import a certificate (in PKCS#12 [PFX] format) and
provides applications running on the TOE an API to import a certificate or secret key. In either case, the
TOE will place the key into the user’s keystore (and the TOE will remove the PKCS#12 password-based
protection if the imported key is a certificate) and doubly encrypt the imported key with DEKs, which in
turn are encrypted by a KEK derived from the user's DKEK and a KEK derived from the REK. All user and
application keys placed into the user’s keystore are secured in this fashion.
The user of the TOE can elect to delete keys from the keystore, as well as to wipe the entire device
securely. The administrator can only delete keys from the keystore that have been deployed to the TOE
by the administrator.
The TOE affords applications control (control over use and destruction) of keys that they create or
import, and only the common application developer can explicitly authorize access, use, or destruction
of one application’s key by any other application.
Entity Can Import? Can Destroy?
Allow Other App
to Use?
Allow Other
App to Destroy?
User Yes Yes
Administrator Yes Yes
Mobile application Yes Yes
Common application
developer
Yes Yes
Table 25 - Key Management Matrix
FCS_STG_EXT.2 (KMD)
The TOE provides protection for all stored keys (i.e. those written to storage media for persistent
storage) chained to both the user’s password and the REK. All keys are encrypted with AES-GCM or AES-
CBC (in the case of SD card File Encryption Keys). All KEKs are 256-bit, ensuring that the TOE encrypts
every key with another key of equal or greater strength/size.
In the case of Wi-Fi, the TOE utilizes the 802.11-2012 KCK and KEK keys to unwrap (decrypt) the WPA2
Group Temporal Key received from the access point. Additionally, the TOE protects persistent Wi-Fi keys
(user certificates) by storing them in the Android Keystore.
The TOE also stores the SecurityLogAgent (properties related to the SE Android configuration) in the
same manner as the long-term trusted channel key materials.
FCS_STG_EXT.3
The key hierarchy shows AES-256-GCM is used to encrypt all KEKs other than SD Card file encryption
keys (which uses HMAC for integrity) and the GCM encryption mode itself ensures integrity as
authenticated decryption operations fail if the encrypted KEK becomes corrupted.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/2
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The TOE provides mobile applications (through its Android API) the use of TLS version 1.2 including
support for the selected ciphersuites in the selections in section 5.1.2.28. The TOE supports Common
Name (CN) and Subject Alternative Name (SAN) (DNS and IP address) as reference identifiers. The TOE
supports client (mutual) authentication. The TOE inherently (without requiring any configuration)
supports the supported ciphersuites and evaluated elliptic curves (P-256 and P-384); neither the user
nor the administrator need configure anything in order for the TOE to support these ciphersuites or
curves. The TOE supports the use of wildcards in X.509 reference identifiers (CN and SAN), and the TOE
supports certificate pinning through Android’s Network security configuration. This configuration allows
a mobile application to specify one or more certificate public key hashes (SHA-1 or SHA-256) along with
the domain and optionally an expiry. With such a configuration, the application will only establish a TLS
connection if one of the public keys in the certificate path matches a “pinned” key hash. After the
optional expiry, Android disregards the pinned certificates and performs no pinning (to prevent
connectivity issues in apps that have not been updated).
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN & PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN
The TSF supports TLS versions 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2 with client (mutual) authentication and supports the
ciphersuites in the selections in section 5.1.2.29 for use with EAP-TLS as part of WPA2. The TOE, by
design, supports the evaluated elliptic curves (P-256 and P-384) and requires/allows no configuration of
the supported curves.
6.3 User Data Protection
FDP_ACF_EXT.1/2/3 (KMD)
The TOE provides protection for high-level services like location, email, calendar in addition to providing
individual permissions to which mobile applications can request access.
The TOE provides the following categories of system services to applications:
1. Normal – A lower-risk permission that gives an application access to isolated application-level
features, with minimal risk to other applications, the system, or the user. The system
automatically grants this type of permission to a requesting application at installation, without
asking for the user's explicit approval (though the user always has the option to review these
permissions before installing).
2. Dangerous – A higher-risk permission that would give a requesting application access to private
user data or control over the device that can negatively impact the user. Because this type of
permission introduces potential risk, the system may not automatically grant it to the requesting
application. For example, any dangerous permissions requested by an application may be
displayed to the user and require confirmation before proceeding, or some other approach may
be taken to avoid the user automatically allowing the use of such facilities.
3. Signature – A permission that the system is to grant only if the requesting application is signed
with the same certificate as the application that declared the permission. If the certificates
match, the system automatically grants the permission without notifying the user or asking for
the user's explicit approval.
4. SignatureOrSystem – A permission that the system is to grant only to packages in the Android
system image or that are signed with the same certificates. Please avoid using this option, as the
signature protection level should be sufficient for most needs and works regardless of exactly
where applications are installed. This permission is used for certain special situations where
multiple vendors have applications built in to a system image which need to share specific
features explicitly because they are being built together.
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An example of a normal permission is the ability to vibrate the device:
android.permission.VIBRATE. This permission allows an application to make the device vibrate,
and an application that does not declare this permission would have its vibration requests ignored.
An example of a dangerous privilege would be access to location services to determine the location of
the mobile device: android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. The TOE controls access to
dangerous permissions during the installation of the application. The TOE prompts the user to review
the application’s requested permissions (by displaying a description of each permission group, into
which individual permissions map, to which an application requested access). If the user approves, then
the mobile device continues with the installation of the application. Thereafter, the mobile device grants
that application during execution access to the set of permissions declared in its Manifest file.
An example of a signature permission is the android.permission.BIND_VPN_SERVICE that an
application must declare in order to utilize the VpnService APIs of the device. Because the permission is
a signature permission, the mobile device only grants this permission to an application that requests this
permission and that has been signed with the same developer key used to sign the application declaring
the permission (in the case of the example, the Android Framework itself).
An example of a signature permission is the android.permission.LOCATION_HARDWARE, which
allows an application to use location features in hardware (such as the geofencing API). The device
grants this permission to requesting applications that either have been signed with the same developer
key used to sign the android application declaring the permissions or that reside in the “system”
directory within Android, which for Android 4.4 and above, are applications residing in the /system/priv-
app/ directory on the read-only system partition. Put another way, the device grants systemOrSignature
permissions by Signature or by virtue of the requesting application being part of the “system image.”
Additionally, Android includes the following flags that layer atop the base categories:
1. Privileged – this permission can also be granted to any applications installed as privileged apps
on the system image. Please avoid using this option, as the signature protection level should be
sufficient for most needs and works regardless of exactly where applications are installed. This
permission flag is used for certain special situations where multiple vendors have applications
built in to a system image which need to share specific features explicitly because they are being
built together.
2. System – Old synonym for "privileged".
3. Development – this permission can also (optionally) be granted to development applications
(e.g., to allow additional location reporting during beta testing).
4. Appop – this permission is closely associated with an app op for controlling access.
5. pre23 – this permission can be automatically granted to apps that target API levels below API
level 23 (Android 6.0).
6. Installer – this permission can be automatically granted to system apps that install packages.
7. Verifier – this permission can be automatically granted to system apps that verify packages.
8. Preinstalled – this permission can be automatically granted to any application pre-installed on
the system image (not just privileged apps) (the TOE does not prompt the user to approve the
permission).
For older applications (those targeting Android’s pre-23 API level, i.e., API level 22 [Android 5.0] and
below), the TOE will prompt a user at the time of application installation whether they agree to grant
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the application access to the requested services. Thereafter (each time the application is run), the TOE
will grant the application access to the services specified during install.
For newer applications (those targeting API level 23 or later), the TOE grants individual permissions at
application run-time by prompting the user for confirmation of each permissions category requested by
the application (and only granting the permission if the user chooses to grant it).
While Android provides a large number of individual permissions, they are generally grouped into
categories or features that provide similar functionality. Table 26 shows a series of functional categories
centered on common functionality.
Service Features Description
Sensitive I/O Devices & Sensors Location services, Audio & Video capture, Body sensors
User Personal Information & Credentials Contacts, Calendar, Call logs, SMS
Metadata & Device ID Information IMEI, Phone Number
Data Storage Protection SD Card, App data, App cache
System Settings & Application
Management
Date time, Reboot/Shutdown, Sleep, Force-close application,
Administrator Enrollment
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, USB Access Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, USB tethering, debugging and file transfer
Mobile Device Management &
Administration
MDM APIs
Peripheral Hardware NFC, Camera, Headphones
Security & Encryption Certificate/Key Management, Password, Revocation rules
Table 26 - Access Control Categories
Only applications with a common application developer are able to allow sharing of data between the
applications. Common applications are those signed by a common certificate or key by the developer
that have permissions to allow data sharing in their manifest. Application data can only be shared under
this scenario.
The TOE provides the ability to create a Knox Separated Apps folder. A Knox Separated Apps folder
provides an administrator with the ability to isolate applications from the broader system. Access to
applications placed into the folder does not require separate authentication. Applications within the
folder are restricted from accessing services provided outside the folder, such as sharing services
(intents) and data storage.
FDP_DAR_EXT.1
The TOE provides encryption of all data (which includes both user data and TSF data) stored on the data
partition and on external media (such as an SD Card) of the TOE.
The TOE uses FBE to encrypt data using XTS-AES-256 using a unique File Content Encryption Key (FCEK)
for each file. File metadata (such as filenames) is encrypted separately with AES-CBC-CTS with a unique
File Name Encryption Key (FNEK) for each file. FBE supports two separate classes of protection,
credentialed and device. While each class is encrypted, the difference is whether the encryption is
chained to the user’s credentials. By default, all data is stored in the credential class, and applications
that will store data in the device class are defined during the installation of the application. Device class
data can be accessed as soon as the device has started, including prior to the first user authentication.
For the protection of data stored on external media (SD Card), the TOE also provides different
encryption based on the device.
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Device Component
A52 5G/A42 5G Drive encryption
A71 5G/A51 5G/Tab Active3 File encryption
Table 27 – External Media Encrpytion
For devices using file encryption, the data is encrypted with AES-256-CBC stored using FEKs. The TOE
encrypts each individual file stored on the SD Card, generating a unique FEK for each file.
For devices using drive encryption, the entire SD Card is encrypted using XTS-AES-256 (with a 256-bit
tweak value). All data is protected by the SD FDE MK.
The TOE’s system executables, libraries, and their configuration data reside in a read-only file system
outside the data partition.
FDP_DAR_EXT.2 (KMD)
The TOE, as part of the Knox Platform for Enterprise, provides mobile applications the ability to store
sensitive data and have the TOE encrypt it accordingly. This functionality is controlled by the
administrator through the apps that support sensitive data storage, and is only available for apps that
have been designed to support sensitive data. When an application stores data as sensitive data, the file
will be marked as sensitive in the metadata. Based on the environment lock-state, sensitive data
protected by this mechanism will be encrypted when locked (either directly by the user or via timeout).
An application can determine whether sensitive data should remain encrypted in this manner or if it
should be re-encrypted (such as by a symmetric key for better performance). Applications can use this
to receive and store data securely while the environment is locked (such as an email application).
FDP_IFC_EXT.1/MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FDP_IFC_EXT.1
The TOE supports the installation of VPN Client applications, which can make use of the provided VPN
APIs in order to configure the TOE’s routing functionality to direct all traffic through the VPN. The TOE
also includes an IPsec VPN Client that ensures all traffic other than traffic necessary to establish the VPN
connection (for example, ARP, 802.11-2012 traffic, IKEv1, and IKEv2) flows through the VPN. The TOE
routes all packets through the kernel’s IPsec interface (ipsec0) when the VPN is active. The kernel
compares packets routed through this interface to the SPDs configured for the VPN to determine
whether to PROTECT, BYPASS, or DISCARD each packet. The vendor developed the TOE’s VPN, when
operating in CC Mode, to allow no configuration and always force all traffic through the VPN. The TOE
ignores any IKEv2 traffic selector negotiations with the VPN GW and will always create an SPD PROTECT
rule that matches all traffic. Thus, the kernel will match all packets, subsequently encrypt those packets,
and finally forward them to the VPN Gateway.
FDP_PBA_EXT.1 (KMD)
The TOE requires the user to enter their password to enroll, re-enroll or un-enroll any biometric
templates. When the user attempts biometric authentication to the TOE, the biometric sensor takes an
image of the presented biometric for comparison to the enrolled templates. The captured image is
compared to all the stored templates on the device to determine if there is a match. The complete
biometric authentication process is handled inside the TEE (including image capture, all processing and
match determination). The image is provided to the biometric service to check the enrolled templates
for a match to the captured image.
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FDP_RIP.2
The TOE has been designed to ensure that no residual information exists in network packets when the
VPN is turned on. When the TOE allocates a new buffer for either an incoming or outgoing a network
packet, the new packet data will be used to overwrite any previous data in the buffer. If an allocated
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buffer exceeds the size of the packet, any additional space will be overwritten (padded) with zeros
before the packet is forwarded (to the external network or delivered to the appropriate internal
application).
FDP_STG_EXT.1
The TOE’s Trusted Anchor Database consists of the built-in certificates (individually stored in
/system/etc/security/cacerts) and any additional user or admin/MDM loaded certificates.
The user can disable the built-in certificates or add new certificates using the TOE’s Android user
interface [Settings->Security-> Trusted Credentials]. The admin is able to load new certificates using the
MDM. Disabled default certificates and user added certificates reside in the
/data/misc/user/0/cacerts-removed and /data/misc/user/0/cacerts-added
directories respectively. The built-in ones are protected, as they are part of the TSF’s read only system
partition, while the TOE protects user-loaded certificates by storing them with appropriate permissions
to prevent modification by mobile applications. The TOE also stores the user-loaded certificates in the
user’s keystore.
FDP_UPC_EXT.1
The TOE provides APIs allowing non-TSF applications (mobile applications) the ability to establish a
secure channel using IPsec, TLS, HTTPS, Bluetooth BR/EDR and Bluetooth LE. Mobile applications can use
the following Android APIs for IPsec, TLS, HTTPS, and Bluetooth respectively:
android.net.VpnService
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService.html
com.samsung.android.knox.net.vpn
https://seap.samsung.com/api-
references/android/reference/com/samsung/android/knox/net/vpn/package-summary.html
javax.net.ssl.SSLContex
http://developer.android.com/reference/javax/net/ssl/SSLContext.html
javax.net.ssl.HttpsURLConnection
http://developer.android.com/reference/javax/net/ssl/HttpsURLConnection.html
android.bluetooth
http://developer.android.com/reference/android/bluetooth/package-summary.html
6.4 Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL_EXT.1
The TOE maintains two separate lock screens: the device (Android) lock screen and a lock screen for the
work profile. Each lock screen maintains individually stored (in separate Flash locations) failed login
attempt counters.
The TOE maintains, for each lock screen, the number of failed logins since the last successful login, and
upon reaching the maximum number of incorrect logins the TOE performs a full wipe of all protected
data. For the device lock screen, this would mean a full wipe of all data on the device (a factory reset),
while for the work profile lock screen this would remove all data associated with the work profile. The
TOE maintains the number of failed logins across power-cycles (so for example, assuming a configured
maximum retry of ten incorrect attempts, if one were to enter five incorrect passwords and power cycle
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the phone, the phone would only allow five more incorrect login attempts before wiping) by storing the
number of logins remaining within its Flash file system. An administrator can adjust the number of failed
logins to a value between one and 30 through an MDM.
For users with biometrics enabled, biometric authentication attempts are maintained along with the
password attempts. In all cases, biometric or hybrid authentication mechanisms are non-critical and
cannot be the authentication method that triggers an action (device or work profile wipe).
The maximum number of incorrect password authentication attempts can be configured to a value
between 1 and 30. The maximum number of biometric attempts is 10 (this cannot be configured
separately and this limit only applies to the device lock screen, not the work profile lock screen). The
user can attempt 10 biometric attempts followed by the maximum number of password attempts
before the TOE will wipe itself. For example, if the counter were set to 15, 10 biometric attempts would
be followed by 15 password attempts before the device was wiped. Alternatively, the user might enter
14 incorrect passwords, and then ten failed biometric authentication attempts followed by a final
incorrect password attempt.
The TOE’s work profile provides its own lock screen, which allows password authentication or hybrid
authentication (biometric and password). The hybrid authentication method requires the user to
authenticate with a biometric and a password in sequential order. To login, the user must first enter his
or her Knox biometric and only upon successfully verifying the user’s biometric, the TOE prompts the
User for their Knox password, and the user must enter their password. Knox will count the number of
incorrect passwords attempted, and wipe the work profile (and its associated data) after the user
reaches the configured number of incorrect attempts.
The TOE validates passwords by providing them to Android’s Gatekeeper (which runs in the Trusted
Execution Environment), and if the presented password fails to validate, the TOE increments the failed
attempt counter before displaying a visual error to the user. The TOE validates biometric attempts
through the biometric service (which runs in the Trusted Execution Environment), and if the presented
biometric does not match the registered templates, the TOE increments the failed attempt counter
before displaying a visual error to the user.
FIA_BLT_EXT.1
The TOE requires explicit user authorization before it will pair with a remote Bluetooth device. When
pairing with another device, the TOE requires that the user either confirm that a displayed numeric
passcode matches between the two devices or that the user enter (or choose) a numeric passcode that
the peer device generates (or must enter).
FIA_BLT_EXT.2
The TOE requires explicit user authorization or user authorization before data transfers over the link.
When transferring data with another device, the TOE requires that the user must confirm an
authorization popup displayed allowing data transfer (Obex Object Push) or confirm the user passkey
displayed numeric passcode matches between the two devices (RFCOMM).
FIA_BLT_EXT.3
The TOE tracks active connections and actively ignores connection attempts from Bluetooth device
addresses for which the TOE already has an active connection.
FIA_BLT_EXT.4
The TOE’s Bluetooth host and controller support Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing and the TOE utilizes
this pairing method when the remote host also supports it.
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FIA_BLT_EXT.6
The TOE supports OPP and MAP profile on a per service basis (as opposed to a per app basis).
FIA_BMG_EXT.1(1)/.1(2)/.1(3): (KMD)
The TOE provides fingerprint biometric authentication. Table 28 - Device biometric sensor shows which
biometric subsystems are available on each device. The devices under evaluation have an image-based
system located under the display (fingerprint-ID).
Device Sensors
A52 5G/A42 5G/A71 5G/A51 5G/Tab Active3 Fingerprint-ID
Table 28 - Device biometric sensor
In the evaluated configuration, the maximum number of authentication attempts is 40 before a wipe
event is triggered. This is broken down into a maximum of 10 biometric attempts and 30 password
attempts that could be made before a wipe occurs. Using this as the worst-case scenario leads to a
maximum of 10 biometric attempts that can be made for the SAFAR calculations. All devices or
configurations provide for fewer attempts (both password and biometric), and so any resulting SAFAR
would be lower than this scenario. The last attempt before a wipe must be a password attempt.
For a password-only configuration, the SAFAR claim would be 1:1,000,000 when set for 10 attempts. The
password minimum length is 4 characters and there are 93 possible characters that can be used in the
password. This is not claimed since this configuration (i.e. no biometric authentication allowed) would
not require FIA_BMG_EXT.1, but is shown here for the overall SAFAR calculations.
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑 = 1 − (1 − 1
93
⁄
4
)
30
= 4.010 ∗ 10−7
The FAR for fingerprint is 1:10,000 and the FRR is 3%. The SAFAR when a fingerprint is in use is 1:1,000
based on a maximum of 10 attempts of the biometric as noted in the worst-case scenario.
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1 − (1 − 10−4)10
= 9.996 ∗ 10−4
For all SAFAR calculations the password is considered a critical factor for all combined factor SAFARany
calculations as detailed in PP_MD_V3.1 section H.4. The values are accepted because they are within the
1% margin allowed by PP_MD_V3.1.
For devices which support fingerprint biometrics, SAFARfingerprint can be used for the calculation of a
worst-case scenario.
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑦−𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1 − (1 − 𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑓𝑓) ∗ (1 − 𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑)
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑦−𝑓𝑓 = 1.00022 ∗ 10−3
The Knox Platform for Enterprise provides hybrid (multi-factor: password and biometric) authentication.
When using the hybrid authentication mechanism, the user must enter a correct biometric factor and
then a correct password in order to successfully unlock the work profile.
The SAFAR when a hybrid mechanism is in use is equal to SAFARpassword. The maximum number of
biometric attempts when using hybrid is 50, but eventually the biometric factor must be entered
correctly and then one must always enter a correct password. Given the potential maximum 50
biometric attempts, although that could take a very long time given some imposed delays, that factor is
discounted in calculating the SAFAR. The password minimum length is 4 characters and there are 93
possible characters that can be used in the password.
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𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐴𝑅ℎ𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑 = 𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑
The biometric FAR/FRR values are tested internally by two independent groups using different
methodologies. The first set of tests are “offline” in that a specially configured device is connected to a
test harness and used to enroll biometric samples for storage. The test harness then uses the samples to
run through numerous combinations of the samples to determine FAR/FRR results that are used to tune
the algorithms controlling the biometric system. Once testing is complete a second set of tests are
performed in an “online” manner where the testing is done with users directly testing on a live device.
All devices with different hardware combinations that could affect the biometric subsystem are tested.
For example, both the Exynos and Qualcomm versions of the mobile devices are tested individually since
the TrustZone components in each device are different. These tests are integrated into the production
process and so are repeated continually during the development process.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_PAE_EXT.1
The TOE can join WPA2-802.1X (802.11i) wireless networks requiring EAP-TLS authentication, acting as a
client/supplicant (and in that role connect to the 802.11 access point and communicate with the 802.1X
authentication server).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
The TOE supports user passwords consisting of basic Latin characters (upper and lower case, numbers,
and the special characters noted in the selection (see section 5.1.4.10)) for authentication to all lock
screens (see Table 29). On devices with a boot lock screen, the TOE uses the same configuration for both
the boot and device lock screens (i.e. there is one setting that applies to both). The TOE can support a
minimum password length of as few as four (4) characters and a maximum of no more than sixteen (16)
characters. The TOE defaults to requiring passwords to have a minimum of four characters that contain
at least one letter and one number. An MDM application can change these defaults and impose
password restrictions (like quality, specify another minimum length, the minimum number of letters,
numeric characters, lower case letters, upper case letters, symbols, and non-letters).
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FIA_PSK_EXT.1
The TOE supports the use of pre-shared keys (the TOE allows 1 to 64 character PSKs) for IPsec VPNs. Pre-
shared keys can include any letter from a-z, A-Z, the numbers 0 – 9, and the special character located
above the numbers on a US keyboard (“!@#$%^&*()”). The specific length of 22 characters required by
the MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2 is supported by the TOE. The TOE does not perform any processing on pre-
shared keys. The TOE simply uses the pre-shared key that was entered by the user or administrator.
FIA_TRT_EXT.1
The TOE allows users to authenticate through external ports (either a USB keyboard or a Bluetooth
keyboard paired in advance of the login attempt). If not using an external keyboard, a user must
authenticate through the standard User Interface (using the TOE touchscreen). The TOE limits the
number of authentication attempts through the UI to no more than five attempts within 30 seconds
(irrespective of what keyboard the operator uses). Thus if the current [the nth
] and prior four
authentication attempts have failed, and the n-4th
attempt was less than 30 second ago, the TOE will
prevent any further authentication attempts until 30 seconds has elapsed. Note as well that the TOE will
wipe itself when it reaches the maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts (as described
in FIA_AFL_EXT.1 above).
FIA_UAU.5
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The TOE allows the following authentication methods at the different lock screens in CC mode. The
available biometrics are dependent on the lock screen being used, MDM configuration and enrolled
templates. Table 29 shows which authentication methods are available at each lock screen.
Device Lock Work Profile Lock
Password, Biometrics per (Table 28) Password, Hybrid
Table 29 - Allowed Lock Screen Authentication Methods
The TOE prohibits other authentication mechanisms such as pattern or swipe. Use of Smart Lock
mechanisms (on-body detection, trusted places, trusted devices, trusted face, and trusted voice) and
PIN can be blocked through management controls. Upon restart or power-up the user can only use a
password for authentication at the first lock screen. Once past this initial authentication screen the user
is able to use one of the configured methods at the device lock screen to login and the work profile lock
screen.
FIA_UAU.6(1)/FIA_UAU.6(2)
The TOE requires the user to enter their password or supply their biometric in order to unlock the TOE.
Additionally, the TOE requires the user to confirm their current password when accessing the “Settings-
>Display->LockScreen->Screen Security->Select screen lock” menu in the TOE’s user interface. The TOE
can disable Smart Lock through management controls. Only after entering their current user password
can the user then elect to change their password.
FIA_UAU.7
The TOE’s two lock screens (device lock screen, and work profile lock screen), by default, briefly display
the most recently entered password character and then obscures the character by replacing the
displayed character with a dot symbol. The user can configure the TOE’s behavior for the device lock
screen so that it does not briefly display the last typed character; however, the TOE always briefly
displays the last entered character for the work profile lock screen. Additionally, the TOE’s device lock
screen does not provide any feedback other than a notification of a failed biometric (fingerprint)
authentication attempt (“not recognized”). Similarly, the TOE’s work profile lock screen, when
configured for hybrid authentication, displays only an indication (“no match”) of a failed biometric
attempt.
FIA_UAU_EXT.1
The TOE's Key Hierarchy requires the user's password in order to derive the sHEK in order to decrypt
other KEKs and DEKs. Thus, until it has the user's password, the TOE cannot decrypt the DEK utilized by
FBE to decrypt protected data.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
The TOE, when configured to require user authentication (as is the case in CC mode), allows only those
actions described in section 5.1.4.18. Beyond those actions, a user cannot perform any other actions
other than observing notifications displayed on the lock screen until after successfully authenticating.
The Galaxy Tab Active3 devices do not support Edge applications, and are not available on these devices.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN
The TOE checks the validity of all imported CA certificates by checking for the presence of the
basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE as the TOE imports the certificate into the
TOE’s Trust Anchor Database. If the TOE detects the absence of either the extension or flag, the TOE will
import the certificate as a user public key and add it to the keystore (not the Trust Anchor Database).
The TOE also checks all the certificates in the server’s certificate chain (including the server’s certificate)
for the presence of the basicConstraints extension and CA flag in each CA certificate. Similarly, the TOE
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verifies the extendedKeyUsage Server Authentication purpose during certificate validation. The TOE’s
certificate validation algorithm examines each certificate in the path (starting with the peer’s certificate)
and first checks for validity of that certificate (e.g., has the certificate expired? or is it not yet valid?
whether the certificate contains the appropriate X.509 extensions [e.g., the CA flag in the basic
constraints extension for a CA certificate, or that a server certificate contains the Server Authentication
purpose in the extendedKeyUsage field]), then verifies each certificate in the chain (applying the same
rules as above, but also ensuring that the Issuer of each certificate matches the Subject in the next rung
“up” in the chain and that the chain ends in a self-signed certificate present in either the TOE’s trusted
anchor database or matches a specified Root CA), and finally the TOE performs revocation checking for
all certificates in the chain.
FIA_X509_EXT.2/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as part of EAP-TLS, TLS, HTTPS and IPsec authentication. The TOE
comes with a built-in set of default Trusted Credentials (Android's set of trusted CA certificates). While
the user cannot remove any of the built-in default CA certificates, the user can disable any of those
certificates through the user interface so that certificates issued by disabled CA’s cannot validate
successfully. In addition, a user can import a new trusted CA certificate into the Keystore or an
administrator can install a new certificate through an MDM.
The TOE does not establish TLS or HTTPS connections itself (beyond EAP-TLS used for WPA2 Wi-Fi
connections), but provides a series of APIs that mobile applications can use to check the validity of a
peer certificate. When establishing an EAP-TLS connection, the TOE does not check for certificate
revocation as the revocation servers are not available until after the EAP-TLS connection is established.
The mobile application, after correctly using the specified APIs, can be assured as to the validity of the
peer certificate and will not establish the trusted connection if the peer certificate cannot be verified
(including validity, certification path, and revocation [through CRL and OCSP]).
The VPN requires that for each VPN profile, the user specify the client certificate the TOE will use (the
certificate must have been previously imported into the keystore) and specify the CA certificate to which
the server’s certificate must chain. The VPN thus uses the specified certificate when attempting to
establish that VPN connection. When establishing a connection to a VPN server, the VPN first compares
the Identification (ID) Payload received from the server against the certificate sent by the server, and if
the DN of the certificate does not match the ID, then the TOE does not establish the connection.
The TOE supports both CRL and OCSP configurations for revocation checking. Only one of these will be
used at a time (even if both are configured). OCSP takes precedence over CRL if a certificate provides
information for checking both. The process of checking the revocation status of a certificate depends on
the configuration on the device set by the admin.
If OCSP is configured (and if the Authority Information Access, AIA, extension is present), OCSP will be
used to check the status. If the certificate lacks AIA, or if OCSP is not configured on the device the TOE
attempts to determine revocation status using CRLs, if the certificate includes a CRL Distribution Point
(CDP). If the TOE cannot establish a connection with the server acting as the CDP or OCSP server, or does
not receive a positive confirmation from the OCSP server, the TOE will deem the server’s certificate as
invalid and not establish a TLS connection with the server. Note that the VPN only checks OCSP for
revocation (if it is configured on the device).
FIA_X509_EXT.3
The TOE’s Android operating system provides applications the
java.security.cert.CertPathValidator API Class of methods for validating certificates and
certification paths (certificate chains establishing a trust chain from a certificate to a trust anchor). This
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class is also recommended to be used by third-party Android developers for certificate validation.
However, TrustedCertificateStore must be used to chain certificates to the Android System
Trust Anchor Database (anchors should be retrieved and provided to PKIXParameters used by
CertPathValidator). The available APIs may be found here:
http://developer.android.com/reference/java/security/cert/package-summary.html
6.5 Security Management
FMT_MOF_EXT.1/FMT_SMF_EXT.1
The TOE provides the management functions described in Table 8 - Security Management Functions.
The table includes annotations describing the roles that have access to each service and how to access
the service. The TOE enforces administrative configured restrictions by rejecting user configuration
(through the UI) when attempted.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN
The TOE provides the management functions described in Table 8 - Security Management Functions
Rows 48-55. The table includes annotations describing the roles that have access to each service and
how to access the service. The TOE enforces administrative configured restrictions by rejecting user
configuration (through the UI) when attempted. It is worth noting that the TOE’s ability to specify
authorized application repositories takes the form of allowing enterprise applications (i.e., restricting
applications to only those applications installed by an MDM Agent).
MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FMT_SMF.1/VPN
The TOE provides the management functions described in Table 8 - Security Management Functions
Rows 56-61. In addition, the VPN Gateway, acting as administrator, can specify the IKE algorithms,
protocols and authentication techniques, and the crypto period for session keys.
The TOE provides users the ability to specify an X.509v3 certificate (previously loaded into the TOE
Platform’s keystore) for the TOE to use to authenticate to the VPN gateway during IPsec peer
authentication as well as an X.509v3 certificate to use as the CA certificate. The TOE alternatively
provides users the ability to enter a Pre-Shared Key to be used in lieu of an X.509v3 certificate during
IPsec peer authentication.
FMT_SMF_EXT.2
A user can unenroll an MDM agent from the device in one of two ways. First, a user can revoke the
MDM agent’s administrative privileges through the Settings app (Settings->Security & Location->Device
admin apps) and then uninstall the agent. This method assumes that the MDM agent does block the
user from revoking the agent’s administrator privileges. When unenrolled in this fashion, the device will
remove the work profile, the work profile’s applications and data. In effect, this translates to the
selections of wiping all sensitive data (all work profile data), removing all Enterprise applications (all
work profile applications), removing all device-stored Enterprise application data (all work profile
application data), and removing Enterprise secondary authentication data (Knox password and/or
fingerprint).
In the case where an MDM agent blocks the user from revoking the agent’s administrative privileges, a
user can only unenroll by wiping the entire device. By doing this, the user causes the device to wipe all
protected data (wiping all data, including both the user’s protected data and any Enterprise/work profile
data) as well as remove MDM policies and disabling CC mode (as the device returns to factory defaults).
FMT_SMF_EXT.3
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The TOE provides the user with the ability to see all apps installed on the device that have administrative
capabilities. Each app listing also shows the status of the app privileges for administration (enabled or
disabled) and the permissions the app has on the device.
6.6 Protection of the TSF
FPT_AEX_EXT.1
The Linux kernel of the TOE’s Android operating system provides address space layout randomization
utilizing a non-cryptographic kernel random function to provide 8 unpredictable bits to the base address
of any user-space memory mapping. The random function, though not cryptographic, ensures that one
cannot predict the value of the bits.
FPT_AEX_EXT.2/FPT_AEX_EXT.6
The TOE's Android 11 operating system utilizes 4.19/4.9 Linux kernels, whose memory management unit
(MMU) enforces read, write, and execute permissions on all pages of virtual memory and ensures that
write and execute permissions are not simultaneously granted on all memory (exceptions are only made
for Dalvik JIT compilation). The Android operating system sets the ARM eXecute Never (XN) bit on
memory pages and the MMU circuitry of the TOE’s ARMv8 Application Processor enforces the XN bits.
From Android’s security documentation (https://source.android.com/security/), Android supports
“Hardware-based No eXecute (NX) to prevent code execution on the stack and heap”. Section D.5 of the
ARM v8 Architecture Reference Manual contains additional details about the MMU of ARM-based
processors: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.ddi0487a.f/index.html.
FPT_AEX_EXT.3
The TOE's Android operating system provides explicit mechanisms to prevent stack buffer overruns
(enabling -fstack-protector) in addition to taking advantage of hardware-based No eXecute to prevent
code execution on the stack and heap. Samsung requires and applies these protections to all TSF
executable binaries and libraries.
FPT_AEX_EXT.4
The TOE protects itself from modification by untrusted subjects using a variety of methods. The first
protection employed by the TOE is a Secure Boot process that uses cryptographic signatures to ensure
the authenticity and integrity of the bootloader and kernels using data fused into the device processor.
The TOE’s Secure Boot process employs a series of public keys to form a chain of trust that operates as
follows. The Application Processor (AP) contains the hash of the Secure Boot Public Key (a key
embedded in the end of the signed bootloader image), and upon verifying the SBPK attached to the
bootloader produces the expected hash, the AP uses this public key to verify the signature of the
bootloader image, to ensure its integrity and authenticity before transitioning execution to the
bootloader. The bootloader, in turn, contains the Image Signing Public Key (ISPK), which the bootloader
will use to verify the signature on either kernel image (primary kernel image or recovery kernel image).
The signing key type and hash type used are listed in Table 30 - Secure Boot Public Keys.
Device Signing Key Hash
A52 5G/A42 5G ECDSA P384 SHA-256
A71 5G/A51 5G/Tab Active3 RSA 2048 SHA-256
Table 30 - Secure Boot Public Keys
Note that when configured for Common Criteria mode, the TOE only accepts updates to the TOE via
FOTA; however, when not configured for CC mode, the TOE allows updates through the bootloader’s
ODIN mode. The primary kernel includes an embedded FOTA Public Key, which the TOE uses to verify
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the authenticity and integrity of FOTA update signatures (which contain a PKCS 2.1 PSS RSA 2048 w/
SHA-256 signature).
The TOE protects access to the REK and derived HEK to only trusted applications4
within the TEE
(TrustZone). The TOE key manager includes a TEE module that utilizes the HEK to protect all other keys
in the key hierarchy. All TEE applications are cryptographically signed, and when invoked at runtime (at
the behest of an untrusted application), the TEE will only load the trusted application after successfully
verifying its cryptographic signature. Furthermore, the device encryption library checks the integrity of
the system by checking the result from both Secure Boot/SecurityManager and from the Integrity Check
Daemon before servicing any requests. Without this TEE application, no keys within the TOE (including
keys for ScreenLock, the keystore, and user data) can be successfully decrypted, and thus are useless.
The third protection is the TOE’s internal SecurityManager watchdog service. The SecurityManager
manages the CC mode of the TOE by looking for unsigned kernels or failures from other, non-
cryptographic checks on system integrity, and upon detection of a failure in either, disables the CC mode
and notifies the TEE application. The TEE application then locks itself, again rendering all TOE keys
useless.
Finally, the TOE’s Android OS provides “sandboxing” that ensures each non-system mobile application
executes with the file permissions of a unique Linux user ID in a different virtual memory space. This
ensures that applications cannot access each other’s memory space (it is possible for two processes to
utilize shared memory, but not directly access the memory of another application) or files and cannot
access the memory space or files of system-level applications.
FPT_AEX_EXT.5
The TOE provides Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization to ensure that the base address of
kernel-space memory mappings consist of six (6) unpredictable bits. This ensures that at each boot, the
location of kernel data structures including the core kernel begins at a random physical address,
mapping the core kernel at a random virtual address in the vmalloc area, loading kernel modules at a
random virtual address in the vmalloc area, and mapping system memory at a random virtual address in
the linear area.
FPT_BBD_EXT.1
The TOE’s hardware and software architecture ensures separation of the application processor (AP)
from the baseband or communications processor (CP). While the AP and CP are part of the same SoC,
they are separate physical components within the SoC with no shared components between them (such
as memory) and communicate via a non-shared bus (i.e. no other chips can communicate via this bus).
From a software perspective, the AP and CP communicate logically through the Android Radio Interface
Layer (RIL) daemon. This daemon, which executes on the AP, coordinates all communication between
the AP and CP. It makes requests of the CP and accepts the response from the CP; however, the RIL
daemon does not provide any reciprocal mechanism for the CP to make requests of the AP. Because the
mobile architecture provides only the RIL daemon interface, the CP has no method to access the
resources of the software executing on the AP.
FPT_JTA_EXT.1
The TOE prevents access to its processor’s JTAG interface by only enabling JTAG when the TOE has a
special image written to its bootloader/TEE partitions. That special image must be signed by the
4
A TrustZone application is a trusted application that executes in a hardware-isolated domain.
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appropriate key (corresponding to the public key that has its SHA-256 hash programmed into the
processor’s fuses).
FPT_KST_EXT.1 (KMD)
The TOE does not store any plaintext key material in its internal Flash; instead, the TOE encrypts all keys
before storing them. This ensures that irrespective of how the TOE powers down (e.g., a user commands
the TOE to power down, the TOE reboots itself, or battery is removed), all keys in internal Flash are
wrapped with a KEK. Please refer to section 6.2 for further information (including the KEK used)
regarding the encryption of keys stored in the internal Flash. As the TOE encrypts all keys stored in Flash,
upon boot-up, the TOE must first decrypt and utilize keys. Note as well that the TOE does not use a
user’s biometric fingerprint to encrypt/protect key material. Rather the TOE always requires the user
enter his or her password after a reboot (in order to derive the necessary keys to decrypt the user data
partition and other keys in the key hierarchy).
FPT_KST_EXT.2 (KMD)
The TOE utilizes a cryptographic library consisting of an implementation of BoringSSL, the Kernel Crypto
module, the SCrypto module, and the following system-level executables that utilize KEKs: fscrypt (on
devices with FBE), eCryptfs, wpa_supplicant, and the keystore.
The TOE ensures that plaintext key material is not exported by not allowing the REK to be exported and
by ensuring that only authenticated entities can request utilization of the REK. Furthermore, the TOE
only allows the system-level executables access to plaintext DEK values needed for their operation. The
TSF software (the system-level executables) protects those plaintext DEK values in memory both by not
providing any access to these values and by clearing them when no longer needed (in compliance with
FCS_CKM_EXT.4). Note again that the TOE does not use the user’s biometric fingerprint to
encrypt/protect key material (and instead only relies upon the user’s password).
FPT_KST_EXT.3 (KMD)
The TOE does not provide any way to export plaintext DEKs or KEKs (including all keys stored in the
keystore) as the TOE chains all KEKs to the HEK/REK.
FPT_NOT_EXT.1
When the TOE encounters a self-test failure or when the TOE software integrity verification fails, the
TOE transitions to a non-operational mode. The user may attempt to power-cycle the TOE to see if the
failure condition persists, and if it does persist, the user may attempt to boot to the recovery
mode/kernel to wipe data and perform a factory reset in order to recover the device.
FPT_STM.1
The TOE requires time for the Package Manager, FOTA image verifier, TLS certificate validation,
wpa_supplicant, audit system and keystore applications. These TOE components obtain time from the
TOE using system API calls [e.g., time() or gettimeofday()]. An application cannot modify the system time
as mobile applications need the Android “SET_TIME” permission to do so. Likewise, only a process with
system privileges can directly modify the system time using system-level APIs. The TOE uses the Cellular
Carrier time (obtained through the Carrier’s network timeserver) as a trusted source; however, the user
can also manually set the time through the TOE’s user interface.
FPT_TST_EXT.1
The TOE performs known answer power on self-tests (POST) on its cryptographic algorithms to ensure
that they are functioning correctly. The kernel itself performs known answer tests on its cryptographic
algorithms to ensure they are working correctly and the SecurityManager service invokes the self-tests
of BoringSSL at start-up to ensure that those cryptographic algorithms are working correctly. The
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Chipset hardware performs a power-up self-test to ensure that its AES implementation is working, as
does the TEE SCrypto cryptographic library. Should any of the tests fail, the TOE will reboot to see if that
will clear the error.
Algorithm Implemented in Description
AES encryption/
decryption
BoringSSL, SCrypto, Kernel
Crypto, Chipset hardware
Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
ECDH key agreement BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
DRBG random bit
generation
BoringSSL, SCrypto, Kernel
Crypto
Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
ECDSA sign/verify BoringSSL, SCrypto Sign operation followed by verify
HMAC-SHA
BoringSSL, SCrypto, Kernel
Crypto
Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
RSA sign/verify BoringSSL, SCrypto Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
SHA hashing
BoringSSL, SCrypto, Kernel
Crypto
Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
Table 31 - Power-up Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0: FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN & MOD_VPN_CLI_V2.2: FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN
The TOE platform performs the previously mentioned self-tests to ensure the integrity of the WLAN
client (wpa_supplicant) and the VPN client (libcharon.so) in addition to the cryptographic libraries used
by the clients.
FPT_TST_EXT.2(1)/FPT_TST_EXT.2(2)
The TOE ensures a secure boot process in which the TOE verifies the digital signature of the bootloader
software for the Application Processor (using a public key whose hash resides in the processor’s internal
fuses) before transferring control. The bootloader, in turn, verifies the signature of the Linux kernel
(either the primary or the recovery kernel) it loads.
Once the kernel has been loaded, the TOE uses dm-verity in EIO mode to protect the integrity of the
system partition. After verifying the digital signature of the dm-verity hash tree (using the same public
key that verifies the kernel image), the TOE will reject the loading of file system blocks where the
integrity does not match, and return an I/O error (as if the block were unreadable).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The TOE’s user interface provides a method to query the current version of the TOE software/firmware
(Android version, baseband version, kernel version, build number, and security software version) and
hardware (model and version). Additionally, the TOE provides users the ability to review the currently
installed apps (including 3rd
party “built-in” applications) and their version.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 (KMD)
When in CC mode, the TOE verifies all updates to the TOE software using a public key (FOTA public key)
chaining ultimately to the Secure Boot Public Key (SBPK), a hardware protected key whose SHA-256 hash
resides inside the application processor (note that when not in CC mode, the TOE allows updates to the
TOE software through the Download mode of the bootloader). After verifying an update’s FOTA
signature, the TOE will then install those updates to the TOE. The TOE will check a new image to ensure
that the image is not older than the current image, and if so, the TOE will reject the new image and not
update the TOE software.
The application processing verifies the bootloader’s authenticity and integrity (thus tying the bootloader
and subsequent stages to a hardware root of trust: the SHA-256 hash of the SBPK, which cannot be
reprogrammed after the “write-enable” fuse, has been blown).
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The Android OS on the TOE requires that all applications bear a valid signature before Android will install
the application.
ALC_TSU_EXT
Samsung utilizes industry best practices to ensure their devices are patched to mitigate security flaws.
Samsung provides a web portal for reporting potential security issues
(https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityReporting.smsb) with instructions about how to securely
contact and communicate with Samsung. As an Android OEM, also works with Google on reported
Android issues (https://source.android.com/source/report-bugs.html) to ensure customer devices are
secure.
Samsung will create updates and patches to resolve reported issues as quickly as possible, at which
point the update is provided to the wireless carriers. The delivery time for resolving an issue depends on
the severity, and can be as rapid as a few days before the carrier handoff for high priority cases. The
wireless carriers perform additional tests to ensure the updates will not adversely impact their networks
and then plan device rollouts once that testing is complete. Carrier updates usually take at least two
weeks to as much as two months (depending on the type and severity of the update) to be rolled out to
customers. However, the Carriers also release monthly Maintenance Releases in order to address
security-critical issues, and Samsung itself maintains a security blog
(https://security.samsungmobile.com) in order to disseminate information directly to the public.
Samsung communicates with the reporting party to inform them of the status of the reported issue.
Further information about updates is handled through the carrier release notes. Issues reported to Google
directly are handled through Google’s notification processes.
6.7 TOE Access
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
The TOE transitions to its locked state either immediately after a user initiates a lock by pressing the
power button or after a configurable period of inactivity. As part of that transition, the TOE will display a
lock screen to obscure the previous contents; however, the TOE’s lock screen still allows a user to
perform the functions listed in section 5.1.4.18 before authenticating. However, without authenticating
first, a user cannot perform any related actions based upon these notifications (for example, they
cannot respond to emails, calendar appointment requests, or text messages) other than answering an
incoming phone call.
On power up the TOE boots to the device lock screen. On the first boot, the user can only make
emergency calls, receive calls, enter their password or see notifications from apps that do not require
user authentication (apps that have requested the use of Device Encrypted `storage during installation).
FTA_TAB.1
The TOE can be configured by an administrator to display a message on the lock screen using an MDM.
FTA_WSE_EXT.1
The TOE allows an administrator to specify (using an MDM) a list of wireless networks (SSIDs) to which
the user may direct the TOE to connect. When not enrolled with an MDM, the TOE allows the user to
control to which wireless networks the TOE should connect, but does not provide an explicit list of such
networks, rather the user may scan for available wireless network (or directly enter a specific wireless
network), and then connect. Once a user has connected to a wireless network, the TOE will
automatically reconnect to that network when in range and the user has enabled the TOE’s Wi-Fi radio.
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6.8 Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC_EXT.1/FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN
The TOE provides secured (encrypted and mutually authenticated) communication channels between
itself and other trusted IT products through the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS, TLS, HTTPS
and IPsec. The TOE permits itself and applications to initiate communications via the trusted channel,
and the TOE initiates communication via the trusted channel for connection to a wireless access point.
The TOE provides access to TLS and HTTPS via published APIs that are accessible to any application that
needs an encrypted end-to-end trusted channel. The TOE also meets the PP-Module for Virtual Private
Network (VPN) Clients.
6.9 Work Profile Functionality
This section specifically enumerates the functionality specifically provided when a work profile has been
created.
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.2
The TOE, through a combination of Android’s multi-user capabilities and Security Enhancements (SE) for
Android, provides the ability to create an isolated profile within the device. Within a work profile a
group of applications can be installed, and access to those applications is then restricted to usage solely
within the work profile. The work profile boundary restricts the ability of sharing data such that
applications outside the work profile cannot see, share or even copy data to those inside the work
profile and vice versa. Exceptions to the boundary (such as allowing a copy operation) must be
configured by the administrator via policy. Furthermore, the work profile boundary policy can control
access to hardware features, such as the camera or microphone, and restrict the ability of applications
within the work profile to access those services.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1
The work profile maintains, in flash, the number of failed logins since the last successful login, and upon
reaching the maximum number of incorrect logins, the work profile performs a full wipe of data
protected by Knox (i.e. data inside the work profile). An administrator can adjust the number of failed
logins for the hybrid and password login mechanism from the default of ten failed logins to a value
between one and thirty through an MDM.
FIA_UAU_EXT.4 (KMD)
The TOE requires a separate password or hybrid authentication for its work profile, thus protecting all
Enterprise application data and shared resource data. The user must enter either their password or both
their password and biometric (if the user has configured hybrid authentication and enrolled a biometric)
in order to access any of the Enterprise application data.
FIA_UAU.5
The work profile allows the user to authenticate using a password, or a hybrid method requiring both a
biometric and the password at the same time. The TOE prohibits other authentication mechanisms, such
as pattern, PIN, or biometric by themselves.
FIA_UAU.6(1)/FIA_UAU6(2)
The work profile requires the user to enter their password in order to unlock the work profile.
Additionally, the work profile requires the user to confirm their current password when accessing the
“Knox Settings -> Knox unlock method” menu in the work profile user interface. Only after entering their
current user password can the user then elect to change their password.
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FIA_UAU.7
The work profile allows the user to enter the user's password from the lock screen. The work profile will,
by default display the most recently entered character of the password briefly or until the user enters
the next character in the password, at which point the work profile obscures the character by replacing
the character with a dot symbol.
The work profile can also be configured for hybrid authentication. In this case the user is prompted to
first scan their biometric successfully before being prompted to enter their password. If the biometric
attempt is unsuccessful, the user is prompted again to enter the biometric. To successfully login, both a
valid biometric and the correct password must be entered.
FMT_MOF.1/FMT_SMF_EXT.1
The work profile grants the admin additional controls over the work profile beyond those available to
the device as a whole. The primary additional control is over sharing data to and from the work profile.
The control over the camera and microphone within the work profile only affects access to those
resources inside the work profile, not outside the work profile. If either of these is disabled outside the
work profile then they will not be available within the work profile, even if they are enabled.
In general, the management functions for the work profile are the same as those of the device as a
whole. Specific differences of the impact of a work profile function are noted in Table 8 - Security
Management Functions.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
The work profile transitions to its locked state either immediately after a user initiates a lock by pressing
the work profile lock button from the notification bar or after a configurable period of inactivity, and as
part of that transition, the work profile will display a lock screen to obscure the previous contents. When
the work profile is locked, it can still display calendar appointments and other notifications allowed by
the administrator to be shown outside the work profile (in the notification area). However, without
authenticating first to the work profile, a user cannot perform any related actions based upon these
work profile notifications (they cannot respond to emails, calendar appointments, or text messages).
The work profile timeout is independent of the TOE timeout and as such can be set to different values.