National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE,
SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE, SC840DPE, SC940DPE
Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11122-2021
Dated: 08/27/2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Farid Ahmed
Sheldon Durrant
Peter Kruus
Linda Morrison
Clare Parran
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Kenneth Lasoski
Joshua Gola
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 7
3 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ................................................................. 9
3.1 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................................9
3.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................10
3.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................11
4 Architectural Information .................................................................................................. 12
5 Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 13
5.1 User Data Protection ....................................................................................................................................13
5.2 Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................................................13
5.3 TOE Access ...................................................................................................................................................13
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 14
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 15
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................15
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................16
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 17
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................17
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 18
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................18
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................18
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................19
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................19
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................19
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................19
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................21
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 22
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 23
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 24
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 25
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 26
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List Of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers.................................................................................................... 7
Table 2: TOE Assumptions.......................................................................................................... 9
Table 3: TOE Threats................................................................................................................. 10
List of Figures
Figure 1 – KVM Switch Evaluated Configuration .................................................................. 15
Figure 2 – KVM Multiviewer Evaluated Configuration......................................................... 16
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE,
SC940HE, SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the
conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S.
Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to
the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in August 2021. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing
Device, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices, which references the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0], the PP‐Module for
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and the PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version
1.0.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and
Video/Display Devices, which references the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device
Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0], the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0
[MOD_KM_V1.0] and the PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0
[MOD_VI_V1.0]. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
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functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted
product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE,
SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0], the PP‐
Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 [MOD_KM_V1.0] and the PP‐
Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0 [MOD_VI_V1.0]
Security Target Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE,
SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Security Target, Version 1.14, July 15, 2021
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE,
SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE, SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version 44404-
E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices, Version 1.2, August 18, 2021
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Vertiv IT Systems
Developer Vertiv IT Systems
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Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd, Rockville MD 20850
CCEVS Validators Da Farid Ahmed, Sheldon Durrant, Peter Kruus, Linda Morrison, Clare Parran
9
3 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
3.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 2: TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.NO_TEMPEST
Computers and peripheral devices connected
to the PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
The TSF may or may not isolate the ground
of the keyboard and mouse computer
interfaces (the USB ground). The Operational
Environment is assumed not to support
TEMPEST red‐black ground isolation.
A.PHYSICAL The environment provides physical security
commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it processes and contains.
A.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES The environment includes no wireless
peripheral devices.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN PSD Administrators and users are trusted to
follow and apply all guidance in a trusted
manner.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the PSD and its
operational environment follow the applicable
security configuration guidance.
A.USER_ALLOWED_ACCESS All PSD users are allowed to interact with all
connected computers. It is not the role of the
PSD to prevent or otherwise control user
access to connected computers. Computers or
their connected network shall have the
required means to authenticate the user and to
control access to their various resources.
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Assumption Assumption Definition
A.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG
_CAPABILITIES
The computers connected to the TOE are not
equipped with special analog data collection
cards or peripherals such as analog to digital
interface, high performance audio interface,
digital signal processing function, or analog
video capture function.
3.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Table 3: TOE Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.DATA_LEAK A connection via the PSD2 between one or
more computers may allow unauthorized data
flow through the PSD or its connected
peripherals.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK A connection via the PSD between one or
more computers may allow unauthorized data
flow through bit‐by‐bit signaling.
T.RESIDUAL_LEAK A PSD may leak (partial, residual, or echo)
user data between the intended connected
computer and another unintended connected
computer.
T.UNINTENDED_USE A PSD may connect the user to a computer
other than the one to which the user intended
to connect.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES The use of an unauthorized peripheral device
with a specific PSD peripheral port may allow
unauthorized data flows between connected
devices or enable an attack on the PSD or its
connected computers.
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER An attached device (computer or peripheral)
with malware, or otherwise under the control
of a malicious user, could modify or
overwrite code or data stored in the PSD’s
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Threat Threat Definition
volatile or non‐volatile memory to allow
unauthorized information flows.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER A malicious user or human agent could
physically modify the PSD to allow
unauthorized information flows.
T.REPLACEMENT A malicious human agent could replace the
PSD during shipping, storage, or use with an
alternate device that does not enforce the PSD
security policies.
T.FAILED Detectable failure of a PSD may cause an
unauthorized information flow or weakening
of PSD security functions.
3.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device,
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices, which references the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0 [PP_PSD_V4.0], the PP‐Module for
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 [MOD_KM_V1.0] and the PP‐Module for
Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0 [MOD_VI_V1.0].
• Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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4 Architectural Information
The Vertiv Secure Keyboard, Video, Mouse (KVM) Switches allow users to share keyboard,
video, and mouse peripherals between a number of connected computers.
Security features ensure isolation between computers and peripherals to prevent data leakage
between connected systems.
The evaluated features of the TOE are described further in Section 7.
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5 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features consists of
several security functionalities, as identified below:
5.1 User Data Protection
The TOE provides secure switching capabilities for video, keyboard and mouse, display. The
TOE ensures that only authorized peripheral devices may be used.
5.2 Protection of the TSF
The TOE ensures a secure state in the case of failure, provides only restricted access, and
performs self-testing. The TOE provides passive detection of physical attack.
5.3 TOE Access
The TOE provides a continuous indication of which computer is currently selected.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE,
SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Security Target, Version 1.14, July 15, 2021
• Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE,
SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version 1.2, July 15, 2021.
• CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES SCMV200DPH MULTIVIEWER Quick
Installation Guide, 590-2307-501B
• CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES SC800E/SC900E Quick Installation
Guide, 590-2283-501B
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that which may be
available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be
relied upon to configure or operate the device as evaluated.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
Figure 1 – KVM Switch Evaluated Configuration
Figure 1 shows a basic evaluated configuration for KVM Switches (SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE,
SC840HE, SC940HE, SC840DPE, SC940DPE). In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is
connected to four computers. The video input is DisplayPort, HDMI or DVI-D, and one or two
displays are connected. The devices are used with an AFP004 remote control.
16
Figure 2 – KVM Multiviewer Evaluated Configuration
Figure 2 shows a basic evaluated configuration for the Multiviewer Switch (SCMV2160DPH).
In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is connected to up to sixteen computers. The video input
is DisplayPort or HDMI and two displays are connected. The device is used with two AFP008
remote control units, and an AFPSPLITTER.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The ST does not describe excluded functionality.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH,
SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE, SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version
44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices, which is not publicly available. The Assurance
Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device
Version 4.0, the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and the PP‐Module for
Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the
Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Vertiv CYBEX™
SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE, SC840DPE, SC940DPE
Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices to be Part 2 extended, and meets the
SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities
specified in the Protection Profile and claimed modules.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH,
SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE, SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version
44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and
product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator
performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for
Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0, PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0
and PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version
4.0, PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for Video/Display
Devices, Version 1.0 related to the examination of the information contained in the TOE
Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
19
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version
4.0, PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for Video/Display
Devices, Version 1.0 related to the examination of the information contained in the operational
guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device
Version 4.0, PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for
Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0 and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the
Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0, PP‐Module for
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0,
and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public
search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with
20
the TOE.
The evaluator searched the Internet for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE using the web sites
listed below:
• National Vulnerability Database: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search
• Vertiv Support: https://www.vertiv.com/en-us/support/
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: https://google.com
The evaluator performed the public domain vulnerability searches using the following key
words: (The search was performed on August 18, 2021.)
• Vertiv
• Vertiv KVM
• Vertiv Firmware
• Vertiv Peripheral Sharing Device
• SCMV2160DPH
• SC840DVIE
• SC940DVIE
• SC840HE
• SC940HE
• SC840DPE
• SC940DPE
• Cybex
• AFP0008
• AFP0004
• NAK transaction
• SYNC Signal
• HPD signal
• EDID traffic
• ARC Signal
• HDCP signal
• USB HID traffic
• STMicroelectronics 32-Bit
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Device Version 4.0, PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for
Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
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9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0, PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
Version 1.0 and PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, and correctly verified that
the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH,
SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE, SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version
44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Common Criteria Guidance Supplement Version 1.2,
July 15, 2021, CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES SCMV200DPH MULTIVIEWER
Quick Installation Guide, 590-2307-501B, and CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES
SC800E/SC900E Quick Installation Guide, 590-2283-501B document.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not
assessed as part of this evaluation such as its ability to collect information from its host. All other
functionality provided by the product needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions
can be drawn about their effectiveness.
23
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
24
12 Security Target
Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE,
SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Security
Target, Version 1.14, July 15, 2021
25
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
26
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, July 19, 2019
6. PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
7. PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
8. Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE,
SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Security Target, Version 1.14, July 15, 2021
9. Assurance Activity Report for Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE,
SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE, SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version 44404-
E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices [AAR], Version 1.3, August 18, 2021
10. Evaluation Technical Report for Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE,
SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE, SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version 44404-
E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices [ETR], Version 1.2, August 18 16, 2021
11. Vertiv CYBEX™ SCMV2160DPH, SC840DVIE, SC940DVIE, SC840HE, SC940HE,
SC840DPE, SC940DPE Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version 1.2, July 15, 2021
12. CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES SCMV200DPH MULTIVIEWER Quick
Installation Guide, 590-2307-501B
13. CYBEX™ SC SERIES SECURE SWITCHES SC800E/SC900E Quick Installation
Guide, 590-2283-501B