BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
for
Touch&Sign2048
Version 1.00
from
ST Incard S.r.l.
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.1
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
Smart Card with Digital Signature Application
Touch&Sign2048
Version 1.00
from ST Incard S.r.l.
PP Conformance: Protection Profile Secure Signature-Creation Device
Type 3, Version 1.05, BSI-PP-0006-2002
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Arrangement
for components
up to EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of
the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005) .
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 09. April 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
IV
This page is intentionally left blank.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005)5
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
A-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition
of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC
for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national
certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this
Agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised
under the terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies
of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory
nations resp. approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site:
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that
this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For
mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are
relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 has undergone the certification procedure
at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 7 March 2008.
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: ST Incard S.r.l.
The product was developed by: ST Incard S.r.l.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of
this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, it is specified in the
following report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the
Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over
time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack
methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified
product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI
Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a
regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be
extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for
assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified
product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation
does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18 and D1 to D-2.
The product Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
A-4
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form
at the internet address stated above.
7
ST Incard S.r.l.
Z.I. Marcianise SUD
81025 Marcianise
ITALY
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 5
3 Security Policy 6
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
5 Architectural Information 7
6 Documentation 8
7 IT Product Testing 8
8 Evaluated Configuration 9
9 Results of the Evaluation 9
9.1 CC specific results 9
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment 10
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE 11
11 Security Target 13
12 Definitions 13
12.1 Acronyms 13
12.2 Glossary 15
13 Bibliography 17
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of evaluation (TOE) is called Touch&Sign2048 V1.00. It is a
multifunctional smartcard product that is intended to provide all capabilities
required to devices involved in creating qualified electronic signatures.
The TOE is able to generate its own signature key pair. The authorized
Administrator uses the CGA to initiate SCD/SVD generation and to ask the
SSCD to export the SVD for generation of the corresponding certificate. The
TOE holds the SVD and, before exporting the SVD to a CGA for certification
purposes, it provides a trusted channel in order to maintain its integrity.
The signatory must be authenticated before signature creation is allowed. For
authentication he sends his authentication data (a PIN) to the TOE using a
trusted path between the interfaces device used, i.e. between a smartcard
reader and the TOE. The smartcard reader is also used by the Signatory or the
Administrator to change his Reference Authentication Data (RAD) held by the
TOE against which the TOE verifies a user PIN and it is used by the
Administrator to unblock the Signatory's Reference Authentication Data, when
needed.
The data to be signed (DTBS) or their representation (DTBSR) are transferred
by the SCA to the TOE only over a trusted channel in order to maintain their
integrity. The same channel is used to return the signed data object (SDO) from
the TOE to the SCA (see the SSCD Protection Profile [9] chapter 2.1). The
TOE, when requested by the SCA, is able to generate a to be signed
representation (DTBSR) using a hash function agreed as suitable according to
[13].
Main Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 functionality include
• Cryptographic key generation and secure management,
• Secure signature generation with secure management of data to be signed,
• Identification and Authentication of trusted users and applications,
• Data storage and protection from modification or disclosures, as needed,
• Secure exchange of sensitive data between the TOE and a trusted
applications,
• Secure exchange of sensitive data between the TOE and a trusted human
interface device.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the
certified Protection Profile Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3, Version
1.05, BSI-PP-0006-2002 [9].
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3
for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation
Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
B-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are
outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 12.1. They are selected
from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the
TOE is CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of
the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 12.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following
TOE Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.AUTH Authentication functions
SF.RAD RAD management
SF.AC Access Control
SF.KEY_GEN Key Generation
SF.HASH Hash computation
SF.MAC MAC computation
SF.SIGN Crypto functions
SF.SM Secure Messaging
SF.OBS_A Un-observability
SF.INT_A TOE logical integrity
SF.DATA_ERASE Secure destruction of the data
SF.TRANSACTION Anti-tearing function
SF.TEST Self Test and Audit
SF.EXCEPTION Error message and exception
SF.LIFE_CYCLE TOE life state management
SF.HARDWARE TRNG and physical protection, TOE
Cryptographic support
Table 1: TOE Security Funktions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 13.
The claimed TOE’s strength of functions ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific functions
as indicated in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 15.4 is confirmed. The
rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable
for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For
details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6]
resp. [7], chapter 10.1. Based on these assets the security environment is
defined in terms of assumptions, threats and policies. This is outlined in the
Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 10.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
Touch&Sign2048 V1.00. For details refer to chapter. 8 of this report.
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Touch&Sign2048 V1.00
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/S
W
The SSCD Application
Touch&Sign2048 V1.00
The devices drivers
Touch&Sign2048 V1.00
The Integrated Circuit and
its libraries ST19WR66I
N/A Physical delivery
2 DOC Touch&Sign2048 V1.00
User and Administrator
guidance [12]
A-2, 2007-12-07 Document in paper or electronic
format
3 OTHER Keys required for the
Personalisation
N/A electronic format via trusted
channel
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is in initialisation state when it is delivered from HW developer. The
prepersonalisation state comprises of TOE patching and configuration. The
Perso-A state is intended for the Card Manufacturer internal use. The state in
which all the files required by the application are created by the Administrator is
the Perso-B state. The TOE is finished after the end of Perso-A state. The
delivery to the card holder is the Personalisation Agent’s responsibility. For
details and definitions of the lifecycle states of the TOE please read chapter 9.3
of the Security Target [6] resp. [7] and more specifically the Guidance [12].
The TOE is initialised and pre-personalised in ST Incard S.r.l. production area
before delivering to personalisation centre. The personalisation centre can be
either internal or external to ST Incard S.r.l.
In case of internal personalisation TOEs are delivered by internal delivery. The
company internal secured areas and an authentication key stored in the TOE
grant the security and the TOE integrity.
In case of external personalisation the TOEs are packed, sealed and delivered
by trusted courier. Delivery documentation, manuals and authentication keys
B-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
are delivered in electronic format via trusted channel (e.g. e-mail signed and
ciphered by PGP).
3 Security Policy
The TOE is the composition of an IC, IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card
Embedded Software and is intended to be used as a secure signature creation
device (SSCD) for the generation of signature creation data (SCD) and the
creation of qualified electronic signatures. The security policy is expressed by
the set of security functional requirements and implemented by the TOE. It
covers the following issues:
• physical attacks through the TOE interfaces,
• storing, copying, releasing and deriving the signature creation data by an
attacker,
• forgery of the electronic signature, of the signature-verification data, or of the
DTBS-representation,
• repudiation of signatures,
• misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats
and organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These
aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-
Environment. The following topics are of relevance:
• The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name and the SVD in
the qualified certificate by an advanced signature of the CSP(A.CGA).
• The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends
the DTBS-representation of data the signatory wishes to sign in a form
appropriate for signing by the TOE (A.SCA).
• The TOE personalization takes place with the observance of physical and
procedural measures granting the integrity, confidentiality and availability
of the TOE personalization data. The symmetric keys that are used to
implement the trusted channels and path by the secure messaging
mechanism are securely imported and stored by the SCA and the CGA
applications (A.PERSONALIZATION).
• The TOE is personalized and administered according to the Administration
documentation by a competent individual who is responsible for the
security of TOE assets and who is trusted not to abuse his privileges.
The TOE Administrator follows the TOE Administration documentation for
TOE secure disposal after it entered the SC end of use state (A.MANAGE).
B-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
• Information needed for positive identification and authentication by the TOE
is delivered to TOE users in a secure manner (A.VAD).
Furthermore, the Security Target [6], chapter 10.5 refers to three Organisational
Security Policies in the Protection Profile [9] that state that the CSP uses a
trustworthy CGA to generate the qualified certificate for the SVD generated by
the SSCD (P.CSP_Qcert), that the signatory uses a signature creation system
to sign data with a qualified electronic signature that is based on a qualified
certificate and that is created by an SSCD (P.Qsign), and that the TOE
implements the SCD used for signature creation under sole control of the
signatory (P.Sigy_SSCD). Please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 10.5
and to the Protection Profile [9], chapter 3.3 for more details.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 is a multifunctional smartcard product on a
smartcard integrated circuit implementing a type 3 Secure Signature Creation
Device (SSCD) according to the Protection Profile [9] and defined by:
• The SSCD Application Touch&Sign2048 V1.00
• The devices drivers Touch&Sign2048 V1.00
• The Integrated Circuit and its libraries ST19WR66I
• User and Administrator guidance
Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 was developed on a ST Microelectronics
microcontroller: ST19WR66I ICC, a hardware platform offering 224Kb ROM,
6Kb RAM, 66Kb of EEPROM and cryptographic support, especially designed
for secure application based on high performance Public and Secret key
algorithms (i.e. RSA, DES, TripleDES, AES-128). The chip includes a Modular
Arithmetic Processor (MAP), based on a 1088-bit processor architecture, and a
DES accelerator, both designed to speed up cryptographic calculations.
The hardware also includes a true random number generator (TRNG) compliant
to both FIPS 140-2 [17] and P2 class of AIS 31 [4].
The HW platform has been certified under the French Scheme (see [16],
ST19WR66I Certification Report) and it is compliant with the PP9806 Protection
Profile for smartcard integrated circuit [14].
The TOE consists of hardware and embedded software which is realised in
several subsystems. All incoming APDU commands are subject to initial checks
by the subsystem “APDU dispatcher” and are then handed over to a subsystem
in charge of the required functionality which can be:
• Identification and authentication,
• Key generation,
• Signing,
• Internal application.
B-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
These subsystems get required data from the subsystem “File System”
subjected to the subsystem “Data Protection” and interact with the subsystem
“Hardware Abstraction Layer” which calls functions of the IC. The entry points of
every interface are denoted by function names of TOE embedded software
functions (APDU commands if the interface externally visible) or by reference to
the IC documentation.
The IC notifies errors to the subsystem “Error Handling” to maintain a secure
TOE state.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the
product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information
for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in
chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The evaluated TOE is the Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 consisting of:
• The SSCD Application Touch&Sign2048 V1.00
• The devices drivers Touch&Sign2048 V1.00
• The Integrated Circuit and its libraries ST19WR66I and has following
identification data:
• 0x496E5472: MASK ID - (ASCII code for “InTr”)
• 0x00010002: ROM Code Version - (ver.01.02)
• 0x0180: EEPROM package CNS – (Version 1.80)
The tests are performed with the composite smartcard product consisting of the
Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 embedded software by ST Incard S.r.l. implementing
an SSCD type 3 application, device drivers on a ST19WR66I integrated circuit
and its libraries by STMicroelectronics.
The developer has tested the 15 TSF of the TOE with 76 testing strategies
which are refined into 681 individual test scenarios. All testing strategies of the
TSF passed all tests of individual test scenarios so that all TSF have been
successfully tested against the functional specification and the high level design
of the TOE. The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TSF perform
as specified. The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE performs
as expected.
The evaluators have tested all 16 TSF. The evaluators have repeated developer
tests and have performed own tests that cover all 16 TSF. During the
evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified. The evaluators
B-8
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
have verified the developer’s test results by executing a sample of tests of the
developer’s test documentation.
The evaluators have performed penetration testing based on the developer’s
and on the evaluator’s vulnerability analysis. During the evaluator’s penetration
testing the TOE operated as specified. In the intended environment of use the
TOE does not feature exploitable vulnerabilities for attackers possessing a high
attack potential if all the measures required are taken into consideration.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE as a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) type 3 only features
one fixed configuration which cannot be altered by the user.
The TOE has a unique label associated. The label is stored in the OTP (one
time programmable) memory area of the TOE and can be read by means of the
commands GET DATA and GET CARD TRACEABILITY.
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE and has following
identification data:
• 0x496E5472: MASK ID - (ASCII code for “InTr”)
• 0x00010002: ROM Code Version - (ver.01.02)
• 0x0180: EEPROM package CNS – (Version 1.80)
The TOE is in initialisation state when it is delivered from the HW developer.
The prepersonalisation state comprises of TOE patching and configuration. The
Perso-A state is intended for the Card Manufacturer internal use. The state in
which all the files required by the application are created by the Administrator is
the Perso-B state. The TOE is finished after the end of Perso-A state. The
delivery to the card holder is the Personalisation Agent’s responsibility. The
TOE is initialised and pre-personalised in the ST Incard S.r.l. production area
before delivering to personalisation centre.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the evaluation methodology CEM [2], the
requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the
Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components used up
to EAL4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition
evaluation, the ETR [8] includes also the evaluation results of the
B-9
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
composite evaluation activities in accordance with CC Supporting
Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A Composite smart card
evaluation [4, AIS 36].
(ii) The ETR [8] builds up on the ETR-lite for Composition documents of the
evaluation of the underlying hardware "ST Microelectronics
microcontroller: ST19WR66I" ([16]). The ETR-lite for Composition [10]
was provided by the ITSEF SERMA Technologoes according to CC
Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition ([4, AIS 36]) and was
validated by a recent re-assessment.
(iii) For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25
and AIS 26 (see [4]) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following
assurance components:
• All components of the class ASE
• All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C
of this report)
• The components
AVA_MSU.3 - Misuse analysis – Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_VLA.4 – Vulnerability analysis – Highly resistant
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• for PP Conformance Protection Profile Secure Signature-Creation Device
Type 3, Version 1.05 ,BSI-PP-0006-2002 [9]
• for the functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function
high :
SF.AUTH, SF.HASH, SF.SM, SF.HARDWARE
In order to assess the strength of function the scheme interpretations AIS 20
and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in
chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its
security policy:
– hash functions:
B-10
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
SHA-1 (provided by the hardware) and SHA-256, implemented by the ESW.
SHA-256 is recommended.
– algorithms for the encryption and decryption:
Triple DES with 2 or 3 keys, AES-128 or RSA with 1024-bit and 2048-bit key
length. For high resistance to attacks only Triple DES and AES-128
algorithms are recommended as symmetric crypto algorithms. For Triple
DES the secret key length must be 128-bit (2 keys) or 192-bit (3 keys). RSA
with key length of 2048 bits is recommended.
This holds for the following security functions:
– SF.AUTH (Authentication functions),
– SF.KEY_GEN (Key Generation),
– SF.HASH (Hash computation),
– SF.MAC (MAC computation),
– SF.SIGN (Crypto functions),
– SF.SM (Secure Messaging)
– SF.HARDWARE (TRNG and physical protection, TOE Cryptographic
support).
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
evaluation (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to the
“Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und
der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen)“ [13] the
algorithms are suitable for creation and verification of electronic signatures. The
validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogue [13] and
summarised in chapter 10.
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information
about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
The following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
• For high resistance to attacks only Triple DES and AES-128 algorithms are
recommended in authentication processes. For Triple DES the secret key
length must be 128-bit (2 keys) or 192-bit (3 keys).
• The length of generated SCD/SVD key pair must be 1024 or 2048 bits. As
the algorithm RSA with key length of 1024-bit is regarded as sufficiently
secure until the end of 2007 (see [13]), for periods later this date SCD/SVD
key pair with 2048 bits have to be used.
• For the generation of RSA keys of whatever length it is recommended to use
a public exponent with length at least 5 bits i.e. with value >= 17.
B-11
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
• For high resistance to attacks only Triple DES and AES-128 algorithms are
recommended as symmetric crypto algorithm. For Triple the secret key
length must be 128-bit (2 keys) or 192-bit (3 keys)
• The hashing performed by the SCA can use the SHA-1 or the SHA-256
algorithm.
• The SHA-1 algorithm is, at the time this guidance is written, widely used for
hashing processing. It is recommended to use the SHA-256 algorithm (see
[FIPS 180-1] and [FIPS 180-2]) as the SHA-1 is regarded sufficiently secure
only until the end of 2007.
• The PIN code value shall not be less than six digits.
• Before a signature operation is processed the Signatory and the SCA must
be identified and authenticated in advance.
As outlined in chapter 9.2 of this report and in the Security Target, the TOE is
able to use the hash functions SHA-1 and SHA-256. For encryption, decryption
and for signature creation and verification the TOE uses Triple DES with 2 or 3
keys, AES-128 or RSA with 1024-bit and 2048-bit key length.
The following table describes the validity period of hash functions according to
the “Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz
und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen)” [13]:
Hash function Valid until end of
SHA-1 2007 (transition period until end of June 2008)
SHA-256 2014
Table 3: Validity period of hash functions
As the Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 implements certain cryptographic algorithms for
encryption, decryption, signature creation and verification, the following table
summarizes the validity period of these algorithms as published in [13].
Algorithm with bitlength Valid until end of
RSA 1024 2007 (transition period until end of March 2008)
RSA 2048 2014 or longer
Table 4: Validity period of cryptographic algorithms
Remark for table 4: A bitlength of 2048 bits for RSA is recommended for an
acceptable long term security level.
For the expiry of the cryptographic algorithms please refer to the relevant and
applicable national directives. The usage of the TOE within the scope of this
certification is limited in accordance with the validity of the used cryptographic
algorithms.
B-12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a
sanitised version of the complete security target [6] used for the evaluation
performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the
relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit, interface standard for smart cards,
see ISO/IEC 7816 part 3
ATE Assurance class Test Activity
ATE_IND Independant testing
ATR Answer to Reset
AVA Assurance class Vulnerability Assessment Activity
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CGA Certification generation application
CSP Certification-Service provider
DES Data Encryption Standard
DOC Documentation / documents
DTBS Data to be signed
DTBSR Representation of Data to be signed
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ESW Embedded Software
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HW Hardware
B-13
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
IC Integrated Circuit
ID Identification number
IMP Implementation Representation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Message Authentication Code
MAP Modular Arithmetic Processor
OE Operational Environment
ODP One Time Programmable
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
PW Password
RAD Reference Authentication Data
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SCA Signature creation application
SCD Signature creation data
SDO Signed Data Object
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirements
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SOF Strength of Function
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
ST Security Target
SVD Signature verification data
SW Software
TDES Triple DES
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
B-14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
TSP TOE Security Policy
TT Test Target
VAD Verification authentication data
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
B-15
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
B-16
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE, specifically:
- AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007 for: CC Supporting Document, -
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 2.0, CCDB-
2006-04-003, April 2006
- AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.3, CCDB-
2007-04-001, April 2007
- AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-
schema.
- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 35 ST-lite
- AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document,
ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and CC
Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
- AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation
results
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0422-2008, Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 - Security
Target, Version A-3, Date 2007-03-29, ST Incard (confidential document)
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0422-2008, Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 - Security
Target, Version A-3, Date 2007-03-29, ST Incard (sanitised public
document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Touch&Sign2048 V1.00, Version 3, Date
2008-03-05, Evaluation Body for IT-Security of TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
B-17
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
B-18
[9] Schutzprofil Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3, Version 1.05,
BSI-PP-0006-2002
[10] ETR-lite for composition ST19WR66D / ST19WR66I (EAL 5+), ITSEF of
SERMA Technologies, 12.10.2006 and Surveillance Technical Report
ST19WR66I, (EAL 5+), ITSEF of SERMA Technologies 25.02.2008
(confidential document)
[11] Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 –Configuration List, Version A-1, Date: 2008-01-
18, ST Incard (confidential document)
[12] Touch&Sign2048 V1.00 – User and Administrator Guidance, Version A-
2, Date: 2007-12-07, ST Incard
[13] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz
und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), 17.
Dezember 2007, Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas,
Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen
[14] Protection Profile PP9806 -Smartcard - Integrated Circuit, version: 2.0,
EAL4+, September 1998
[15] ST Microelectronics, Security Target,
SMD_ST19WR66_ST_05_001_V01.02
[16] Certification Report 2006/18, ST19WR66I microcontroller, November, 7th
2006, Direction centrale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information
[17] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (FIPS PUB 140-2),
NIST, 1999
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC
Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC
Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as
part of the conformance result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
C-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for
inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the
corresponding TOE evaluation.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
C-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
C-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
C-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
C-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
C-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
C-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
C-8
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
D-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0422-2008
D-2
This page is intentionally left blank.