Security Target Juniper Networks Mx Routers, PTX Routers and EX9200 Switches running Junos 14.2R3.8
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Security Target
Juniper Networks Mx Routers, PTX Routers and EX9200 Switches
running Junos OS 14.2R3
ST Version 1.0
December 10, 2015
Security Target Juniper Networks Mx Routers, PTX Routers and EX9200 Switches running Junos 14.2R3.8
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Prepared By:
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
www.juniper.net
Abstract
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), the Junos
OS 14.2R3 running on Mx-Series 3D Universal Edge Routers, PTX-Series Packet Transport Routers and
EX-9200 Ethernet Switches. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of
the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set
of security requirements and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of
requirements.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 6
1.1 ST Reference...............................................................................................................................................6
1.2 TOE Reference ............................................................................................................................................6
1.3 About This Document.................................................................................................................................6
1.3.1 Document Conventions .........................................................................................................................7
1.3.2 Document Terminology .........................................................................................................................7
1.4 TOE Overview .............................................................................................................................................7
1.5 TOE Boundaries ..........................................................................................................................................7
1.5.1 Physical Boundary..................................................................................................................................8
1.5.2 Logical Boundary....................................................................................................................................9
1.5.3 Non-TOE hardware, software, firmware .............................................................................................11
1.5.4 Summary of Out-of-Scope Items .........................................................................................................11
2 Conformance Claims.................................................................................................................................. 12
2.1 CC Conformance Claim.............................................................................................................................12
2.2 PP Claim ...................................................................................................................................................12
3 Security Problem Definition ...................................................................................................................... 13
3.1 Threats .....................................................................................................................................................13
3.2 Organizational Security Policies ...............................................................................................................13
3.3 Assumptions.............................................................................................................................................14
4 Security Objectives.................................................................................................................................... 15
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ................................................................................................................15
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ..............................................................................15
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale...................................................................................................................15
5 Extended Security Requirement Components Definition........................................................................... 17
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional Requirement Components .................................................................17
5.1.1 FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage ......................................................................................17
5.1.2 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization..................................................................................17
5.1.3 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation............................................................................18
5.1.4 FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Explicit: SSH................................................................................................................18
5.1.5 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management ............................................................................................19
5.1.6 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism...........................................20
5.1.7 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 Extended: Password-based Authentication and Identification Mechanism...............20
5.1.8 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords ..................................................21
5.1.9 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF data (for reading of all symmetric keys).......................21
5.1.10 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing.............................................................................................22
5.1.11 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Management of TSF Data ....................................................................22
5.1.12 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 Extended: TSF-initiated Session Locking ................................................................23
5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance Requirement Components..................................................................23
6 Security Requirements .............................................................................................................................. 24
6.1 Security Functional Requirements............................................................................................................24
6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU).............................................................................................................................26
6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)................................................................................................................26
6.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)..................................................................................................................28
6.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA) ...............................................................................................28
6.1.5 Security Management (FMT) ...............................................................................................................29
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ..................................................................................................................30
6.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)..................................................................................................................................31
6.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) ...............................................................................................................31
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements ............................................................................................................32
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6.3 Security Requirements Rationale .............................................................................................................32
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale.......................................................................................32
6.3.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale .......................................................................................35
7 TOE Summary Specification....................................................................................................................... 36
7.1 Security Audit ...........................................................................................................................................36
7.2 Cryptographic Support .............................................................................................................................37
7.3 User Data Protection................................................................................................................................40
7.4 Identification and Authentication ............................................................................................................40
7.5 Security Management..............................................................................................................................41
7.6 Protection of the TSF................................................................................................................................42
7.7 TOE Access................................................................................................................................................45
7.8 Trusted Path/Channels.............................................................................................................................45
7.9 RFC Conformance Statements..................................................................................................................46
7.10 Conformance Statements for 800-56.......................................................................................................49
7.10.1 Finite Field-Based and Elliptic Curve-Based Key Establishment Schemes.......................................49
8 Audit Events .............................................................................................................................................. 52
9 Install Packages ......................................................................................................................................... 53
9.1 Mx/PTX Routers........................................................................................................................................53
9.2 EX9200 Switches.......................................................................................................................................53
9.3 FIPS Install Packages ................................................................................................................................53
10 TOE Network Interfaces............................................................................................................................. 54
10.1 Mx 240, Mx 480 and Mx 960....................................................................................................................54
10.1.1 MPCs................................................................................................................................................54
10.1.2 MICs.................................................................................................................................................54
10.1.3 DPC ..................................................................................................................................................55
10.2 Mx 2010 and Mx 2020 .............................................................................................................................55
10.2.1 Modular Port Concentrators (MPCs)...............................................................................................55
10.2.2 Modular Interface Cards (MICs) ......................................................................................................57
10.3 PTX 5000 ..................................................................................................................................................57
10.3.1 PTX5000 FPC and PICs .....................................................................................................................57
10.3.2 PTX5000 Supported FPC and PIC Compatibility: .............................................................................58
10.4 PTX3000 ...................................................................................................................................................59
10.4.1 PTX3000 Supported FPCs ................................................................................................................59
10.4.2 PTX3000 Supported PICs .................................................................................................................59
10.4.3 PTX3000 Supported FPC and PIC Compatibility: .............................................................................59
10.5 EX9200 .....................................................................................................................................................59
11 Appendices................................................................................................................................................ 59
11.1 References................................................................................................................................................60
11.2 Glossary....................................................................................................................................................61
11.3 Acronyms..................................................................................................................................................63
List of Tables
Table 1 - ST Organization and Section Descriptions ....................................................................................................6
Table 2 – TOE Physical Boundary.................................................................................................................................9
Table 3 – TOE Logical Boundary.................................................................................................................................10
Table 4 – Threats Addressed by the TOE...................................................................................................................13
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Table 5 – Organizational Security Policies .................................................................................................................14
Table 6 – Assumptions...............................................................................................................................................14
Table 7 – TOE Security Objectives .............................................................................................................................15
Table 8– Operational Environment Security Objectives............................................................................................15
Table 9– TOE Security Functional Requirements.......................................................................................................25
Table 10 – Security Assurance Requirements ...........................................................................................................32
Table 11– Satisfaction of dependencies ....................................................................................................................35
Table 12 – Minimum Storage Capacity for Audit File ................................................................................................37
Table 13 – CAVP Certificate Results...........................................................................................................................37
Table 14– Key zeroization handling...........................................................................................................................39
Table 15 – RFC Conformance Statements .................................................................................................................49
Table 16 – [800-56A] Conformance Statements .......................................................................................................51
Table 17 – Security Audit Requirements ...................................................................................................................53
Table 18 - Acronyms used in the Security Target ......................................................................................................64
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1 Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), Security Target organization,
document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the evaluated products.
1.1 ST Reference
ST Title Security Target: Juniper Networks Mx Routers, PTX Routers and EX9200
Switches running Junos OS 14.2R3
ST Revision 1.0
ST Draft Date December 10, 2015
Author Juniper Networks, Inc.
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Reference Juniper Networks Mx Routers, PTX Routers and EX9200 Switches running
Junos OS 14.2R3
1.3 About This Document
This Security Target follows the following format:
SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION
1 Introduction Provides an overview of the TOE and defines the hardware and
software that make up the TOE as well as the physical and logical
boundaries of the TOE
2 Conformance Claims Lists evaluation conformance to Common Criteria versions,
Protection Profiles, or Packages where applicable
3 Security Problem Definition Specifies the threats, assumptions and organizational security
policies that affect the TOE
4 Security Objectives Defines the security objectives for the TOE/operational
environment and provides a rationale to demonstrate that the
security objectives satisfy the threats
5 Security Requirements Contains the functional and assurance requirements for this TOE
6 TOE Summary Specification Identifies the IT security functions provided by the TOE and also
identifies the assurance measures targeted to meet the
assurance requirements
7 Rationale Demonstrates traceability and internal consistency
8 Audit Events TOE audit events are listed here
9 Appendices Supporting material
Table 1 - ST Organization and Section Descriptions
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1.3.1 Document Conventions
The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections,
assignments within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font
conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC that are not already completed in
[NDPP]1
:
 Assignment: Indicated with italicized text;
 Refinement made by ST author: Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs, if necessary;
 Selection: Indicated with underlined text;
 Assignment within a Selection: Indicated with italicized and underlined text.
Iterations are indicated by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g., (1), (2), (3).
Iterations identified in [NDPP] are identified in the same manner in this ST.
1.3.2 Document Terminology
See Section 11.2 for the Glossary.
1.4 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a network device (router/switch), and includes the following secure
network devices running Junos OS 14.2R3
 Mx-Series 3D Universal Edge Routers: Mx240 Mx480 Mx960 Mx2010 Mx2020
 PTX-Series Packet Transport Routers: PTX3000 PTX5000
 EX-Series Ethernet Switches: EX9200 (EX9204, EX9208 & EX9214)
1.5 TOE Boundaries
The TOE consists of the following IT components:
1. Network devices (as detailed in Table 2 below).
2. Junos OS 14.2R3: an operating system for security appliances.
The TOE is managed and configured via Command Line Interface.
Each appliance is a secure network device that protects itself largely by offering only a minimal logical
interface to the network and attached nodes. All router platforms are powered by the Junos OS
software, which is a special purpose OS that provides no general purpose computing capability. Junos
OS provides both management and control functions as well as all IP routing.
Each Juniper Networks Mx-series and PTX-series routing platform is a complete routing system that
supports a variety of high-speed interfaces (only Ethernet is within scope of the evaluation) for
medium/large networks and network applications. Similarly, the EX-series 9200 switches provide high-
1
i.e. if a selection, assignment or refinement has been made in [NDPP] it will not also be marked using the font conventions
(although any square brackets used in [NDPP] will be retained) in this security target, thereby highlighting the additional
operations completed in the Security Target.
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performance, carrier-class networking solutions, supporting a variety of high-speed Ethernet interfaces
for medium/large networks.
Juniper Networks routers share common Junos OS software, features, and technology for compatibility
across platforms.
The hardware has two components: the router/switch chassis and the PICs, DPCs and Line Cards that
have been installed in the appliance. The various PICs, DPCs, MPCs, MICs and FPCs that have been
installed in the appliance allow it to communicate with the different types of networks that may be
required within the environment where the router/switch will be used2
.
The architecture of each appliance cleanly separates routing and control functions from packet
forwarding operations, thereby eliminating bottlenecks and permitting the router to maintain a high
level of performance.
Each appliance consists of two major architectural components:
 The Routing Engine (RE), which provides Layer 3 routing services and network management
and control;
 The Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE)3
, which provides all operations necessary for transit packet
forwarding.
The Routing Engine and Packet Forwarding Engine perform their primary tasks independently, while
constantly communicating through a high-speed internal link. This arrangement provides streamlined
forwarding and routing control and the capability to run Internet-scale networks at high speeds.
1.5.1 Physical Boundary
Series Model Slots4
Firmware5
Mx-Series Mx240 3 x MPCs and DPCs (as detailed in
Section 10.1)
Junos 14.2R3.8
Mx480 6 x MPCs and DPCs (as detailed in
Section 10.1)
Junos 14.2R3.8
Mx960 12 x MPCs and DPCs (as detailed in
Section 10.1)
Junos 14.2R3.8
Mx2010 10 x 480 line-rate 10GbE ports (as
detailed in Section 10.2)
Junos 14.2R3.8
Mx2020 20 x 960 line-rate 10GbE ports (as
detailed in Section 10.2)
Junos 14.2R3.8
2
These network interfaces are required for the TOE to operate. However, they are not relied upon for the enforcement
security functionality necessary to satisfy the requirements of [NDPP] and so do not fall within the scope of the TSF.
Therefore, the network interfaces are considered to be non-TOE hardware/software/firmware entities, and are referenced as
such in section 1.5.3.
3
The network interface components form the lower layers of the PFE (the DPC, PICs, DPCs, MPCs and FPCs network interface
components) which simply deal with physical interfaces mechanics.
4
The fabric/cards plugged into the chassis slots are considered to be non-TOE hardware/software/firmware entities as
discussed above.
5
The firmware version reflects the detail reported for the components of the Junos OS when the show version command is
executed on the appliance.
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Series Model Slots4
Firmware5
PTX-Series PTX3000 9 x Switch Interface Boards (as
detailed in Section 10.4)
Junos 14.2R3.8
PTX5000 9 x Switch Interface Boards (as
detailed in Section 10.3)
Junos 14.2R3.8
EX-Series EX9204 4 slots of up to 260 Gbps (full
duplex) per slot fabric capacity (as
detailed in Section 10.5)
Junos 14.2R3.8
EX9208 8 slots of up to 260 Gbps (full
duplex) per slot fabric capacity (as
detailed in Section 10.5)
Junos 14.2R3.8
EX9214 14 slots of up to 260 Gbps (full
duplex) per slot fabric capacity (as
detailed in Section 10.5)
Junos 14.2R3.8
Table 2 – TOE Physical Boundary
The TOE is comprised of the Junos OS 14.2R3 firmware running on the appliance chassis listed in Table
2 above (including the software implementing the Routing Engine and the software and ASICs
implementing the Packet Forwarding Engine). Hence the TOE is contained within the physical
boundary of the specified appliance chassis.
Details of the appliance specific install packages of the Junos OS 14.2R3 are provided in Section 9,
Install Packages.
The guidance documents included as part of the TOE are:
[CLI] Junos OS CLI User Guide, Release 14.2
[ECG] Junos OS Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide for Mx Series, PTX Series
and EX9200 Series Devices Release 14.2R3
[GSG] Junos OS Getting Started Guide for Routing Devices, Release 14.2
[IUG] Installation and Upgrade Guide, Release 14.2
[SLM] Junos OS System Log Messages Reference, Release 14.2
[SSG] Junos OS Security Services Administration Guide for Routing Devices, Release 14.2
[UAA] Junos OS User Access and Authentication Feature Guide for Routing Devices,
Release 14.2
1.5.2 Logical Boundary
This section outlines the boundaries of the security functionality of the TOE; the logical boundary of the
TOE includes the security functionality described in the following sections.
TSF DESCRIPTION
Audit (FAU) Junos auditable events are stored in the syslog files, and can be sent to an
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TSF DESCRIPTION
external log server (via Netconf over SSH). Auditable events include start-up
and shutdown of the audit functions, authentication events, service
requests, as well as the events listed in the table in Section 8. Audit records
include the date and time, event category, event type, username, and the
outcome of the event (success or failure). Local syslog storage limits are
configurable and are monitored. In the event of storage limits being reached
the oldest logs will be overwritten.
Cryptographic Support
(FCS)
The TOE includes a baseline cryptographic module that provides
confidentiality and integrity services for authentication and for protecting
communications with adjacent systems.
User Data Protection The TOE is designed to process network packets and forward them as
appropriate. The packet handling is implemented in such a manner as to
prevent the leakage of user data from one packet into other packet(s) there
were not intended by the originator.
Identification and
Authentication (FIA)
The TOE requires users to provide unique identification and authentication
data before any administrative access to the system is granted. .The devices
also require that applications exchanging information with them successfully
authenticate prior to any exchange. This covers all services used to exchange
information, including Secure Shell (SSH). Telnet, File Transfer Protocol (FTP),
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) are out of scope.
Security Management
(FMT)
The TOE provides an Authorized Administrator role that is responsible for:
 the configuration and maintenance of cryptographic elements
related to the establishment of secure connections to and from the
evaluated product
 the regular review of all audit data;
 all administrative tasks (e.g., creating the security policy).
The devices are managed through a Command Line Interface (CLI). The CLI is
accessible through remote administrative session.
Protection of the TSF (FPT) The TOE provides protection mechanisms for its security functions. One of
the protection mechanisms is to protect TFS data (e.g. cryptographic keys,
administrator passwords). Another protection mechanism is to ensure the
integrity of any software/firmware updates are can be verified prior to
installation. The TOE provides for both cryptographic and non-cryptographic
self-tests, and is capable of automated recovery from failure states. Also,
reliable timestamp is made available for use by the TOE.
TOE Access (FTA) The TOE can be configured to terminate interactive user sessions and to
present an access banner with warning messages prior to authentication.
Trusted Path/Channels
(FTP)
The TOE creates trusted channels between itself and remote trusted
authorized IT product (e.g. syslog server) entities that protect the
confidentiality and integrity of communications. The TOE creates trusted
paths between itself and remote administrators and users that protect the
confidentiality and integrity of communications.
Table 3 – TOE Logical Boundary
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1.5.3 Non-TOE hardware, software, firmware
Network interfaces (DPCs, MPCs, MICs and PICs) are required by the TOE to operate, communicate
with the connected network. These are detailed for each TOE appliance in Section 10.
The TOE requires the following clients/servers to be provided in the connected network:
 Syslog server supporting SSHv2 connections to send audit logs
 SSHv2 client for remote administration
 Serial connection client for local administration
1.5.4 Summary of Out-of-Scope Items
The only security functionality addressed by the evaluation is the functionality specified by the
functional requirements in Section 6.1, and does not include additional product capabilities such as use
of information flow control based on traffic filters. The following items are out of the scope of the
evaluation:
 Use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 6.1)
 Use of FTP, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 6.1)
 Use of SNMP, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 6.1)
 Use of SSL, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope, since it violates the
Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 6.1)
 Media use (other than during installation of the TOE)
 Use of root account, other than during initial installation and configuration.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
The TOE is Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 3 (July 2009) Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant.
2.2 PP Claim
The TOE conforms (exact compliance) to the following Protection Profile:
 Security Requirements for Network Devices, Version 1.1, 08June 2012, [NDPP]
 Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata #3, 3 November 2014, [NDPPerr]
It is understood that “exact compliance”, as specified in [NDPPerr], is a subset of strict
conformance whereby the ST contains all of the requirements in [NDPP] section 4 and the
relevant requirements from Appendix C [NDPP]. There is no iteration of requirements in this ST
and no additional requirements (from [CC2] or [CC3]) in the ST. Further, no requirements in
[NDPP] section 4 are omitted.
The Security Problem definition in this Security Target is consistent with the security problem definition
detailed in [NDPP] Section 2. The threats in this ST are the same as the resulting threats detailed in
Table 4 of [NDPP] Annex A. The organizational security policies in this ST are the same as those
specified in Table 5 of [NDPP] Annex A and the assumptions in this ST are the same as those in Table 3
of [NDPP] Annex A.
The statement of security objectives in this ST is consistent with the statement of security objectives
detailed in [NDPP] Section 3. The Security Objectives for the TOE specified in this ST are the same as
those in Table 6 of [NDPP] Annex A and the Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
specified in this ST are the same as those in Table 7 of [NDPP] Annex A.
The statement of requirement sin this ST is consistent with the statement of requirements detailed in
[NDPP] Section 4. The Security Functional Requirements specified in this ST are the same as those in
[NDPP] Section 4.2, with all extended requirements taken from [NDPP] Section 4.2. The Security
Assurance Requirements specified in this ST include all those in [NDPP] Section 4.3, with all refinements
taken from [NDPP] Section 4.3. In addition to those Security Assurance Requirements specified in
[NDPP] this ST includes the ASE requirements necessary to evaluate this Security Target as part of a
TOE evaluation.
From the additional requirements specified in [NDPP] Annex C, the (extended) requirement
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Explicit SSH is selected. There are no claims for IPSec, TLS or HTTPS included in this ST,
so the extended requirements FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, FCS_TLS_EXT.1, FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 and FIA_PSK_EXT.1
detailed in Annex C of [NDPP] and [NDPPerr] are not included in this ST. In addition, as there are no
separate parts of the TOE the additional requirementFPT_ITT.1 (also specified in [NDPP] Annex C) is not
applicable and is not included in this ST.
No requirements are contained in this ST that are in addition to those specified in [NDPP] & [NDPPerr].
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3 Security Problem Definition
The security problem to be addressed by the TOE is described by threats and policies that are common
to network devices, as opposed to those that might be targeted at the specific functionality of a specific
type of network device, as specified in [NDPP].
This chapter identifies assumptions as A.assumption, threats as T.threat and policies as P.policy.
Note that the assumptions, threats, and policies are the same as those found in [NDPP] such that this
TOE serves to address the Security Problem.
3.1 Threats
The following threats are addressed by the TOE, as detailed in table 4 of [NDPP] Annex A.
THREAT DESCRIPTION
T.ADMIN_ERROR An authorized administrator may incorrectly install or
configure the TOE incorrectly, resulting in ineffective
security mechanisms.
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a
compromise of the TSF.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS Malicious remote users or external IT entities may take
actions that adversely affect the security of the TOE.
These actions may remain undetected and thus their
effects cannot be effectively mitigated.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data
and TOE executable code. A malicious user, process, or
external IT entity may masquerade as an authorized
entity in order to gain unauthorized access to data or
TOE resources. A malicious user, process, or external IT
entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain
identification and authentication data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with
an update to the product that may compromise the
security features of the TOE.
T.USER_DATA_REUSE User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination
not intended by the original sender.
Table 4 – Threats Addressed by the TOE
3.2 Organizational Security Policies
An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an organization
to address its security needs. The TOE is required to meet the following organizational security policies,
as specified in table 5 of [NDPP] Annex A.
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POLICY NAME POLICY DESCRIPTION
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing
restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other
appropriate information to which users consent
by accessing the TOE.
Table 5 – Organizational Security Policies
3.3 Assumptions
This section contains assumptions regarding the security environment and the intended usage of the
TOE, as specified in table 3 of [NDPP] Annex A.
ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE It is assumed that there are no general-purpose computing capabilities
(e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than
those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of
the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it
contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all admin guidance in a
trusted manner.
Table 6 – Assumptions
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The IT Security Objectives for the TOE are detailed below, as specified in table 6 of [NDPP] Annex A.
OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION
O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS The TOE will provide protected communication channels for
administrators, other parts of a distributed TOE, and authorized IT
entities.
O.VERIFIABLE_UPDATES The TOE will provide the capability to help ensure that any
updates to the TOE can be verified by the administrator to be
unaltered and (optionally) from a trusted source.
O.SYSTEM_MONITORING The TOE will provide the capability to generate audit data and
send those data to an external IT entity.
O.DISPLAY_BANNER The TOE will display an advisory warning regarding use of the TOE.
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION The TOE will provide mechanisms to ensure that only
administrators are able to log in and configure the TOE, and
provide protections for logged-in administrators.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEARING The TOE will ensure that any data contained in a protected
resource is not available when the resource is reallocated.
O.SESSION_LOCK The TOE shall provide mechanisms that mitigate the risk of
unattended sessions being hijacked.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST The TOE will provide the capability to test some subset of its
security functionality to ensure it is operating properly.
Table 7 – TOE Security Objectives
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The security objectives for the operational environment are detailed below, as specified in table 7 of
[NDPP] Annex A.
OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user
applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the
operation, administration and support of the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it
contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all admin guidance in a
trusted manner.
Table 8– Operational Environment Security Objectives
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
As these objectives for the TOE and operational environment are the same as those specified in
[NDPP], the rationales provided in the prose of [NDPP] Section 3 and in the tables in [NDPP] Annex A
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are wholly applicable to this security target as the statements of threats, assumptions, OSPs and
security objectives provided in this security target are the same as those defined in the [NDPP].
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5 Extended Security Requirement Components Definition
This section defines the extended Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) to be met by the TOE as
drawn from [NDPP].
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional Requirement Components
This section specifies the extended SFRs for the TOE.
5.1.1 FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage requires the TSF to use an external IT entity for audit data
storage. It is modeled after FAU_STG.1, and is considered to be part of the FAU_STG family.
Management: FAU_STG_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_STG_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to [selection: transmit the generated audit data to an
external IT entity, receive and store audit data from an external IT entity] using
a trusted channel implementing the [selection: Ipsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS]
protocol.
5.1.2 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic key zeroization requires cryptographic keys and cryptographic critical
security parameters to be zeroized. It is modeled after FCS_CKM.4, and is considered to be part of the
FCS_CKM family.
Management: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4Cryptographic Key Zeroization
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
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FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and
CSPs when no longer required.
5.1.3 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in
accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source. It is modeled after FCS_COP.1,
but belongs to a new family defined for the FCS Class.
Management: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all random bit generation (RBG) services in accordance
with [selection, choose one of: NIST16 Special Publication 800-90 using
[selection: Hash_DRBG17 (any), HMAC18_DRBG (any), CTR19_DRBG (AES20),
Dual_EC21_DRBG (any)]; FIPS Pub 140-2 Annex C: X9.31 Appendix 2.4 using
AES] seeded by an entropy source that accumulated entropy from [selection,
one or both of: a software-based noise source; a TSF-hardware-based noise
source].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded with a minimum of [selection, choose
one of: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security
strength of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.1.4 FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Explicit: SSH
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH requires that SSH be implemented. It belongs to a new family defined
for the FCS Class.
Management: FCS_SSH_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_SSH_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
ST:
a) Failure to establish a SSH session, and reason for failure;
b) Establishment/Termination of a SSH session, and non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP address)
for both successes and failures.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (for data encryption/decryption)
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FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic signature)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252,
4253, and 4254, and [selection: 5656, 6668, no other RFCs].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the
following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based,
password-based.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than
[assignment: number of bytes] bytes in an SSH transport connection are
dropped.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following
encryption algorithms: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, [selection:
AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM, no other algorithms].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [selection:
SSH_RSA, ecdsa-sh2-nistp256] and [selection: PGP-SIGN-RSA, PGP-SIGN-DSS,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, no other public key algorithms,] as its public key
algorithm(s).
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that data integrity algorithms used in SSH transport
connection is [selection: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha1-96, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-
sha2-512].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and [selection: ecdh-
sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521, no other methods]
are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
5.1.5 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management defines the password strength requirements that the TSF will
enforce. It belongs to a new family defined for FIA class.
Management: FIA_PMG_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FIA_PMG_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
administrative passwords:
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1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of
upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters:
[selection: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, [assignment:
other characters]];
2. Minimum password length shall settable by the Security
Administrator, and support passwords of 15 characters or greater;
5.1.6 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism requires a local password-based
authentication mechanism and the capability for passwords to expire. In addition, other authentication
mechanisms can be specified. It is considered to be part of the FIA_UAU family.
Management: FIA_UAU_EXT.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FIA_UAU_EXT.2
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
ST:
a) All use of the authentication mechanisms.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism,
[selection: [assignment: other authentication mechanism(s)], none] to perform
user authentication.
5.1.7 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 Extended: Password-based Authentication and Identification
Mechanism
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 Extended: Password-based Authentication and Identification Mechanism, requires a
local password-based authentication mechanism and the capability for passwords to expire. In
addition, other authentication mechanisms can be specified. It is based on a combination of FIA_UAU.1
and FIA_UID.1, and belongs to a new family defined for class FIA.
Management: FIA_UIA_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FIA_UIA_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
ST:
a) All use of the authentication mechanism with provided user identity and origin of the attempt
(e.g. IP address).
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 Extended: Password-based Authentication and Identification Mechanism
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication
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Dependencies: None
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity
to initiate the identification and authentication process:
o Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
o [selection: no other actions, [assignment: list of services,
actions performed by the TSF in response to non-TOE
requests.]]
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that administrative user.
5.1.8 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords requires administrator passwords to
be stored in non-plaintext form and requires the TOE to prevent reading of plaintext passwords. It is
modeled after FPT_SSP.2, but it belongs to a new family defined for the FPT class.
Management: FPT_APW_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_APW_EXT.1
There are no audit activities foreseen.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.
5.1.9 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF data (for reading of all symmetric
keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF data (for reading of all symmetric keys) requires the TOE to
prevent reading of all pre-shared, symmetric, and private keys. It is modeled after FPT_SSP.1, but it
belongs to a new family defined for the FPT class.
Management: FPT_SKP_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_SKP_EXT.1
There are no audit activities foreseen.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF data (for reading of all symmetric keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and
private keys.
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5.1.10 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing requires a suite of self-tests to be run during initial start-up in
order to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF. It is modeled after FPT_TST.1, but belongs to a new
family defined for class FPT.
Management: FPT_TST_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_TST_EXT.1
There are no audit activities foreseen.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
5.1.11 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Management of TSF Data
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Management of TSF Data, requires management tools be provided to
update the TOE firmware and software, including the ability to verify the updates prior to installation. It
belongs to a new family defined for the FPT class.
Management: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
ST:
a) Initiation of update.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic signature)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to query the current
version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to initiate updates to
TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE
using a [selection: digital signature mechanism, published hash] prior to
installing those updates.
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5.1.12 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 Extended: TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 Extended: TSF-initiated Session Locking requires system initiated locking of an
interactive session after a specified period of inactivity. It is part of the FTA_SSL family.
Management: FTA_SSL_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Specification of the time of user inactivity after which lock-out occurs for an individual user.
Audit: FTA_SSL_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
ST:
a) Any attempts at unlocking an interactive session.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 Extended: TSF-initiated Session Locking
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UIA_EXT.1 Password-based Authentication and Identification Mechanism
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [selection:
 lock the session – disable any activity of the user’s data access display
devices other than unlocking the session, and requiring that the
administrator re-authenticate to the TSF prior to unlocking the session;
 terminate the session]
after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance Requirement Components
There are no extended TOE Security Assurance Requirement Components required by [NDPP].
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6 Security Requirements
This section provides security functional and assurance requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE.
These requirements consist of components from the CC Part 2 and Part 3, National Information
Assurance Partnership (NIAP) interpreted requirements, and explicit requirements defined in [NDPP].
All extended components are taken from [NDPP] and as such are understood to be defined by [NDPP],
hence no statement of extended components is required in this security target.
6.1 Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the security functional requirements (SFRs) for the TOE, organized by CC class as
specified in [NDPP].
Table 8 identifies all the SFR’s implemented by the TOE.
CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION
AUDIT
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SERVICES
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1(4)
Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Explicit SSH Requirements
USER DATA
PROTECTION
FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management
IDENTIFICATION & FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
AUTHENTICATION FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
SECURITY
MANAGEMENT
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data (for general TSF data)
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
PROTECTION
OF THE TOE
FPT_SKP_EXT.1
Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric
keys)
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CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FTA_EXT_SSL.1 TSF-initiated session locking
TOE FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
ACCESS FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
TRUSTED
PATH/CHANNEL
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1
Trusted path
Table 9– TOE Security Functional Requirements
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6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)
6.1.1.1 Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit;
c) All administrative actions; and
d) [specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 17, Section 8].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event time, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, [information specified in
column three of Table 1Table 17, Section 8].
6.1.1.2 User identity association – human users (FAU_GEN.2)
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able
to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the
event.
6.1.1.3 Protected audit trail storage (FAU_STG_EXT.1)
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to [transmit the generated audit data to an external IT
entity] using a trusted channel implementing the [SSH] protocol.
6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.1.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) (FCS_CKM.1.1)
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for key
establishment in accordance with;
[NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for finite field-
based key establishment schemes,
NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for elliptic
curve-based key establishment schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-
256, P-384 and [P-521] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-3, “Digital Signature
Standard”)]
and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a
symmetric key strength of 112 bits.
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6.1.2.2 Cryptographic Key Zeroization (for asymmetric keys) (FCS_CKM_EXT.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 The TSF shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and
CSPs when no longer required.
6.1.2.3 Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption) (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1.1(1) The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [AES operating in [CBC mode]] and
cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and 256-bits that meets the following:
 FIPS PUB 197, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”
 [NIST SP 800-38A, NIST SP 800-38D]
6.1.2.4 Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature) (FCS_COP.1(2))
FCS_COP.1.1(2) The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in accordance with a [:
(3) Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with a key size of 256 bits
or greater]
that meets the following:
Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-3, “Digital Signature Standard “
 The TSF shall implement “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [P-521] (as
defined in FIPS PUB 186-3, “Digital Signature Standard”).]
Application Note: ECDSA (P-256) + SHA256 (FCS_COP.1(2)) is used for package verification by
M/Mx/PTX-series, as required for FPT_TUD_EXT.1. ECDSA signature services
are also used by the SSH module, in support of the FCS_SSH_EXT.1
requirements.
6.1.2.5 Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing) (FCS_COP.1(3))
FCS_COP.1.1(3) The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512] and message
digest sizes [160, 256, 512] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-3,
“Secure Hash Standard.”
6.1.2.6 Cryptographic Operation (for key-hash message authentication) (FCS_COP.1(4))
FCS_COP.1.1(4) The TSF shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[SHA1, SHA-256, SHA-512], key size
[160, 256, 512 bits], and message digest sizes [160, 256, 512] bits that meet the
following: FIPS Pub 198-1, “The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, and
FIPS Pub 180-3, “Secure Hash Standard.”
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6.1.2.7 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all random bit generation (RBG) services in accordance
with [NIST Special Publication 800-90 using [HMAC_DRBG (any)]] seeded by an
entropy source that accumulated entropy from [a software-based noise
source; a TSF-hardware-based noise source].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy
at least equal to the greatest security strength of the keys and hashes that it
will generate.
6.1.2.8 Explicit: SSH (FCS_SSH_EXT.1)
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252,
4253, and 4254, and [5656, 6668].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the
following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based,
password-based.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than
[256K] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following
encryption algorithms: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, [no other algorithms].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [ecdsa-sha2-
nistp256] and [no other public key algorithms] as its public key algorithm(s).
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that data integrity algorithms used in SSH transport
connection is [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and [ecdh-sha2-
nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only allowed key
exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
6.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
6.1.3.1 Full residual information protection (FDP_RIP.2)
FDP_RIP.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the [allocation of the resource to] all objects.
6.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.1.4.1 Password Management (FIA_PMG_EXT.1)
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
administrative passwords:
1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower
case letters, numbers, and the following special characters [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”,
“^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”];
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2. Minimum password length shall be settable by the Authorized6
Administrator, and
support passwords of 15 characters or greater;
6.1.4.2 User Identification and Authentication (FIA_UIA_EXT.1)
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity
to initiate the identification and authentication process:
 Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
 [[routing/switching services, including ping, arp, BFD send (UDP port 49152),
GRE OAM Keep-alive and SGR tunnel status (UDP port 49153) and HCM JVAS
plugin (UDP port 49154) services]].
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified
and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on
behalf of that administrative user.
6.1.4.3 Extended: Password-based Authentication mechanism (FIA_UAU_EXT.2)
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism,
[public key-based authentication] to perform administrative user
authentication.
Application Note: ECDSA is the public key algorithm supported for administrative user
authentication.
6.1.4.4 Protected Authentication Feedback (FIA_UAU.7)
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while
the authentication is in progress at the local console7
.
6.1.5 Security Management (FMT)
6.1.5.1 Management of TSF data (For General TSF data) (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to the Authorized6
Administrators.
6.1.5.2 Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
 Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
 Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital signature]
capability prior to installing those updates;
6
This is identified as a refinement as the PP uses the term “Security Administrator” in this instance, but defines the role
“Authorized Administrator” in FMT_SMR.1 (see section 6.1.5.3). Therefore, the ST has adopted and applied the term
“Authorized Administrator” for consistency reasons.
7
The refinement “at the local console” is not marked in [NDPP].
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 [No other capabilities].
Application Note: ECDSA is the supported digital signature algorithms (as specified in
FCS_COP.1(2) for NDPP compliance.
6.1.5.3 Restrictions on security roles (FMT_SMR.2)
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
 Authorized Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
 Authorized Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
 Authorized Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE
remotely;
are satisfied.
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.6.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys) (FPT_SKP_EXT.1)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and
private keys.
6.1.6.2 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords (FPT_APW_EXT.1)
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.
6.1.6.3 Reliable time stamps (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
6.1.6.4 Extended: Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized6
administrators the ability to query the
current version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized6
administrators the ability to initiate
updates to TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the
TOE using a [digital signature mechanism] prior to installing those updates.
6.1.6.5 Extended: TSF Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up (on power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
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6.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)
6.1.7.1 TSF-initiated session locking (local sessions) (FTA_SSL_EXT.1)
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session] after an
Authorized6
Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
6.1.7.2 TSF-initiated termination (remote sessions) (FTA_SSL.3)
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after an [Authorized6
Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity].
6.1.7.3 User-initiated termination (FTA_SSL_EXT.4)
FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s
own interactive session.
6.1.7.4 Default TOE access banners (FTA_TAB.1)
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display an
Authorized6
Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning
message regarding use of the TOE.
6.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
6.1.8.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (prevention of disclosure) (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall use [SSH] to provide a trusted communication channel between
itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit
server, [[no other capabilities]] that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points
and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of
modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [export of
audit logs to syslog servers].
6.1.8.2 Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1)
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall use [SSH] to provide a trusted communication path between itself
and remote administrators that is logically distinct from other communication
paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of
the communicated data from disclosure and detection of modification of the
communicated data.
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication via the
trusted path.
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FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial administrator
authentication and all remote administration actions.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE, which are summarized in Table 10 below.
The security assurance requirements included in this Security Target include all those specified in
[NDPP] for which conformance is claimed. In addition, Table 10 details the ASE Security Assurance
Requirements to be applied for the evaluation of this ST, in the context of a TOE evaluation.
ASSURANCE CLASS COMPONENTS DESCRIPTION
ASE: Security Target
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance Documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative User Guidance
ALC: Lifecycle Support
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing – Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Analysis
Table 10 – Security Assurance Requirements
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The rationale of how the security functional requirements meet all objectives for the TOE is provided in
the prose of [NDPP] Section 3. As all objectives and all SFRs in this Security Target are the same as
those specified in [NDPP] the rationale provided in [NDPP] Section 3 is wholly applicable to this security
target.
All dependencies of security functional requirements are satisfied as demonstrated in below.
SFR Dependency Satisfaction of dependency
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1 dependency satisfied by
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 which authenticates
administrator identity prior to interaction
with TSF.
FAU_STG_EXT.1
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FAU_GEN.1
FTP_ITC.1
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SFR Dependency Satisfaction of dependency
FCS_CKM.1
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_COP.1 (1-4)
FCS_CKM.4 dependency met by
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1(1)
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4 dependency met by
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_COP.1(2)
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4 dependency met by
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_COP.1(3)
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4 dependency met by
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_COP.1(4)
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4 dependency met by
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None n/a
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS FCS_TLS_EXT.1
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SFR Dependency Satisfaction of dependency
FDP_RIP.2
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic
operation (for data
encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic
operation (for cryptographic
signature)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic
operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic
operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended:
Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key
Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key
Zeroization
FCS_COP.1(1)
FCS_COP.1(2)
FCS_COP.1(3))
FCS_COP.1(4)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic
operation (for data
encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic
operation (for cryptographic
signature)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic
operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic
operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended:
Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key
Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key
Zeroization
FCS_COP.1(1)
FCS_COP.1(2)
FCS_COP.1(3))
FCS_COP.1(4)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 None n/a
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 None n/a
FIA_UAU.7 None n/a
FMT_MTD.1 None n/a
FMT_SMF.1
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_UIA_EXT.1 which authenticates
administrator identity prior to interaction
with TSF.
FMT_SMR.2
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None n/a
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SFR Dependency Satisfaction of dependency
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UIA_EXT.1 which authenticates
administrator identity prior to interaction
with TSF.
FPT_STM.1 None n/a
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 None n/a
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None n/a
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 None n/a
FTA_SSL.3 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic
operation (for cryptographic
signature)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic
operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1(2)
FCS_COP.1(3)
FTA_SSL.4 None n/a
FTA_TAB.1 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 Password-based
Authentication and Identification
Mechanism
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
FTP_ITC.1 None n/a
FTP_TRP.1 None n/a
Table 11– Satisfaction of dependencies
6.3.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The rationale provided in [NDPP] Section 4.3 for the selection of security assurance requirements is
wholly applicable to this security target, as the security assurance requirements specified in this
security target are the same as those specified in [NDPP].
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7 TOE Summary Specification
This section provides summary information on how the security requirements are met. The objective is
to give a high-level view of the security requirements are satisfied by the TOE; therefore, the
descriptions are not overly detailed.
7.1 Security Audit
JUNOS creates and stores audit records for the following events (the detail of content recorded for
each audit event is detailed in Table 17):
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit function8
;
b) All administrative actions;
c) All events specified in Table 17.
Auditing is done using syslog. Syslog can be configured to store the audit logs locally, and optionally to
send them to one or more syslog log servers (via Netconf over SSH9
). Local audit log are stored in
/var/log/ in the underlying filesystem. Only an authorized administrator can read log files, or delete log
and archive files through the CLI interface or through direct access to the filesystem having first
authenticated as an authorized administrator (see Section 7.4 below). The syslogs are automatically
deleted locally according to configurable limits on storage volume.
The TOE defines an active log file and a number of “archive” files (10 by default, but configurable from
1 to 1000). When the active log file reaches its maximum size, the logging utility closes the file,
compresses it, and names the compressed archive file ‘logfile.0.gz’. The logging utility then opens and
writes to a new active log file. When the new active log file reaches the configured maximum size,
‘logfile.0.gz’ is renamed ‘logfile.1.gz’, and the active log file is closed, compressed, and renamed
‘logfile.0.gz’ (see [SLM] Chapter 1, Subsection ‘Specifying Log File Size, Number, and Archiving
Properties’). When the maximum number of archive files is reached and when the size of the active file
reaches the configured maximum size, the contents of the oldest archived file are deleted so the
current active file can be archived.
The maximum value that can be specified for the size of a log file is 1GB. However, the default
maximum size depends on the platform type:
 1 megabyte (MB) for M Series, Mx Series and PTX Series Routers
 128KB for the EX Series switches
These defaults maximum sizes can be modified by the user, as detailed in [SLM] Chapter 1, Subsection
‘Specifying Log File Size, Number, and Archiving Properties’.
A 1GB syslog file takes approximately 25Mb of storage when archived. Syslog files can acquire
complete storage allocated to /var filesystem which is platform specific. However, when the filesystem
reaches 92% storage capacity an event is raised to the administrator but the eventd process (being a
privileged process) still can continue using the reserved storage blocks. This allows the syslog to
continue storing events while the administrator frees the storage. If the administrator does not free
8
Start-up and shutdown of the audit function are synonymous with start-up and shutdown of the TOE, as the audit functions
cannot be enabled or disabled, and so form part of the TOE start-up and shutdown process, respectively.
9
In accordance with RFC 4741.
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the storage in time and the /var filesystem storage becomes exhausted a final entry is recorded in the
log reporting “No space left on device” and logging is terminated. The appliance continues to operate
in the event of exhaustion of audit log storage space. The minimum capacity available for the storage
of audit files is detailed in Table 12.
Series Models Minimum Storage Capacity for Audit Files
Mx-Series Mx240 Mx480 Mx960 Mx2010 Mx2020 18Gb
PTX-Series PTX3000 PTX5000 50Gb
EX9200-Series EX9204, EX9208, EX9214 16Gb
Table 12 – Minimum Storage Capacity for Audit File
For more information about configuring event logging see [SLM] and [ECG].
The Audit function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FAU_GEN.1
 FAU_GEN.2
 FAU_STG_EXT.1
7.2 Cryptographic Support
All FIPS-approved cryptographic functions implemented by the secure network appliance are
implemented in the Junos crypto module. The TOE evaluation provides a CAVP validation certificate for
all FIPS-approved cryptographic functions implemented by the TOE. CAVP certificate details are
provided in Table 13 – CAVP Certificate Results, below
Implementation Algorithm Cert Number
LibMD SHA #2960
HMAC #2295
OpenSSL AES #3597
DSA #1000
ECDSA #734
SHA #2959
HMAC #2294
DRBG_HMAC #932
Table 13 – CAVP Certificate Results
The TOE meets the cryptographic requirements by allowing the administrator to run a FIPS install
package (per platform guidance). The evaluated configuration of the TOE details that the FIPS
operating mode should not be enabled10
. The Cryptographic security function is described in the
context of how it satisfies the cryptographic security requirements.
10
The knob “set system fips level 1” (which is NOT set in the evaluated configuration) will enforce strict compliance to FIPS
and enable restrictions on algorithms and keys sizes as required by FIPS requirements. While FIPS validated algorithms are
invoked to provide the cryptographic operations necessary to support the evaluation configuration (including encryption,
decryption, hashing services, signature services, random number generation and self-testing), FIPS mode should not be
applied.
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The FIPS-approved crypto module implements Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with a
key size of 256 bits or greater (as specified by the authorized administrator) with SHA256 for digital
signature generation and verification.
The TOE implements a timeout period for authentication for the SSHv2 protocol and provides a limit of
three failed authentication attempts. The TOE uses public key-based authentication methods and
password-based authentication for SSHv2.
Packets greater than 256Kbytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped and the connection is
terminated by the TOE.
The TOE supports AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256 encryption algorithms for SSH transport and uses
“ecdsa-sha2-nistp256” as its public key algorithm.
The data integrity algorithms used in SSH transport connection are “hmac-sha1”as required by
[RFC4253] and hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512 as required by [RFC6668].
Key exchange is done using one of “diffie-hellman-group14-sha1” [RFC4253] ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-
sha2-nistp384, or ecdh-sha2-nistp521 [RFC5656]. No other key exchange methods are supported in
the evaluated configuration, as detailed in [ECG].
The TOE supports cryptographic hashing via the SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 algorithms, provided it
has a message digest size of 160, 256 or 512 bits.
The TOE handles zeroization for all CSP, plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys according to
Table 14– Key zeroization handling below. Zeroization is performed when then memory is called back
for subsequent use, and is zeroized before it is re-used.
The TOE performs random number generation in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90 using
HMAC_DRBG, SHA-256
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CSP Description
How
Stored
Where
Stored
Zeroization Method
SSH Private
Host Key
The first time SSH is
configured, the key is
generated. Used to
identify the host.
Plaintext Disk When the appliance is recommissioned,
the config files (including CSP files such as
SSH keys) are removed using "rm –rf".
Files are overwritten three times using the
zeroize option before they are deleted
SSH Private
Host Key
Loaded into memory to
complete session
establishment
Plaintext Memory Memory is overwritten upon session
termination (erased on deallocation from
a resource and also erased on
(re)allocation to a resource)
SSH Session
Key
Session keys used with
SSH, AES 128, 256,
HMAC-SHA-1, hmac-sha2-
256 or hmac-sha2-512
key (160, 256 or 512), DH
Private Key (2048 or
elliptic curve
256/384/521-bits)
Plaintext Memory Memory is overwritten upon session
termination (erased on deallocation from
a resource and also erased on
(re)allocation to a resource)
User
Password
Plaintext value as entered
by user
Plaintext
as entered
Hashed
when
stored
Processed
in Memory
Stored on
disk
Memory is overwritten once password
verification is complete.
When the appliance is recommissioned,
the config files (including password hash
file) are removed using "rm –rf".
RNG State Internal state and seed
key of RNG
Plaintext Memory Handled by kernel, which zeroizes at
power-cycle
ecdh private
keys
Loaded into memory to
complete key exchange in
session establishment
Plaintext Memory Memory is overwritten upon session
termination (erased on deallocation from
a resource and also erased on
(re)allocation to a resource)
Table 14– Key zeroization handling
The Cryptographic support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FCS_CKM.1
 FCS_CKM_EXT.4
 FCS_COP.1(1)
 FCS_COP.1(2)
 FCS_COP.1(3)
 FCS_COP.1(4)
 FCS_RBG_EXT.1
 FCS_SSH_EXT.1
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7.3 User Data Protection
The only resource made available to information flowing through a TOE is the temporary storage of
packet information when access is requested and when information is being routed. User data is not
persistent when resources are released by one user/process and allocated to another user/process.
Temporary storage (memory) used to build network packets is erased when the resource is called into
use by the next user/process. Junos knows, and keeps track of, the length of the packet. This means
that when memory allocated from a previous user/process arrives to build the next network packet,
Junos is aware of when the end of the packet is reached and pads a short packet with zeros
accordingly. Hence, the memory content is overwritten by either the content of the subsequent
packet or zeros and no residual information from packets in a previous information stream can traverse
through the TOE.
The User Data Protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FDP_RIP.2
7.4 Identification and Authentication
The TSF enforces binding between human users and subjects. The Authorized Administrator is
responsible for provisioning user accounts, and only the Authorized Administrator can do so. User
accounts in the TOE have the following attributes: user identity (user name), authentication data
(password) and role (privilege). The Authorized Administrator is associated with a defined login class,
which is assigned “permissions all”.
Junos users are configured under “system login user” and are exported to the password database
‘/var/etc/master.passwd’. A Junos user is therefore an entry in the password database. Each entry in
the password database has fields corresponding to the attributes of “system login user”, including
username, (obfuscated) password and login class. The passwords are stored in obfuscated form using
either sha1 or sha256 as detailed in [ECG].
Locally stored authentication data for fixed password authentication is a case-sensitive, alphanumeric
value. The password has a minimum length of 1511
characters, must contain characters from at least
two different character sets (upper, lower, numeric, punctuation), and can be up to 20 ASCII characters
in length (control characters are not recommended).Authentication data for public key-based
authentication methods are stored in a directory owned by the user (and typically with the same name
as the user). This directory contains the files ‘.ssh/authorized_keys’ and ‘.ssh/authorized_keys2’ which
are used for SSH public key authentication.
The internal architecture supporting Authentication includes an active process, associated linked
libraries and supporting configuration data. The Authentication process and library are
 login()
 PAM Library module
Following TOE initialization, a ‘login’ process is listening for a connection at the local console. This
‘login’ process can be accessed through either direct connection to the local console or following
11
By default the minimum password length is 10, but this is configurable and can be set to another minimum length value, e.g.
15 using the command: set system login password minimum-length 15
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successful establishment of a remote management connection over SSH (as detailed in Section 7.8),
when a login prompt is displayed.
This login process identifies and authenticates the user using PAM operations. The login process does
two things; it first establishes that the requesting user is whom they claim to be and second provides
them with an interactive Junos Command interactive command line interface (CLI).
The SSH daemon supports public key authentication by looking up a public key in an authorized keys
file located in the directory ‘.ssh’ in the user’s home directory (i.e. ‘~/.ssh/’) and this authentication
method will be attempted before any other if the client has a key available. The SSH daemon will
ignore the authorized keys file if it or the directory ‘.ssh’ or the user’s home directory are not owned by
the user or are writeable by anyone else.
For password authentication, login() interacts with a user to request a username and password to
establish and verify the user’s identity. The username entered by the administrator at the username
prompt is reflected to the screen, but no feedback to screen is provided while the entry made by the
administrator at the password prompt until the Enter key is pressed. Login() uses PAM Library calls for
the actual verification of this data.The password is hashed and compared to the stored value, and
success/failure is indicated to login(). PAM is used in the TOE support authentication management,
account management, session management and password management. Login primarily uses the
session management and password management functionality offered by PAM.
Following authentication, login launches the CLI using an exec()12
system call. Such an invocation,
results in the main() function for the CLI to be invoked.
The TOE requires users to provide unique identification and authentication data (passwords/public key)
before any access to the system is granted. A password is configured for each user allowed to log into
the secure router. The TOE successfully authenticates if the authentication data provided matches that
stored in conjunction with the provided identity.
The TOE will permit support of the following services prior to identification and authentication of the
administrator: ping, arp, BFD send (UDP port 49152), GRE OAM Keep-alive and SGR tunnel status (UDP
port 49153) and HCM JVAS plug-in (UDP port 49154). These services are permitted by default once the
evaluated configuration, as specified in [ECG], has been applied. No administrator functions are
available prior to identification and authentication. Junos OS process permissions prevent the
daemons associated with these listening services from accessing any TSF data.
The Identification and Authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FIA_PMG_EXT.1
 FIA_UIA_EXT.1
 FIA_UAU_EXT.2
 FIA_UAU.7
7.5 Security Management
There is only one user role defined for the TOE: Authorized Administrator. The Authorized
Administrator is responsible for provisioning user accounts. User accounts in the TOE have the
following attributes: user identity (user name), authentication data (password/public key) and role
12
Any of the exec family of system calls may be used.
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(privilege). Locally stored authentication data for fixed password authentication is a case-sensitive,
value comprised of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and punctuation (from the
set [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”). Public keys are stored in ‘.ssh’ files in the user’s
home directory (i.e. ‘~/.ssh/’).
The TOE provides user access either through the system console or remotely over the Trusted Path
using the SSHv2 protocol. Users are required to provide unique identification and authentication data
(passwords/public key) before any access to the system is granted. A password is configured for each
user allowed to log into the secure router. Password information is stored as hashed data (using hmac-
sha1) in the authentication database and public keys are stored in plaintext in ‘.ssh’ files in the user’s
home directory (i.e. ‘~/.ssh/’). The TOE successfully authenticates if the authentication data provided
matches that stored in conjunction with the provided identity.
The Authorized Administrator has the capability to:
 Modify cryptographic security data (import of certificates for the establishment of SSH
sessions) and date/time
 Restrict the service available to unidentified or unauthenticated IT entities
 Restrict TOE (release) updates13
Detailed topics on the secure management of Juniper’s routers & switches are discussed in [SSG], [CLI],
[UAA] and [ECG].
The Security Management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FMT_MTD.1
 FMT_SMF.1
 FMT_SMR.2
7.6 Protection of the TSF
The clock function of the TOE provides a source of date and time information for the appliance, used in
audit timestamps. The clock function is reliant on the system clock provided by the underlying
hardware. In addition, for each user session the TOE maintains a count of clock cycles (provided by the
system clock) since last activity. The count is reset each time there is activity related to the user
session. When the counter reaches the number of clock cycles equating to the configured period of
inactivity the user session is locked out.
Authorized administrators are able to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software. Junos
does not provide partial updates for the TOE, customers requiring updates must migrate to a
subsequent release.
The kernel maintains a set of fingerprints (SHA1 digests) for executable files and other files which
should be immutable. No executable can be run or shared object loaded unless the fingerprint is
correct. The fingerprints are loaded as the filesystems are mounted, from digitally signed manifests.
The manifest file is signed using the Juniper engineering private key, and is verified by the TOE using
the Juniper engineering public key (stored on the TOE filesystem in clear, protected by filesystem
access rights).
13
Patch updates are not included in the scope of the evaluation; only complete release updates are supported.
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ECDSA (P-256) with SHA-256 is used for package verification by M/Mx/PTX-series and EX-series
The fingerprint loader will only process a manifest for which it can verify the signature. Thus without a
valid digital signature an executable cannot be run. When the command is issued to install an update
(e.g. request system software add jinstall), the manifest file for the update is verified and stored, and each
executable/immutable file is verified before it is executed. If any of the fingerprints in an update are
not correctly verified, the TOE rolls back to the last known verified image.
The TOE will run the following set of self-tests during power on to check the correct operation of the
TOE:
 Power on test – determines the boot-device responds, and performs a memory size check to
confirm the amount of available memory.
 File integrity test –verifies integrity of all mounted signed packages, to assert that system files
have not been tampered with.
 Crypto integrity test – checks integrity of major CSPs, such as SSH hostkeys and iked
credentials, such as Cas, CERTS, and various keys.
 Authentication error – verifies that veriexec is enabled and operates as expected using
/opt/sbin/kats/cannot-exec.real.
 Kernel, libmd, OpenSSL, QuickSec, SSH Ipsec – verifies correct output from known answer tests
for appropriate algorithms
The power on self-tests are run in different modules for example:
Testing kernel KATS:
DES3-CBC Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA2-256 Known Answer Test
SHA-2 Known Answer Test
AES128-CMAC Known Answer Test
AES-CBC Known Answer Test
Testing MacSec KATS:
AES128-CMAC Known Answer Test
Testing libmd KATS:
HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA2-256 Known Answer Test
SHA-2 Known Answer Test
Testing OpenSSL KATS:
FIPS RNG Known Answer Test
NIST 800-90 HMAC DRBG Known Answer Test
FIPS DSA Known Answer Test
FIPS ECDSA Known Answer Test
FIPS ECDH Known Answer Test
FIPS RSA Known Answer Test
DES3-CBC Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA2-224 Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA2-256 Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA2-384 Known Answer Test
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HMAC-SHA2-512 Known Answer Test
SHA-2 Known Answer Test
AES-CBC Known Answer Test
AES-GCM Known Answer Test
ECDSA-SIGN Known Answer Test
KDF-IKE-V1 Known Answer Test
KDF-SSH Known Answer Test
Testing QuickSec KATS:
NIST 800-90 HMAC DRBG Known Answer Test
DES3-CBC Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA2-224 Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA2-256 Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA2-384 Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA2-512 Known Answer Test
AES-CBC Known Answer Test
SSH-RSA-ENC Known Answer Test
SSH-RSA-SIGN Known Answer Test
KDF-IKE-V1 Known Answer Test
KDF-IKE-V2 Known Answer Test
Testing SSH Ipsec KATS:
NIST 800-90 HMAC DRBG Known Answer Test
DES3-CBC Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test
HMAC-SHA2-256 Known Answer Test
SHA-2 Known Answer Test
AES-CBC Known Answer Test
SSH-RSA-ENC Known Answer Test
SSH-RSA-SIGN Known Answer Test
KDF-IKE-V1 Known Answer Test
Testing file integrity:
File integrity Known Answer Test
Testing crypto integrity:
Crypto integrity Known Answer Test
Expect an exec Authentication error…
/sbin/kats/run-tests: /sbin/kats/cannot-exec: Authentication error
Junos OS is designed to fail securely. In the event of a transiently corrupt state or failure condition, the
system will report an error; the event will be logged and the system restarted, having ceased to process
network traffic. When the system restarts, the system boot process does not succeed without passing
all self-tests for cryptographic algorithms, RNG tests, and software integrity tests. The logging of this
self-test behavior is discussed in Chapter 10 of [ECG].
The TOE does not provide a CLI interface to permit the viewing of keys. Cryptographic keys are
protected through the enforcement of kernel-level file access rights, limiting access to the contents of
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cryptographic key containers to processes with cryptographic rights or shell users with root
permission14
.
The Protection of the TSF function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FPT_SKP_EXT.1
 FPT_APW_EXT.1
 FPT_STM.1
 FPT_TUD_(EXT).1
 FPT_TST_EXT.1
7.7 TOE Access
Junos enables Authorized Administrators to configure an access banner provided with the
authentication prompt. The banner can provide warnings against unauthorized access to the secure
router as well as any other information that the Authorized Administrator wishes to communicate.
User sessions can be terminated by users. The Authorized Administrator can set the TOE so that a user
session is terminated after a period of inactivity.
The TSF overwrites the display device and makes the current contents unreadable after the local
interactive session is terminated due to inactivity, thus disabling any further interaction with the TOE.
This mechanism is the inactivity timer for administrative sessions. The Authorized Administrator can
configure this inactivity timer on administrative sessions after which the session will be logged out.
The local administrative user can logout of existing session by typing logout to exit the CLI admin
session and the TSF makes the current contents unreadable after the admin initiates the termination.
No user activity can take place until the user re-identifies and authenticates.
The TOE Access function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
 FTA_SSL.3
 FTA_SSL.4
 FTA_TAB.1
7.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports and enforces Trusted Channels that protect the communications between the TOE
and a remote audit server from unauthorized disclosure or modification. It also supports Trusted Paths
between itself and remote administrators so that the contents of administrative sessions are protected
against unauthorized disclosure or modification.
The TOE achieves Trusted Channels by use of the SSHv2 protocol which ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of communication with the remote audit server. Export of audit information to a secure,
remote server is achieved by setting up an event trace monitor that sends event log messages by using
NETCONF over SSH to the remote system event logging server. Either the TOE or the remote audit
server can initiate the connection, and mutual identification of the endpoints is guaranteed by using
14
[ECG] details the use of the root user is limited to initial installation and configuration and is not to be used in normal
operation.
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public key certificate based authentication for SSH. The SSHv2 protocol ensures that the data
transmitted over a SSH session cannot be disclosed or altered by using the encryption and integrity
mechanisms of the protocol with the FIPS cryptographic module.
The TOE achieves Trusted Paths by use of the SSHv2 protocol which ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of user sessions. The encrypted communication path between the TSF and a remote
administrator is provided by the use of an SSH session. Remote administrators of the TSF initiate
communication with the TSF through the SSH tunnel created by the SSH session. Assured identification
of the TSF is guaranteed by using public key based authentication for SSH. The SSHv2 protocol ensures
that the data transmitted over a SSH session cannot be disclosed or altered by using the encryption and
integrity mechanisms of the protocol with the FIPS cryptographic module.
Local console access is gained by connecting an RJ-45 cable between the console port on the appliance
and a workstation with a serial connection client.
The Trusted Path/Channels function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FTP_ITC.1
 FPT_TRP.1
7.9 RFC Conformance Statements
This section identifies, for the critical RFCs applied in the implementation of SSH, the options supported
by the TOE.
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RFC RFC synopsis TOE Handling of Security-Related Protocol Options
RFC
4251
The Secure Shell
(SSH) Protocol
Architecture
Host Keys: The TOE uses an ECDSA Host Key for SSH v2, which is generated on
initial setup of the TOE. It can be de-configured via the CLI and the key will be
deleted and thus unavailable during connection establishment. This key is
randomly generated to be unique to each TOE instance. The TOE presents the
client with its public key and the client matches this key against its
known_hosts list of keys. When a client connects to the TOE, the client will be
able to determine if the same host key was used in previous connections, or if
the key is different (per the SSHv2 protocol).
Policy Issues: The TOE implements all mandatory algorithms and methods. The
TOE can be configured to accept public-key based authentication and/or
password-based authentication. The TOE does not require multiple
authentication mechanisms for users. The TOE allows port forwarding and
sessions to clients. The TOE has no X11 libraries or applications and X11
forwarding is prohibited.
Confidentiality: The TOE does not accept the “none” cipher. For ciphers whose
blocksize >= 16, the TOE rekeys every 2^32 blocks have been sent/received.
For other ciphers, the TOE rekeys connections, after 2^27 blocks have been
sent/received. (Rekeying can also be triggered by sending 2^31 + 1 packets,
rather than blocks.) The client may explicitly request a rekeying event as a valid
SSHv2message at any time and the TOE will honor this request.
Denial of Service: When the SSH connection is brought down, the TOE does not
attempt to re-establish it.
Ordering of Key Exchange Methods: The TOE orders key exchange algorithms
as follows: ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-
hellman-group14-sha1.
Debug Messages: The TOE sshd server does not support debug messages via
the CLI.
End Point Security: The TOE permits port forwarding.
Proxy Forwarding: The TOE permits proxy forwarding.
X11 Forwarding: The TOE does not support X11 forwarding.
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RFC RFC synopsis TOE Handling of Security-Related Protocol Options
RFC
4252
The Secure Shell
(SSH)
Authentication
Protocol
Authentication Protocol: The TOE does not accept the “none” authentication
method. The TOE disconnects a client after 30 seconds if authentication has
not been completed. The TOE also allows authentication retries of three times
before sending a disconnect to the client.
Authentication Requests: The TOE does not accept authentication if the
requested service does not exist. The TOE does not allow authentication
requests for a non-existent username to succeed – it sends back a disconnect
as it would for failed authentications and hence does not allow enumeration of
valid usernames. The TOE denies “none” authentication method and replies
with a list of permitted authentication methods.
Public Key Authentication Method: The TOE supports public key
authentication. Authentication succeeds if the correct private key is used. The
TOE does not require multiple authentications (public key and password) for
users.
Password Authentication Method: The TOE supports password authentication.
Expired passwords are not supported and cannot be used for authentication.
Host-Based Authentication: The TOE does not support the configuration of
host-based authentication methods.
RFC
4253
The Secure Shell
(SSH) Transport
Layer Protocol
Encryption: The TOE offers the following for encryption of SSH sessions:
aes128-cbc and aes256-cbc
15
. The TOE permits negotiation of encryption
algorithms in each direction. The TOE does not allow the “none” algorithm for
encryption.
Data Integrity: The TOE permits negotiation of HMAC-SHA1 in each direction.
Key Re-Exchange: The TOE performs a re-exchange when SSH_MSG_KEXINIT is
received.
RFC
4254
Secure Shell (SSH)
Connection
Protocol
Multiple channels: The TOE assigns each channel a number (as detailed in RFC
4251, see above).
Data transfers: The TOE supports a maximum window size of 256K bytes for
data transfer.
Interactive sessions: The TOE only supports interactive sessions that do NOT
involve X11 forwarding.
Forwarded X11 connections: This is not supported in the TOE.
Environment variable passing: The TOE only sets variables once the server
process has dropped privileges.
Starting shells/commands: The TOE supports starting one of shell, application
program or command (only one request per channel). These will be run in the
context of a channel, and will not halt the execution of the protocol stack.
Window dimension change notices: The TOE will accept notifications of
changes to the terminal size (dimensions) from the client.
Port forwarding: This is fully supported by the TOE.
15
Others are supported by default, but these are the encryption algorithms [ECG] specifies are to be configured in the
evaluated configuration.
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RFC RFC synopsis TOE Handling of Security-Related Protocol Options
RFC5656 SSH ECC Algorithm
Integration
ECDH Key Exchange: The client matches the key against its known_hosts list of
keys.
Required Curves: All required curves are implemented: ecdh-sha2-nistp256,
ecdh-sha2-nistp384, or ecdh-sha2-nistp521. None of the recommended curves
are supported as they are not included in [NDPPerr].
RFC
6668
sha2-Transport
Layer Protocol
Data Integrity Algorithms: Both the recommended and optional algorithms
hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512 (respectively) are implemented.
Table 15 – RFC Conformance Statements
The RFC conformance statements support the satisfaction of FCS_SSH_EXT.1.
7.10 Conformance Statements for 800-56
The following sections detail all sections of the [800-56A] standard the TOE complies with for
generation of asymmetric cryptographic keys (as claimed in FCS_CKM.1). The relevant sections of [800-
56A] are section 5.5 “Domain Parameters” and section 5.6 “Private and Public Keys”.
All “SHALL” statements within the listed sections are implemented in the TOE and all “SHALL NOT”
statements are adhered to within the TOE and the described functionality/behavior is not present. The
implemented option associated with each “SHOULD” and “SHOULD NOT” statement in a referenced
section is detailed.
There are no TOE specific extensions relating to cryptographic key generation that are not included in
this standard.
7.10.1 Finite Field-Based and Elliptic Curve-Based Key Establishment Schemes
The requirements for both Finite Field-Based Key Establishment Schemes and Elliptic Curve-Based Key
Establishment Schemes are specified in [800-56A]:
800-56A section 800-56A sub section Compliance
5.5 Domain Parameters General Comply with all “shall”
statements.
5.5.1 Domain Parameter
Generation
5.5.1.1 FFC Domain Parameter
Generation
Comply with all “shall”
statements.
5.5.1.2 ECC Domain Parameter
Generation
Comply with all “shall”
statements.
5.6 Key Establishment Key Pairs General No statements
5.6.1 Key Pair Generation 5.6.1.1 FFC Key Pair Generation Comply with all “shall”
statements.
5.6.1.2 ECC Key Pair Generation Comply with all “shall”
statements.
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800-56A section 800-56A sub section Compliance
5.6.2 Required Assurances General Comply with all “shall”
statements.
The TOE will determine and
explicitly reflect whether or
not key establishment is
allowed based upon the
method(s) of assurance that
was used.
5.6.2.1 Assurances Required by
the Key Pair Owner
Owner Receives Assurance via
Key Generation – The act of
generating a key pair.
Owner Full Validation – The
owner performs a successful
full public key validation, via
pair-wise consistency check If
consistency fails the key pair
shall not be used.
5.6.2.2 Assurances Required by
a Public Key Recipient
The recipient receives
assurance that a trusted third
party (trusted by the recipient)
has generated the
public/private key pair in
accordance with Section 5.6.1
and has provided the key pair
to the owner.
The TOE will be made aware of
the method(s) used by the
third party.
The underlying key agreement
used by the TOE is “dhOneFlow
or (Cofactor) One-Pass Diffie-
Hellman”.
Comply with all “shall”
statements.
5.6.2.3 Public Key Validation
Routines
Comply with all “shall”
statements.
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800-56A section 800-56A sub section Compliance
5.6.3 Key Pair Management 5.6.4.1 Common Requirements
on Static and Ephemeral Key
Pairs
Comply with all “shall”
statements and the “shall not”
statement.
5.6.4.2 Specific Requirements
on Static Key Pairs
Comply with all “shall”
statements and the “shall not”
statement.
In item #3 – The TOE will
determine whether or not key
establishment is allowed based
upon the method(s) of
assurance that was used.
5.6.4.3 Specific Requirements
on Ephemeral Key Pairs
Comply with all “shall”
statements.
In item #2 – The TOE will
generate an ephemeral key
pair just before the ephemeral
public key is transmitted.
In item #3 – The TOE will
determine whether or not to
key establishment is allowed
based upon the method(s) of
assurance that was used.
Table 16 – [800-56A] Conformance Statements
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8 Audit Events
The table below maps security requirements to auditable events and audit record contents, in support
of FAU_GEN.1.1.
REQUIREMENT AUDITABLE EVENTS AUDIT RECORD CONTENTS
FAU_GEN.2 None
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None
FCS_CKM.1 None
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 None
FCS_COP.1(1) None
FCS_COP.1(2) None
FCS_COP.1(3) None
FCS_COP.1(4) None.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1
Failure to establish an SSH session
Establishment/Termination of an SSH
session
Reason for failure :
 Protocol version mismatch
 cipher mismatch between client
and server
 mac algorithm mismatch
 ssh hostkey mismatch
 ssh key-exchange mismatch
Non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP
address) for both successes and failures.
FDP_RIP.2 None.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of the authentication mechanism. Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7 None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism.
Provided user identity, origin of the
attempt (e.g., IP address).
FMT_MTD.1 None.
FMT_SMF.1 None.
FMT_SMR.2 None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None.
FPT_STM.1 Changes to the time.
The old and new values for the time.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update. No additional information.
FPT_TST_EXT.1
None.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
Any attempts at unlocking of an interactive
session.
No additional information.
FTA_SSL.3
The termination of a remote session by the
session locking mechanism.
No additional information.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive session. No additional information.
FTA_TAB.1 None.
FTP_ITC.1
Initiation of the trusted channel.
Termination of the trusted channel.
Failure of the trusted channel functions.
Identification of the initiator and target of
failed trusted channels establishment
attempt.
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REQUIREMENT AUDITABLE EVENTS AUDIT RECORD CONTENTS
FTP_TRP.1
Initiation of the trusted channel.
Termination of the trusted channel.
Failures of the trusted path functions.
Identification of the claimed user identity.
Table 17 – Security Audit Requirements
9 Install Packages
This section details the install packages for the routers and switches. All of the support Mx, PTX and
EX9200 appliances are Intel Xeon i386 based platforms.
9.1 Mx/PTX Routers
The router install images (Mx/PTX) are all derived from one release branch, which is compiled into
different install images according to the platforms, namely:
 64 bit Junos image for Mx240 Mx480 Mx960 Mx2010 Mx2020.
-> jinstall64-14.2R3.8-domestic-signed.tgz
 64 bit Junos image for PTX3000, PTX5000.
-> jinstall64-14.2R3.8-domestic-signed.tgz
9.2 EX9200 Switches
The EX-9200(9204 & 9208, 9214) image is a 64-bit image.
 EX9200 (9204 & 9208, 9214) -> jinstall64-ex92xx-14.2R3.8-domestic-signed.tgz
9.3 FIPS Install Packages
For all appliances there is a single image for the FIPS install package that must be applied to the above
router/switch images, namely:
 fips-mode-i386-14.2R3.8-signed.tgz
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10 TOE Network Interfaces
10.1 Mx 240, Mx 480 and Mx 960
10.1.1 MPCs
Model Number Description
MX-MPC1-3D MPC1 with port queuing; includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MX-MPC1-3D-Q MPC1 with per-IFL HQoS, 128,000 queues (maximum 64000 egress); includes full scale
L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MX-MPC1-3D-Q-R-B MX-MPC1-3D-Q line card bundle; includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5 features
MX-MPC1-3D-R-B MX-MPC1-3D line card bundle; includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5 features
MX-MPC1E-3D Enhanced MPC1, port queuing; includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MX-MPC1E-3D-Q Enhanced MPC1, per-IFL HQoS, 128,000 queues (max 64,000 egress); includes full scale
L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MX-MPC1E-3D-Q-R-B MX-MPC1E-3D-Q line card bundle; includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5 features
MX-MPC1E-3D-R-B MX-MPC1E-3D line card bundle; includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5 features
MX-MPC2-3D MPC2 with port queuing; includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MX-MPC2-3D-EQ MPC2 with per-IFL HQoS, 512,000 queues; includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3
features
MX-MPC2-3D-EQ-R-B MX-MPC2-3D-EQ line card bundle, includes full scale L3, L2 and L2.5 features
MX-MPC2-3D-Q MPC2 with per-IFL HQoS, 256,000 queues (max 128,000 egress); includes full scale L2/L2.5
and reduced scale L3 features
MX-MPC2-3D-Q-R-B MX-MPC2-3D-Q line card bundle; includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5 features
MX-MPC2-3D-R-B MX-MPC2-3D line card bundle; includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5 features
MX-MPC2E-3D Enhanced MPC2 with port queuing; includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MX-MPC2E-3D-EQ Enhanced MPC2 with per-IFL HQoS, 512,000 queues; includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced
scale L3 features
MX-MPC2E-3D-EQ-R-B MX-MPC2E-3D-EQ line card bundle; includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5 features
MX-MPC2E-3D-P Enhanced MPC2 with 1588v2, port queuing; includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3
features
MX-MPC2E-3D-P-Q-B MX-MPC2E-3D-P line card bundle; includes 1588v2, per-IFL HQoS, 256,000 queues
(maximum 128,000 egress), full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MX-MPC2E-3D-P-Q-R-B MX-MPC2E-3D-P line card bundle; includes 1588v2, per-IFL HQoS, 256,000 queues
(maximum 128,000 egress), full scale L3, L2, and L2.5 features
MX-MPC2E-3D-P-R-B MX-MPC2E-3D-P line card bundle; includes 1588v2, full scale L3, L2, and L2.5 features
MX-MPC2E-3D-Q Enhanced MPC2 with per-IFL HQoS, 256,000 queues (maximum 128,000 egress); includes
full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MX-MPC2E-3D-Q-R-B MX-MPC2E-3D-Q line card bundle; includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5 features
MX-MPC2E-3D-R-B MX-MPC2E-3D line card bundle; includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5 features
MPC2E-3D-NG Next-generation MPC2E with upgraded CPU and memory. Offers full feature parity with the
MPC1E, MPC2E, and MPC3E. Includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features.
Flexible queuing option enables hierarchical QoS support with up to 32,000 total queues.
Supports all MICs supported by MPC1E and MPC2E.
MPC2E-3D-NG-IR-B Next-generation MPC2E line card bundle. Offers full feature parity with MPC1E, MPC2E, and
MPC3E. Includes full scale L2/L2.5, L3 features and up to 16 L3VPNs per MPC. Flexible
queuing option enables hierarchical QoS support with up to 32,000 total queues. Supports all
MICs supported by MPC1E and MPC2E.
Some MPCs can accept 2 or 4 Modular Interface Cards (MICs), which are detailed in the following
section (Section 10.2.2).
10.1.2 MICs
Model Number Description
MIC3-3D-10XGE-SFPP MIC with 10x10GbE SFP+ interface
MIC-3D-20GE-SFP 20 ports of 10/100/1000 Ethernet with small form-factor pluggable transceiver (SFP)
interfaces
MIC-3D-20GE-SFP-E 20 ports of 10/100/1000 Ethernet with enhanced small form-factor pluggable transceiver
(SFP) interfaces
MIC-3D-20GE-SFP-EH 20 ports of 10/100/1000 Ethernet with enhanced and temperature hardened small form-
factor pluggable transceiver (SFP) interfaces
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Model Number Description
MIC-3D-2XGE-XFP 2 10GbE modular interface cards with XFP interfaces
MIC-3D-4XGE-XFP 4 10GbE modular interface cards with XFP interfaces
MIC-3D-40GE-TX 40 ports of 10/100/1000 Ethernet with TX interfaces
MIC3-3D-1X100GE-CFP MIC with 1x100GbE C form-factor pluggable transceiver (CFP) interface
MIC3-3D-1X100GE-CXP MIC with 1x100GbE CXP interface
MIC3-3D-2X40GE-QSFPP MIC with 2x40GbE QSFP+ interfaces
MIC-3D-4CHOC3-2CHOC12 4-port channelized OC3/2-port channelized OC12 (down to DS0) MIC
MIC-3D-4COC3-1COC12-CE Multirate circuit emulation MIC, 4-port channelized OC3/STM1 (to DS0) or 1-port
channelized OC12/STM4 (to DS0)
MIC-3D-4OC3OC12-1OC48 4-port non-channelized OC3-OC12/1-port non-channelized OC48 MIC
MIC-3D-4XGE-XFP 4x10GbE MIC for MX Series (supported on MX-MPC2 line cards)
MIC-3D-8CHDS3-E3-B 8-port channelized DS3 (down to DS0)/non-channelized E3 MIC, 75 ohm mini SMB
MIC-3D-8CHOC3-4CHOC12 High-density multi-rate MIC channelized, 8-port channelized OC3/4-port channelized OC12
(down to DS0) MIC
MIC-3D-8DS3-E3 8-port non-channelized DS3/non-channelized E3 MIC, 75 ohm mini SMB
MIC-3D-8OC3-2OC12-ATM Multirate 8-port non-channelized ATM OC3/STM1 or 2-port non-channelized OC12/STM4
ATM MIC
MIC-3D-8OC3OC12-4OC48 Multirate 8-port non-channelized OC3-OC12/4-port non-channelized OC48 MIC
10.1.3 DPC
Model Number Description
DPCE-R-20GE-2XGE 20-port GbE + 2-port 10GbE DPC with L2+L3 features
DPCE-R-Q-20GE-2XGE 20-port GbE + 2-port 10GbE enhanced queuing DPC with L2+L3 features
DPCE-R-Q-20GE-SFP 20x1GbE L2/L3 capable with enhanced queuing
DPCE-R-2XGE-XFP 2x10GbE Enhanced DPC for MX Series
DPCE-R-40GE-SFP 40x1GbE L2/L3 capable
DPCE-R-Q-40GE-SFP 40x1GbE enhanced queuing DPC for MX Series with L2/L3 features and
VLAN-HQoS
DPCE-R-40GE-TX 40-port 10/100/1000 RJ-45 DPC with L2+L3 features
DPCE-X-40GE-SFP 40x1GbE L2+ capable
DPCE-X-Q-40GE-SFP 40x10/100/1000 Ethernet L2/L3 capable with RJ45
DPCE-X-4XGE-XFP 4x10GbE L2+ capable
DPCE-R-4XGE-XFP 4x10GbE Enhanced DPC with L2+L3 features
DPCE-R-Q-4XGE-XFP 4x10GbE queuing DPC with L2/L3 features and VLAN-HQoS
DPCE-X-Q-4XGE-XFP 4x10GbE L2+ capable board with enhanced queuing
MX-FPC2 DPC with 2 slots for type 2 PICs
10.2 Mx 2010 and Mx 2020
10.2.1 Modular Port Concentrators (MPCs)
Model Number Description
MX-MPC1-3D 1xTrio chipset MPC, port queuing, price includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced
scale L3
MX-MPC1-3D-Q 1xTrio chipset MPC, per-IFL HQoS, 128K queues (max 64K egress); full scale
L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3
MX-MPC1-3D-Q-R-B Line-card bundle, price includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC1-3D-R-B Line-card bundle, price includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC1E-3D 1xTrio chipset enhanced MPC, port queuing, price includes full scale L2/L2.5
and reduced scale L3
MX-MPC1E-3D-Q 1xTrio chipset enhanced MPC, per-IFL HQoS, 128K queues (max 64K egress);
full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3
MX-MPC1E-3D-Q-R-B Line-card bundle, price includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC1E-3D-R-B Line-card bundle, price includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC2-3D 2xTrio chipset MPC, port queuing, price includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced
scale L3
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Model Number Description
MX-MPC2-3D-EQ 2xTrio chipset MPC, per-IFL HQoS, 512K queues; full scale L2/L2.5 and
reduced scale L3
MX-MPC2-3D-EQ-R-B Line-card bundle, price includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC2-3D-Q 2xTrio chipset MPC, per-IFL HQoS, 256K queues (max 128K egress); full scale
L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3
MX-MPC2-3D-Q-R-B Line-card bundle, price includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC2-3D-R-B Line-card bundle, price includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC2E-3D 2xTrio chipset enhanced MPC, port queuing, price includes full scale L2/L2.5
and reduced scale L3
MX-MPC2E-3D-EQ 2xTrio chipset enhanced MPC, per-IFL HQoS, 512K queues; full scale L2/L2.5
and reduced scale L3
MX-MPC2E-3D-EQ-R-B Line-card bundle, price includes full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC2E-3D-P 2xTrio chipset enhanced MPC, 1588v2, port queuing, price includes full scale
L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3
MX-MPC2E-3D-P-Q-B Line-card bundle, 1588v2, per-IFL HQoS, 256K queues (max 128K egress), full
scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3
MX-MPC2E-3D-P-Q-R-B Line-card bundle, 1588v2, per-IFL HQoS, 256K queues (max 128K egress), full
scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC2E-3D-P-R-B Line-card bundle, price includes 1588v2, full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC2E-3D-Q 2xTrio chipset enhanced MPC, per-IFL HQoS, 256K queues (max 128K
egress); full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3
MX-MPC2E-3D-Q-R-B Line-card bundle, full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC2E-3D-R-B Line-card bundle, full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MX-MPC3E-3D MPC3 with support for 100GbE, 40GbE, and 10GbE interfaces, L2.5
MX-MPC3E-3D-R-B MPC3E with support for 100GbE, 40GbE, and 10GbE interfaces. full scale L2,
L3, L3VPN
MPC-3D-16XGE-SFPP 16x10GbE line card, full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3
MPC-3D-16XGE-SFPP-R-B 16x10GbE line card bundle, full scale L3, L2, and L2.5
MPC4E-3D-2CGE-8XGE 2x100GbE and 8x10GbE ports, full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MPC4E-3D-32XGE-SFPP 32x10GbE SFP ports, full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MPC4E-3D-2CGE8XGE-IR-B 2x100GbE and 8x10GbE ports, full scale L2/L2.5, L3 features, up to 16 L3VPNs
per MPC
MPC4E-3D-32XGE-IR-B 32x10GbE SFP ports, full scale L2/L2.5, L3 features, up to 16 L3VPNs per MPC
MPC4E-3D-2CGE8XGE-R-B 2x100GbE and 8x10GbE ports, full scale L2/L2.5, L3, and L3VPN features
MPC4E-3D-32XGE-R-B 32x10GbE SFP ports, full scale L2/L2.5, L3, and L3VPN features
MPC5E-100G10G 2x100GbE and 4x10GbE ports; includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale
L3 features; optional license permits up to 32,000 queues with HQoS
MPC5E-100G10G-IRB 2x100GbE and 4x10GbE ports; includes full scale L2/L2.5, L3 features, and up
to 16 L3VPN instances; optional license permits up to 32,000 queues with
HQoS
MPC5E-100G10G-RB 2x100GbE and 4x10GbE ports; includes full scale L2/L2.5, L3, and L3VPN
features; optional license permits up to 32,000 queues with HQoS
MPC5E-40G10G 6x40GbE or 24x10GbE ports; includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3
features; optional license permits up to 32,000 queues with HQoS
MPC5E-40G10G-IRB 6x40GbE or 24x10GbE ports; includes full scale L2/L2.5, L3 features and up to
16 L3VPN instances; optional license permits up to 32,000 queues with HQoS
MPC5E-40G10G-RB 6x40GbE or 24x10GbE; includes full scale L2/L2.5, L3, and L3VPN features;
optional license permits up to 32,000 queues with HQoS
MPC5EQ-100G10G 2x100GbE and 4x10GbE ports with HQoS; supports 1 million queues and
128,000 sessions; includes full scale L2/L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MPC5EQ-100G10G-IRB 2x100GbE and 4x10GbE ports with HQoS; supports 1 million queues and
128,000 sessions; includes full scale L2/L2.5, L3 features, and up to 16 L3VPN
instances
MPC5EQ-100G10G-RB 2-port 100GbE and 4x10GbE ports with HQoS; supports 1 million queues and
128,000 sessions; includes full scale L2/L2.5, L3, and L3VPN features
MPC5EQ-40G10G 6x40GbE or 24x10GbE ports with HQoS; supports 1 million queues and
128,000 sessions; includes full scale L2/ L2.5 and reduced scale L3 features
MPC5EQ-100G10G-IRB 2x100GbE and 4x10GbE ports with HQoS; supports 1 million queues and
128,000 sessions; includes full scale L2/L2.5, L3 features, and up to 16 L3VPN
instances
MPC5EQ-100G10G-RB 2-port 100GbE and 4x10GbE ports with HQoS; supports 1 million queues and
128,000 sessions; includes full scale L2/L2.5, L3, and L3VPN features
MX2K-MPC6E MPC6E with support for 4x100GbE CFP2, 48x10GbE SFP+, or 8x100GbE CXP
interfaces; compatible with MX2020 and MX2010 only
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Model Number Description
MX2K-MPC6E-IRB MPC6E line card bundle with support for 4x100GbE CFP2, 48x10GbE SFP+, or
8x100GbE
CXP interfaces; includes full scale L2/L2.5, L3 features and up to 16 L3VPN;
instances; compatible with MX2020 and MX2010 only
MX2K-MPC6E-RB MPC6E line card bundle with support for 4x100GbE CFP2, 48x10GbE SFP+, or
8x100GbE CXP interfaces; includes full scale L2/L2.5, L3 and L3VPN features;
compatible with
Some MPCs can accept 2 or 4 Modular Interface Cards (MICs), which are detailed in the following
section (Section10.2.2).
10.2.2 Modular Interface Cards (MICs)
Model Number Description
MIC3-3D-10XGE-SFPP MIC with 10x10GbE small form-factor pluggable plus transceiver (SFP+) interface,
optics sold separately
MIC3-3D-1X100GE-CFP MIC with 1x100GbE C form-factor pluggable transceiver (CFP) interface, optics sold
separately
MIC3-3D-1X100GE-CXP MIC with 1x100GbE 100-gigabit small form-factor pluggable transceiver (CXP)
interface, optics sold separately
MIC3-3D-2X40GE-QSFPP MIC with 2x40GbE quad small form-factor pluggable plus transceiver (QSFP+)
interface, optics sold separately
MIC-3D-1CHOC48 1 port channelized OC48/channelized STM16 (down to DS0) MIC
MIC-3D-1OC192-XFP 1 port OC192/STM64 MIC
MIC-3D-20GE-SFP 20x10/100/1000 MIC for MX Series; requires optics sold separately
MIC-3D-2XGE-XFP 2x10GbE MIC for MX Series; requires optics sold separately
MIC-3D-40GE-TX 40x10/100/1000 RJ-45 full height MIC (fixed optics)
MIC-3D-4CHOC3-2CHOC12 4 port channelized OC3/2 port channelized OC12 (down to DS0) MIC
MIC-3D-4COC3-1COC12-CE Multirate circuit emulation MIC, 4 port channelized OC3/STM1 (to DS0) or 1 port
channelized OC12/STM4 (to DS0)
MIC-3D-4OC3OC12-1OC48 4 port non-channelized OC3-OC12/1 port non-channelized OC48 MIC
MIC-3D-4XGE-XFP 4x10GbE MIC for MX Series (supported on MX-MPC2 line cards)
MIC-3D-8CHDS3-E3-B 8 port channelized DS3 (down to DS0)/non-channelized E3 MIC, 75 ohm mini SMB
MIC-3D-8CHOC3-4CHOC12 High-density multi-rate MIC channelized, 8 port channelized OC3/4 port channelized
OC12 (down to DS0) MIC
MIC-3D-8DS3-E3 8 port non-channelized DS3/non-channelized E3 MIC, 75 ohm mini SMB
MIC-3D-8OC3-2OC12-ATM Multi-rate 8 port non-channelized ATM OC3/STM1 or 2 port non-channelized
OC12/STM4 ATM MIC
MIC-3D-8OC3OC12-4OC48 Multirate 8 port non-channelized OC3-OC12/4 port non-channelized OC48 MIC
MIC6-10G 24x10GbE MIC for MPC6 only
MIC6-100G-CXP 4x100GbE CXP MIC for MPC6 only
MIC6-10G-OTN 24x10GbE SFP OTN MIC for MPC6 only
MIC6-100G-CFP2 2x100GbE CFP2 OTN MIC for MPC6 only
10.3 PTX 5000
10.3.1 PTX5000 FPC and PICs
Model Number Description
FPC3-PTX-U1-L PTX5000 3rd generation 1 Tbps FPC3 for LSR application
FPC3-PTX-U1-R PTX5000 3rd generation 1 Tbps FPC3 for IP application
FPC3-PTX-U2-L PTX5000 3rd generation 2 Tbps FPC3 for LSR application
FPC3-PTX-U2-R PTX5000 3rd generation 2 Tbps FPC3 for LSR application
FPC3-PTX-U3-L PTX5000 3rd generation 3 Tbps FPC3 for LSR application
FPC3-PTX-U3-R PTX5000 3rd generation 3 Tbps FPC3 for LSR application
PTX-FPC3-U1-R-BNDL PTX5000 3rd generation 1 Tbps Bundle with FPC and PIC for full IP application (choose
either one 3rd Gen PIC or two 2ndgen PICs)
PTX-FPC3-U2-R-BNDL PTX5000 3rd generation 2 Tbps Bundle with FPC and PIC for full IP application
PTX-FPC3-U3-R-BNDL PTX5000 3rd generation 3 Tbps Bundle with FPC and PIC for full IP application
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Model Number Description
PTX5K-FPC3-UPG-KIT PTX5000 3rd generation Upgrade Kit to support FPC3 line cards, includes 9 SIB3 and 2
FAN-H Only
FPC2-PTX-P1A PTX 2nd generation FPC
P2-100GE-CFP2 PTX, 4 x 100GbE PIC for second-generation FPC, CFP2 pluggable optics
P2-100GE-OTN PTX 4 x 100GbE Ethernet/OTN PIC for second generation FPC, CFP2 pluggable optics
P2-10G-40G-QSFPP PTX Flexible 48 x 10GbE/12 x 40GbE/OTN PIC for second generation FPC, QSFP+
pluggable optics
FPC-PTX-P1-A First-generation FPC
P1-PTX-2-100GE-CFP 2 x 100GbE PIC, first generation
P1-PTX-2-40GE-CFP 2 x 40GbE PIC, first generation
P1-PTX-24-10GE-SFPP 24 x 10GbE (LAN) PIC, first generation
P1-PTX-2-100G-C-WDM-C 2-port 100G DWDM PIC, first generation
P1-PTX-24-10G-W-SFPP 24 x 10GbE (LAN/WAN) PHY PIC, first generation
P3-15-100GE-CFP4 PTX 15x100GE, CFP4, PIC for 3rd Generation FPC
P3-10-100GE-CFP4 PTX 10x100GE, CFP4, PIC for 3rd Generation FPC
P3-24-U-QSFP28 PTX 8x100GE QSFP28 or 24x40GE,96x10GE QSFPP, universal PIC for 3rd Generation
FPC
P3-10-U-QSFP28 PTX 10x100GE QSFP28 or 10x40GE, 40x10GE QSFPP, universal PIC for 3rd
Generation FPC
P3-15-U-QSFP28 PTX 15x100GE QSFP28 or 15x40GE, 50x10GE QSFPP, universal PIC for 3rd
Generation FPC
PIC-BLANK-PTX PIC Blank, Spare
FPC-BLANK-PTX FPC Blank, Spare
10.3.2 PTX5000 Supported FPC and PIC Compatibility:
PICs FPC1 FPC2 FPC3-2T FPC3-3T
First-Generation PIC
24 x 10GbE LAN-PHY
Yes Yes No No
First-Generation PIC
24 x 10GbE
Ethernet/OTN
Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-Generation PIC 2
x 100GbE
Yes No No No
First-Generation PIC 2
x 40GbE
Yes Yes No No
First-Generation PIC 2
x 100GbE OTN DWDM
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second-Generation
PIC 4 x 100GbE CFP2
No Yes No No
Second-Generation
PIC 48 x 10GbE / 12 x
40GbE Ethernet/OTN
QSFPP
No Yes Yes Yes
Second-Generation
PIC 4 x 100GbE
Ethernet/ OTN CFP2
No Yes Yes Yes
Second-Generation
PIC 4 x 100GbE CXP
(SR10)
No Yes Yes Yes
Third-Generation PIC
15 x 100GbE CFP4
No No Yes Yes
Third-Generation PIC
96 x 10GbE/24 x
40GbE/8 x 100GbE
QSFP28 Universal
No No Yes Yes
Third-Generation PIC
60 x 10GbE/15 x
40GbE/15 x 100GbE
QSFP28 Universal
No No Yes Yes
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10.4 PTX3000
10.4.1 PTX3000 Supported FPCs
Model Number Description
FPC-SFF-PTX-P1-A Flexible PIC Concentrator (FPC)
10.4.2 PTX3000 Supported PICs
Model Number Description
P1-PTX-2-100G-C-WDM-C 2-port 100G DWDM PIC
P1-PTX-2-100GE-CFP 2 x 100GbE PIC
P1-PTX-2-40GE-CFP 2 x 40GbE PIC
P1-PTX-24-10GE-SFPP 24 x 10GbE (LAN) PIC
P1-PTX-24-10G-W-SFPP 24 x 10GbE (LAN/WAN) PHY PIC
SFF-SLOT-BLNK FPC Slot filler/blank
SFF-PSM-BLNK PSM Slot filler/blank
PIC-BLANK-PTX PIC Slot filler/blank
10.4.3 PTX3000 Supported FPC and PIC Compatibility:
PICs FPC1 FPC2
First Generation PIC 24x10GE LAN-PHY Yes No
First Generation PIC 24x10GE Ethernet/OTN Yes Yes
First Generation PIC 2x100GE Yes No
First Generation PIC 2x40GE Yes No
First Generation PIC 2x100GE OTN DWDM Yes Yes
Second Generation PIC 4x100GE CFP2 No No
Second Generation PIC - 48x10GE / 12x40GE Ethernet/ OTN QSFPP No Yes
Second Generation PIC - 4x100GE Ethernet/OTN CFP2 No Yes
Second Generation PIC 4x100GE CXP (SR10) No Yes
Third Generation PIC - 15x100G Ethernet CFP4 No Yes
Third Generation PIC 96x10GE/24x40GE/8x100GE QSFP28 Universal No Yes
Third Generation PIC - 60x10GE/15x40GE/15x100GE QSFP28 Universal No Yes
10.5 EX9200
Model Number Description
EX9200-40T 40-port 10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45 line card
EX9200-40F 40-port 100FX/1000BASE-X small form-factor pluggable transceiver (SFP) line card
EX9200-32XS 32-port 10GbE SFP+ line card
EX9200-4QS 4-port 40GbE quad SFP (QSFP+) line card
EX9200-40F-M 40-port 100FX/1000BASE-X MACsec-capable SFP line card
EX9200-6QS 6-port 40GbE QSFP+ or 24-port 10GbE SFP+ combo line card
EX9200-2C-8XS 2-port 100GbE C form-factor pluggable (CFP) + 8-port 10GbE SFP+ line card
11 Appendices
This section contains the appendices that accompany the Security Target and provide clarity and/or
explanation for the reader.
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11.1 References
[800-56A] NIST Special Publication 800-56A, Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
[CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-001.
[CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-002.
[CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-003.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-004.
[CLI] Junos OS CLI User Guide, Release 14.2
[ECG] Junos OS Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide for Mx Series, PTX Series and
EX9200 Series Devices Release 14.2R3
[FIPS140] Federal Information Processing Standard Publication (FIPS-PUB) 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001. (Change notice (12-03-2002))
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standard Publication (FIPS-PUB) 197, Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), November 2001.
[GSG] Junos OS Getting Started Guide for Routing Devices, Release 14.2
[IUG] Installation and Upgrade Guide, Release 14.2
[NDPP] Security Requirements for Network Devices, Version 1.1, 08 June 2012
[NDPPerr] Security Requirements for Network Devices Errata #3, 3 November 2014
[RFC4251] Internet Engineering Task Force, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, January 2006
[RFC4252] Internet Engineering Task Force, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, January
2006
[RFC4253] Internet Engineering Task Force, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, January
2006
[RFC4254] Internet Engineering Task Force, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, January 2006
[RFC5656] Internet Engineering Task Force, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell
Transport Layer, December 2009
[RFC6668] Internet Engineering Task Force, SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer Protocol, July 2012
[SLM] Junos OS System Log Messages Reference, Release 14.2
[SSG] Junos OS Security Services Administration Guide for Routing Devices, Release 14.2
[UAA] Junos OS User Access and Authentication Feature Guide for Routing Devices, Release 14.2
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11.2 Glossary
Access – Interaction between an entity and an object that results in the flow or modification of data.
Access Control – Security service that controls the use of resources and the disclosure and modification
of data.
Administrator – A user who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion or the
entire TOE and whose actions may affect the TSP. Administrators may possess special privileges that
provide capabilities to override portions of the TSP.
Assurance – A measure of confidence that the security features of an IT system are sufficient to enforce
its security policy.
Asymmetric Cryptographic System – A system involving two related transformations; one determined
by a public key (the public transformation), and another determined by a private key (the private
transformation) with the property that it is computationally infeasible to determine the private
transformation (or the private key) from knowledge of the public transformation (and the public key).
Asymmetric Key – The corresponding public/private key pair needed to determine the behavior of the
public/private transformations that comprise an asymmetric cryptographic system
Attack – An intentional act attempting to violate the security policy of an IT system.
Authentication – Security measure that verifies a claimed identity.
Authentication data – Information used to verify a claimed identity.
Authorization – Permission, granted by an entity authorized to do so, to perform functions and access
data.
Authorized user – An authenticated user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
Compromise – Violation of a security policy.
Confidentiality – A security policy pertaining to disclosure of data.
Critical Security Parameters (CSP) – Security-related information (e.g., cryptographic keys,
authentication data such as passwords and pins, and cryptographic seeds) appearing in plaintext or
otherwise unprotected form and whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a
cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the module.
Cryptographic boundary – An explicitly defined contiguous perimeter that establishes the physical
bounds (for hardware) or logical bounds (for software) of a cryptographic module.
Cryptographic key (key) – A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that
determines:
 the transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data,
 the transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data,
 a digital signature computed from data,
 the verification of a digital signature computed from data, or
 a digital authentication code computed from data.
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Cryptographic Module – The set of hardware, software, firmware, or some combination thereof that
implements cryptographic logic or processes, including cryptographic algorithms, and is contained
within the cryptographic boundary of the module.
Cryptographic Module Security Policy – A precise specification of the security rules under which a
cryptographic module must operate, including the rules derived from the requirements of this PP and
additional rules imposed by the vendor.
Entity – A subject, object, user or another IT device, which interacts with TOE objects, data, or
resources.
External IT entity – Any trusted Information Technology (IT) product or system, outside of the TOE,
which may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
HCM JVAS – HTTP Content Management Juniper Value Added Software. This is an application used to
inspect HTTP traffic; irrespective of the port on which the HTTP traffic arrives (i.e. it is not bound to
port 80). Although use of this application is out of scope of the evaluation, the daemon supporting the
service cannot be disabled. This service can only inspect http transit traffic, and cannot be used to
undermine the configuration or operation of the TOE.
Identity – A representation (e.g., a string) uniquely identifying an authorized user, which can either be
the full or abbreviated name of that user or a pseudonym.
Integrity – A security policy pertaining to the corruption of data and TSF mechanisms.
JUNOScope – A management framework that consists of tools for managing IP services for the M-Series
Multiservice Edge Routers, Mx-Series 3D Universal Edge Routers, PTX-Series Routers and EX-Series
Ethernet Switches. Use of JUNOScope is not supported in the evaluated configuration.
JUNOScript – An XML-based API for managing devices, developed by Juniper Networks. Use of
JUNOScript is not supported in the evaluated configuration.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) – A means of restricting access to objects based on subject and object
sensitivity labels.
Object – An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects
perform operations.
Operating Environment – The total environment in which a TOE operates. It includes the physical
facility and any physical, procedural, administrative and personnel controls.
Operating System (OS) – An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed. Subjects can
come in two forms: trusted and untrusted. Trusted subjects are exempt from part or all of the TOE
security policies. Untrusted subjects are bound by all TOE security policies.
Security attributes – TSF data associated with subjects, objects, and users that are used for the
enforcement of the TSP.
Security level – The combination of a hierarchical classification and a set of non-hierarchical categories
that represent the sensitivity of the information.
Sensitivity label – A security attribute that represents the security level of an object and that describes
the sensitivity (e.g., Classification) of the data in the object. Sensitivity labels are used by the TOE as the
basis for mandatory access control decision.
Subject – An entity within the TSC that causes operation to be performed.
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Symmetric key – A single, secret key used for both encryption and decryption in symmetric
cryptographic algorithms.
Threat – Capabilities, intentions and attack methods of adversaries, or any circumstance or event, with
the potential to violate the TOE security policy.
Threat Agent – Any human user or Information Technology (IT) product or system, which may attempt
to violate the TSP and perform an unauthorized operation with the TOE.
User – Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.
Vulnerability – A weakness that can be exploited to violate the TOE security policy.
11.3 Acronyms
TERM DEFINITION
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Program Interface
CC Common Criteria
CCMB Common Criteria Management Board
CM Configuration Management
CSP Cryptographic security parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie Hellman
DPC Dense Port Concentrator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FIPS-PUB 140-2 Federal Information Processing Standard
Publication
FPC(s) Flexible PIC Concentrator(s)
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation
GUI Graphical User Interface
HCM HTTP Content Management
HMAC Keyed-Hash Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ID Identification
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
Ipsec Internet Protocol Security
IT Information Technology
Junos Juniper Operating System
JVAS Juniper Value-Added Software
MAC Mandatory Access Control
MIC(s) Modular Interface Card(s)
MPC(s) Modular Port Concentrator(s)
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TERM DEFINITION
NDPP Network Devices Protection Profile
NIAP National Information Assurance Program
NIST National Institute of Standards Technology
OAM Operations, Administration and
Maintenance
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PAM Pluggable Authentication Module
PFE Packet Forwarding Engine
PIC Physical Interface Card
PP Protection Profile
RE Routing Engine
RFC Request for Comment
RNG Random Number Generator
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adelman
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TOE Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Function
TSFI TSF interfaces
TSP TOE Security Policy
UDP User Datagram Protocol
Table 18 - Acronyms used in the Security Target