Version 20101101 TUV Rheinland Nederland B.V. A TUVRheinland® Precisely Right. Certification Report Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders, running NX-OS 7.2(1)N1(1) Sponsor and developer: Cisco Systems Inc. 170 West Tasman Dr. San Jose, CA 95134 USA Evaluation facility: Brightsight Delftechpark 1 2628 XJ Delft The Netherlands Reportnumber: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR Report version: 1 Projectnumber: NSCIB-CC-15-77333 Authors(s): Denise Cater Date: 10 June 2016 Number of pages: 13 Number of appendices: 0 Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety. © TOV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval Headoffice: Location Leek: info@nl.tuv.com TUV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a Westervoortsedik 73 Eiberkamp 10 woww.tuv.com/nl registered company at the Dutch NL-6827 AV Arnhem NL-9351 VT Leek Chamber of Commerce under P.O. Box 2220 P.O. Box 37 Tel. +31 (0) 88 888 7 888 number 27288788 NL-6802 CE Amhem NL-9350 AA Leek Fax +31 (0) 88 888 7 879 VAT number: NL815820380B01 IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096 ® TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. Certificate Standard Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 Revision 4 (ISO/IEC 15408) Certificate number CC-16-77333 TUV Rheinland Nederland B.V. certifies: Gertfieate holder Cisco Systems Inc and developer . 170 West Tasman Dr.,San Jose, CA 95134, USA Product and Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series assurance level Fabric Extenders, running NX-OS 7.2(1)N14(1), Assurance Package: = EAL2 Projectnumber NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR Evaluation facility Brightsight BV located in Delft, the Netherlands Applying the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 Revision 4 (ISO/IEC 18045) The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation version 3.1 Revision 4 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation version 3.1 Revision 4. This certificate Common Criteria applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in Recognition conjunction with the complete certification report. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with ‘Arrangement for "© provisions of the Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security [NSCIB] and the components up to conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence poı p adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. or by EAL2 other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by AN certificate, is either expressed or implied. Validity Date of issue : 13-06-2016 Certificate expiry : 13-06-2021 a DUCTS RvA C078 Accredited by the Dutch ‘Council for Accreditation www.tuv.com/nl TUV Rheinland Nederland B.V. or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this A TUVRheinland® Precisely Right. @ TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. Page: 3/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR, dated 10 June 2016 CONTENTS: Foreword Recognition of the certificate International recognition European recognition 1 Executive Summary 2 Certification Results 2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 2.2 Security Policy 2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 24 Architectural Information 2.5 Documentation 2.6 IT Product Testing 2.7 Evaluated Configuration 2.8 Results of the Evaluation 2.9 Comments/Recommendations 3 Security Target 4 Definitions 5 Bibliography A TÜVRheinland® Precisely Right. 12 13 @ TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. Page: 4/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR, dated 10 June 2016 A TUVRheinland® Precisely Right. Foreword The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TUV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products as well as for protection profiles and sites. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TUV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TUV Rheinland Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025, General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories. By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TUV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer should review the security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target. Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety. @ TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. Page: 5/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR, dated 10 June 2016 A TUVRheinland® Precisely Right. Recognition of the certificate Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate would indicate that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS agreement and will be recognised by the participating nation International recognition The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC. Starting 8 September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be found on: http:/www.commoncriteriaportal.org. Certificates issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of the previous CCRA (i.e. recognition based on assurance components up to and including EAL4+ALC_FLR). Also certification procedures started before 8 September 2014 and Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates remain recognised according to the rules of the previous CCRA. European recognition The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April 2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on: http://www.sogisportal.eu. @ TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. Page: 6/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR, dated 10 June 2016 A TUVRheinland® Precisely Right. 1 Executive Summary This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders running NX-OS 7.2(1)N1(1). The developer of the Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders running NX- OS 7.2(1) is Cisco Systems Inc. located in San Jose, USA and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements. The TOE is a data center-class switch for 10 Gigabit Ethernet networks with a fabric architecture that scales to 17 terabits per second (Tbps). The TOE is both IPv4 and IPv6 capable and provides network virtualization running Cisco NX-OS, which is a Cisco-developed highly configurable proprietary operating system that provides for efficient and effective routing and switching as well as network virtualization. The NX-OS supports Virtual Device Contexts (VDC), which enables the partitioning of a single physical Nexus 5600 device into multiple logical devices. Each VDC appears as a unique device and enables separate Roles-Based Access Control Management (RBAC) per VDC. This enables VDCs to be administered by different administrators while still maintaining a rich, granular RBAC capability. With this functionality, each administrator can define VRF names and VLAN IDs independent of those used in other VDCs safely with the knowledge that VDCs maintain their own unique software processes, configuration, and data plane forwarding tables. NX-OS provides virtual routing and forwarding capabilities that logically segment the network by virtualizing both the routing control plane and data plane functions into autonomous instances. Routing protocols and interfaces, both physical and logical, become members of a specific VRF instance via configuration. For each VRF, IPv4 and IPv6 tables are created automatically and independent routing and forwarding decisions are made. NX-OS supports up to 1000 unique VRF instances, whether defined in a single Virtual Device Context (VDC) or spread across multiple VDCs. The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation was completed on June 3 2016 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB]. The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report. The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]' for this product provide sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL2 assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 4 [CC]. TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders running NX-OS 7.2(1)N1(1) evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply to the specific version of the product as evaluated. ' The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review. @ TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. Page: 7/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR, dated 10 June 2016 A TUVRheinland® Precisely Right. 2 Certification Results 2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders running NX-OS 7.2(1)N1(1) from Cisco Systems Inc.located in San Jose, USA. The TOE is comprised of the following main components: Delivery Identifier Version item type Cisco Nexus 5624Q, 5648Q, 5672UP, 5696Q, 56128P Series switches with 2332TQ, 2348TQ, 2348UPQ, 2224TP, 2248TP, Hardware 554gTP-E, 2232PP, 2248PQ, 2232TM, 2232TM-E Fabric "V2 Extenders Software Cisco NX-OS 7.2(1)N1(1) To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders running NX-OS 7.2(1)N1(1). Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report. 2.2 Security Policy The major security features provided by the TOE are: The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, enforcement of information flow control policies and administrative actions v The TOE provides cryptography in support of remote administrative management via SSHv2. vv The TOE performs user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. v The following types of traffic flow are controlled for both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic: o Layer 3 Traffic - RACLs (A RACL is an administratively configured access control list that is applied to Layer 3 traffic that is routed into or out Nexus 5600 Series switch) o Layer 2 Traffic - PACLs (A PACL is an administratively configured access control list that is applied to Layer 2 traffic that is routed into Nexus 5600 Series switch) o VLAN Traffic - VACLs (A VACL is an administratively configured access control list that is applied to packets that are routed into or out of a VLAN or are bridged within a VLAN. VACLs are strictly for security packet filtering and for redirecting traffic to specific physical interfaces) o VRFs (Virtual Routing and Forwarding allows multiple instances of routing tables to exist within the Nexus 5600 Series switch TOE component simultaneously) > The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE; > The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication and access controls to limit configuration to authorized administrators; > The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an authorized administrator configurable time-period and can also display a Security Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE. @ TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. Page: 8/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR, dated 10 June 2016 A TUVRheinland® Precisely Right. 2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 2.3.1. Assumptions Detailed information on the assumption and threats can be found in the [ST] sections 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. Detailed information on the security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 4.2 of the [ST]. >» Administrators are assumed to be non-malicious with appropriate training. > The TOE will be physically protected within controlled access facilities; > There are no general-purpose computing capabilities available on the TOE, only those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE. 2.4 Architectural Information The general architecture consists of the following subsystems, as depicted in Figure 1 below: > The Hardware subsystem providing: Hardware clock, CPU, memory, network ports, and interrupts to switch. Local storage (NVRAM, DRAM, and FLASH memory) of audit data and other data Physical ports Entropy for random numbers. Self-tests on boot up 20000 > The Cryptographic subsystem providing cryptographic support for: o Encrypting of communication with users and other systems (SSH) o Hashing of stored passwords o Generation and zeroizing cryptographic keys > The NX-OS subsystem providing all other SFR-related functionality, such as: o Generating audit records o Information Flow Control " Control traffic flow (Packet Filtering) "ACL enforcement Identification and Authentication (I&A) Protection of the TSF TOE Access Security Management Trusted Path/Channels communicating with users and other systems (SSH) o0000 Figure 1 TOE Architecture 2.5 Documentation The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer: @ TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. Page: 9/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR, dated 10 June 2016 A TUVRheinland® Precisely Right. Identifier Version Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switch with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders Common Criteria Configuration Guide 1.0 2.6 IT Product Testing Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities. 2.6.1 Testing approach and depth The developer tests consist of eleven (11) tests, some of which were quite extensive. These tests cover all TSFI and all SFRs and include both positive and negative tests. Brightsight repeated six (6) of the eleven developer tests. In addition to the developer tests, the evaluator derived and executed six (6) additional functional tests. 2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing The evaluators performed twenty-seven (27) penetration tests. These were derived from a vulnerability analysis comprised of 3 parts: 1. Public domain vulnerability analysis of TOE specific vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities specific for 5600/2000 series hardware and NX-OS 7.2(1)N1(1) software); 2. Public domain vulnerability analysis of TOE-type vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities that are generic for routers/switches); 3. Analysis of TOE deliverables (FSP/TDS etc.). 2.6.3 Test Configuration The network diagram in Figure 2 describes the overall setup of the lab and the IP addresses used for developer and evaluator testing. Ports are labelled as follows: > TA, TB, TC are physical interfaces used to simulate independent virtual testers (e.g. Test PC1, Test PC2, etc.) from the networking point of view (using Linux namespaces). > TLand RL are loopback interfaces used on the testing computer and the TOE. They are not used in the tests because they are just providing local connectivity. The virtual machines (TA, TB, TC) need this interface due to Linux requirements. > COis the console port of the TOE and is connected directly to the testing computers console port of SER. > RAand RB are connected to the uplink ports of UP and UQ. These connections enable the Fabric Extenders to function normally. > TP and TQ are the interfaces of the TOE that are managed through NSK-C5672UP. >» RC is directly connected to NSK-C5672UP and the testing computer as NSK-C5672UP offers connections to end points as well as Fabric Extenders. @ TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. A TÜVRheinland® Precisely Right. Page: 10/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR, dated 10 June 2016 Testing Computer [Management Network, Management PC bo: 0GE ua N2K-C2232PP-10GI RA| N5K-C5672UP Figure 2 Test Configuration Test cases load a baseline configuration (verified to match the security guidance provided in [AGD]) on the TOE before configuring the TOE into the state necessary for the test case to proceed. The baseline configuration has been created by the Evaluator and saved in flash memory on the TOE. The following tools were used for testing: Description Package Name Platform Version Linux Kernel Linux X86_64 4.0.4 GNU/Linux Kali X86_64 2.0 SSH Client Software openssh-client X86_64 6.7p1 Debian-5 Serial console client Minicom X86_64 2.7 Test Automation python-pexpect X86_64 3.2-1 Test Automation python-scapy X86_64 2.2.0-1kali1 MLAN hopping Frogger X86_64 Github a2959fe MLAN hopping Python-scapy X86_64 2.2.0-1kali1 MLAN hopping Yersinia framework X86_64 0.7.3 Dsniff framework Layer2 attacks X86_64 2.4b1+debian- 22.1+b1 Packet capture Tepdump X86_64 4.6.2 Packet capture Wireshark X86_64 1.12.6 IP fragmentation Rose attack tool X86_64 Rev. 20061112 Network enumeration nmap X86_64 6.49BETAA4 Packet crafting Hping X86_64 3.0.0.a2 Password attacks Hydra X86_64 8.1 Mulnerability scan tool Nessus X86_64 6.5.2 2.6.4 Testing Results The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details. The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification. No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests. @ TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. Page: 11/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR, dated 10 June 2016 A TUVRheinland® Precisely Right. 2.7 Evaluated Configuration The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders running NX-OS 7.2(1)N1(1). 2.8 Results of the Evaluation The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETRP which references the ASE Intermediate Report and other NSP#6-compliant evaluator documents. The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”. Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders running NX-OS 7.2(1)N1(1), to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 2.This implies that the product satisfies the security technical requirements specified in Security Target Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switch with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders NX-OS 7.2 (1) Security Target, version 1.0, dated 03 June 2016. 2.9 Comments/Recommendations The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. The strength of the implemented cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation. To fend off attackers with high attack potential appropriate cryptographic algorithms with adequate key lengths must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards). ? The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review. @ TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. Page: 12/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR, dated 10 June 2016 A TUVRheinland® Precisely Right. 3 Security Target The Security Target Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switch with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders NX-OS 7.2 (1) Security Target, version 1.0, dated 03 June 2016 [ST] is included here by reference 4 Definitions This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM: ACL Access Control List IT Information Technology ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility LAN Local Address Network NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security PACL Port ACL PP Protection Profile RACL Router ACL RBAC Roles-Based Access Control (management) SSH Secure Shell TOE Target of Evaluation VACL VLAN ACL VDC Virtual Device Context VLAN Virtual LAN VRF Virtual Routing and Forwarding @ TÜV, TUEV and TUV are registered trademarks. Any use or application requires prior approval. Page: 13/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-15-77333-CR, dated 10 June 2016 A TUVRheinland® Precisely Right. 5 Bibliography This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report: [cc] [CEM] [ETR] [NSCIB] IST] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts | version 3.1 revision 1, and Part II and Ill, version 3.1,revision 4, September 2012. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012. Brightsight, Evaluation Technical Report Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switches with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders running NX-OS 7.2 (1)N1(1)-EAL2, 16-RPT-017, Version 3.0, 8 June 2016. Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.2, August 10", 2015. Cisco Nexus 5600 Series Switch with 2000 Series Fabric Extenders NX-OS 7.2 (1) Security Target, version 1.0, dated 03 June 2016. (This is the end of this report).