BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017
for
Infineon Technologies Security Controller M7794
A12 / G12 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013
or v2.00.002, EC v1.02.013 or v2.00.002 and
Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.00.002 libraries and with
specific IC-dedicated software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017 (*)
Infineon Technologies Security Controller M7794 A12 / G12 with
optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.00.002, EC v1.02.013 or
v2.00.002 and Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.00.002 libraries and with
specific IC-dedicated software
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification
Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 8 September 2017
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................21
11. Security Target............................................................................................................22
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................22
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................26
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................29
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................29
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................30
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000 this
certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up to and including CC
part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3 and AVA_VAN.5 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA-2000, for mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Technologies Security Controller M7794 A12 / G12 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.00.002, EC v1.02.013 or v2.00.002 and Toolbox v1.02.013
or v2.00.002 libraries and with specific IC-dedicated software has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V2-
2017. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V2-2017 were re-
used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Technologies Security Controller M7794 A12 / G12
with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.00.002, EC v1.02.013 or v2.00.002 and
Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.00.002 libraries and with specific IC-dedicated software was
conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 5
September 2017. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 8 September
2017 is valid until 7 September 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed,
4. to inform the product customer (together with BSI) in case of cryptographic
weaknesses in order to enable the customers to decide, based on their risk
management decisions, whether to further use respective cryptographic
mechanisms..
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product Infineon Technologies Security Controller M7794 A12 / G12 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.00.002, EC v1.02.013 or v2.00.002 and Toolbox v1.02.013
or v2.00.002 libraries and with specific IC-dedicated software has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Technologies Security Controller M7794
A12 / G12 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.00.002, EC v1.02.013 or
v2.00.002 and Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.00.002 libraries and with specific IC-dedicated
software. The major components of the core system are the CPU, the MMU (Memory
Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The coprocessor block
contains the processors for RSA/EC and 3DES/AES processing, while the peripheral block
contains the random number generation and the external interfaces service. The
peripheral block also contains the timers and a watchdog. All data of the memory block is
encrypted, RAM and ROM are equipped with an error detection code and the SOLID
FLASH™ memory is equipped with an error correction code (ECC). The Security modules
manage the alarms. Alarms may be triggered when the environmental conditions are
outside the specified operational range. The block diagram of the TOE is shown in [6] and
[9], Figure 1. The TOE comprises as one part the hardware of the smart card security
controller in various configurations.
The TOE is able to communicate using either its contact based or contactless interface.
The implemented dual interface provides the flexibility to use different communication
protocols: e.g. ISO 7816, ISO 14443 Type A and Type B, ISO/IEC 18092 passive, Mifare
compatible Interface or the Digital Contactless Bridge mode (DCLB) can be chosen and
configured. The DCLB mode enables the use of an external analogue interface or near
field communication (NFC) modem via the ISO-pads. Those external analogue modems
are typically deemed for applications running in mobile devices and are not part of this
TOE. Whether the DCLB option is available or not is a configuration applied in TOE
production which cannot be changed afterwards.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating
systems according to the life cycle model from [8]. The term Smartcard Embedded
Software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications stored and
executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software. The
Smartcard Embedded Software itself is not part of the TOE.
The TOE is represented by various configurations called products.The module design,
layout and footprint, of all products are identical. However, minor differences between one
metal mask allows the TOE to connect to different types of antennas (not part of the TOE).
The metal masks differ in their input capacities of the RFI peripheral. The degree of
freedom for configuring the TOE is predefined by Infineon Technologies AG. For more
details please refer to the Security Target [9], chapter 2.2.7.
The symmetric coprocessor (SCP) combines both AES and triple DES with dual-key or
triple-key hardware acceleration. The asymmetric crypto coprocessor, called Crypto2304T
in the following, supports RSA-2048 bit (4096-bit with CRT) and Elliptic Curve (EC)
cryptography.
The software part of the TOE consists of the cryptographic libraries RSA and EC and the
supporting Toolbox and Base Libraries. If RSA or EC or Toolbox is part of the shipment, the
Base Library is automatically included. The Base Library provides the low level interface to
the asymmetric cryptographic coprocessor for the cryptographic libraries and has no user
interface. It does not support any security relevant policy or function.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017 Certification Report
The cryptographic libraries RSA and EC and the Toolbox library are delivery options. If one
of the libraries RSA, EC or Toolbox is delivered, the Base Library is automatically part of it.
Therefore the user may choose a free combination of these libraries. In the case of
deselecting one or several of these libraries the TOE does not provide the corresponding
functionality for Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC). The Toolbox and Base
Library are no cryptographic libraries and provide no additional specific security
functionality.
The RSA library is used to provide a high-level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The hardware Crypto2304T unit
provides the basic long number calculations (add, subtract, multiply, square with 1100 bit
numbers) with high performance. The RSA library is delivered as object code. The RSA
library can perform RSA operations from 512 to 4096 bits. The key lengths below 1024 bits
are not included in the certificate.
The EC library is used to provide a high-level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography
implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures
against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The routines are used for ECDSA signature
generation, ECDSA signature verification, ECDSA key generation and Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman key agreement. The EC library is delivered as object code. The certification
covers the standard NIST and Brainpool Elliptic Curves with different key lengths. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and Security Target Lite [9], chapter 1.2.
This TOE is equipped with Flash Loader software (FL). It supports download of user
software or parts of it to SOLID FLASH™. After completion of the download the Flash
Loader can be deactivated permanently by the user. For more details please refer to the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 2.2.2.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Functionality and features
SF_DPM Device Phase Management:
The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several phases.
Different operation modes help to protect the TOE during each
phase of its lifecycle.
SF_PS Protection against Snooping:
The TOE uses various means to protect from snooping of
memories and busses and prevents single stepping.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017
TOE Security Functionality Functionality and features
SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks:
This TOE implements protection against modifying attacks of
memories, alarm lines and sensors.
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks:
Memory access of the TOE is controlled by a Memory
Management Unit (MMU), which implements different
privileged levels. The MMU decides, whether access to a
physical memory location is allowed based on the access
rights of the privilege levels.
SF_CS Cryptographic Support:
The TOE is equipped with an asymmetric and a symmetric
hardware accelerator and also software modules to support
several asymmetric cryptographic operations. It further
provides random numbers to meet class PTG.2 of AIS31.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.1 and 4.2.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Technologies Security Controller M7794 A12 / G12 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.00.002, EC v1.02.013 or v2.00.002 and Toolbox
v1.02.013 or v2.00.002 libraries and with specific IC-dedicated software.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
HW M7794 Smart Card IC A12 (produced in
Dresden)
or
G12 (produced in
Tainan - TSMC)
Complete modules, as plain
wafers in an IC case or in bare
dies
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017 Certification Report
Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
SW RSA library (optional) RSA2048
v1.02.013 or
v2.00.002
RSA4096
v1.02.013 or
v2.00.002
Object code in electronic form
SW EC library (optional) EC v1.02.013 or
v2.00.002
Object code in electronic form
SW Toolbox (optional) Toolbox
v1.02.013 or
v2.00.002
Object code in electronic form
FW Flash Loader FW Identifier
77.017.12.0 or
77.017.12.2 or
77.017.13.2
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in SOLID
FLASH)
FW STS Self Test Software (the
IC Dedicated Test Software)
FW Identifier
77.017.12.0 or
77.017.12.2 or
77.017.13.2
Stored in Test ROM on the IC
(patch in SOLID FLASH)
FW RMS Resource
Management System (the IC
Dedicated Support
Software)
FW Identifier
77.017.12.0 or
77.017.12.2 or
77.017.13.2
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in SOLID
FLASH)
FW SAM library FW Identifier
77.017.12.0 or
77.017.12.2 or
77.017.13.2
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in SOLID
FLASH)
FW Mifare compatible software
interface
FW Identifier
77.017.12.0 or
77.017.12.2 or
77.017.13.2
Stored in reserved area of ROM
on the IC (patch in SOLID
FLASH)
DOC M7794 Controller Product
Group for Payment
Applications Hardware
Reference Manual
2011-11-02 Hardcopy or pdf-file
DOC AMM Advanced Mode for
Mifare-Compatible
Technology Addendum to
M7794 Hardware Reference
Manual
2011-11-03 Hardcopy or pdf-file
DOC 16-bit Controller Family SLE
70 Programmer’s Reference
Manual
2017-05-10 Hardcopy and pdf-file
DOC SLE 77 Controller Family
Errata Sheet
2017-06-21 Hardcopy or pdf-file
DOC SLE77 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface (1.02.013)
2017-05-10 Hardcopy and pdf-file
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017
Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
DOC SLE77 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface (2.00.002)
2017-05-10 Hardcopy and pdf-file
DOC Crypto@2304T User Manual 2010-03-23 Hardcopy and pdf-file
DOC M7794 Security Guidelines 2017-06-28 Hardcopy or pdf-file
DOC Option 2 for Fast Startup 2014-11-20 Hardcopy and pdf-file
DOC SLx 70 Family Production
and Personalization User’s
Manual
2015-04-01 Hardcopy and pdf-file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
A processing step during production testing incorporates the chip-individual features into
the hardware of the TOE. The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its serial
number.
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE Manufacturer can only
guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the
Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software
(developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
Another characteristic of the TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification
data is accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). This GCIM outputs
amongst others a chip identifier byte, design step, firmware identifier, metal configuration
identifier, temperature range and system frequency. Additionally, dedicated RMS functions
allow a customer to extract the present hardware configuration.
The hardware part of the TOE (in general) is identified by M7793 A12 and G12. By the
above mentioned GCIM chip identification data, the IC Embedded Software Developer can
clearly identify a product in question by the ChipIdent function and the user guidance,
whereas additional RMS functions provides the complete chip configuration. Thereby, the
exact and clear identification of any product with its exact configuration of this TOE is
given. The Chip Type is listed in [13], table 1-8 and [18], chapter 4.4.
The firmware part of the TOE is also identified via the GCIM.
The RSA (optional), EC (optional), Toolbox (optional), and Base Library (optional) as
separate software parts of the TOE are identified by their unique version numbers. The
user can identify these versions by calculating the hash signatures of the provided library
files. The mapping of these hash signatures to the version numbers is provided in [6] and
[9], section 10.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE.
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data
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by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a True
Random Number Generator (TRNG).
The RSA Library is used to provide a high level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The EC Library is used to provide a
high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA
attacks.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: protection during packaging, finishing and personalization, usage of
hardware platform and treatment of user data. The augmented organizational security
policy P.Add-Functions, derived from the additional security functionality of the
cryptographic libraries, the augmented assumption A.Key-Function, related to the usage of
key-depending functions, and the threat of memory access violation T.Mem-Access, due to
specific TOE memory access control functionality, have been added. Details can be found
in the Security Target [6] and Security Target Lite [9], chapter 4.3.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating
system and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target Lite [7], chapter
2.1.
The major components of the core system are the CPU, the MMU (Memory Management
Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The TOE implements a 16-MByte
linear addressable memory space, a simple scaleable Memory Management concept and
a scaleable stack size. The flexible memory concept consists of ROM and SOLID
FLASH™.
The symmetric coprocessor (SCP) combines both AES and triple DES with dual-key or
triple-key hardware acceleration. The asymmetric crypto coprocessor, called Crypto2304T
in the following, supports RSA-2048 bit (4096-bit with CRT) and Elliptic Curve (EC)
cryptography.
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The software part of the TOE consists of the cryptographic libraries RSA and EC, the
Toolbox and Base library. If RSA or EC or Toolbox is part of the shipment, the Base Library
is automatically included. The Base Library provides the low level interface to the
asymmetric cryptographic coprocessor and has no user available interface.
Part of the evaluation are the RSA straight operations with key lengths from 1024 bits to
2048 bits, and the RSA CRT operations with key lengths of 1024 bits to 4096 bits. Note
that key lengths below 1024 bits are not included in the certificate.
The Flash Loader is a firmware located in the user-ROM and allowing downloading the
user software or parts of it to the NVM memory. The download is only possible after
successful authentication. After completion of the download the Flash Loader can be
permanently deactivated by the user.
For more details please refer to the Security Target Lite [6] and [9], chapter 1.2 and 2.2.2.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer (and partly by the evaluator) were divided into five
categories:
● Simulation tests (design verification):
In the course of the development of the TOE simulation tests are carried out. These
simulation tests yield CRC sums, which are used in the further testing.
● Qualification tests:
For each mask version a qualification test is performed. Via the results of these tests a
qualification report is generated. The positive result of the qualification is one part of the
necessary testing results documented with the qualification report. The qualification
report is completed after the verification testing (see below) and the security evaluation
(see below) are performed successfully. The tests performed and their results are listed
in the qualification report. The results of the tests are the basis on which it is decided,
whether the TOE is released to production.
● Verification Tests:
With these tests in user mode the functionality of the end user environment is checked.
● Security Evaluation Tests:
In the context of security evaluation testing the security mechanisms is tested again in
the user mode only focusing on security. Here is not only verified that the security
functionality is working as this was already tested on every single TOE during
production, but also it is tested how well the security functionality is working and the
effectiveness is calculated. This step is necessary as the mechanisms work together and
that must be evaluated in the user mode.
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● Production Tests:
Before delivery on every chip production tests are performed. These tests use the CRC
checksums attained by the simulation tests. The aim of these tests is to check whether
each chip is functioning correctly.
The tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as identified in the
functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer were repeated by sampling, by
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with an evaluation operating system. For the
developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters were used and the test
equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data
and on the final product.
The evaluation showed that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically. The penetration tests results confirm that
the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment for
the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC M7794 A12 (produced in Dresden),
● Smartcard IC M7794 G12 (produced in Tainan).
Depending on the blocking configuration a M7794 A12 and G12 product can have e.g.
different user available memory sizes and can come with or without individual accessible
cryptographic co-processor. More information are given in [6] and [9], section 2.2.7.
The entire configuration is done during the manufacturing process of the TOE according to
the choice of the user or by Bill Per Use (BPU). BPU allows a customer to block chips on
demand at the customer´s premises. Customers, who intend to use this feature receive the
TOEs in a predefined configuration. The blocking information is part of a chip configuration
area. Dedicated blocking information can be modified by customers using specific APDUs.
Once final blocking is done, further modifications are disabled.
The dedicated RMS functions allow a customer to extract the present hardware
configuration and the original Chip Identifier Byte, which was valid before blocking. The
blocking mechanism is also part of the evaluation. For more details please refer to the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 2.2.7 and 2.2.8.
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9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V2-2017, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on documentation
changes.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
An overview over the claimed cryptopgraphic functionalities is given in the Security Target
[6] and [9], section 7.1.4. Any Cryptographic Functionality therein, that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' with 'no', achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in
general context).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
ETR for composite evaluation [10].
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [12] to [20] have to be
considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [21] have to be considered.
In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has
to be considered:
● The IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let
them implement it in the TOE (in Flash memory) or to the Composite Product
Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
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● The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APB™ Advanced Peripheral Bus
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
AXI™ Advanced eXtensible Interface Bus Protocol
BPU Bill Per Use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BOS Boot Software
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CPU Central Processing Unit
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
Crypto2304T Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CRT Chinese Reminder Theorem
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
DFA Differential Failure Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECC Error Correction Code
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
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EDC Error Detection Code
EDU Error Detection Unit
EEPROM Electrically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA Electro Magnetic Analysis
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
Flash EEPROM Flash Memory
FL Flash Loader software
FTL Flash Translation Layer
FW Firmware
GCIM Generic Chip Identification Mode
GPIO General Purpose IO
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
ID Identification
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
I/O Input/Output
IRAM Internal Random Access Memory
MED Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU Memory Management Unit
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
OS Operating system
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PROM Programmable Read Only Memory
RAM Random Access Memory
RMS Resource Management System
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rives-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAM Service Algorithm Minimal
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SF Security Feature
SFP Security Functional Policy
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SFR Special Function Register, as well as Security Functional Requirement,
the specific meaning is given in the context
SOLID FLASH™ An Infineon Trade Mark and Stands for Flash EEPROM Technology
SPA Simple Power Analysis
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
SSC Synchronous Serial Communication
ST Security Target
STS Self Test Software
SW Software
SO Security Objective
SWP Single Wire Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TM Test Mode (STS)
TSF TOE Security Functions
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSC TOE Security Functions Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
UM User Mode (STS)
UmSLC User Mode Security Life Control
WLP Wafer Level Package
3DES Triple DES Encryption Standards
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
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Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
8
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 13, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Verbindlich Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR
(Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 23, Version 4, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017, Version 2.4, 2017-08-11, “Security
Target M7794 A12/G12 Including optional software libraries RSA – EC - Toolbox”,
Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report for BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017, Version 2, 2017-08-28,
Evaluation Technical Report Summary, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-
0035-2007
[9] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017, Version 2.4, 2017-08-11, “Security
Target Lite M7794 A12/G12 Including optional software libraries RSA – EC -
Toolbox”, Infineon Technologies AG (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-
0964-V3-2017, Version 2, 2017-08-28, Evaluation Technical Report for Composite
Evaluation (ETR-COMP), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.1, 2014-12-09, Configuration Management
Scope M7794 A12 and G12 including optional Software Libraries RSA – EC –
Toolbox (confidential document)
[12] M7794 Security Guidelines, 2017-06-28, Infineon Technologies AG, (confidential
document)
[13] M7794 Controller Product Group for Payment Applications Hardware Reference
Manual, Version 1.1, 2011-11-02, Infineon Technologies AG, (confidential document)
[14] AMM Advanced Mode for Mifare Compatible Technology Addendum to M7794
Hardware Reference Manual, Rev.1.1, Version 1.0, 2011-11-03, Infineon
Technologies AG, (confidential document)
[15] Option 2 for Fast Startup, 2014-11-20, Infineon Technologies AG, (confidential
document)
[16] 16-bit Controller Family SLE 70 Programmer’s Reference Manual, 2017-05-10,
Infineon Technologies AG, (confidential document)
[17] SLE 77 Controller Family Errata Sheet, Version 6.1, 2017-06-21, Infineon
Technologies AG, (confidential document)
[18] Crypto@2304T User Manual, 2010-03-23, Infineon Technologies AG, (confidential
document)
[19] SLE77 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface (1.02.013), Version 1.02.013, 2017-05-10, Infineon Technologies AG,
(confidential document)
[20] SLE77 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface (2.00.002), Version 2.00.002, 2017-05-10, Infineon Technologies AG,
(confidential document)
[21] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User’s Manual, 2015-04-01, Infineon
Technologies AG, (confidential document)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
Table 3: APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
Table 4: ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Table 5: Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0964-V3-2017
Evaluation results regarding
development and production environment
The IT product Infineon Technologies Security Controller M7794 A12 / G12 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.00.002, EC v1.02.013 or v2.00.002 and Toolbox v1.02.013
or v2.00.002 libraries and with specific IC-dedicated software (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting
Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 8 September 2017, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Name of site /
Company name
Address
Development:
IFX Augsburg Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
IFX Bangalore Infineon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.
Kalyani Platina, Sy. No. 6 & 24
Kundanahalli Village
Krishnaraja Puram Hobli
Bangalore
India – 560066 India
IFX Bucharest Infineon Technologies Romania
Blvd. Dimitrie Pompeiu Nr. 6
Sector 2
020335 Bucharest
Romania
IFX Milpitas Infineon Technologies AG
Chip Card and Security
640 North McCarthy Blvd
Milpitas, CA 95035
IFX Munich Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
IFX Graz Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
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Name of site /
Company name
Address
8020 Graz
Austria
IFX Villach Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach
Austria
IFX Klagenfurt Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt
Austria
IFX Melaka Infineon Technologies Sdn. Bhd.
Batu Berendam FTZ
75350, Melaka
Malaysia
Production:
Amkor Manila Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philippines
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philippines
ARDT Hsin-Chu Ardentec Corporation
No. 3, Gungye 3rd Rd.,
Hsin-Chu Industrial Park, Hu-Kou,
Hsin-Chu Hsien
Taiwan 30351, R.O.C.
ARDT Singapore Ardentec Singapore Pte. Ltd.
12 Woodlands Loop #02-00
Singapore 738283
ASK Burlington ASK-intTag, LLC
Building 966
1000 River St., Essex Junction,
Vermont 05452
USA
DHL Singapore DHL Exel Supply Chain
Richland Business Centre
11 Bedok North Ave 4, Level 3,
Singapore 489949
Disco Kirchheim DISCO HI-TEC EUROPE GmbH
Liebigstrasse 8
D-85551 Kirchheim
Germany
DNP Agrate DNP Photomask Europe S.p.A.
Via C. Olivetti 2/A
20041 Agrate Brianza
Italy
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Name of site /
Company name
Address
Exceet Paderborn exceet Card AG
Senefelderstr. 10
D-33100 Paderborn
Germany
G&D Nitra Giesecke & Devrient Slovakia, s.r.o.
Dolné Hony 11
94901 Nitra
Slovakia
HID Galway HID Global Ireland Teoranta
Pairc Tionscail na Tullaigh
Baile na hAbhann
Co. Galway
Ireland
IFX Dresden Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co. OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden
Germany
IFX Morgan Hill Infineon Technologies North America Corp.
18275 Serene Drive
Morgan Hill, CA 95037
USA
IFX Regensburg Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
IFX Singapore Infineon Technologies Asia Pacific PTE Ltd.
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
IFX Wuxi Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd.
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu
P.R. China
K&N Großostheim Infineon Technology AG
Distribution Center Europe (DCE)
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
K&N Hayward Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
USA
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Name of site /
Company name
Address
Smartrac Bangkok Smartrac Technology Ltd.
142/121/115 Moo
Hi-Tech Industrial Estate
Tambon Ban Laean
Amphor Bang-Pa-In
13160 Ayutthaya
Thailand
Toppan Dresden
(via BSI-DSZ-CC-S-
0087-2017)
Toppan Photomask, Inc
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden
Germany
Toppan Ranzan9
Toppan Printing Co., Ltd.
Ranzan Plant
6-2, Hanami-Dai, Ranzan-Machi, Hiki-Gun,
Saitama 355-0204
Japan
TSMC Tainan Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
Ltd.
1, Nan-Ke North Rd.
Tainan Science Park
Tainan 741-44
Taiwan
Table 7: Relevant production and development sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
9
No remote IT support from other Toppan sites is performed.
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