© 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced in full without any modification.
1
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9
for iOS 13
Security Target
Version: 0.5
Date: August 18, 2021
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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Table of Contents
Document Introduction..............................................................................................................................................................................................5
Security Target Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................................................7
ST and TOE Reference ...........................................................................................................................................................................................7
TOE Overview........................................................................................................................................................................................................7
TOE Product Type .............................................................................................................................................................................................7
Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware...........................................................................................................................................8
TOE Description.....................................................................................................................................................................................................8
TOE Evaluated Configuration.................................................................................................................................................................................8
Tested Configuration ........................................................................................................................................................................................9
Physical Scope of the TOE .....................................................................................................................................................................................9
Logical Scope of the TOE .......................................................................................................................................................................................9
Cryptographic Support ...................................................................................................................................................................................10
User Data Protection ......................................................................................................................................................................................10
Identification and Authentication...................................................................................................................................................................10
Security Management ....................................................................................................................................................................................10
Privacy ............................................................................................................................................................................................................10
Protection of the TSF......................................................................................................................................................................................10
Trusted Channels............................................................................................................................................................................................10
Excluded Functionality ........................................................................................................................................................................................10
Conformance Claims ................................................................................................................................................................................................11
Common Criteria Conformance Claim.................................................................................................................................................................11
Protection Profile Conformance Claim................................................................................................................................................................11
Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale................................................................................................................................................13
TOE Appropriateness......................................................................................................................................................................................13
TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency ................................................................................................................................................13
Statement of Security Requirements Consistency..........................................................................................................................................13
Security Problem Definition .....................................................................................................................................................................................14
Assumptions........................................................................................................................................................................................................14
Threats ................................................................................................................................................................................................................14
Organizational Security Policies...........................................................................................................................................................................18
Security Objectives...................................................................................................................................................................................................19
Security Objectives for the TOE...........................................................................................................................................................................19
Security Objectives for the Environment.............................................................................................................................................................20
Security Requirements.............................................................................................................................................................................................21
Conventions.........................................................................................................................................................................................................21
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Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS) ....................................................................................................................................................................23
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services...............................................................................................................................23
FCS_CKM.1.1/VPN Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE).................................................................................................................................23
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation............................................................................................................................23
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment................................................................................................................................................23
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption.................................................................................................................24
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation – Hashing.........................................................................................................................................24
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation – Signing..........................................................................................................................................24
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication...........................................................................................24
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage ..................................................................................................................................................24
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction............................................................................................................................................24
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services..........................................................................................................................................25
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials ..........................................................................................................................................................25
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol.....................................................................................................................................................................25
Class: User Data Protection (FDP).......................................................................................................................................................................25
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources ..............................................................................................................................................25
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications....................................................................................................................................................26
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data ............................................................................................................................26
FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection.............................................................................................................................................26
Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA) ....................................................................................................................................................26
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation .................................................................................................................................................26
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication..........................................................................................................................................27
Class: Security Management (FMT)....................................................................................................................................................................27
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism ................................................................................................................................27
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration .........................................................................................................................................27
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ....................................................................................................................................27
FMT_SMF.1/VPN Specification of Management Functions (VPN)..................................................................................................................27
Class: Privacy (FPR).............................................................................................................................................................................................27
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information...............................................................................27
Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT).......................................................................................................................................................................27
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs ......................................................................................................................................27
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities................................................................................................................................................28
FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN TSF Self-Test (VPN Client)..............................................................................................................................................28
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update....................................................................................................................................28
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update....................................................................................................................................28
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries ....................................................................................................................................................28
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions ....................................................................................................................................28
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Class: Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)....................................................................................................................................................................29
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit..................................................................................................................................................29
TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale........................................................................................................................................................................29
Security Assurance Requirements.......................................................................................................................................................................29
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.......................................................................................................................................................29
Assurance Measures............................................................................................................................................................................................30
TOE Summary Specification .....................................................................................................................................................................................31
CAVP Certificates.................................................................................................................................................................................................39
References................................................................................................................................................................................................................40
Acronyms and Terms...........................................................................................................................................................................................40
Obtaining Documentation and Submitting a Service Request .................................................................................................................................42
Contacting Cisco.......................................................................................................................................................................................................42
Table of Tables
Table 1. ST and TOE Identification..............................................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2. Required IT Environment Components ........................................................................................................................................................8
Table 3. Tested Mobile Platforms ..............................................................................................................................................................................9
Table 4. Excluded Functionality and Rationale.........................................................................................................................................................11
Table 5. Protection Profile Conformance .................................................................................................................................................................11
Table 6. NIAP Technical Decisions ............................................................................................................................................................................12
Table 7. TOE Assumptions........................................................................................................................................................................................14
Table 8. Threats........................................................................................................................................................................................................14
Table 9. Security Objectives for the TOE ..................................................................................................................................................................19
Table 10. Security Objectives for the Environment..................................................................................................................................................20
Table 11. Security Requirement Conventions ..........................................................................................................................................................21
Table 12. Security Functional Requirements............................................................................................................................................................21
Table 13. Assurance Requirements..........................................................................................................................................................................29
Table 14. Assurance Measures.................................................................................................................................................................................30
Table 15. TSS Rationale ............................................................................................................................................................................................31
Table 16. CAVP Certificates ......................................................................................................................................................................................40
Table 17. References................................................................................................................................................................................................40
Table 18. Acronyms and Terms ................................................................................................................................................................................40
Table of Figures
Figure 1. TOE and Environment..................................................................................................................................................................................9
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Document Introduction
Prepared By:
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9
for iOS 13. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product
intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements, and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which
meet the set of requirements. Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as administrators, Authorized Administrators, TOE
administrators, semi-privileged, privileged administrators, and security administrators in this document.
Revision History
Version Date Change
0.1 August 26, 2020 Initial Version
0.2 January 12, 2021 Updates for Check-In
0.3 May 25, 2021 Updates from Check-In
0.4 June 4, 2021 Updates from Testing
0.5 August 18, 2021 Updates from Check-Out
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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Cisco and the Cisco logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Cisco and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. To view a list
of Cisco trademarks, go to this URL: www.cisco.com/go/trademarks. Third-party trademarks mentioned are the property of their
respective owners. The use of the word partner does not imply a partnership relationship between Cisco and any other company. (1110R)
© 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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Security Target Introduction
This Security Target contains the following sections:
■ Security Target Introduction
■ Conformance Claims
■ Security Problem Definition
■ Security Objectives
■ Security Requirements
■ TOE Summary Specification
■ References
The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A, and Part 2.
ST and TOE Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.
Table 1. ST and TOE Identification
Name Description
ST Title Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13
ST Version 0.5
Publication Date August 18, 2021
Vendor and ST Author Cisco Systems, Inc.
TOE Reference Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13
TOE Overview
The TOE is Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 (herein after referred to as the VPN client, or the TOE). The TOE
enables remote users within an organization to communicate securely as if their devices were directly connected to a private network.
The TOE is a VPN Client software application. A virtual private network (VPN) extends the organization’s private network across a shared
or public network. A VPN client establishes a IKEv2/IPsec connection to a VPN Gateway which allowing the remote user to securely
connect to the organization’s private network.
TOE Product Type
The TOE product type is a VPN client. A VPN client provides protection of data in transit across a shared or public network. The TOE
implements IPsec which establishes a cryptographic tunnel to protect the transmission of data between IPsec peers. The VPN client is
intended to be located outside an organization’s private network, protecting data flows between a host and the VPN Gateway.
Use case 3 (Communication) as described in [PP_APP_V1.3] and use case 1 (TOE to VPN Gateway) as described in [MOD_VPNC_V2.2] both
apply to the TOE.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE requires the following hardware/software/firmware in the IT environment when the TOE is configured in its evaluated
configuration
Table 2. Required IT Environment Components
Component Usage/Purpose/Description
Certificate Authority The Certification Authority provides the TOE with valid
certificates. The CA also provides the TOE with a method to
check the certificate revocation status of the VPN Gateway.
Apple iPhone 11/XR running iOS 13.x Apple iOS provides an execution platform for the TOE to run.
ASA 5500-X series VPN Gateway The Cisco ASA 5500-X with software version 9.2.2 or later
functions as the head-end VPN Gateway. The Cisco AnyConnect
TOE communicates only with the Cisco ASA 5500-X Series
Gateway.
ASDM Management Platform The ASDM 7.7 or later operates from any of the following
operating systems:
■ Windows 7, 8, 10
■ Windows Server 2008, 2012, 2012 R2
■ Apple OS X 10.4 or later
■ Ubuntu Linux 14.04
■ Debian Linux 7
Note that that ASDM software is installed on the ASA appliance
and the management platform is used to connect to the ASA
and run the ASDM. The only software installed on the
management platform is a Cisco ASDM Launcher.
TOE Description
This section provides an overview of the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The Cisco AnyConnect TOE is a client application that provides remote
users a secure VPN tunnel to protect data in transit on both IPv4 and IPv6 networks. The TOE provides IPsec to authenticate and encrypt
network traffic travelling across an unprotected public network. By protecting the communication from unauthorized disclosure or
modification, remote users can securely connect to an organization’s network resources and applications.
TOE Evaluated Configuration
The following figure provides a visual depiction of the TOE and IT Environment. The TOE is a software app running on iOS 13. The TOE
boundary is denoted by the hash red line.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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Figure 1. TOE and Environment
Refer to the Common Criteria Administrator’s Guide for instructions on installing and configuring the TOE.
Tested Configuration
The Cisco AnyConnect v4.9 TOE was tested on the following mobile platforms in the IT Environment:
Table 3. Tested Mobile Platforms
Device Name Model iOS Version Processor
iPhone 11 A2111 13 A13 Bionic
iPhone XR A1984 13 A12 Bionic
Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is a software-only VPN client application. The underlying mobile platform on which the TOE resides is considered part of the IT
environment.
Logical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists of several security functionalities,
as identified below.
■ Cryptographic Support
■ User Data Protection
■ Identification and Authentication
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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■ Security Management
■ Privacy
■ Protection of the TSF
■ Trusted Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below.
Cryptographic Support
The TOE incorporates a cryptographic module, CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module version 7.0a to provide the cryptography in support of IPsec
with ESP symmetric cryptography for bulk AES encryption/decryption and SHA-2 algorithm for hashing. In addition the TOE provides the
cryptography to support Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the derivation function used in the IKEv2 and ESP protocols. The cryptographic
algorithm implementation has been validated for CAVP conformance. See Table 16 for certificate references.
The TOE platform provides asymmetric cryptography, which is used by the TOE for IKE peer authentication using digital signature and
hashing services. In addition the TOE platform provides a DRBG.
User Data Protection
The TOE platform ensures that residual information from previously sent network packets processed through the platform are protected
from being passed into subsequent network packets.
Identification and Authentication
The TOE and TOE platform perform device-level X.509 certificate-based authentication of the VPN Gateway during IKE v2 key exchange.
Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted VPN Gateway. The secure channel is established
only after each endpoint successfully authenticates each other.
Security Management
The TOE, TOE platform, and VPN Gateway provide the management functions to configure the security functionality provided by the TOE.
The TOE provides a Security Administrator role and only the Security Administrator can perform the above security management
functions.
Privacy
The TOE does not store or transmit Personally Identifiable Information (PII) over a network.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE performs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to verify correct operation of its CAVP tested algorithms. Upon execution, the
integrity of the TOEs software executables is also verified.
The TOE Platform provides for verification of TOE software updates prior to installation.
Trusted Channels
The TOE’s implementation of IPsec provides a trusted channel ensuring sensitive data is protected from unauthorized disclosure or
modification when transmitted from the host to a VPN gateway.
Excluded Functionality
The functionality listed below is not included in the evaluated configuration.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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Table 4. Excluded Functionality and Rationale
Function Excluded Rationale
Non-FIPS mode of operation This mode of operation includes non-FIPS allowed operations.
SSL Tunnel with DLTS tunneling options [MOD_VPNC_V2.2] permits only an IPsec VPN tunnel.
Conformance Claims
Common Criteria Conformance Claim
The TOE and ST are compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017. The TOE and ST are CC Part 2
extended and CC Part 3 conformant.
Protection Profile Conformance Claim
The TOE and ST are conformant with the following Protection Profiles:
Table 5. Protection Profile Conformance
Protection Profile Version Date
PP-Configuration for Application Software and Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Clients
1.1 5 January 2021
The PP-Configuration includes the following components:
• Base-PP: Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3
(PP_APP_V1.3)
1.3 1 March, 2019
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients,
Version 2.2 (MOD_VPNC_V2.2)
2.2 5 January 2021
This ST applies the following NIAP Technical Decisions:
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Table 6. NIAP Technical Decisions
Number Title PP Applicable Exclusion Rational
TD0587 X.509 SFR Applicability in App PP [PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0582 PP-Configuration for Application
Software and Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Clients now allowed
[PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0561 Signature verification update [PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0554 iOS/iPadOS/Android AppSW Virus Scan [PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0548 Integrity for installation tests in AppSW
PP 1.3
[PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0544 Alternative testing methods for
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
[PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0543 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 evaluation activity
update
[PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0540 Expanded AES Modes in FCS_COP [PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0519 Linux symbolic links and FMT_CFG_EXT.1 [PP_APP_V1.3] No Linux platform is not applicable to
this TOE
TD0515 Use Android APK manifest in test [PP_APP_V1.3] No Android platform is not applicable to
this TOE
TD0510 Obtaining random bytes for iOS/macOS [PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0498 Application Software PP Security
Objectives and Requirements Rationale
[PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0495 FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 Test Clarification [PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0473 Support for Client or Server TOEs in
FCS_HTTPS_EXT
[PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0465 Configuration Storage for .NET Apps [PP_APP_V1.3] No Windows platform is not applicable
to this TOE
TD0445 User Modifiable File Definition [PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0437 Supported Configuration Mechanism [PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0435 Alternative to SELinux for
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
[PP_APP_V1.3] No Linux platform is not applicable to
this TOE
TD0434 Windows Desktop Applications Test [PP_APP_V1.3] No Windows platform is not applicable
to this TOE
TD0427 Reliable Time Source [PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
TD0416 Correction to FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Test
Activity
[PP_APP_V1.3] Yes
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Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale
TOE Appropriateness
The TOE provides all of the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified in the U.S. Government Protection
Profiles listed in Table 5.
TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency
The Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target represent the Assumptions, Threats, and
Organization Security Policies specified in [PP_APP_V1.3] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.2] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts
covered in the Protection Profile Security Problem Definition are included in the Security Target Statement of Security Objectives
Consistency.
The Security Objectives included in the Security Target represent the Security Objectives specified in [PP_APP_V1.3] and
[MOD_VPNC_V2.2] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile’s Statement of Security
Objectives are included in the Security Target.
Statement of Security Requirements Consistency
The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security Functional Requirements specified in
[PP_APP_V1.3] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.2] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered the Protection Profile’s
Statement of Security Requirements are included in the Security Target. Additionally, the Security Assurance Requirements included in
the Security Target are identical to the Security Assurance Requirements included in the claimed Protection Profiles.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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Security Problem Definition
This section identifies the following:
■ Assumptions about the TOE’s operational environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development
of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
■ Threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment.
■ Organizational Security Policies imposed by an organization on the TOE to address its security needs.
The security problem definition below has been drawn verbatim from [PP_APP_V1.3] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.2].
Assumptions
Table 7. TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A. PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a
reliable time clock for its execution. This includes the underlying
platform and whatever runtime environment it provides to the
TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or
hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied
enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless,
willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software in
compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN
client's host is connected without passing through the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the
environment.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment
will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
Threats
Table 8. Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage
in communications with the application software or alter
communications between the application software and other
endpoints in order to compromise it.
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T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may
monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the
application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same
computing platform on which the application executes.
Attackers may provide maliciously formatted input to the
application in the form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS This PP-Module does not include requirements that can protect
against an insider threat. Authorized users are not considered
hostile or malicious and are trusted to follow appropriate guid-
ance. Only authorized personnel should have access to the sys-
tem or device that contains the IPsec VPN client. Therefore, the
primary threat agents are the unauthorized entities that try to
gain access to the protected network (in cases where tunnel
mode is used) or to plaintext data that traverses the public net-
work (regardless of whether transport mode or tunnel mode is
used).
The endpoint of the network communication can be both geo-
graphically and logically distant from the TOE, and can pass
through a variety of other systems. These intermediate systems
may be under the control of the adversary, and offer an oppor-
tunity for communications over the network to be compro-
mised.
Plaintext communication over the network may allow critical
data (such as passwords, configuration settings, and user data)
to be read and/or manipulated directly by intermediate sys-
tems, leading to a compromise of the TOE or to the secured en-
vironmental system(s) that the TOE is being used to facilitate
communications with. IPsec can be used to provide protection
for this communication; however, there are myriad options that
can be implemented for the protocol to be compliant to the
protocol specification listed in the RFC. Some of these options
can have negative impacts on the security of the connection. For
instance, using a weak encryption algorithm (even one that is al-
lowed by the RFC, such as DES) can allow an adversary to read
and even manipulate the data on the encrypted channel, thus
circumventing countermeasures in place to prevent such at-
tacks. Further, if the protocol is implemented with little-used or
non-standard options, it may be compliant with the protocol
specification but will not be able to interact with other, diverse
equipment that is typically found in large enterprises.
Even though the communication path is protected, there is a
possibility that the IPsec peer could be duped into thinking that
a malicious third-party user or system is the TOE. For instance, a
middleman could intercept a connection request to the TOE,
and respond to the request as if it were the TOE. In a similar
manner, the TOE could also be duped into thinking that it is es-
tablishing communications with a legitimate IPsec peer when in
fact it is not. An attacker could also mount a malicious man-in-
the-middle-type of attack, in which an intermediate system is
compromised, and the traffic is proxied, examined, and modi-
fied by this system. This attack can even be mounted via en-
crypted communication channels if appropriate countermeas-
ures are not applied. These attacks are, in part, enabled by a
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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malicious attacker capturing network traffic (for instance, an au-
thentication session) and “playing back” that traffic in order to
fool an endpoint into thinking it was communicating with a le-
gitimate remote entity.
T.TSF_CONFIGURATION Configuring VPN tunnels is a complex and time-consuming
process, and prone to errors if the interface for doing so is not
well-specified or well-behaved. The inability to configure certain
aspects of the interface may also lead to the mis-specification of
the desired communications policy or use of cryptography that
may be desired or required for a particular site. This may result
in unintended weak or plaintext communications while the user
thinks that their data are being protected. Other aspects of
configuring the TOE or using its security mechanisms (for
example, the update process) may also result in a reduction in
the trustworthiness of the VPN client.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE Since the most common attack vector used involves attacking
unpatched versions of software containing well-known flaws,
updating the VPN client is necessary to ensure that changes to
threat environment are addressed. Timely application of
patches ensures that the client is a “hard target”, thus increas-
ing the likelihood that product will be able to maintain and en-
force its security policy. However, the updates to be applied to
the product must be trustable in some manner; otherwise, an
attacker can write their own “update” that instead contains ma-
licious code of their choosing, such as a rootkit, bot, or other
malware. Once this “update” is installed, the attacker then has
control of the system and all of its data.
Methods of countering this threat typically involve hashes of the
updates, and potentially cryptographic operations (e.g., digital
signatures) on those hashes as well. However, the validity of
these methods introduces additional threats. For instance, a
weak hash function could result in the attacker being able to
modify the legitimate update in such a way that the hash re-
mained unchanged. For cryptographic signature schemes, there
are dependencies on
1) the strength of the cryptographic algorithm used to
provide the signature, and
2) the ability of the end user to verify the signature
(which typically involves checking a hierarchy of digital
signatures back to a root of trust (a certificate author-
ity)).
If a cryptographic signature scheme is weak, then it may be
compromised by an attacker and the end user will install a
malicious update, thinking that it is legitimate. Similarly, if the
root of trust can be compromised, then a strong digital
signature algorithm will not stop the malicious update from
being installed (the attacker will just create their own signature
on the update using the compromised root of trust, and the
malicious update will then be installed without detection).
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
18
T.USER_DATA_REUSE Data traversing the TOE could inadvertently be sent to a
different user; since these data may be sensitive, this may cause
a compromise that is unacceptable. The specific threat that
must be addressed concerns user data that is retained by the
TOE in the course of processing network traffic that could be
inadvertently re-used in sending network traffic to a user other
than that intended by the sender of the original network traffic.
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE generally build up from a
primitive set of mechanisms (e.g., memory management,
privileged modes of process execution) to more complex sets of
mechanisms. Failure of the primitive mechanisms could lead to
a compromise in more complex mechanisms, resulting in a
compromise of the TSF.
Organizational Security Policies
There are no organizational security policies defined in [PP_APP_V1.3] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.2].
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security objectives identify the responsibilities of the
TOE and the TOE’s IT environment in meeting the security needs.
Security Objectives for the TOE
The following table identifies the Security Objectives for the TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter identified
threats and/or comply with any security policies. The security objectives below have been drawn verbatim from [PP_APP_V1.3] and
[MOD_VPNC_V2.2].
Table 9. Security Objectives for the TOE
Environment Security Objective TOE Security Objective Definition
O.INTEGRITY Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and
update packages, and also leverage execution environment-
based mitigations. Software is seldom if ever shipped without
errors. The ability to deploy patches and updates to fielded
software with integrity is critical to enterprise network security.
Processor manufacturers, compiler developers, execution
environment vendors, and operating system vendors have
developed execution environment-based mitigations that
increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task
of compromising systems. Application software can often take
advantage of these mechanisms by using APIs provided by the
runtime environment or by enabling the mechanism through
compiler or linker options.
O.QUALITY To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs leverage
services and APIs provided by the runtime environment rather
than implementing their own versions of these services and
APIs. This is especially important for cryptographic services and
other complex operations such as file and media parsing.
Leveraging this platform behavior relies upon using only
documented and supported APIs.
O.MANAGEMENT To facilitate management by users and the enterprise,
conformant TOEs provide consistent and supported interfaces
for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This
includes the deployment of applications and application
updates through the use of platform-supported deployment
mechanisms and formats, as well as providing mechanisms for
configuration. This also includes providing control to the user
regarding disclosure of any PII.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the
event of loss of physical control of the storage medium,
conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest protection. This involves
encrypting data and keys stored by the TOE in order to prevent
unauthorized access to this data. This also includes unnecessary
network communications whose consequence may be the loss
of data.
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O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet
modification) network attack threats, conformant TOEs will use
a trusted channel for sensitive data. Sensitive data includes
cryptographic keys, passwords, and any other data specific to
the application that should not be exposed outside of the
application.
O.AUTHENTICATION To address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of
information in transit, a compliant TOE’s authentication ability
(IPsec) will allow the TSF to establish VPN connectivity with a
remote VPN gateway or peer and ensure that any such
connection attempt is both authenticated and authorized.
O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS To address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of
information in transit, a compliant TOE will implement
cryptographic capabilities. These capabilities are intended to
maintain confidentiality and allow for detection and
modification of data that is transmitted outside of the TOE.
O.KNOWN_STATE The TOE will provide sufficient measures to ensure it is
operating in a known state. At minimum this includes
management functionality to allow the security functionality to
be configured and self-test functionality that allows it to assert
its own integrity. It may also include auditing functionality that
can be used to determine the operational behavior of the TOE.
O.NONDISCLOSURE To address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of
information at rest, a compliant TOE will ensure that non-
persistent data is purged when no longer needed. The TSF may
also implement measures to protect against the disclosure of
stored cryptographic keys and data through implementation of
protected storage and secure erasure methods. The TOE may
optionally also enforce split-tunneling prevention to ensure that
data in transit cannot be disclosed inadvertently outside of the
IPsec tunnel.
Security Objectives for the Environment
The following table identifies the Security Objectives for the Environment. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter
identified threats and/or comply with any security policies. The security objectives below have been drawn verbatim from [PP_APP_V1.3]
and [MOD_VPNC_V2.2].
Table 10. Security Objectives for the Environment
Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its
execution. This includes the underlying operating system and
any discrete execution environment provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or
hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied
enterprise security policy.
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OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless,
willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software
within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN
client's host is connected without passing through the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the
environment.
OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment
will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
Security Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security Functional Requirements in this section are drawn
from [CC_PART2], [PP_APP_V1.3], [MOD_VPNC_V2.2] and NIAP Technical Decisions.
Conventions
[CC_PART1] defines operations on Security Functional Requirements. This document uses the following conventions to identify the
operations permitted by [PP_APP_V1.3], [MOD_VPNC_V2.2] and NIAP Technical Decisions.
Table 11. Security Requirement Conventions
Convention Indication
Assignment Indicated with italicized text
Refinement Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs
Selection Indicated with underlined text
Assignment within a Selection Indicated with italicized and underlined text
Iteration indicated by adding a string starting with ‘/’ (e.g.
‘FCS_COP.1/Hash’)
Where operations were completed in the [PP_APP_V1.3] or [MOD_VPNC_V2.2], the formatting used in the PP has been retained.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are identified in the following table are described in more detail in the following subsections.
Table 12. Security Functional Requirements
Class Name Component Identification Component Name Drawn From
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
Services
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FCS_CKM.1.1/VPN FCS_CKM.1/VPN Cryptographic
Key Generation (IKE)
[MOD_VPNC_V2.2]
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FCS_CKM.1.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key
Generation
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FCS_CKM.2.1 Cryptographic Key Establishment [PP_APP_V1.3]
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation –
Encryption/Decryption
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation –
Hashing
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation –
Signing
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation –
Keyed–Hash Message
Authentication
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage [MOD_VPNC_V2.2]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction [MOD_VPNC_V2.2]
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services [PP_APP_V1.3]
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials [PP_APP_V1.3]
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec [MOD_VPNC_V2.2]
FDP: User Data
Protection
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources [PP_APP_V1.3]
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications [PP_APP_V1.3]
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive
Application Data
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information
Protection
[MOD_VPNC_V2.2]
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation [PP_APP_V1.3]
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication [PP_APP_V1.3]
FMT: Security
management
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration
Mechanism
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration [PP_APP_V1.3]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FMT_SMF.1/VPN Specification of Management
Functions (VPN)
[MOD_VPNC_V2.2]
FPR: Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of
Personally Identifiable
Information
[PP_APP_V1.3]
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Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1(1) The application shall [implement asymmetric key generation].
FCS_CKM.1.1/VPN Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE)
The TSF shall [invoke platform-provided functionality] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for IKE peer authentication in
accordance with: [
■ FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes;
]
and specified cryptographic key sizes [equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits] that meet the following:
[assignment: list of standards].
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1(1) The application shall [implement functionality] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm
■ ECC schemes using “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other curves] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4; and,
■ [no other key generation methods].
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM_2.1 The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key establishment method:
■ [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following: [NIST Special Publication 800-56A,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”]; and,
FPT: Protection of the
TSF
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and
APIs
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities [PP_APP_V1.3]
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and
Update
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and
Update
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries [PP_APP_V1.3]
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and
Versions
[PP_APP_V1.3]
FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN TSF Self-Test (VPN Client) [MOD_VPNC_V2.2]
FTP: Trusted
path/channels
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit [MOD_VPNC_V2.2]
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■ [No other schemes].
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1(1) The application shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
■ AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode;
■ AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) mode; and
■ [No other AES modes]
and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1(2) The application shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[SHA-256, SHA-384]
and message digest sizes
[256, 384]
bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1.1(3) The application shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Section 4,
].
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1(4) The application shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
• HMAC-SHA-256
and [
• SHA-384
]
with key sizes [256, 384 used in HMAC] and message digest sizes 256 and [384] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1 The Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication Code and FIPS Pub 180-4 Secure Hash Standard.
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1 The [TOE Platform] shall store persistent secrets and private keys when not in use in platform-provided key storage.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The [TOE] shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs when no longer required.
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FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality] for its cryptographic operations.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store [X.509 Certificates]] to non-
volatile memory.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement [tunnel mode].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is otherwise unmatched, and discards
it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using the cryptographic algorithms [AES-GCM-
128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106, [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (both specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [
• IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 7296 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23), RFC 8784, RFC 8247, and
[RFC 4868 for hash functions]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv2] protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms [AES-CBC-128,
AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 6379 and [AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by [VPN Gateway] based on [length of time]]. If length
of time is used, it must include at least one option that is 24 hours or less for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours or less for Phase 2 SAs.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH groups [19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP),
and [no other DH groups]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman key exchange (“x” in g^x mod p) using the
random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, and having a length of at least [256 (for DH Group 19), 384 (for DH Group 20)] bits.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall generate nonces used in IKE exchanges in a manner such that the probability that a specific nonce value
will be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2^[256].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer authentication using a [RSA] that use X.509v3 certificates
that conform to RFC 4945 and [no other method].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 The TSF shall not establish an SA if the [IP address, Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)] and [no other reference
identifier type] contained in a certificate does not match the expected value(s) for the entity attempting to establish a connection.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 The TSF shall not establish an SA if the presented identifier does not match the configured reference identifier of the
peer.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 The [VPN Gateway] shall be able to ensure by default that the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the
number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the [IKEv2 IKE_SA] connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric
algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the [IKEv2 CHILD_SA] connection.
Class: User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict its access to [network connectivity].
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FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2 The application shall restrict its access to [no sensitive information repositories].
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict network communication to [user-initiated communication for [IKEv2/IPsec tunnel
establishment]].
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1 The application shall [protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1] in non-volatile memory.
FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP.2.1 The [TOE platform] shall enforce that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the
[allocation of the resource to] all objects.
Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoked platform-provided functionality] to validate certificates in accordance with the following
rules:
■ RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
■ The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate
■ The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set
to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met
■ The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field
■ The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [OCSP as specified in RFC 6960].
■ The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-
kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
in the EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in
the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA
flag is set to TRUE.
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FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec and [no other
protocols].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the application shall [not
accept the certificate].
Class: Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and setting
configuration options].
Application Note: This requirement has applied NIAP TD-0437
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1 The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with default credentials
or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2 The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application's binaries and data
files from modification by normal unprivileged user.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [no management functions].
FMT_SMF.1/VPN Specification of Management Functions (VPN)
FMT_SMF.1.1/VPN The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
■ Specify VPN gateways to use for connections,
■ Specify client credentials to be used for connections,
■ Configure the reference identifier of the peer
]
Class: Privacy (FPR)
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [not transmit PII over a network].
Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1 The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
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FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2 The application shall [not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4 The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless explicitly directed
by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5 The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN TSF Self-Test (VPN Client)
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1/VPN The [TOE] shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of
the TSF.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.2/VPN The [TOE platform] shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code when it is
loaded for execution through the use of the [cryptographic signature verification service provided by the TOE Platform].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4 The application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can cryptographically verify them
prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5 The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 The application shall be distributed using the format of the platform-supported package manager.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the application, with the
exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3 The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can cryptographically verify them
prior to installation.
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1 The application shall be packaged with only [OpenSSL, Boost, libxml, libcurl].
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1 The application shall be versioned with [[sequence-based versioning control]].
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Class: Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 The application shall [not encrypt any [sensitive data]] between itself and another trusted IT product.
TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale
[PP_APP_V1.3] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.2] contain all the requirements claimed in this Security Target. As such the dependencies are not
applicable since the PPs themselves have been approved.
Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from [PP_APP_V1.3] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.2] which are derived from
[CC_PART3]. The assurance requirements are summarized in the table below.
Table 13. Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Components Description
Security Target (ASE) Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life Cycle Support (ALC) Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent testing – conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The Security Functional Requirements included in the ST represent all mandatory, optional, and selection-based SFRs specified in
[PP_APP_V1.3] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.2] against which exact compliance is claimed.
All dependency rationale in the ST are considered to be identical to those that are defined in the claimed PP.
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Assurance Measures
The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. The table below identifies the Assurance Measures applied by Cisco to satisfy the
assurance requirements.
Table 14. Assurance Measures
Assurance Component Rationale
ASE_INT.1
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_OBJ.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_REQ.1
ASE_TSS.1
Cisco provided this Security Target document.
ADV_FSP.1 No additional “functional specification” documentation was
provided by Cisco to satisfy the Evaluation Activities.
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
Cisco will provide the guidance documents with the ST.
ALC_CMC.1
ALC_CMS.1
Cisco will identify the TOE such that it can be distinguished from
other products or versions from the Cisco and can be easily
specified when being procured by an end user.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Cisco will provide a Security Vulnerability Policy.
ATE_IND.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for Vulnerability Analysis.
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TOE Summary Specification
The table below identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met by the TOE.
Table 15. TSS Rationale
TOE SFR Rationale
FCS_CKM.1/VPN The TOE Platform provides a specified key generation algorithm to generate asymmetric cryp-
tographic keys for IKE authentication. The key sizes are 2048-bit for RSA scheme.
The key generation function is invoked by the TOE platform Administrator using a MDM
product.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1(1)
Key generation for asymmetric keys used by IPsec for key establishment is provided by the TOE
and is implemented using ECDSA with NIST curve sizes P-256 and P-384 according to FIPS PUB
186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4.
FCS_CKM.2 To support IPsec the TOE implements the following algorithms to perform key establishment:
■ ECC key establishment schemes that meet SP800-56A.
FCS_COP.1(1) The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES supporting the
following modes:
■ CBC mode as specified in NIST SP 800-38A.
■ GCM mode as specified in NIST SP 800-38D.
The TOE uses AES in IPsec using the following modes and key sizes: CBC mode with key size of
128 and 256 bits. GCM mode with key sizes of 128 and 256 bits.
FCS_COP.1(2) The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services in support of HMAC in IKEv2 and IPsec using
SHA-256 and SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-3 “Secure Hash Standard.”
FCS_COP.1(3) The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with
key size of 2048 as specified in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard.”
FCS_COP.1(4) The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-SHA-256 (key
size – 256 bits, block size 512 bits) and HMAC-SHA-384 (key size – 384 bits, block size 1024
bits).
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE invokes /dev/random on the platform when needed to generate a cryptographic key.
This applies to the following SFRs:
FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 – IPsec Protocol
FCS_STO_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE leverages the platform to store X.509v3 certificates used by the TOE
for IKE peer authentication. Certificates are stored in the iOS Keychain.
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 The TOE platform stores RSA private keys used by the TOE for IKE peer authentication. Private
Keys are stored in the iOS Keychain.
The TOE does not use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 The TOE’s implementation of the IPsec standard (in accordance with RFC 4301) uses the Encap-
sulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol to provide authentication, encryption and anti-replay
services. By default ESP operates in tunnel mode. No configuration is required by the user or
administrator for the TOE to operate in tunnel mode.
Remote access policies managed by the administrator of the ASA VPN Gateway provide an in-
terface to create ACLs defining network segments that require IPsec protection. The default be-
havior of the remote access policy is for the TOE to protect all traffic with IPsec.
If an organization explicitly permits use of split-tunneling, a remote access policy on the ASA
VPN Gateway allows the administrator to define IPsec protection for the organization’s net-
work(s) but bypass protection for other traffic.
The Cisco AnyConnect TOE is distributed as a separate software package to the platform OS.
The AnyConnect TOE invokes APIs via the Apple Network Extension framework and informs the
OS what network routes to include or exclude. The OS calls AnyConnect with packets that are
intended to be tunneled, which AnyConnect encrypts and sends to the VPN Gateway via the
platform’s network interface. Packets received from the Gateway are decrypted and sent to
the OS stack via APIs.
The Security Policy Database (SPD) is implemented by the underlying platform and the TOE in-
teracts with the SPD by using the process described above, informing the OS what network
routes to include or exclude. Network(s) not subjected to the remote access policy, but reach-
able from the platform, such as Internet traffic, travels without being protected with IPsec by
the TOE. SPD discard rules are performed exclusively by the TOE platform.
The TOE implements IKEv2 and does not support IKEv1.
IPsec Internet Key Exchange is the negotiation protocol that lets the TOE and a VPN Gateway
agree on how to build an IPsec Security Association (SA). IKE separates negotiation into two
phases: phase 1 and phase 2.
During IKE Phase 1, the TOE authenticates the remote VPN Gateway using device-level authen-
tication with RSA X.509v3 certificates provided by the TOE platform.
The TOE compares its reference identifier to the identifier presented by the VPN Gateway peer.
The TOE supports reference identifiers as configured by the Administrator to be either FQDN or
IP address and compares it to the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) or the Common Name (CN)
fields in the certificate of the peer. The order of comparison is SAN followed by CN. If the TOE
successfully matches the reference identifier to the presented identifier, IKE Phase 1 authenti-
cation will succeed. Otherwise it will fail if it does not match.
Phase 1 creates the first tunnel, which protects later IKE negotiation messages. The key negoti-
ated in phase 1 enables IKE to communicate securely in phase 2. The TOE supports only IKEv2
session establishment. As part of this support, the TOE by default does not support aggressive
mode used in IKEv1 exchanges.
The TOE supports Diffie-Hellman Group 19 (256-bit Random ECP) and 20 (384-bit Random ECP)
in support of IKE Key Establishment negotiated in phase 1. These keys are generated using the
DRBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 having 256 bits of entropy. The administrator is instructed in
the CC Configuration Guide to select a supported DH group using one of the following corre-
sponding key sizes (in bits): 256 (for DH Group 19), and 384 (for DH Group 20) bits.
For each DH Group, the TOE generates the secret value 'x' used in the IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman key
exchange ('x' in gx mod p) using its DH private key, the IPsec peer’s public key and a nonce.
When a random number is needed for a nonce, the probability that a specific nonce value will
be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2256. The nonce is likewise gener-
ated using the DRBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
During Phase 2, IKE negotiates the IPsec SA and includes:
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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TOE SFR Rationale
• The negotiation of mutually acceptable IPsec SA parameters;
• The Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) is used for the construction of keying material
for cryptographic algorithms used in the SA.
• The establishment of IPsec Security Associations to protect packet flows using Encap-
sulating Security Payload (ESP).
The resulting potential strength of the symmetric key will be 128 or 256 bits of security de-
pending on the algorithms negotiated between the two IPsec peers. The VPN Gateway ensures
by default the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key)
negotiated to protect the IKEv2 IKE_SA connection is greater than or equal to the strength of
the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the
IKEv2 CHILD_SA connection.
After IKE phase 2 completes, the IPsec SA is established, providing a secure tunnel to a remote
VPN Gateway. The TOE uses active SA settings or creates new SAs for initial connections with
the ASA VPN Gateway. The TOE supports administratively configured lifetimes for both Phase
1 SAs and Phase 2 SAs. The default time value for Phase 1 SAs is 24 hours. The value for Phase 2
SAs is configurable to 8 hours. Both values are configurable using management functions
provided by the VPN Gateway.
All ESP processing to authenticate, encrypt, and tunnel the traffic is performed by the TOE. The
TOE performs IKEv2 payload and bulk IPsec encryption using AES-GCM-128, AES_GCM-256,
AES-CBC-128, or AES-CBC-256 algorithms. The VPN Gateway allows the administrator to con-
figure AES-GCM-128, AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, and AES-CBC-256 encryption algorithms.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
34
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 The TOE ensures volatile memory areas containing the following keys are zeroized:
Key, Secret, or CSP Purpose Zeroization Method
SK_ei IKE SA Initiator Encryption
Key
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use by
the IPsec VPN trusted
channel.
SK_er IKE SA Responder Encryption
Key
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use by
the IPsec VPN trusted
channel.
SK_ai IKE SA Initiator Integrity Key Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use by
the IPsec VPN trusted
channel.
SK_ar IKE SA Responder Integrity
Key
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use by
the IPsec VPN trusted
channel.
Diffie-Hellman Shared Se-
cret
IKE v2 SA setup Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use by
the IPsec VPN trusted
channel.
SK_d IKEv2 SA key from which
child IPsec keys are derived.
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use by
the IPsec VPN trusted
channel.
Initiator encryption and in-
tegrity key
IPsec child SA key that en-
crypts and authenticates
outgoing ESP traffic.
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use by
the IPsec VPN trusted
channel.
Responder encryption and
integrity key
IPsec child SA key that de-
crypts and authenticates in-
coming ESP traffic.
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use by
the IPsec VPN trusted
channel.
The TOE platform zeroizes private keys it manipulates and stores on the TOE platform:
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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TOE SFR Rationale
Key, Secret, or CSP Purpose Zeroization Method
Asymmetric RSA Private
Key stored on the mobile
device platform
RSA digital signature gener-
ation
Performed exclusively by
the TOE Platform.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE restricts access to network connectivity resources.
The TOE Platform determines the Data Protection Class used to store AnyConnect data files.
For each data file stored locally, the iOS platform assigns the "Protected Until First User
Authentication Data Protection Class."
FDP_NET_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE limits network communication to user initiated communication for
IKEv2/IPsec tunnel establishment
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Sensitive data in the TOE is defined as the private key used for X.509 certificate generation and
peer authentication, which is protected in accordance with FCS_STO.EXT.1
FDP_RIP.2 The TOE platform transmits packets over Wi-Fi or cellular radio and therefore is responsible for
clearing residual information.
FIA_X509_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE invokes functionality provided by the platform to perform certifi-
cate path validation on the certificate chain presented by ASA VPN Gateway. The certificate
path validation begins with the identity certificate presented by ASA VPN Gateway and pro-
ceeds through intermediate CA certificate(s) up to a trusted root certificate issued by a trusted
certificate authority (CA). The following steps are performed for each certificate in the path:
• The certificate must not be expired.
• The certificate must not be revoked.
• The issuer name is checked to ensure it matches the subject name of the previous
certificate in the chain.
• All CA certificates must have the basicConstraints extension present and be of type
CA=TRUE.
• The extendedKeyUsage field must be valid based on the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification
shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication pur-
pose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose
(id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the
Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the extend-
edKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing pur-
pose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority
(RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extend-
edKeyUsage field
These checks ensure certificate validation results in a trusted root certificate. At any point if a
certificate cannot be successfully validated, the CC Configuration Guide instructs the
administrator to configure the TOE to not allow the user an option for continuing the
connection. In all cases, if a certificate or certificate path cannot be validated, the TOE will not
establish an IPsec connection to an untrusted ASA VPN Gateway.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
36
TOE SFR Rationale
FIA_X509_EXT.2 During TOE installation the user imports a new certificate to the certificate store. The user can
also select the certificate used by tapping 'Import' and then 'Device Credential Storage'.
The Cisco AnyConnect TOE compares the FQDN of the server it is establishing connectivity
with, against the Subject Alternate Name-dnsName attributes in the certificate. If AnyConnect
determines there is a mismatch, it will not establish the IPsec trusted channel.
At any point if a certificate cannot be successfully validated, the CC Configuration Guide
instructs the administrator to configure the TOE to not allow the user an option for continuing
the connection.
In all cases, if a certificate or certificate path cannot be validated, the TOE will not establish an
IPsec connection to an untrusted VPN Gateway.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 All IPsec configuration for the Cisco AnyConnect TOE is stored remotely on the Cisco ASA VPN
Gateway.
As described in guidance the user controls the following settings which must enabled:
"Block Untrusted Servers"
"Set VPN FIPS Mode"
"Strict Certificate Trust Mode"
"Check Certificate Revocation"
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE requires client credentials to be used for connection but is not
installed with any preset default credentials. In context of the AnyConnect TOE, client
credentials are a X.509 certificate which is used to authenticate the ASA VPN Gateway during
establishment of an IPsec session.
Users can only access files which are associated to the installation that user performed.
FMT_SMF.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE does not perform any security management functions from
[PP_APP_V1.3].
FMT_SMF.1/VPN The Cisco AnyConnect TOE is capable of the following security management functions from
[MOD_VPNC_V2.2]:
■ Specify VPN gateways to use for connections
■ Specify client credentials to be used for connections
■ Configuring the reference identifier of the peer
In context of the AnyConnect TOE, client credentials are a X.509 certificate which is used to
authenticate the ASA VPN Gateway during establishment of an IPsec session.
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE does not transmit PII.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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TOE SFR Rationale
FPT_API_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE uses the following platform APIs
■ LocalAuthentication
■ UIKit
■ SystemConfiguration
■ Security
■ NetworkExtension
■ CoreFoundation
■ CFNetwork
■ UserNotifications
■ Foundation
■ libresolv
■ libxml2
■ libz
■ libobjc
■ libc++
■ libSystem
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE enables ASLR and stack protection by fPIE -pie and the -fstack-
protector-all flags.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.2
ALC_TSU_EXT.1
The TOE has specific versions that can be queried by a user. A TOE update is not a patch ap-
plied to the existing TOE, it is a new version of the TOE. When TOE updates are made available
by Cisco, an administrator can obtain and install the update. Upon installation of a TOE up-
date, a digital signature verification check will automatically be performed to ensure it has not
been modified since distribution. The authorized source for the digitally signed updates is
"Cisco Systems, Inc.".
All Cisco communications relating to security issues are handled by the Cisco Product Security
Incident Response Team (PSIRT). Cisco aims to provide fixes in 30 days but depending on the
timing it may be greater than 30 days though not more than 60 days for most security issues.
Fixes may be delayed longer for low-risk security issues. Updates are then made available at
Cisco Software Central available at: https://software.cisco.com.
Customers can subscribe to the Cisco Notification Service allows users to subscribe and receive
important information regarding product updates. Full information is provide in the Cisco
Security Vulnerability Policy available at:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
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TOE SFR Rationale
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE is packaged with the following third-party libraries:
■ OpenSSL
■ Boost
■ libxml
■ libcurl
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE uses a sequence-based versioning control system. The application
uses the major.minor.build format for versioning control. For example: 4.9.05043
■ Major (4 in the example above) designates a release where significant new features
are added.
■ Minor (9 in the example above) designates a release where minor new features are
added.
■ Build (05043 in the example above) designates a software build number.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
39
TOE SFR Rationale
FPT_TST_EXT.1 As a software product incorporating a cryptographic module, the TOE runs a suite of self-tests
during start-up to verify its correct operation.
These tests include:
■ AES Known Answer Test – For the encrypt test, a known key is used to encrypt a
known plain text value resulting in an encrypted value. This encrypted value is com-
pared to a known encrypted value to ensure that the encrypt operation is working
correctly. The decrypt test is just the opposite. In this test a known key is used to de-
crypt a known encrypted value. The resulting plaintext value is compared to a known
plaintext value to ensure that the decrypt operation is working correctly.
■ RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification) – This test takes a
known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the public key to encrypt
the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted value to verify that encrypt
operation is working properly. The encrypted data is then decrypted using the private
key. This value is compared to the original plaintext value to ensure the decrypt oper-
ation is working properly.
■ ECDSA Signature Test – This test takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key
pair and used the public key to encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known
encrypted value to verify that encrypt operation is working properly. The encrypted
data is then decrypted using the private key. This value is compared to the original
plaintext value to ensure the decrypt operation is working properly.
■ HMAC Known Answer Test– For each of the hash values (256 and 384), the HMAC im-
plementation is fed known plaintext data and a known key. These values are used to
generate a MAC. This MAC is compared to a known MAC to verify that the HMAC and
hash operations are operating correctly.
■ SHA Known Answer Test – For each of the values (256 and 384), the SHA implemen-
tation is fed known data and key. These values are used to generate a hash. This
hash is compared to a known value to verify they match and the hash operations are
operating correctly.
■ Software Integrity Test - The Software Integrity Test is run automatically whenever
the module is loaded and confirms the image has maintained its integrity.
If any self-test fails subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls is prevented. If all
components of the power-up self-test are successful then the product is in FIPS mode.
Integrity verification is performed each time the AnyConnect app is loaded and it will wait for
the integrity verification to complete. Cryptographic services provided by the TOE platform are
invoked to verify the digital signature of the TOE’s executable files. If the integrity verification
fails to successfully complete, the GUI will not load, rendering the app unusable. If the
integrity verification is successful, the app GUI will load and operate normally. These tests are
sufficient to verify that the TOE software is operating correctly as well as the cryptographic
operations are all performing as expected.
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE itself is the application, and does not maintain any sensitive data of
its own. Therefore, there is no need to protect (through FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1) VPN-client-specific
data.
CAVP Certificates
The table below lists the CAVP certificates for the TOE and mobile device platform.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
40
Table 16. CAVP Certificates
SFR Algorithm Certificate Number
FCS_CKM.1.1(1) ECDSA KeyGen and KeyVer A877 (Cisco)
FCS_CKM.2.1 ECC Key Establishment(KAS-ECC
Component)
A877 (Cisco)
FCS_COP.1(1) AES-CBC Encrypt/Decrypt
AES-GCM Encrypt/Decrypt
A877 (Cisco)
FCS_COP.1(2) SHS A877 (Cisco)
FCS_COP.1(3) RSA SigGen and SigVer A877 (Cisco)
FCS_COP.1(4) HMAC A877 (Cisco)
References
The documentation listed below was used to prepare this ST
Table 17. References
Identifier Description
[CC_PART1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general
model, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
[CC_PART2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional
components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
[CC_PART3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance
components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation Methodology,
dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
[PP_APP_V1.3] Protection Profile for Application Software Version 1.3, March 1st, 2019
[MOD_VPNC_V2.2] PP-Module for VPN Client Version 2.2, [5 January 2021]
[SD] Supporting Document – PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Client, Version 2.2, [5
January 2021]
Acronyms and Terms
The following acronyms and terms are common and may be used in this Security Target.
Table 18. Acronyms and Terms
Acronym/Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
41
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CM Configuration Management
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC-DH Elliptic Curve-Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IT Information Technology
NGE Next Generation Encryption
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PRF Pseudo-Random Functions
RFC Request For Comment
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SPD Security Policy Database
ST Security Target
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TIMA TrustZone Integrity Measurement Architecture
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP TOE Security Policy
UDP User datagram protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client v4.9 for iOS 13 Security Target
42
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