National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices
on Android 11 – Fall
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11211-2021
Dated: September 8, 2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11- Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, September 8, 2021
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerome Myers, Ph.D.
Patrick Mallett, Ph.D.
DeRon Graves
The Aerospace Corporation
Joyce Baidoo
Anne Gugel
John Hopkins University APL
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Rizheng Sun
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 5
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 7
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 7
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 7
4.3 User data protection ............................................................................................ 7
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 7
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 8
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 8
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 8
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 9
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 9
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 9
7 Documentation.......................................................................................................... 11
8 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 11
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 11
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 11
9 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 11
10 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 11
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 12
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 12
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 12
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 12
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 13
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 13
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 13
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 13
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 14
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 14
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 14
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 15
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11
solution provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement
of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is
either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in September 2021. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017, General
Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection
Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version
1.0, 08 February 2016 and PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version
2.2, January 5, 2021.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11 - Fall.
The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version
of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11 - Fall Security Target,
version 0.1, July 7, 2021 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
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evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1 - Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11 – Fall
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017,
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device
Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016 and PP-Module for
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.2, January 5, 2021
ST Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11 - Fall
Security Target, version 0.1, July 7, 2021
Evaluation
Technical Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy
Devices on Android 11, version 02., August 26, 2021
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, rev
5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, Jerome Myers, DeRon Graves, Joyce Baidoo, Anne Gugel
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE evaluated configuration consists of the hardware and software described in this
section when configured in accordance with the documentation specified in section 7.
The TOE is a mobile device based on Android 11 with a built-in IPsec VPN client and
modifications made to increase the level of security provided to end users and enterprises.
The TOE is intended for use as part of an enterprise mobility solution providing mobile
staff with enterprise connectivity.
The TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or “CC mode”) that an administrator can
invoke using an MDM. The TOE must meet the following prerequisites in order for an
administrator to transition the TOE to and remain in the CC configuration.
• Require a boot and device lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, accessibility
(direction), screen locks are not allowed). Acceptable biometrics vary with the device
for the device lock.
• The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to 30.
• A screen lock password required to decrypt data on boot.
• Revocation checking must be enabled.
• External storage must be encrypted.
• When CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows:
o The TOE sets the system wide Android CC mode property to be enabled.
o The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all updates
occur through FOTA.
o The TOE utilizes ACVP/CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers for TLS.
The TOE includes the ability to create separate profiles part of the Knox Platform. A
profile provides a way to segment applications and data into two separate areas on the
device, such as a personal area and a work area, each with its own separate apps, data and
security policies. For this effort, the TOE was evaluated both without and with profiles
created. Thus, the evaluation includes several Knox-specific claims that apply when these
profiles are created.
There are different models of the TOE, the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11, and
these models differ in their internal components (as described in the table below). All
devices are A64 architecture.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The model numbers of the mobile devices used during evaluation testing are as follows:
Device Name
Model
Number
Chipset
Vendor
SoC Arch Kernel Build Number
Galaxy A52 5G SM-A526B Qualcomm Snapdragon 750 ARMv8 4.19.152 RP1A.200720.012
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Device Name
Model
Number
Chipset
Vendor
SoC Arch Kernel Build Number
Galaxy A71 5G SM-A716V Qualcomm Snapdragon 765 ARMv8 4.19.125 RP1A.200720.012
Galaxy Tab
Active3
SM-T575 Samsung Exynos 9810 ARMv8 4.9.191 RP1A.200720.012
Table 2 - Evaluated Devices
In addition to the evaluated devices, the devices in Table 3 - Equivalent Devices are
claimed as equivalent with a note about the differences between the evaluated device (first
column) and the equivalent models (noted in the third column with the differences in the
fourth column). Equivalence in this table is determined by the use of identical processors,
kernel and build number, and is not made across processor types.
The Differences column in the table denotes the differences between the evaluated device
and those listed in the Equivalent column (which typically contains multiple different
derivative devices), and are not meant to line up with the devices listed in the Equivalent
column itself. Except in the case of a different Wi-Fi radios or biometric sensors (in which
case the radio or biometric is tested on a different device and so always verified as part of
the evaluation), any differences between the evaluated device and claimed equivalent
devices are outside the requirements of the evaluation requirements, such as screen
size/type/resolution, battery size, position of ports.
Evaluated Device SoC Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy A52 5G Snapdragon 750 Galaxy A42 5G A52 5G > A42 5G screen resolution & RAM
Galaxy A71 5G Snapdragon 765 Galaxy A51 5G A71 5G > A51 5G in terms of display size
Galaxy Tab Active3 Exynos 9810 Galaxy Tab Active3
T577 & T575 tablets have 5G
T570 tablets only have Wi-Fi
Table 3 - Equivalent Devices
In general, the devices include a final letter or number at the end of the name that denotes
that the device is for a specific carrier or region (for example, U = US Carrier build and F =
International, which were used during the evaluation).
For each device, there are specific models that are validated. This table lists the specific
carrier models that have the validated configuration (covering both evaluated and
equivalent devices).
Device Name Chipset Vendor
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy A52 5G Qualcomm SM-A526 B, N, U, U1, W, SC-53B
Galaxy A42 5G
Qualcomm SM-A426 B, N, U, U1
Qualcomm SM-S426 DL
Galaxy A71 5G Qualcomm SM-A716 U, V
Galaxy A51 5G Qualcomm SM-A516 V, Q, SC-54A, SCG07
Galaxy Tab Active3 Samsung SM-T577 U
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Device Name Chipset Vendor
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
SM-T575 N, None
SM-T570 None
Table 4 - Carrier Models
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE combines with a Mobile Device Management solution (note that this evaluation
does not include an MDM agent nor server) that enables the Enterprise to watch, control
and administer all deployed mobile devices, across multiple mobile service providers as
well as facilitate secure communications through a VPN. This partnership provides a secure
mobile environment that can be managed and controlled by the environment and reduces
the risks inherent in any mobile deployment.
Data on the TOE is protected through the implementation of Samsung File-Based
Encryption (FBE) that utilizes ACVP/CAVP certified cryptographic algorithms to encrypt
device storage. This functionality is combined with a number of on-device policies
including local wipe, remote wipe, password complexity, automatic lock and privileged
access to security configurations to prevent unauthorized access to the device and stored
data.
The Knox Platform for Enterprise provides a set of flexible deployment options for work
environments. With Knox Platform for Enterprise, it is possible to segment the device into
two separate areas, by convention called the personal profile and the work profile. In
creating a work profile, the Enterprise establishes a completely separate workspace, with its
own authentication, applications and services, and ensure they are kept separate from
anything the user may do in the personal profile. Another option for deployment is Knox
Separated Apps, a folder where the Enterprise can isolate a group of applications from the
rest of the device, restricting access to shared information, while maintaining seamless
access to the isolated applications for the user.
The Samsung Knox Software Development Kit (SDK) builds on top of the existing
Android security model by expanding the current set of security configuration options to
more than 600 configurable policies and including additional security functionality such as
application allow and block listing.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a multi-user capable mobile device based on Android 11 that incorporates the
Samsung Knox SDK. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the
operating system, but does include controls that limit application behavior. The TOE
includes an IPsec VPN client integrated into the firmware (as opposed to a downloadable
application). Within an Enterprise environment, the Enterprise can manage the
configuration of the mobile device, including the VPN client, through a compliant device
management solution.
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The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data
networks to establish network connectivity, and the through that connectivity interacts with
MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
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4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE generates logs for a range of security relevant events. The TOE stores the logs
locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or they can be exported to an MDM.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with ACVP certified algorithms for a
wide range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation
and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic
hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with
suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector
generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive
cryptographic functions are used to implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS,
IPsec, and HTTPS and to encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of
data and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are
also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of
the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data
using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The
functionality provided by work profiles and Knox Separated Apps enhance the security of
user data by providing an additional layer of separation between different categories of
apps and data while the device is in use. The TOE ensures that residual information is
protected from potential reuse in accessible objects such as network packets.
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a
user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password or
Biometric Authentication Factor (BAF) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. In
addition, even when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the
password or re-enroll the biometric template. Passwords are obscured when entered so they
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cannot be read from the TOE's display, the frequency of entering passwords is limited and
when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents.
Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower case characters, numbers, and special
characters and passwords between 4 and 16 characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X.509v3 and validate
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges. The TOE can also act as a client or
server in an authenticated Bluetooth pairing. In addition to storing X.509 certificates used
for IPsec connections, the TOE can also securely store pre-shared keys for VPN
connections.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions (including
the VPN client) identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions
commonly found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users
of the TOE while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device
Management solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled
and then un-enrolled, it removes all MDM policies and disables CC mode.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic
keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own timing
mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log
accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address
space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the
potential to exploit application flaws. It also protects itself from modification by
applications as well as isolates the address spaces of applications from one another to
protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE
will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the
digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring
that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when
users unlock the TOE for use.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
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4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS, HTTPS and IPsec to
secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017,
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device
Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016 and PP-Module for
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.2, January 5, 2021
That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC22
should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC22 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and the
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device
Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN) Clients and the Module for Virtual Private Network Clients and
performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the MDF Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the
specific mobile device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as
evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
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CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC22 and applicable
Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
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7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Samsung Android 11 on Galaxy Devices Administrator Guide, Version 7.2, June 15,
2021
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated. Only the Administrator Guide listed above and the specific
sections of the other documents referenced by that guide should be trusted for the
installation, administration, and use of this product in its evaluated configuration.”
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Samsung
Galaxy Devices on Android 11 - Fall, Version 02., August 26, 2021 (DTR), as summarized
in the evaluation Section 3.4 of the Assurance Activity Report.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC22 including
the tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in section 1.1, lists the tested
devices, provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
9 Evaluated Configuration
See Section 3.1.
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Samsung
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Galaxy Devices on Android 11 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained
in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC22.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11
products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC22
related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and
testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that
the TOE was identified.
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The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC22 and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities on 08/26/2021. The public search for vulnerabilities did
not uncover any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: “"SM-T575", "SM-
A526B", "SM-A716V", "Tab Active3", "Samsung A52", "Samsung A71", "Knox",
"Android", "BoringSSL", "strongswan", and "charon".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Samsung Android 11
on Galaxy Devices Administrator Guide, Version 7.2, June 15, 2021. No versions of the
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TOE and software, either earlier or later were evaluated. Please note that the functionality
evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the
Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this
evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment, such as
the syslog server, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn
about their effectiveness.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy
Devices on Android 11 - Fall Security Target, Version 0.1, July 7, 2021.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11- Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, September 8, 2021
15
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017 and
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device
Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016 and PP-Module for
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.2, January 5, 2021.
[5] Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11 - Fall
Security Target, Version 0.1, July 7, 2021 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11, Version
02., August 26, 2021 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11, Version 02.,
August 26, 2021 (DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 11, Version
02., August 26, 2021 (ETR)