UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ
559-LSS
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
FortiGate/FortiOS Version 6.2.7
14 January 2022
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE).
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common
Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or
any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT
product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report,
and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your organization has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Contact Centre and Information Services
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security.
A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the
official website of the International Common Criteria Project).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Description................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................................... 8
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 9
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................................................................... 9
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ......................................................................................................10
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................................................10
3.2 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................................................12
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................13
4.1 Documentation.................................................................................................................................................14
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................16
5.1 Development....................................................................................................................................................16
5.2 Guidance Documents........................................................................................................................................16
5.3 Life-Cycle Support ............................................................................................................................................16
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................17
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests.........................................................................................................................17
6.2 Conduct of Testing...........................................................................................................................................17
6.3 Independent Testing.........................................................................................................................................17
6.3.1 Independent Testing Results .........................................................................................................................17
6.4 Vulnerability Analysis .......................................................................................................................................18
6.4.1 Vulnerability Analysis Results........................................................................................................................18
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................19
7.1 Recommendations/Comments..........................................................................................................................19
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................20
8.1 List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................20
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8.2 References.......................................................................................................................................................20
LIST OF FIGURES
TOE Architecture..................................................................................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification ................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s).........................................................................................................................9
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
FortiGate/FortiOS Version 6.2.7 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Fortinet, Inc. , was the
subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this
evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Section 1.1 for the
evaluated security functionality.
Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 14 January 2022 and was
carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify
that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Program).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version FortiGate/FortiOS Version 6.2.7
Developer Fortinet, Inc.
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance:
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v2.2e with the following PP-Modules:
• PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, v1.4e;
• PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, v1.1; and
• PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems, v1.0
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is a firewall that includes Virtual Private Network (VPN) and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) capabilities.
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1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 Residual Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
 Stateful Traffic and Packet Filtering
 Intrusion Prevention
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic implementations have been evaluated by the CAVP/CMVP and are used by the TOE:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)
Cryptographic Module/Algorithm Certificate Number
Fortinet FortiOS FIPS Cryptographic Library v6.2 C1575
Fortinet FortiOS-VM FIPS Cryptographic Library v6.2 C2197, C2200
Fortinet FortiOS SSL Cryptographic Library v6.2 C1549, C1576
Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library v6.2 C2140, C2199, C2201
Fortinet FortiOS RBG Cryptographic Library v6.2 C1573
Fortinet FortiOS-VM RBG Cryptographic Library v6.2 C2195, C2198
Fortinet CP8 Cryptographic Library C1797
Fortinet FortiOS CP9 Cryptographic Library C1578
Fortinet CP9Lite Cryptographic Library C1798
Fortinet CP9XLite Cryptographic Library A1253
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical
attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation.
This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does
not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not
expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data,
bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the physical
platform on which the VM runs.
 The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general-purpose computing. For example, the device should not
provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality). In the case
of vNDs, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance for each physical hardware platform. The
exception being where components of the distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single
VS. There are no other guest VMs on the physical platform providing non-Network Device functionality
 A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses
it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include
administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity,
is not covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for
particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).
 The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of
security for the organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance
documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy
and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of
defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
 For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully
validate (e.g., offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into
the TOE’s trust store (aka ‘root store’, ‘trusted CA Key Store’, or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
 The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
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 The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are protected by the platform on
which they reside.
 The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g.,
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is
discarded or removed from its operational environment.
 The Security Administrators for the VS are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes not interfering with the correct operation of the device. The Network Device is not
expected to be capable of defending against a malicious VS Administrator that actively works to bypass or
compromise the security of the device
 The VS software is assumed to be updated by the VS Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of
product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
 For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS provides, and is configured to provide sufficient isolation between software
running in VMs on the same physical platform. Furthermore, it is assumed that the VS adequately protects itself
from software running inside VMs on the same physical platform.
 For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS and VMs are correctly configured to support ND functionality implemented in
VMs.
 It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE security policies
will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.
 This assumption defines the TOE’s placement in a network such that it is able to perform its required security
functionality.
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3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Only the functionality covered by the claimed protection profile and modules was evaluated.
The following features are not within scope of this evaluation:
a) High-Availability
b) FortiExplorer client
c) Anti-spam
d) Anti-virus
e) Content filtering
f) Web filtering
g) Use of syslog
h) FortiToken and FortiSSO Authentication
i) Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), BGP, RIP and DHCP protocols
j) Usage of the boot-time configuration menu to upgrade the TOE
k) Policy-based VPN
l) SSL VPN
m) Virtual domains (vdoms)
n) Logging to FortiCloud
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
TOE Software/Firmware FortiOS Version 6.2.7 Build 5067
Virtual Models
FortiGate-VM01 FortiGate-VM08
FortiGate-VM02 FortiGate-VM16
FortiGate-VM04 FortiGate-VM32
FortiGate-VMUL
TOE Hardware FG-30E FWF-30E FG-40F FG-50E FG-40F-3G4G
FWF-50E FG-51E FWF-51E FG-52E FG-60E-DSLJ
FG-60E FG-60E-DSL FG-60E-PoE FG-60F FG-60F
FWF-60E FWF-60E-DSL FWF-60F FG-61E FG-61F
FG-61F FWF-61E FWF-61F FG-80E FG-800D
FG-80E-PoE FG-81E FG-81E-PoE FG-100E FWF-40F
FG-100EF FG-100F FG-101E FG-101F FWF-40F-3G4G
FG-140E FG-140E-PoE FG-200E FG-201E FWF-50E-2R
FG-300D FG-300E FG-301E FG-400D FWF-60E-DSLJ
FG-400E FG-401E FG-500D FG-500E FWF-60F
FG-501E FG-600D FG-600E FG-601E FWF-61F
FG-900D FG-1000D FG-1100E FG-1101E
FG-1200D FG-1500D FG-1500D-DC FG-1500DT
FG-2000E FG-2200E FG-2201E FG-2500E
FG-3000D FG-3100D FG-3100D-DC FG-3200D-DC
FG-3200D FG-3300E FG-3301E FG-3400E
FG-3401E FG-3600E FG-3601E FG-3700D
FG-3800D FG-3810D FG-3815D FG-3960E
FG-3980E FG-5001D FG-5001E FG-5001E1
FGR-30D FGR-60F FGR-60F-3G4G FWF-61F
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Environmental Support  ESXi v6.7 (Virtual Models)
 Fortinet Entropy token (for models that require it)
 FortiAnalyzer 200D log server running v6.0.4 (build0292)
 CRL Webserver
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a) FortiOS – Cookbook, Version 6.2.7, 01-627-538742-20210210
b) FortiOS 6.2 and FortiGate NGFW Appliances FIPS 140-2 and Common Criteria Technote, 01-627-672110-20210525
c) FortiOS 6.2.7 CLI Reference, 01-627-685877-20210209
d) FortiOS - Log Reference, Version 6.2.7, 01-627-538745-20201217
e) FortiOS - Hardening your FortiGate, Version 6.2.0, 01-620-554155-20201210
f) Custom IPS and Application Control Signature 3.6 Syntax Guide, 43-360-453749-20200225
g) FortiOS 6.2 Virtualization Reference, https://docs.fortinet.com/vm
h) FortiGate Virtual Appliances documentation https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate-private-
cloud/6.2.0/vmware-esxiadministration-guide/706376/about-fortigate-vm-on-vmware-esxi
i) FortiGate/FortiWiFi 30E/50E/51E 01-540-269598-20180808
j) FortiGate 52E 01-540-300075-20170907
k) FortiGate 60E/61E Series 01-540-367071-20181107
l) FortiGate 60E-DSL 01-560-442605-20200519
m) QuickStart Guide FortiGate/FortiWiFi 40F/40F-3G4G & 60F/61F Series, August 4, 2020
n) FortiGate 80E/81E 01-543-402959-20180808
o) FortiGate 80E/81E-POE 01-542-391830-20180314
p) FortiGate 100E/101E 01-540-366134-20170913
q) FortiGate 100EF 01-543-403497-20170907
r) QuickStart Guide FortiGate 100F/101F Series, April 14, 2020
s) FortiGate 140E/140E-PoE Series 01-543-404092-20180807
t) FortiGate 200E/201E 01-542-381079-20190912
u) FortiGate 300D 01-506-238488-20170824
v) FortiGate 300E/301E 01-560-440261-20191010
w) FortiGate 400D 01-523-277788-20170824
x) FortiGate 400E/401E 01-563-522532-20200427
y) FortiGate 500D 01-523-278008-20190408
z) FortiGate 500E/501E 01-560-440260-20191009
aa) FortiGate 600D 01-523-278008-20170907
bb) FortiGate 600E/601E 01-602-519311-20190726
cc) FortiGate 800D 01-540-273916-20200724
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dd) FortiGate 900D 01-523-279315-20200406
ee) FortiGate 1000D 01-503-237227-20200406
ff) FortiGate 1100E/1101E 01-620-24051-20190425
gg) FortiGate 1200D 01-540-306494-20190613
hh) FortiGate 2200E/2201E 01-600-231503-20200430
ii) FortiGate 3000D 01-522-266144-20170907
jj) FortiGate 3100D 01-5011-275737-20180711
kk) FortiGate 3200D 01-522-256537-20190321
ll) FortiGate 1500D 01-523-211767-20200406
mm) FortiGate 3300E/3301E 01-600-511354-20200430
nn) FortiGate 3400E/3401E Series 01-602-511354-20200225
oo) FortiGate 3600E/3601E Series 01-602-510285-20200225
pp) FortiGate 3700D 01-540-292415-20190501-M
qq) FortiGate 3800D 01-540-292415-20190828-M
rr) FortiGate 3810D 01-522-261444-20170901-M
ss) FortiGate 3815D 01-540-292419-20170901-M
tt) FortiGate-5001D 01-560-0242101-20170728
uu) FortiGate 2000E/2500E 01-540-306896 -20170907
vv) FortiGate 3960E/3980E 01-540-376285-20180807
ww)FortiGate-5001E System Guide 01-600-410512-20190709
xx) FortiGate Rugged 30D Information 01-540-297736-20200812
yy) FortiGate Rugged 60F/3G4G Series October 15, 2020
zz) FortiGate 100F/101F Series QuickStart Guide December 11, 2020
aaa) FortiGate 1500DT QSG Supplement 01-540-297032-20200728
bbb) FortiGate 1500D QSG Supplement 01-523-211767-20200728
ccc) FortiGate/FortiWiFi 40F & 60F Series QuickStart Guide August 4, 2020
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a
vulnerability analysis.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and
guidance documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP
b. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluator verified that the claimed cryptographic implementations
were present in the TOE.
6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as
specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.
 Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
 Technical community sources (Type 2)
 Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
 Tool Generated (Type 4)
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and
technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to
discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators
formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.
Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on 6/14/2021 and included the following search terms:
Fortinet CP8 CP9X-lite Linux Kernel 3.2.16 Apache v2.4.41
FortiGate CP9 Fortinet Entropy Token OpenSSL 1.1.1
FortiOS CP9-lite Araneus USB TRNG hardware Token OpenSSH 7.1
In addition to a standard web search, vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:
Fortinet FortiGuard Services:
https://Fortiguard.com
Community (Symantec) security community:
https://www.securityfocus.com/
NIST National Vulnerabilities Database:
https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
Tenable Network Security:
http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search
Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories
Offensive Security Exploit Database:
https://www.exploit-db.com/
Rapid7 Vulnerability Database:
https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities
OpenSSL Vulnerabilities:
https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html
6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS
The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration.
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GC Government of Canada
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Security
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
VPN Virtual Private Network
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Security Target FortiGate/FortiOS Version 6.2.7, 14 January 2021, v1.7
Evaluation Technical Report FortiGate/FortiOS Version 6.2.7, 14 January 2021, v1.7
Assurance Activity Report FortiGate/FortiOS Version 6.2.7, 14 January 2021, v1.6